QUESTIONS 1-43 QUESTION THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE (TEN ARTICLES)

To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning this there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is necessary? (2) Whether it is a science? (3) Whether it is one or many? (4) Whether it is speculative or practical? (5) How it is compared with other sciences? (6) Whether it is the same as wisdom? (7) Whether God is its subject-matter? (8) Whether it is a matter of argument? (9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes? (10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in different senses?

P(1)- Q(1)- A(1) Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required?

P(1)- Q(1)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason: “Seek not the things that are too high for thee” (Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true.

But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science — even God Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 2 Timothy 3:16): “All Scripture, inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice.”

Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e. inspired of God.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(1) —

I answer that, It was necessary for man’s salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: “The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee” ( Isaiah 66:4).

But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man’s whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although those things which are beyond man’s knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason, nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by faith. Hence the sacred text continues, “For many things are shown to thee above the understanding of man” (Ecclus. 3:25). And in this, the sacred science consists.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Sciences are differentiated according to the various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion: that the earth, for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e. abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself.

Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(2) Whether sacred doctrine is a science?

P(1)- Q(1)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since their truth is not admitted by all: “For all men have not faith” ( 2 Thessalonians 3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, no science deals with individual facts.

But this sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) “to this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected and strengthened.” But this can be said of no science except sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(2) —

I answer that, Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The principles of any science are either in themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher science; and such, as we have said, are the principles of sacred doctrine.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Individual facts are treated of in sacred doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but they are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as in moral sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those men through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture or doctrine is based, has come down to us.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(3) Whether sacred doctrine is one science?

P(1)- Q(1)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) “that science is one which treats only of one class of subjects.” But the creator and the creature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot be grouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore sacred doctrine is not one science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal creatures and human morality. But these belong to separate philosophical sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science: “Wisdom gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of holy things” (Wis. 10:10).

P(1)- Q(1)- A(3) —

I answer that, Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object. For example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise formality of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight. Therefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science; and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the unity of this science is not impaired.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the “common sense” is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore, whatever is visible or audible.

Hence the “common sense,” although one faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly, objects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation. So that in this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the divine science which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(4) Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science?

P(1)- Q(1)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science; for a practical science is that which ends in action according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained to action: “Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only” ( James 1:22).

Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the New Law. But law implies a moral science which is a practical science. Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Every practical science is concerned with human operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a practical but a speculative science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(4) —

I answer that, Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the Objections.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(5) Whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences?

P(1)- Q(1)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other sciences; for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it establishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its principles — namely, articles of faith — can be doubted. Therefore other sciences seem to be nobler.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon a higher; as music depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in a sense depend upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in his Epistle to Magnus, that “the ancient doctors so enriched their books with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou knowest not what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or their scriptural learning.”

Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other sciences.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this one: “Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower” ( Proverbs 9:3).

P(1)- Q(1)- A(5) —

I answer that, Since this science is partly speculative and partly practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by reason of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its subjectmatter.

In both these respects this science surpasses other speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while other sciences consider only those things which are within reason’s grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained to a further purpose, as political science is nobler than military science; for the good of the army is directed to the good of the State. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every standpoint, it is nobler than other sciences.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(5)- RO(1) —

It may well happen that what is in itself the more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the weakness of our intelligence, “which is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun” (Metaph. ii, lect. i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths, but to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said in de Animalibus xi.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(5)- RO(2) —

This science can in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its principles not from other sciences, but immediately from God, by revelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as handmaidens: even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that supply their materials, as political of military science.

That it thus uses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known through natural reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that which is above reason, such as are the teachings of this science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(6) Whether this doctrine is the same as wisdom?

P(1)- Q(1)- A(6)- O(1) —

It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom. For no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (Metaph. i). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science is not wisdom.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles of other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is clear in Ethic. 6:But this doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas wisdom is acquired by God’s inspiration; so that it is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit ( Isaiah 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is not the same as wisdom.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 4:6): “This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations.”

P(1)- Q(1)- A(6) —

I answer that, This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus in the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim the wood and make ready the stones: “As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation” ( 1 Corinthians 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life, the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a fitting end: “Wisdom is prudence to a man” (Proverbs 10: 23). Therefore he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest cause — not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew Him — ”That which is known of God is manifest in them” ( Romans 1:19) — but also as far as He is known to Himself alone and revealed to others.

Hence sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The principles of other sciences either are evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes through revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this science must be condemned as false: “Destroying counsels and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God” ( 2 Corinthians 10:4,5).

P(1)- Q(1)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it.

Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost: “The spiritual man judgeth all things” ( 1 Corinthians 2:15).

And Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): “Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by experience of divine things.” The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(7) Whether God is the object of this science?

P(1)- Q(1)- A(7)- O(1) —

It seems that God is not the object of this science. For in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, iv): “It is impossible to define the essence of God.”

Therefore God is not the object of this science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many other things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is not the object of this science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(7) —

On the contrary, The object of the science is that of which it principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is the object of this science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(7) —

I answer that, God is the object of this science. The relation between a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all things are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to be something other than God — that is, either things and signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Although we cannot know in what consists the essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Whatever other conclusions are reached in this sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or accidents but as in some way related to Him.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(8) Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?

P(1)- Q(1)- A(8)- O(1) —

It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument.

For Ambrose says (De Fide 1): “Put arguments aside where faith is sought.” But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: “But these things are written that you may believe” ( John 20:31).

Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting its end, because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), “faith has no merit in those things of which human reason brings its own experience.” Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(8) —

On the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop should “embrace that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers” ( Titus 1:9).

P(1)- Q(1)- A(8) —

I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection ( 1 Corinthians 15). However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections — if he has any — against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Although arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(8)- RO(2) —

This doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine.

Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity.

Hence the Apostle says: “Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ” ( 2 Corinthians 10:5).

Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus: “As some also of your own poets said:

For we are also His offspring” ( Acts 17:28).

Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): “Only those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning.”

P(1)- Q(1)- A(9) Whether Holy Scripture should use metaphors?

P(1)- Q(1)- A(9)- O(1) —

It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors. For that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science should make use of such similitudes.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: “They that explain me shall have life everlasting” (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they approach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in Scriptures.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(9) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Hosea 12:10): “I have multiplied visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets.” But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(9) —

I answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things.

For God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature.

Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): “We cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within the covering of many sacred veils.” It is also befitting Holy Writ, which is proposed to all without distinction of persons — ”To the wise and to the unwise I am a debtor” ( Romans 1:14) — that spiritual truths be expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may be able to understand it.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(9)- RO(1) —

Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with representations.

But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both necessary and useful.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(9)- RO(2) —

The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says (Coel.

Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in the metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive instruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught more openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of the impious, according to the words “Give not that which is holy to dogs” ( Matthew 7:6).

P(1)- Q(1)- A(9)- RO(3) —

As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of less noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly, because thereby men’s minds are the better preserved from error. For then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who could think of nothing nobler than bodies.

Secondly, because this is more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what He is not is clearer to us than what He is.

Therefore similitudes drawn from things farthest away from God form within us a truer estimate that God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him. Thirdly, because thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the unworthy.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(10) Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses?

P(1)- Q(1)- A(10) - O(1) —

It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion and deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, but only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to a word.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that “the Old Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy and allegory.” Now these four seem altogether different from the four divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four different senses mentioned above.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical, which is not one of these four.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(10) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): “Holy Writ by the manner of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery.”

P(1)- Q(1)- A(10) —

I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are signified by words, this science has the property, that the things signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For as the Apostle says ( Hebrews 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) “the New Law itself is a figure of future glory.” Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(10) - RO(1) —

The multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things, but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are founded on one — the literal — from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(10) - RO(2) —

These three — history, etiology, analogy — are grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as Augustine expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it is called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives — namely, on account of the hardness of men’s hearts; it is called analogy whenever the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.) includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down three senses only — the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.

P(1)- Q(1)- A(10) - RO(3) —

The parabolical sense is contained in the literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks of God’s arm, the literal sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.

QUESTION THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)

Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature’s advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.

In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.

Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what isNOT the manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations — namely, His knowledge, will, power.

Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the proposition “God exists” is self-evident? (2) Whether it is demonstrable? (3) Whether God exists?

P(1)- Q(2)- A(1) Whether the existence of God is self-evident?

P(1)- Q(2)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that the existence of God is self-evident.

Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), “the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all.” Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word “God” is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word “God” is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually.

