QUESTIONS 79-81 QUESTION OF THE QUASI-INTEGRAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are “to do good,” and “to decline from evil,” and the opposite vices. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether these two are parts of justice? (2) Whether transgression is a special sin? (3) Whether omission is a special sin? (4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(1) Whether to decline from evil and to do good are parts of justice?

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good are not parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform a good deed and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the whole.

Therefore to decline from evil and to do good should not be reckoned parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, a gloss on Psalm 33:15, “Turn away from evil and do good,” says: “The former,” i.e. to turn away from evil, “avoids sin, the latter,” i.e. to do good, “deserves the life and the palm.” But any part of a virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to decline from evil is not a part of justice.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, things that are so related that one implies the other, are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now declining from evil is implied in doing good: since no one does evil and good at the same time. Therefore declining from evil and doing good are not parts of justice.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares that “declining from evil and doing good” belong to the justice of the law.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(1) —

I answer that, If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the sense of “all virtue” [*Cf. Q(58) , A(5) ]. And yet even if justice be taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good; namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.

On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good as due to one’s neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special justice to do good considered as due to one’s neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one’s neighbor; while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil.

Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of special justice, because each is required for the perfect act of justice. For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our relations with others, as shown above ( Q(58) , A(2) ): and it pertains to the same cause to establish and to preserve that which it has established. Now a person establishes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves the already established equality of justice by declining from evil, that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Good and evil are here considered under a special aspect, by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason why these two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of good and evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral virtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with the passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean, which is the same as to avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding evil come to the same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other hand justice is concerned with operations and external things, wherein to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the equality established is another.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(1)- RO(2) —

To decline from evil, considered as a part of justice, does not denote a pure negation, viz.”not to do evil”; for this does not deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it implies a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term “decline” shows.

This is meritorious; especially when a person resists against an instigation to do evil.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Doing good is the completive act of justice, and the principal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a. material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the formal and completive part.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(2) Whether transgression is a special sin?

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that transgression is not a special sin. For no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now transgression is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that sin is “a transgression of the Divine law.” Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus. But transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is a “word, deed or desire against the law of God,” according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature, or custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, no species contains all the parts into which its genus is divided. Now the sin of transgression extends to all the capital vices, as well as to sins of thought, word and deed. Therefore transgression is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(2) —

I answer that, The term transgression is derived from bodily movement and applied to moral actions. Now a person is said to transgress in bodily movement, when he steps [graditur] beyond [trans] a fixed boundary — and it is a negative precept that fixes the boundary that man must not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore to transgress, properly speaking, is to act against a negative precept.

Now materially considered this may be common to all the species of sin, because man transgresses a Divine precept by any species of mortal sin.

But if we consider it formally, namely under its special aspect of an act against a negative precept, it is a special sin in two ways. First, in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin that are opposed to the other virtues: for just as it belongs properly to legal justice to consider a precept as binding, so it belongs properly to a transgression to consider a precept as an object of contempt. Secondly, in so far as it is distinct from omission which is opposed to an affirmative precept.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Even as legal justice is “all virtue” ( Q(58) , A(5) ) as regards its subject and matter, so legal injustice is materially “all sin.” It is in this way that Ambrose defined sin, considering it from the point of view of legal injustice.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The natural inclination concerns the precepts of the natural law. Again, a laudable custom has the force of a precept; since as Augustine says in an epistle On the Fast of the Sabbath (Ep. xxxvi), “a custom of God’s people should be looked upon as law.” Hence both sin and transgression may be against a laudable custom and against a natural inclination.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(2)- RO(3) —

All these species of sin may include transgression, if we consider them not under their proper aspects, but under a special aspect, as stated above. The sin of omission, however, is altogether distinct from the sin of transgression.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(3) Whether omission is a special sin?

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that omission is not a special sin. For every sin is either original or actual. Now omission is not original sin, for it is not contracted through origin nor is it actual sin, for it may be altogether without act, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(71) , A(5) ) when we were treating of sins in general. Therefore omission is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, every sin is voluntary. Now omission sometimes is not voluntary but necessary, as when a woman is violated after taking a vow of virginity, or when one lose that which one is under an obligation to restore, or when a priest is bound to say Mass, and is prevented from doing so. Therefore omission is not always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, it is possible to fix the time when any special sin begins. But this is not possible in the case of omission, since one is not altered by not doing a thing, no matter when the omission occurs, and yet the omission is not always sinful. Therefore omission is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But it is not possible to assign any special virtue to which omission is opposed, both because the good of any virtue can be omitted, and because justice to which it would seem more particularly opposed, always requires an act, even in declining from evil, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2), while omission may be altogether without act. Therefore omission is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( James 4:17): “To him... who knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin.”

