QUESTIONS 84-90 QUESTION OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the Sacrament of Penance. We shall consider (1) Penance itself; (2) Its effect; (3) Its Parts; (4) The recipients of this sacrament; (5) The power of the ministers, which pertains to the keys; (6) The solemnization of this sacrament.

The first of these considerations will be two fold: (1) Penance as a sacrament; (2) Penance as a virtue.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether Penance is a sacrament? (2) Of its proper matter; (3) Of its form; (4) Whether imposition of hands is necessary for this sacrament? (5) Whether this sacrament is necessary for salvation? (6) Of its relation to the other sacraments; (7) Of its institution; (8) Of its duration; (9) Of its continuance; (10) Whether it can be repeated?

P(3)- Q(84)- A(1) Whether Penance is a sacrament?

P(3)- Q(84)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that Penance is not a sacrament.

For Gregory [*Cf. Isidore, Etym. vi, ch. 19] says: “The sacraments are Baptism, Chrism, and the Body and Blood of Christ; which are called sacraments because under the veil of corporeal things the Divine power works out salvation in a hidden manner.” But this does not happen in Penance, because therein corporeal things are not employed that, under them, the power of God may work our salvation. Therefore Penance is not a sacrament.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the sacraments of the Church are shown forth by the ministers of Christ, according to 1 Corinthians 4:1: “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God.”

But Penance is not conferred by the ministers of Christ, but is inspired inwardly into man by God, according to Jeremiah 31:19: “After Thou didst convert me, I did penance.” Therefore it seems that Penance is not a sacrament.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, in the sacraments of which we have already spoken above, there is something that is sacrament only, something that is both reality and sacrament, and something that is reality only, as is clear from what has been stated ( Q(66), A(1) ). But this does not apply to Penance. Therefore Penance is not a sacrament.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(1) —

On the contrary, As Baptism is conferred that we may be cleansed from sin, so also is Penance: wherefore Peter said to Simon Magus ( Acts 8:22): “Do penance... from this thy wickedness.”

But Baptism is a sacrament as stated above ( Q(66), A(1) ). Therefore for the same reason Penance is also a sacrament.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(1) —

I answer that, As Gregory says [*Isidore, Etym. vi, ch. 19], “a sacrament consists in a solemn act, whereby something is so done that we understand it to signify the holiness which it confers.” Now it is evident that in Penance something is done so that something holy is signified both on the part of the penitent sinner, and on the part of the priest absolving, because the penitent sinner, by deed and word, shows his heart to have renounced sin, and in like manner the priest, by his deed and word with regard to the penitent, signifies the work of God Who forgives his sins. Therefore it is evident that Penance, as practiced in the Church, is a sacrament.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(1)- RO(1) —

By corporeal things taken in a wide sense we may understand also external sensible actions, which are to this sacrament what water is to Baptism, or chrism to Confirmation. But it is to be observed that in those sacraments, whereby an exceptional grace surpassing altogether the proportion of a human act, is conferred, some corporeal matter is employed externally, e.g. in Baptism, which confers full remission of all sins, both as to guilt and as to punishment, and in Confirmation, wherein the fulness of the Holy Ghost is bestowed, and in Extreme Unction, which confers perfect spiritual health derived from the virtue of Christ as from an extrinsic principle. Wherefore, such human acts as are in these sacraments, are not the essential matter of the sacrament, but are dispositions thereto. On the other hand, in those sacraments whose effect corresponds to that of some human act, the sensible human act itself takes the place of matter, as in the case of Penance and Matrimony, even as in bodily medicines, some are applied externally, such as plasters and drugs, while others are acts of the person who seeks to be cured, such as certain exercises.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(1)- RO(2) —

In those sacraments which have a corporeal matter, this matter needs to be applied by a minister of the Church, who stands in the place of Christ, which denotes that the excellence of the power which operates in the sacraments is from Christ. But in the sacrament of Penance, as stated above (ad 1), human actions take the place of matter, and these actions proceed from internal inspiration, wherefore the matter is not applied by the minister, but by God working inwardly; while the minister furnishes the complement of the sacrament, when he absolves the penitent.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(1)- RO(3) —

In Penance also, there is something which is sacrament only, viz. the acts performed outwardly both by the repentant sinner, and by the priest in giving absolution; that which is reality and sacrament is the sinner’s inward repentance; while that which is reality, and not sacrament, is the forgiveness of sin. The first of these taken altogether is the cause of the second; and the first and second together are the cause of the third.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(2) Whether sins are the proper matter of this sacrament?

P(3)- Q(84)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that sins are not the proper matter of this sacrament. Because, in the other sacraments, the matter is hallowed by the utterance of certain words, and being thus hallowed produces the sacramental effect. Now sins cannot be hallowed, for they are opposed to the effect of the sacrament, viz. grace which blots out sin.

Therefore sins are not the proper matter of this sacrament.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says in his book De Poenitentia [Cf. Serm. cccli]: “No one can begin a new life, unless he repent of the old.” Now not only sins but also the penalties of the present life belong to the old life. Therefore sins are not the proper matter of Penance.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, sin is either original, mortal or venial.

Now the sacrament of Penance is not ordained against original sin, for this is taken away by Baptism, [nor against mortal sin, for this is taken away by the sinner’s confession]*, nor against venial sin, which is taken away by the beating of the breast and the sprinkling of holy water and the like.

Therefore sins are not the proper matter of Penance. [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition].

P(3)- Q(84)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( 2 Corinthians 12:21): “(Who) have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness, that they have committed.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(2) —

I answer that, Matter is twofold, viz. proximate and remote: thus the proximate matter of a statue is a metal, while the remote matter is water. Now it has been stated ( A(1), ad 1, ad 2), that the proximate matter of this sacrament consists in the acts of the penitent, the matter of which acts are the sins over which he grieves, which he confesses, and for which he satisfies. Hence it follows that sins are the remote matter of Penance, as a matter, not for approval, but for detestation, and destruction.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This argument considers the proximate matter of a sacrament.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The old life that was subject to death is the object of Penance, not as regards the punishment, but as regards the guilt connected with it.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Penance regards every kind of sin in a way, but not each in the same way. Because Penance regards actual mortal sin properly and chiefly; properly, since, properly speaking, we are said to repent of what we have done of our own will; chiefly, since this sacrament was instituted chiefly for the blotting out of mortal sin. Penance regards venial sins, properly speaking indeed, in so far as they are committed of our own will, but this was not the chief purpose of its institution. But as to original sin, Penance regards it neither chiefly, since Baptism, and not Penance, is ordained against original sin, nor properly, because original sin is not done of our own will, except in so far as Adam’s will is looked upon as ours, in which sense the Apostle says ( Romans 5:12): “In whom all have sinned.” Nevertheless, Penance may be said to regard original sin, if we take it in a wide sense for any detestation of something past: in which sense Augustine uses the term in his book De Poenitentia (Serm. cccli).

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3) Whether the form of this sacrament is: “I absolve thee”?

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the form of this sacrament is not: “I absolve thee.” Because the forms of the sacraments are received from Christ’s institution and the Church’s custom. But we do not read that Christ instituted this form. Nor is it in common use; in fact in certain absolutions which are given publicly in church (e.g. at Prime and Compline and on Maundy Thursday), absolution is given not in the indicative form by saying: “I absolve thee,” but In the deprecatory form, by saying: “May Almighty God have mercy on you,” or: “May Almighty God grant you absolution and forgiveness.” Therefore the form of this sacrament is not: “I absolve thee.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, Pope Leo says (Ep. cviii) that God’s forgiveness cannot be obtained without the priestly supplications: and he is speaking there of God’s forgiveness granted to the penitent. Therefore the form of this sacrament should be deprecatory.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, to absolve from sin is the same as to remit sin. But God alone remits sin, for He alone cleanses man inwardly from sin, as Augustine says (Contra Donatist. v, 21). Therefore it seems that God alone absolves from sin. Therefore the priest should say not: “I absolve thee,” as neither does he say: “I remit thy sins.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, just as our Lord gave His disciples the power to absolve from sins, so also did He give them the power “to heal infirmities,” “to cast out devils,” and “to cure diseases” ( Matthew 10:1; Luke 9:1). Now the apostles, in healing the sick, did not use the words: “I heal thee,” but: “The Lord Jesus Christ heal [Vulg.: ‘heals’] thee,” as Peter said to the palsied man ( Acts 9:34). Therefore since priests have the power which Christ gave His apostles, it seems that they should not use the form: “I absolve thee,” but: “May Christ absolve thee.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, some explain this form by stating that when they say: “I absolve thee,” they mean “I declare you to be absolved.” But neither can this be done by a priest unless it be revealed to him by God, wherefore, as we read in Matthew 16:19 before it was said to Peter: “Whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth,” etc., it was said to him ( Matthew 16:17): “Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jona: because flesh and blood have not revealed it to thee, but My Father Who is in heaven.”

Therefore it seems presumptuous for a priest, who has received no revelation on the matter, to say: “I absolve thee,” even if this be explained to mean: “I declare thee absolved.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3) —

On the contrary, As our Lord said to His disciples ( Matthew 28:19): “Going... teach ye all nations, baptizing them,” etc., so did He say to Peter ( Matthew 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth,” etc. Now the priest, relying on the authority of those words of Christ, says: “I baptize thee.” Therefore on the same authority he should say in this sacrament: “I absolve thee.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3) —

I answer that, The perfection of a thing is ascribed to its form. Now it has been stated above ( A(1), ad 2) that this sacrament is perfected by that which is done by the priest. Wherefore the part taken by the penitent, whether it consist of words or deeds, must needs be the matter of this sacrament, while the part taken by the priest, takes the place of the form.

Now since the sacraments of the New Law accomplish what they signify, as stated above ( Q(62), A(1), ad 1), it behooves the sacramental form to signify the sacramental effect in a manner that is in keeping with the matter. Hence the form of Baptism is: “I baptize thee,” and the form of Confirmation is: “I sign thee with the sign of the cross, and I confirm thee with the chrism of salvation,” because these sacraments are perfected in the use of their matter: while in the sacrament of the Eucharist, which consists in the very consecration of the matter, the reality of the consecration is expressed in the words: “This is My Body.”

Now this sacrament, namely the sacrament of Penance, consists not in the consecration of a matter, nor in the use of a hallowed matter, but rather in the removal of a certain matter, viz. sin, in so far as sins are said to be the matter of Penance, as explained above ( A(2) ). This removal is expressed by the priest saying: “I absolve thee”: because sins are fetters, according to Proverbs 5:22. “His own iniquities catch the wicked, and he is fast bound with the ropes of his own sins.” Wherefore it is evident that this is the most fitting form of this sacrament: “I absolve thee.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3)- RO(1) —

This form is taken from Christ’s very words which He addressed to Peter ( Matthew 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth,” etc., and such is the form employed by the Church in sacramental absolution. But such absolutions as are given in public are not sacramental, but are prayers for the remission of venial sins. Wherefore in giving sacramental absolution it would not suffice to say: “May Almighty God have mercy on thee,” or: “May God grant thee absolution and forgiveness,” because by such words the priest does not signify the giving of absolution, but prays that it may be given. Nevertheless the above prayer is said before the sacramental absolution is given, lest the sacramental effect be hindered on the part of the penitent, whose acts are as matter in this sacrament, but not in Baptism or Confirmation.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The words of Leo are to be understood of the prayer that precedes the absolution, and do not exclude the fact that the priest pronounces absolution.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3)- RO(3) —

God alone absolves from sin and forgives sins authoritatively; yet priests do both ministerially, because the words of the priest in this sacrament work as instruments of the Divine power, as in the other sacraments: because it is the Divine power that works inwardly in all the sacramental signs, be they things or words, as shown above ( Q(62), A(4) ; Q(64), AA(1),2 ). Wherefore our Lord expressed both: for He said to Peter ( Matthew 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth,” etc., and to His disciples ( John 20:23): “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.” Yet the priest says: “I absolve thee,” rather than: “I forgive thee thy sins,” because it is more in keeping with the words of our Lord, by expressing the power of the keys whereby priests absolve.

Nevertheless, since the priest absolves ministerially, something is suitably added in reference to the supreme authority of God, by the priest saying: “I absolve thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,” or by the power of Christ’s Passion, or by the authority of God.

However, as this is not defined by the words of Christ, as it is for Baptism, this addition is left to the discretion of the priest.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Power was given to the apostles, not that they themselves might heal the sick, but that the sick might be healed at the prayer of the apostles: whereas power was given to them to work instrumentally or ministerially in the sacraments; wherefore they could express their own agency in the sacramental forms rather than in the healing of infirmities. Nevertheless in the latter case they did not always use the deprecatory form, but sometimes employed the indicative or imperative: thus we read ( Acts 3:6) that Peter said to the lame man: “What I have, I give thee: In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, arise and walk.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(3)- RO(5) —

It is true in a sense that the words, “I absolve thee” mean “I declare thee absolved,” but this explanation is incomplete.

Because the sacraments of the New Law not only signify, but effect what they signify. Wherefore, just as the priest in baptizing anyone, declares by deed and word that the person is washed inwardly, and this not only significatively but also effectively, so also when he says: “I absolve thee,” he declares the man to be absolved not only significatively but also effectively. And yet he does not speak as of something uncertain, because just as the other sacraments of the New Law have, of themselves, a sure effect through the power of Christ’s Passion, which effect, nevertheless, may be impeded on the part of the recipient, so is it with this sacrament.

Hence Augustine says (De Adult. Conjug. ii): “There is nothing disgraceful or onerous in the reconciliation of husband and wife, when adultery committed has been washed away, since there is no doubt that remission of sins is granted through the keys of the kingdom of heaven.”

Consequently there is no need for a special revelation to be made to the priest, but the general revelation of faith suffices, through which sins are forgiven. Hence the revelation of faith is said to have been made to Peter.

It would be a more complete explanation to say that the words, “I absolve thee” mean: “I grant thee the sacrament of absolution.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(4) Whether the imposition of the priest’s hands is necessary for this sacrament?

P(3)- Q(84)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the imposition of the priest’s hands is necessary for this sacrament. For it is written ( Mark 16:18): “They shall lay hands upon the sick, and they shall recover.” Now sinners are sick spiritually, and obtain recovery through this sacrament.

Therefore an imposition of hands should be made in this sacrament.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, in this sacrament man regains the Holy Ghost Whom he had lost, wherefore it is said in the person of the penitent ( Psalm 1:14): “Restore unto me the joy of Thy salvation, and strengthen me with a perfect spirit.” Now the Holy Ghost is given by the imposition of hands; for we read ( Acts 8:17) that the apostles “laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost”; and ( Matthew 19:13) that “little children were presented” to our Lord, “that He should impose hands upon them.” Therefore an imposition of hands should be made in this sacrament.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the priest’s words are not more efficacious in this than in the other sacraments. But in the other sacraments the words of the minister do not suffice, unless he perform some action: thus, in Baptism, the priest while saying: “I baptize thee,” has to perform a bodily washing. Therefore, also while saying: “I absolve thee,” the priest should perform some action in regard to the penitent, by laying hands on him.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(4) —

On the contrary, When our Lord said to Peter ( Matthew 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth,” etc., He made no mention of an imposition of hands; nor did He when He said to all the apostles ( John 20:13): “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.” Therefore no imposition of hands is required for this sacrament.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(4) —

I answer that, In the sacraments of the Church the imposition of hands is made, to signify some abundant effect of grace, through those on whom the hands are laid being, as it were, united to the ministers in whom grace should be plentiful. Wherefore an imposition of hands is made in the sacrament of Confirmation, wherein the fulness of the Holy Ghost is conferred; and in the sacrament of order, wherein is bestowed a certain excellence of power over the Divine mysteries; hence it is written ( 2 Timothy 1:6): “Stir up the grace of God which is in thee, by the imposition of my hands.”

Now the sacrament of Penance is ordained, not that man may receive some abundance of grace, but that his sins may be taken away; and therefore no imposition of hands is required for this sacrament, as neither is there for Baptism, wherein nevertheless a fuller remission of sins is bestowed.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(4)- RO(1) —

That imposition of hands is not sacramental, but is intended for the working of miracles, namely, that by the contact of a sanctified man’s hand, even bodily infirmity might be removed; even as we read of our Lord ( Mark 6:5) that He cured the sick, “laying His hands upon them,” and ( Matthew 8:3) that He cleansed a leper by touching him.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(4)- RO(2) —

It is not every reception of the Holy Ghost that requires an imposition of hands, since even in Baptism man receives the Holy Ghost, without any imposition of hands: it is at the reception of the fulness of the Holy Ghost which belongs to Confirmation that an imposition of hands is required.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(4)- RO(3) —

In those sacraments which are perfected in the use of the matter, the minister has to perform some bodily action on the recipient of the sacrament, e.g. in Baptism, Confirmation, and Extreme Unction; whereas this sacrament does not consist in the use of matter employed outwardly, the matter being supplied by the part taken by the penitent: wherefore, just as in the Eucharist the priest perfects the sacrament by merely pronouncing the words over the matter, so the mere words which the priest while absolving pronounces over the penitent perfect the sacrament of absolution. If, indeed, any bodily act were necessary on the part of the priest, the sign of the cross, which is employed in the Eucharist, would not be less becoming than the imposition of hands, in token that sins are forgiven through the blood of Christ crucified; and yet this is not essential to this sacrament as neither is it to the Eucharist.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(5) Whether this sacrament is necessary for salvation?

