ST. THOMAS AQUINAS Gathered From His Commentary On Book 4 Of The Sentences Of Peter Lombard QUESTIONS 1-99 QUESTION OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN PARTICULAR, AND FIRST OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES) We must now consider each single part of Penance, and (1) Contrition (2) Confession; (3) Satisfaction.

The consideration about Contrition will be fourfold: (1) What is it? (2) What should it be about? (3) How great should it be? (4) Of its duration; (5) Of its effect.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Contrition is suitably defined? (2) Whether it is an act of virtue? (3) Whether attrition can become contrition?

P(4)- Q(1)- A(1) Whether contrition is an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making satisfaction for them?

P(4)- Q(1)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that contrition is not “an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making satisfaction for them,” as some define it. For, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6), “sorrow is for those things that happen against our will.” But this does not apply to sin. Therefore contrition is not sorrow for sins.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, contrition is given us by God. But what is given is not assumed. Therefore contrition is not an assumed sorrow.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, satisfaction and confession are necessary for the remission of the punishment which was not remitted by contrition.

But sometimes the whole punishment is remitted in contrition. Therefore it is not always necessary for the contrite person to have the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(1) —

On the contrary, stands the definition.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated in Ecclus. 10:15, “pride is the beginning of all sin,” because thereby man clings to his own judgment, and strays from the Divine commandments. Consequently that which destroys sin must needs make man give up his own judgment. Now he that persists in his own judgment, is called metaphorically rigid and hard: wherefore anyone is said to be broken when he is torn from his own judgment. But, in material things, whence these expressions are transferred to spiritual things, there is a difference between breaking and crushing or contrition, as stated in Meteor. iv, in that we speak of breaking when a thing is sundered into large parts, but of crushing or contrition when that which was in itself solid is reduced to minute particles. And since, for the remission of sin, it is necessary that man should put aside entirely his attachment to sin, which implies a certain state of continuity and solidity in his mind, therefore it is that the act through which sin is cast aside is called contrition metaphorically.

In this contrition several things are to be observed, viz. the very substance of the act, the way of acting, its origin and its effect: in respect of which we find that contrition has been defined in various ways. For, as regards the substance of the act, we have the definition given above: and since the act of contrition is both an act of virtue, and a part of the sacrament of Penance, its nature as an act of virtue is explained in this definition by mentioning its genus, viz. “sorrow,” its object by the words “for sins,” and the act of choice which is necessary for an act of virtue, by the word “assumed”: while, as a part of the sacrament, it is made manifest by pointing out its relation to the other parts, in the words “together with the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction.”

There is another definition which defines contrition, only as an act of virtue; but at the same time including the difference which confines it to a special virtue, viz. penance, for it is thus expressed: “Contrition is voluntary sorrow for sin whereby man punishes in himself that which he grieves to have done,” because the addition of the word “punishes” defines the definition to a special virtue. Another definition is given by Isidore (De Sum. Bono ii, 12) as follows: “Contrition is a tearful sorrow and humility of mind, arising from remembrance of sin and fear of the Judgment.” Here we have an allusion to the derivation of the word, when it is said that it is “humility of the mind,” because just as pride makes the mind rigid, so is a man humbled, when contrition leads him to give up his mind. Also the external manner is indicated by the word “tearful,” and the origin of contrition, by the words, “arising from remembrance of sin,” etc. Another definition is taken from the words of Augustine [*Implicitly on Psalm 46], and indicates the effect of contrition. It runs thus: “Contrition is the sorrow which takes away sin.” Yet another is gathered from the words of Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 11) as follows: “Contrition is humility of the soul, crushing sin between hope and fear.” Here the derivation is indicated by saying that contrition is “humility of the soul”; the effect, by the words, “crushing sin”; and the origin, by the words, “between hope and fear.”

Indeed, it includes not only the principal cause, which is fear, but also its joint cause, which is hope, without which, fear might lead to despair.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although sins, when committed, were voluntary, yet when we are contrite for them, they are no longer voluntary, so that they occur against our will; not indeed in respect of the will that we had when we consented to them, but in respect of that which we have now, so as to wish they had never been.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Contrition is from God alone as to the form that quickens it, but as to the substance of the act, it is from the free-will and from God, Who operates in all works both of nature and of will.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Although the entire punishment may be remitted by contrition, yet confession and satisfaction are still necessary, both because man cannot be sure that his contrition was sufficient to take away all, and because confession and satisfaction are a matter of precept: wherefore he becomes a transgressor, who confesses not and makes not satisfaction.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(2) Whether contrition is an act of virtue?