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(3) —

I answer that, omission signifies the non-fulfilment of a good, not indeed of any good, but of a good that is due. Now good under the aspect of due belongs properly to justice; to legal justice, if the thing due depends on Divine or human law; to special justice, if the due is something in relation to one’s neighbor. Wherefore, in the same way as justice is a special virtue, as stated above ( Q(58) , AA(6),7 ), omission is a special sin distinct from the sins which are opposed to the other virtues; and just as doing good, which is the opposite of omitting it, is a special part of justice, distinct from avoiding evil, to which transgression is opposed, so too is omission distinct from transgression.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Omission is not original but actual sin, not as though it had some act essential to it, but for as much as the negation of an act is reduced to the genus of act, and in this sense non-action is a kind of action, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(71) , A(6), ad 1).

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Omission, as stated above, is only of such good as is due and to which one is bound. Now no man is bound to the impossible: wherefore no man sins by omission, if he does not do what he cannot. Accordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity, is guilty of an omission, not through not having virginity, but through not repenting of her past sin, or through not doing what she can to fulfil her vow by observing continence. Again a priest is not bound to say Mass, except he have a suitable opportunity, and if this be lacking, there is no omission.

And in like manner, a person is bound to restitution, supposing he has the wherewithal; if he has not and cannot have it, he is not guilty of an omission, provided he does what he can. The same applies to other similar cases.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Just as the sin of transgression is opposed to negative precepts which regard the avoidance of evil, so the sin of omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, which regard the doing of good. Now affirmative precepts bind not for always, but for a fixed time, and at that time the sin of omission begins. But it may happen that then one is unable to do what one ought, and if this inability is without any fault on his part, he does not omit his duty, as stated above (ad 2; P(2a), Q(71) , A(5) ). On the other hand if this inability is due to some previous fault of his (for instance, if a man gets drunk at night, and cannot get up for matins, as he ought to), some say that the sin of omission begins when he engages in an action that is illicit and incompatible with the act to which he is bound.

But this does not seem to be true, for supposing one were to rouse him by violence and that he went to matins, he would not omit to go, so that, evidently, the previous drunkenness was not an omission, but the cause of an omission. Consequently, we must say that the omission begins to be imputed to him as a sin, when the time comes for the action; and yet this is on account of a preceding cause by reason of which the subsequent omission becomes voluntary.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Omission is directly opposed to justice, as stated above; because it is a non-fulfilment of a good of virtue, but only under the aspect of due, which pertains to justice. Now more is required for an act to be virtuous and meritorious than for it to be sinful and demeritorious, because “good results from an entire cause, whereas evil arises from each single defect” [*Dionysius, De Div. Nom. iv]. Wherefore the merit of justice requires an act, whereas an omission does not.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(4) Whether a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression?

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression. For “delictum” would seem to signify the same as “derelictum” [*Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx], and therefore is seemingly the same as an omission. But “delictum” denotes a more grievous offence than transgression, because it deserves more expiation as appears from Leviticus 5. Therefore the sin of omission is more grievous than the sin of transgression.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). Now to do good is a more excellent part of justice, than to decline from evil, to which transgression is opposed, as stated above ( A(1), ad 3). Therefore omission is a graver sin than transgression.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, sins of transgression may be either venial or mortal. But sins of omission seem to be always mortal, since they are opposed to an affirmative precept. Therefore omission would seem to be a graver sin than transgression.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, the pain of loss which consists in being deprived of seeing God and is inflicted for the sin of omission, is a greater punishment than the pain of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of transgression, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super Matth.). Now punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of omission is graver than the sin of transgression.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain from an evil deed, i.e. “to transgress,” than not to accomplish a good deed, which is “to omit.”

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(4) —

I answer that, The gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest remoteness, according to Metaph. x [*Didot. ed. ix, 4]. Wherefore a thing is further removed from its contrary than from its simple negation; thus black is further removed from white than not-white is, since every black is notwhite, but not conversely. Now it is evident that transgression is contrary to an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation thereof: for instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to give one’s parents due reverence, while it is a sin of transgression to revile them or injure them in any way. Hence it is evident that, simply and absolutely speaking, transgression is a graver sin than omission, although a particular omission may be graver than a particular transgression.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(4)- RO(1) —

“Delictum” in its widest sense denotes any kind of omission; but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission of something concerning God, or for a man’s intentional and as it were contemptuous dereliction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity, for which reason it demands a greater expiation.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The opposite of “doing good” is both “not doing good,” which is an omission, and “doing evil,” which is a transgression: but the first is opposed by contradiction, the second by contrariety, which implies greater remoteness: wherefore transgression is the more grievous sin.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Just as omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, so is transgression opposed to negative precepts: wherefore both, strictly speaking, have the character of mortal sin. Transgression and omission, however, may be taken broadly for any infringement of an affirmative or negative precept, disposing to the opposite of such precept: and so taking both in a broad sense they may be venial sins.

