QUESTIONS 72-76 QUESTION OF REVILING (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered extrajudicially.

We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting, (3) tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is reviling? (2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin? (3) Whether one ought to check revilers? (4) Of the origin of reviling.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(1) Whether reviling consists in words?

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that reviling does not consist in words. Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one’s neighbor, since it is a kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one’s neighbor, either in his person, or in his belongings. Therefore reviling does not consist in words.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can be dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words.

Therefore it seems that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing or a taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt.

Therefore reviling does not consist in words.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing. Now reviling is perceived by the hearing according to Jeremiah 20:10, “I heard reviling [Douay: ‘contumelies’] on every side.”

Therefore reviling consists in words.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(1) —

I answer that, Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and this happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence, one person dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the excellence for which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed, whereof we have spoken above ( Q(64) , seqq.). Secondly, when a man publishes something against another’s honor, thus bringing it to the knowledge of the latter and of other men. This reviling properly so called, and is done I some kind of signs. Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), “compared with words all other signs are very few, for words have obtained the chief place among men for the purpose of expressing whatever the mind conceives.” Hence reviling, properly speaking consists in words: wherefore, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a reviler [contumeliosus] “is hasty and bursts out [tumet] in injurious words.” Since, however, things are also signified by deeds, which on this account have the same significance as words, it follows that reviling in a wider sense extends also to deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Romans 1:30, “contumelious, proud,” says: “The contumelious are those who by word or deed revile and shame others.”

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Our words, if we consider them in their essence, i.e. as audible sound injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the ear, as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs conveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many kinds of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his honor, or of the respect due to him from others. Hence the reviling is greater if one man reproach another in the presence of many: and yet there may still be reviling if he reproach him by himself. in so far as the speaker acts unjustly against the respect due to the hearer.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(1)- RO(2) —

One man slights another by deeds in so far as such deeds cause or signify that which is against that other man’s honor. In the former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some other kind of injustice, of which we have spoken above ( QQ(64),65,66 ): where as in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds have the significant force of words.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Railing and taunts consist in words, even as reviling, because by all of them a man’s faults are exposed to the detriment of his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault of guilt, which is exposed by “reviling” words. Secondly, there is the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by “taunts” [convicium], because “vice” is commonly spoken of in connection with not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man says spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not revile him: whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only taunts but also reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him for any kind of excellence. This is done by “upbraiding” words, and properly speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man that one has succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 20:15): “He will give a few things and upbraid much.” Nevertheless these terms are sometimes employed one for the other.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(2) Whether reviling or railing is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act of a virtue, viz. of wittiness \eutrapelia\ [*Cf. P(2a), Q(60) , A(5) ] to which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and yet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the Apostle says ( Galatians 3:1): “O senseless Galatians!,” and our Lord said ( Luke 24:25): “O foolish and slow of heart to believe!” Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of its genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its genus cannot become venial, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(88) , AA(4),6 ).

Hence if by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to railing or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin. But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who utters a reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger. Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its genus.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal punishment of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment of hell, according to Matthew 5:22, “Whosoever shall say to his brother... Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire.” Therefore railing or reviling is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), words are injurious to other persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification depends on the speaker’s inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it seems that we ought to consider with what intention the words are uttered. Since then railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring, if the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other man, this is properly and essentially to give utterance to railing or reviling: and this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since a man loves his honor no less than his possessions. If, on the other hand, a man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the intention, not of dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting him or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not formally and essentially, but accidentally and materially, in so far to wit as he says that which might be a railing or reviling. Hence this may be sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without any sin at all.

Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters, and one should use such words with moderation, because the railing might be so grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dishonor the person against whom it is uttered. In such a case a man might commit a mortal sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other man: just as were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by striking him in fun, he would not be without blame.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(2)- RO(1) —

It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight mockery, not with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the object of the mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and this may be without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. on the other hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object of his witty mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful, as stated in the passage quoted.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or damnify him in his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too, for the purpose of correction, may one say a mocking word to a person whom one has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples “foolish,” and the Apostle called the Galatians “senseless.” Yet, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), “seldom and only when it is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, and then so as to urge God’s service, not our own.”