P(4)- Q(1)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that contrition is not an act of virtue. For passions are not acts of virtue, since “they bring us neither praise nor blame” (Ethic. ii, 5). But sorrow is a passion. As therefore contrition is sorrow, it seems that it is not an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, as contrition is so called from its being a crushing, so is attrition. Now all agree in saying that attrition is not an act of virtue. Neither, therefore, is contrition an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Nothing but an act of virtue is meritorious. But contrition is a meritorious act. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(2) —

I answer that, Contrition as to the literal signification of the word, does not denote an act of virtue, but a corporeal passion. But the question in point does not refer to contrition in this sense, but to that which the word is employed to signify by way of metaphor. For just as the inflation of one’s own will unto wrong-doing implies, in itself, a generic evil, so the utter undoing and crushing of that same will implies something generically good, for this is to detest one’s own will whereby sin was committed. Wherefore contrition, which signifies this, implies rectitude of the will; and so it is the act of that virtue to which it belongs to detest and destroy past sins, the act, to wit, of penance, as is evident from what was said above (Sent. iv, D, 14, Q(1) , A(1) ; P(3), Q(85), AA(2),3 ).

P(4)- Q(1)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Contrition includes a twofold sorrow for sin.

One is in the sensitive part, and is a passion. This does not belong essentially to contrition as an act of virtue, but is rather its effect. For just as the virtue of penance inflicts outward punishment on the body, in order to compensate for the offense done to God through the instrumentality of the bodily members, so does it inflict on the concupiscible part of the soul a punishment, viz. the aforesaid sorrow, because the concupiscible also cooperated in the sinful deeds. Nevertheless this sorrow may belong to contrition taken as part of the sacrament, since the nature of a sacrament is such that it consists not only of internal but also of external acts and sensible things. The other sorrow is in the will, and is nothing else save displeasure for some evil, for the emotions of the will are named after the passions, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 26, Q(1) , A(5) ; P(2a), Q(22), A(3), ad 3). Accordingly, contrition is essentially a kind of sorrow, and is an act of the virtue of penance.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Attrition denotes approach to perfect contrition, wherefore in corporeal matters, things are said to be attrite, when they are worn away to a certain extent, but not altogether crushed to pieces; while they are said to be contrite, when all the parts are crushed [tritae] minutely. Wherefore, in spiritual matters, attrition signifies a certain but not a perfect displeasure for sins committed, whereas contrition denotes perfect displeasure.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(3) Whether attrition can become contrition?

P(4)- Q(1)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that attrition can become contrition. For contrition differs from attrition, as living from dead. Now dead faith becomes living. Therefore attrition can become contrition.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, matter receives perfection when privation is removed. Now sorrow is to grace, as matter to form, because grace quickens sorrow. Therefore the sorrow that was previously lifeless, while guilt remained, receives perfection through being quickened by grace: and so the same conclusion follows as above.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Things which are caused by principles altogether diverse cannot be changed, one into the other. Now the principle of attrition is servile fear, while filial fear is the cause of contrition. Therefore attrition cannot become contrition.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(3) —

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question: for some say that attrition may become contrition, even as lifeless faith becomes living faith. But, seemingly, this is impossible; since, although the habit of lifeless faith becomes living, yet never does an act of lifeless faith become an act of living faith, because the lifeless act passes away and remains no more, as soon as charity comes. Now attrition and contrition do not denote a habit, but an act only: and those habits of infused virtue which regard the will cannot be lifeless, since they result from charity, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 27, Q(2) , A(4) ; P(2a), Q(65), A(4) ). Wherefore until grace be infused, there is no habit by which afterwards the act of contrition may be elicited; so that attrition can nowise become attrition: and this is the other opinion.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(3)- RO(1) —

There is no comparison between faith and contrition, as stated above.

P(4)- Q(1)- A(3)- RO(2) —

When the privation is removed from matter, the matter is quickened if it remains when the perfection comes. But the sorrow which was lifeless, does not remain when charity comes, wherefore it cannot be quickened.

It may also be replied that matter does not take its origin from the form essentially, as an act takes its origin from the habit which quickens it.

Wherefore nothing hinders matter being quickened anew by some form, whereby it was not quickened previously: whereas this cannot be said of an act, even as it is impossible for the identically same thing to arise from a cause wherefrom it did not arise before, since a thing is brought into being but once.

QUESTION OF THE OBJECT OF CONTRITION (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the object of contrition. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether a man should be contrite on account of his punishment? (2) Whether, on account of original sin? (3) Whether, for every actual sin he has committed? (4) Whether, for actual sins he will commit? (5) Whether, for the sins of others? (6) Whether, for each single mortal sin?

P(4)- Q(2)- A(1) Whether man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on account of his sin?