P(3)- Q(84)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that this sacrament is not necessary for salvation. Because on <19C505> Psalm 125:5, “They that sow in tears,” etc., the gloss says: “Be not sorrowful, if thou hast a good will, of which peace is the meed.” But sorrow is essential to Penance, according to 2 Corinthians 7:10: “The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation.” Therefore a good will without Penance suffices for salvation.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Proverbs 10:12): “Charity covereth all sins,” and further on ( Proverbs 15:27): “By mercy and faith sins are purged away.” But this sacrament is for nothing else but the purging of sins. Therefore if one has charity, faith, and mercy, one can obtain salvation, without the sacrament of Penance.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the sacraments of the Church take their origin from the institution of Christ. But according to John 8 Christ absolved the adulterous woman without Penance. Therefore it seems that Penance is not necessary for salvation.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(5) —

On the contrary, our Lord said ( Luke 13:3): “Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(5) —

I answer that, A thing is necessary for salvation in two ways: first, absolutely; secondly, on a supposition. A thing is absolutely necessary for salvation, if no one can obtain salvation without it, as, for example, the grace of Christ, and the sacrament of Baptism, whereby a man is born again in Christ. The sacrament of Penance is necessary on a supposition, for it is necessary, not for all, but for those who are in sin. For it is written (2 Paral 37 [*The prayer of Manasses, among the Apocrypha]), “Thou, Lord, God of the righteous, hast not appointed repentance to the righteous, to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, nor to those who sinned not against Thee.” But “sin, when it is completed, begetteth death” ( James 1:15). Consequently it is necessary for the sinner’s salvation that sin be taken away from him; which cannot be done without the sacrament of Penance, wherein the power of Christ’s Passion operates through the priest’s absolution and the acts of the penitent, who co-operates with grace unto the destruction of his sin. For as Augustine says (Tract. lxxii in Joan. [*Implicitly in the passage referred to, but explicitly Serm. xv de verb Apost.]), “He Who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee.” Therefore it is evident that after sin the sacrament of Penance is necessary for salvation, even as bodily medicine after man has contracted a dangerous disease.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(5)- RO(1) —

This gloss should apparently be understood as referring to the man who has a good will unimpaired by sin, for such a man has no cause for sorrow: but as soon as the good will is forfeited through sin, it cannot be restored without that sorrow whereby a man sorrows for his past sin, and which belongs to Penance.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(5)- RO(2) —

As soon as a man falls into sin, charity, faith, and mercy do not deliver him from sin, without Penance. Because charity demands that a man should grieve for the offense committed against his friend, and that he should be anxious to make satisfaction to his friend; faith requires that he should seek to be justified from his sins through the power of Christ’s Passion which operates in the sacraments of the Church; and well-ordered pity necessitates that man should succor himself by repenting of the pitiful condition into which sin has brought him, according to Proverbs 14:34: “Sin maketh nations miserable”; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 30:24): “Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(5)- RO(3) —

It was due to His power of “excellence,” which He alone had, as stated above ( Q(64), A(3) ), that Christ bestowed on the adulterous woman the effect of the sacrament of Penance, viz. the forgiveness of sins, without the sacrament of Penance, although not without internal repentance, which He operated in her by grace.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(6) Whether Penance is a second plank after shipwreck?

P(3)- Q(84)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that Penance is not a second plank after shipwreck. Because on Isaiah 3:9, “They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom,” a gloss says: “The second plank after shipwreck is to hide one’s sins.” Now Penance does not hide sins, but reveals them. Therefore Penance is not a second plank.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, in a building the foundation takes the first, not the second place. Now in the spiritual edifice, Penance is the foundation, according to Hebrews 6:1: “Not laying again the foundation of Penance from dead works”; wherefore it precedes even Baptism, according to Acts 2:38: “Do penance, and be baptized every one of you.” Therefore Penance should not be called a second plank.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, all the sacraments are planks, i.e. helps against sin. Now Penance holds, not the second but the fourth, place among the sacraments, as is clear from what has been said above ( Q(65), AA(1),2 ). Therefore Penance should not be called a second plank after shipwreck.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. cxxx) that “Penance is a second plank after shipwreck.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(6) —

I answer that, That which is of itself precedes naturally that which is accidental, as substance precedes accident. Now some sacraments are, of themselves, ordained to man’s salvation, e.g.

Baptism, which is the spiritual birth, Confirmation which is the spiritual growth, the Eucharist which is the spiritual food; whereas Penance is ordained to man’s salvation accidentally as it were, and on something being supposed, viz. sin: for unless man were to sin actually, he would not stand in need of Penance and yet he would need Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist; even as in the life of the body, man would need no medical treatment, unless he were ill, and yet life, birth, growth, and food are, of themselves, necessary to man.

Consequently Penance holds the second place with regard to the state of integrity which is bestowed and safeguarded by the aforesaid sacraments, so that it is called metaphorically “a second plank after shipwreck.” For just as the first help for those who cross the sea is to be safeguarded in a whole ship, while the second help when the ship is wrecked, is to cling to a plank; so too the first help in this life’s ocean is that man safeguard his integrity, while the second help is, if he lose his integrity through sin, that he regain it by means of Penance.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(6)- RO(1) —

To hide one’s sins may happen in two ways: first, in the very act of sinning. Now it is worse to sin in public than in private, both because a public sinner seems to sin more from contempt, and because by sinning he gives scandal to others. Consequently in sin it is a kind of remedy to sin secretly, and it is in this sense that the gloss says that “to hide one’s sins is a second plank after shipwreck”; not that it takes away sin, as Penance does, but because it makes the sin less grievous. Secondly, one hides one’s sin previously committed, by neglecting to confess it: this is opposed to Penance, and to hide one’s sins thus is not a second plank, but is the reverse, since it is written ( Proverbs 28:13): “He that hideth his sins shall not prosper.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Penance cannot be called the foundation of the spiritual edifice simply, i.e. in the first building thereof; but it is the foundation in the second building which is accomplished by destroying sin, because man, on his return to God, needs Penance first. However, the Apostle is speaking there of the foundation of spiritual doctrine.

Moreover, the penance which precedes Baptism is not the sacrament of Penance.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(6)- RO(3) —

The three sacraments which precede Penance refer to the ship in its integrity, i.e. to man’s state of integrity, with regard to which Penance is called a second plank.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(7) Whether this sacrament was suitably instituted in the New Law?

P(3)- Q(84)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that this sacrament was unsuitably instituted in the New Law. Because those things which belong to the natural law need not to be instituted. Now it belongs to the natural law that one should repent of the evil one has done: for it is impossible to love good without grieving for its contrary. Therefore Penance was unsuitably instituted in the New Law.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, that which existed in the Old Law had not to be instituted in the New. Now there was Penance in the old Law wherefore the Lord complains ( Jeremiah 8:6) saying: “There is none that doth penance for his sin, saying: What have I done?” Therefore Penance should not have been instituted in the New Law.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, Penance comes after Baptism, since it is a second plank, as stated above ( A(6) ). Now it seems that our Lord instituted Penance before Baptism, because we read that at the beginning of His preaching He said ( Matthew 4:17): “Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” Therefore this sacrament was not suitably instituted in the New Law.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(7)- O(4) —

Further, the sacraments of the New Law were instituted by Christ, by Whose power they work, as stated above ( Q(62), A(5) ; Q(64), A(1) ). But Christ does not seem to have instituted this sacrament, since He made no use of it, as of the other sacraments which He instituted. Therefore this sacrament was unsuitably instituted in the New Law.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(7) —

On the contrary, our Lord said ( Luke 24:46,47): “It behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise again from the dead the third day: and that penance and remission of sins should be preached in His name unto all nations.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(7) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1), ad 1, ad 2), in this sacrament the acts of the penitent are as matter, while the part taken by the priest, who works as Christ’s minister, is the formal and completive element of the sacrament. Now in the other sacraments the matter pre-exists, being provided by nature, as water, or by art, as bread: but that such and such a matter be employed for a sacrament requires to be decided by the institution; while the sacrament derives its form and power entirely from the institution of Christ, from Whose Passion the power of the sacraments proceeds.

Accordingly the matter of this sacrament pre-exists, being provided by nature; since it is by a natural principle of reason that man is moved to repent of the evil he has done: yet it is due to Divine institution that man does penance in this or that way. Wherefore at the outset of His preaching, our Lord admonished men, not only to repent, but also to “do penance,” thus pointing to the particular manner of actions required for this sacrament. As to the part to be taken by the ministers, this was fixed by our Lord when He said to Peter ( Matthew 16:19): “To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven,” etc.; but it was after His resurrection that He made known the efficacy of this sacrament and the source of its power, when He said ( Luke 24:47) that “penance and remission of sins should be preached in His name unto all nations,” after speaking of His Passion and resurrection. Because it is from the power of the name of Jesus Christ suffering and rising again that this sacrament is efficacious unto the remission of sins.

It is therefore evident that this sacrament was suitably instituted in the New Law.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(7)- RO(1) —

It is a natural law that one should repent of the evil one has done, by grieving for having done it, and by seeking a remedy for one’s grief in some way or other, and also that one should show some signs of grief, even as the Ninevites did, as we read in John 3. And yet even in their case there was also something of faith which they had received through Jonas’ preaching, inasmuch as they did these things in the hope that they would receive pardon from God, according as we read ( John 3:9): “Who can tell if God will turn and forgive, and will turn away from His fierce anger, and we shall not perish?” But just as other matters which are of the natural law were fixed in detail by the institution of the Divine law, as we have stated in the P(2a), Q(91), A(4) ; P(2a), Q(95), A(2) ; P(2a), Q(99), so was it with Penance.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Things which are of the natural law were determined in various ways in the old and in the New Law, in keeping with the imperfection of the old, and the perfection of the New. Wherefore Penance was fixed in a certain way in the Old Law — with regard to sorrow, that it should be in the heart rather than in external signs, according to Joel 2:13: “Rend your hearts and not your garments”; and with regard to seeking a remedy for sorrow, that they should in some way confess their sins, at least in general, to God’s ministers. Wherefore the Lord said ( Leviticus 5:17,18): “If anyone sin through ignorance... he shall offer of the flocks a ram without blemish to the priest, according to the measure and estimation of the sin, and the priest shall pray for him, because he did it ignorantly, and it shall be forgiven him”; since by the very fact of making an offering for his sin, a man, in a fashion, confessed his sin to the priest. And accordingly it is written ( Proverbs 28:13): “He that hideth his sins, shall not prosper: but he that shall confess, and forsake them, shall obtain mercy.” Not yet, however, was the power of the keys instituted, which is derived from Christ’s Passion, and consequently it was not yet ordained that a man should grieve for his sin, with the purpose of submitting himself by confession and satisfaction to the keys of the Church, in the hope of receiving forgiveness through the power of Christ’s Passion.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(7)- RO(3) —

If we note carefully what our Lord said about the necessity of Baptism ( John 3:3, seqq.), we shall see that this was said before His words about the necessity of Penance ( Matthew 4:17); because He spoke to Nicodemus about Baptism before the imprisonment of John, of whom it is related afterwards ( John 3:23,24) that he baptized, whereas His words about Penance were said after John was cast into prison.

If, however, He had admonished men to do penance before admonishing them to be baptized, this would be because also before Baptism some kind of penance is required, according to the words of Peter ( Acts 2:38): “Do penance, and be baptized, every one of you.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(7)- RO(4) —

Christ did not use the Baptism which He instituted, but was baptized with the baptism of John, as stated above ( Q(39), AA(1),2 ). Nor did He use it actively by administering it Himself, because He “did not baptize” as a rule, “but His disciples” did, as related in John 4:2, although it is to be believed that He baptized His disciples, as Augustine asserts (Ep. cclxv, ad Seleuc.). But with regard to His institution of this sacrament it was nowise fitting that He should use it, neither by repenting Himself, in Whom there was no sin, nor by administering the sacrament to others, since, in order to show His mercy and power, He was wont to confer the effect of this sacrament without the sacrament itself, as stated above ( A(5), ad 3). On the other hand, He both received and gave to others the sacrament of the Eucharist, both in order to commend the excellence of that sacrament, and because that sacrament is a memorial of His Passion, in which Christ is both priest and victim.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(8) Whether Penance should last till the end of life?

P(3)- Q(84)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that Penance should not last till the end of life. Because Penance is ordained for the blotting out of sin.

Now the penitent receives forgiveness of his sins at once, according to Ezekiel 18:21: “If the wicked do penance for all his sins which he hath committed... he shall live and shall not die.” Therefore there is no need for Penance to be further prolonged.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, Penance belongs to the state of beginners. But man ought to advance from that state to the state of the proficient, and, from this, on to the state of the perfect. Therefore man need not do Penance till the end of his life.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, man is bound to observe the laws of the Church in this as in the other sacraments. But the duration of repentance is fixed by the canons, so that, to wit, for such and such a sin one is bound to do penance for so many years. Therefore it seems that Penance should not be prolonged till the end of life.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Augustine says in his book, De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: “What remains for us to do, save to sorrow ever in this life?

For when sorrow ceases, repentance fails; and if repentance fails, what becomes of pardon?”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(8) —

I answer that, Penance is twofold, internal and external. Internal penance is that whereby one grieves for a sin one has committed, and this penance should last until the end of life. Because man should always be displeased at having sinned, for if he were to be pleased thereat, he would for this very reason fall into sin and lose the fruit of pardon. Now displeasure causes sorrow in one who is susceptible to sorrow, as man is in this life; but after this life the saints are not susceptible to sorrow, wherefore they will be displeased at, without sorrowing for, their past sins, according to Isaiah 65:16. “The former distresses are forgotten.”

External penance is that whereby a man shows external signs of sorrow, confesses his sins verbally to the priest who absolves him, and makes satisfaction for his sins according to the judgment of the priest. Such penance need not last until the end of life, but only for a fixed time according to the measure of the sin.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(8)- RO(1) —

True penance not only removes past sins, but also preserves man from future sins. Consequently, although a man receives forgiveness of past sins in the first instant of his true penance, nevertheless he must persevere in his penance, lest he fall again into sin.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(8)- RO(2) —

To do penance both internal and external belongs to the state of beginners, of those, to wit, who are making a fresh start from the state of sin. But there is room for internal penance even in the proficient and the perfect, according to Psalm 83:7: “In his heart he hath disposed to ascend by steps, in the vale of tears.” Wherefore Paul says ( 1 Corinthians 15:9): “I... am not worthy to be called an apostle because I persecuted the Church of God.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(8)- RO(3) —

These durations of time are fixed for penitents as regards the exercise of external penance.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(9) Whether Penance can be continuous?

P(3)- Q(84)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem that penance cannot be continuous. For it is written ( Jeremiah 31:16): “Let thy voice cease from weeping, and thy eyes from tears.” But this would be impossible if penance were continuous, for it consists in weeping and tears. Therefore penance cannot be continuous.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, man ought to rejoice at every good work, according to Psalm 99:1: “Serve ye the Lord with gladness.” Now to do penance is a good work. Therefore man should rejoice at it. But man cannot rejoice and grieve at the same time, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore a penitent cannot grieve continually for his past sins, which is essential to penance. Therefore penance cannot be continuous.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 2 Corinthians 2:7): “Comfort him,” viz. the penitent, “lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.” But comfort dispels grief, which is essential to penance. Therefore penance need not be continuous.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(9) —

On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on Penance [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: “In doing penance grief should be continual.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(9) —

I answer that, One is said to repent in two ways, actually and habitually. It is impossible for a man continually to repent actually. for the acts, whether internal or external, of a penitent must needs be interrupted by sleep and other things which the body needs. Secondly, a man is said to repent habitually. and thus he should repent continually, both by never doing anything contrary to penance, so as to destroy the habitual disposition of the penitent, and by being resolved that his past sins should always be displeasing to him.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(9)- RO(1) —

Weeping and tears belong to the act of external penance, and this act needs neither to be continuous, nor to last until the end of life, as stated above ( A(8) ): wherefore it is significantly added: “For there is a reward for thy work.” Now the reward of the penitent’s work is the full remission of sin both as to guilt and as to punishment; and after receiving this reward there is no need for man to proceed to acts of external penance. This, however, does not prevent penance being continual, as explained above.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(9)- RO(2) —

Of sorrow and joy we may speak in two ways: first, as being passions of the sensitive appetite; and thus they can no. wise be together, since they are altogether contrary to one another, either on the part of the object (as when they have the same object), or at least on the part of the movement, for joy is with expansion [*Cf. P(2a), Q(33), A(1) ] of the heart, whereas sorrow is with contraction; and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks in Ethic. 9. Secondly, we may speak of joy and sorrow as being simple acts of the will, to which something is pleasing or displeasing. Accordingly, they cannot be contrary to one another, except on the part of the object, as when they concern the same object in the same respect, in which way joy and sorrow cannot be simultaneous, because the same thing in the same respect cannot be pleasing and displeasing. If, on the other hand, joy and sorrow, understood thus, be not of the same object in the same respect, but either of different objects, or of the same object in different respects, in that case joy and sorrow are not contrary to one another, so that nothing hinders a man from being joyful and sorrowful at the same time — for instance, if we see a good man suffer, we both rejoice at his goodness and at the same time grieve for his suffering. In this way a man may be displeased at having sinned, and be pleased at his displeasure together with his hope for pardon, so that his very sorrow is a matter of joy. Hence Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: “The penitent should ever grieve and rejoice at his grief.”