Therefore the proposition “God exists” is self-evident.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition “Truth does not exist” is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: “I am the way, the truth, and the life” ( John 14:6) Therefore “God exists” is self-evident.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(1) —

On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition “God is” can be mentally admitted: “The fool said in his heart, There is no God” ( Psalm 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(1) —

I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as “Man is an animal,” for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: “Whether all that is, is good”), “that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space.” Therefore I say that this proposition, “God exists,” of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown ( Q(3) , A(4) ). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not selfevident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(1)- RO(1) —

To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man’s beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man’s perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Perhaps not everyone who hears this word “God” understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word “God” is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(2) Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?

P(1)- Q(2)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen ( Hebrews 11:1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God’s essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4).

Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says: “The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” ( Romans 1:20).

But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is whether it exists.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(2) —

I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called “a priori,” and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration “a posteriori”; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(2)- RO(2) —

When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause’s existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word “God”.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(2)- RO(3) —

From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(3) Whether God exists?

P(1)- Q(2)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word “God” means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world.

Therefore God does not exist.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God’s existence.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: “I am Who am.” ( Exodus 3:14)

P(1)- Q(2)- A(3) — I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(3) —

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another.

If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(3) —

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes.

There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one.

Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(3) —

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd.

Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(3) —

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. 2:Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(3) —

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(3)- RO(1) —

As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): “Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.” This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

P(1)- Q(2)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.

QUESTION OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)

When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not.

Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.

Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like.

Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss 2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.

Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is a body? (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form? (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject? (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence? (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference? (6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident? (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple? (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1) Whether God is a body?

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written: “He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea” ( Job 11:8,9). Therefore God is a body.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is written: “Let us make man to our image and likeness” ( Genesis 1:26).

Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: “Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure,” i.e. the image, “of His substance” ( Hebrews 1:3). Therefore God is a body.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body.

Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. “Hast thou an arm like God?” ( Job 40:4); and “The eyes of the Lord are upon the just” ( Psalm 33:16); and “The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength” ( <19B701> Psalm 117:16). Therefore God is a body.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: “I saw the Lord sitting” ( Isaiah 6:1), and “He standeth up to judge” ( Isaiah 3:13). Therefore God is a body.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term “wherefrom” or “whereto.” But in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term “whereto,” according to the words, “Come ye to Him and be enlightened” ( Psalm 33:6), and as a term “wherefrom”: “All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth” ( Jeremiah 17:13).

Therefore God is a body.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John ( John 4:24): “God is a spirit.”

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1) —

I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved ( Q(2) , A(3) ), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality.

Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As we have said above ( Q(1) , A(9) ), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His allpervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals.

Hence, when it is said, “Let us make man to our image and likeness”, it is added, “And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea” ( Genesis 1:26).

Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of God.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel.

For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with the other parts.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(5) —

We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(2) Whether God is composed of matter and form?

P(1)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews ( Hebrews 10:38), where God says: “But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul.” Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: “The Lord was exceeding angry with His people” ( <19A540> Psalm 105:40). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(2) —

I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ( Q(2) , A(3) ) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the best — viz. God — is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent.

Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(2)- RO(1) —

A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul.

Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God’s punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(3) Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?

P(1)- Q(3)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of God — i.e. the Godhead — is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the “suppositum” is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity.

Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: “I am the way, the truth, and the life” ( John 14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(3) —

I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the “suppositum,” because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man.

Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter.

On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter — that is to say, to “this” matter — the very forms being individualized of themselves — it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting “supposita.”

Therefore “suppositum” and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(3)- RO(1) —

We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge.

Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and therefore, in them “suppositum” is not the same as nature.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(4) Whether essence and existence are the same in God?

P(1)- Q(3)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it.

Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: “For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood” (Wis. 14:21). Therefore God’s existence is not His essence.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, we can know “whether” God exists as said above ( Q(2) , A(2) ); but we cannot know “what” He is. Therefore God’s existence is not the same as His essence — that is, as His quiddity or nature.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): “In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth.” Therefore what subsists in God is His existence.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(4) —

I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species — as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man — and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent — as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing’s existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above ( A(1) ), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence.

Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above ( A(3) ) if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the first being — which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(4)- RO(1) —

A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(4)- RO(2) —

“To be” can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking “to be” in the first sense, we cannot understand God’s existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say “God is,” is true; and this we know from His effects ( Q(2) , A(2) ).

P(1)- Q(3)- A(5) Whether God is contained in a genus?

P(1)- Q(3)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(5) —

On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is not in any genus.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(5) —

I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus “being”, because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and quiddity — i.e. essence — must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself — for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way — namely, of existing of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(5)- RO(2) —

This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as it resembles Him.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(6) Whether in God there are any accidents?

P(1)- Q(3)- A(6)- O(1) —

It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God there are accidents.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, in every genus there is a first principle.

But there are many “genera” of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God — which is absurd.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for “no simple form can be a subject”, as Boethius says (De Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(6) —

I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown ( Q(2) , A(3) ). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God as there are in us.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all being, outside of every genus.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(7) Whether God is altogether simple?

P(1)- Q(3)- A(7)- O(1) —

It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether simple.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple; thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God is altogether simple.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): “God is truly and absolutely simple.”

P(1)- Q(3)- A(7) —

I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question.

For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His “suppositum”; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown above ( Q(2) , A(3) ). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above ( Q(2) , A(3) ), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite.

Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): “God, Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim.”

P(1)- Q(3)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ( Q(4) , A(3) ).

P(1)- Q(3)- A(7)- RO(2) —

With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing ( Q(4) , A(1)- and Q(6) , A(2) ).

P(1)- Q(3)- A(8) Whether God enters into the composition of other things?

P(1)- Q(3)- A(8)- O(1) —

It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): “The being of all things is that which is above being — the Godhead.” But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the composition of other things.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., [*Serm. xxxviii]) that, “the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated form.” But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor — whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each other.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): “There can be no touching Him,” i.e. God, “nor any other union with Him by mingling part with part.”

P(1)- Q(3)- A(8) —

Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).

P(1)- Q(3)- A(8) —

I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially.

But that which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings — not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing ( Q(3) , A(1) ): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being ( Q(2) , A(3) ).

P(1)- Q(3)- A(8)- RO(1) —

The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(8)- RO(2) —

The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound.

P(1)- Q(3)- A(8)- RO(3) —

Simple things do not differ by added differences — for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x), “things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are different differ by something.” Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.

QUESTION THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)

Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God’s perfection.

Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness.

Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is perfect? (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things? (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?

P(1)- Q(4)- A(1) Whether God is perfect?

P(1)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that perfection does not belong to God.

For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, as shown above ( Q(3) , A(4) ), God’s essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is imperfect.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written: “Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect” ( Matthew 5:48).

P(1)- Q(4)- A(1) —

I answer that, As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate “best” and “most perfect” of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality.

Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): “Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God.” For that which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are brought into actuality, this word “perfect” signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The material principle which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into act by some being already actual.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(2) Whether the perfections of all things are in God?

P(1)- Q(4)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above ( Q(3) , A(7) ); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its specific difference. But the differences by which “genera” are divided, and “species” constituted, are opposed to each other. Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are not in God.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that “God in His one existence prepossesses all things.”

P(1)- Q(4)- A(2) —

I answer that, All created perfections are in God.

Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator, Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent — as when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent — thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun’s power. Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): “It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all.” Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent ( Q(3) , A(4) ).

Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, “God exists not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly;” and afterwards he adds that, “He is the very existence to subsisting things.”

P(1)- Q(4)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div.

Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; “a fortiori” should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of existence; nevertheless God’s existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(3) Whether any creature can be like God?

P(1)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written ( Psalm 85:8): “There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord.” But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different “genus.” Therefore neither can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same “genus” as God: since God is no “genus,” as shown above ( Q(3) , A(5) ). Therefore no creature is like God.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone, essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: “To whom have you likened God?” ( Isaiah 40:18).

P(1)- Q(4)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written: “Let us make man to our image and likeness” ( Genesis 1:26), and: “When He shall appear we shall be like to Him” ( 1 John 3:2).

P(1)- Q(4)- A(3) —

I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated by the sun’s heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific likeness, but in its generic likeness.

Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any “genus,” its effect will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent’s form according to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(1) —

As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness to Him. For, “the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause,” not merely in intensity and remission, as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(2) —

God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different “genus,” but as transcending every “genus,” and as the principle of all “genera.”

P(1)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.

P(1)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): “A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between a cause and that which is caused.” For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.

QUESTION OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)

We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether goodness and being are the same really? (2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought? (3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good? (4) To what cause should goodness be reduced? (5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order? (6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?

P(1)- Q(5)- A(1) Whether goodness differs really from being?

P(1)- Q(5)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that goodness differs really from being.