P(4)- Q(2)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on account of his sin. For Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*Cf. Hom. 50 inter 1]: “No man desires life everlasting unless he repent of this mortal life.” But the morality of this life is a punishment. Therefore the penitent should be contrite on account of his punishments also.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 16, cap. i), quoting Augustine (De vera et falsa Poenitentia [*Work of an unknown author]), that the penitent should be sorry for having deprived himself of virtue. But privation of virtue is a punishment. Therefore contrition is sorrow for punishments also.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(1) —

On the contrary, No one holds to that for which he is sorry. But a penitent, by the very signification of the word, is one who holds to his punishment [*”Poenitens,” i.e. “poenam tenens”]. Therefore he is not sorry on account of his punishment, so that contrition which is penitential sorrow is not on account of punishment.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(1) , A(1) ), contrition implies the crushing of something hard and whole. Now this wholeness and hardness is found in the evil of fault, since the will, which is the cause thereof in the evil-doer, sticks to its own ground*, and refuses to yield to the precept of the law, wherefore displeasure at a suchlike evil is called metaphorically “contrition.” [*There is a play on the words here — ’integer’ (whole) and ‘in suis terminis’ (to its own ground)]. But this metaphor cannot be applied to evil of punishment, because punishment simply denotes a lessening, so that it is possible to have sorrow for punishment but not contrition.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(1)- RO(1) —

According to St. Augustine, penance should be on account of this mortal life, not by reason of its mortality (unless penance be taken broadly for every kind of sorrow); but by reason of sins, to which we are prone on account of the weakness of this life.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Sorrow for the loss of virtue through sin is not essentially the same as contrition, but is its principle. For just as we are moved to desire a thing on account of the good we expect to derive from it, so are we moved to be sorry for something on account of the evil accruing to us therefrom.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(2) Whether contrition should be on account of original sin?

P(4)- Q(2)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that contrition should be on account of original sin. For we ought to be contrite on account of actual sin; not by reason of the act, considered as a kind of being, but by reason of its deformity, since the act, regarded in its substance, is a good, and is from God. Now original sin has a deformity, even as actual sin has.

Therefore we should be contrite on its account also.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, by original sin man has been turned away from God, since in punishment thereof he was to be deprived of seeing God. But every man should be displeased at having been turned away from God. Therefore man should be displeased at original sin; and so he ought to have contrition for it.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The medicine should be proportionate to the disease. Now we contracted original sin without willing to do so.

Therefore it is not necessary that we should be cleansed from it by an act of the will, such as contrition is.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(2) —

I answer that, Contrition is sorrow, as stated above ( Q(1) , AA(1),2 ), respecting and, so to speak, crushing the hardness of the will. Consequently it can regard those sins only which result in us through the hardness of our will. And as original sin was not brought upon us by our own will, but contracted from the origin of our infected nature, it follows that, properly speaking, we cannot have contrition on its account, but only displeasure or sorrow.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Contrition is for sin, not by reason of the mere substance of the act, because it does not derive the character of evil therefrom; nor again, by reason of its deformity alone, because deformity, of itself, does not include the notion of guilt, and sometimes denotes a punishment. But contrition ought to be on account of sin, as implying deformity resulting from an act of the will; and this does not apply to original sin, so that contrition does not apply to it.

The same Reply avails for the Second Objection, because contrition is due to aversion of the will.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(3) Whether we should have contrition for every actual sin?

P(4)- Q(2)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that we have no need to have contrition for every actual sin we have committed. For contraries are healed by their contraries. Now some sins are committed through sorrow, e.g. sloth and envy. Therefore their remedy should not be sorrow, such as contrition is, but joy.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, contrition is an act of the will, which cannot refer to that which is not known. But there are sins of which we have no knowledge, such as those we have forgotten. Therefore we cannot have contrition for them.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, by voluntary contrition those sins are blotted out which we committed voluntarily. But ignorance takes away voluntariness, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore contrition need not cover things which have occurred through ignorance.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, we need not be contrite for a sin which is not removed by contrition. Now some sins are not removed by contrition, e.g. venial sins, that remain after the grace of contrition.

Therefore there is no need to have contrition for all one’s past sins.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Penance is a remedy for all actual sins. But penance cannot regard some sins, without contrition regarding them also, for it is the first part of Penance. Therefore contrition should be for all one’s past sins.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(3) —

Further, no sin is forgiven a man unless he be justified.

But justification requires contrition, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(1) ; P(2a), Q(113) ). Therefore it is necessary to have contrition for all one’s sins.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(3) —

I answer that, Every actual sin is caused by our will not yielding to God’s law, either by transgressing it, or by omitting it, or by acting beside it: and since a hard thing is one that is disposed not to give way easily, hence it is that a certain hardness of the will is to be found in every actual sin. Wherefore, if a sin is to be remedied, it needs to be taken away by contrition which crushes it.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(3)- RO(1) —

As clearly shown above ( A(2), ad 1), contrition is opposed to sin, in so far as it proceeds from the choice of the will that had failed to obey the command of God’s law, and not as regards the material part of sin: and it is on this that the choice of the will falls. Now the will’s choice falls not only on the acts of the other powers, which the will uses for its own end, but also on the will’s own proper act: for the will wills to will something. Accordingly the will’s choice falls on that pain or sadness which is to be found in the sin of envy and the like, whether such pain be in the senses or in the will itself. Consequently the sorrow of contrition is opposed to those sins.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(3)- RO(2) —

One may forget a thing in two ways, either so that it escapes the memory altogether, and then one cannot search for it; or so that it escapes from the memory in part, and in part remains, as when I remember having heard something in general, but know not what it was in particular, and then I search my memory in order to discover it.