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on the intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it be a slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and be uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by such a word to give but little pain.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(3) Whether one ought to suffer oneself to be reviled?

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled. For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the reviler. But one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now one ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written ( Proverbs 26:10): “He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger.” Therefore neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it is said: “Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay” [* Hebrews 10:30]. Now by submitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.): “If thou wilt be revenged, be silent; thou hast dealt him a fatal blow.” Therefore one ought not by silence to submit to reviling words, but rather answer back.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 37:13): “They that sought evils to me spoke vain things,” and afterwards ( Psalm 37:14) he says: “But I as a deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth.”

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(3) —

I answer that, Just as we need patience in things done against us, so do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of patience in those things done against us refer to the preparedness of the mind, according to Augustine’s (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) exposition on our Lord’s precept, “If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other” [*The words as quoted by St. Thomas are a blending of Matthew 5:39 and Luke 6:29]: that is to say, a man ought to be prepared to do so if necessary. But he is not always bound to do this actually: since not even did our Lord do so, for when He received a blow, He said: “Why strikest thou Me?” ( John 18:23). Consequently the same applies to the reviling words that are said against us. For we are bound to hold our minds prepared to submit to be reviled, if it should be expedient. Nevertheless it sometimes behooves us to withstand against being reviled, and this chiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler; namely, that his daring may be checked, and that he may not repeat the attempt, according to Proverbs 26:5, “Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he imagine himself to be wise.” Secondly, for the good of many who would be prevented from progressing in virtue on account of our being reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super Ezekiel): “Those who are so placed that their life should be an example to others, ought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their preaching be not heard by those who could have heard it, and they continue their evil conduct through contempt of a good life.”

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The daring of the railing reviler should be checked with moderation, i.e. as a duty of charity, and not through lust for one’s own honor. Hence it is written ( Proverbs 26:4): “Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou be like him.”

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(3)- RO(2) —

When one man prevents another from being reviled there is not the danger of lust for one’s own honor as there is when a man defends himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to proceed from a sense of charity.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(3)- RO(3) —

It would be an act of revenge to keep silence with the intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be praiseworthy to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 8:4): “Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire.”

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(4) Whether reviling arises from anger?

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger. For it is written ( Proverbs 11:2): “Where pride is, there shall also be reviling [Douay: ‘reproach’].” But anger is a vice distinct from pride.

Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Proverbs 20:3): “All fools are meddling with revilings [Douay: ‘reproaches’].” Now folly is a vice opposed to wisdom, as stated above ( Q(46) , A(1) ); whereas anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: for it is a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that “anger gives rise to revilings.”

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(4) —

I answer that, While one sin may arise from various causes, it is nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which it is wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected with its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger’s end, which is revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take revenge on another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises chiefly from anger.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Reviling is not directed to the end of pride which is excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride.

Nevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who think themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and inflict injuries on them, because they are more easily angered, through deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done against their will.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(4)- RO(2) —

According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6) “anger listens imperfectly to reason”: wherefore an angry man suffers a defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence reviling arises from folly on account of the latter’s kinship with anger.

P(2b)- Q(72)- A(4)- RO(3) —

According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) “an angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about this.” Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger rather than to hatred.

QUESTION OF BACKBITING [*OR DETRACTION] (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is backbiting? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? (3) Of its comparison with other sins; (4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting?

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(1) Whether backbiting is suitably defined as the blackening of another’s character by secret words?

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some [*Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii.], “the blackening of another’s good name by words uttered in secret.” For “secretly” and “openly” are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a sin, because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by few. Now that which does not constitute the species of a sin, does not belong to its essence, and should not be included in its definition. Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting that it should be done by secret words.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the notion of a good name implies something known to the public. If, therefore, a person’s good name is blackened by backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered openly.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish something already existing. But sometimes a man’s good name is blackened, even without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when one reveals the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore not every blackening of a good name is backbiting.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Ecclesiastes 10:11): “If a serpent bite in silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth.”