If, however, sorrow were altogether incompatible with joy, this would prevent the continuance, not of habitual penance, but only of actual penance.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(9)- RO(3) —

According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3,6,7,9) it belongs to virtue to establish the mean in the passions. Now the sorrow which, in the sensitive appetite of the penitent, arises from the displeasure of his will, is a passion; wherefore it should be moderated according to virtue, and if it be excessive it is sinful, because it leads to despair, as the Apostle teaches ( 2 Corinthians 2:7), saying: “Lest such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.” Accordingly comfort, of which the Apostle speaks, moderates sorrow but does not destroy it altogether.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) Whether the sacrament of Penance may be repeated?

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) - O(1) —

It would seem that the sacrament of Penance should not be repeated. For the Apostle says ( Hebrews 6:4, seqq.): “It is impossible for those, who were once illuminated, have tasted also the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost... and are fallen away, to be renewed again to penance.” Now whosoever have done penance, have been illuminated, and have received the gift of the Holy Ghost. Therefore whosoever sin after doing penance, cannot do penance again.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii): “Some are to be found who think they ought often to do penance, who take liberties with Christ: for if they were truly penitent, they would not think of doing penance over again, since there is but one Penance even as there is but one Baptism.” Now Baptism is not repeated. Neither, therefore, is Penance to be repeated.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, the miracles whereby our Lord healed bodily diseases, signify the healing of spiritual diseases, whereby men are delivered from sins. Now we do not read that our Lord restored the sight to any blind man twice, or that He cleansed any leper twice, or twice raised any dead man to life. Therefore it seems that He does not twice grant pardon to any sinner.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) - O(4) —

Further, Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): “Penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again those we have deplored”: and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii): “He is a mocker and no penitent who still does what he has repented of.” If, therefore, a man is truly penitent, he will not sin again. Therefore Penance cannot be repeated.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) - O(5) —

Further, just as Baptism derives its efficacy from the Passion of Christ, so does Penance. Now Baptism is not repeated, on account of the unity of Christ’s Passion and death. Therefore in like manner Penance is not repeated.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) - O(6) —

Further, Ambrose says on <19B805> Psalm 118:58, “I entreated Thy face,” etc., that “facility of obtaining pardon is an incentive to sin.” If, therefore, God frequently grants pardon through Penance, it seems that He affords man an incentive to sin, and thus He seems to take pleasure in sin, which is contrary to His goodness. Therefore Penance cannot be repeated.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) —

On the contrary, Man is induced to be merciful by the example of Divine mercy, according to Luke 6:36: “Be ye... merciful, as your Father also is merciful.” Now our Lord commanded His disciples to be merciful by frequently pardoning their brethren who had sinned against them; wherefore, as related in Matthew 18:21, when Peter asked: “How often shall my brother off end against me, and I forgive him? till seven times?” Jesus answered: “I say not to thee, till seven times, but till seventy times seven times.” Therefore also God over and over again, through Penance, grants pardon to sinners, especially as He teaches us to pray ( Matthew 6:12): “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) —

I answer that, As regards Penance, some have erred, saying that a man cannot obtain pardon of his sins through Penance a second time. Some of these, viz. the Novatians, went so far as to say that he who sins after the first Penance which is done in Baptism, cannot be restored again through Penance. There were also other heretics who, as Augustine relates in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown], said that, after Baptism, Penance is useful, not many times, but only once.

These errors seem to have arisen from a twofold source: first from not knowing the nature of true Penance. For since true Penance requires charity, without which sins are not taken away, they thought that charity once possessed could not be lost, and that, consequently, Penance, if true, could never be removed by sin, so that it should be necessary to repeat it.

But this was refuted in the P(2b), Q(24), A(11), where it was shown that on account of free-will charity, once possessed, can be lost, and that, consequently, after true Penance, a man can sin mortally. Secondly, they erred in their estimation of the gravity of sin. For they deemed a sin committed by a man after he had received pardon, to be so grave that it could not be forgiven. In this they erred not only with regard to sin which, even after a sin has been forgiven, can be either more or less grievous than the first, which was forgiven, but much more did they err against the infinity of Divine mercy, which surpasses any number and magnitude of sins, according to Psalm 50:1,2: “Have mercy on me, O God, according to Thy great mercy: and according to the multitude of Thy tender mercies, blot out my iniquity.”

Wherefore the words of Cain were reprehensible, when he said ( Genesis 4:13): “My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon.” And so God’s mercy, through Penance, grants pardon to sinners without any end, wherefore it is written (2 Paral 37 [*Prayer of Manasses, among the Apocrypha. St. Thomas is evidently quoting from memory, and omits the words in brackets.]): “Thy merciful promise is unmeasurable and unsearchable... (and Thou repentest) for the evil brought upon man.” It is therefore evident that Penance can be repeated many times.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) - RO(1) —

Some of the Jews thought that a man could be washed several times in the laver of Baptism, because among them the Law prescribed certain washing-places where they were wont to cleanse themselves repeatedly from their uncleannesses. In order to disprove this the Apostle wrote to the Hebrews that “it is impossible for those who were once illuminated,” viz. through Baptism, “to be renewed again to penance,” viz. through Baptism, which is “the laver of regeneration, and renovation of the Holy Ghost,” as stated in Titus 3:5: and he declares the reason to be that by Baptism man dies with Christ, wherefore he adds ( Hebrews 6:6): “Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) - RO(2) —

Ambrose is speaking of solemn Penance, which is not repeated in the Church, as we shall state further on ( P(4), Q(28), A(2) ).

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) - RO(3) —

As Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia the authorship of which is unknown], “Our Lord gave sight to many blind men at various times, and strength to many infirm, thereby showing, in these different men, that the same sins are repeatedly forgiven, at one time healing a man from leprosy and afterwards from blindness. For this reason He healed so many stricken with fever, so many feeble in body, so many lame, blind, and withered, that the sinner might not despair; for this reason He is not described as healing anyone but once, that every one might fear to link himself with sin; for this reason He declares Himself to be the physician welcomed not of the hale, but of the unhealthy. What sort of a physician is he who knows not how to heal a recurring disease? For if a man ail a hundred times it is for the physician to heal him a hundred times: and if he failed where others succeed, he would be a poor physician in comparison with them.”

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) - RO(4) —

Penance is to deplore past sins, and, “while deploring them,” not to commit again, either by act or by intention, those which we have to deplore. Because a man is a mocker and not a penitent, who, “while doing penance,” does what he repents having done, or intends to do again what he did before, or even commits actually the same or another kind of sin. But if a man sin afterwards either by act or intention, this does not destroy the fact that his former penance was real, because the reality of a former act is never destroyed by a subsequent contrary act: for even as he truly ran who afterwards sits, so he truly repented who subsequently sins.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) - RO(5) —

Baptism derives its power from Christ’s Passion, as a spiritual regeneration, with a spiritual death, of a previous life. Now “it is appointed unto man once to die” ( Hebrews 9:27), and to be born once, wherefore man should be baptized but once. On the other hand, Penance derives its power from Christ’s Passion, as a spiritual medicine, which can be repeated frequently.

P(3)- Q(84)- A(10) - RO(6) —

According to Augustine (De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown), “it is evident that sins displease God exceedingly, for He is always ready to destroy them, lest what He created should perish, and what He loved be lost,” viz. by despair.

QUESTION OF PENANCE AS A VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider penance as a virtue, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether penance is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) To what species of virtue does it belong? (4) Of its subject; (5) Of its cause; (6) Of its relation to the other virtues.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(1) Whether Penance is a virtue?

P(3)- Q(85)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that penance is not a virtue. For penance is a sacrament numbered among the other sacraments, as was shown above ( Q(84), A(1) ; Q(65), A(1) ). Now no other sacrament is a virtue. Therefore neither is penance a virtue.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9), “shame is not a virtue,” both because it is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, and because it is not the disposition of a perfect thing, since it is about an evil act, so that it has no place in a virtuous man. Now, in like manner, penance is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, viz. tears, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) that “penance consists in deploring past sins”: moreover it is about evil deeds, viz. sins, which have no place in a virtuous man. Therefore penance is not a virtue.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), “no virtuous man is foolish.” But it seems foolish to deplore what has been done in the past, since it cannot be otherwise, and yet this is what we understand by penance. Therefore penance is not a virtue.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue, because “a lawgiver intends to make the citizens virtuous” (Ethic. ii, 1). But there is a precept about penance in the Divine law, according to Matthew 4:17: “Do penance,” etc. Therefore penance is a virtue.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( O(2), Q(84), A(10), ad 4), to repent is to deplore something one has done. Now it has been stated above ( Q(84), A(9) ) that sorrow or sadness is twofold. First, it denotes a passion of the sensitive appetite, and in this sense penance is not a virtue, but a passion. Secondly, it denotes an act of the will, and in this way it implies choice, and if this be right, it must, of necessity, be an act of virtue. For it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6 that virtue is a habit of choosing according to right reason. Now it belongs to right reason than one should grieve for a proper object of grief as one ought to grieve, and for an end for which one ought to grieve. And this is observed in the penance of which we are speaking now; since the penitent assumes a moderated grief for his past sins, with the intention of removing them. Hence it is evident that the penance of which we are speaking now, is either a virtue or the act of a virtue.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( Q(84), A(1), ad 1; AA(2),3 ), in the sacrament of Penance, human acts take the place of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and Confirmation. Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of an act, penance is either a virtue or accompanies a virtue, rather than Baptism or Confirmation.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Penance, considered as a passion, is not a virtue, as stated above, and it is thus that it is accompanied by a bodily alteration. On the other hand, it is a virtue, according as it includes a right choice on the part of the will; which, however, applies to penance rather than to shame. Because shame regards the evil deed as present, whereas penance regards the evil deed as past. Now it is contrary to the perfection of virtue that one should have an evil deed actually present, of which one ought to be ashamed; whereas it is not contrary to the perfection of virtue that we should have previously committed evil deeds, of which it behooves us to repent, since a man from being wicked becomes virtuous.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(1)- RO(3) —

It would indeed be foolish to grieve for what has already been done, with the intention of trying to make it not done.

But the penitent does not intend this: for his sorrow is displeasure or disapproval with regard to the past deed, with the intention of removing its result, viz. the anger of God and the debt of punishment: and this is not foolish.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(2) Whether Penance is a special virtue?

P(3)- Q(85)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that penance is not a special virtue. For it seems that to rejoice at the good one has done, and to grieve for the evil one has done are acts of the same nature. But joy for the good one has done is not a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy emotion proceeding from charity, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,8,9): wherefore the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 13:6) that charity “rejoiceth not at iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth.” Therefore, in like manner, neither is penance, which is sorrow for past sins, a special virtue, but an emotion resulting from charity.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, every special virtue has its special matter, because habits are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their objects. But penance has no special matter, because its matter is past sins in any matter whatever. Therefore penance is not a special virtue.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, nothing is removed except by its contrary. But penance removes all sins. Therefore it is contrary to all sins, and consequently is not a special virtue.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Law has a special precept about penance, as stated above ( Q(84), AA(5),7 ).

P(3)- Q(85)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated in the P(2a), Q(54), A(1), ad 1, A(2), habits are specifically distinguished according to the species of their acts, so that whenever an act has a special reason for being praiseworthy, there must needs be a special habit. Now it is evident that there is a special reason for praising the act of penance, because it aims at the destruction of past sin, considered as an offense against God, which does not apply to any other virtue. We must therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(2)- RO(1) —

An act springs from charity in two ways: first as being elicited by charity, and a like virtuous act requires no other virtue than charity, e.g. to love the good, to rejoice therein, and to grieve for what is opposed to it. Secondly, an act springs from charity, being, so to speak, commanded by charity; and thus, since charity commands all the virtues, inasmuch as it directs them to its own end, an act springing from charity may belong even to another special virtue. Accordingly, if in the act of the penitent we consider the mere displeasure in the past sin, it belongs to charity immediately, in the same way as joy for past good acts; but the intention to aim at the destruction of past sin requires a special virtue subordinate to charity.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(2)- RO(2) —

In point of fact, penance has indeed a general matter, inasmuch as it regards all sins; but it does so under a special aspect, inasmuch as they can be remedied by an act of man in co-operating with God for his justification.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Every special virtue removes formally the habit of the opposite vice, just as whiteness removes blackness from the same subject: but penance removes every sin effectively, inasmuch as it works for the destruction of sins, according as they are pardonable through the grace of God if man co-operate therewith. Wherefore it does not follow that it is a general virtue.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(3) Whether the virtue of penance is a species of justice?

P(3)- Q(85)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the virtue of penance is not a species of justice. For justice is not a theological but a moral virtue, as was shown in the P(2b), Q(62), A(3) . But penance seems to be a theological virtue, since God is its object, for it makes satisfaction to God, to Whom, moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes the mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to the extreme, according to Jeremiah 6:26: “Make thee mourning as for an only son, a bitter lamentation.” Therefore penance is not a species of justice.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, there are two species of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 4, viz. “distributive” and “commutative.” But penance does not seem to be contained under either of them. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, a gloss on Luke 6:21, “Blessed are ye that weep now,” says: “It is prudence that teaches us the unhappiness of earthly things and the happiness of heavenly things.” But weeping is an act of penance. Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of justice.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: “Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry for having done.” But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1), ad 2) penance is a special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and purposes to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another, just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice.

It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) a thing is said to be just in two ways, simply and relatively. A thing is just simply when it is between equals, since justice is a kind of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil just, because all citizens are equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler, retaining their freedom. But a thing is just relatively when it is between parties of whom one is subject to the other, as a servant under his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband. It is this kind of just that we consider in penance.

Wherefore the penitent has recourse to God with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his master, according to <19C202> Psalm 122:2: “Behold, as the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters... so are our eyes unto the Lord our God, until He have mercy on us”; and as a son to his father, according to Luke 15:21: “Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee”; and as a wife to her husband, according to Jeremiah 3:1 “Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, saith the Lord.”

P(3)- Q(85)- A(3)- RO(1) —

As stated in Ethic. v, 1, justice is a virtue towards another person, and the matter of justice is not so much the person to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not God, but human acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is as one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is not a theological virtue, because God is not its matter or object.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The mean of justice is the equality that is established between those between whom justice is, as stated in Ethic. 5:But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on account of the excellence of one, as between father and son, God and man, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), wherefore in such cases, he that falls short of the other must do whatever he can. Yet this will not be sufficient simply, but only according to the acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing excess to penance.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(3)- RO(3) —

As there is a kind of commutation in favors, when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is there commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an offense committed against another, a man is either punished against his will, which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge. Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative justice.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Although penance is directly a species of justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it must have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the object of which is God.

Consequently penance comprises faith in Christ’s Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon, and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only something belonging to justice, but also something belonging to temperance and fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which pertain to temperance, and those which cause terror, which fortitude moderates, are objects of commutative justice.

Accordingly it belongs to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance, and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(4) Whether the will is properly the subject of penance?

P(3)- Q(85)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the subject of penance is not properly the will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is in the concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in the concupiscible faculty.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, penance is a kind of vengeance, as Augustine states in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]. But vengeance seems to regard the irascible faculty, since anger is the desire for vengeance. Therefore it seems that penance is in the irascible part.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the past is the proper object of the memory, according to the Philosopher (De Memoria i). Now penance regards the past, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2, ad 3). Therefore penance is subjected in the memory.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance removes sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance is in every power of the soul, and not only in the will.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Psalm 50:19: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.” But to offer a sacrifice is an act of the will, according to Psalm 53:8: “I will freely sacrifice to Thee.” Therefore penance is in the will.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(4) —

I answer that, We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so far as it is a passion, and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is in the concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it is a virtue, and thus, as stated above ( A(3) ), it is a species of justice. Now justice, as stated in the P(2a), Q(56), A(6), is subjected in the rational appetite which is the will. Therefore it is evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue, is subjected in the will, and its proper act is the purpose of amending what was committed against God.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(4)- RO(1) —

This argument considers penance as a passion.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(4)- RO(2) —

To desire vengeance on another, through passion, belongs to the irascible appetite, but to desire or take vengeance on oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The memory is a power that apprehends the past. But penance belongs not to the apprehensive but to the appetitive power, which presupposes an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance is not in the memory, but presupposes it.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(4)- RO(4) —

The will, as stated above ( P(1), Q(82), A(4) ; P(2a), Q(9) , A(1) ), moves all the other powers of the soul; so that it is not unreasonable for penance to be subjected in the will, and to produce an effect in each power of the soul.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(5) Whether penance originates from fear?