Accordingly a sin also may be forgotten in two ways, either so as to remain in a general, but not in a particular remembrance, and then a man is bound to bethink himself in order to discover the sin, because he is bound to have contrition for each individual mortal sin. And if he is unable to discover it, after applying himself with due care, it is enough that he be contrite for it, according as it stands in his knowledge, and indeed he should grieve not only for the sin, but also for having forgotten it, because this is owing to his neglect. If, however, the sin has escaped from his memory altogether, then he is excused from his duty through being unable to fulfill it, and it is enough that he be contrite in general for everything wherein he has offended God. But when this inability is removed, as when the sin is recalled to his memory, then he is bound to have contrition for that sin in particular, even as a poor man, who cannot pay a debt, is excused, and yet is bound to, as soon as he can.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(3)- RO(3) —

If ignorance were to remove altogether the will to do evil, it will excuse, and there would be no sin: and sometimes it does not remove the will altogether, and then it does not altogether excuse, but only to a certain extent: wherefore a man is bound to be contrite for a sin committed through ignorance.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(3)- RO(4) —

A venial sin can remain after contrition for a mortal sin, but not after contrition for the venial sin: wherefore contrition should also cover venial sins even as penance does, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, 16, Q(2) , A(2), qu. 2; P(4), Q(87), A(1) ).

P(4)- Q(2)- A(4) Whether a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins?

P(4)- Q(2)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins also. For contrition is an act of the free-will: and the free-will extends to the future rather than to the past, since choice, which is an act of the free-will, is about future contingents, as stated in Ethic. 3:Therefore contrition is about future sins rather than about past sins.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, sin is aggravated by the result that ensues from it: wherefore Jerome says [*St. Basil asserts this implicitly in De Vera Virgin.] that the punishment of Arius is not yet ended, for it is yet possible for some to be ruined through his heresy, by reason of whose ruin his punishment would be increased: and the same applies to a man who is judged guilty of murder, if he has committed a murderous assault, even before his victim dies. Now the sinner ought to be contrite during that intervening time. Therefore the degree of his contrition ought to be proportionate not only to his past act, but also to its eventual result: and consequently contrition regards the future.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Contrition is a part of penance. But penance always regards the past: and therefore contrition does also, and consequently is not for a future sin.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(4) —

I answer that, In every series of things moving and moved ordained to one another, we find that the inferior mover has its proper movement, and besides this, it follows, in some respect, the movement of the superior mover: this is seen in the movement of the planets, which, in addition to their proper movements, follow the movement of the first heaven. Now, in all the moral virtues, the first mover is prudence, which is called the charioteer of the virtues.

Consequently each moral virtue, in addition to its proper movement, has something of the movement of prudence: and therefore, since penance is a moral virtue, as it is a part of justice, in addition to its own act, it acquires the movement of prudence. Now its proper movement is towards its proper object, which is a sin committed. Wherefore its proper and principal act, viz. contrition, essentially regards past sins alone; but, inasmuch as it acquires something of the act of prudence, it regards future sins indirectly, although it is not essentially moved towards those future sins. For this reason, he that is contrite, is sorry for his past sins, and is cautious of future sins. Yet we do not speak of contrition for future sins, but of caution, which is a part of prudence conjoined to penance.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The free-will is said to regard future contingents, in so far as it is concerned with acts, but not with the object of acts: because, of his own free-will, a man can think about past and necessary things, and yet the very act of thinking, in so far as it is subject to the free-will, is a future contingent. Hence the act the contrition also is a future contingent, in so far as it is subject to the free-will; and yet its object can be something past.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The consequent result which aggravates a sin was already present in the act as in its cause; wherefore when the sin was committed, its degree of gravity was already complete, and no further guilt accrued to it when the result took place. Nevertheless some accidental punishment accrues to it, in the respect of which the damned will have the more motives of regret for the more evils that have resulted from their sins.

It is in this sense that Jerome [*Basil] speaks. Hence there is not need for contrition to be for other than past sins.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(5) Whether a man ought to have contrition for another’s sin?

