QUESTIONS 1-5 PROLOGUE Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God’s image, in so far as the image implies “an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement”: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having freewill and control of his actions.

QUESTION OF MAN’S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)

In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end? (2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature? (3) Whether a man’s actions are specified by their end? (4) Whether there is any last end of human life? (5) Whether one man can have several last ends? (6) Whether man ordains all to the last end? (7) Whether all men have the same last end? (8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name, implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this preposition “for” indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to man to act for an end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one’s foot or hand, or scratches one’s beard, while intent on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(1) —

On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs to man to do everything for an end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(1) —

I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone are properly called “human,” which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions.

Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as “the faculty and will of reason.”

Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions “of a man,” but not properly “human” actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good.

Therefore all human actions must be for an end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent’s intention. And it is this way that it is a cause.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(1)- RO(2) —

If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing.

Consequently it follows that if a human action be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that action in which the last end consists.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(2) Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they are altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for an end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, to act for an end is to order one’s action to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to things that lack reason.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But “the will is in the reason” (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that “not only mind but also nature acts for an end.”

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(2) —

I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the “rational appetite,” which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the “natural appetite.”

Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the “faculty of will and reason.” But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent, as stated above ( P(1), Q(22), A(2), ad 4; P(1), Q(103), A(1), ad 3).

Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(2)- RO(1) —

When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he acts at another’s command, or when he is moved under another’s compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it is thus with irrational creatures.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(2)- RO(2) —

To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular departments of the city.

Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(3) Whether human acts are specified by their end?

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards.

Therefore a human act does not derive its species from the end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends. Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13): “According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy of blame or praise.”

I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific nature. And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For human acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above ( A(1) ) that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In like manner it is their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of the thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator.

And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.) “morality is said properly of man,” moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as human acts.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as passion.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above ( A(1), ad 1). And it is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral act.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(3)- RO(3) —

One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the will: thus this act “to kill a man,” which is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there would be several acts in different species of morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a movement does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its “per se” terminus. Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality.

Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered in their moral species, and conversely.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(4) Whether there is one last end of human life?

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is no last end of the human will.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that “to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good.” But the good is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to fix one last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(4) —

I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends — the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first.

For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely.

On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The very nature of good is that something flows from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that from the end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are ordained to the end. And this would be true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which is infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wis. 11:21), God disposes all things “in number, weight and measure.”

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(4)- RO(2) —

In things which are of themselves, reason begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one another.

But in those things which are accidentally connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it.

Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders the reason from an indefinite process.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(4)- RO(3) —

This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or several times.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(5) Whether one man can have several last ends?

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem possible for one man’s will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man’s last end to consist in four things, viz. “in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue.” But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many things.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does not exclude others.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is possible for one man’s will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(5) —

On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life. Hence of gluttons it is written ( Philippians 3:19): “Whose god is their belly”: viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now according to Matthew 6:24, “No man can serve two masters,” such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man to have several last ends not ordained to one another.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(5) —

I answer that, It is impossible for one man’s will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): “In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be complete.” It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man’s appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.

The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only.

But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last end.

Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end, is one.

The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their species from the end, as stated above ( A(3) ), they must needs receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as natural things are placed in a genus according to a common form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every genus there is one first principle; and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(5)- RO(1) —

All these several objects were considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing’s perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing’s perfection.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(5)- RO(3) —

The power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2).

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(6) Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to the last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake. Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end.

Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): “That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we love it for its own sake.”

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(6) —

I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons.

First, because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good.

And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end.

Secondly, because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford him pleasure or relaxation. But man’s consummate good is his last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist’s good, included in complete and perfect good, which is the ultimate end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(6)- RO(3) —

One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one’s thoughts be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(7) Whether all men have the same last end?

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning.

Therefore all men have not the same last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, man’s entire life is ruled according to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(7) —

I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above ( A(5) ). But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires for his last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above ( A(5) ).

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(8) Whether other creatures concur in that last end?

