QUESTIONS 125-140 QUESTION OF FEAR* (FOUR ARTICLES)

[*St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently ‘fear’ or ‘timidity.’ The translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account of the connection with the passion of fear. Otherwise ‘cowardice’ would be a better rendering.] We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2) Fearlessness; (3) Daring.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether fear is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(1) Whether fear is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion, as stated above ( P(1), Q(23) , A(4) ; Q(42) ). Now we are neither praised nor blamed for passions, as stated in Ethic. 2:Since then every sin is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a sin: since the “law of the Lord is unspotted” ( Psalm 18:8). Yet fear is commanded in God’s law, for it is written ( Ephesians 6:5): “Servants, be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling.”

Therefore fear is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii). Now fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that “a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear.” Therefore fear is not a sin. .

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(1) —

On the contrary, our Lord said ( Matthew 10:28): “Fear ye not them that kill the body,” and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): “Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words.”

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(1) —

I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on account of its being inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, as stated above ( Q(109), A(2) ; Q(114), A(1) ). Now this due order requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some sought after.

Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a good is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided. Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other hand, when the appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is neither inordinate nor sinful.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame, because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate manner.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking in the service they owe their masters.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing. Hence there is no sin in fearing them.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(2) Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude?

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated above ( Q(123), AA(4),5 ). But the sin of fear is not always connected with dangers of death, for a gloss on <19C701> Psalm 127:1, “Blessed are all they that fear the Lord,” says that “it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods.” Again a gloss on Matthew 27:44, “He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word,” says that “evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of contempt.”

Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death.

Now sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not to be Caesar’s slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed thereto.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above ( Q(20) , A(1) ; P(1), Q(40) , A(4) ). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that timidity is opposed to fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(19) , A(3) ; P(1), Q(43) , A(1) ), all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary to something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for its object, as we find proved in Ethic. iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of death. For this reason timidity is said to be antonomastically* opposed to fortitude. [*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of the danger of death.]

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(2)- RO(1) — The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the end, as stated above ( P(1), Q(1) , A(3) ; P(1), Q(18) , A(6) ): and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a good. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), that “to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or something disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun hardships is a mark of effeminacy.”

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As stated above ( P(1), Q(45) , A(2) ), fear is the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring. Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair results from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(3) Whether fear is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated above ( P(1), Q(23) , A(1) ), fear is in the irascible faculty which is a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the sensuality, as stated above ( P(1), Q(74) , A(4) ). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God. But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, “Whosoever is fearful,” etc., says that “a man is fearful when he trembles at the very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart, but that he can rally and take courage.” Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a precept, but only from perfection; for a gloss on Deuteronomy 20:8, “What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted?” says: “We learn from this that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches.” Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(3) —

On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and yet this is due to the fearful, according to Revelation 21:8, “But the fearful and unbelieving and the abominable,” etc., “shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second death.” Therefore fear is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), fear is a sin through being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be shunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of the rational appetite’s consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the rational appetite which is called the will, which deliberately shuns something against the dictate of reason: and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit what is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial sin.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(3)- RO(1) —

This argument considers fear as confined to the sensuality.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(3)- RO(2) —

This gloss also can be understood as referring to the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from accomplishing what he purposed doing.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(3)- RO(3) —

This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance when one has a reasonable cause for fear.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(4) Whether fear excuses from sin?

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that fear does not excuse from sin.

For fear is a sin, as stated above ( A(1) ). But sin does not excuse from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), “one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor anything that is not a result of one’s own wickedness.” Therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q(1) , Cap. Constat.): “A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by heretics, has an ostensible excuse.”

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(3) ), fear is sinful in so far as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from sin, because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body. and evils of the body more than evils of external things.

Wherefore if one were to incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet one’s sin would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through fear are not simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but in the point of its involuntariness.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of fear.

P(2b)- Q(125)- A(4)- RO(3) —

According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal goods not to be man’s goods, it follows in consequence that temporal evils are not man’s evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these temporal things are goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that which is good according to virtue.

QUESTION OF FEARLESSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless? (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(1) Whether fearlessness is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is written in praise of the just man ( Proverbs 28:1): “The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread.” Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death, according to Matthew 10:28, “Fear ye not them that kill the body,” etc., nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Isaiah 51:12, “Who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?” Therefore it is not a sin to be fearless.

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, fear is born of love, as stated above ( Q(125), A(2) ). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), “the love of God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city.” Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly.

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is said of the unjust judge ( Luke 18:2) that “he feared not God nor regarded man.”

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(1) —

I answer that, Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear whereby one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of temporal goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure, that is, to love these things not as placing his end therein, but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence it is contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving them in due measure.

Nevertheless, one never lapses entirely from this love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says ( Ephesians 5:29): “No man ever hated his own flesh.” Wherefore even those that slay themselves do so from love of their own flesh, which they desire to free from present stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and other temporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that he loves them* less than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect ‘se’ instead of ‘ea.’ We should then read: For the reason that he loves himself less than he ought.] But that he fear none of these things cannot result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride of soul presuming on self and despising others, according to the saying of Job 41:24,25: “He [Vulg.: ‘who’] was made to fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing”: and sometimes it happens through a defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that the “Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing.” [*”A man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as is said to be the case with the Celts.”] It is therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of soul, or dullness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from sin if it be invincible.

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The just man is praised for being without fear that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it is written (Ecclus. 1:28): “He that is without fear cannot be justified.”

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others. Hence it is written ( Proverbs 14:16): “A wise man feareth and declineth from evil.”