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(1) —

I answer that, Just as one man injures another by deed in two ways — openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence — and secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures another by words in two ways — in one way, openly, and this is done by reviling him, as stated above ( Q(72) , A(1) ) — and in another way secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one man openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think little of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that reviling is detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the other hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his honor but his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he, for his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the person against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends and aims at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting differs from reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the words are uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and the backbiter secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, i.e. as regards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a man’s honor, the backbiter injuring his good name.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(1)- RO(1) —

In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced all injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances “secretly” and “openly,” because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence and by ignorance, as stated above ( Q(65) , A(4) ; P(2a), Q(6) , AA(5),8 ).

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The words of a backbiter are said to be secret, not altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said, because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face. Wherefore if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is a case of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he alone be present: although if a man speak ill of an absent person to one man alone, he destroys his good name not altogether but partly.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(1)- RO(3) —

A man is said to backbite [detrehere] another, not because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly, in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about him; secondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by revealing something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his good deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by gainsaying his good, or by maliciously concealing it, or by diminishing it.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(2) Whether backbiting is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For no act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin, which pertains to backbiting, as stated above ( A(1), ad 3), is an act of the virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother’s sin in order that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby a man accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, a gloss on Proverbs 24:21, “Have nothing to do with detractors,” says: “The whole human race is in peril from this vice.” But no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many refrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found in all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine’s work] reckons it a slight sin “to speak ill without hesitation or forethought.” But this pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Romans 1:30): “Backbiters, hateful to God,” which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, “lest it be deemed a slight sin because it consists in words.”

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(72) , A(2) ), sins of word should be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting by its very nature aims at blackening a man’s good name.

Wherefore, properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to blacken a man’s good name, because of all temporal things a man’s good name seems the most precious, since for lack of it he is hindered from doing many things well. For this reason it is written (Ecclus. 41:15): “Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand treasures precious and great.” Therefore backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that a man utters words, whereby someone’s good name is tarnished, and yet he does not intend this, but something else. This is not backbiting strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and accidentally as it were. And if such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some necessary good, and with attention to the due circumstances, it is not a sin and cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of lightness of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal sin, unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature, as to cause a notable injury to a man’s good name, especially in matters pertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of the words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a man his good name, no less than any other thing one has taken from him, in the manner stated above ( Q(62) , A(2) ) when we were treating of restitution.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(2)- RO(1) —

As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a man’s hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or accuse him for the good of public justice.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(2)- RO(2) —

This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to be found throughout the whole of mankind, but “almost,” both because “the number of fools is infinite,” [* Ecclesiastes 1:15] and few are they that walk in the way of salvation, [*Cf. Matthew 7:14] and because there are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of heart, so as to injure someone’s good name at least slightly, for it is written ( James 3:2): “If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man.”

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Augustine is referring to the case when a man utters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but through lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(3) Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one’s neighbor?

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one’s neighbor. Because a gloss on <19A804> Psalm 108:4, “Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me,” a gloss says: “Those who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that was soon to rise again.” From this it seems to follow that backbiting is by so much a graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to kill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the other sins that are committed against one’s neighbor. Therefore backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than reviling, because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret backbiting. Now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery, because adultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling severs utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more grievous than adultery: and yet of all other sins a man commits against his neighbor, adultery is most grave.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a graver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than reviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity of the defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous defect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2): “What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the less they see of the truth?”