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that all other creatures concur in man’s last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man’s beginning — i.e. God — is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in man’s last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “God turns all things to Himself as to their last end.” But He is also man’s last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man’s last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, man’s last end is the object of the will.

But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all.

Therefore other things, too, concur in man’s last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(8) —

On the contrary, man’s last end is happiness; which all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But “happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason,” as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5).

Therefore other things do not concur in man’s last end.

P(2a)- Q(1)- A(8) —

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold — the end “for which” and the end “by which”; viz. the thing itself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of a weighty body is either a lower place as “thing,” or to be in a lower place, as “use”; and the end of the miser is money as “thing,” or possession of money as “use.”

If, therefore, we speak of man’s last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man’s last end, since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man’s last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.

Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means the acquisition of the last end.

QUESTION OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN’S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.

Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether happiness consists in wealth? (2) Whether in honor? (3) Whether in fame or glory? (4) Whether in power? (5) Whether in any good of the body? (6) Whether in pleasure? (7) Whether in any good of the soul? (8) Whether in any created good?

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(1) Whether man’s happiness consists in wealth?

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that man’s happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man’s last end, it must consist in that which has the greatest hold on man’s affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written ( Ecclesiastes 10:19): “All things obey money.” Therefore man’s happiness consists in wealth.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is “a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.” Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more than anything else; since “a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches” ( Ecclesiastes 5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Man’s good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), “wealth shines in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded.” Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in wealth.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(1) —

I answer that, It is impossible for man’s happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3), viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things salable.

Now it is evident that man’s happiness cannot consist in natural wealth.

For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man’s last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to Psalm 8:8: “Thou hast subjected all things under his feet.”

And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(1)- RO(1) —

All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(1)- RO(2) —

All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written ( Proverbs 17:16): “What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom.”

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:29): “They that eat me shall yet hunger.” Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord’s words ( John 4:13): “Whosoever drinketh of this water,” by which temporal goods are signified, “shall thirst again.” The reason of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good does not consist therein.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(2) Whether man’s happiness consists in honors?

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that man’s happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is “the reward of virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).

Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).

Moreover, the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 1:17): “To . . . the only God be honor and glory.” Therefore happiness consists in honor.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor.

Therefore happiness consists in honor.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5).

Therefore happiness does not consist in honor.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(2) —

I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man’s excellence is in proportion, especially to his happiness, which is man’s perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(2)- RO(1) —

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive honor from men by way of reward, “as from those who have nothing greater to offer.” But virtue’s true reward is happiness itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that honor makes them excellent.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(2)- RO(3) —

That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(3) Whether man’s happiness consists in fame or glory?

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that man’s happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says ( Romans 8:18): “The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us.”

Therefore happiness consists in glory.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man’s good is spread abroad in the knowledge of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. 2:13], glory consists “in being well known and praised.” Therefore man’s happiness consists in glory.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, happiness is the most enduring good.

Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): “You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your fame in future time.”

Therefore man’s happiness consists in fame or glory.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Happiness is man’s true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), “many owe their renown to the lying reports spread among the people.

Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at their own praise.” Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in fame or glory.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(3) —

I answer that, Man’s happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists “in being well known and praised,” as Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says.

Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God’s knowledge: for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God’s knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another’s happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man’s happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man’s good depends on God’s knowledge as its cause. And therefore man’s beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; according to Psalm 90:15,16: “I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation.”

Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written ( 2 Corinthians 10:18): “He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth.”

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels.

Hence it is written ( Mark 8:38): “The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels” [*St. Thomas joins Mark 8:38 with Luke 12:8 owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory].

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(3)- RO(2) —

A man’s good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident.

But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(4) Whether man’s happiness consists in power?

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that happiness consists in power.

For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture they are called “gods” ( Exodus 22:28), “Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods.”

Therefore happiness consists in power.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), “the power of man cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety”: and further on: “Think you a man is powerful who is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?”

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(4) —

I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle, as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good and evil: whereas happiness is man’s proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.

Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, since happiness is man’s supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to “satisfy of itself,” as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like.

Thirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written ( Ecclesiastes 5:12) that “riches” are sometimes “kept to the hurt of the owner”; and the same may be said of the other three. Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(4)- RO(1) —

God’s power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men.

Consequently it is not enough for man’s happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man’s supreme good consists in power.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(5) Whether man’s happiness consists in any bodily good?

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that man’s happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): “There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body.” But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore it consists in the health of the body.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that “to be” is better than “to live,” and “to live” is better than all that follows. But for man’s being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is man’s supreme good, it seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that which is most desired by all. Therefore man’s happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the health of the body.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in goods of the body.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(5) —

I answer that, It is impossible for man’s happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to Ecclus. 15:14: “God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel.” Now it is evident that man is ordained to something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man’s reason and will cannot be the preservation of man’s being.

Secondly, because, granted that the end of man’s will and reason be the preservation of man’s being, it could not be said that the end of man is some good of the body. For man’s being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above ( P(1), Q(75), A(2) ); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man’s last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by “riches,” just as the good of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent. Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than living things.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(6) Whether man’s happiness consists in pleasure?

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that man’s happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: “for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be pleased” (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, “the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause” (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man’s will and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man’s last end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): “Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too.”

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(6) —

I answer that, Because bodily delights are more generally known, “the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them” (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man’s happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.

But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way.

For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man’s perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite.

Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not man’s perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is written (Wis. 7:9) that “all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand.” And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(6)- RO(1) —

It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite’s rest in good: thus it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition “for” denote the final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(6)- RO(3) —

All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(7) Whether some good of the soul constitutes man’s happiness?

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man’s happiness. For happiness is man’s good. Now this is threefold: external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above ( AA(4),5 ). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above ( A(5) ). Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(7) —

On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr.

Christ. i, 22), “that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake.” But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God’s sake. Therefore happiness consists in no good of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(7) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(1) , A(8) ), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man’s last end, it is impossible for man’s last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.

In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man’s appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good.

And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man’s last end.

But if we speak of man’s last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness is a good of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(7)- RO(2) —

As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself.

Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(8) Whether any created good constitutes man’s happiness?

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that some created good constitutes man’s happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom “unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things,” from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher nature. But man’s highest good is happiness.

Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated in P(1), Q(111), A(1), it seems that man’s happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its end.

But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect.

Therefore man’s happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man’s natural desire does not reach out to a good surpassing his capacity. Since then man’s capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man’s happiness.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): “As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man’s life of happiness: of Whom it is written: ‘Happy is that people whose God is the Lord’ ( <19E301> Psalm 143:15).”

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(8) —

I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true.

Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s will, save the universal good.

This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of <19A205> Psalm 102:5: “Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.” Therefore God alone constitutes man’s happiness.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(8)- RO(1) —

The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(8)- RO(2) —

If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself.

P(2a)- Q(2)- A(8)- RO(3) —

Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.

QUESTION WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider 1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it.

Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether happiness is something uncreated? (2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation? (3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part? (4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will? (5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect? (6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences? (7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels? (8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence?

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): “We must needs confess that God is happiness itself.”

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, happiness is the last end, to which man’s will tends naturally. But man’s will should tend to nothing else as an end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same as God.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But man’s happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): “Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy.” Therefore happiness is not something uncreated.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(1) , A(8) ; Q(2) , A(7) ), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense, then, man’s last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man’s will. But in the second way, man’s last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man’s happiness in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something created.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(1) —

God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called “gods,” by participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Happiness is called man’s supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2) Whether happiness is an operation?

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says ( Romans 6:22): “You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting.”

But life is not an operation, but the very being of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is “a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.” But state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: since it is man’s final perfection. But the meaning of operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, happiness remains in the happy one.

Now operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(6) —

Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that “happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue.”

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2) —

I answer that, In so far as man’s happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness is man’s supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect.

Consequently happiness must consist in man’s last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the Philosopher calls it “second act” (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering.

And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said to be “for its operation” (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man’s happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown ( Q(2) , A(5) ) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not that man’s happiness; for of God alone is it true that His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which operation the principle of life is made actual: thus we speak of active and contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from John 17:3: “This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God.”