For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): “I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing: that they are is another.” Therefore goodness and being really differ.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, nothing can be its own form. “But that is called good which has the form of being”, according to the commentary on De Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, “inasmuch as we exist we are good.”

P(1)- Q(5)- A(1) —

I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): “Goodness is what all desire.” Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual.

Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing ( Q(3) , A(4) ; Q(4) , A(1) ). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing’s substantial being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e. substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.), “I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another,” is to be referred to a thing’s goodness simply, and having being simply.

Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply — in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing’s superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(2) Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?

P(1)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being.

For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His being.

Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius notes (Div. Nom. v), “goodness extends to things both existing and nonexisting; whereas existence extends to existing things alone.” Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: “It were better for him, if that man had not been born” ( Matthew 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that “the first of created things is being.”

P(1)- Q(5)- A(2) —

I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word that stands for it.

Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect.

Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div.

Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that “goodness extends to nonexistence” (Div. Nom. v).

P(1)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The same solution is applied to this objection.

Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them — if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively — i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being.

Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as relatively good.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is good except being.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(3) Whether every being is good?

P(1)- Q(5)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A(1) . But whatever is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc.

Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, no evil is good: “Woe to you that call evil good and good evil” ( Isaiah 5:20).

But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires.

Therefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness.

Therefore not every being is good.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that “in mathematics goodness does not exist.” But mathematics are entities; otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Every being that is not God is God’s creature. Now every creature of God is good ( 1 Timothy 4:4): and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(3) —

I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from A(1) . Hence it follows that every being as such is good.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature.

Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(3)- RO(2) —

No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(3)- RO(3) —

As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to desire.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as was said in the preceding article.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(4) Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?

P(1)- Q(5)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.

Nom. iv), “Goodness is praised as beauty.” But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause.

Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that “we exist because God is good.” But we owe our existence to God as the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that “that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which something is.” Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(4) —

I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality of goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind — because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(4)- RO(3) —

He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, “we exist because God is good” has reference to the final cause.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5) Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically.

But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: “Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight” (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. iv, 3): “Measure fixes the mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it rest and stability.” Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, mode, species and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5)- O(5) —

Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): “It is of the nature of light not to have been created in number, weight and measure.” Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): “These three — mode, species and order — as common good things, are in everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do not exist at all, there can be nothing good.” But this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5) —

I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above AA(1),3 ).

Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5)- RO(1) —

These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because it is through them that other things are both beings and good.

Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object that is white.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5)- RO(4) —

Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), “Every mode, as mode, is good” (and the same can be said of species and order). “But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they ought to belong.

Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous.”

P(1)- Q(5)- A(5)- RO(5) —

The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body that causes change, i.e. the heavens.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(6) Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the pleasant? (*”Bonum honestum” is the virtuous good considered as fitting.) P(1)- Q(5)- A(6)- O(1) —

It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, every division is made by opposites.

But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De Offic. i, 9)

P(1)- Q(5)- A(6) — I answer that, This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called the pleasant.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according to its proper formality.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(6)- RO(2) —

This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in themselves.

P(1)- Q(5)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority.

Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.

QUESTION THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether goodness belongs to God? (2) Whether God is the supreme good? (3) Whether He alone is essentially good? (4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?

P(1)- Q(6)- A(1) Whether God is good?

P(1)- Q(6)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that to be good does not belong to God.

For goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Lamentations 3:25): “The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him.”

P(1)- Q(6)- A(1) —

I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness.

Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good “as by Whom all things subsist.”

P(1)- Q(6)- A(1)- RO(1) —

To have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(1)- RO(2) —

All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said above ( Q(4) , A(3) ). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(2) Whether God is the supreme good?

P(1)- Q(6)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is supremely simple; as was shown above ( Q(3) , A(7) ). Therefore God is not the supreme good.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, “Good is what all desire,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said ( Luke 18:19): “None is good but God alone.” But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above ( Q(3) , A(5) ; Q(4) , A(3) ) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is “the supreme good, discerned by purified minds.”

P(1)- Q(6)- A(2) —

I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above ( Q(4) , A(2) ); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in comparison with it.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(2)- RO(2) —

When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, “None is good but God alone,” this is to be understood of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(3) Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?

P(1)- Q(6)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as “one” is convertible with “being,” so is “good”; as we said above ( Q(5) , A(1) ). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good essentially.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, everything is good by its own goodness.

Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that “all things but God are good by participation.” Therefore they are not good essentially.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(3) —

I answer that, God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above ( Q(3) , A(6) ); and He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(3)- RO(1) —

“One” does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does not follow that a creature is good essentially.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself has some other goodness whereby it is good.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?

P(1)- Q(6)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), “This and that are good; take away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good.” But everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is God.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(4) —

On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(4) —

I answer that, As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated “placed” from “place,” and “measured” from “measure.” But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas ( Q(84), A(4) ) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of “being” and of “one,” and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation of these, everything was called “being” or “one”; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by way of participation.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(4) —

Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves — as Aristotle argues in many ways — still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above ( Q(2) , A(3) ), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears from the above ( Q(4) , A(3) ).

P(1)- Q(6)- A(4) —

Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.

P(1)- Q(6)- A(4) —

This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.

QUESTION THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God’s existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.

Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is infinite? (2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence? (3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude? (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?

P(1)- Q(7)- A(1) Whether God is infinite?

P(1)- Q(7)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and matter, as is said in Phys. 3: But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown above ( Q(3) , A(1) ). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that “God is infinite and eternal, and boundless.”

P(1)- Q(7)- A(1) —

I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle.

But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(1) —

We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown above ( Q(4) , A(1) , O(3) ). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown above ( Q(3) , A(4) ), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(1) —

From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God; as was said above, in this article.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him.

Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing in a subject.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(2) Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?

P(1)- Q(7)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the extent of a power is known by its effect.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is infinite.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above ( Q(3) , A(8) ). But primary matter is infinite.

Therefore something besides God can be infinite.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. 3:But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(2) —

I answer that, Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes.

But if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(2)- RO(1) —

It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite.

Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3) Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since “there is no lie in things abstract,” as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in his demonstrations says, “Let this line be infinite.” Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear from Phys. 3:But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity.

Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in Phys. 4:But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3) —

I answer that, It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3) —

We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3) —

Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3) —

The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure, and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3)- RO(1) —

A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude is infinite.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?

P(1)- Q(7)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore an infinite number of actual figures is possible.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written, “Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight” (Wis. 11:21).

P(1)- Q(7)- A(4) —

I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject.

Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(4) —

A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(4) —

This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition of multitude.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.

P(1)- Q(7)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.

QUESTION THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is in all things? (2) Whether God is everywhere? (3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence? (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?

P(1)- Q(8)- A(1) Whether God is in all things?

P(1)- Q(8)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm ( <19B204> Psalm 112:4), “The Lord is high above all nations,” etc.

Therefore God is not in all things.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, what is in anything is thereby contained.

Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them.

Therefore God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that “in Him things are, rather than He is in any place.”

P(1)- Q(8)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents.

Therefore His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness ( Corinthians 6:14). Therefore God is not in all things.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(1) —

On the contrary, A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to Isaiah 26:12, “Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: ‘for’] us.” Therefore God is in all things.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(1) —

I answer that, God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above ( Q(7) , A(1) ). Hence it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(1)- RO(1) —

God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all things; as was shown above in this article.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body.

Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(1)- RO(3) —

No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own nature.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(1)- RO(4) —

In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, “inasmuch as they are beings.” But in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(2) Whether God is everywhere?

P(1)- Q(8)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for “incorporeal things,” as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), “are not in a place.”

Therefore God is not everywhere.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place.

Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written, “I fill heaven and earth.” ( Jeremiah 23:24).

P(1)- Q(8)- A(2) —

I answer that, Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things — i.e. as one thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places, and in a small or large place.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(2)- RO(3) —

A whole is so called with reference to its parts.

Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that the mode of God’s existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power.

For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of anything.

Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added.

Therefore if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of God’s existence in things.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3) —

On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, “God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace” [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3) —

I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later ( Q(12)- ). He is said to be thus in the saints by grace.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3) —

But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present.

Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3) —

But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, “He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our things” [Vulg.: ‘He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,’ etc.] ( Job 22:14).

Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3) —

Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God’s providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things by His essence.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3) —

Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3)- RO(1) —

God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3)- RO(2) —

A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to another.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(3)- RO(4) —

No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God’s existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God’s existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (TP).

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said above ( Q(3) ). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom (Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the universe is a kind of “whole perfect body” (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(5) —

Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is “whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts.”

Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(6) —

Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), “The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives.” But the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): “Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?”