P(3)- Q(85)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that penance does not originate from fear. For penance originates in displeasure at sin. But this belongs to charity, as stated above ( A(3) ). Therefore penance originates from love rather than fear.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, men are induced to do penance, through the expectation of the heavenly kingdom, according to Matthew 3:2 and Matthew 4:17: “Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.”

Now the kingdom of heaven is the object of hope. Therefore penance results from hope rather than from fear.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, fear is an internal act of man. But penance does not seem to arise in us through any work of man, but through the operation of God, according to Jeremiah 31:19: “After Thou didst convert me I did penance.” Therefore penance does not result from fear.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Isaiah 26:17): “As a woman with child, when she draweth near the time of her delivery, is in pain, and crieth out in her pangs, so ere we become,” by penance, to wit; and according to another [*The Septuagint] version the text continues: “Through fear of Thee, O Lord, we have conceived, and been as it were in labor, and have brought forth the spirit of salvation,” i.e. of salutary penance, as is clear from what precedes. Therefore penance results from fear.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(5) —

I answer that, We may speak of penance in two ways: first, as to the habit, and then it is infused by God immediately without our operating as principal agents, but not without our cooperating dispositively by certain acts. Secondly, we may speak of penance, with regard to the acts whereby in penance we co-operate with God operating, the first principle [*Cf. P(2a), Q(113) ] of which acts is the operation of God in turning the heart, according to Lamentations 5:21: “Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted”; the second, an act of faith; the third, a movement of servile fear, whereby a man is withdrawn from sin through fear of punishment; the fourth, a movement of hope, whereby a man makes a purpose of amendment, in the hope of obtaining pardon; the fifth, a movement of charity, whereby sin is displeasing to man for its own sake and no longer for the sake of the punishment; the sixth, a movement of filial fear whereby a man, of his own accord, offers to make amends to God through fear of Him.

Accordingly it is evident that the act of penance results from servile fear as from the first movement of the appetite in this direction and from filial fear as from its immediate and proper principle.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Sin begins to displease a man, especially a sinner, on account of the punishments which servile fear regards, before it displeases him on account of its being an offense against God, or on account of its wickedness, which pertains to charity.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(5)- RO(2) —

When the kingdom of heaven is said to be at hand, we are to understand that the king is on his way, not only to reward but also to punish. Wherefore John the Baptist said ( Matthew 3:7): “Ye brood of vipers, who hath showed you to flee from the wrath to come?”

P(3)- Q(85)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Even the movement of fear proceeds from God’s act in turning the heart; wherefore it is written ( Deuteronomy 5:29): “Who shall give them to have such a mind, to fear Me?” And so the fact that penance results from fear does not hinder its resulting from the act of God in turning the heart.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(6) Whether penance is the first of the virtues?

P(3)- Q(85)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that penance is the first of the virtues. Because, on Matthew 3:2, “Do penance,” etc., a gloss says: “The first virtue is to destroy the old man, and hate sin by means of penance.”

P(3)- Q(85)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, withdrawal from one extreme seems to precede approach to the other. Now all the other virtues seem to regard approach to a term, because they all direct man to do good; whereas penance seems to direct him to withdraw from evil. Therefore it seems that penance precedes all the other virtues.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, before penance, there is sin in the soul.

Now no virtue is compatible with sin in the soul. Therefore no virtue precedes penance, which is itself the first of all and opens the door to the others by expelling sin.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Penance results from faith, hope, and charity, as already stated ( AA(2),5 ). Therefore penance is not the first of the virtues.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(6) —

I answer that, In speaking of the virtues, we do not consider the order of time with regard to the habits, because, since the virtues are connected with one another, as stated in the P(2a), Q(65), A(1), they all begin at the same time to be in the soul; but one is said to precede the other in the order of nature, which order depends on the order of their acts, in so far as the act of one virtue presupposes the act of another.

Accordingly, then, one must say that, even in the order of time, certain praiseworthy acts can precede the act and the habit of penance, e.g. acts of dead faith and hope, and an act of servile fear; while the act and habit of charity are, in point of time, simultaneous with the act and habit of penance, and with the habits of the other virtues. For, as was stated in the P(2a), Q(113), AA(7),8 , in the justification of the ungodly, the movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and the movement of the free-will towards sin, which is the act of penance, are simultaneous. Yet of these two acts, the former naturally precedes the latter, because the act of the virtue of penance is directed against sin, through love of God; where the first-mentioned act is the reason and cause of the second.

Consequently penance is not simply the first of the virtues, either in the order of time, or in the order of nature, because, in the order of nature, the theological virtues precede it simply. Nevertheless, in a certain respect, it is the first of the other virtues in the order of time, as regards its act, because this act is the first in the justification of the ungodly; whereas in the order of nature, the other virtues seem to precede, as that which is natural precedes that which is accidental; because the other virtues seem to be necessary for man’s good, by reason of their very nature, whereas penance is only necessary if something, viz. sin, be presupposed, as stated above ( Q(55), A(2) ), when we spoke of the relation of the sacrament of penance to the other sacraments aforesaid.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(6)- RO(1) —

This gloss is to be taken as meaning that the act of penance is the first in point of time, in comparison with the acts of the other virtues.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(6)- RO(2) —

In successive movements withdrawal from one extreme precedes approach to the other, in point of time; and also in the order of nature, if we consider the subject, i.e. the order of the material cause; but if we consider the order of the efficient and final causes, approach to the end is first, for it is this that the efficient cause intends first of all: and it is this order which we consider chiefly in the acts of the soul, as stated in Phys. ii.

P(3)- Q(85)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Penance opens the door to the other virtues, because it expels sin by the virtues of faith, hope and charity, which precede it in the order of nature; yet it so opens the door to them that they enter at the same time as it: because, in the justification of the ungodly, at the same time as the free-will is moved towards God and against sin, the sin is pardoned and grace infused, and with grace all the virtues, as stated in the P(2a), Q(65), AA(3),5 .

QUESTION OF THE EFFECT OF PENANCE, AS REGARDS THE PARDON OF MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of Penance; and (1) as regards the pardon of mortal sins; (2) as regards the pardon of venial sins; (3) as regards the return of sins which have been pardoned; (4) as regards the recovery of the virtues.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether all mortal sins are taken away by Penance? (2) Whether they can be taken away without Penance? (3) Whether one can be taken away without the other? (4) Whether Penance takes away the guilt while the debt remains? (5) Whether any remnants of sin remain? (6) Whether the removal of sin is the effect of Penance as a virtue, or as a sacrament?

P(3)- Q(86)- A(1) Whether all sins are taken away by Penance?

P(3)- Q(86)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that not all sins are taken away by Penance. For the Apostle says ( Hebrews 12:17) that Esau “found no place of repentance, although with tears he had sought it,” which a gloss explains as meaning that “he found no place of pardon and blessing through Penance”: and it is related (2 Macc. 9:13) of Antiochus, that “this wicked man prayed to the Lord, of Whom he was not to obtain mercy.”

Therefore it does not seem that all sins are taken away by Penance.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i) that “so great is the stain of that sin (namely, when a man, after coming to the knowledge of God through the grace of Christ, resists fraternal charity, and by the brands of envy combats grace itself) that he is unable to humble himself in prayer, although he is forced by his wicked conscience to acknowledge and confess his sin.” Therefore not every sin can be taken away by Penance.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, our Lord said ( Matthew 12:32): “He that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come.”

Therefore not every sin can be pardoned through Penance.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Ezekiel 18:22): “I will not remember” any more “all his iniquities that he hath done.”

P(3)- Q(86)- A(1) —

I answer that, The fact that a sin cannot be taken away by Penance may happen in two ways: first, because of the impossibility of repenting of sin; secondly, because of Penance being unable to blot out a sin. In the first way the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be blotted out by Penance, because their will is confirmed in evil, so that sin cannot displease them as to its guilt, but only as to the punishment which they suffer, by reason of which they have a kind of repentance, which yet is fruitless, according to Wis. 5:3: “Repenting, and groaning for anguish of spirit.” Consequently such Penance brings no hope of pardon, but only despair. Nevertheless no sin of a wayfarer can be such as that, because his will is flexible to good and evil. Wherefore to say that in this life there is any sin of which one cannot repent, is erroneous, first, because this would destroy free-will, secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of grace, whereby the heart of any sinner whatsoever can be moved to repent, according to Proverbs 21:1: “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it.”

It is also erroneous to say that any sin cannot be pardoned through true Penance. First, because this is contrary to Divine mercy, of which it is written ( Joel 2:13) that God is “gracious and merciful, patient, and rich in mercy, and ready to repent of the evil”; for, in a manner, God would be overcome by man, if man wished a sin to be blotted out, which God were unwilling to blot out. Secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of Christ’s Passion, through which Penance produces its effect, as do the other sacraments, since it is written ( 1 John 2:2): “He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.”

Therefore we must say simply that, in this life, every sin can be blotted out by true Penance.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Esau did not truly repent. This is evident from his saying ( Genesis 27:41): “The days will come of the mourning of my father, and I will kill my brother Jacob.”

Likewise neither did Antiochus repent truly; since he grieved for his past sin, not because he had offended God thereby, but on account of the sickness which he suffered in his body.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(1)- RO(2) —

These words of Augustine should be understood thus: “So great is the stain of that sin, that man is unable to humble himself in prayer,” i.e. it is not easy for him to do so; in which sense we say that a man cannot be healed, when it is difficult to heal him.

Yet this is possible by the power of God’s grace, which sometimes turns men even “into the depths of the sea” ( Psalm 67:23).

P(3)- Q(86)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The word or blasphemy spoken against the Holy Ghost is final impenitence, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xi), which is altogether unpardonable, because after this life is ended, there is no pardon of sins. or, if by the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, we understand sin committed through certain malice, this means either that the blasphemy itself against the Holy Ghost is unpardonable, i.e. not easily pardonable, or that such a sin does not contain in itself any motive for pardon, or that for such a sin a man is punished both in this and in the next world, as we explained in the P(2b), Q(14), A(3) .

P(3)- Q(86)- A(2) Whether sin can be pardoned without Penance?

P(3)- Q(86)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that sin can be pardoned without Penance. For the power of God is no less with regard to adults than with regard to children. But He pardons the sins of children without Penance.

Therefore He also pardons adults without penance.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, God did not bind His power to the sacraments. But Penance is a sacrament. Therefore by God’s power sin can be pardoned without Penance.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, God’s mercy is greater than man’s.

Now man sometimes forgives another for offending him, without his repenting: wherefore our Lord commanded us ( Matthew 5:44): “Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you.” Much more, therefore, does God pardon men for offending him, without their repenting.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Lord said ( Jeremiah 18:8): “If that nation... shall repent of their evil” which they have done, “I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do them,” so that, on the other hand, if man “do not penance,” it seems that God will not pardon him his sin.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(2) —

I answer that, It is impossible for a mortal actual sin to be pardoned without penance, if we speak of penance as a virtue. For, as sin is an offense against God, He pardons sin in the same way as he pardons an offense committed against Him. Now an offense is directly opposed to grace, since one man is said to be offended with another, because he excludes him from his grace. Now, as stated in the P(2a), Q(110), A(1), the difference between the grace of God and the grace of man, is that the latter does not cause, but presupposes true or apparent goodness in him who is graced, whereas the grace of God causes goodness in the man who is graced, because the good-will of God, which is denoted by the word “grace,” is the cause of all created good. Hence it is possible for a man to pardon an offense, for which he is offended with someone, without any change in the latter’s will; but it is impossible that God pardon a man for an offense, without his will being changed. Now the offense of mortal sin is due to man’s will being turned away from God, through being turned to some mutable good. Consequently, for the pardon of this offense against God, it is necessary for man’s will to be so changed as to turn to God and to renounce having turned to something else in the aforesaid manner, together with a purpose of amendment; all of which belongs to the nature of penance as a virtue. Therefore it is impossible for a sin to be pardoned anyone without penance as a virtue.

But the sacrament of Penance, as stated above ( Q(88), A(3) ), is perfected by the priestly office of binding and loosing, without which God can forgive sins, even as Christ pardoned the adulterous woman, as related in John 8, and the woman that was a sinner, as related in Luke vii, whose sins, however, He did not forgive without the virtue of penance: for as Gregory states (Hom. xxxiii in Evang.), “He drew inwardly by grace,” i.e. by penance, “her whom He received outwardly by His mercy.”

P(3)- Q(86)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In children there is none but original sin, which consists, not in an actual disorder of the will, but in a habitual disorder of nature, as explained in the P(2a), Q(82), A(1), and so in them the forgiveness of sin is accompanied by a habitual change resulting from the infusion of grace and virtues, but not by an actual change. On the other hand, in the case of an adult, in whom there are actual sins, which consist in an actual disorder of the will, there is no remission of sins, even in Baptism, without an actual change of the will, which is the effect of Penance.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(2)- RO(2) —

This argument takes Penance as a sacrament.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(2)- RO(3) —

God’s mercy is more powerful than man’s, in that it moves man’s will to repent, which man’s mercy cannot do.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3) Whether by Penance one sin can be pardoned without another?

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that by Penance one sin can be pardoned without another. For it is written ( Amos 4:7): “I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece was rained upon: and the piece whereupon I rained not, withered.”

These words are expounded by Gregory, who says (Hom. x super Ezech.): “When a man who hates his neighbor, breaks himself of other vices, rain falls on one part of the city, leaving the other part withered, for there are some men who, when they prune some vices, become much more rooted in others.” Therefore one sin can be forgiven by Penance, without another.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, Ambrose in commenting on Psalm 118, “Blessed are the undefiled in the way,” after expounding verse 136 (“My eyes have sent forth springs of water”), says that “the first consolation is that God is mindful to have mercy; and the second, that He punishes, for although faith be wanting, punishment makes satisfaction and raises us up.” Therefore a man can be raised up from one sin, while the sin of unbelief remains.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, when several things are not necessarily together, one can be removed without the other. Now it was stated in the P(2a), Q(73), A(1)- that sins are not connected together, so that one sin can be without another. Therefore also one sin can be taken away by Penance without another being taken away.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, sins are the debts, for which we pray for pardon when we say in the Lord’s Prayer: “Forgive us our trespasses,” etc. Now man sometimes forgives one debt without forgiving another.

Therefore God also, by Penance, forgives one sin without another.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, man’s sins are forgiven him through the love of God, according to Jeremiah 31:3: “I have loved thee with an everlasting love, therefore have I drawn thee, taking pity on thee.”

Now there is nothing to hinder God from loving a man in one respect, while being offended with him in another, even as He loves the sinner as regards his nature, while hating him for his sin. Therefore it seems possible for God, by Penance, to pardon one sin without another.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: “There are many who repent having sinned, but not completely; for they except certain things which give them pleasure, forgetting that our Lord delivered from the devil the man who was both dumb and deaf, whereby He shows us that we are never healed unless it be from all sins.”

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3) —

I answer that, It is impossible for Penance to take one sin away without another. First because sin is taken away by grace removing the offense against God. Wherefore it was stated in the P(2a), Q(109), A(7) ; P(2a), Q(113), A(2)- that without grace no sin can be forgiven. Now every mortal sin is opposed to grace and excludes it.

Therefore it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned without another.

Secondly, because, as shown above ( A(2) ) mortal sin cannot be forgiven without true Penance, to which it belongs to renounce sin, by reason of its being against God, which is common to all mortal sins: and where the same reason applies, the result will be the same. Consequently a man cannot be truly penitent, if he repent of one sin and not of another. For if one particular sin were displeasing to him, because it is against the love of God above all things (which motive is necessary for true repentance), it follows that he would repent of all. Whence it follows that it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned through Penance, without another. Thirdly, because this would be contrary to the perfection of God’s mercy, since His works are perfect, as stated in Deuteronomy 32:4; wherefore whomsoever He pardons, He pardons altogether. Hence Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown], that “it is irreverent and heretical to expect half a pardon from Him Who is just and justice itself.”

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3)- RO(1) —

These words of Gregory do not refer to the forgiveness of the guilt, but to the cessation from act, because sometimes a man who has been wont to commit several kinds of sin, renounces one and not the other; which is indeed due to God’s assistance, but does not reach to the pardon of the sin.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3)- RO(2) —

In this saying of Ambrose “faith” cannot denote the faith whereby we believe in Christ, because, as Augustine says on John 15:22, “If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin” (viz. unbelief): “for this is the sin which contains all others”: but it stands for consciousness, because sometimes a man receives pardon for a sin of which he is not conscious, through the punishment which he bears patiently.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Although sins are not connected in so far as they turn towards a mutable good, yet they are connected in so far as they turn away from the immutable Good, which applies to all mortal sins in common. and it is thus that they have the character of an offense which needs to be removed by Penance.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Debt as regards external things, e.g. money, is not opposed to friendship through which the debt is pardoned. hence one debt can be condoned without another. On the other hand, the debt of sin is opposed to friendship, and so one sin or offense is not pardoned without another; for it would seem absurd for anyone to ask even a man to forgive him one offense and not another.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(3)- RO(5) —

The love whereby God loves man’s nature, does not ordain man to the good of glory from which man is excluded by any mortal sin. but the love of grace, whereby mortal sin is forgiven, ordains man to eternal life, according to Romans 6:23: “The grace of God (is) life everlasting.” Hence there is no comparison.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(4) Whether the debt of punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven through Penance?