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be feared; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 34:16): “He that feareth the Lord shall tremble at nothing.” But temporal goods are not to be despised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(2) Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude?

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude. For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of due love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side.

Since then fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(123), A(3) ), fortitude is concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned.

Hence it belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to reason, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when he ought, and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man fears what he ought not, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by deficiency of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to fear.

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The act of fortitude is to endure death without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the fearless man does not do.

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But in respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(126)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude imposes the mean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its having different extremes in different respects.

QUESTION OF DARING [*Excessive daring or foolhardiness] (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether daring is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(1) Whether daring is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written ( Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that “he goeth forth boldly to meet armed men [*Vulg.: ‘he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men’].” But no vice redounds to a man’s praise. Therefore it is not a sin to be daring.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), “one should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been counseled.” But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore daring is not sinful but praiseworthy.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above ( P(1), Q(45) , A(2) ) when we were treating of the passions.

But hope is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted a sin.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): “Go not on the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils.” Now no man’s fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(1) —

I answer that, Daring, as stated above ( P(1), Q(23) , A(1) ; Q(55) ), is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by deficiency, and on this account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess, thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the same way daring as implying excess is accounted a sin.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(1)- RO(2) —

It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above ( Q(58) , A(3) ).

Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4,5,6). Hence the names of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially the names of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good for this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(2) Whether daring is opposed to fortitude?

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind.

But presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility.

Therefore daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to injustice.

Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude but to justice.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above ( Q(123), A(3) ). Now since timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring. But there is no such vice. Therefore neither should daring be accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(126), A(2) ), it belongs to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of daring. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above ( Q(122), A(3) ).

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice’s very species.

Wherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same virtue as presumption which is its cause.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition of daring depend on this.

P(2b)- Q(127)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The movement of daring consists in a man taking the offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature inclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), “the daring are precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is present,” namely through fear.

QUESTION OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE (ONE ARTICLE)

We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each part.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1) Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned?

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to fortitude, namely “magnificence,” “confidence,” “patience,” and “perseverance.” Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are concerned about money, and “a magnificent man must needs be liberal,” as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above ( Q(117), A(5) ). Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is written ( Matthew 24:13): “He that shall persevere to the end he shall be saved.” Therefore perseverance should not be accounted a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- O(6) —

Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of fortitude, namely “magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability.” Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, “courage, strength of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence.”

Therefore it seems that Tully’s reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- O(7) —

Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of fortitude. The first is “civic” fortitude, which produces brave deeds through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is “military” fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(48) ), a virtue can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter.

However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above ( Q(123), AA(3),6 ), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one’s having a mind ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions “confidence,” of which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings.” The second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect Tully mentions “magnificence,” which he describes as being “the discussion and administration,” i.e. accomplishment “of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind,” so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasiintegral parts thereof, because without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus “magnificence” is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and “magnanimity,” which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this respect he mentions “patience,” which he describes as “the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit.” The other is that by the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, according to Hebrews 12:3, “That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds.” In this respect he mentions “perseverance,” which accordingly he describes as “the fixed and continued persistence in a well considered purpose.” If these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above ( Q(17) , A(5) ; P(1), Q(62) , A(3) ). But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself, yet under God withal.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- RO(3) —

To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part thereof.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the Article.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- RO(6) —

Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by Tully, namely “confidence, magnificence, forbearance,” which he puts in the place of patience, and “firmness,” which he substitutes for perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely “magnanimity” and “security,” are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man’s hope for great things: and hope for anything presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above ( P(1), Q(40) , A(2) ) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for.

A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one’s own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope, as stated above, ( P(1), Q(40) , A(4), ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles.

Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions “perseverance” and “magnificence,” and with Macrobius, “magnanimity.” “Strength of will” is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that “strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be endured” — i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as “strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose.” Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says that “manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue.” Besides magnificence he mentions \andragathia\, i.e. manly goodness which we may render “strenuousness.” For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to \andragathia\, strenuousness: wherefore he says that \andragathia\ is the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.

Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully.

P(2b)- Q(128)- A(1)- RO(7) —

The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude, they differ as to motive, as stated above ( Q(123), A(1), ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.

QUESTION OF MAGNANIMITY* (EIGHT ARTICLES)

[*Not in the ordinary restricted sense but as explained by the author] We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider (1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance.

As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether magnanimity is about honors? (2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors? (3) Whether it is a virtue? (4) Whether it is a special virtue? (5) Whether it is a part of fortitude? (6) Of its relation to confidence; (7) Of its relation to assurance; (8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since “magnanimity” signifies greatness of mind, and “mind” denotes the irascible part, as appears from De Anima iii, 42, where the Philosopher says that “in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind,” i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems that magnanimity is not about honors.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that “magnanimity is about honor and dishonor.”

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(1) —

I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about which is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing.

The things which come into man’s use are external things, and among these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person’s virtue, as stated above ( Q(103), AA(1),2 ); and because it is offered to God and to the best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about honors.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Good and evil absolutely considered regard the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something great or difficult.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even so, we have stated ( Q(123), AA(4),5 ) with regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of fear and daring.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(2) Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors?

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated above ( A(1) ). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great honor.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor, and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not only about great honors.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity is about great honors.

I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in De Coelo i, 116.

Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3.

Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div.

Nom. iv, 4).

Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of money or of honor.

And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely “magnificence.”