Therefore backbiting is the most grievous sin committed against one’s neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word. But backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft are sins of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other sins committed against one’s neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(3) —

I answer that, The essential gravity of sins committed against one’s neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him, since it is thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the greater the good taken away, the greater the injury. And while man’s good is threefold, namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the good of external things; the good of the soul, which is the greatest of all, cannot be taken from him by another save as an occasional cause, for instance by an evil persuasion, which does not induce necessity. On the other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the body and of external things, can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the goods of the body excel the goods of external things, those sins which injure a man’s body are more grievous than those which injure his external things. Consequently, among other sins committed against one’s neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since it deprives man of the life which he already possesses: after this comes adultery, which is contrary to the right order of human generation, whereby man enters upon life. In the last place come external goods, among which a man’s good name takes precedence of wealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods, wherefore it is written ( Proverbs 22:1): “A good name is better than great riches.” Therefore backbiting according to its genus is a more grievous sin than theft, but is less grievous than murder or adultery. Nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or extenuating circumstances.

The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to the sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if he sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of word have a certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur through a slip of the tongue, and without much forethought.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith of His members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our faith. Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting, in as much as it implies greater contempt of one’s neighbor: even as robbery is a graver sin than theft, as stated above ( Q(66) , A(9) ).

Yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the gravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union of bodies, but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the reviler is not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man, but is only the occasional cause of division among those who were united, in so far, to wit, as by declaring the evils of another, he for his own part severs that man from the friendship of other men, though they are not forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a backbiter is a murderer “occasionally,” since by his words he gives another man an occasion for hating or despising his neighbor. For this reason it is stated in the Epistle of Clement [*Ad Jacob. Ep. i], that “backbiters are murderers,” i.e. occasionally; because “he that hateth his brother is a murderer” ( 1 John 3:15).

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes place in secret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but rather of envy, which strives by any means to lessen one’s neighbor’s glory. Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin depends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on the thing to which the sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away from.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Since “a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his mouth” ( Proverbs 15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves and believes what he says, and consequently more and more hates his neighbor, and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less.

This effect however may also result from other sins pertaining to hate of one’s neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(4) Whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter?

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations to others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): “Just as we ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited by their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater.”

Therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who backbite others.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): “In no wise speak against the truth.” Now sometimes a person tells the truth while backbiting, as stated above ( A(1), ad 3). Therefore it seems that one is not always bound to withstand a backbiter.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to others. Now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten: for Pope Pius [*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus. vi, qu. 1]: “Not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good persons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, are humbled by backbiting.” Therefore one ought not to withstand backbiters.

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): “Take care not to have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract others nor listen to backbiters.”

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(4) —

I answer that, According to the Apostle ( Romans 1:32), they “are worthy of death... not only they that” commit sins, “but they also that consent to them that do them.” Now this happens in two ways. First, directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or when the sin is pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he does not withstand him when he might do so, and this happens sometimes, not because the sin is pleasing to him, but on account of some human fear.

Accordingly we must say that if a man list ens to backbiting without resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he becomes a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite, or at least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his hatred of the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes more.

Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): “It is difficult to say which is the more to be condemned the backbiter or he that listens to backbiting.” If however the sin is not pleasing to him, and he fails to withstand the backbiter, through fear negligence, or even shame, he sins indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule venially. Sometimes too this may be a mortal sin, either because it is his official duty to cor. rect the backbiter, or by reason of some consequent danger; or on account of the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes be a mortal sin, as stated above ( Q(19) , A(3) ).

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(4)- RO(1) —

No man hears himself backbitten, because when a man is spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly speaking, but reviling, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2). Yet it is possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his knowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name, unless this endanger the good of others, as stated above ( Q(72) , A(3) ). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as he suffers patiently being detracted himself.

But it is not left to his discretion to permit an injury to be done to another’s good name, hence he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for the same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man’s ass lying “underneath his burden,” as commanded in Deuteronomy 21:4 [* Exodus 23:5].

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(4)- RO(2) —

One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows that he is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with words, for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our pained demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting, because according to Proverbs 25:23, “the north wind driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue.”

P(2b)- Q(73)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The profit one derives from being backbitten is due, not to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God Who produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less withstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience.

QUESTION OF TALE-BEARING [*’SUSURRATIO,’ I.E.

WHISPERING] (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting? (2) Which of the two is the more grievous?