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4) —

I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to His very self.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would not be in them.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(4) —

If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(5) —

Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.

P(1)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(6) —

When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb “anywhere” determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere.

QUESTION THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)

We next consider God’s immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is altogether immutable? (2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?

P(1)- Q(9)- A(1) Whether God is altogether immutable?

P(1)- Q(9)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that God is not altogether immutable.

For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit viii, 20), “The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place.” Therefore God is in some way mutable.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is said of Wisdom, that “it is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.’mobilior’]” (Wis. 7:24). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, “Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to you” ( James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written, “I am the Lord, and I change not” ( Malachi 3:6).

P(1)- Q(9)- A(1) —

I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown above ( Q(3) , A(7) ) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously.

Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle was immovable.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(1)- RO(3) —

These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, or decline from Him.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?

P(1)- Q(9)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that “matter is in everything which is moved.” But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be immutable does not belong to God alone.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion.

But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, everything which is mutable is variable.

But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that “form is essence consisting of the simple and invariable.” Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), “God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable.”

P(1)- Q(9)- A(2) —

I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed, were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into existence.

Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from Augustine (Genesis ad lit. iv, 12).

Therefore as it was in the Creator’s power to produce them before they existed in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator’s power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power of another — namely, of God — they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(2) —

If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent with nonbeing.

Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with privation of accident; as, for example, this subject “man” can exist with “not-whiteness” and can therefore be changed from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to nonexistence; and so these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances.” Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places — which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was shown above ( Q(8) , A(2) ).

P(1)- Q(9)- A(2) —

Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such movement.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.

P(1)- Q(9)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation because by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though they were the subject of being, but because through them something has being.

QUESTION THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry: (1) What is eternity? (2) Whether God is eternal? (3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone? (4) Whether eternity differs from time? (5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity?

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1) Whether this is a good definition of eternity, “The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life”?

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: “Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life.” For the word “interminable” is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word “interminable” ought not to be found.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word “life” ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word “existence.”

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be “whole.”

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1)- O(4) —

Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it is said, “His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity” ( Micah 5:2); and also it is said, “According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity” ( Romans 16:25).

Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is “whole,” it is superfluously described as “perfect.”

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1)- O(6) —

Further, duration does not imply “possession.”

But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1) —

I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by “before” and “after.” For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1) —

Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1) —

Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable — that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as “a point is that which has no parts.” Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1)- RO(2) —

What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1)- RO(4) —

As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the “now” of time, which is imperfect.

Hence the expression “simultaneously-whole” is used to remove the idea of time, and the word “perfect” is used to exclude the “now” of time.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(1)- RO(6) —

Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we use the word “possession.”

P(1)- Q(10)- A(2) Whether God is eternal?

P(1)- Q(10)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, “The now that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;” and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) “that God is the author of eternity.” Therefore God is not eternal.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), “God is before eternity and He is after eternity”: for it is written that “the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: ‘for ever and ever’]” ( Exodus 15:18).

Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: “The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal.”

P(1)- Q(10)- A(2) —

I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The “now” that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the “now,” so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the “now” standing still. When Augustine says that “God is the author of eternity,” this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates His immutability.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(2)- RO(2) —

From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that “intelligence is equal to eternity.” In the words of Exodus, “The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond,” eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo 1:Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously whole.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Eternity is nothing else but God Himself.

Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered through present, past and future.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?

P(1)- Q(10)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that “those who instruct many to justice,” shall be “as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: ‘for all eternity’]” ( Daniel 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is written “Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: ‘everlasting’] fire” ( Matthew 25:41).

Therefore God is not the only eternal.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that “God is the only one who has no beginning.” Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(3) —

I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above ( Q(9) , A(1) ). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, “it standeth for ever” ( Ecclesiastes 1:4). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus ( Psalm 75:5) the hills are called “eternal” and we read “of the fruits of the eternal hills.” ( Deuteronomy 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because “as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, “This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God,” etc. ( John 17:3).

P(1)- Q(10)- A(3)- RO(1) —

There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according to the words “To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters” ( Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm “Their time will be for ever” ( Psalm 80:16).

P(1)- Q(10)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(4) Whether eternity differs from time?

P(1)- Q(10)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that eternity does not differ from time.

For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the “now” of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the “now” of time. But the “now” of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different from time.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being — that is, of the divine being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either eternity or is a part of eternity.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole.

But time has a “before” and an “after.” Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(4) —

I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end.

This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(4) —

Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The “now” of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its “now” corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement.

Likewise the flow of the “now” as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the “now” of time.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(4)- RO(3) —

As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(5) The difference of aeviternity and time P(1)- Q(10)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that “God moves the spiritual through time.” But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, it is essential to time to have “before” and “after”; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal “Wisdom is before age.” Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has “before” and “after”; and thus it is the same as time.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, if there is no “before” and “after” in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible.

Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) “Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity.”

P(1)- Q(10)- A(5) —

I answer that, Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity, and from time.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(5) —

Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no “before” and “after”; but that time has both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has “before” and “after” without innovation and veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For since “before” and “after” of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has “before” and “after,” it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the things measured, even then an incongruity would follow.

For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows “before” and “after” in the measure, as is clear from Phys. 4:Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain “before” and “after.” We say then that since eternity is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean between eternity and time.

But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has “before” and “after”; aeviternity in itself has no “before” and “after,” which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has neither “before” nor “after,” nor is it compatible with such at all.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because “before” and “after” are compatible with it.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(5)- RO(3) —

In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not subject to the divine power.

Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything.

Hence, since the existence and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(5)- RO(4) —

The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6) Whether there is only one aeviternity?

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6)- O(1) —

It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: “Majesty and power of ages are with Thee, O Lord.”

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels.

Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6)- O(4) —

Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity one only.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6) —

I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual things.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6) —

Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured.

Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6) —

This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later ( Q(47), A(2) ); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing’s duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we mean ages.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6)- RO(3) —

All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.

P(1)- Q(10)- A(6)- RO(4) —

For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple than the rest.

QUESTION THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether “one” adds anything to “being”? (2) Whether “one” and “many” are opposed to each other? (3) Whether God is one? (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?

P(1)- Q(11)- A(1) Whether “one” adds anything to “being”?

P(1)- Q(11)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that “one” adds something to “being.”

For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates all “genera.” But “one” is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore “one” adds something to “being.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But “being” is divided by “one” and by “many.”

Therefore “one” is an addition to “being.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, if “one” is not an addition to “being,” “one” and “being” must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to call “being” by the name of “being”; therefore it would be equally so to call being “one.” Now this is false. Therefore “one” is an addition to “being.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): “Nothing which exists is not in some way one,” which would be false if “one” were an addition to “being,” in the sense of limiting it. Therefore “one” is not an addition to “being.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(1) —

I answer that, “One” does not add any reality to “being”; but is only a negation of division; for “one” means undivided “being.” This is the very reason why “one” is the same as “being.” Now every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Some, thinking that the “one” convertible with “being” is the same as the “one” which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the “one” convertible with “being” did not add any reality to “being,” but signified the substance of “being” as undivided, thought that the same applied to the “one” which is the principle of number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the substances of all things.

Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that “one” which is the principle of number, added a reality to the substance of “being” (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought that the “one” convertible with “being” added a reality to the substance of beings; as “white” to “man.” This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is “one” by its substance. For if a thing were “one” by anything else but by its substance, since this again would be “one,” supposing it were again “one” by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the “one” which is convertible with “being,” does not add a reality to being; but that the “one” which is the principle of number, does add a reality to “being,” belonging to the genus of quantity.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(1)- RO(2) —

There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way “one,” and in another way “many.” Still, if it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is “one” in the whole, and is “many” in parts; in such a case a thing will be “one” absolutely and “many” accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be “many” absolutely and “one” accidentally; as what are “many” in number and “one” in species or “one” in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by “one” and by “many”; as it were by “one” absolutely and by “many” accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained under “being,” unless it were in some way contained under “one.” Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that “there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(1)- RO(3) —

It does not follow that it is nugatory to say “being” is “one”; forasmuch as “one” adds an idea to “being.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(2) Whether “one” and “many” are opposed to each other?

P(1)- Q(11)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that “one” and “many” are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite.