P(3)- Q(86)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that no debt of punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven through Penance. For when the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But the guilt is the cause of the debt of punishment: since a man deserves to be punished because he has been guilty of a sin. Therefore when the sin has been forgiven, no debt of punishment can remain.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, according to the Apostle ( Romans 5) the gift of Christ is more effective than the sin of Adam. Now, by sinning, man incurs at the same time guilt and the debt of punishment. Much more therefore, by the gift of grace, is the guilt forgiven and at the same time the debt of punishment remitted.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the forgiveness of sins is effected in Penance through the power of Christ’s Passion, according to Romans 3:25: “Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His Blood... for the remission of former sins.” Now Christ’s Passion made satisfaction sufficient for all sins, as stated above ( QQ(48),49,79, A(5) ).

Therefore after the guilt has been pardoned, no debt of punishment remains.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is related ( 2 Samuel 12:13) that when David penitent had said to Nathan: “I have sinned against the Lord,” Nathan said to him: “The Lord also hath taken away thy sin, thou shalt not die. Nevertheless... the child that is born to thee shall surely die,” which was to punish him for the sin he had committed, as stated in the same place. Therefore a debt of some punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated in the P(2a), Q(87), A(4), in mortal sin there are two things, namely, a turning from the immutable Good, and an inordinate turning to mutable good. Accordingly, in so far as mortal sin turns away from the immutable Good, it induces a debt of eternal punishment, so that whosoever sins against the eternal Good should be punished eternally. Again, in so far as mortal sin turns inordinately to a mutable good, it gives rise to a debt of some punishment, because the disorder of guilt is not brought back to the order of justice, except by punishment: since it is just that he who has been too indulgent to his will, should suffer something against his will, for thus will equality be restored. Hence it is written ( Revelation 18:7): “As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.”

Since, however, the turning to mutable good is finite, sin does not, in this respect, induce a debt of eternal punishment. Wherefore, if man turns inordinately to a mutable good, without turning from God, as happens in venial sins, he incurs a debt, not of eternal but of temporal punishment.

Consequently when guilt is pardoned through grace, the soul ceases to be turned away from God, through being united to God by grace: so that at the same time, the debt of punishment is taken away, albeit a debt of some temporal punishment may yet remain.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Mortal sin both turns away from God and turns to a created good. But, as stated in the P(2a), Q(71), A(6), the turning away from God is as its form while the turning to created good is as its matter. Now if the formal element of anything be removed, the species is taken away: thus, if you take away rational, you take away the human species. Consequently mortal sin is said to be pardoned from the very fact that, by means of grace, the aversion of the mind from God is taken away together with the debt of eternal punishment: and yet the material element remains, viz. the inordinate turning to a created good, for which a debt of temporal punishment is due.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(4)- RO(2) —

As stated in the P(2a), Q(109), AA(7),8 ; P(2a), Q(111), A(2), it belongs to grace to operate in man by justifying him from sin, and to co-operate with man that his work may be rightly done. Consequently the forgiveness of guilt and of the debt of eternal punishment belongs to operating grace, while the remission of the debt of temporal punishment belongs to co-operating grace, in so far as man, by bearing punishment patiently with the help of Divine grace, is released also from the debt of temporal punishment. Consequently just as the effect of operating grace precedes the effect of co-operating grace, so too, the remission of guilt and of eternal punishment precedes the complete release from temporal punishment, since both are from grace, but the former, from grace alone, the latter, from grace and free-will.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Christ’s Passion is of itself sufficient to remove all debt of punishment, not only eternal, but also temporal; and man is released from the debt of punishment according to the measure of his share in the power of Christ’s Passion. Now in Baptism man shares the Power of Christ’s Passion fully, since by water and the Spirit of Christ, he dies with Him to sin, and is born again in Him to a new life, so that, in Baptism, man receives the remission of all debt of punishment. In Penance, on the other hand, man shares in the power of Christ’s Passion according to the measure of his own acts, which are the matter of Penance, as water is of Baptism, as stated above ( Q(84), AA(1),3 ). Wherefore the entire debt of punishment is not remitted at once after the first act of Penance, by which act the guilt is remitted, but only when all the acts of Penance have been completed.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(5) Whether the remnants of sin are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven?

P(3)- Q(86)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that all the remnants of sin are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven. For Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: “Our Lord never healed anyone without delivering him wholly; for He wholly healed the man on the Sabbath, since He delivered his body from all disease, and his soul from all taint.” Now the remnants of sin belong to the disease of sin. Therefore it does not seem possible for any remnants of sin to remain when the guilt has been pardoned.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), “good is more efficacious than evil, since evil does not act save in virtue of some good.” Now, by sinning, man incurs the taint of sin all at once. Much more, therefore, by repenting, is he delivered also from all remnants of sin.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, God’s work is more efficacious than man’s. Now by the exercise of good human works the remnants of contrary sins are removed. Much more, therefore, are they taken away by the remission of guilt, which is a work of God.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(5) —

On the contrary, We read (Mark 8) that the blind man whom our Lord enlightened, was restored first of all to imperfect sight, wherefore he said ( Mark 8:24): “I see men, as it were trees, walking”; and afterwards he was restored perfectly, “so that he saw all things clearly.” Now the enlightenment of the blind man signifies the delivery of the sinner. Therefore after the first remission of sin, whereby the sinner is restored to spiritual sight, there still remain in him some remnants of his past sin.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(5) —

I answer that, Mortal sin, in so far as it turns inordinately to a mutable good, produces in the soul a certain disposition, or even a habit, if the acts be repeated frequently. Now it has been said above ( A(4) ) that the guilt of mortal sin is pardoned through grace removing the aversion of the mind from God. Nevertheless when that which is on the part of the aversion has been taken away by grace, that which is on the part of the inordinate turning to a mutable good can remain, since this may happen to be without the other, as stated above ( A(4) ).

Consequently, there is no reason why, after the guilt has been forgiven, the dispositions caused by preceding acts should not remain, which are called the remnants of sin. Yet they remain weakened and diminished, so as not to domineer over man, and they are after the manner of dispositions rather than of habits, like the “fomes” which remains after Baptism.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(5)- RO(1) —

God heals the whole man perfectly; but sometimes suddenly, as Peter’s mother-in-law was restored at once to perfect health, so that “rising she ministered to them” ( Luke 4:39), and sometimes by degrees, as we said above ( Q(44), A(3), ad 2) about the blind man who was restored to sight ( Matthew 8). And so too, He sometimes turns the heart of man with such power, that it receives at once perfect spiritual health, not only the guilt being pardoned, but all remnants of sin being removed as was the case with Magdalen ( Luke 7); whereas at other times He sometimes first pardons the guilt by operating grace, and afterwards, by co-operating grace, removes the remnants of sin by degrees.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Sin too, sometimes induces at once a weak disposition, such as is the result of one act, and sometimes a stronger disposition, the result of many acts.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(5)- RO(3) —

One human act does not remove all the remnants of sin, because, as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. viii) “a vicious man by doing good works will make but little progress so as to be any better, but if he continue in good practice, he will end in being good as to acquired virtue.” But God’s grace does this much more effectively, whether by one or by several acts.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(6) Whether the forgiveness of guilt is an effect of Penance?

P(3)- Q(86)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that the forgiveness of guilt is not an effect of penance as a virtue. For penance is said to be a virtue, in so far as it is a principle of a human action. But human action does nothing towards the remission of guilt, since this is an effect of operating grace.

Therefore the forgiveness of guilt is not an effect of penance as a virtue.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, certain other virtues are more excellent than penance. But the forgiveness of sin is not said to be the effect of any other virtue. Neither, therefore, is it the effect of penance as a virtue.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, there is no forgiveness of sin except through the power of Christ’s Passion, according to Hebrews 9:22: “Without shedding of blood there is no remission.” Now Penance, as a sacrament, produces its effect through the power of Christ’s Passion, even as the other sacraments do, as was shown above ( Q(62), AA(4),5 ).

Therefore the forgiveness of sin is the effect of Penance, not as a virtue, but as a sacrament.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Properly speaking, the cause of a thing is that without which it cannot be, since every defect depends on its cause. Now forgiveness of sin can come from God without the sacrament of Penance, but not without the virtue of penance, as stated above ( Q(84), A(5), ad 3; Q(85), A(2) ); so that, even before the sacraments of the New Law were instituted, God pardoned the sins of the penitent. Therefore the forgiveness of sin is chiefly the effect of penance as a virtue.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(6) —

I answer that, Penance is a virtue in so far as it is a principle of certain human acts. Now the human acts, which are performed by the sinner, are the material element in the sacrament of Penance.

Moreover every sacrament produces its effect, in virtue not only of its form, but also of its matter. because both these together make the one sacrament, as stated above ( Q(60), A(6), ad 2, A(7) ). Hence in Baptism forgiveness of sin is effected, in virtue not only of the form (but also of the matter, viz. water, albeit chiefly in virtue of the form) [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition] from which the water receives its power — and, similarly, the forgiveness of sin is the effect of Penance, chiefly by the power of the keys, which is vested in the ministers, who furnish the formal part of the sacrament, as stated above ( Q(84), A(3) ), and secondarily by the instrumentality of those acts of the penitent which pertain to the virtue of penance, but only in so far as such acts are, in some way, subordinate to the keys of the Church. Accordingly it is evident that the forgiveness of sin is the effect of penance as a virtue, but still more of Penance as a sacrament.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The effect of operating grace is the justification of the ungodly (as stated in the P(2a), Q[113]), wherein there is, as was there stated (AA(1),2,3 ), not only infusion of grace and forgiveness of sin, but also a movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and a movement of the freewill against sin, which is the act of penance. Yet these human acts are there as the effects of operating grace, and are produced at the same time as the forgiveness of sin. Consequently the forgiveness of sin does not take place without an act of the virtue of penance, although it is the effect of operating grace.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(6)- RO(2) —

In the justification of the ungodly there is not only an act of penance, but also an act of faith, as stated above (ad 1:

P(2a), Q(113), A(4) ). Wherefore the forgiveness of sin is accounted the effect not only of the virtue of penance, but also, and that chiefly, of faith and charity.

P(3)- Q(86)- A(6)- RO(3) —

The act of the virtue of penance is subordinate to Christ’s Passion both by faith, and by its relation to the keys of the Church; and so, in both ways, it causes the forgiveness of sin, by the power of Christ’s Passion.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that the act of the virtue of penance is necessary for the forgiveness of sin, through being an inseparable effect of grace, whereby chiefly is sin pardoned, and which produces its effect in all the sacraments. Consequently it only follows that grace is a higher cause of the forgiveness of sin than the sacrament of Penance. Moreover, it must be observed that, under the Old Law and the law of nature, there was a sacrament of Penance after a fashion, as stated above ( Q(84), A(7), ad 2).

QUESTION OF THE REMISSION OF VENIAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the forgiveness of venial sins, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether venial sin can be forgiven without Penance? (2) Whether it can be forgiven without the infusion of grace? (3) Whether venial sins are forgiven by the sprinkling of holy water, a bishop’s blessing, the beating of the breast, the Lord’s Prayer, and the like? (4) Whether a venial sin can be taken away without a mortal sin?

P(3)- Q(87)- A(1) Whether venial sin can be forgiven without Penance?

P(3)- Q(87)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that venial sin can be forgiven without penance. For, as stated above ( Q(84), A(10), ad 4), it is essential to true penance that man should not only sorrow for his past sins, but also that he should purpose to avoid them for the future. Now venial sins are forgiven without any such purpose, for it is certain that man cannot lead the present life without committing venial sins. Therefore venial sins can be forgiven without penance.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, there is no penance without actual displeasure at one’s sins. But venial sins can be taken away without any actual displeasure at them, as would be the case if a man were to be killed in his sleep, for Christ’s sake, since he would go to heaven at once, which would not happen if his venial sins remained. Therefore venial sins can be forgiven without penance.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, venial sins are contrary to the fervor of charity, as stated in the P(2b), Q(24), A(10) . Now one contrary is removed by another. Therefore forgiveness of venial sins is caused by the fervor of charity, which may be without actual displeasure at venial sin.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown], that “there is a penance which is done for venial sins in the Church every day” which would be useless if venial sins could be forgiven without Penance.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(1) —

I answer that, Forgiveness of sin, as stated above ( Q(86), A(2) ), is effected by man being united to God from Whom sin separates him in some way. Now this separation is made complete by mortal sin, and incomplete by venial sin: because, by mortal sin, the mind through acting against charity is altogether turned away from God; whereas by venial sin man’s affections are clogged, so that they are slow in tending towards God. Consequently both kinds of sin are taken away by penance, because by both of them man’s will is disordered through turning inordinately to a created good; for just as mortal sin cannot be forgiven so long as the will is attached to sin, so neither can venial sin, because while the cause remains, the effect remains.

Yet a more perfect penance is requisite for the forgiveness of mortal sin, namely that man should detest actually the mortal sin which he committed, so far as lies in his power, that is to say, he should endeavor to remember each single mortal sin, in order to detest each one. But this is, not required for the forgiveness of venial sins; although it does not suffice to have habitual displeasure, which is included in the habit of charity or of penance as a virtue, since then venial sin would be incompatible with charity, which is evidently untrue. Consequently it is necessary to have a certain virtual displeasure, so that, for instance, a man’s affections so tend to God and Divine things, that whatever might happen to him to hamper that tendency would be displeasing to him, and would grieve him, were he to commit it, even though he were not to think of it actually: and this is not sufficient for the remission of mortal sin, except as regards those sins which he fails to remember after a careful examination.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(1)- RO(1) —

When man is in a state of grace, he can avoid all mortal sins, and each single one; and he can avoid each single venial sin, but not all, as was explained in the P(2a), Q(74), A(8), ad 2; P(2a), Q(109), A(8) . Consequently penance for mortal sins requires man to purpose abstaining from mortal sins, all and each; whereas penance for venial sins requires man to purpose abstaining from each, but not from all, because the weakness of this life does not allow of this. Nevertheless he needs to have the purpose of taking steps to commit fewer venial sins, else he would be in danger of falling back, if he gave up the desire of going forward, or of removing the obstacles to spiritual progress, such as venial sins are.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Death for Christ’s sake, as stated above ( Q(66), A(11) ), obtains the power of Baptism, wherefore it washes away all sin, both venial and mortal, unless it find the will attached to sin.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The fervor of charity implies virtual displeasure at venial sins, as stated above ( Q(79), A(4) ).

P(3)- Q(87)- A(2) Whether infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of venial sins?

P(3)- Q(87)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of venial sins. Because an effect is not produced without its proper cause. Now the proper cause of the remission of sins is grace; for man’s sins are not forgiven through his own merits; wherefore it is written ( Ephesians 2:4,5): “God, Who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity, wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ, by Whose grace you are saved.”

Therefore venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, venial sins are not forgiven without Penance. Now grace is infused, in Penance as in the other sacraments of the New Law. Therefore venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, venial sin produces a stain on the soul.

Now a stain is not removed save by grace which is the spiritual beauty of the soul. Therefore it seems that venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The advent of venial sin neither destroys nor diminishes grace, as stated in the P(2b), Q(24), A(10) .

Therefore, in like manner, an infusion of grace is not necessary in order to remove venial sin.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(2) —

I answer that, Each thing is removed by its contrary.

But venial sin is not contrary to habitual grace or charity, but hampers its act, through man being too much attached to a created good, albeit not in opposition to God, as stated in the P(2a), Q(88), A(1) ; P(2b), Q(24), A(10) . Therefore, in order that venial sin be removed, it is not necessary that habitual grace be infused, but a movement of grace or charity suffices for its forgiveness.

Nevertheless, since in those who have the use of free-will (in whom alone can there be venial sins), there can be no infusion of grace without an actual movement of the free-will towards God and against sin, consequently whenever grace is infused anew, venial sins are forgiven.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Even the forgiveness of venial sins is an effect of grace, in virtue of the act which grace produces anew, but not through any habit infused anew into the soul.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Venial sin is never forgiven without some act, explicit or implicit, of the virtue of penance, as stated above ( A(1) ): it can, however, be forgiven without the sacrament of Penance, which is formally perfected by the priestly absolution, as stated above ( Q(87), A(2) ). Hence it does not follow that infusion of grace is required for the forgiveness of venial sin, for although this infusion takes place in every sacrament, it does not occur in every act of virtue.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Just as there are two kinds of bodily stain, one consisting in the privation of something required for beauty, e.g. the right color or the due proportion of members, and another by the introduction of some hindrance to beauty, e.g. mud or dust; so too, a stain is put on the soul, in one way, by the privation of the beauty of grace through mortal sin, in another, by the inordinate inclination of the affections to some temporal thing, and this is the result of venial sin. Consequently, an infusion of grace is necessary for the removal of mortal sin, but in order to remove venial sin, it is necessary to have a movement proceeding from grace, removing the inordinate attachment to the temporal thing.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(3) Whether venial sins are removed by the sprinkling of holy water and the like?

