Herein are Explained and Stated Various Terms and Things Belonging to the Subject of the Ensuing Discourse.

SECTION 1.

CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE WILL.

IT may possibly be thought, that there is no great need of going about to define or describe the will; this word being, generally as well understood as any other words me can use to explain it: and so, perhaps, it would be, had not philosophers, metaphysicians, and polemic divines brought the matter into obscurity by the things they have said of it. But since it is so, I think it may be of some use, and will tend to the greater clearness in the following, discourse, to say a few things concerning it.

And therefore I observe, that the will (without any metaphysical refining,) is plainly, that by which the mind chooses any thing. The faculty of the will is that faculty or power, or principle of minds, by which it is capable of choosing: an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice.

If any think it is a more perfect definition of the will to say, that, it is that by which the soul either chooses or refuses, I am content with it; though I think that it is to say, It is that by which the soul chooses: for in every act of will whatsoever, the mind chooses one thing rather than another; it chooses something rather than the contrary, or rather than the want or nonexistence of that thing. So, in every act of refusal, the mind chooses the absence of the thing refused; the positive and the negative are set before the mind for its choice, and it chooses the negative; and the mind’s making its choice in that case is properly the act of the will; the will’s determining between the two is a voluntary determining, but that is the same thing as making a choice. So that whatever names we call the act of the will by, choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining, or being averse, a being pleased or displeased with; all may be reduced to this of choosing. For the soul to act voluntarily, is evermore to act electively.

Mr. Locke says, “The will signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose;” and in the foregoing page says, “The word preferring seems best to express the act of volition,” but adds, that “it does it not precisely; for (says he) though a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it?” But the instance he mentions does not prove that there is any thing else in willing but merely preferring; for it should be considered what is the next and immediate object of the will, with respect to a man’s walking, or any other external action; which is, not being removed from one place to another, on the earth or through the air — these are remoter objects of preference — but such or such an immediate exertion of himself.

The thing nextly chosen or preferred when a man wills to walk, is, not his being removed to such a place where he would he, but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, etc., in order to it. And his willing such an alteration in his body in the present moment, is nothing else but his choosing or preferring such an alteration in his body at such a moment, or his liking it better than the forbearance of it. And God has so made and established the human nature, the soul being united to a body in proper state, that the soul preferring or choosing such an immediate exertion or alteration of the body, such an alteration instantaneously follows. There is nothing else in the actions of my mind, that I am conscious of while I walk, but only my preferring or choosing, through successive moments, that there should be such alterations of my external sensations and motions, together with a concurring habitual expectation that it will be so; having ever found by experience, that on such an immediate preference, such sensations and motions do actually, instantaneously, and constantly arise.

But it is not so in the case of flying; though a man may be said remotely to choose or prefer flying, yet he does not choose or prefer, incline to, or desire, under circumstances in view, any immediate exertion of the members of his body in order to it, because he has no expectation that he should obtain the desired end by any such exertion; and he does not prefer or incline to any bodily exertion or effort under this apprehended circumstance, of its being wholly in vain. So that if we carefully distinguish the proper objects of the several acts of the will, it will not appear, by this and such like instances, that there is any difference between volition and preference; or that a man’s choosing, liking best, or being best pleased faith a thing, are not the same with his willing that thing; as they seem to be according to those general and more natural motions of men, according to which language is formed. Thus, an act of the will is commonly expressed by its pleasing a man to do thus or thus; and a man doing as he wills, and doing as he pleases, are the same thing in common speech.

Mr. Locke says, “The will is perfectly distinguished from desire, which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our wills set us upon. A man (says he,) whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain the will and desire run counter.” I do not suppose that will and desire are words of precisely the same signification: will seems to be a word of a more general significations, extending to things present and absent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my present situation and posture, suppose sitting still, or having, any eyes open, and so may will it. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A man never, in any instance, wills any thing contrary to his desires, or desires any tiling contrary to his will. The aforementioned instance, which Mr. Locke produces, does not prove that he ever does. He may, on some consideration or other, will to utter speeches which have a tendency to persuade another, and still may desire that they may not persuade him; but yet his will and desire do not run counter at all; the thing which he wills, the very same he desires; and he does not will a thing, and desire the contrary, in any particular. In this instance, it is not carefully observed what is the thing willed, and what is the thin, desired: if it were, it would be found that will and desire do not clash in the least. The thing willed on some consideration, is to utter such words; and certainly, the saline consideration so influences him, that he does not desire the contrary; all things considered, he chooses to utter such words, and does not desire not to utter then. And so as to the thing which Mr. Locke speaks of as desired, viz. that the words, though they tend to persuade, should not be effectual to that end; his will is not contrary to this; he does not will that they should be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he desires.

In order to prove that the will and desire may run counter, it should be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the same thing, or with respect to the very same object of will or desire: but here the objects are two; and in each, taken by themselves, the will and desire agree.

And it is no wonder that they should not agree in different things, however little distinguished they are in their nature. The will may not agree with the will, nor desire agree with desire, in different things. As in this very instance which Mr. Locke mentions, a person may, on some consideration, desire to use persuasions, and at the same time may desire they may not prevail; but yet nobody will say, that desire runs counter to desire, or that this proves that desire is perfectly a distinct thing from desire. The like might be observed of the other instance Mr. Locke produces, of a man’s desiring to be eased of pain, etc.