But every “multitude” is in a certain way “one,” as appears from the preceding article. Therefore “one” is not opposed to “multitude.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But “multitude” is constituted by “one.” Therefore it is not opposed to “multitude.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, “one” is opposed to “one.” But the idea of “few” is opposed to “many.” Therefore “one” is not opposed to “many.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, if “one” is opposed to “multitude,” it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that “one” comes after “multitude,” and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, “multitude” is defined by “one.” Hence there would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore “one” and “many” are not opposed.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of “one” consists in indivisibility; and the idea of “multitude” contains division. Therefore “one” and “many” are opposed to each other.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(2) —

I answer that, “One” is opposed to “many,” but in various ways. The “one” which is the principle of number is opposed to “multitude” which is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For “one” implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is “multitude” measured by “one,” as is clear from Metaph. 10:But the “one” which convertible with “being” is opposed to “multitude” by way of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(2)- RO(1) —

No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means “negation in the subject,” according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being in the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely “one” is relatively “many,” and vice versa.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(2)- RO(2) —

A “whole” is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance, every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole. Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not houses.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(2)- RO(3) —

“Many” is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to “one”; in another way as importing some kind of excess, in which sense it is opposed to “few”; hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(2)- RO(4) —

“One” is opposed to “many” privatively, inasmuch as the idea of “many” involves division. Hence division must be prior to unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and hence we define a point to be, “what has no part,” or “the beginning of a line.” “Multitude” also, in idea, follows on “one”; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence “one” is placed in the definition of “multitude”; but “multitude” is not placed in the definition of “one.” But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(3) Whether God is one?

P(1)- Q(11)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that God is not one. For it is written “For there be many gods and many lords” ( 1 Corinthians 8:5).

P(1)- Q(11)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, “One,” as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise, neither can “one” which is convertible with “being” be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord” ( Deuteronomy 6:4).

P(1)- Q(11)- A(3) —

I answer that, It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is “this particular thing” is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above ( Q(3) , A(3) ). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God.

Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(3) —

Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above ( Q(4) , A(2) ) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(3) —

Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world.

For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the “per se” cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so “per se” and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is God.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: “Our God is one,” etc.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(3)- RO(2) —

“One” which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For “one” the principle of number belongs to the “genus” of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But “one” which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(4) Whether God is supremely one?

P(1)- Q(11)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that God is not supremely “one.” For “one” is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore God is not more “one” than other things which are called “one.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity.

But a thing is said to be more “one” according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more “one” than unity is “one” and a point is “one.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially “one” is supremely “one.” But every being is essentially “one,” as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely “one”; and therefore God is not “one” more than any other being is “one.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Bernard says (De Consid. v): “Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(4) —

I answer that, Since “one” is an undivided being, if anything is supremely “one” it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown above ( Q(3) , A(7) ). Hence it is manifest that God is “one” in the supreme degree.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less.

Therefore according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, “one.”

P(1)- Q(11)- A(4)- RO(2) —

A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely “one.” For as a subject cannot be supremely “one,” because of the difference within it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.

P(1)- Q(11)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Although every being is “one” by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is compound and of others simple.

QUESTION HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God? (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image? (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye? (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God? (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God? (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another? (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God? (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it? (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes? (10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God? (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God? (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life? (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. 14:in Joan.) commenting on John 1:18, “No man hath seen God at any time,” says: “Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is increatable?” Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: “Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him.”

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above ( Q(7) , A(1) ).

Therefore in Himself He is unknown.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather superexistence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but above all intellect.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written: “We shall see Him as He is” ( 1 John 2:2).

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1) —

I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1) —

Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1)—

Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited, “He is universally to all incomprehensible,” etc. Chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says: “He says this of the most certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son.”

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as appears from what was said above ( Q(7) , A(1) ).

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1)- RO(3) —

God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means that He is not comprehended.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: “We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: ‘because’] we shall see Him as He is” ( 1 John 3:2).

P(1)- Q(12)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): “When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us.”

P(1)- Q(12)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some similitude.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle says, “We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: ‘in a dark manner’],” “by the terms ‘glass’ and ‘enigma’ certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God.” But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(2) —

I answer that, Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision — viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(2) —

Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness of Him who is the first intellect.

Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection superadded of grace or of glory.

Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), “by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;” as by the likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above ( Q(3) , A(4) ), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(2) —

Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the Psalm 35:10, “In Thy light we shall see light.” The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the divine essence itself as it really is.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(2)- RO(1) —

That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(3) Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written ( Job 19:26): “In my flesh I shall see . . . God,” and ( Job 42:5), “With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee.”

P(1)- Q(12)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): “Those eyes” (namely the glorified) “will therefore have a greater power of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things.” Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: “I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,” etc. ( Isaiah 6:1). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen by a vision of sense.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): “No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life, as visible things are seen by corporeal vision.”

P(1)- Q(12)- A(3) —

I answer that, It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power.

For every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later ( Q(78)- ). Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things.

For God is incorporeal, as was shown above ( Q(3) , A(1) ). Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The words, “In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour,” do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, “Now my eye seeth Thee,” are to be understood of the mind’s eye, as the Apostle says: “May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart” may be “enlightened” ( Ephesians 1:17,18).

P(1)- Q(12)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: “Therefore they will have an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see that incorporeal nature;” and afterwards he explains this, saying: “It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it.” Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal things, happens from two causes — viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused into the body after its renovation.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God according to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(4) Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God.” But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he understands the Divine essence.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he understand God.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above ( A(1) ). Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written: “The grace of God is life everlasting” ( Romans 6:23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the words: “This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God,” etc. ( John 17:3). Therefore to see the essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(4) —

I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything’s being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence, but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form of certain matter.

Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects as universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the body. It follows therefore that to know selfsubsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond the natural power of any created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect, as an object made intelligible to it.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(4)- RO(1) —

This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel — namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above ( A(2) ). Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it does not possess the excellence which is in God.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen.

Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created light.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, what is created can be natural to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see God; which is impossible.

Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It is written: “In Thy light we shall see light” ( Psalm 35:10).

P(1)- Q(12)- A(5) —

I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the Apocalypse ( Revelation 21:23): “The glory of God hath enlightened it” — viz. the society of the blessed who see God.

By this light the blessed are made “deiform” — i.e. like to God, according to the saying: “When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: ‘because’] we shall see Him as He is” ( 1 John 2:2).

P(1)- Q(12)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible of color.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(5)- RO(2) —

This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(5)- RO(3) —

The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made deiform, as is said in this article.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(6) Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(6)- O(1) —

It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written ( John 3:2): “We shall see Him as He is.” But He is only in one way.

Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii): “One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than another.” But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was shown above ( A(3) ). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one does not see more clearly than another.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to John 17:3: “This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God,” etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: “Star differs from star in glory” ( 1 Corinthians 15:41).

P(1)- Q(12)- A(6) —

I answer that, Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of “deiformity,” as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(6) —

Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(6)- RO(1) —

In the words,”We shall see Him as He is,” the conjunction “as” determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God’s existence.

Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is, does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the understanding of another.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(6)- RO(3) —

The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all — viz. the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(7) Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(7)- O(1) —

It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says ( Philippians 3:12): “But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: ‘apprehend’].”

But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for he said ( 1 Corinthians 9:26): “I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty.” Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: “So run that you may comprehend.”

P(1)- Q(12)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): “That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer.” But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple.

Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, if we say that He is seen as a “whole,” but not “wholly,” it may be contrarily urged that “wholly” refers either to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written: “O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought” ( Jeremiah 32:18,19).

Therefore He cannot be comprehended.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(7) —

I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet “for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great beatitude,” as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii).

P(1)- Q(12)- A(7) —

In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears — Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above ( Q(7) ) is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(7)- RO(1) —

“Comprehension” is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense “comprehension” is taken more largely as opposed to “non-attainment”; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, “I held him, and I will not let him go” (Cant 3:4); in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way “comprehension” is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(7)- RO(2) —

God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(7)- RO(3) —

The word “wholly” denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God’s essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(8) Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(8)- O(1) —

It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): “What do they not see, who see Him Who sees all things?” But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all things.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima 3:But all that God does, or can do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(8)- O(4) —

Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows all things.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(8) —

On the contrary, The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), “the inferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels.”

Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the essence of God, does not know all things.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(8) —

I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it.

For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above ( A(7) ). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it sees God.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(8)- RO(2) —

It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror itself.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(8)- RO(3) —

Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less perfectly.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(8)- RO(4) —

The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): “Unhappy the man who knoweth all these” (i.e. all creatures) “and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone.”

P(1)- Q(12)- A(9) Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(9)- O(1) —

It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude of color.

Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their similitudes.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he said: “I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter” ( 2 Corinthians 12:4).

Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(9) —

On the contrary, A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror. Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or ideas.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(9) —

I answer that, Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God Himself is seen.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(9)- RO(1) —

The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(9)- RO(2) —

Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(10) Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(10) - O(1) —

It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii): “It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood.” But what is seen in God, is understood; for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the same time.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. viii, 22,23), “God moves the spiritual creature according to time” — i.e. by intelligence and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively; for time means succession.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(10) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): “Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall see all we know at one glance.” I answer that, What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not successively.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(10) - RO(1) —

We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand “animal” and “rational”; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(10) - RO(2) —

As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God, they see all at the same time.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(11) Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(11) - O(1) —

It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: “I have seen God face to face” ( Genesis 32:30).