In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes, which are \philotimia\, i.e. love of honor, and \aphilotimia\, i.e. without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great honors there is “magnanimity.” Wherefore we must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honor.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Great and little are accidental to honor considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(2)- RO(2) —

In anger and other matters only that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are things existing outside the soul.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(2)- RO(3) —

He that makes good use of great things is much more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3) Whether magnanimity is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean but the greater extreme: because the “magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the greatest things” (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above ( P(1), Q(65) , A(1) ). But one may have a virtue without having magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that “whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous.” Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, “Virtue is a good quality of the mind,” as stated above ( P(1), Q(55) , A(4) ). But magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of “a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance calm.” Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since “the magnanimous deems himself worthy of great things, and despises others,” according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame.

For, in the first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [*Cf. Q(113) ] towards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he holds to the barren things rather than to those that are fruitful.

Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc. 15:18): “Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas’ companions, and the greatness of courage [animi magnitudinem] with which they fought for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword.” Now, only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3) —

I answer that, The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man’s proper good. Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others, as stated above ( A(1) ; P(1), Q(11) , A(2), O(3) ). Therefore magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3)- RO(1) —

As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), “the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes,” in so far as he tends to what is greatest, “but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the mean,” because he tends to the greatest things according to reason, for “he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth” (Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man, but only to great men. on the other hand, as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his state.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The movements of the body are differentiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement.

Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found naturally.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3)- RO(4) —

There is in man something great which he possesses through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from God’s gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God’s gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man ( Psalm 14:4): “In his sight a vile person is contemned [*Douay: ‘The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,’ etc.],” which indicates the contempt of magnanimity, “but he honoreth them that fear the Lord,” which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because they proceed according to different considerations.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(3)- RO(5) —

These properties in so far as they belong to a magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him.

He is also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), “it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle class.” In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with others: this means that he is not at home with others than his friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(4) Whether magnanimity is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 3) that “whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous.” Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man. For it is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that “it belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof” (which is an act of prudence), “nor to act unjustly” (which is an act of justice), “that he is ready to do favors” (which is an act of charity), “that he gives his services readily” (which is an act of liberality), that “he is truthful” (which is an act of truthfulness), and that “he is not given to complaining” (which is an act of patience).

Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul, according to the saying of Isaiah 61:10, “He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation,” and afterwards he adds, “and as a bride adorned with her jewels.” But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as stated in Ethic. 4:Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it from the other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(123), A(2) ), it belongs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above ( AA(1),2 ): and honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue.

Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above ( Q(103), A(1), ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it regards all the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy of great honors.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence, and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other virtues. on the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his excellence or greatness.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(5) Whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude?

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): “If magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great assurance”: and Tully says (De Offic. i): “If a man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from deception.” Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a magnanimous man is not \philokindynos\, that is, a lover of danger.

But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(5) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(1), Q(61) , A(3) ), a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because “a firm standing is necessary in every virtue,” according to Ethic. 2:And this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.

Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(5)- RO(1) —

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1,3), “to lack evil is looked upon as a good,” wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(5)- RO(2) —

A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks “many” the same as “great.” This is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to danger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not \mikrokindynos\, i.e. endangering himself for small things, but \megalokindynos\, i.e. endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): “Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life.”

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil, evil is of more import in this particular respect.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(6) Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity?

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(6)- O(1) —

It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in another, according to 2 Corinthians 3:4,5, “Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.”

But this seems inconsistent with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to Isaiah 12:2, “I will deal confidently and will not fear.”

But to be without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, reward is not due except to virtue.

But a reward is due to confidence, according to Hebrews 3:6, where it is said that we are the house of Christ, “if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the end.” Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (ad 6) and in the prologue to this.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(6) —

I answer that, Confidence takes its name from “fides” [faith]: and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, “Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee.” Wherefore confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about something, not only on account of another’s statement, but also on account of something we observe in another, it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through observing something either in oneself — for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. or in another, for instance, through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help from him.

Now it has been stated above ( A(1), ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(6)- RO(1) —

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to the “magnanimous to need nothing,” for need is a mark of the deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds “or scarcely anything.” For it surpasses man to need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(6)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( P(1), Q(23) , A(2) ; P(1), Q(40) , A(4) ), when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely good. But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter’s object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as stated in the preceding Question.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(7) Whether security belongs to magnanimity?

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(7)- O(1) —

It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For security, as stated above ( Q(128), ad 6), denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case.

Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man “is said to be secure because he is without care.” But this seems to be contrary to virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Timothy 2:15, “Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God.” Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14,18, “If thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand... being buried thou shalt sleep secure.”

Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: “Magnanimity consists of two things,” that “it belongs to magnanimity to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune.” But a man’s security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(7) —

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), “fear makes a man take counsel,” because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards fortitude.

Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.

It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of the passion ( P(1), Q(45) , A(2) ). Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(7)- RO(3) —

There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and participation of, future happiness, as stated above ( P(1), Q(5) , AA(3),7 ). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue’s reward.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(8) Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity?

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(8)- O(1) —

It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): “virtue suffices for itself.” Now magnanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above ( A(4), ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: “Magnanimity consists of two things,” that “a great soul is commended for despising external things.” Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that “it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man.” And Aristotle says (Ethic. iv, 3) that “a magnanimous man does not grieve at misfortune.” Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him.

Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(8) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that “good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity.”

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(8) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), magnanimity regards two things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expeditiously.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(8)- RO(2) —

The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.

P(2b)- Q(129)- A(8)- RO(3) —

If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it.

Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.