But not to dwell any longer on this, whether desire and will, and whether preference and volition, be precisely the same things or no; yet, I trust it will be allowed by all, that in every act of will there is an act of choice; that in every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby the soul, at that instant, is out of A state of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct object of the volition. So that in every act, or going forth of the will, there is some preponderation of the mind or inclination one way rather than another; and the soul had rather have or do one thing than another, or than not to have or do that thing; and that there, where there is absolutely no preferring or choosing, but a perfect continuing equilibrium, there is no volition.

SECTION CONCERNING THE DETERMINATION OF THE WILL.

By determining the will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended, causing that the act of the will or choice should be thus, and not otherwise: and the will is said to be determined, when, in consequence of some action or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon, a particular object. As, when we speak of the determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be such a way, or in such a direction, rather than another.

To talk of the determination of the will, supposes an effect which must have a cause. If the will be determined, there is a determiner. This must be supposed to be intended even by them that say the will determines itself. If it be so, the will is both determiner and determined; it is a cause that acts and produces effects upon itself, and is the object of its own influence and action.

With respect to that grand inquiry, What determines the wills it would be very tedious and unnecessary at present to enumerate and examine all the various opinions which have been advanced concerning this matter; nor is it needful that I should enter into a particular disquisition of all points debated in disputes on that question, Whether the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. It is sufficient to my present purpose to say, It is that motive which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will: but it may be necessary that I should a little explain my meaning in this.

By motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are, as it were, one complex motive. And when I speak of the strongest motive, I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce to a particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together.

Whatever is a motive, in this sense, must be something that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act any thing, any further than it is perceived, or in some way or other in the mind’s view; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind’s view, cannot affect the mind at all. It is most evident, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or takes any hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of.

And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every thing that is properly called a motive, excitement, or inducement, to a perceiving willing agent, has some sort and degree of tendency or advantage to move or excite the will, previous to the effect, or to the act of the will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I call the strength of the motive. That motive which has a less degree of previous advantage or tendency to move the will, or that appears less inviting, as it stands in the view of the mind, is what I call a weaker motive. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the understanding or apprehension, the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite and induce the choice, is what I call the strongest motive. And in this sense, I suppose the will is always determined by the strongest motive.

Things that exist in the view of the mind, have their strength, tendency, or advantage, to move or excite its will, from many things appertaining to the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed, the nature and circumstances of the mind that views, and the degree and manner of its view; which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration of. But so much I think may be determined in general, without room for controversy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or viewed as good; nor has it any tendency to invite or engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears such.

For to say otherwise, would be to say, that things that appear have a tendency by the appearance they make to engage the mind to elect them some other way than by their appearing eligible to it, which is absurd; and therefore it must be true, in some sense, that the will always is as the greatest apparent good is. But only, for the right understanding of this, two things must be well and distinctly observed. 1. It must be observed in what sense I use the term good: namely, as of the same import with agreeable. To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable or seem pleasing to the mind.

Certainly nothing appears inviting and eligible to the mind, or tending to engage its inclination and choice, considered as evil or disagreeable; nor indeed as indifferent, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable. But if it tends to draw the inclination and move the will, it must be under the notion of that which suits the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the mind’s view, suits it best and pleases it most; and in that sense is the greatest apparent good: to say otherwise, is little, if any thing, short of a direct and plain contradiction.

The word good, in this sense, includes in its signification the removal or avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreeable and uneasy. It is agreeable and pleasing to avoid what is disagreeable and displeasing, and to have uneasiness removed. So that here is included what Mr. Locke supposes determines the will. For when he speaks of uneasiness as determining the will he must be understood as supposing that the end or aim which governs ill the volition or act of preference, is the avoiding or removal of that uneasiness; and that is the same thing as choosing and seeking what is more easy and agreeable. 2. When I say the will is as the greatest apparent good is, or (as I have explained it) that volition has always for its object the thing which appears most agreeable, it t be carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless objection, that I speak of the direct and immediate object of the act of volition and not some object that the act of will has not an immediate, but only an indirect and remote, respect to. Many acts of volition have some remote relation to an object that is different from the thing most immediately willed and chosen. Thus, when a drunkard has his liquor before him, and he has to choose whether to drink it or no, the proper and immediate objects about which his present volition is conversant, and between which his choice now decides, are his own acts in drinking the liquor or letting it alone; and this will certainly be done according to what, in the present view of his mind, taken in the whole of it, is most agreeable to him. If he chooses or wills to drink it, and not to let it alone, then this action, as it stands in the view of his mind, with all that belongs to its appearance there, is more agreeable and pleasing than letting it alone.

But the objects to which this act of volition may relate more remotely, and between which his choice may determine more indirectly, are the present pleasure the man expects by drinking, and the future misery which he judges will be the consequence of it: he may judge that this future misery, when it comes, will be more disagreeable and unpleasant than refraining from drinking now would be. But these two things are not the proper objects that the act of volition spoken of is nextly conversant about. For the act of will spoken of, is concerning, present drinking or forbearing to drink. If he wills to drink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his will and drinking, on some account or other, now appears most agreeable to him, and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain, then refraining is the immediate object of his will, and is most pleasing to him. If in the choice he makes in the case, he prefers a present pleasure to a future advantage, which he judges will be greater when it collies, then a lesser present pleasure appears more agreeable to him than a greater advantage at a distance. If, on the contrary, a future advantage is preferred, then that appears most agreeable, and suits him best. And so still the present volition is as the greatest apparent good at present is.