But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: “We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face” ( 1 Corinthians 13:12).

P(1)- Q(12)- A(11) - O(2) —

Further, the Lord said to Moses: “I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord” ( Numbers 12:8); but this is to see God in His essence.

Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(11) - O(3) —

Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): “If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our minds.” He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, “We judge of all things according to the divine truth”; and (De Trin. xii) that, “it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable.” Therefore even in this life we see God Himself.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(11) - O(4) —

Further, according to Augustine (Genesis ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says (Genesis ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(11) —

On the contrary, It is written, “Man shall not see Me, and live” ( Exodus 32:20), and a gloss upon this says, “In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own nature.” I answer that, God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, as was said above ( A(4) ), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above ( AA(2),9 ) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(11) - RO(1) —

According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, “I have seen God face to face,” this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as will later be explained ( P(2) Q(174) ) in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(11) - RO(2) —

As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles.

This will be treated more fully in the question of rapture ( P(2) Q(175) ).

P(1)- Q(12)- A(11) - RO(3) —

All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun’s light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), “The lessons of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun,” namely God. As therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(11) - RO(4) —

Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(12) Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(12) - O(1) —

It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that “reason does not grasp simple form.” But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above ( Q(3) , A(7) ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(12) - O(2) —

Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(12) - O(3) —

Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature.

But the knowledge of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): “The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith.” Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(12) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Romans 1:19), “That which is known of God,” namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, “is manifest in them.” I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as their cause.

Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God “whether He exists,” and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.

Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(12) - RO(1) —

Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know “what it is”; but it can know “whether it is.”

P(1)- Q(12)- A(12) - RO(2) —

God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(12) - RO(3) —

As the knowledge of God’s essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting what he had said before: “I do not approve what I said in prayer, ‘God who willest that only the pure should know truth.’

For it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths,” i.e. by natural reason.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(13) Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?

P(1)- Q(12)- A(13) - O(1) —

It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him “what He is,” comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to us by grace than by natural reason.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(13) - O(2) —

Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that “it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils.” Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(13) - O(3) —

Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Ev.) that “things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge.” Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of God by grace.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(13) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says that “God hath revealed to us His spirit,” what “none of the princes of this world knew” ( 1 Corinthians 2:10), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds. I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions.

Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect’s natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, “This is My beloved Son” ( Matthew 3:17).

P(1)- Q(12)- A(13) - RO(1) —

Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God “what He is,” and thus are united to Him as to one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and One.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(13) - RO(2) —

From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light.

P(1)- Q(12)- A(13) - RO(3) —

Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles.

QUESTION THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)

After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.

Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry: (1) Whether God can be named by us? (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially? (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically? (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous? (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally? (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures? (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time? (8) Whether this name “God” is a name of nature, or of the operation? (9) Whether this name “God” is a communicable name? (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion? (11) Whether this name, “Who is,” is the supremely appropriate name of God? (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(1) Whether a name can be given to God?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, “Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be found of Him;” and it is written: “What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?” ( Proverbs 30:4).

P(1)- Q(13)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Exodus 15:3): “The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name.”

P(1)- Q(13)- A(1) —

I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above ( Q(12), AA(11),12 ) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name “man” expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by the name is the definition.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about God, and signify in word.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as He is.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(1)- RO(3) —

To signify substance with quality is to signify the “suppositum” with a nature or determined form in which it subsists.

Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative pronouns.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(2) Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): “Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation.”

P(1)- Q(13)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): “You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God.” Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence.

Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi): “The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified.” Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(2) —

I answer that, Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(2) —

But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as “good,” “wise,” and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses.

Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, “God is good,” we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other names.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(2) —

Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words “God is good,” signified no more than, “God is the cause of good things,” it might in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(2) —

Therefore we must hold a different doctrine — viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above ( Q(4) , A(2) ) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above ( Q(4) , A(3) ), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, “God is good,” the meaning is not, “God is the cause of goodness,” or “God is not evil”; but the meaning is, “Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God,” and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), “Because He is good, we are.”

P(1)- Q(13)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(2)- RO(2) —

In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance, this name “stone” [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word “lapis” which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say “God lives,” the sense were, “life proceeds from Him”; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it preexists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(2)- RO(3) —

We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(3) Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained above ( A(1) ). But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like.

Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such names as “good,” “wise,” and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).

Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii), “Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude.”

Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(3) —

I answer that, According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God — viz. the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him.

But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(3)- RO(1) —

There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as “stone” signifies a material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense.

Other names, however, express these perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their signification as the words “being,” “good,” “living,” and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and all life.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(3)- RO(3) —

These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(4) Whether names applied to God are synonymous?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain notions.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(4) —

On the contrary, All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, “vesture clothing.” Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous, we cannot properly say “good God” or the like, and yet it is written, “O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy name” ( Jeremiah 32:18).

P(1)- Q(13)- A(4) —

I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above ( A(2) ), that these names signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said ( AA 1,2 ) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood.

Therefore although the names applied to God signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not synonymous.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(4) —

Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things represent Him.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(5) Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one; for if the name “dog” be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally — viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is predicated univocally.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the word of Genesis ( Genesis 1:26), “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(5) —

On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God.

Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(5) —

Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(5) —

I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things.

In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term “wise” applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man’s essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term “wise” applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term “wise” is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(5) —

Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: “The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made” ( Romans 1:20).

Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(5) —

Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example “healthy” predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus “healthy” is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense.

For we can name God only from creatures ( A(1) ). Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus “healthy” applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first nonunivocal analogical predication, which is being.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing ( Q(4) , A(3) ).

P(1)- Q(13)- A(5)- RO(3) —

God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same genus.

The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(6) Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(6)- O(1) —

It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since “names”, as the Philosopher says, “are signs of ideas.” But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): “We name God from creatures.” But names transferred from creatures to God, are said primarily of creatures rather than of God, as “lion,” “stone,” and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for “healthy” is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written, “I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named” ( Ephesians 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures.

Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(6) —

I answer that, In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for instance, “healthy” applied to animals comes into the definition of “healthy” applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of “healthy” which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal’s health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as “smiling” applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of “lion” applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, “God is good,” it would then only mean “God is the cause of the creature’s goodness”; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature’s goodness. Hence “good” would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above ( A(2) ), these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, “God is good,” or “wise,” signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above ( A(3) ).

P(1)- Q(13)- A(6)- RO(1) —

This objection refers to the imposition of the name.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(6)- RO(3) —

This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as “healthy” is applied to medicine.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7) Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)- O(1) —

It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name “Lord” is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and “Creator” signifies the action of God, which is His essence.

Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: “I have loved thee with an everlasting love” ( Jeremiah 31:3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as “Lord” and “Creator,” are applied to God from eternity.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)- O(4) —

Further, names of this kind signify relation.

Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only.

But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called “Lord” from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)- O(5) —

Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)- O(6) —

Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names “Lord” and “Creator” are predicated of God from eternity, and not temporally.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation “Lord” is applied to God temporally.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7) —

I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7) —

To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical.

Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing “the same as itself.” For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between “being” and “non-being” formed by reason, apprehending “non-being” as an extreme.

The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)—

Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7) —

Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, “on the right” is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7) —

Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as “master” and “servant,” “father,” and “son,” and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as “Lord,” and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as “Saviour,” “Creator,” and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)- RO(2) —

As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, “to become” or “to be made” are applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, “Lord, Thou art become [Douay: ‘hast been’] our refuge” ( Psalm 89:1).

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)- RO(3) —

The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as “Saviour,” “Creator,” and the like.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)- RO(4) —

Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)- RO(5) —

Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(7)- RO(6) —

To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, “Lord” and “servant,” are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not “Lord” until He had a creature subject to Himself.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(8) Whether this name “God” is a name of the nature?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(8)- O(1) —

It seems that this name, “God,” is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that “God \Theos\ is so called from the \theein\ [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the \aithein\, that is to burn, for our God is a fire consuming all malice; or from \theasthai\, which means to consider all things.” But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name “God” signifies His operation and not His nature.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, a thing is named by us as we know it.

But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name “God” does not signify the divine nature.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide i) that “God” is a name of the nature.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(8) —

I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the stone’s substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(8) —

Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as said in A(1) ; hence this name “God” is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), “The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and goodness.” But taken from this operation, this name “God” is imposed to signify the divine nature.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(8)- RO(1) —

All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name “God.”