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and he signified this by saying that happiness is “a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things,” thus implying that the state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing by what man is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of operation. And so it is that he proves happiness to be “the perfect good” (Ethic. i, 7).

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold.

One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as “to burn” and “to cut.” And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the agent, such as to feel, to understand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the agent. And such an operation can be happiness.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man.

Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man’s happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: “We call men happy, but only as men.” But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be “as the angels . . . in heaven” ( Matthew 22:30).

Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man’s mind will be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are evident.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(3) Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellective part only?

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective operation depends on the sensitive: since “we cannot understand without a phantasm” (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the senses also.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is “a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.” But some goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses.

Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for happiness.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for happiness.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(3) —

I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently.

Now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man’s happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is his last end, as shown above ( A(1) ): to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above ( Q(2) , A(5) ), man’s happiness does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses.

Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, “from the very happiness of the soul,” as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) “the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations”; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection ( P(2b), QQ(82)-85 ). But then the operation whereby man’s mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(3)- RO(1) —

This objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(3)- RO(3) —

In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher.

But in the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4) Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of the will?

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man’s happiness consists in peace; wherefore it is written ( <19E703> Psalm 147:3): “Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: ‘borders’]”.

But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man’s happiness is in the will.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the will.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, as we shall state further on ( Q(9) , AA(1),3 ). Therefore happiness regards the will.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man’s most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Corinthians 13).

Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4)- O(5) —

Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that “happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss.”

And a little further on he adds: “He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy, and such a man already possesses some good — i.e. a good will.” Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Our Lord said ( John 17:3): “This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God.”

Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above ( A(2), ad 1). Therefore man’s happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(2) , A(6) ) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said ( AA(1),2 ; Q(2) , A(7) ) that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.

This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.

So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is “joy in truth,” because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of happiness.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Peace pertains to man’s last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being at rest.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The will’s first object is not its act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore, from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will’s first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as its act.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4)- RO(4) —

Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for “naught is loved save what is known,” as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain a sensible end by an act of sense.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(4)- RO(5) —

He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, “alteration” to the genus “quality.”

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(5) Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect?

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative intellect, which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man’s happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, happiness is man’s perfect good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding. Therefore man’s happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, happiness is a good of man himself.

But the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man’s happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that “contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting perfection of our joys.”

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(5) —

I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons. First because if man’s happiness is an operation, it must needs be man’s highest operation. Now man’s highest operation is that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And since that “seems to be each man’s self, which is best in him,” according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to him.

Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect.

Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly.

Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union and “information”; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative knowledge.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(5)- RO(3) —

This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and passions would be his happiness. But since man’s last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man’s happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(6) Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that man’s happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that “happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue.” And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than three speculative virtues — ”knowledge,” “wisdom” and “understanding,” which all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore man’s final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be man’s final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, “all men naturally desire to know”; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, happiness is man’s final perfection.

Now everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration of these sciences, man’s final happiness consists.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Jeremiah 9:23): “Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom”: and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man’s final happiness does not consist in the consideration of these.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(6) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2), ad 4), man’s happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence.

Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man’s final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher. Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man.

Consequently the intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of itself.

Therefore man’s final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been shown ( P(1), Q(88), A(2) ), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man’s happiness cannot consist in the consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(6)- RO(1) —

In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above ( A(2), ad 4).

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect act.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(7) Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels?

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that man’s happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in a homily (xxvi in Evang.): “It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of angels”; by which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man’s final happiness consists in contemplating the angels.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect is to be united to the angels by contemplation.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Jeremiah 9:24): “Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me.”

Therefore man’s final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(7) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(6) ), man’s perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by participation: because in God alone is His Being His Essence, as shown in the P(1), Q(44), A(1) . It follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(7)- RO(1) —

We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God Himself.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(7)- RO(2) —

According to those that hold human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man’s happiness should consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in P(1), Q(90), A(3) . Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the P(1), Q(111), A(2), ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man’s happiness.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(7)- RO(3) —

The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man’s final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(8) Whether man’s happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that man’s happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst.