I have rather chosen to express myself thus, that the will always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable is, than to say that the will is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable or pleasing, to the mind, and the mind’s preferring and choosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary action, which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the mind’s volition or choice, is determined lay that which appears most agreeable, than the preference or choice itself; but that the act of volition itself is always determined by that, in or about the mind’s view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say in or about the mind’s view of the object, because what has influence to render an object in view agreeable, is not only what appears in the object viewed, but also the manner of the view, and the state and circumstances of the mind that views. Particularly to enumerate all things pertaining to the mind’s view of the objects of volition, which have influence in their appearing agreeable to the mind, would be a matter of no small difficulty, and might require a treatise by itself, and is not necessary to my present purpose. I shall therefore only mention some things in general.

I. One thing that makes an object proposed to choice agreeable, is the apparent nature and circumstances of the object. And there are various things of this sort, that have a hand in rendering, the object more or less agreeable; as, 1. That which appears in the object, which renders it beautiful and pleasant, or deformed and irksome to the mind, viewing it as it is in itself. 2. The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or the consequence of it. Such concomitants and consequence being, viewed as circumstances of the objects, are to be considered as belonging to it, and as it were parts of it; as it stands in the mind’s view, as a proposed object of choice. 3. The apparent state of the pleasure or trouble that appears, with respect to distance of time; being either nearer or farther off. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have pleasure speedily, and disagreeable to have it delayed; so that if there be two equal degrees of pleasure set in the mind’s view, and all other things are equal, but only one is beheld as near, and the other far off; the nearer will appear most agreeable, and so will he chosen. Because, though the agreeableness of the objects be exactly equal, as viewed in themselves, yet not as viewed in their circumstances: one of them having the additional agreeableness of the circumstance of nearness.

II. Another thing that contributes to the agreeableness of an object of choice, as it stands in the mind’s view, is the manner of the view. If the object be something, which appears connected with future pleasure, not only will the degree of apparent pleasure have influence, but also the manner of the view, especially in two respects. 1. With respect to the degree of judgment, or firmness of assent, with which the mind judges the pleasure to be future. Because it is more agreeable to have a certain happiness than an uncertain one; and a pleasure viewed as more probable, all other things being equal, is more agreeable to the mind than that which is viewed as less probable. 2. With respect to the degree of the idea of the future pleasure. With regard to things which are the subject of our thoughts, either past, present, or future, we have much more of an idea or apprehension of some things than others; that is, our idea is much more clear, lively, and strong. Thus, the ideas we have of sensible things by immediate sensation, are usually much more lively than those we have by mere imagination, or by contemplation of them when absent. My idea of the sun when I look upon it, is more vivid than when I only think of it. Our idea of the sweet relish of a delicious fruit is usually stronger when we taste it, than when we only imagine it. And sometimes the idea we have of things by contemplation is much stronger and clearer than at other times. Thus, a man at one time has a much stronger idea of the pleasure which is to be enjoyed in eating some sort of food that he loves than at another. Now, the degree or strength of the idea or sense that men have of future good Or evil, is one thing that has great influence on their minds to excite choice or volition. When of two kinds of future pleasure, which the mind considers of, and are presented for choice, both are supposed exactly equal by the judgment, and both equally certain, and all other things are equal, but only one of them is what the mind has a far more lively sense of than of the other; this has the greatest advantage by far to affect and attract the mind, and move the will It is now more agreeable to the mind to take the pleasure it has a strong and lively sense of, than that which it has only a faint idea of: the view of the former is attended with the strongest appetite, and the greatest uneasiness attends the want of it; and it is agreeable to the mind to have uneasiness removed, and its appetite gratified. And if several future enjoyments are presented together, as competitors for the choice of the mind, some of them judged to be greater, and others less, the mind also having a greater sense and more lively idea of the good of some of then, and of others a less; and some are viewed as of greater certainty or probability than others, and those enjoyments that appear most agreeable in one of these respects, appear least so in others; in this case, all other things being equal, the agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the judgment, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of that good, and the degree of the view or sense, or liveliness of the idea the mind has of that good; because all together concur to constitute the degree in which the object appears at present agreeable; and accordingly, volition will be determined.

I might further observe, the state of the mind that views a proposed object of choice, is another thing that contributes to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of that object: the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced and established by education, example, custom, or some other means, or the frame or state that the mind is in on a particular occasion. That object which appears agreeable to one, does not so to another; and the same object does not always appear like agreeable to the same person at different times. It is most agreeable to some men to follower their reason, and to others to follow their appetites: to some men it is more agreeable to deny a vicious inclination than to gratify it, others it suits best to gratify the vilest appetites. It is more disagreeable to some men than others to counteract a former resolution. In these respects, and many others which might be mentioned, different things will be most agreeable to different persons; and not only so, but to the same persons at different times.