QUESTION OF PRESUMPTION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether presumption is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(1) Whether presumption is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle says: “Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg.: ‘and stretching forth’] myself to those that are before.” But it seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) “we should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish those that make us immortal”: and (Metaph. i) “that man should pursue divine things as far as possible.” Now divine and immortal things are seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 2 Corinthians 3:5): “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.” If then presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 37:3): “O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?” and a gloss answers: “From a creature’s evil will.” Now all that comes of the root of an evil will is a sin.

Therefore presumption is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(1) —

I answer that, Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in general throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now it is established throughout all natural things, that every action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is vicious and sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that any one should assume to do what is above his power: and this is what is meant by presumption, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Nothing hinders that which is above the active power of a natural thing, and yet not above the passive power of that same thing: thus the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be so changed as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to advance towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually advancing forward.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely the intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. In this respect the Philosopher says that “man ought to pursue immortal and divine things,” not that he should do what it becomes God to do, but that he should be united to Him in intellect and will.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), “what we can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense.”

Hence since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in God’s assistance.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(2) Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above ( Q(14) , A(2) ; Q(21) , A(1) ). But the sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), “on account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they deem external goods as something great.” Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by deficiency.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the “vain man,” i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a presumptuous man, “is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess.”

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(129), A(3), ad 1), magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is becoming to us.

Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(2)- RO(1) —

It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one’s own ability, it can be opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If, however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary honor, as stated above ( Q(129), A(2) ).

P(2b)- Q(130)- A(2)- RO(3) —

No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so far as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may err in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly, as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something that does not make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), “those who have these things without virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor are rightly called magnanimous.”

Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not simply, but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, despising and wronging others. This savors of an excess of magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people’s opinion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.) that “when magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on excelling in all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of virtue.” Thus it is evident that the presumptuous man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although in appearance he surpasses him.

QUESTION OF AMBITION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(1) Whether ambition is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition denotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and the greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for honor are reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, that which heartens a man to do good and disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men to do good and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that “with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave in honor”: and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that “honor fosters the arts.”

Therefore ambition is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Corinthians 13:5) that “charity is not ambitious, seeketh not her own.” Now nothing is contrary to charity, except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(103), AA(1),2 ), honor denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence.

Now two things have to be considered with regard to man’s honor. The first is that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point that calls for observation is that the thing in which man excels is given to him by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be pleased that others bear witness to his excellence, as this enables him to profit others.

Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when a man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is to desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires honor for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man’s appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is evident that it is always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The desire for good should be regulated according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason’s dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward: since the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which honor derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be desired in due measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man cares not by what means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that “the good as well as the wicked covet honors for themselves, but the one,” i.e. the good, “go about it in the right way,” whereas “the other,” i.e. the wicked, “through lack of the good arts, make use of deceit and falsehood.” Yet they who, merely for the sake of honor, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they who do brave things for the sake of honor are not truly brave.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(2) Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above ( Q(130), A(2) ). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by excess.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Macc. 4:7) that “Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood.” Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is written ( Acts 25:27) that “Agrippa and Berenice... with great pomp [ambitione]. . . had entered into the hall of audience” [*’Praetorium.’ The Vulgate has ‘auditorium,’ but the meaning is the same], and (2 Para. 16:14) that when Asa died they “burned spices and... ointments over his body” with very great pomp [ambitione]. But magnanimity is not about outward show. Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) that “the more a man exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate others.” But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), ambition signifies inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes use of them in a becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its end, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man attempts in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man attempts great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various respects.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Honor is due to those who are in a position of dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and accordingly inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition.

For if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity, not for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious but presumptuous.

P(2b)- Q(131)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is signified by the words of James 2:2,3: “If there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel... and you... shall say to him: Sit thou here well,” etc.

Wherefore ambition does not regard outward worship, except in so far as this is a kind of honor.

QUESTION OF VAINGLORY (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether desire of glory is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is a capital vice? (5) Of its daughters.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(1) Whether the desire of glory is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin.

For no one sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded ( Ephesians 5:1): “Be ye... followers of God, as most dear children.”

Now by seeking glory man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it is written ( Isaiah 43:6,7): “Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth on My name, I have created him for My glory.”

Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which incites a mar to do good is apparently not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that “glory inflames every man to strive his utmost”: and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works, according to Romans 2:7: “To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work... glory and honor” [*Vulg.: ‘Who will render to every man according to his works, to them indeed who... seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.’]. Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is “consistent good report about a person, together with praise”: and this comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz. that glory is, “as it were, clear knowledge with praise.” Now it is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to call for praise, according to Ecclus. 41:15, “Take care of a good name,” and Romans 12:17, “Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of all men.” Therefore the desire of vainglory is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): “He is better advised who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful.”

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(1) —

I answer that, Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that to be “glorified is the same as to be clarified.” Now clarity and comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word glory properly denotes the display of something as regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those who are far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes that somebody’s good is known and approved by many, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.) [*The quotation is from Livy: Hist., Lib. XXII C, 39]: “I must not boast while I am addressing one man.”

But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few, or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one considers one’s own good as being worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve one’s own good: for it is written ( 1 Corinthians 2:12): “Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God that we may know the things that are given us from God.”

Likewise it is not a sin to be willing to approve one’s own good works: for it is written ( Matthew 5:16): “Let your light shine before men.” Hence the desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin: but the desire for empty or vain glory denotes a sin: for it is sinful to desire anything vain, according to Psalm 4:3, “Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?”

Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something frail and perishable: secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: thirdly, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as God’s honor, or the spiritual welfare of his neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As Augustine says on John 13:13, “You call Me Master and Lord; and you say well” (Tract. lviii in Joan.): “Selfcomplacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of pride.

But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself, does not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not His: nor does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows.” It is therefore evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but for ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good of others, according to Matthew 5:16, “That they may see your good works, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven.”

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(1)- RO(2) —

That which we receive from God is not vain but true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works, and of which it is written ( 2 Corinthians 10:17,18): “He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God commendeth.”

It is true that some are heartened to do works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v).

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(1)- RO(3) —

It is requisite for man’s perfection that he should know himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be glorified by men, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testimony of others’ praise the good which is in him, may himself strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is praiseworthy that a man should “take care of his good name,” and that he should “provide good things in the sight of God and men”: but not that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(2) Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity?

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. For, as stated above ( A(1) ), vainglory consists in glorying in things that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and perishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above ( Q(130), A(2) ; Q(131), A(2) ): and these differ from vainglory. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a gloss on Philippians 2:3, “Let nothing be done through contention, neither by vainglory,” says: “Some among them were given to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for the sake of vainglory.” But contention [*Cf. Q(38) ] is not opposed to magnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading, “Magnanimity consists in two things: We should beware of the desire for glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should ever strive to keep untrammeled.” Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(103), A(1), ad 3), glory is an effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated above ( Q(129), AA(1),2 ), it follows that it also is about glory: seeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory in moderation.

Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(2)- RO(1) —

To think so much of little things as to glory in them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him. In like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for honor’s sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth than for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man to glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv), that he cares not to be praised.

And so, when a man looks upon little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(2)- RO(2) —

He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply. But if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man by way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great in his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As stated above ( Q(127), A(2), ad 2), the opposition of vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless contention, if done intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no one contends save for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not contentious, because nothing is great in his estimation.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(3) Whether vainglory is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory precludes the eternal reward: for it is written ( Matthew 6:1): “Take heed, that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise you shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in heaven.”

Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man appropriates to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written ( Isaiah 42:8): “I will not give My glory to another,” and ( 1 Timothy 1:17): “To... the only God be honor and glory.” Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a gloss of Augustine on 1 Thessalonians 2:4, “God, Who proveth our hearts,” says: “Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not perceive its baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to take pleasure in it, when it is given.” Chrysostom also says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that “vainglory enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of all our inward possessions.” Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that “while other vices find their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory finds a place even in the servants of Christ.” Yet in the latter there is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(24) , A(12) ; Q(110), A(4) ; Q(112), A(2) ), a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be contrary to charity as regards the love of one’s neighbor: yet as regards the love of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by reason of the matter about which one glories: for instance when one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe God, according to Ezekiel 28:2, “Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God,” and 1 Corinthians 4:7, “What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?”

Or again when a man prefers to God the temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden ( Jeremiah 9:23,24): “Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me.”

Or again when a man prefers the testimony of man to God’s; thus it is written in reproval of certain people ( John 12:43): “For they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God.”

In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of the one who glories, in that he refers his intention to glory as his last end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to obtain it, forbears not from doing even that which is against God. In this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 14) that “this vice,” namely the love of human praise, “is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory more than it fears or loves God, that our Lord said ( John 5:44): How can you believe, who receive glory one from another, and the glory which is from God alone, you do not seek?”

If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter gloried in, nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal but a venial sin.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(3)- RO(1) —

No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it be done for the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal sin.

On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, desires the excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to God alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not only on account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to grave sins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too self-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward goods.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(4) Whether vainglory is a capital vice?

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice.

For a vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital.

But vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor is not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good, since human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something outside man himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the seven capital vices.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(4) —

I answer that, The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place vainglory among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi), reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and not without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on ( Q(152), AA(1),2 ), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices, and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of vice, known as the capital vices.

Now among the goods that are the means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most conducive to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of a man’s goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all. Wherefore, just as by the glory which is in God’s sight man acquires honor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of man he acquires excellence in human things. Hence on account of its close connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it follows that it is most desirable. And since many vices arise from the inordinate desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(4)- RO(1) —

It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and P(1), Q(84) , A(2) ) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Praise and honor, as stated above ( A(2) ), stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory is compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man loves to be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain renown in the knowledge of others.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin, inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(5) Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned to be disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and love of novelties?

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably reckoned to be “disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [*Praesumptio novitatum, literally ‘presumption of novelties’].” For according to Gregory (Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride. Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way about, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with vainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men. Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter of vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(5) —

On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who there assigns the above daughters to vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(5) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(34) , A(5) ; Q(35) , A(4) ; P(1), Q(84) , AA(3),4 ), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one’s own excellence, as stated above ( AA(1),4 ): and to this end a man may tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a man strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and thus we have “obstinacy,” by which a man is too much attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have “discord,” whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as regards “speech,” and then we have “contention,” whereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds, and this is “disobedience,” whereby a man refuses to carry out the command of his superiors.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(5)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( Q(112), A(1), ad 2), boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according to Ethic. iv, is directed sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and thus it is the result of vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Anger is not the cause of discord and contention, except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a glorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others.

P(2b)- Q(132)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Vainglory is reproved in connection with almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory to the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the sake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to give alms as though this were something novel.

QUESTION OF PUSILLANIMITY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin? (2) To what virtue is it opposed?

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a fainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).

Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that “a fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet does not deem himself worthy of them.” Now no one is worthy of great goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), “none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor.” Therefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently pusillanimity is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, “Pride is the beginning of all sin” (Ecclus. 10:15). But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that “he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted.” Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose them for, which they both humbly declined ( Exodus 3:11; Jeremiah 1:6). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written ( Colossians 3:21): “Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged.”

Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(1) —

I answer that, Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a natural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto.

Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received from his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear, was punished by his master ( Matthew 25; Luke 19).

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil, because he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if “they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they might have done had they been less retiring.”

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially, sometimes mortally.

Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he derives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or from external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion, whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he is competent. Hence it is written ( Proverbs 26:16): “The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences.”

For nothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and having a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastoral. i) of Moses that “perchance he would have been proud, had he undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without misgiving: and again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the command of his Creator.”

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which they were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine grace: yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness, demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(2) Whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity?

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that “the fainthearted man knows not himself: for he would desire the good things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself.” Now ignorance of self seems opposed to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money.

Moreover the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of prudence, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(9) ). Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear: hence it is written ( Isaiah 35:4): “Say to the fainthearted:

Take courage and fear not.” It also seems to proceed from inordinate anger, according to Colossians 3:21, “Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged.” Now inordinate fear is opposed to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the saying of Ecclus. 37:3, “O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?” Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness and littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and little are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(2) —

I answer that, Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways. First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it is opposed to magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little differ in connection with the same subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which on the part of the intellect is ignorance of one’s own qualification, and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed one’s ability. Thirdly, it may be considered in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from the great things of which one is worthy. But, as stated above ( Q(132), A(2), ad 3), opposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective species than on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is directly opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but from laziness in considering one’s own ability, according to Ethic. iv, 3, or in accomplishing what is within one’s power.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(2)- RO(2) —

This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of view of its effect.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(2)- RO(3) —

This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers of death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however, we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to pusillanimity.

P(2b)- Q(133)- A(2)- RO(4) —

According to its proper species pusillanimity is a graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good things, which is a very great evil according to Ethic. 4:Presumption, however, is stated to be “wicked” on account of pride whence it proceeds.

QUESTION OF MAGNIFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether magnificence is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) What is its matter? (4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above ( P(1), Q(65) , A(1) ). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence: because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “not every liberal man is magnificent.” Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to Ethic. ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean, for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now “great” and “little” are opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is “equal,” as stated in Metaph. 10:Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above ( Q(108), A(2) ; Q(117), A(1), O(1) ). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the “magnificent man is not lavish towards himself”: and this is opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) “act is right reason about things to be made.” Now magnificence is about things to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence= magna facere — i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Divine power, according to Psalm 47:35: “His magnificence and His power is in the clouds.” Therefore magnificence is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(1) —

I answer that, According to De Coelo i, 16, “we speak of virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing’s power,” not as regards the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence, either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as explained above ( Q(129), A(3), ad 2), as also ( P(1), Q(65) , A(1) ) when we were treating of the connection of virtues.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(1)- RO(2) —

It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity ( Q(129), A(3), ad 1).

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(1)- RO(3) —

It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But that which regards a man’s person is little in comparison with that which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(1)- RO(4) —

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) “there must needs be a virtue of act,” i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(2) Whether magnificence is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great.

But it may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to something great, as stated above ( Q(129), AA(1),2 ). Therefore it belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is written ( Exodus 15:11): “Magnificent [Douay: ‘glorious’] in holiness,” and ( Psalm 95:6): “Holiness and magnificence [Douay: ‘Majesty’] in His sanctuary.” Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above ( Q(81) , A(8) ). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(2) —

I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do [facere] something great, as its name implies [magnificence= magna facere — i.e. to make great things]. Now “facere” may be taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly “facere” means to work something in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the kind; in a broad sense “facere” is employed to denote any action, whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand or will.

Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something great, the doing [factio] being understood in the strict sense, it is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness, namely that the work produced [factum] by the act is something great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.

If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something great, the doing [facere] being understood in a broad sense, it is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(2)- RO(1) —

It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something great in the genus of that virtue, if “doing” [facere] be taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper to magnificence.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(2)- RO(2) —

It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by making [faciendo], or by any kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something great, direct their principal intention, not to something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue.

On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something great, “doing” [facere] being taken in the strict sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “magnificence is the discussing and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind, discussion” referring to the inward intention, and “administration” to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in external matter [factibili].

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The intention of magnificence is the production of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no end of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine honor.

Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “the most commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine sacrifices”: and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect is directed to religion or holiness.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(3) Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure?

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But liberality is about expenditure, as stated above ( Q(117), A(2) ). Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, “every magnificent man is liberal” (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.

Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of magnificence.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since “the virtues do not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for themselves,” as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore magnificence is not about great expenditure.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale.”

Therefore it is only about great expenditure.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ), it belongs to magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal,” i.e. proportionate, “expenditure.” Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(3)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( Q(129), A(2) ), those virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing.

Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use of money.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(3)- RO(4) —

The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply.

Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(4) Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above ( A(3) ). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, fortitude is about fear and darings.

But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “the magnificent man is like the man of science.” Now science has more in common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(4) —

I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.

In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above ( Q(80) ). The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one’s property, which is of much less account than danger to one’s person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.

P(2b)- Q(134)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Magnificence directs the use of art to something great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the risk of a great loss.

QUESTION OF MEANNESS* (TWO ARTICLES)

[*”Parvificentia,” or doing mean things, just as “magnificentia” is doing great things.] We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether meanness is a vice? (2) Of the vice opposed to it.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(1) Whether meanness is a vice?