P(4)- Q(2)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man ought to have contrition for another’s sin. For one should not ask forgiveness for a sin unless one is contrite for it. Now forgiveness is asked for another’s sin in Psalm 18:13: “From those of others spare thy servant.” Therefore a man ought to be contrite for another’s sins.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, man is bound, ought of charity, to love his neighbor as himself. Now, through love of himself, he both grieves for his ills, and desires good things. Therefore, since we are bound to desire the goods of grace for our neighbor, as for ourselves, it seems that we ought to grieve for his sins, even as for our own. But contrition is nothing else than sorrow for sins. Therefore man should be contrite for the sins of others.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Contrition is an act of the virtue of penance. But no one repents save for what he has done himself. Therefore no one is contrite for others’ sins.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(5) —

I answer that, The same thing is crushed [conteritur] which hitherto was hard and whole. Hence contrition for sin must needs be in the same subject in which the hardness of sin was hitherto: so that there is no contrition for the sins of others.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The prophet prays to be spared from the sins of others, in so far as, through fellowship with sinners, a man contracts a stain by consenting to their sins: thus it is written ( Psalm 17:27): “With the perverse thou wilt be perverted.”

P(4)- Q(2)- A(5)- RO(2) —

We ought to grieve for the sins of others, but not to have contrition for them, because not all sorrow for past sins is contrition, as is evident for what has been said already.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(6) Whether it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin?

P(4)- Q(2)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin. For the movement of contrition in justification is instantaneous: whereas a man cannot think of every mortal sin in an instant. Therefore it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, contrition should be for sins, inasmuch as they turn us away from God, because we need not be contrite for turning to creatures without turning away from God. Now all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God. Therefore one contrition for all is sufficient.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, mortal sins have more in common with one another, than actual and original sin. Now one Baptism blots out all sins both actual and original. Therefore one general contrition blots out all mortal sins.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(6) —

On the contrary, For diverse diseases there are diverse remedies, since “what heals the eye will not heal the foot,” as Jerome says (Super Marc. ix, 28). But contrition is the special remedy for one mortal sin. Therefore one general contrition for all mortal sins does not suffice.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(6) —

Further, contrition is expressed by confession. But it is necessary to confess each mortal sin. Therefore it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(6) —

I answer that, Contrition may be considered in two ways, as to its origin, and as to its term. By origin of contrition I mean the process of thought, when a man thinks of his sin and is sorry for it, albeit not with the sorrow of contrition, yet with that of attrition. The term of contrition is when that sorrow is already quickened by grace. Accordingly, as regards the origin of contrition, a man needs to be contrite for each sin that he calls to mind; but as regards its term, it suffices for him to have one general contrition for all, because then the movement of his contrition acts in virtue of all his preceding dispositions.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Although all mortal sins agree in turning man away from God, yet they differ in the cause and mode of aversion, and in the degree of separation from God; and this regards the different ways in which they turn us to creatures.

P(4)- Q(2)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Baptism acts in virtue of Christ’s merit, Who had infinite power for the blotting out of all sins; and so for all sins one Baptism suffices. But in contrition, in addition to the merit of Christ, an act of ours is requisite, which must, therefore, correspond to each sin, since it has not infinite power for contrition.

It may also be replied that Baptism is a spiritual generation; whereas Penance, as regards contrition and its other parts, is a kind of spiritual healing by way of some alteration. Now it is evident in the generation of a body, accompanied by corruption of another body, that all the accidents contrary to the thing generated, and which were the accidents of the thing corrupted, are removed by the one generation: whereas in alteration, only that accident is removed which was contrary to the accident which is the term of the alteration. In like manner, one Baptism blots out all sins together and introduces a new life; whereas Penance does not blot out each sin, unless it be directed to each. For this reason it is necessary to be contrite for, and to confess each sin.

QUESTION OF THE DEGREE OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the degree of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world? (2) Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great? (3) Whether sorrow for one sin ought to be greater than for another?

P(4)- Q(3)- A(1) Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?

P(4)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that contrition is not the greatest possible sorrow in the world. For sorrow is the sensation of hurt. But some hurts are more keenly felt than the hurt of sin, e.g. the hurt of a wound. Therefore contrition is not the greatest sorrow.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, we judge of a cause according to its effect. Now the effect of sorrow is tears. Since therefore sometimes a contrite person does not shed outward tears for his sins, whereas he weeps for the death of a friend, or for a blow, or the like, it seems that contrition is not the greatest sorrow.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the more a thing is mingled with its contrary, the less its intensity. But the sorrow of contrition has a considerable admixture of joy, because the contrite man rejoices in his delivery, in the hope of pardon, and in many like things. Therefore his sorrow is very slight.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the sorrow of contrition is a kind of displeasure. But there are many things more displeasing to the contrite than their past sins; for they would not prefer to suffer the pains of hell rather than to sin. nor to have suffered, nor yet to suffer all manner of temporal punishment; else few would be found contrite. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is not the greatest.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(1) —

On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), “all sorrow is based on love.” Now the love of charity, on which the sorrow of contrition is based, is the greatest love. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is the greatest sorrow.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(1) —

Further, sorrow is for evil. Therefore the greater the evil, the greater the sorrow. But the fault is a greater evil than its punishment. Therefore contrition which is sorrow for fault, surpasses all other sorrow.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(1) , A(2), ad 1), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the will, and is the very essence of contrition, being nothing else than displeasure at past sin, and this sorrow, in contrition, surpasses all other sorrows. For the more pleasing a thing is, the more displeasing is its contrary. Now the last end is above all things pleasing: wherefore sin, which turns us away from the last end, should be, above all things, displeasing. The other sorrow is in the sensitive part, and is caused by the former sorrow either from natural necessity, in so far as the lower powers follow the movements of the higher, or from choice, in so far as a penitent excites in himself this sorrow for his sins. In neither of these ways is such sorrow, of necessity, the greatest, because the lower powers are more deeply moved by their own objects than through redundance from the higher powers. Wherefore the nearer the operation of the higher powers approaches to the objects of the lower powers, the more do the latter follow the movement of the former.