But possibly it is needless and improper to mention the frame and state of the mind, AS a distinct ground of the agreeableness of objects from the other two mentioned before; viz. the apparent nature and circumstances of the objects viewed, and the manner of the view: perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter, the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as to the agreeableness of objects any other way, than as it makes the objects themselves appear differently beautiful or deformed, having apparent pleasure or pain attending, them; and, as it occasions the manner of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively.

However, I think so much is certain, that volition, in no one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained. The choice of the mind never departs from that which, at that time, and with respect to the direct and immediate objects of that decision of the mind, appears most agreeable and pleasing, all things considered. If the immediate objects of the will are a man’s own actions, then those actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most agreeable to him, all things considered, to walk, then he now wills to walk. If it be now, the whole of what at present appears to him, most agreeable to speak, then he chooses to speak; if it suits him best to keep silence, then he chooses to keep silence. There is scarcely A plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits then; best, or what is most agreeable to them. To say that they do what they please, or what pleases then, but yet do not do billet is agreeable to then, is the same thing as to say they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say, that they do what they please, and yet do not do what they please.

It appears from these things, that in some sense the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding; but then the understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called reason or judgment. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant what reason declares to be best, or most for the person’s happiness, taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding.

Such a dictate of reason is quite a different matter from things appearing now most agreeable; all things being put together which pertain to the mind’s present perceptions, apprehensions, or idea, in any respect; although that dictate of reason, when it takes place, is one thing that is put into the scales, and is to be considered as a thing that has concern in the compound influence which moves and induces the will; and is one thing that is to be considered in estimating the degree of that appearance of good which the will always follows; either as having its influence added to other things, or subjected from them. When it concurs with other things, then its weight is added to them, as put into the same scale; but when it is against then, it is as a weight in the opposite scale, where it resists the influence of other things: yet its resistance is often overcome by their greater weight, and so the act of the will is determined in opposition to it.

The things which I have said, may, I hope, serve in some measure to illustrate and confirm the position I laid down in the beginning of this section, viz. that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite violation. But whether I have been so happy as rightly to explain the thing wherein consists the strength of motives, or not, my failing in this will not overthrow the position itself, which carries much of its own evidence with it, and is the thing of chief importance to the purpose of the ensuing discourse; and the truth of it I hope will appear with great clearness before I have finished what I have to say on the subject of human liberty.

SECTION CONCERNING THE MEANING OF THE TERMS NECESSITY, IMPOSSIBILITY, INABILITY, ETC., AND OF CONTINGENCE.

The words necessary, impossible, etc. are abundantly used in controversies about free-will and moral agency; and therefore the sense in which they are used should be clearly understood.

Here I might say, that a thing is then said to be necessary, when it must be, and cannot be otherwise. But this would not properly be a definition of necessity, or an explanation of the word, any more than if I explained the word must, by there being a necessity. The words must, can, and cannot, need explication as much the words necessary and impossible; excepting that the former are words that children commonly use, and know something of the meaning of, earlier that the latter.

The word necessary, as used in common speech, is a relative term, and relates to some supposed opposition made to the existence of the thing spoken of, which is overcome, or proves in vain to hinder or alter it. That is necessary, in the original and proper sense of the word, which is, or will be, notwithstanding all supposable opposition. To say that a thing is necessary, is the same thing as to say that it is impossible it should not be: but the word impossible is manifestly a relative term, and has reference to supposed power, exerted to bring a thing to pass, which is insufficient for the effect; as the word unable is relative, and has relation to ability or endeavor, which is insufficient; and as the word irresistible is relative, and has always reference to resistance which is made, or may be made, to some force or power tending to an effect, and is insufficient to withstand the power, or hinder the effect. The common notion of necessity and impossibility implies something that frustrates endeavor or desire.

Here several things are to be noted: — 1. Things are said to be necessary in general, which are or will be, notwithstanding any supposable opposition from us or others, or from whatever quarter. But things are said to be necessary to us which are or will be notwithstanding all opposition supposable in the case from us. The same may he observed of the word impossible, and other such like terms. 2. These terms, necessary, impossible, irresistible, etc. do especially belong to controversy about liberty and moral agency, as used in the latter of the two senses now mentioned; viz. as necessary or impossible to us, and with relation to any supposable opposition or endeavor of ours. 3. As the word necessity, in its vulgar and common use, is relative, and has always reference to some supposable insufficient opposition; so, when we speak of any thing as necessary to us, it is with relation to some supposable opposition of our wills, or some voluntary exertion or effort of ours to the contrary. For we do not properly make opposition to an event, any otherwise than as we voluntarily oppose it. Things are said to be what must be, or necessarily are, as to us, when they are, or will be, though we desire or endeavor the contrary, or try to prevent or remove their existence; but such opposition of ours always either consists in, or implies, opposition of our wills.

It is manifest, that all such like words and phrases, as vulgarly used, are used and accepted in this manner. A thing is said to be necessary, when we cannot help it, let us do what we will. So any thing is said to be impossible to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to pass, and endeavor it; or at least may be supposed to desire and seek it, but all our desires and endeavors etc, or would be, vain. And that is said to be irresistible, which overcomes all our opposition, resistance, and endeavor to the contrary. And we are said to be unable to do a thing, when our supposable desires and endeavors to do it are insufficient.