P(3)- Q(87)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that venial sins are not removed by the sprinkling of holy water, a bishop’s blessing, and the like. For venial sins are not forgiven without Penance, as stated above ( A(1) ). But Penance suffices by itself for the remission of venial sins. Therefore the above have nothing to do with the remission of venial sins.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, each of the above bears the same relation to one venial sin as to all. If therefore, by means of one of them, some venial sin is remitted, it follows that in like manner all are remitted, so that by beating his breast once, or by being sprinkled once with holy water, a man would be delivered from all his venial sins, which seems unreasonable.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, venial sins occasion a debt of some punishment, albeit temporal; for it is written ( 1 Corinthians 3:12,15) of him that builds up “wood, hay, stubble” that “he shall be saved, yet so as by fire.” Now the above things whereby venial sins are said to be taken away, contain either no punishment at all, or very little. Therefore they do not suffice for the full remission of venial sins.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*Hom. 30 inter 1; Ep. cclxv] that “for our slight sins we strike our breasts, and say: Forgive us our trespasses,” and so it seems that striking one’s breast, and the Lord’s Prayer cause the remission of venial sins: and the same seems to apply to the other things.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ), no infusion of fresh grace is required for the forgiveness of a venial sin, but it is enough to have an act proceeding from grace, in detestation of that venial sin, either explicit or at least implicit, as when one is moved fervently to God. Hence, for three reasons, certain things cause the remission of venial sins: first, because they imply the infusion of grace, since the infusion of grace removes venial sins, as stated above ( A(2) ); and so, by the Eucharist, Extreme Unction, and by all the sacraments of the New Law without exception, wherein grace is conferred, venial sins are remitted. Secondly, because they imply a movement of detestation for sin, and in this way the general confession [*i.e. the recital of the Confiteor or of an act of contrition], the beating of one’s breast, and the Lord’s Prayer conduce to the remission of venial sins, for we ask in the Lord’s Prayer: “Forgive us our trespasses.” Thirdly, because they include a movement of reverence for God and Divine things; and in this way a bishop’s blessing, the sprinkling of holy water, any sacramental anointing, a prayer said in a dedicated church, and anything else of the kind, conduce to the remission of venial sins.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(3)- RO(1) —

All these things cause the remission of venial sins, in so far as they incline the soul to the movement of penance, viz., the implicit or explicit detestation of one’s sins.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(3)- RO(2) —

All these things, so far as they are concerned, conduce to the remission of all venial sins: but the remission may be hindered as regards certain venial sins, to which the mind is still actually attached, even as insincerity sometimes impedes the effect of Baptism.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(3)- RO(3) —

By the above things, venial sins are indeed taken away as regards the guilt, both because those things are a kind of satisfaction, and through the virtue of charity whose movement is aroused by such things.

Yet it does not always happen that, by means of each one, the whole guilt of punishment is taken away, because, in that case, whoever was entirely free from mortal sin, would go straight to heaven if sprinkled with holy water: but the debt of punishment is remitted by means of the above, according to the movement of fervor towards God, which fervor is aroused by such things, sometimes more, sometimes less.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(4) Whether venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin?

P(3)- Q(87)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin. For, on John 8:7: “He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her,” a gloss says that “all those men were in a state of mortal sin: for venial offenses were forgiven them through the legal ceremonies.” Therefore venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, no infusion of grace is required for the remission of venial sin. but it is required for the forgiveness of mortal sin.

Therefore venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, a venial sin differs from a mortal sin more than from another venial sin. But one venial sin can be pardoned without another, as stated above ( A(3), ad 2; Q(87), A(3) ). Therefore a venial sin can be taken away without a mortal sin.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Matthew 5:26): “Amen I say to thee, thou shalt not go out from thence,” viz., from the prison, into which a man is cast for mortal sin, “till thou repay the last farthing,” by which venial sin is denoted. Therefore a venial sin is not forgiven without mortal sin.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(87), A(3) ), there is no remission of any sin whatever except by the power of grace, because, as the Apostle declares ( Romans 4:8), it is owing to God’s grace that He does not impute sin to a man, which a gloss on that passage expounds as referring to venial sin. Now he that is in a state of mortal sin is without the grace of God. Therefore no venial sin is forgiven him.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Venial offenses, in the passage quoted, denote the irregularities or uncleannesses which men contracted in accordance with the Law.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Although no new infusion of habitual grace is requisite for the remission of venial sin, yet it is necessary to exercise some act of grace, which cannot be in one who is a subject of mortal sin.

P(3)- Q(87)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Venial sin does not preclude every act of grace whereby all venial sins can be removed; whereas mortal sin excludes altogether the habit of grace, without which no sin, either mortal or venial, is remitted. Hence the comparison fails.

QUESTION OF THE RETURN OF SINS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY BY PENANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the return of sins which have been taken away by Penance: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether sins which have been taken away by Penance return simply through a subsequent sin? (2) Whether more specially as regards certain sins they return, in a way, on account of ingratitude? (3) Whether the debt of punishment remains the same for sins thus returned? (4) Whether this ingratitude, on account of which sins return, is a special sin?

P(3)- Q(88)- A(1) Whether sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin?

P(3)- Q(88)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. i, 12): “Our Lord teaches most explicitly in the Gospel that sins which have been forgiven return, when fraternal charity ceases, in the example of the servant from whom his master exacted the payment of the debt already forgiven, because he had refused to forgive the debt of his fellow-servant.”

Now fraternal charity is destroyed through each mortal sin. Therefore sins already taken away through Penance, return through each subsequent mortal sin.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, on Luke 11:24, “I will return into my house, whence I came out,” Bede says: “This verse should make us tremble, we should not endeavor to explain it away lest through carelessness we give place to the sin which we thought to have been taken away, and become its slave once more.” Now this would not be so unless it returned. Therefore a sin returns after once being taken away by Penance.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the Lord said ( Ezekiel 18:24): “If the just man turn himself away from his justice, and do iniquity... all his justices which he hath done, shall not be remembered.”

Now among the other “justices” which he had done, is also his previous penance, since it was said above ( Q(85), A(3) ) that penance is a part of justice. Therefore when one who has done penance, sins, his previous penance, whereby he received forgiveness of his sins, is not imputed to him. Therefore his sins return.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, past sins are covered by grace, as the Apostle declares ( Romans 4:7) where he quotes Psalm 31:1: “Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered.”

But a subsequent mortal sin takes away grace. Therefore the sins committed previously, become uncovered: and so, seemingly, they return.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Romans 11:29): “The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance.” Now the penitent’s sins are taken away by a gift of God. Therefore the sins which have been taken away do not return through a subsequent sin, as though God repented His gift of forgiveness.

Moreover, Augustine says (Lib. Resp. Prosperi i [*Cf. Prosper, Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum ii]): “When he that turns away from Christ, comes to the end of this life a stranger to grace, whither does he go, except to perdition? Yet he does not fall back into that which had been forgiven, nor will he be condemned for original sin.”

P(3)- Q(88)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(86), A(4) ), mortal sin contains two things, aversion from God and adherence to a created good. Now, in mortal sin, whatever attaches to the aversion, is, considered in itself, common to all mortal sins, since man turns away from God by every mortal sin, so that, in consequence, the stain resulting from the privation of grace, and the debt of everlasting punishment are common to all mortal sins. This is what is meant by what is written ( James 2:10): “Whosoever... shall offend in one point, is become guilty of all.” On the other hand, as regards their adherence they are different from, and sometimes contrary to one another. Hence it is evident, that on the part of the adherence, a subsequent mortal sin does not cause the return of mortal sins previously dispelled, else it would follow that by a sin of wastefulness a man would be brought back to the habit or disposition of avarice previously dispelled, so that one contrary would be the cause of another, which is impossible. But if in mortal sins we consider that which attaches to the aversion absolutely, then a subsequent mortal sin [causes the return of that which was comprised in the mortal sins before they were pardoned, in so far as the subsequent mortal sin] [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition.] deprives man of grace, and makes him deserving of everlasting punishment, just as he was before. Nevertheless, since the aversion of mortal sin is [in a way, caused by the adherence, those things which attach to the aversion are*] diversified somewhat in relation to various adherences, as it were to various causes, so that there will be a different aversion, a different stain, a different debt of punishment, according to the different acts of mortal sin from which they arise; hence the question is moved whether the stain and the debt of eternal punishment, as caused by acts of sins previously pardoned, return through a subsequent mortal sin.

Accordingly some have maintained that they return simply even in this way. But this is impossible, because what God has done cannot be undone by the work of man. Now the pardon of the previous sins was a work of Divine mercy, so that it cannot be undone by man’s subsequent sin, according to Romans 3:3: “Shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect?”

Wherefore others who maintained the possibility of sins returning, said that God pardons the sins of a penitent who will afterwards sin again, not according to His foreknowledge, but only according to His present justice: since He foresees that He will punish such a man eternally for his sins, and yet, by His grace, He makes him righteous for the present. But this cannot stand: because if a cause be placed absolutely, its effect is placed absolutely; so that if the remission of sins were effected by grace and the sacraments of grace, not absolutely but under some condition dependent on some future event, it would follow that grace and the sacraments of grace are not the sufficient causes of the remission of sins, which is erroneous, as being derogatory to God’s grace.

Consequently it is in no way possible for the stain of past sins and the debt of punishment incurred thereby, to return, as caused by those acts.

Yet it may happen that a subsequent sinful act virtually contains the debt of punishment due to the previous sin, in so far as when a man sins a second time, for this very reason he seems to sin more grievously than before, as stated in Romans 2:5: “According to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath against the day of wrath,” from the mere fact, namely, that God’s goodness, which waits for us to repent, is despised. And so much the more is God’s goodness despised, if the first sin is committed a second time after having been forgiven, as it is a greater favor for the sin to be forgiven than for the sinner to be endured.

Accordingly the sin which follows repentance brings back, in a sense, the debt of punishment due to the sins previously forgiven, not as caused by those sins already forgiven but as caused by this last sin being committed, on account of its being aggravated in view of those previous sins. This means that those sins return, not simply, but in a restricted sense, viz., in so far as they are virtually contained in the subsequent sin.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(1)- RO(1) —

This saying of Augustine seems to refer to the return of sins as to the debt of eternal punishment considered in itself, namely, that he who sins after doing penance incurs a debt of eternal punishment, just as before, but not altogether for the same “reason.”

Wherefore Augustine, after saying (Lib. Resp. Prosperi i [*Cf. Prosper, Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum ii]) that “he does not fall back into that which was forgiven, nor will he be condemned for original sin,” adds: “Nevertheless, for these last sins he will be condemned to the same death, which he deserved to suffer for the former,” because he incurs the punishment of eternal death which he deserved for his previous sins.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(1)- RO(2) —

By these words Bede means that the guilt already forgiven enslaves man, not by the return of his former debt of punishment, but by the repetition of his act.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The effect of a subsequent sin is that the former “justices” are not remembered, in so far as they were deserving of eternal life, but not in so far as they were a hindrance to sin. Consequently if a man sins mortally after making restitution, he does not become guilty as though he had not paid back what he owed; and much less is penance previously done forgotten as to the pardon of the guilt, since this is the work of God rather than of man.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Grace removes the stain and the debt of eternal punishment simply; but it covers the past sinful acts, lest, on their account, God deprive man of grace, and judge him deserving of eternal punishment; and what grace has once done, endures for ever.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(2) Whether sins that have been forgiven, return through ingratitude which is shown especially in four kinds of sin?

P(3)- Q(88)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that sins do not return through ingratitude, which is shown especially in four kinds of sin, viz., hatred of one’s neighbor, apostasy from faith, contempt of confession and regret for past repentance, and which have been expressed in the following verse: “Fratres odit, apostata fit, spernitque, fateri, Poenituisse piget, pristina culpa redit.” For the more grievous the sin committed against God after one has received the grace of pardon, the greater the ingratitude. But there are sins more grievous than these, such as blasphemy against God, and the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that sins already pardoned do not return through ingratitude as manifested in these sins, any more than as shown in other sins.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Rabanus says: “God delivered the wicked servant to the torturers, until he should pay the whole debt, because a man will be deemed punishable not only for the sins he commits after Baptism, but also for original sin which was taken away when he was baptized.” Now venial sins are reckoned among our debts, since we pray in their regard: “Forgive us our trespasses [debita].” Therefore they too return through ingratitude; and, in like manner seemingly, sins already pardoned return through venial sins, and not only through those sins mentioned above.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, ingratitude is all the greater, according as one sins after receiving a greater favor. Now innocence whereby one avoids sin is a Divine favor, for Augustine says (Confess. ii): “Whatever sins I have avoided committing, I owe it to Thy grace.” Now innocence is a greater gift, than even the forgiveness of all sins. Therefore the first sin committed after innocence is no less an ingratitude to God, than a sin committed after repentance, so that seemingly ingratitude in respect of the aforesaid sins is not the chief cause of sins returning.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii [*Cf.

Dial. iv]): “It is evident from the words of the Gospel that if we do not forgive from our hearts the offenses committed against us, we become once more accountable for what we rejoiced in as forgiven through Penance”: so that ingratitude implied in the hatred of one’s brother is a special cause of the return of sins already forgiven: and the same seems to apply to the others.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), sins pardoned through Penance are said to return, in so far as their debt of punishment, by reason of ingratitude, is virtually contained in the subsequent sin. Now one may be guilty of ingratitude in two ways: first by doing something against the favor received, and, in this way, man is ungrateful to God in every mortal sin whereby he offends God Who forgave his sins, so that by every subsequent mortal sin, the sins previously pardoned return, on account of the ingratitude. Secondly, one is guilty of ingratitude, by doing something not only against the favor itself, but also against the form of the favor received. If this form be considered on the part of the benefactor, it is the remission of something due to him; wherefore he who does not forgive his brother when he asks pardon, and persists in his hatred, acts against this form. If, however, this form be taken in regard to the penitent who receives this favor, we find on his part a twofold movement of the free- will. The first is the movement of the free-will towards God, and is an act of faith quickened by charity; and against this a man acts by apostatizing from the faith. The second is a movement of the free-will against sin, and is the act of penance. This act consists first, as we have stated above ( Q(85), AA(2),5 ) in man’s detestation of his past sins; and against this a man acts when he regrets having done penance. Secondly, the act of penance consists in the penitent purposing to subject himself to the keys of the Church by confession, according to Psalm 31:5: “I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord: and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin”: and against this a man acts when he scorns to confess as he had purposed to do.

Accordingly it is said that the ingratitude of sinners is a special cause of the return of sins previously forgiven.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This is not said of these sins as though they were more grievous than others, but because they are more directly opposed to the favor of the forgiveness of sin.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Even venial sins and original sin return in the way explained above, just as mortal sins do, in so far as the favor conferred by God in forgiving those sins is despised. A man does not, however, incur ingratitude by committing a venial sin, because by sinning venially man does not act against God, but apart from Him, wherefore venial sins nowise cause the return of sins already forgiven.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(2)- RO(3) —

A favor can be weighed in two ways. First by the quantity of the favor itself, and in this way innocence is a greater favor from God than penance, which is called the second plank after shipwreck (cf. Q(84), A(6) ). Secondly, a favor may be weighed with regard to the recipient, who is less worthy, wherefore a greater favor is bestowed on him, so that he is the more ungrateful if he scorns it. In this way the favor of the pardon of sins is greater when bestowed on one who is altogether unworthy, so that the ingratitude which follows is all the greater.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(3) Whether the debt of punishment that arises through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as that of the sins previously pardoned?

P(3)- Q(88)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the debt of punishment arising through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as that of the sins previously pardoned. Because the greatness of the favor of the pardon of sins is according to the greatness of the sin pardoned, and so too, in consequence, is the greatness of the ingratitude whereby this favor is scorned. But the greatness of the consequent debt of punishment is in accord with the greatness of the ingratitude. Therefore the debt of punishment arising through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as the debt of punishment due for all the previous sins.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is a greater sin to offend God than to offend man. But a slave who is freed by his master returns to the same state of slavery from which he was freed, or even to a worse state. Much more therefore he that sins against God after being freed from sin, returns to the debt of as great a punishment as he had incurred before.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( Matthew 18:34) that “his lord being angry, delivered him” (whose sins returned to him on account of his ingratitude) “to the torturers, until he paid all the debt.” But this would not be so unless the debt of punishment incurred through ingratitude were as great as that incurred through all previous sins.