P(2b)- Q(79)- A(4)- RO(4) —

To the sin of transgression there correspond both the pain of loss on account of the aversion from God, and the pain of sense, on account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. In like manner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the pain of sense, according to Matthew 7:19, “Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire”; and this on account of the root from which it grows, although it does not necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good.

QUESTION OF THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (ONE ARTICLE)

We must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the virtues annexed thereto; under which head there are two points of consideration: (1) What virtues are annexed to justice? (2) The individual virtues annexed to justice.

P(2b)- Q(80)- A(1) Whether the virtues annexed to justice are suitably enumerated?

P(2b)- Q(80)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are unsuitably enumerated Tully [*De Invent. ii, 53] reckons six, viz. “religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth.” Now revenge is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby revenge is taken for injuries inflicted, as stated above ( Q(61) , A(4) ). Therefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to justice.

P(2b)- Q(80)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven, viz. “innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, humanity,” several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.

P(2b)- Q(80)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz. “obedience” in respect of one’s superiors, “discipline” with regard to inferiors, “equity” as regards equals, “fidelity” and “truthfulness” towards all; and of these “truthfulness” alone is mentioned by Tully. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice.

P(2b)- Q(80)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons nine parts annexed to justice viz. “liberality, kindliness, revenge, commonsense, [*\eugnomosyne\] piety, gratitude, holiness, just exchange” and “just lawgiving”; and of all these it is evident that Tully mentions none but “revenge.” Therefore he would appear to have made an incomplete enumeration.

P(2b)- Q(80)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions \epieikeia\ as being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice are insufficiently enumerated.

P(2b)- Q(80)- A(1) —

I answer that, Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have something in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above ( Q(58) , A(2) ), all the virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his due according to equality, as stated above ( Q(58) , A(11) ). Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered to God as much as he owes Him, according to <19B512> Psalm 115:12, “What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?” In this respect “religion” is annexed to justice since, according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and ceremonial rites or worship to “some superior nature that men call divine.” Secondly, it is not possible to make to one’s parents an equal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 14); and thus “piety” is annexed to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man “renders service and constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his country.”

Thirdly, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus “observance” is annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53) in the “deference and honor rendered to those who excel in worth.”

A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed “truth,” whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and future things are told without perversion.

It may also be considered from the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the reward he receives with what he has done — sometimes in good things; and then annexed to justice we have “gratitude” which “consists in recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back,” as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53) — and sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed “revenge,” whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), “we resist force, injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by self-defense.” [*St. Thomas read ‘obscurum,’ and explains it as meaning ‘derogatory,’ infra Q(108), A(2) . Cicero, however, wrote ‘obfuturum,’ i.e. ‘hurtful.’] There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured. This due is the concern of “liberality,” “affability” or “friendship,” or the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in them.

P(2b)- Q(80)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in accordance with a judge’s sentence, belongs to commutative justice: whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge, belongs to the virtue annexed to justice.

P(2b)- Q(80)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral parts of justice, namely, “declining from evil,” to which “innocence” belongs, and “doing good,” to which the six others belong. Of these, two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely, “friendship” in the external conduct and “concord” internally; two regard our relations toward superiors, namely, “piety” to parents, and “religion” to God; while two regard our relations towards inferiors, namely, “condescension,” in so far as their good pleases us, and “humanity,” whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be “humane, through having a feeling of love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity whereby we uphold one another.” In this sense “friendship” is understood as directing our external conduct towards others, from which point of view the Philosopher treats of it in Ethic. iv, 6. “Friendship” may also be taken as regarding properly the affections, and as the Philosopher describes it in Ethic. viii and 9:In this sense three things pertain to friendship, namely, “benevolence” which is here called “affection”; “concord,” and “beneficence” which is here called “humanity.” These three, however, are omitted by Tully, because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a due.

P(2b)- Q(80)- A(1)- RO(3) —

“Obedience” is included in observance, which Tully mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to persons who excel. “Faithfulness whereby a man’s acts agree with his words” [*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in “truthfulness” as to the observance of one’s promises: yet “truthfulness” covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on ( Q(109), AA(1),3 ). “Discipline” is not due as a necessary duty, because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors, according to Matthew 24:45, “A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family”: and for this reason it is omitted by Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by Macrobius; and equity under \epieikeia\ or under “friendship.”