We are accustomed, in the common use of language, to apply and understand these phrases in this sense: we grow up with such a habit, which by the daily use of these terms, in such a sense, from our childhood, becomes fixed and settled; so that the idea of a relation to a supposed will, desire, and endeavor of ours, is strongly connected with these terms, and naturally excited in our minds, whenever we hear the words used. Such ideas, and these words are so united associated that they unavoidably go together — one suggests the other, and carries the other with it, and never can be separated as long as we live. And if we use the words as terms of art, in another sense, yet unless we are exceeding, circumspect and wary, we shall insensibly slide into the vulgar use of them, and so apply the words in a very inconsistent manner. This habitual connection of ideas will deceive and confound us in our reasonings and discourses, whererein we pretend to use these terms in that manner, as terms of art. 4. It follows from what has been observed, that when these terms, necessary, impossible, irresistible, unable, etc. are used in cases wherein no opposition, or insufficient will, or endeavor, is supposed, or can be supposed, but the very nature of the supposed case itself excludes and denies any such opposition, will, or endeavor, these terms are then not used in their proper signification, but quite beside their use in common speech. The reason is manifest; namely, that in such cases we cannot use the words with reference to a supposable opposition, will, or endeavor.

And therefore, if any man uses these terms in such cases, he either uses them nonsensically, or in some new sense diverse from their original and proper meaning. As, for instance, if a man should affirm after this manner — That it is necessary for a man, and what must be, that a man should choose virtue rather than vice, during, the time that he prefers virtue to vice; and that it is a thing impossible and irresistible, that it should be otherwise than that he should have this choice, so long as this choice continues, — such a man would use the terms, must, irresistible, etc. with perfect insignificance and nonsense, or in some new sense, diverse from their common use; which is with reference, as has been observed, to supposable opposition, unwillingness, and resistance; whereas, here, the very supposition excludes and denies any such things: for the case supposed is that of being willing, and choosing. 5. It appears from what has been said, that these terms, necessary, impossible, etc., are often used by philosophers and metaphysicians in a sense quite diverse from their common use and original signification: for they apply them to many cases in which no opposition is supposed or supposable. Thus, they use them with respect to God’s existence before the creation of the world, when there was no other being but He: so with regard to many of the dispositions and acts of the Divine Being, such as his loving himself, his loving righteousness, hating sin, etc. So they apply these terms to many cases of the inclinations and actions of created intelligent beings, angels, and men; wherein all opposition of the will is shut out and denied, in the very supposition of the case.

Metaphysical or philosophical necessity is nothing different from their certainty. I speak not now of the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty that is in things themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge of them; or that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition which affirms them.

What is sometimes given as the definition of philosophical necessity — namely, that by which a thing cannot but be, or, whereby it cannot be otherwise, fails of being a proper explanation of it, on two accounts; first, the words can or cannot, need explanation as much as the word necessity; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former Thus, if any one asked us what we mean, when we say, a thing cannot but be, we might explain ourselves by saying, we mean, It must necessarily be so; as well as explain necessity, by saying, It is that by which a thing cannot but be. And secondly, this definition is liable to the aforementioned great inconvenience: the words cannot or unable, are properly relative, and have relation to power exerted, in order to the thing spoken of; to which, as I have now observed, the word necessity, as used by philosophers, has no reference.

Philosophical necessity is really nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms something to be true. When there is such a connection, then the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary, in a philosophical sense, whether any opposition or contrary effort be supposed, or supposable in the case, or no. When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence of any tiling, either substance, quality, act, or circumstance, have a full and certain connection, then the existence or being, of that thing is said to be necessary, in a metaphysical sense. And in this sense I use the word necessity in the following discourse, when I endeavor to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty, The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connection several ways. 1. They may have a full and perfect connection in and of themselves, because it may imply a contradiction or gross absurdity to suppose them not connected. Thus, many things are necessary in their own nature. So, the external existence of being, generally considered, is necessary in itself; because it would be, in itself, the greatest absurdity to deny the existence of being in general, or to say there was absolute and universal nothing; and is as it were, the sum of all contradictions, as might he shown, if this were a proper place for it. So, God’s infinity and other attributes are necessary.

So, it is necessary, in its own nature, that two and two should be four; and it is necessary that all right lines, drawn from the center of a circle to the circumference, should be equal. It is necessary, fit, and suitable, that men should do to others as they would that they should do to them. So, innumerable metaphysical and mathematical truths are necessary in themselves; the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms them are perfectly connected of themselves. 2. The connection of the subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms the existence of something, may be fixed and made certain; because the existence of that thing is already come to pass, and either now is or has been, and so has, as it were, made sure of existence. And therefore the proposition which affirms present and past existence of it, may by this means be made certain, and necessarily and unalterably true; the past event has fixed and decided the matter, as to its existence, and has made it impossible but that existence should be truly predicated of it. Thus, the existence of whatever is already come to pass, is now become necessary; it is become impossible it should be otherwise than true, that such a thing has been. 3. The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be, may have a real and certain connection consequentially; and so the existence of the thing may be consequentially necessary, as it may be surely and firmly connected with something else that is necessary in one of the former respects; as it is either fully and thoroughly connected with that which is absolutely necessary in its own nature, or with something which has already received and made sure of existence. This necessity lies in, or may be explained by, the connection of two or more propositions one with another. Things which are perfectly connected with other things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a necessity of consequence.