Therefore an equal debt of punishment returns through ingratitude.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 25:2): “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be,” whence it is evident that a great debt of punishment does not arise from a slight sin. But sometimes a subsequent mortal sin is much less grievous than any one of those previously pardoned. Therefore the debt of punishment incurred through subsequent sins is not equal to that of sins previously forgiven.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(3) —

I answer that, Some have maintained that the debt of punishment incurred through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is equal to that of the sins previously pardoned, in addition to the debt proper to this subsequent sin. But there is no need for this, because, as stated above ( A(1) ), the debt of punishment incurred by previous sins does not return on account of a subsequent sin, as resulting from the acts of the subsequent sin. Wherefore the amount of the debt that returns must be according to the gravity of the subsequent sin.

It is possible, however, for the gravity of the subsequent sin to equal the gravity of all previous sins. But it need not always be so, whether we speak of the gravity which a sin has from its species (since the subsequent sin may be one of simple fornication, while the previous sins were adulteries, murders, or sacrileges); or of the gravity which it incurs through the ingratitude connected with it. For it is not necessary that the measure of ingratitude should be exactly equal to the measure of the favor received, which latter is measured according to the greatness of the sins previously pardoned. Because it may happen that in respect of the same favor, one man is very ungrateful, either on account of the intensity of his scorn for the favor received, or on account of the gravity of the offense committed against the benefactor, while another man is slightly ungrateful, either because his scorn is less intense, or because his offense against the benefactor is less grave. But the measure of ingratitude is proportionately equal to the measure of the favor received: for supposing an equal contempt of the favor, or an equal offense against the benefactor, the ingratitude will be so much the greater, as the favor received is greater.

Hence it is evident that the debt of punishment incurred by a subsequent sin need not always be equal to that of previous sins; but it must be in proportion thereto, so that the more numerous or the greater the sins previously pardoned, the greater must be the debt of punishment incurred by any subsequent mortal sin whatever.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The favor of the pardon of sins takes its absolute quantity from the quantity of the sins previously pardoned: but the sin of ingratitude does not take its absolute quantity from the measure of the favor bestowed, but from the measure of the contempt or of the offense, as stated above: and so the objection does not prove.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(3)- RO(2) —

A slave who has been given his freedom is not brought back to his previous state of slavery for any kind of ingratitude, but only when this is grave.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(3)- RO(3) —

He whose forgiven sins return to him on account of subsequent ingratitude, incurs the debt for all, in so far as the measure of his previous sins is contained proportionally in his subsequent ingratitude, but not absolutely, as stated above.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(4) Whether the ingratitude whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of previous sins, is a special sin?

P(3)- Q(88)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the ingratitude, whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of sins previously forgiven, is a special sin. For the giving of thanks belongs to counterpassion which is a necessary condition of justice, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. v, 5). But justice is a special virtue. Therefore this ingratitude is a special sin.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that thanksgiving is a special virtue. But ingratitude is opposed to thanksgiving.

Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, a special effect proceeds from a special cause. Now ingratitude has a special effect, viz. the return, after a fashion, of sins already forgiven. Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(4) —

On the contrary, That which is a sequel to every sin is not a special sin. Now by any mortal sin whatever, a man becomes ungrateful to God, as evidenced from what has been said ( A(1) ). Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

P(3)- Q(88)- A(4) —

I answer that, The ingratitude of the sinner is sometimes a special sin; and sometimes it is not, but a circumstance arising from all mortal sins in common committed against God. For a sin takes its species according to the sinner’s intention, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that “he who commits adultery in order to steal is a thief rather than an adulterer.”

If, therefore, a sinner commits a sin in contempt of God and of the favor received from Him, that sin is drawn to the species of ingratitude, and in this way a sinner’s ingratitude is a special sin. If, however, a man, while intending to commit a sin, e.g. murder or adultery, is not withheld from it on account of its implying contempt of God, his ingratitude will not be a special sin, but will be drawn to the species of the other sin, as a circumstance thereof. And, as Augustine observes (De Nat. et Grat. xxix), not every sin implies contempt of God in His commandments. Therefore it is evident that the sinner’s ingratitude is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first (three) objections prove that ingratitude is in itself a special sin; while the last objection proves that ingratitude, as included in every sin, is not a special sin.

QUESTION OF THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE BY MEANS OF PENANCE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the recovery of virtues by means of Penance, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether virtues are restored through Penance? (2) Whether they are restored in equal measure? (3) Whether equal dignity is restored to the penitent? (4) Whether works of virtue are deadened by subsequent sin? (5) Whether works deadened by sin revive through Penance? (6) Whether dead works, i.e. works that are done without charity, are quickened by Penance?

P(3)- Q(89)- A(1) Whether the virtues are restored through Penance?

P(3)- Q(89)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the virtues are not restored through penance. Because lost virtue cannot be restored by penance, unless penance be the cause of virtue. But, since penance is itself a virtue, it cannot be the cause of all the virtues, and all the more, since some virtues naturally precede penance, viz., faith, hope, and charity, as stated above ( Q(85), A(6) ). Therefore the virtues are not restored through penance.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Penance consists in certain acts of the penitent. But the gratuitous virtues are not caused through any act of ours: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18: In Psalm 118) that “God forms the virtues in us without us.” Therefore it seems that the virtues are not restored through Penance.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, he that has virtue performs works of virtue with ease and pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that “a man is not just if he does not rejoice in just deeds.” Now many penitents find difficulty in performing deeds of virtue. Therefore the virtues are not restored through Penance.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(1) —

On the contrary, We read ( Luke 15:22) that the father commanded his penitent son to be clothed in “the first robe,” which, according to Ambrose (Expos. in Luc. vii), is the “mantle of wisdom,” from which all the virtues flow together, according to Wis. 8:7: “She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life.” Therefore all the virtues are restored through Penance.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(1) —

I answer that, Sins are pardoned through Penance, as stated above ( Q(86), A(1) ). But there can be no remission of sins except through the infusion of grace. Wherefore it follows that grace is infused into man through Penance. Now all the gratuitous virtues flow from grace, even as all the powers result from the essence of the soul; as stated in the P(2a), Q(110), A(4), ad 1. Therefore all the virtues are restored through Penance.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Penance restores the virtues in the same way as it causes grace, as stated above ( Q(86), A(1) ). Now it is a cause of grace, in so far as it is a sacrament, because, in so far as it is a virtue, it is rather an effect of grace. Consequently it does not follow that penance, as a virtue, needs to be the cause of all the other virtues, but that the habit of penance together with the habits of the other virtues is caused through the sacrament of Penance.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(1)- RO(2) —

In the sacrament of Penance human acts stand as matter, while the formal power of this sacrament is derived from the power of the keys. Consequently the power of the keys causes grace and virtue effectively indeed, but instrumentally; and the first act of the penitent, viz., contrition, stands as ultimate disposition to the reception of grace, while the subsequent acts of Penance proceed from the grace and virtues which are already there.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As stated above ( Q(86), A(5) ), sometimes after the first act of Penance, which is contrition, certain remnants of sin remain, viz. dispositions caused by previous acts, the result being that the penitent finds difficulty in doing deeds of virtue. Nevertheless, so far as the inclination itself of charity and of the other virtues is concerned, the penitent performs works of virtue with pleasure and ease. even as a virtuous man may accidentally find it hard to do an act of virtue, on account of sleepiness or some indisposition of the body.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(2) Whether, after Penance, man rises again to equal virtue?

P(3)- Q(89)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that, after Penance, man rises again to equal virtue. For the Apostle says ( Romans 8:28): “To them that love God all things work together unto good,” whereupon a gloss of Augustine says that “this is so true that, if any such man goes astray and wanders from the path, God makes even this conduce to his good.” But this would not be true if he rose again to lesser virtue. Therefore it seems that a penitent never rises again to lesser virtue.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Ambrose says [*Cf. Hypognosticon iii, an anonymous work falsely ascribed to St. Augustine] that “Penance is a very good thing, for it restores every defect to a state of perfection.” But this would not be true unless virtues were recovered in equal measure.

Therefore equal virtue is always recovered through Penance.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, on Genesis 1:5: “There was evening and morning, one day,” a gloss says: “The evening light is that from which we fall the morning light is that to which we rise again.” Now the morning light is greater than the evening light. Therefore a man rises to greater grace or charity than that which he had before; which is confirmed by the Apostle’s words ( Romans 5:20): “Where sin abounded, grace did more abound.”

P(3)- Q(89)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Charity whether proficient or perfect is greater than incipient charity. But sometimes a man falls from proficient charity, and rises again to incipient charity. Therefore man always rises again to less virtue.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(86), A(6), ad 3; Q(89), A(1), ad 2), the movement of the free-will, in the justification of the ungodly, is the ultimate disposition to grace; so that in the same instant there is infusion of grace together with the aforesaid movement of the freewill, as stated in the P(2a), Q(113), AA(5),7 , which movement includes an act of penance, as stated above ( Q(86), A(2) ). But it is evident that forms which admit of being more or less, become intense or remiss, according to the different dispositions of the subject, as stated in the P(2a), Q(52), AA(1),2 ; P(2a), Q(66), A(1) . Hence it is that, in Penance, according to the degree of intensity or remissness in the movement of the free-will, the penitent receives greater or lesser grace. Now the intensity of the penitent’s movement may be proportionate sometimes to a greater grace than that from which man fell by sinning, sometimes to an equal grace, sometimes to a lesser. Wherefore the penitent sometimes arises to a greater grace than that which he had before, sometimes to an equal, sometimes to a lesser grace: and the same applies to the virtues, which flow from grace.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The very fact of falling away from the love of God by sin, does not work unto the good of all those who love God, which is evident in the case of those who fall and never rise again, or who rise and fall yet again; but only to the good of “such as according to His purpose are called to be saints,” viz. the predestined, who, however often they may fall, yet rise again finally. Consequently good comes of their falling, not that they always rise again to greater grace, but that they rise to more abiding grace, not indeed on the part of grace itself, because the greater the grace, the more abiding it is, but on the part of man, who, the more careful and humble he is, abides the more steadfastly in grace. Hence the same gloss adds that “their fall conduces to their good, because they rise more humble and more enlightened.”

P(3)- Q(89)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Penance, considered in itself, has the power to bring all defects back to perfection, and even to advance man to a higher state; but this is sometimes hindered on the part of man, whose movement towards God and in detestation of sin is too remiss, just as in Baptism adults receive a greater or a lesser grace, according to the various ways in which they prepare themselves.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(2)- RO(3) —

This comparison of the two graces to the evening and morning light is made on account of a likeness of order, since the darkness of night follows after the evening light, and the light of day after the light of morning, but not on account of a likeness of greater or lesser quantity. Again, this saying of the Apostle refers to the grace of Christ, which abounds more than any number of man’s sins. Nor is it true of all, that the more their sins abound, the more abundant grace they receive, if we measure habitual grace by the quantity. Grace is, however, more abundant, as regards the very notion of grace, because to him who sins more a more “gratuitous” favor is vouchsafed by his pardon; although sometimes those whose sins abound, abound also in sorrow, so that they receive a more abundant habit of grace and virtue, as was the case with Magdalen.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense it must be replied that in one and the same man proficient grace is greater than incipient grace, but this is not necessarily the case in different men, for one begins with a greater grace than another has in the state of proficiency: thus Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): “Let all, both now and hereafter, acknowledge how perfectly the boy Benedict turned to the life of grace from the very beginning.”

P(3)- Q(89)- A(3) Whether, by Penance, man is restored to his former dignity?

P(3)- Q(89)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that man is not restored by Penance to his former dignity: because a gloss on Amos 5:2, “The virgin of Israel is cast down,” observes: “It is not said that she cannot rise up, but that the virgin of Israel shall not rise; because the sheep that has once strayed, although the shepherd bring it back on his shoulder, has not the same glory as if it had never strayed.” Therefore man does not, through Penance, recover his former dignity.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, Jerome says: “Whoever fail to preserve the dignity of the sacred order, must be content with saving their souls; for it is a difficult thing to return to their former degree.” Again, Pope Innocent I says (Ep. vi ad Agapit.) that “the canons framed at the council of Nicaea exclude penitents from even the lowest orders of clerics.” Therefore man does not, through Penance, recover his former dignity.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, before sinning a man can advance to a higher sacred order. But this is not permitted to a penitent after his sin, for it is written ( Ezekiel 44:10,13): “The Levites that went away... from Me... shall never [Vulg.: ‘not’] come near to Me, to do the office of priest”: and as laid down in the Decretals (Dist. 1, ch. 52), and taken from the council of Lerida: “If those who serve at the Holy Altar fall suddenly into some deplorable weakness of the flesh, and by God’s mercy do proper penance, let them return to their duties, yet so as not to receive further promotion.” Therefore Penance does not restore man to his former dignity.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(3) —

On the contrary, As we read in the same Distinction, Gregory writing to Secundinus (Regist. vii) says: “We consider that when a man has made proper satisfaction, he may return to his honorable position”: and moreover we read in the acts of the council of Agde: “Contumacious clerics, so far as their position allows, should be corrected by their bishops. so that when Penance has reformed them, they may recover their degree and dignity.”

P(3)- Q(89)- A(3) —

I answer that, By sin, man loses a twofold dignity, one in respect of God, the other in respect of the Church. In respect of God he again loses a twofold dignity. one is his principal dignity, whereby he was counted among the children of God, and this he recovers by Penance, which is signified ( Luke 15) in the prodigal son, for when he repented, his father commanded that the first garment should be restored to him, together with a ring and shoes. The other is his secondary dignity, viz. innocence, of which, as we read in the same chapter, the elder son boasted saying ( Luke 15:29): “Behold, for so many years do I serve thee, and I have never transgressed thy commandments”: and this dignity the penitent cannot recover. Nevertheless he recovers something greater sometimes; because as Gregory says (Hom. de centum Ovibus, 34 in Evang.), “those who acknowledge themselves to have strayed away from God, make up for their past losses, by subsequent gains: so that there is more joy in heaven on their account, even as in battle, the commanding officer thinks more of the soldier who, after running away, returns and bravely attacks the foe, than of one who has never turned his back, but has done nothing brave.”

By sin man loses his ecclesiastical dignity, because thereby he becomes unworthy of those things which appertain to the exercise of the ecclesiastical dignity. This he is debarred from recovering: first, because he fails to repent; wherefore Isidore wrote to the bishop Masso, and as we read in the Distinction quoted above ( O(3) ): “The canons order those to be restored to their former degree, who by repentance have made satisfaction for their sins, or have made worthy confession of them. On the other hand, those who do not mend their corrupt and wicked ways are neither allowed to exercise their order, nor received to the grace of communion.”

Secondly, because he does penance negligently, wherefore it is written in the same Distinction ( O(3) ): “We can be sure that those who show no signs of humble compunction, or of earnest prayer, who avoid fasting or study, would exercise their former duties with great negligence if they were restored to them.”

Thirdly, if he has committed a sin to which an irregularity is attached; wherefore it is said in the same Distinction ( O(3) ), quoting the council of Pope Martin [*Martin, bishop of Braga]: “If a man marry a widow or the relict of another, he must not be admitted to the ranks of the clergy: and if he has succeeded in creeping in, he must be turned out. In like manner, if anyone after Baptism be guilty of homicide, whether by deed, or by command, or by counsel, or in self-defense.” But this is in consequence not of sin, but of irregularity.

Fourthly, on account of scandal, wherefore it is said in the same Distinction ( O(3) ): “Those who have been publicly convicted or caught in the act of perjury, robbery, fornication, and of such like crimes, according to the prescription of the sacred canons must be deprived of the exercise of their respective orders, because it is a scandal to God’s people that such persons should be placed over them. But those who commit such sins occultly and confess them secretly to a priest, may be retained in the exercise of their respective orders, with the assurance of God’s merciful forgiveness, provided they be careful to expiate their sins by fasts and alms, vigils and holy deeds.” The same is expressed (Extra, De Qual.

Ordinand.): “If the aforesaid crimes are not proved by a judicial process, or in some other way made notorious, those who are guilty of them must not be hindered, after they have done penance, from exercising the orders they have received, or from receiving further orders, except in cases of homicide.”

P(3)- Q(89)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The same is to be said of the recovery of virginity as of the recovery of innocence which belongs to man’s secondary dignity in the sight of God.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(3)- RO(2) —

In these words Jerome does not say that it is impossible, but that it is difficult, for man to recover his former dignity after having sinned, because this is allowed to none but those who repent perfectly, as stated above. To those canonical statutes, which seem to forbid this, Augustine replies in his letter to Boniface (Ep. clxxxv): “If the law of the Church forbids anyone, after doing penance for a crime, to become a cleric, or to return to his clerical duties, or to retain them the intention was not to deprive him of the hope of pardon, but to preserve the rigor of discipline; else we should have to deny the keys given to the Church, of which it was said: ‘Whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.’“ And further on he adds: “For holy David did penance for his deadly crimes, and yet he retained his dignity; and Blessed Peter by shedding most bitter tears did indeed repent him of having denied his Lord, and yet he remained an apostle. Nevertheless we must not deem the care of later teachers excessive, who without endangering a man’s salvation, exacted more from his humility, having, in my opinion, found by experience, that some assumed a pretended repentance through hankering after honors and power.”