P(2b)- Q(80)- A(1)- RO(4) —

This enumeration contains some belonging to true justice. To particular justice belongs “justice of exchange,” which he describes as “the habit of observing equality in commutations.” To legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes “legislative justice,” which he describes as “the science of political commutations relating to the community.” As regards things which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he mentions “common sense” or “good judgment*,” which is our guide in such like matters, as stated above ( Q(51) , A(4) ) in the treatise on prudence: wherefore he says that it is a “voluntary justification,” because by his own free will man observes what is just according to his judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas indicates the Greek derivation: \eugnomosyne\ quasi ‘bona \gnome\.’] These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice as their executor. \Eusebeia\ [piety] means “good worship” and consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is the science of “the service of God” (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said that ‘all the virtues are sciences’) [*Aristotle, Ethic. vi, 13]: and “holiness” comes to the same, as we shall state further on ( Q(81) , A(8) ). \Eucharistia\ (gratitude) means “good thanksgiving,” and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do good, and is of gentle speech”: and Andronicus too says that “kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence.” “Liberality” would seem to pertain to “humanity.”

P(2b)- Q(80)- A(1)- RO(5) —

\Epieikeia\ is annexed, not to particular but to legal justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of \eugnomosyne\ [common sense].

QUESTION OF RELIGION (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as our present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, (3) observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, (8) liberality, (9) \epieikeia\.

Of the other virtues that have been mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for instance, of right commutations and of innocence. of legislative justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.

Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God? (2) Whether religion is a virtue? (3) Whether religion is one virtue? (4) Whether religion is a special virtue? (5) Whether religion is a theological virtue? (6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues? (7) Whether religion has any external actions? (8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1) Whether religion directs man to God alone?

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that religion does not direct man to God alone. It is written ( James 1:27): “Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world.”

Now “to visit the fatherless and widows” indicates an order between oneself and one’s neighbor, and “to keep oneself unspotted from this world” belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore religion does not imply order to God alone.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that “since in speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred and relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is nothing else but the worship of God.” Therefore religion signifies a relation not only to God but also to our kindred.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, seemingly “latria” pertains to religion.

Now “latria signifies servitude,” as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).

And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor, according to Galatians 5:13, “By charity of the spirit serve one another.”

Therefore religion includes a relation to one’s neighbor also.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying of Cato [*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], “Worship thy parents.” Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to God.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious, but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances, and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does not denote a relation of subjection of man to God.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that “religion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call divine.”

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1) —

I answer that, as Isidore says (Etym. x), “according to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from ‘religio,’ because he often ponders over, and, as it were, reads again [relegit], the things which pertain to the worship of God,” so that religion would seem to take its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to Proverbs 3:6, “In all thy ways think on Him.” According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that “we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by our neglect” [*St. Augustine plays on the words ‘reeligere,’ i.e. to choose over again, and ‘negligere,’ to neglect or despise.]. Or again, religion may be derived from “religare” [to bind together], wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): “May religion bind us to the one Almighty God.” However, whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are concerned with the means. Accordingly “to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation” is an act of religion as commanding, and an act of mercy as eliciting; and “to keep oneself unspotted from this world” is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or of some similar virtue as eliciting.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to one’s human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense, but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the passage quoted, Augustine says: “In a stricter sense religion seems to denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God.”

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to Him, which is known as “latria” in Greek; and therefore it belongs to religion.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1)- RO(4) —

We are said to worship those whom we honor, and to cultivate [*In the Latin the same word ‘colere’ stands for ‘worship’ and ‘cultivate’]: a man’s memory or presence: we even speak of cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer [agricola] is one who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant [incola] is one who cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is \Eusebeia\ or \Theosebeia\, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Although the name “religious” may be given to all in general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing from human affairs. Thus also the term “contemplative” is applied, not to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for man’s sake but for God’s sake, according to the word of the Apostle ( Galatians 4:14), “You... received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus.”

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(2) Whether religion is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that religion is not a virtue.

Seemingly it belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an act of fear which is a gift, as stated above ( Q(19) , A(9) ). Therefore religion is not a virtue but a gift P(2b)- Q(81)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will, wherefore it is described as an “elective” or voluntary “habit” [*Ethic. ii, 6]. Now, as stated above ( A(1), ad 3) “latria” belongs to religion, and “latria” denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore religion is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, according to Ethic. ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion “to offer ceremonial worship to the Godhead” [*Cf. A(1) ], and ceremonial matters, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(99) , A(3), ad 2; P(2a), Q(101) ), do not belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is enumerated with the other virtues, as appears from what has been said above ( Q(80) ).