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “careful reckoning is mean.” But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy, since man’s good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “a mean man is loth to spend money.” But this belongs to covetousness or illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the others.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(1), Q(1) , A(3) ; P(1), Q(18) , A(6) ), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean [parvificus] because he intends to do something little [parvum]. Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may produce a great work.

Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4) that “the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more magnificent result.” On the other hand, the mean man intends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “he seeks how he may spend least.”

As a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher says that “the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good” of the magnificent work, “for the trifle” that he is unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a vice.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little things: hence meanness is a vice.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), “fear makes us take counsel”: wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure, so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm one’s neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful.”

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(2) Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness?

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated above ( A(1) ), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much, where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have something of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now those who spend excessively, do so in order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But this belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above ( Q(131), A(2) ). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(2) —

On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(2) —

I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are relative terms, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now just as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion between his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek \banausia\, so called from the Greek \baunos\, because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything. It is also called \apyrokalia\, i.e. lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called “consumptio” [waste].

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(2)- RO(2) —

To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend little.

But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work, which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far as when it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.

P(2b)- Q(135)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas meanness falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being directed to the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other.

QUESTION OF PATIENCE (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether patience is a virtue? (2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues? (3) Whether it can be had without grace? (4) Whether it is a part of fortitude? (5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(1) Whether patience is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according to Isaiah 49:10 and Revelation 7:16, “They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them.” Therefore patience is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue it is “that makes its possessor good.” Yet patience is sometimes found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may amass money, according to Ecclesiastes 5:16, “All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery and in sorrow.” Therefore patience is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above ( P(1), Q(70) , A(1), ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits ( Galatians 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i): “The virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us.”

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(123), A(1) ), the moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Corinthians 7:10, “The sorrow of the world worketh death,” and Ecclus. 30:25, “Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.” Hence the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia ii): “A man’s patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal mind,” i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, “lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things.”

It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven. Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that “patience itself will not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal.”

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) “properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them patient.”

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As stated above ( P(1), Q(11) , A(1) ), the very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue. but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being overcome by sorrow.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(2) Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now “patience hath a perfect work” ( James 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written ( Luke 21:19): “In your patience you shall possess your souls.”

Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxxv in Evang.) “patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues.” Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call principal.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(2) —

I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For it is virtue that “makes its possessor good, and renders the latter’s work good” (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue’s superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity /are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect.

Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, that it is more perfect simply.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but merely because it removes their obstacles.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(3) Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that it is possible to have patience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil’s sake, by their own virtue and without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that “men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sinfully.” Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be truly patient.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help of grace.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, it is quite evident that some go through much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 61:6): “From Him,” i.e. from God, “is my patience.”

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(3) —

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), “the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which gives pleasure.” The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, according to Corinthians 13:4, “Charity is patient.”

But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through grace, according to Romans 5:5, “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us.” Therefore it is clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The good of a social virtue [*Cf. P(1), Q(61) , A(5) ] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without the help of God’s grace [*Cf. P(1), Q(109), A(2) ]. On the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the sake of his body’s health, proceeds from the love a man naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(4) Whether patience is a part of fortitude?

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above ( Q(123), A(6) ), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that “patience consists in enduring evils inflicted by others.” Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above ( Q(123), A(3) ), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the whole cannot be without its part.

Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(4) —

I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue.

For it belongs to patience “to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by others,” as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811).

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(4)- RO(1) —

It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death: whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible faculty.

Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however great they be.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(4)- RO(3) —

It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily 5:in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Matthew 4:10, “Begone Satan,” that “it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure God’s wrongs patiently is most wicked”: and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that “the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our enemies.” But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(5) Whether patience is the same as longanimity? (*Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with magnanimity.)

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For Augustine says (De Patientia i) that “we speak of patience in God, not as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked, that they may be converted.” Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:4): “The Most High is a patient rewarder.” Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from patience.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(5)- O(4) —

On the contrary, a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Romans ii] on Romans 2:4, “Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and longsuffering?” says: “It seems that longanimity differs from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently.”

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(5) —

I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with magnanimity than with patience.

Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Proverbs 13:12, “Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul.”

Hence there may be patience in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so far as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous evil.

For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says that “patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit.” By saying “arduous” he refers to constancy in good; when he says “difficult” he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and by adding “continued” or “long lasting,” he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in common with patience.

This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.

P(2b)- Q(136)- A(5)- RO(3) —

That which is a long way off as to place, though distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails.

Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us.

We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to be borne with patience.

QUESTION OF PERSEVERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether perseverance is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a part of fortitude? (3) Of its relation to constancy; (4) Whether it needs the help of grace?

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that perseverance is not a virtue.

For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater than perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9.

Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, “by virtue man lives aright,” according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority (De Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living, unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “perseverance is the fixed and continued persistence in a well-considered purpose.” Therefore perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that “perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand, and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are indifferent.” Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(1) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), “virtue is about the difficult and the good”; and so where there is a special kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the act’s very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special virtue.

Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in connection with dangers of death (which also is something difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as necessity requires.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): “Faith is to believe without seeing.” Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it. Accordingly we must reply that the term “perseverance” is sometimes used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and the magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are, however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the entire life of man.

Wherefore as regards these which are the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end, belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a “quality difficult to change.”

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(2) Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), “perseverance is about pains of touch.” But these belong to temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues.

Therefore perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a part of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(123), A(2) ; P(1), Q(61) , AA(3),4 ), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been stated ( Q(123), A(2) ) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand firm, namely in dangers of death.

Wherefore it follows of necessity that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death.