Consequently there is greater pain in the sensitive part, on account of a sensible hurt, than that which redounds into the sensitive part from the reason; and likewise, that which redounds from the reason when it deliberates on corporeal things, is greater than that which redounds from the reason in considering spiritual things. Therefore the sorrow which results in the sensitive part from the reason’s displeasure at sin, is not greater than the other sorrows of which that same part is the subject: and likewise, neither is the sorrow which is assumed voluntarily greater than other sorrows — both because the lower appetite does not obey the higher appetite infallibly, as though in the lower appetite there should arise a passion of such intensity and of such a kind as the higher appetite might ordain — and because the passions are employed by the reason, in acts of virtue, according to a certain measure, which the sorrow that is without virtue sometimes does not observe, but exceeds.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Just as sensible sorrow is on account of the sensation of hurt, so interior sorrow is on account of the thought of something hurtful. Therefore, although the hurt of sin is not perceived by the external sense, yet it is perceived to be the most grievous hurt by the interior sense or reason.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Affections of the body are the immediate result of the sensitive passions and, through them, of the emotions of the higher appetite. Hence it is that bodily tears flow more quickly from sensible sorrow, or even from a thing that hurts the senses, than from the spiritual sorrow of contrition.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The joy which a penitent has for his sorrow does not lessen his displeasure (for it is not contrary to it), but increases it, according as every operation is increased by the delight which it causes, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Thus he who delights in learning a science, learns the better, and, in like manner, he who rejoices in his displeasure, is the more intensely displeased. But it may well happen that this joy tempers the sorrow that results from the reason in the sensitive part.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(4) —

The degree of displeasure at a thing should be proportionate to the degree of its malice. Now the malice of mortal sin is measured from Him against Whom it is committed, inasmuch as it is offensive to Him; and from him who sins, inasmuch as it is hurtful to him.

And, since man should love God more than himself, therefore he should hate sin, as an offense against God, more than as being hurtful to himself.

Now it is hurtful to him chiefly because it separates him from God; and in this respect the separation from God which is a punishment, should be more displeasing than the sin itself, as causing this hurt (since what is hated on account of something else, is less hated), but less than the sin, as an offense against God. Again, among all the punishments of malice a certain order is observed according to the degree of the hurt. Consequently, since this is the greatest hurt, inasmuch as it consists in privation of the greatest good, the greatest of all punishments will be separation from God.

Again, with regard to this displeasure, it is necessary to observe that there is also an accidental degree of malice, in respect of the present and the past; since what is past, is no more, whence it has less of the character of malice or goodness. Hence it is that a man shrinks from suffering an evil at the present, or at some future time, more than he shudders at the past evil: wherefore also, no passion of the soul corresponds directly to the past, as sorrow corresponds to present evil, and fear to future evil. Consequently, of two past evils, the mind shrinks the more from that one which still produces a greater effect at the present time, or which, it fears, will produce a greater effect in the future, although in the past it was the lesser evil. And, since the effect of the past sin is sometimes not so keenly felt as the effect of the past punishment, both because sin is more perfectly remedied than punishment, and because bodily defect is more manifest than spiritual defect, therefore even a man, who is well disposed, sometimes feels a greater abhorrence of his past punishment than of his past sin, although he would be ready to suffer the same punishment over again rather than commit the same sin.

We must also observe, in comparing sin with punishment, that some punishments are inseparable from offense of God, e.g. separation from God; and some also are everlasting, e.g. the punishment of hell. Therefore the punishment to which is connected offense of God is to be shunned in the same way as sin; whereas that which is everlasting is simply to be shunned more than sin. If, however, we separate from these punishments the notion of offense, and consider only the notion of punishment, they have the character of malice, less than sin has as an offense against God: and for this reason should cause less displeasure.

We must, however, take note that, although the contrite should be thus disposed, yet he should not be questioned about his feelings, because man cannot easily measure them. Sometimes that which displeases least seems to displease most, through being more closely connected with some sensible hurt, which is more known to us.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(2) Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?