P(1)- Q(13)- A(8)- RO(2) —

We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can know what stone is in itself from its property, this name “stone” signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Metaph. 4:Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above ( Q(12), A(12) ). Thus the name “God” signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(9) Whether this name “God” is communicable?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(9)- O(1) —

It seems that this name “God” is communicable.

For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name “God” signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, “He hath given us great [Vulg.: ‘most great’] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: ‘ye’] may be made partakers of the divine nature” ( 2 Peter 1:4).

Therefore this name “God” can be communicated to others.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name “God” is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, “I have said, You are gods” ( Psalm 81:6). Therefore this name “God” is communicable.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, this name “God” comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as “good,” “wise,” and the like. Therefore this name “God” is communicable.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(9) —

On the contrary, It is written: “They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones” (Wis. 14:21), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name “God” is incommunicable.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(9) —

I answer that, A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance this name “lion” is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as “lion”; by similitude it is communicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called “Achilles” metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any “suppositum,” but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some “suppositum.” Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(9) —

Since, then, this name “God” is given to signify the divine nature as stated above ( A(8) ), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above ( Q(11), A(3) ), it follows that this name “God” is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name “sun” would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: “You served them who by nature are not gods,” ( Galatians 4:8), and a gloss adds, “Gods not in nature, but in human opinion.”

Nevertheless this name “God” is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, “I have said, You are gods” ( Psalm 81:6).

P(1)- Q(13)- A(9) —

But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His “suppositum,” accordingly as He is considered as “this something,” that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(9)- RO(1) —

The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(9)- RO(2) —

This name “God” is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name “sun.”

P(1)- Q(13)- A(9)- RO(3) —

These names “good,” “wise,” and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But this name “God” is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine nature.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(10) Whether this name “God” is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(10) - O(1) —

It seems that this name “God” is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who says: “An idol is not God,” contradicts a pagan who says: “An idol is God.” Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken of univocally.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. But this name “beatitude” is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this name “God” is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: “There is one God,” he understands by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: “An idol is God.” Therefore this name “God” is applied univocally to both.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(10) —

On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. 1:But the word “animal” applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal.

Therefore this name “God” applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally.

Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name “God” is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(10) —

I answer that, This name “God” in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, “being” which is applied to “substance” is placed in the definition of being as applied to “accident”; and “healthy” applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.

The same applies to the question at issue. For this name “God,” as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(10) - RO(1) —

The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name “man,” of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name “man” we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name “man” what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, “All the gods of the Gentiles are demons” ( Psalm 95:5).

P(1)- Q(13)- A(10) - RO(1) —

The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(10) - RO(4) —

The term “animal” applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of different predicaments.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(10) - RO(5) —

Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion ( Q(12), A(12) ). So a pagan can take this name “God” in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know not.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(11) Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(11) - O(1) —

It seems that this nameHE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name “God” is an incommunicable name. But this nameHE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name.

Therefore this nameHE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(11) - O(2) —

Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that “the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God.” But it especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things.

Therefore this name “good” is supremely proper to God, and not this nameHE WHO IS.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(11) - O(3) —

Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this nameHE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name\parHE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(11) —

On the contrary, It is written that when Moses asked, “If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?” The Lord answered him, “Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you” ( Exodus 3:13,14).

Therefor this nameHE WHO IS most properly belongs to God.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(11) —

I answer that, This nameHE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:

First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other ( Q(3) , A(4) ), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.

Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, “HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance.” Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this nameHE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the “infinite ocean of substance.”

Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).

P(1)- Q(13)- A(11) - RO(1) —

This nameHE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name “God,” as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name “God” is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(11) - RO(2) —

This name “good” is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(11) - RO(3) —

It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name,HE WHO IS.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?

P(1)- Q(13)- A(12) - O(1) —

It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that “negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague.”

P(1)- Q(13)- A(12) - O(2) —

Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that “a simple form cannot be a subject.” But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown ( Q(3) ): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject.

Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(12) - O(3) —

Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown above ( Q(3) , A(7) ). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(12) —

On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false.

But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God. I answer that, True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that “man” and “white” are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, “man is an animal”; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same “suppositum” there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to “suppositum,” but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the “suppositum” what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the “suppositum”; according to the saying that “predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially.” To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.

God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(12) - RO(1) —

Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, “incongruous,” inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(12) - RO(2) —

Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and attributes something else to it.

P(1)- Q(13)- A(12) - RO(3) —

This proposition, “The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false,” can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb “otherwise” determines the word “understanding” on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of understanding is immaterial.

Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.

QUESTION OF GOD’S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)

Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God’s operation. And since one kind of operation is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas.

Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry: (1) Whether there is knowledge in God? (2) Whether God understands Himself? (3) Whether He comprehends Himself? (4) Whether His understanding is His substance? (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself? (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them? (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive? (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things? (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things? (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil? (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things? (12) Whether He knows the infinite? (13) Whether He knows future contingent things? (14) Whether He knows enunciable things? (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable? (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(1) Whether there is knowledge (*Scientia)?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular.

But in God there is no universal or particular ( Q(3) , A(5) ). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says, “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God” ( Romans 11:33).

P(1)- Q(14)- A(1) —

I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that “the soul is in a sense all things.” Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above ( Q(7) , A(1) ) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima 3:Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above ( Q(7) , A(1) ), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself ( Q(4) , A(2) ), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly ( Q(13), A(4) ). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge.

He has “intelligence” as regards the knowledge of principles; he has “science” as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has “wisdom,” according as he knows the highest cause; he has “counsel” or “prudence,” according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown ( A(7) ). Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, “With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding” ( Job 12:13).

P(1)- Q(14)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(2) Whether God understands Himself?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that God does not understand Himself.

For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), “Every knower who knows his own essence, returns completely to his own essence.” But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made perfect by itself, “nor,” as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), “is a thing its own likeness.” Therefore God does not understand Himself.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima 3:Therefore God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written: “The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God” ( 1 Corinthians 2:11).

P(1)- Q(14)- A(2) —

I answer that, God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that “the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act.” For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(2) —

Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God understands Himself through Himself.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, “whoever knows his essence returns to it.” Now it supremely belongs to God to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in De Anima 3. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and its own intelligible object.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(3) Whether God comprehends Himself?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that “whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself.” But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(3)- O(2) —

If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is against what was laid down above ( Q(7) , A(1) ). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that “Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself.” But God understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(3) —

I answer that, God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. 9. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above ( AA(1),2 ). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The strict meaning of “comprehension” signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), “The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer.”

P(1)- Q(14)- A(3)- RO(2) —

When it is said, “God is finite to Himself,” this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(4) Whether the act of God’s intellect is His substance?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that the act of God’s intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God’s intellect is not His substance.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, to understand one’s act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, and but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand our act of understanding: and thus God’s act of understanding will not be something great.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God’s intellect is not His substance.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii), “In God to be is the same as to be wise.” But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God’s existence is His substance, as shown above ( Q(3) , A(4) ). Therefore the act of God’s intellect is His substance.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(4) —

I answer that, It must be said that the act of God’s intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how this is. As was laid down above ( A(2) ), to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above ( Q(3) ). Hence as His essence itself is also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(4) —

Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(4)- RO(1) —

To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(4)- RO(2) —

When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.

Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is not another’s; hence it need not proceed to infinity.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(5) Whether God knows things other than Himself?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that “God does not behold anything out of Himself.” Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It is written: “All things are naked and open to His eyes” ( Hebrews 4:13).

P(1)- Q(14)- A(5) —

I answer that, God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid ( Q(2) , A(3) ), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence of the first effective cause — viz. God — is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(5) —

Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(5) —

So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God “sees nothing outside Himself” is not to be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima 3:For “a stone is not in the soul, but its image.” Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the divine intellect other than the divine essence.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(5)- RO(3) —

The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended.

Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(6) Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(6)- O(1) —

It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown ( A(5) ), God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above ( Q(12)- / A(2) ). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know “what it is,” which is to have proper knowledge of it.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(6) —

On the contrary, To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches “even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His sight” ( Hebrews 4:12,13).

P(1)- Q(14)- A(6) —

I answer that, Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(6) —

But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. 1:If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above ( Q(4) , A(1) ). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(6) —

Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise.

For it was shown above ( Q(4) , A(2) ) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures--viz. being — belongs to their perfection, but also what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the nonintelligent.

Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of God is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(6) —

As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(6)- RO(1) —

So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb “so” imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false.

For the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb ‘so’ be understood to import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge.

We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(6)- RO(3) —

The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in, and imitate it.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(7)- O(1) —

It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): “The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a time.” Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above ( AA 2,5 ), it seems that He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), “God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there; but He sees all things together at once.”