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): “The susurro [tale-bearer] takes his name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks disparagingly not to the face but into the ear.” But to speak of another disparagingly belongs to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from backbiting.

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Leviticus 19:16): “Thou shalt not be an informer [Douay: ‘a detractor’] nor a tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] among the people.”

But an informer is apparently the same as a backbiter. Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from backbiting.

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): “The tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] and the double-tongued is accursed.” But a double-tongued man is apparently the same as a backbiter, because a backbiter speaks with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with another in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a backbiter.

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(1) —

On the contrary, A gloss on Romans 1:29,30, “Tale-bearers, backbiters [Douay: ‘whisperers, detractors’]” says: “Talebearers sow discord among friends; backbiters deny or disparage others’ good points.”

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(1) —

I answer that, The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter, and also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil secretly of their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are sometimes used one for the other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, “Be not called a talebearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’]” says: “i.e. a backbiter.” They differ however in end, because the backbiter intends to blacken his neighbor’s good name, wherefore he brings forward those evils especially about his neighbor which are likely to defame him, or at least to depreciate his good name: whereas a tale-bearer intends to sever friendship, as appears from the gloss quoted above and from the saying of Proverbs 26:20, “Where the talebearer is taken away, contentions shall cease.” Hence it is that a tale-bearer speaks such ill about his neighbors as may stir his hearer’s mind against them, according to Ecclus. 28:11, “A sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace.”

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(1)- RO(1) —

A tale-bearer is called a backbiter in so far as he speaks ill of another; yet he differs from a backbiter since he intends not to speak ill as such, but to say anything that may stir one man against another, though it be good simply, and yet has a semblance of evil through being unpleasant to the hearer.

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(1)- RO(2) —

An informer differs from a tale-bearer and a backbiter, for an informer is one who charges others publicly with crimes, either by accusing or by railing them, which does not apply to a backbiter or tale-bearer.

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(1)- RO(3) —

A double-tongued person is properly speaking a tale-bearer. For since friendship is between two, the tale-bearer strives to sever friendship on both sides. Hence he employs a double tongue towards two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other: wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): “The tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] and the double-tongued is accursed,” and then it is added, “for he hath troubled many that were peace.”

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(2) Whether backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing?

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for such things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name: whereas a tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently evil, because to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than talebearing.

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, he that deprives. a man of his good name, deprives him not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is minded to scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name.

Hence it is reproached against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] (2 Paralip 19:2): “Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord.” But tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( James 4:11): “He that backbiteth [Douay:,’detracteth’] his brother... detracteth the law,” and consequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of backbiting seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as stated above ( Q(20) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(73) , A(3) ). On the other hand the sin of talebearing is against one’s neighbor. Therefore the sin of backbiting is graver than the sin of tale-bearing.

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): “An evil mark of disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] hatred, and enmity, and reproach.”

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(73) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(73) , A(8) ), sins against one’s neighbor are the more grievous, according as they inflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the greater, according to the greatness of the good which it takes away. Now of all one’s external goods a friend takes the first place, since “no man can live without friends,” as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 1). Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): “Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend.”

Again, a man’s good name whereof backbiting deprives him, is most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship. Therefore talebearing is a greater sin than backbiting or even reviling, because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved is better than to be honored, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii).

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The species and gravity of a sin depend on the end rather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its end, tale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the backbiter says worse things.

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(2)- RO(2) —

A good name is a disposition for friendship, and a bad name is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short of the thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to a disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what conduces directly to enmity.

P(2b)- Q(74)- A(2)- RO(3) —

He that backbites his brother, seems to detract the law, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one’s neighbor: while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more directly against this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially against God, because “God is charity” ( 1 John 4:16), and for this reason it is written ( Proverbs 6:16): “Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth,” and the seventh is “he ( Proverbs 6:19) that soweth discord among brethren.”

QUESTION OF DERISION [*OR MOCKERY] (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins whereby one’s neighbor is injured by words? (2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned?