P(4)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great. For no sorrow can be more immoderate than that which destroys its own subject. But the sorrow of contrition, if it be so great as to cause death or corruption of the body, is praiseworthy. For Anselm says (Orat. lii): “Would that such were the exuberance of my inmost soul, as to dry up the marrow of my body”; and Augustine [*De Contritione Cordis, work of an unknown author] confesses that “he deserves to blind his eyes with tears.” Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the sorrow of contrition results from the love of charity. But the love of charity cannot be too great. Neither, therefore, can the sorrow of contrition be too great.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(3) —

On the contrary, Every moral virtue is destroyed by excess and deficiency. But contrition is an act of a moral virtue, viz. penance, since it is a part of justice. Therefore sorrow for sins can be too great.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(2) —

I answer that, Contrition, as regards the sorrow in the reason, i.e. the displeasure, whereby the sin is displeasing through being an offense against God, cannot be too great; even as neither can the love of charity be too great, for when this is increased the aforesaid displeasure is increased also. But, as regards the sensible sorrow, contrition may be too great, even as outward affliction of the body may be too great. In all these things the rule should be the safeguarding of the subject, and of that general well-being which suffices for the fulfillment of one’s duties; hence it is written ( Romans 12:1): “Let your sacrifice be reasonable [*Vulg.: ‘Present your bodies... a reasonable sacrifice’].”

P(4)- Q(3)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Anselm desired the marrow of his body to be dried up by the exuberance of his devotion, not as regards the natural humor, but as to his bodily desires and concupiscences. And, although Augustine acknowledged that he deserved to lose the use of his bodily eyes on account of his sins, because every sinner deserves not only eternal, but also temporal death, yet he did not wish his eyes to be blinded.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(2)- RO(2) —

This objection considers the sorrow which is in the reason: while the Third considers the sorrow of the sensitive part.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(3) Whether sorrow for one sin should be greater than for another?

P(4)- Q(3)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that sorrow for one sin need not be greater than for another. For Jerome (Ep. cviii) commends Paula for that “she deplored her slightest sins as much as great ones.” Therefore one need not be more sorry for one sin than for another.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the movement of contrition is instantaneous. Now one instantaneous movement cannot be at the same time more intense and more remiss. Therefore contrition for one sin need not be greater than for another.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, contrition is for sin chiefly as turning us away from God. But all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God, since they all deprive us of grace whereby the soul is united to God.

Therefore we should have equal contrition for all mortal sins.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 25:2): “According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be.”

Now, in contrition, the stripes are measured according to the sins, because to contrition is united the purpose of making satisfaction. Therefore contrition should be for one sin more than for another.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(3) —

Further, man should be contrite for that which he ought to have avoided. But he ought to avoid one sin more than another, if that sin is more grievous, and it be necessary to do one or the other. Therefore, in like manner, he ought to be more sorry for one, viz. the more grievous, than for the other.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(3) —

I answer that, We may speak of contrition in two ways: first, in so far as it corresponds to each single sin, and thus, as regards the sorrow in the higher appetite, a man ought to be more sorry for a more grievous sin, because there is more reason for sorrow, viz. the offense against God, in such a sin than in another, since the more inordinate the act is, the more it offends God. In like manner, since the greater sin deserves a greater punishment, the sorrow also of the sensitive part, in so far as it is voluntarily undergone for sin, as the punishment thereof, ought to be greater where the sin is greater. But in so far as the emotions of the lower appetite result from the impression of the higher appetite, the degree of sorrow depends on the disposition of the lower faculty to the reception of impressions from the higher faculty, and not on the greatness of the sin.

Secondly, contrition may be taken in so far as it is directed to all one’s sins together, as in the act of justification. Such contrition arises either from the consideration of each single sin, and thus although it is but one act, yet the distinction of the sins remains virtually therein; or, at least, it includes the purpose of thinking of each sin; and in this way too it is habitually more for one than for another.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Paula is commended, not for deploring all her sins equally, but because she grieved for her slight sins as much as though they were grave sins, in comparison with other persons who grieve for their sins: but for graver sins she would have grieved much more.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(3)- RO(2) —

In that instantaneous movement of contrition, although it is not possible to find an actually distinct intensity in respect of each individual sin, yet it is found in the way explained above; and also in another way, in so far as, in this general contrition, each individual sin is related to that particular motive of sorrow which occurs to the contrite person, viz. the offense against God. For he who loves a whole, loves its parts potentially although not actually, and accordingly he loves some parts more and some less, in proportion to their relation to the whole; thus he who loves a community, virtually loves each one more or less according to their respective relations to the common good. In like manner he who is sorry for having offended God, implicitly grieves for his different sins in different ways, according as by them he offended God more or less.

P(4)- Q(3)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Although each mortal sin turns us away from God and deprives us of His grace, yet some remove us further away than others, inasmuch as through their inordinateness they become more out of harmony with the order of the Divine goodness, than others do.

QUESTION OF THE TIME FOR CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the time for contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition? (2) Whether it is expedient to grieve continually for our sins? (3) Whether souls grieve for their sins even after this life?