And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are necessary only in this last way: their existence is not necessary in itself; for if so, they always would have existed. Nor is their existence become necessary by beings made sure, by being already come to pass. Therefore, the only way that any thing that is to come to pass hereafter, is or can be necessary, is by a connection with something that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already is, or has been; so that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows. And this, also, is the only way that all things past, excepting those which were from eternity, could be necessary before they came to pass, or could come to pass necessarily; and therefore the only way in which any effect or event, or any thing whatsoever that ever has had or will leave a beginning, has come into being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the necessity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts of the will.

It may be of some use in these controversies, further to observe, concerning metaphysical necessity, that (agreeable to the distinction before observed of necessity, as vulgarly understood) things that exist may be said to be necessary, either with a general or particular necessity. The existence of a thing may be said to be necessary with a general necessity, when, all things whatsoever being considered, there is a foundation for certainty of their existence; or when, in the most general and universal view of things, the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms its existence, would appear with an infallible connection.

An event, or the existence of a tiling, may be said to be necessary with a particular necessity, or with regard to a particular person, thing, or time, when nothing that can be taken into consideration in or about that person, thing, or time, alters the case at all, as to the certainty of that event, or the existence of that thing; or can be of any account at all, in determining the infallibility of the connection of the subject and predicate in the proposition which affirms the existence of the thing; so that it is all one, as to that person or thing, at least, at that time, as if the existence were necessary with a necessity that is most universal and absolute. Thus, there are many things that happen to particular persons, which they have no hand in, and in the existence of which no will of theirs has any concern, at least at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not, with regard to things in general, yet are necessary to then, and with regard to any volition of theirs at that time, as they prevent all acts of the will about the affair. I shall have occasion to apply this observation to particular instances in the following discourse. Whether the same things that are necessary with a particular necessity, be not also necessary with a general necessity, may be a matter of future consideration. Let that be as it will, it alters not the case, as to the use of this distinction of the kinds of necessity.

These things may be sufficient for the explaining of the terms necessary and necessity, as terms of art, and as often used by metaphysicians and controversial writers in divinity, in a sense diverse from and more extensive than their original meaning in common language, which was before explained.

What has been said to show the meaning of the terns necessary and necessity, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms impossible and impossibility; for there is no difference, but only the latter are negative, and the former positive. Impossibility is the same as negative necessity, or a necessity that a thing should not be; and it is used as a term of art, in a like diversity from the original and vulgar meaning with necessity.

The same may be observed concerning the words unable and inability. It has been observed, that these terms, in their original and common use, have relation to will and endeavor, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient for the bringing to pass the thing willed and endeavored; but as these terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on controversies about free-will, they are used in a quite different and far more extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will or endeavor for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be supposed, but is actually denied and excluded in the nature of the case.

As the words, necessary, impossible, unable, etc., are used by polemic writers in a sense diverse from their common signification, the like has happened to the term contingent. Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connection with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of the foresight of. And especially is any thing said to be contingent or accidental with regard to us, when any thing comes to pass that we are concerned in, as occasions or subjects, without our foreknowledge, and beside our design and scope.

But the word contingent is abundantly used in a very different sense; not for that whose connection with the series of things we cannot discern, so as to foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has any fixed and certain connection.

SECTION OF THE DISTINCTION OF NATURAL AND MORAL NECESSITY, AND INABILITY.

THAT necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible connection of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is distinguished into moral and natural necessity.

I shall not now stand to inquire whether this distinction be a proper and perfect distinction; but shall only explain how these two sorts of necessity are understood, as the terms are sometimes used, and as they are used in the following discourse.

The phrase moral necessity is used variously; sometimes it is used for a necessity of moral obligation. So, we say a man is under necessity, when he is under bonds of duty and conscience, which he cannot be discharged from. So, the word necessity is often used for great obligation in point of interest. Sometimes, by moral necessity is meant that apparent connection of things which is the ground of moral evidence; and so is distinguished from absolute necessity, or that sure connection of things that is a foundation for infallible certainty. In this sense, moral necessity signifies much the same as that high degree of probability which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy, and be relied upon by mankind, in their conduct and behavior in the world, as they would consult their own safety and interest, and treat others properly as members of society. And sometimes by moral necessity is meant that necessity of connection and consequence which arises from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between these, and such certain volition’s and actions. And it is in this sense that I use the phrase moral necessity in the following discourse.

By natural necessity, as applied to men, I mean such necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes; as distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements. Thus, men placed in certain circumstances are the subjects of particular sensations by necessity; they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects presented before them in a clear light when their eyes are opened: so, they assent to the truth of certain propositions as soon as the terms are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so, by a natural necessity, men’s bodies move downwards when there is nothing to support them.