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(58) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(55) , AA(3),4 ) “a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good likewise,” wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner.

But order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is evident that religion is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(2)- RO(1) —

To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated above ( Q(9) , A(1), ad 3; P(2a), Q(68) , A(8) ).

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his master, and so “he makes a virtue of necessity” [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad Furiam.], by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so voluntarily.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(2)- RO(3) —

It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(3) Whether religion is one virtue?

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that religion is not one virtue.

Religion directs us to God, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now in God there are three Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically from one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for a difference of virtue, as stated above ( Q(50) , A(2), ad 2). Therefore religion is not one virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God Himself. Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would seem that religion is not one virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Ephesians 4:5): “One God [Vulg.: ‘Lord’], one faith.” Now true religion professes faith in one God. Therefore religion is one virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(54) , A(2), ad 1), habits are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object.

Now it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect, namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of things.

Wherefore He Himself says (Malach. 1:6): “If... I be a father, where is My honor?” For it belongs to a father to beget and to govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and governs them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore religion is one virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(3)- RO(2) —

By the one same act man both serves and worships God, for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due: while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God, either by offering something to God, or by assuming something Divine.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The worship of religion is paid to images, not as considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to God incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither “latria” nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious worship is paid to the images of Christ.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(4) Whether religion is a special virtue, distinct from the others?

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that religion is not a special virtue distinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): “Any action whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true sacrifice.” But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 10:31): “Do all to the glory of God.” Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence of God, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2; A(2) ). Therefore religion is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from the charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to Ethic. viii, 8 “to be honored is almost to be loved.” Therefore the religion whereby we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from observance, or “dulia,” or piety whereby we honor our neighbor. Therefore religion is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from the other parts.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(4) —

I answer that, Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there is a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue.

Now the good to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God.

Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special honor due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor is due to different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father, another to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in so far as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other virtues, as stated above ( A(1), ad 1).

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Every deed, in so far as it is done in God’s honor, belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God by reason of their specific character.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The object of love is the good, but the object of honor and reverence is something excellent. Now God’s goodness is communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is not.

Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby God is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that religion is a theological virtue. Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that “God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity,” which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to God alone, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore religion is a theological virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said ( P(2a), QQ(57),58,62 ). Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the mean between too much and too little. for one cannot worship God too much, according to Ecclus. 43:33, “Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above all praise.” Therefore it remains that it is a theological virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral virtue.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(5) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(4) ) religion pays due worship to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz. God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated ( Q(1) , AA(1),2 , 4 ) that God is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but because we believe God.

Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Religion directs man to God not as its object but as its end.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say “equality,” I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man’s ability and God’s acceptance.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(5)- RO(3) And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other circumstance.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that religion should not be preferred to the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in its observing the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But religion fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral virtues.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater need: wherefore it is written ( Isaiah 57:7): “Deal thy bread to the hungry.” But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to Psalm 15:2, “I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my goods.”

Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the other virtues whereby man’s needs are relieved.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, the greater. the obligation to do a thing, the less praise does it deserve, according to 1 Corinthians 9:16, “If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me.” Now the more a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then, what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him, it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human virtues.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(6) —

On the contrary, The precepts pertaining to religion are given precedence ( Exodus 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of the moral virtues.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(6) —

I answer that, Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above ( A(5) ; Q(4) , A(7) ), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of his will.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(6)- RO(2) —

In offering a thing to a man on account of its usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory, and on account of its usefulness to us.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it be done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(7) Whether religion has an external act?

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that religion has not an external act. It is written ( John 4:24): “God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth.”

Now external acts pertain, not to the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration belongs, has acts that are not external but internal.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and honor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in showing reverence to God.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca for finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to the true God, Who is “exalted above all gods” [* Psalm 94:3]. Therefore it would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions.

Therefore religion has no bodily actions.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 83:3): “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.” Now just as internal actions belong to the heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the flesh. Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by internal but also by external actions.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(7) —

I answer that, We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake (because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the human mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the sensible world, since “invisible things... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made,” as the Apostle says ( Romans 1:20). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things, that man’s mind may be aroused thereby, as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God. Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important and directly intended in the worship of God.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(7)- RO(2) —

These external things are offered to God, not as though He stood in need of them, according to Psalm 49:13, “Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats?” but as signs of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): “The visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice.”

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked.

P(2b)- Q(81)- A(8) Whether religion is the same as sanctity?