Therefore perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends not only on the matter [*Cf. Q(136), A(4), ad 2], but also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter.

Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising from length of time.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is in the irascible.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end, according to Matthew 24:13, “He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved.” Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(3) Whether constancy pertains to perseverance?

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above ( Q(137), A(5) ): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, “virtue is about the difficult and the good.” Now it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance, as stated above ( Q(128), A(6) ). Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(3) —

On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to perseverance.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(3) —

I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good, against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude, because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external obstacles.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(3)- RO(1) —

External obstacles to persistence in good are especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as stated above ( Q(136), A(1) ). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(3)- RO(2) —

It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which perseverance regards.

Hence constancy may pertain to both.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the point of their difference, as stated in the Article.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(4) Whether perseverance needs the help of grace?

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that perseverance does not need the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for perseverance.

Therefore this does not need the help of grace.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the gift of Christ’s grace is greater than the harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Romans 5:15, seqq. Now “before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had received,” as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, persevere without the help of a further grace.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis. 5:7): “We... have walked through hard ways.” Now some persevere in sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i): “We hold that perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in Christ.”

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1), ad 2; A(2), ad 3), perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated above ( P(1), Q(109), A(10) ), when we were treating of grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to accomplish.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(4)- RO(2) —

As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), “it was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their constancy, have persevered in faith.”

P(2b)- Q(137)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God’s grace. On the other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs the help of grace for that end.

QUESTION OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Of effeminacy; (2) Of pertinacity.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(1) Whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance? (*Mollities, literally ‘softness’) P(2b)- Q(138)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance. For a gloss on 1 Corinthians 6:9,10, “Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind,” expounds the text thus: “Effeminate — i.e. obscene, given to unnatural vice.” But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “delicacy is a kind of effeminacy.” But to be delicate seems akin to intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but to temperance.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “the man who is fond of amusement is effeminate.” Now immoderate fondness of amusement is opposed to \eutrapelia\, which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate.”

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(137), AA(1),2 ), perseverance is deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is directly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be “soft” if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is no wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them.” Now it is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading “True magnanimity consists of two things:

It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure.”

Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(1)- RO(1) —

This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish themselves, as it were.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written ( Deuteronomy 28:56): “The tender and delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her foot for... softness [Douay: ‘niceness’].”

Thus delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for instance toil or the like.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(1)- RO(3) —

In play two things may be considered. In the first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play is opposed to \eutrapelia\. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(2) Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above ( Q(132), A(2) ). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess: because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) “they rejoice when they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected.” And if it be opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is clearly false.

Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, just as the persevering man persists in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures, the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is opposed to religion, as stated above ( Q(92) , A(1) ).

Therefore pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(2) —

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) “a person is said to be pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious.” “Pervicacious” has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man “perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients called ‘vicia’ what we call victory.” These the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) calls \ischyrognomones\, that is “head-strong,” or \idiognomones\, that is “self-opinionated,” because they abide by their opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for falling short of it.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The reason why a man is too persistent in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now it has been stated above ( Q(127), A(2), ad 1; Q(133), A(2) ), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on their species.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man. Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man.

P(2b)- Q(138)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Although the other virtues persist against the onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is directly opposed to perseverance.

QUESTION OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether fortitude is a gift? (2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(1) Whether fortitude is a gift?

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should not be reckoned a gift.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated above ( P(1), Q(68) , A(6) ). But the act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that “fortitude encourages the fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven.” Therefore fortitude is not a gift.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that “it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures of the passing show.” Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the Holy Ghost ( Isaiah 11:2).

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(1) —

I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated above ( Q(123), A(2) ; P(1), Q(61) , A(3) ): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above ( Q(123), A(2) ).

Yet furthermore man’s mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man’s power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above ( P(1), Q(68) , AA(1),2 ) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(2) Whether the fourth beatitude: “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” corresponds to the gift of fortitude?

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that the fourth beatitude, “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” does not correspond to the gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above ( Q(45) ). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8.

Now the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): “Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil.”

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(121), A(2) ), Augustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude.

Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated ( A(1) ), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(2)- RO(1) —

As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which is related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a gift.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(8), ad 3; P(1), Q(68) , A(4), ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.

P(2b)- Q(139)- A(2)- RO(3) —

There are two of the fruits which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods.

QUESTION OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider the precepts of fortitude: (1) The precepts of fortitude itself; (2) The precepts of its parts.

P(2b)- Q(140)- A(1) Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?

P(2b)- Q(140)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude ( Deuteronomy 20). Therefore precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law also.

P(2b)- Q(140)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.

P(2b)- Q(140)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated above ( Q(123), A(2) ; P(1), Q(61) , A(2) ). Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should have been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief precepts of the Law.

P(2b)- Q(140)- A(1) —

On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.

P(2b)- Q(140)- A(1) —

I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a view to directing the mind to God. For this reason it is written ( Deuteronomy 20:3,4): “Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies.”

As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among them we find precepts of fortitude according to the requirements of those goods.

P(2b)- Q(140)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Matthew 11:12, “The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away.” Hence Peter commands ( 1 Peter 5:8,9): “Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye, strong in faith,” as also James 4:7: “Resist the devil, and he will fly from you.” Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely endure temporal evils, according to Matthew 10:28, “Fear ye not them that kill the body.”

P(2b)- Q(140)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The law gives general directions in its precepts. But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.

P(2b)- Q(140)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As stated above ( Q(122), A(1) ), the precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear dangers of death.

P(2b)- Q(140)- A(2) Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?