Theol. i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His Essence.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something less.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(8) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 John 3:2): “When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: ‘because’] we shall see Him as He is.”

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(8) —

I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause “what it is”; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, “what it is.” And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.

If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than “that He is”; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone man’s happiness consists, as stated above ( AA(1),7 ; Q(2) , A(8) ).

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness.

P(2a)- Q(3)- A(8)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( Q(1) , A(8) ), the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(8) ). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, according to their respective habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.

QUESTION OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether delight is required for happiness? (2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision? (3) Whether comprehension is required? (4) Whether rectitude of the will is required? (5) Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness? (6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary? (7) Whether any external goods are necessary? (8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(1) Whether delight is required for happiness?

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that “vision is the entire reward of faith.” But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides vision is required for happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, happiness is “the most self-sufficient of all goods,” as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above ( Q(3) , A(8) ); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the “operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered” (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5).

Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is “joy in truth.”

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(1) —

I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(1) —

From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight. Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The very sight of God causes delight.

Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(2) Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For “delight is the perfection of operation” (Ethic. x, 4). But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, which is vision.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect.

But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(2) —

I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will’s repose is caused by the goodness of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end, which has been disproved above ( Q(1) , A(1), ad 2; Q(3) , A(4) ): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(2)- RO(1) —

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) “delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth,” because it is a result of youth.

Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to charity.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(3) Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm. xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): “To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible.” Therefore happiness is without comprehension.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect and will, as stated in the P(1), QQ(79)- and following. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him.

Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 9:24): “So run that you may comprehend [Douay: ‘obtain’].” But happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says ( 2 Timothy 4:7,8): “I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice.”

Therefore comprehension is necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(3) —

I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is the will’s first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for.

Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and this relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in the end now present results from love, as already stated ( A(2), ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend [*In English we should say ‘catch.’] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension is necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes therein.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(4) Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation of the intellect, as stated above ( Q(3) , A(4) ). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) “I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will none but the clean of heart to know the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths.” Therefore rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will. Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of the will.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance, after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Matthew 5:8): “Blessed are the clean of heart; for they shall see God”: and ( Hebrews 12:14): “Follow peace with all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God.”

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(4) —

I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above ( Q(3) , A(8) ), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not God’s Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this is precisely what makes the will right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection, such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order to the end is necessary.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5) Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness?

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace.

Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above ( Q(3) , AA(2),5 ). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since, therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate from its whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, Happiness is the perfection of man.

But the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in the soul separated from the body.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) “the operation of bliss,” in which operation happiness consists, is “not hindered.” But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii, 35), the soul “has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to speak, from tending with all its might to the heavenward journey,” i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5)- O(5) —

Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii, 35).

Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the body.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5)- O(6) —

Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Revelation 14:13): “Happy [Douay: ‘blessed’] are the dead who die in the Lord.”

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5) —

I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the P(1), Q(84), AA(6),7 . Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason. By authority, since the Apostle says ( 2 Corinthians 5:6): “While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord”; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: “For we walk by faith and not by sight.” Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are in God’s presence; wherefore the text continues: “But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord.” Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, “walk by sight,” seeing the Essence of God, wherein is true Happiness.

Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the P(1), Q(84), A(7) . Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the P(1), Q(12), A(3) . Wherefore, since man’s perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the body.

Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.

We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing’s perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man’s perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its wellbeing: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection belong to man’s perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing’s nature, the more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine, after inquiring (Genesis ad lit. xii, 35) “whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead separated from their bodies,” answers “that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body.”

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body.

Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the P(1), Q(75), A(2) . It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness.

Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5)- RO(4) —

One thing is hindered by another in two ways.

First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5)- RO(5) —

The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would wish to possess it.

Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(5)- RO(6) —

The statement made (Genesis ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect that “the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do,” is not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever will have, whereas the separated souls of the saints have not.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(6) Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man’s perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily good. But it has been shown above ( Q(2) ) that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man’s Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, man’s Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above ( Q(3) , A(8) ). But the body has not part in this operation, as shown above ( A(5) ). Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is written ( John 13:17): “You shall be blessed, if you do them.” But the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written ( Isaiah 66:14): “You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall flourish like a herb.”

Therefore good disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(6) —

I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in “an operation according to perfect virtue”; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue.

But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said that “for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal.” But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural perfection.

Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii, 35), “if body be such, that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven.” Whence he concludes that, “when this body will no longer be ‘natural,’ but ‘spiritual,’ then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden.” Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that “God gave the soul such a powerful nature that from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature.”

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(6)- RO(3) —

The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the Third Part of this work ( P(2b), Q(82), seqq.).

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(7) Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that external goods also are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said ( Luke 22:30): “That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom”: and ( Matthew 6:20): “Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven”: and ( Matthew 25:34): “Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom.”

Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is “a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.” But some of man’s goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, Our Lord said ( Matthew 5:12): “Your reward is very great in heaven.” But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place is necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 72:25): “For what have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?”

As though to say: “I desire nothing but this,” — ”It is good for me to adhere to my God.” Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(7) —

I answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its operations.

On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason of this is that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or for certain operations which belong to human life, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no longer animal but spiritual.

Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained to the animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than that of action to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated in Ethic. x, 8.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(7)- RO(1) —

All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order “that from things we know, we may rise to the desire of things unknown,” as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of God.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(7)- RO(2) —

These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists.

Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(7)- RO(3) —

According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints, but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(8) Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the name of “glory.” But glory consists in man’s good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, Boethius [*Seneca, Ep. 6] says that “there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us.” But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(8) —

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 7:11): “All good things came to me together with her,” i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(8) —

I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.

But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. viii, 25) that “the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship.”

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(8)- RO(1) —

That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(8)- RO(2) —

This saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.

P(2a)- Q(4)- A(8)- RO(3) —

Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness.

QUESTION OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether man can attain Happiness? (2) Whether one man can be happier than another? (3) Whether any man can be happy in this life? (4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost? (5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers? (6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature? (7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God? (8) Whether every man desires Happiness?

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(1) Whether man can attain happiness?

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that man cannot attain happiness.

For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who is of rational nature, attain the end of the intellectual nature, which is Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material things: wherefore “he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm” (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle. Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot attain Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 93:12): “Blessed is the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord.”

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(1) —

I answer that, Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain Happiness. Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness.

This can be proved again from the fact that man is capable of seeing God, as stated in P(1), Q(12), A(1) : in which vision, as we stated above ( Q(3) , A(8) ) man’s perfect Happiness consists.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal, whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the P(1), Q(58), A(3) ; P(1), Q(79), A(8) . Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(1)- RO(2) —

To man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the P(1), Q(84), A(7) ; P(1), Q(89), A(1) .

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained it, he will be perfectly happy.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(2) Whether one man can be happier than another?

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For Happiness is “the reward of virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written ( Matthew 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard “received every man a penny”; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), “each was equally rewarded with eternal life.” Therefore one man cannot be happier than another.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man’s Happiness cannot be surpassed by another’s.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, since Happiness is “the perfect and sufficient good” (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man’s desire. But his desire is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be greater.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( John 14:2): “In My Father’s house there are many mansions”; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify “the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal life.” But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(1) , A(8) ; Q(2) , A(7) ), Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And in this sense one man can be happier than another.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the divers degrees of enjoyment.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(3) —

None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is “the good of all good,” as Augustine says (Enarr. in Psalm 134). But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the addition of other goods does not increase Happiness, since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): “He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing Thee alone.”

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(3) Whether one can be happy in this life?

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written ( <19B801> Psalm 118:1): “Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord.”

But this happens in this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not be happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore man can be happy in this life.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature does not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as appears from <19E301> Psalm 143:15: “They have called the people happy that hath these things,” to wit, the good things in this life.

Therefore one can be happy in this life.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Job 14:1): “Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries.”