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that derision is not a special sin distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is apparently the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from reviling.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, no man is derided except for something reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they be imputed to a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct from the foregoing vices.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury they inflict on one’s neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is detrimental to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin distinct from the foregoing.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is described as “making fun.” Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in jest. Therefore derision differs from all of them.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(72) , A(2) ), sins of word should be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure the honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider intends to shame the person he derides. And since this end is distinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is distinct from the foregoing sins.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but differ in mode, because derision is done with the “mouth,” i.e. by words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the nose, as a gloss says on Psalm 2:4, “He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them”: and such a distinction does not differentiate the species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is “to fear dishonor,” as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(1)- RO(2) —

For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the glory of a good conscience, according to 2 Corinthians 1:12, “Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience.” Hence, on the other hand, for doing a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor and good name in the eyes of others — and for this purpose the reviler and the backbiter speak of another person — while in his own eyes, he loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at reprehensible deeds being imputed to him — and for this purpose the derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to the end.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(1)- RO(3) —

A secure and calm conscience is a great good, according to Proverbs 15:15, “A secure mind is like a continual feast.”

Wherefore he that disturbs another’s conscience by confounding him inflicts a special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(2) Whether derision can be a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin. Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem contrary to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among friends, wherefore it is known as “making fun.” Therefore derision cannot be a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that which is done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal sin when it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin to relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore says (De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that “he who continues to do what he has repented of, is a derider and not a penitent.” It would likewise follow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 15) “the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who derides the horse, i.e. the just man, and his rider, i.e. God.” Therefore derision is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins than derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest. But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore is derision a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Proverbs 3:34): “He derideth [Vulg.: ‘shall scorn’] the scorners.” But God’s derision is eternal punishment for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Psalm 2:4, “He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them.” Therefore derision is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(2) —

I answer that, The object of derision is always some evil or defect. Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but seriously: consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule (whence the terms ‘derision’ and ‘jesting’), this is because it is considered to be slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first, in itself, secondly, in relation to the person. When anyone makes game or fun of another’s evil or defect, because it is a slight evil in itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its genus. on the other hand this defect may be considered as a slight evil in relation to the person, just as we are wont to think little of the defects of children and imbeciles: and then to make game or fun of a person, is to scorn him altogether, and to think him so despicable that his misfortune troubles us not one whit, but is held as an object of derision. In this way derision is a mortal sin, and more grievous than reviling, which is also done openly: because the reviler would seem to take another’s evil seriously; whereas the derider does so in fun, and so would seem the more to despise and dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a grievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a greater respect is due to the person derided.

Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the things of God, according to Isaiah 37:23, “Whom hast thou reproached, and whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy voice?” and he replies: “Against the Holy One of Israel.” In the second place comes derision of one’s parents, wherefore it is written ( Proverbs 30:17): “The eye that mocketh at his father, and that despiseth the labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick it out, and the young eagles eat it.” Further, the derision of good persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of virtue, and against this it is written ( Job 12:4): “The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn.” Such like derision does very much harm: because it turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14), “Who when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts of others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a mischievous reviling.”

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in relation to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something against charity in relation to the person who is the object of the jest, on account of contempt, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he has repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly, in so far as either’s behavior is like a derider’s. Nor is it true that to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but only dispositively and imperfectly.

P(2b)- Q(75)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Derision considered in itself is less grievous than backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but jest.

Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as stated above, and then it is a grave sin.

QUESTION OF CURSING (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether one may lawfully curse another? (2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature? (3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin? (4) Of its comparison with other sins.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(1) Whether it is lawful to curse anyone?

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is unlawful to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ spoke, according to 2 Corinthians 13:3. Now he commanded ( Romans 12:14), “Bless and curse not.” Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Daniel 3:82, “O ye sons of men, bless the Lord.” Now the same mouth cannot both bless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James. Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him some evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be a kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone, indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): “While the ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul.” Much less therefore is it lawful to curse a man.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, a gloss on Numbers 23:8, “How shall I curse whom God hath not cursed?” says: “There cannot be a just cause for cursing a sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments.” Now one man cannot know another man’s sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore no man may lawfully curse another.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 27:26): “Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law.”