But here several things may be noted concerning these two kinds of necessity. 1. Moral necessity maybe as absolute as natural necessity: that is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause. Whether the will in every case is necessarily determined by the strongest motive, or whether the will ever makes any resistance to such a motive, or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination, or not; if that matter should be controverted, yet I suppose none will deny, but that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive presented, may be so powerful, that the act of the will may be certainly and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives or previous bias are very strong, all will allow that there is some difficulty in going against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And therefore, if more were still added to their strength, to a certain degree, it would make the difficulty so great, that it would be wholly impossible to surmount it; for this plain reason, because whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite; and so goes not beyond certain limits. If a man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty; yet, if the difficulty be increased to thirty, or a hundred, or a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty. As, therefore, it must be allowed, that there may be such a thing as a sure and perfect connection between moral causes and effects; so this only is what I call by the name of moral necessity. 2. When I use this distinction of moral and natural necessity, I would not be understood to suppose, that if any thing comes to pass by the former kind of necessity, the nature of things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I do not mean to determine, that when a moral habit or motive is so strong, that the act of the will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the nature of things. But these are the names that these two kinds of necessity have usually been called by; and they must be distinguished by some names or other; for there is a distinction or difference between them, that is very important in its consequences, which difference does not be so much in the nature of the connection as in the two terms connected. The cause with which the effect is connected is of a particular kind; viz. that which is of a moral nature; either some previous habitual disposition, or some motive exhibited to the understanding. And the erect is also of a particular kind; being likewise of a moral nature, consisting in some inclination or volition of the soul or voluntary action.

I suppose, that necessity which is called natural, in distinction from moral necessity, is so called, because mere nature, as the word is vulgarly used, is concerned, without any thing of choice. The word nature is often used in opposition to choice; not because nature has indeed never any hand in our choice; but this probably comes to pass by means that we first get our notion of nature from that discernible and obvious course of events, which we observe in many things that our choice has no concern in; and especially in the material world, which, in very many parts of it, we easily perceive to be in a settled course; the stated order and manner of succession being very apparent. But where we do not readily discern the rule and connection, (though there be a connection, according to an established law, truly taking place,) we signify the manner of event by some other name. Even in many things which are seen in the material and inanimate world, which do not discernibly and obviously come to pass according to any settled course, men do not call the manner of the event by the name of nature, but by such names as accident, chance, contingent, etc. So, men make a distinction between nature and choice, as though they were completely and universally distinct. Whereas, I suppose none will deny but that choice, in many cases, arises from nature, as truly as other events. But the dependence and connection between acts of volition or choice, and their causes, according to established laws, is not so sensible and obvious. And we observe, that choice is as it were a new principle of motion and action, different from that established law and order of things which is most obvious, that is seen especially in corporeal and sensible things; and also the choice often interposes, interrupts, and alters the chain of events in these external objects, and causes them to proceed otherwise than they would do, if let alone, and left to go on according to the laws of motion among themselves.

Hence, it is spoken of as if it were a principle of motion entirely distinct from nature, and properly set in opposition to it; — names being commonly given to things, according to what is most obvious, and is suggested by what appears to the senses without reflection and research. 3. It must be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name of moral necessity, the word necessity is not used according to the original design and meaning of the word: for, as was observed before, such terms — necessary, impossible, irresistible, etc. in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always relative; having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor that is insufficient. But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavor, is supposable in the case of moral necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself, which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself in its present act, or the present choice to be opposite to and resisting present choice; as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time. And therefore the very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing, or resisting will can overcome this necessity.

What has been said of natural and moral necessity, may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral inability. We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called nature does not allow of it, or because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will; either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. Moral inability consists not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view to induce and excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For when a Person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing as his being unable, through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circumstances, and under the influence of such views.

To give some instances of this moral inability. — A woman of great honor and chastity may have a moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave. A child of great love and duty to his parents may be unable to be willing to kill his father. A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust. A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking of strong drink. A very malicious man may he unable to exert benevolent acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity: yea, some may be so under the power of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their esteem and affection.

A strong habit of virtue, and great degree of holiness, may cause a moral inability to love wickedness in general, — may render a man unable to take complacence in wicked persons or things, or to choose a wicked life, and prefer it to a virtuous life. And, on the other hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love and choose holiness, and render him utterly unable to love any infinitely holy Being, or to choose and cleave to him as his chief good.

Here it may be of use to observe this distinction of moral inability, viz. of that which is general and habitual, and that which is particular and occasional. By a general and habitual moral inability, I mean an inability in the heart to all exercises or acts of will of that nature or kind, through a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual and stated defect, or want of a certain kind of inclination. Thus, a very ill-natured man may be unable to exert such acts of benevolence, as another, who is full of good nature, commonly exerts; and a man, whose heart is habitually void of gratitude, may be unable to exert such and such grateful acts, through that stated defect of a grateful inclination. By particular and occasional moral inability, I mean an inability of the will or heart to a particular act, through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements presented to the view of the understanding on this occasion. If it be so, that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, then it must always have an inability, in this latter sense, to act otherwise than it does; it not bring, possible, in any case, that the will should at present go against the motive which has now, all things considered, the greatest strength and advantage to excite and induce it. The former of these livings of moral inability, consisting in that which is stated, habitual, and general, is most commonly called by the name of inability; because the word inability, in its most proper and original signification, has respect to some stated defect. And this especially obtains the name of inability also upon another account. I before observed, that the word inability, in its original most common use, is a relative term, and has respect to will and endeavor, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient to bring to pass the thing desired and endeavored.