P(1)- Q(14)- A(7) —

I answer that, In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown.

Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first.

Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Altogether there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium), as shown above.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(7)- RO(2) —

God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(7)- RO(3) —

God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His knowledge is not discursive.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(8)- O(1) —

It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on Romans 8:30, “Whom He called, them He also justified,” etc.: “A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists.”

P(1)- Q(14)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, “The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure,” as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), “Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are.”

P(1)- Q(14)- A(8) —

I answer that, The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the “knowledge of approbation.”

P(1)- Q(14)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(8)- RO(1) But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(8)- RO(2) —

The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(8)- RO(3) —

Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(9) Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(9)- O(1) —

It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But “truth” and “being” are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(9) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says: “Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are” ( Romans 4:17).

P(1)- Q(14)- A(9) —

I answer that, God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(9) —

Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God’s act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God’s power, or the creature’s, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(9)- RO(1) —

Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(9)- RO(2) —

Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(9)- RO(3) —

The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be possible.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(10) Whether God knows evil things?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(10) - O(1) —

It seems that God does not know evil things.

For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation. But “evil is the privation of good,” as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing ( A(2) ), it seems that God does not know evil things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing ( A(5) ). Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii).

Therefore God does not know evil things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(10) - O(4) —

Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect.

Therefore God does not know evil things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(10) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Proverbs 15:11), “Hell and destruction are before God [Vulg: ‘the Lord’].” I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): “God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through light.”

P(1)- Q(14)- A(10) - RO(1) —

The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(10) - RO(2) —

The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(10) - RO(3) —

Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(10) - RO(4) —

To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(11) Whether God knows singular things?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(11) - O(1) —

It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect.

Now the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), “reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things.” Therefore God does not know singular things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(11) - O(2) —

Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions.

But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality.

Therefore God does not know singular things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(11) - O(3) —

Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(11) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Proverbs 16:2), “All the ways of a man are open to His eyes.” I answer that, God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing ( Q(4) , A(2) ). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.

Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singular things in their singularity.

On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above ( A(8) ), His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on ( Q(44), A(2) ), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(11) - RO(1) —

Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also singular things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(11) - RO(2) —

Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(11) - RO(3) —

Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(12) Whether God can know infinite things?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(12) - O(1) —

It seems that God cannot know infinite things.

For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, “to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured,” as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that “whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower.” Now infinite things have no boundary.

Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(12) - O(2) —

Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God’s knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. 3:But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. 6:Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in God’s knowledge, which is infinite.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(12) - O(3) —

Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(12) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), “Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds.” I answer that, Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above ( A(9) ), and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things.

Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.

The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(12) - RO(1) —

The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above ( A(7) ). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(12) - RO(2) —

Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender.

Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as if it were traversable.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(12) - RO(3) —

The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art.

Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of God.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(13) Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(13) - O(1) —

It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above ( A(8) ). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(13) - O(2) —

Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. 1:But this is a true conditional proposition, “If God knew that this thing will be, it will be,” for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(13) - O(3) —

Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(13) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 32:15), “He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works,” i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things. I answer that, Since as was shown above ( A(9) ), God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.

In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above ( Q(10), A(2) ).

Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(13) - RO(1) —

Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(13) - RO(2) —

Some say that this antecedent, “God knew this contingent to be future,” is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow.

On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, “Socrates is a white man.” But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, “God knew this contingent to be future,” contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition.

Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, “if the sun moves, the grass will grow.”

Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, “What the soul understands is immaterial,” this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, “If God knew anything, it will be,” the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: “For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be,” as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(13) - RO(3) —

Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, “Everything known by God must necessarily be,” is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, “Everything which God knows is necessary.” If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, “This proposition, ‘that which is known by God is’ is necessary.”

Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, “It is possible for a white thing to be black,” it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, “ a white thing is black” can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, “A black crow can be white”; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words “that which is known” implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(14) Whether God knows enunciable things?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(14) - O(1) —

It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition.

Therefore God does not know enunciable things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(14) - O(2) —

Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(14) —

On the contrary, It is written: “The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men” ( Psalm 93:11).

But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things. I answer that, Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above ( A(9) ), it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.

Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine intellect, which is God’s essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(14) - RO(1) —

This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(14) - RO(2) —

Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(15) - O(1) —

It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the variation of creatures.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(15) - O(2) —

Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(15) - O(3) —

Further, God knew that Christ would be born.

But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(15) —

On the contrary, It is said, that in God “there is no change nor shadow of alteration” ( James 1:17). I answer that, Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing ( A(4) ), just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above ( Q(9) , A(1) ), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(15) - RO(1) —

“Lord”, “Creator” and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that “Lord”, “Creator” and the like, import the relations consequent upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But “knowledge” and “love,” and the like, import relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable manner.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(15) - RO(2) —

God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(15) - RO(3) —

The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say “Christ is born” and “will be born” and “was born”; because the same thing is signified by these three — viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, “Socrates sits,” is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, “Whatever God knew He knows,” if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God is variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of which can be in God.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(16) Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?

P(1)- Q(14)- A(16) - O(1) —

It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above ( A(8) ). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(16) - O(2) —

Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge.

Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(16) —

On the contrary, Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things. I answer that, Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing.

Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing — as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; “for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.

In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.

Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(16) - RO(1) —

The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make, and which nevertheless are never made.

P(1)- Q(14)- A(16) - RO(2) —

The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as it is human.

In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.

QUESTION OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)

After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are ideas? (2) Whether they are many, or one only? (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?

P(1)- Q(15)- A(1) Whether there are ideas?

P(1)- Q(15)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them.

Therefore there are no ideas.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said ( Q(14), A(5) ). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),”Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood.”

P(1)- Q(15)- A(1) —

I answer that, It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word \Idea\ is in Latin “forma.” Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:

P(1)- Q(15)- A(1) —

In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire.

Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later ( Q(46), A(1) ), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(1)- RO(1) —

God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(1)- RO(3) —

God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(2) Whether ideas are many?

P(1)- Q(15)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God’s essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, except “ingenerability, generation, and procession.” Ideas therefore are not many.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), “Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so.”

P(1)- Q(15)- A(2) —

I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. 12:Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), “that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it,” from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(2)- RO(2) —

By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(3) Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?

P(1)- Q(15)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above ( A(9) ). But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): “Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things.” Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato’s teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(3) —

I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an “exemplar,” and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a “type,” and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an “exemplar” nor as a “type.”

P(1)- Q(15)- A(3)- RO(2) —

God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an “exemplar” but only in so far as it denotes a “type.”

P(1)- Q(15)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.

P(1)- Q(15)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an “exemplar”; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later ( Q(22), A(3) ).

QUESTION OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect? (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing? (3) On the comparison of the true to being. (4) On the comparison of the true to the good. (5) Whether God is truth? (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many? (7) On the eternity of truth. (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(1) Whether truth resides only in the intellect?

P(1)- Q(16)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, “That is true which is seen”; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, “That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know,” for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it.

Therefore he defines truth thus: “That is true which is.” It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, “that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so,” as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), “ The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect.”

P(1)- Q(16)- A(1) —

I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite — and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(1) —

Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect’s mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), “Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;” and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that “Truth makes being clear and evident” and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine’s definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), “Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle”: also Anselm’s definition (De Verit. xii), “Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone”; for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna’s definition (Metaph. viii, 6), “The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it.” The definition that “Truth is the equation of thought and thing” is applicable to it under either aspect.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or a word is true “from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true.”

P(1)- Q(16)- A(2) Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?

P(1)- Q(16)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards “what a thing is.” Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing “what a thing is.” Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is.

Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(2) —

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and “what a thing is,” truth is “found neither in the intellect nor in things.”

P(1)- Q(16)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth.

But in no way can sense know this. For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing “what a thing is.” When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows “what a thing is”; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing “what a thing is,” as in anything that is true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word “truth”; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing “what a thing is.”

And thus the Objections given are solved.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(3) Whether the true and being are convertible terms?

P(1)- Q(16)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated ( A(1) ); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, that which extends to being and notbeing is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and notbeing; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(3) —

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(3) —

I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that “the soul is in some manner all things,” through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true.

But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before ( A(1) ). But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already ( A(1) ). It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable.

Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(3)- RO(3) —

When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true.

In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(4) Whether good is logically prior to the true?

P(1)- Q(16)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that good is logically prior to the true.

For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. 1:But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above ( A(2) ). But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. 4:But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(4) —

On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(4) —

I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely.

Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(4)- RO(2) —

A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The virtue which is called “truth” is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to “life” is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things ( A(1) ). Whereas the truth of “justice” is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.

P(1)- Q(16)- A(5) Whether God is truth?