Moreover Eliseus cursed the little boys who mocked him ( 2 Kings 2:24).

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(1) —

I answer that, To curse [maledicere] is the same as to speak ill [malum dicere]. Now “speaking” has a threefold relation to the thing spoken. First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is expressed in the indicative mood: in this way “maledicere” signifies simply to tell someone of another’s evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore tellers of evil [maledici] are sometimes called backbiters. Secondly, speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way of cause, and this belongs to God first and foremost, since He made all things by His word, according to Psalm 32:9, “He spoke and they were made”; while secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his word, commands others and thus moves them to do something: it is for this purpose that we employ verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly, “speaking” is related to the thing spoken by expressing the sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed in words; and for this purpose we employ the verb in the optative mood.

Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by way of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds. And here we must observe that to do something and to will it are consequent on one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness, as shown above ( P(2a), Q(20) , A(3) ). Hence in these two ways of evil speaking, by way of command and by way of desire, there is the same aspect of lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or desires another’s evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is meant by cursing. On the other hand if a man commands or desires another’s evil under the aspect of good, it is lawful; and it may be called cursing, not strictly speaking, but accidentally, because the chief intention of the speaker is directed not to evil but to good.

Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the aspect of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and thus a judge lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the same way the prophets in the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on sinners, as though conforming their will to Divine justice, although such like imprecation may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken under the aspect of useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or hindrance of some kind, either that he may himself reform, or at least that he may cease from harming others.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called with an evil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second Objection.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(1)- RO(3) —

To wish another man evil under the aspect of good, is not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good simply, in fact rather is it in conformity therewith.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(1)- RO(4) —

In the devil both nature and guilt must be considered. His nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful to curse it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed, according to Job 3:8, “Let them curse it who curse the day.” Yet when a sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same reason he judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he is said to curse his own soul.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Although the sinner’s sentiments cannot be perceived in themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest sin, which has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to know who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(2) Whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature?

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects either of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse them.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but the nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the devil, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational creature.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as bodies, or transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral. iv, 2), “it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to curse what exists.” Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational creature.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(2) —

On the contrary, our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Matthew 21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1.

I answer that, Benediction and malediction, properly speaking, regard things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational creatures: while good and evil are said to happen to irrational creatures in relation to the rational creature for whose sake they are. Now they are related to the rational creature in several ways. First by way of ministration, in so far as irrational creatures minister to the needs of man. In this sense the Lord said to man ( Genesis 3:17): “Cursed is the earth in thy work,” so that its barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also David cursed the mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory’s expounding (Moral. iv, 3).

Again the irrational creature is related to the rational creature by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in signification of Judea.

Thirdly, the irrational creature is related to rational creatures as something containing them, namely by way of time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account of the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on account of the consequent penalties. In this sense also we may understand David to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in Kgs. 1:21, namely on account of the people slaughtered there.

But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a sin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is idle and vain and consequently unlawful.

From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin.

For Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the appendix of St. Augustine’s works] reckons cursing among slight sins. But such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a venial Sin.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing sometimes arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words.

But evil deeds are not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the kingdom of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God, according to 1 Corinthians 6:10, “Nor cursers [Douay: ‘railers’], nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God.”

Therefore cursing is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(3) —

I answer that, The evil words of which we are speaking now are those whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or desire. Now to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil by commanding it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity whereby we love our neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a mortal sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, as the person whom we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect. Hence it is written ( Leviticus 20:9): “He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die.”

It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial sin either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in cursing him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters the curse; because he may say such words through some slight movement, or in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word should be weighed chiefly with regard to the speaker’s intention, as stated above ( Q(72) , A(2) ).

From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered.

P(2b)- Q(76)- A(4) Whether cursing is a graver sin than backbiting?