But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(3) —

I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. This may be seen from a twofold consideration.

First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a “perfect and sufficient good,” it excludes every evil, and fulfils every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4.

Likewise neither can the desire for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.

Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this life, as was shown in the P(1), Q(12), A(11). Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according to Romans 8:24: “We are saved by hope”; or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign Good.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, in comparison with the way in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not destroy the true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above ( Q(3) , A(2) ), the true nature of Happiness is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness. And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(4) Whether happiness once had can be lost?

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the end corresponds to the beginning.

But man’s Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy.

Therefore it seems that it has an end.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Matthew 25:46) of the righteous that “they shall god . . . into life everlasting,” which, as above stated ( A(2) ), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(4) —

I answer that, If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of contemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.

This is also clear of active happiness: since man’s will can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner.

And since the happiness of this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but “as men,” whose nature is subject to change.

But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after the final Happiness.

This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the “perfect and sufficient good,” it must needs set man’s desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never will lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion: because the false is the evil of the intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no longer be truly happy, if evil be in him.

Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above ( Q(3) , A(8) ) that man’s perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see It.

Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is written ( Psalm 16:15): “I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear”; and (Wis. 7:11): “All good things came to me together with her,” i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): “Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness.” It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Because, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault; and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above ( Q(4) , A(4) ). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent.

Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other things: and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as are subject to time and movement.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends all change.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The will can be directed to opposites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity, to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from another.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(5) Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end.

Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Happiness by his natural powers.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, Happiness is a “perfect operation,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect operation, which is as the beginning in human operations, is subject to man’s natural power, whereby he is master of his own actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural powers.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says ( Corinthians 2:9) “Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him.”

Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(5) —

I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on ( Q(63) ). But man’s perfect Happiness, as stated above ( Q(3) , A(8) ), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God’s Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of every creature, as was shown in the P(1), Q(12), A(4) . For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii) that “it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its substance.” But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final Happiness by his natural powers.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy. “For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves” (Ethic. iii, 3).

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(5)- RO(3) —

When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of necessity, if they be of different species: for not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection. Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man’s natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man’s happiness: since operation takes its species from its object. Consequently the argument does not prove.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(6) Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that man can be made happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a twofold order in things — one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which is outside the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the lower, as stated in the P(1), Q(109), A(2) : while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy, through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually happy by an angel who is actually happy.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as stated above ( Q(3) , A(4) ). But an angel can enlighten man’s intellect as shown in the P(1), Q(111), A(1) . Therefore an angel can make a man happy.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 83:12): “The Lord will give grace and glory.”

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(6) —

I answer that, Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now it has been shown above ( A(5) ) that Happiness is a good surpassing created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by God alone is man made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it consists.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(6)- RO(1) —

It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last end itself through the First Agent, which is God.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(6)- RO(2) —

When a form exists perfectly and naturally in something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for instance a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the “intention” of color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something else; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is in God perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness or participation. Consequently no creature can communicate its Happiness to another.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(6)- RO(3) —

A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the P(1), Q(106), A(1) : since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(7) Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God?

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man’s works, since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as stated above ( A(6) ), can be required only as dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect forthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man without any previous works.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, the Apostle says ( Romans 4:6) that Happiness is of the man “to whom God reputeth justice without works.”

Therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written ( John 13:17): “If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them.”

Therefore Happiness is obtained through works.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(7) —

I answer that, Rectitude of the will, as stated above ( Q(4) , A(4) ), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, in order to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his Happiness: for God could make a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should not be thus; for as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, “of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several.” Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone.

Therefore it belongs to God alone not to be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained in the P(1), Q(62), A(5) ; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits. Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(7)- RO(2) —

God produced the first creatures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various species, that through them nature might be propagated to their progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through Christ, who is God and Man, “Who,” according to Hebrews 2:10, “had brought many children into glory”; therefore, from the very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious operation. But this is peculiar to Him: for Christ’s merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of Christ.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(7)- RO(3) —

The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends towards Happiness.

P(2a)- Q(5)- A(8) Whether every man desires happiness?