Now, there may be more of an appearance and shadow of this, with respect to the acts which arise from a fixed and strong habit, than others that arise only from transient occasions and causes. Indeed, will and endeavor against, or diverse from, present acts of the will, are in no case supposable, whether those acts be occasional or habitual, for that would be to suppose the will at present to be otherwise than at present it is. But yet there may be will and endeavor against future acts of the will, or volition’s that are likely to take place, as viewed at a distance. It is no contradiction to suppose that the acts of the will at one time may be against the acts of the will at another time; and there may be desires and endeavors to prevent or excite future acts of the will; but such desires and endeavors are, in many cases, rendered insufficient and vain, through fixedness of habit: when the occasion returns, the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such opposition. In this respect, a man may be in miserable slavery and bondage to a strong habit. But it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration with respect to such future acts, as are only occasional and transient; because the occasion or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be prevented or avoided. On this account, the moral inability that attends fixed habits, especially obtains the name of inability. And then, as the will may remotely and indirectly resist itself and do it in vain, in the case of strong habits, so reason may resist present acts of the will, and its resistance be insufficient; and this is more commonly the case also when the acts arise from strong habit.

But it must be observed, concerning moral inability, in each kind of it, that the word inability is used in a sense very diverse from its original import.

The word signifies only a natural inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a per son is said to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be ever so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbor kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be ever so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election; and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing when he can do it if he will. It is improperly said, that a person cannot perform those external actions which are dependent on the act of the will, and which would be easily performed if the act of the will were present. And if it be improperly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions which depend on the will, it is in some respect more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the will themselves; because it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot if he will: for to say so, is a downright contradiction; it is to say, he cannot will, if he does will; and in this case not only is it true that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing; when once he has willed, the thing is performed, and nothing else remains to be done. Therefore, in these things to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability, is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being willing. There are faculties of the mind, and capacity of nature, and every thing else sufficient, but a disposition: nothing is wanting but a will.

SECTION CONCERNING THE NOTION OF LIBERTY AND OF MORAL AGENCY.

THE plain and obvious meaning of the words freedom and liberty, in common speech, is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases. Or in other words, his being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting, in any respect, as he ‘wills.’ And the contrary to liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person’s being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise.

If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word liberty, in the ordinary use of language, as I trust that none that has ever learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny; then it will follow that in propriety of speech, neither liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, hut that which has such a faculty, power, or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no such thing as will, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing according to its will, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore, to talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging, to the very will itself, is not to speak good sense, it we judge of sense and nonsense by the original and proper signification of words. For the will itself is not an agent that has a will; the power of choosing, itself has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of volition or choice, is the man or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the liberty of doing according to his will, is the agent or doer who is possessed of the will, and not the will which he is possessed of. We say with propriety, that a bird let loose has power and liberty to fly; but not that the bird’s power of flying has a power and liberty of flying. To be free, is the property of an agent who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the properties of men or persons, and not the properties of properties.

There are two things that are contrary to this which is called liberty in common speech. One is constraint; the same is otherwise celled force, compulsion, and coalition, which is a person’s being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint; which is his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his will. But that which has no will, cannot be the subject of these things. — I need say the less on this head, Mr. Locke having set the same thing forth with so great clearness in his “Essay on the Human Understanding.”

But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called liberty namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the word, any thing of the cause or original of that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition, whether it was caused by some external motive or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing, in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing, his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom.

What has been said may be sufficient to show what is meant by liberty, according to the common notions of mankind, and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word: but the word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians, and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different signification. These several things belong to their notion of liberty. That it consists in self-determining power in the will, or a certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volition’s; so as not to be dependent in its determinations on any cause without itself, nor determined by any thing prior to its own acts. 2.

Indifference belongs to liberty, in their notion of it, or that the mind, previous to the act of volition, be in equilibria. 3. Contingence is another thing that belongs and is essential to it; not in the common acceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and certain connection with some previous ground or reason of its existence They suppose the essence of liberty so much to consist in these things, that unless the will of man be free in this sense, he has no real freedom, how much soever he may be at liberty to act according to his will.

A moral agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty.

The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence on the earth, in warming it, and causing it to bring forth its fruits; but it is not a moral agent; its action, though good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a city, and consumes great part of it, is very mischievous in its operation, but is not a moral agent: what it does is not faulty or sinful, or deserving of any punishment. The brute creatures are not moral agents: the actions of some of them arc very profitable and pleasant; others are very hurtful: yet, seeing they have no moral faculty or sense of desert, and do not act from choice guided by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by moral inducements, their actions are not properly sinful or virtuous; nor are they properly the subjects of any such moral treatment for what they do, as moral agents are for their faults or good deeds.

Here it may be noted, that there is a circumstantial difference between the moral agency of a ruler and a subject. I call it circumstantial, because it lies only in the difference of moral inducements they are capable of being influenced by, arising from the difference of circumstances. A ruler acting in that capacity only, is not capable of being influenced by a moral law, and its sanctions of threatenings and promises, rewards and punishments, as the subject is; though both may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil. And therefore the moral agency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the capacity of a ruler towards his creatures, and never as a subject, differs in that respect from the moral agency of created intelligent beings.