P(3)- Q(89)- A(3)- RO(3) —

This statute is to be understood as applying to those who do public penance, for these cannot be promoted to a higher order. For Peter, after his denial, was made shepherd of Christ’s sheep, as appears from John 21:21, where Chrysostom comments as follows: “After his denial and repentance Peter gives proof of greater confidence in Christ: for whereas, at the supper, he durst not ask Him, but deputed John to ask in his stead, afterwards he was placed at the head of his brethren, and not only did not depute another to ask for him, what concerned him, but henceforth asks the Master instead of John.”

P(3)- Q(89)- A(4) Whether virtuous deeds done in charity can be deadened?

P(3)- Q(89)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that virtuous deeds done in charity cannot be deadened. For that which is not cannot be changed. But to be deadened is to be changed from life to death. Since therefore virtuous deeds, after being done, are no more, it seems that they cannot afterwards be deadened.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, by virtuous deeds done in charity, man merits eternal life. But to take away the reward from one who has merited it is an injustice, which cannot be ascribed to God. Therefore it is not possible for virtuous deeds done in charity to be deadened by a subsequent sin.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the strong is not corrupted by the weak. Now works of charity are stronger than any sins, because, as it is written ( Proverbs 10:12), “charity covereth all sins.” Therefore it seems that deeds done in charity cannot be deadened by a subsequent mortal sin.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Ezekiel 18:24): “If the just man turn himself away from his justice... all his justices which he hath done shall not be remembered.”

P(3)- Q(89)- A(4) —

I answer that, A living thing, by dying, ceases to have vital operations: for which reason, by a kind of metaphor, a thing is said to be deadened when it is hindered from producing its proper effect or operation.

Now the effect of virtuous works, which are done in charity, is to bring man to eternal life; and this is hindered by a subsequent mortal sin, inasmuch as it takes away grace. Wherefore deeds done in charity are said to be deadened by a subsequent mortal sin.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Just as sinful deeds pass as to the act but remain as to guilt, so deeds done in charity, after passing, as to the act, remain as to merit, in so far as they are acceptable to God. It is in this respect that they are deadened, inasmuch as man is hindered from receiving his reward.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(4)- RO(2) —

There is no injustice in withdrawing the reward from him who has deserved it, if he has made himself unworthy by his subsequent fault, since at times a man justly forfeits through his own fault, even that which he has already received.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(4)- RO(3) —

It is not on account of the strength of sinful deeds that deeds, previously done in charity, are deadened, but on account of the freedom of the will which can be turned away from good to evil.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(5) Whether deeds deadened by sin, are revived by Penance?

P(3)- Q(89)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that deeds deadened by sin are not revived by Penance. Because just as past sins are remitted by subsequent Penance, so are deeds previously done in charity, deadened by subsequent sin. But sins remitted by Penance do not return, as stated above ( Q(88), AA(1),2 ). Therefore it seems that neither are dead deeds revived by charity.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, deeds are said to be deadened by comparison with animals who die, as stated above ( A(4) ). But a dead animal cannot be revived. Therefore neither can dead works be revived by Penance.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, deeds done in charity are deserving of glory according to the quantity of grace or charity. But sometimes man arises through Penance to lesser grace or charity. Therefore he does not receive glory according to the merit of his previous works; so that it seems that deeds deadened by sin are not revived.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(5) —

On the contrary, on Joel 2:25, “I will restore to you the years, which the locust... hath eaten,” a gloss says: “I will not suffer to perish the fruit which you lost when your soul was disturbed.” But this fruit is the merit of good works which was lost through sin. Therefore meritorious deeds done before are revived by Penance.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(5) —

I answer that, Some have said that meritorious works deadened by subsequent sin are not revived by the ensuing Penance, because they deemed such works to have passed away, so that they could not be revived. But that is no reason why they should not be revived: because they are conducive to eternal life (wherein their life consists) not only as actually existing, but also after they cease to exist actually, and as abiding in the Divine acceptance. Now, they abide thus, so far as they are concerned, even after they have been deadened by sin, because those works, according as they were done, will ever be acceptable to God and give joy to the saints, according to Revlation 3:11: “Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown.” That they fail in their efficacy to bring the man, who did them, to eternal life, is due to the impediment of the supervening sin whereby he is become unworthy of eternal life. But this impediment is removed by Penance, inasmuch as sins are taken away thereby. Hence it follows that deeds previously deadened, recover, through Penance, their efficacy in bringing him, who did them, to eternal life, and, in other words, they are revived. It is therefore evident that deadened works are revived by Penance.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The very works themselves of sin are removed by Penance, so that, by God’s mercy, no further stain or debt of punishment is incurred on their account: on the other hand, works done in charity are not removed by God, since they abide in His acceptance, but they are hindered on the part of the man who does them; wherefore if this hindrance, on the part of the man who does those works, be removed, God on His side fulfills what those works deserved.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Deeds done in charity are not in themselves deadened, as explained above, but only with regard to a supervening impediment on the part of the man who does them. On the other hand, an animal dies in itself, through being deprived of the principle of life: so that the comparison fails.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(5)- RO(3) —

He who, through Penance, arises to lesser charity, will receive the essential reward according to the degree of charity in which he is found. Yet he will have greater joy for the works he had done in his former charity, than for those which he did in his subsequent charity: and this joy belongs to the accidental reward.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(6) Whether the effect of subsequent Penance is to quicken even dead works?

P(3)- Q(89)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that the effect of subsequent Penance is to quicken even dead works, those, namely, that were not done in charity. For it seems more difficult to bring to life that which has been deadened, since this is never done naturally, than to quicken that which never had life, since certain living things are engendered naturally from things without life. Now deadened works are revived by Penance, as stated above ( A(5) ). Much more, therefore, are dead works revived.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. But the cause of the lack of life in works generically good done without charity, was the lack of charity and grace. which lack is removed by Penance. Therefore dead works are quickened by charity.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, Jerome in commenting on Agg. i, 6: “You have sowed much,” says: “If at any time you find a sinner, among his many evil deeds, doing that which is right, God is not so unjust as to forget the few good deeds on account of his many evil deeds.” Now this seems to be the case chiefly when past evil “deeds” are removed by Penance. Therefore it seems that through Penance, God rewards the former deeds done in the state of sin, which implies that they are quickened.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(6) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 13:3): “If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.”

But this would not be true, if, at least by subsequent Penance, they were quickened. Therefore Penance does not quicken works which before were dead.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(6) —

I answer that, A work is said to be dead in two ways: first, effectively, because, to wit, it is a cause of death, in which sense sinful works are said to be dead, according to Hebrews 9:14: “The blood of Christ... shall cleanse our conscience from dead works.” These dead works are not quickened but removed by Penance, according to Hebrews 6:1: “Not laying again the foundation of Penance from dead works.”

Secondly, works are said to be dead privatively, because, to wit, they lack spiritual life, which is founded on charity, whereby the soul is united to God, the result being that it is quickened as the body by the soul: in which sense too, faith, if it lack charity, is said to be dead, according to James 2:20: “Faith without works is dead.” In this way also, all works that are generically good, are said to be dead, if they be done without charity, inasmuch as they fail to proceed from the principle of life; even as we might call the sound of a harp, a dead voice. Accordingly, the difference of life and death in works is in relation to the principle from which they proceed. But works cannot proceed a second time from a principle, because they are transitory, and the same identical deed cannot be resumed. Therefore it is impossible for dead works to be quickened by Penance.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(6)- RO(1) —

In the physical order things whether dead or deadened lack the principle of life. But works are said to be deadened, not in relation to the principle whence they proceeded, but in relation to an extrinsic impediment; while they are said to be dead in relation to a principle. Consequently there is no comparison.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Works generically good done without charity are said to be dead on account of the lack of grace and charity, as principles. Now the subsequent Penance does not supply that want, so as to make them proceed from such a principle. Hence the argument does not prove.

P(3)- Q(89)- A(6)- RO(3) —

God remembers the good deeds a man does when in a state of sin, not by rewarding them in eternal life, which is due only to living works, i.e. those done from charity, but by a temporal reward: thus Gregory declares (Hom. de Divite et Lazaro, 41 in Evang.) that “unless that rich man had done some good deed, and had received his reward in this world, Abraham would certainly not have said to him: ‘Thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.’“ Or again, this may mean that he will be judged less severely: wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia xxvi): “We cannot say that it would be better for the schismatic that by denying Christ he should suffer none of those things which he suffered by confessing Him; but we must believe that he will be judged with less severity, than if by denying Christ, he had suffered none of those things. Thus the words of the Apostle, ‘If I should deliver my body to be burned and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing,’ refer to the obtaining of the kingdom of heaven, and do not exclude the possibility of being sentenced with less severity at the last judgment.”

QUESTION OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the parts of Penance: (1) in general. (2) each one in particular.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Penance has any parts? (2) Of the number of its parts; (3) What kind of parts are they? (4) Of its division into subjective parts.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(1) Whether Penance should be assigned any parts?

P(3)- Q(90)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that parts should not be assigned to Penance. For it is the Divine power that works our salvation most secretly in the sacraments. Now the Divine power is one and simple.

Therefore Penance, being a sacrament, should have no parts assigned to it.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Penance is both a virtue and a sacrament. Now no parts are assigned to it as a virtue, since virtue is a habit, which is a simple quality of the mind. In like manner, it seems that parts should not be assigned to Penance as a sacrament, because no parts are assigned to Baptism and the other sacraments. Therefore no parts at all should be assigned to Penance.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the matter of Penance is sin, as stated above ( Q(84), A(2) ). But no parts are assigned to sin. Neither, therefore, should parts be assigned to Penance.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The parts of a thing are those out of which the whole is composed. Now the perfection of Penance is composed of several things, viz. contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Therefore Penance has parts.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(1) —

I answer that, The parts of a thing are those into which the whole is divided materially, for the parts of a thing are to the whole, what matter is to the form; wherefore the parts are reckoned as a kind of material cause, and the whole as a kind of formal cause (Phys. ii).

Accordingly wherever, on the part of matter, we find a kind of plurality, there we shall find a reason for assigning parts.

Now it has been stated above ( Q(84), AA(2),3 ), that, in the sacrament of Penance, human actions stand as matter: and so, since several actions are requisite for the perfection of Penance, viz., contrition, confession, and satisfaction, as we shall show further on ( A(2) ), it follows that the sacrament of Penance has parts.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Every sacrament is something simple by reason of the Divine power, which operates therein: but the Divine power is so great that it can operate both through one and through many, and by reason of these many, parts may be assigned to a particular sacrament.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Parts are not assigned to penance as a virtue: because the human acts of which there are several in penance, are related to the habit of virtue, not as its parts, but as its effects. It follows, therefore, that parts are assigned to Penance as a sacrament, to which the human acts are related as matter: whereas in the other sacraments the matter does not consist of human acts, but of some one external thing, either simple, as water or oil, or compound, as chrism, and so parts are not assigned to the other sacraments.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Sins are the remote matter of Penance, inasmuch, to wit, as they are the matter or object of the human acts, which are the proper matter of Penance as a sacrament.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(2) Whether contrition, confession, and satisfaction are fittingly assigned as parts of Penance?

P(3)- Q(90)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that contrition, confession, and satisfaction are not fittingly assigned as parts of Penance. For contrition is in the heart, and so belongs to interior penance; while confession consists of words, and satisfaction in deeds; so that the two latter belong to interior penance. Now interior penance is not a sacrament, but only exterior penance which is perceptible by the senses. Therefore these three parts are not fittingly assigned to the sacrament of Penance.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, grace is conferred in the sacraments of the New Law, as stated above ( Q(62), AA(1),3 ). But no grace is conferred in satisfaction. Therefore satisfaction is not part of a sacrament.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the fruit of a thing is not the same as its part. But satisfaction is a fruit of penance, according to Luke 3:8: “Bring forth... fruits worthy of penance.” Therefore it is not a part of Penance.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, Penance is ordained against sin. But sin can be completed merely in the thought by consent, as stated in the P(2a), Q(72), A(7) : therefore Penance can also. Therefore confession in word and satisfaction in deed should not be reckoned as parts of Penance.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It seems that yet more parts should be assigned to Penance. For not only is the body assigned as a part of man, as being the matter, but also the soul, which is his form. But the aforesaid three, being the acts of the penitent, stand as matter, while the priestly absolution stands as form. Therefore the priestly absolution should be assigned as a fourth part of Penance.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(2) —

I answer that, A part is twofold, essential and quantitative. The essential parts are naturally the form and the matter, and logically the genus and the difference. In this way, each sacrament is divided into matter and form as its essential parts. Hence it has been said above ( Q(60), AA(5),6 ) that sacraments consist of things and words. But since quantity is on the part of matter, quantitative parts are parts of matter: and, in this way, as stated above ( A(1) ), parts are assigned specially to the sacrament of Penance, as regards the acts of the penitent, which are the matter of this sacrament.

Now it has been said above ( Q(85), A(3), ad 3) that an offense is atoned otherwise in Penance than in vindictive justice. Because, in vindictive justice the atonement is made according to the judge’s decision, and not according to the discretion of the offender or of the person offended; whereas, in Penance, the offense is atoned according to the will of the sinner, and the judgment of God against Whom the sin was committed, because in the latter case we seek not only the restoration of the equality of justice, as in vindictive justice, but also and still more the reconciliation of friendship, which is accomplished by the offender making atonement according to the will of the person offended. Accordingly the first requisite on the part of the penitent is the will to atone, and this is done by contrition; the second is that he submit to the judgment of the priest standing in God’s place, and this is done in confession; and the third is that he atone according to the decision of God’s minister, and this is done in satisfaction: and so contrition, confession, and satisfaction are assigned as parts of Penance.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Contrition, as to its essence, is in the heart, and belongs to interior penance; yet, virtually, it belongs to exterior penance, inasmuch as it implies the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Satisfaction confers grace, in so far as it is in man’s purpose, and it increases grace, according as it is accomplished, just as Baptism does in adults, as stated above ( Q(68), A(2) ; Q(69), A(8) ).

P(3)- Q(90)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Satisfaction is a part of Penance as a sacrament, and a fruit of penance as a virtue.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(2)- RO(4) —

More things are required for good, “which proceeds from a cause that is entire,” than for evil, “which results from each single defect,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). And thus, although sin is completed in the consent of the heart, yet the perfection of Penance requires contrition of the heart, together with confession in word and satisfaction in deed.

The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(3) Whether these three are integral parts of Penance?

P(3)- Q(90)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that these three are not integral parts of Penance. For, as stated above ( Q(84), A(3) ), Penance is ordained against sin. But sins of thought, word, and deed are the subjective and not integral parts of sin, because sin is predicated of each one of them.

Therefore in Penance also, contrition in thought, confession in word, and satisfaction in deed are not integral parts.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, no integral part includes within itself another that is condivided with it. But contrition includes both confession and satisfaction in the purpose of amendment. Therefore they are not integral parts.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, a whole is composed of its integral parts, taken at the same time and equally, just as a line is made up of its parts. But such is not the case here. Therefore these are not integral parts of Penance.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Integral parts are those by which the perfection of the whole is integrated. But the perfection of Penance is integrated by these three. Therefore they are integral parts of Penance.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(3) —

I answer that, Some have said that these three are subjective parts of Penance. But this is impossible, because the entire power of the whole is present in each subjective part at the same time and equally, just as the entire power of an animal, as such, is assured to each animal species, all of which species divide the animal genus at the same time and equally: which does not apply to the point in question.

Wherefore others have said that these are potential parts: yet neither can this be true, since the whole is present, as to the entire essence, in each potential part, just as the entire essence of the soul is present in each of its powers: which does not apply to the case in point. Therefore it follows that these three are integral parts of Penance, the nature of which is that the whole is not present in each of the parts, either as to its entire power, or as to its entire essence, but that it is present to all of them together at the same time.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Sin forasmuch as it is an evil, can be completed in one single point, as stated above ( A(2), ad 4); and so the sin which is completed in thought alone, is a special kind of sin. Another species is the sin that is completed in thought and word: and yet a third species is the sin that is completed in thought, word, and deed; and the quasi-integral parts of this last sin, are that which is in thought, that which is in word, and that which is in deed. Wherefore these three are the integral parts of Penance, which is completed in them.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(3)- RO(2) —

One integral part can include the whole, though not as to its essence: because the foundation, in a way, contains virtually the whole building. In this way contrition includes virtually the whole of Penance.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(3)- RO(3) —

All integral parts have a certain relation of order to one another: but some are only related as to position, whether in sequence as the parts of an army, or by contact, as the parts of a heap, or by being fitted together, as the parts of a house, or by continuation, as the parts of a line; while some are related, in addition, as to power, as the parts of an animal, the first of which is the heart, the others in a certain order being dependent on one another: and thirdly some are related in the order of time: as the parts of time and movement. Accordingly the parts of Penance are related to one another in the order of power and time, since they are actions, but not in the order of position, since they do not occupy a place.

P(3)- Q(90)- A(4) Whether Penance is fittingly divided into penance before Baptism, penance for mortal sins, and penance for venial sins?