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1) Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the time for contrition is not the whole of this life. For as we should be sorry for a sin committed, so should we be ashamed of it. But shame for sin does not last all one’s life, for Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii) that “he whose sin is forgiven has nothing to be ashamed of.” Therefore it seems that neither should contrition last all one’s life, since it is sorrow for sin.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( 1 John 4:18) that “perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain.” But sorrow also has pain. Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot remain in the state of perfect charity.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, there cannot be any sorrow for the past (since it is, properly speaking, about a present evil) except in so far as something of the past sin remains in the present time. Now, in this life, sometimes one attains to a state in which nothing remains of a past sin, neither disposition, nor guilt, nor any debt of punishment. Therefore there is no need to grieve any more for that sin.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, it is written ( Romans 8:28) that “to them that love God all things work together unto good,” even sins as a gloss declares [*Augustine, De Correp. et Grat.]. Therefore there is no need for them to grieve for sin after it has been forgiven.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, contrition is a part of Penance, condivided with satisfaction. But there is no need for continual satisfaction. Therefore contrition for sin need not be continual.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says that “when sorrow ceases, penance fails, and when penance fails, no pardon remains.”

Therefore, since it behooves one not to lose the forgiveness which has been granted, it seems that one ought always to grieve for one’s sins.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1) —

Further, it is written (Ecclus. 5:5): “Be not without fear about sin forgiven.” Therefore man should always grieve, that his sins may be forgiven him.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(3) , A(1) ), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the reason, and is detestation of the sin committed; the other is in the sensitive part, and results from the former: and as regards both, the time for contrition is the whole of the present state of life. For as long as one is a wayfarer, one detests the obstacles which retard or hinder one from reaching the end of the way.

Wherefore, since past sin retards the course of our life towards God (because the time which was given to us for the course cannot be recovered), it follows that the state of contrition remains during the whole of this lifetime, as regards the detestation of sin. The same is to be said of the sensible sorrow, which is assumed by the will as a punishment: for since man, by sinning, deserved everlasting punishment, and sinned against the eternal God, the everlasting punishment being commuted into a temporal one, sorrow ought to remain during the whole of man’s eternity, i.e. during the whole of the state of this life. For this reason Hugh of St. Victor says [*Richard of St. Victor, De Pot. Lig. et Solv. 3,5,13] that “when God absolves a man from eternal guilt and punishment, He binds him with a chain of eternal detestation of sin.”

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Shame regards sin only as a disgraceful act; wherefore after sin has been taken away as to its guilt, there is no further motive for shame; but there does remain a motive of sorrow, which is for the guilt, not only as being something disgraceful, but also as having a hurt connected with it.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Servile fear which charity casts out, is opposed to charity by reason of its servility, because it regards the punishment.

But the sorrow of contrition results from charity, as stated above ( Q(3) , A(2) ): wherefore the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Although, by penance, the sinner returns to his former state of grace and immunity from the debt of punishment, yet he never returns to his former dignity of innocence, and so something always remains from his past sin.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Just as a man ought not to do evil that good may come of it, so he ought not to rejoice in evil, for the reason that good may perchance come from it through the agency of Divine grace or providence, because his sins did not cause but hindered those goods; rather was it Divine providence that was their cause, and in this man should rejoice, whereas he should grieve for his sins.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Satisfaction depends on the punishment appointed, which should be enjoined for sins; hence it can come to an end, so that there be no further need of satisfaction. But that punishment is proportionate to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence to a creature whence it derives its finiteness. On the other hand, the sorrow of contrition corresponds to sin on the part of the aversion, whence it derives a certain infinity; wherefore contrition ought to continue always; nor is it unreasonable if that which precedes remains, when that which follows is taken away.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(2) Whether it is expedient to grieve for sin continually?

P(4)- Q(4)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually. For it is sometimes expedient to rejoice, as is evident from Philippians 4:4, where the gloss on the words, “Rejoice in the Lord always,” says that “it is necessary to rejoice.” Now it is not possible to rejoice and grieve at the same time. Therefore it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, that which, in itself, is an evil and a thing to be avoided should not be taken upon oneself, except in so far as it is necessary as a remedy against something, as in the case of burning or cutting a wound. Now sorrow is in itself an evil; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 30:24): “Drive away sadness far from thee,” and the reason is given (Ecclus. 30:25): “For sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.” Moreover the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. vii, 13,14; x, 5).

Therefore one should not grieve for sin any longer than suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already blotted out after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore it is not expedient to grieve any longer.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in Cant.): “Sorrow is a good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with wormwood.” Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve continually.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says: “The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice in his grief.”

P(4)- Q(4)- A(2) —

Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible, those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is sorrow for sin, as is shown by the words of Matthew 5:5, “Blessed are they that mourn.” Therefore it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(2) —

I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 6,7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance, there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to its duration, except in so far as the act of one virtue hinders the act of another which is more urgent for the time being. Consequently the more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better it is, provided he exercises the acts of other virtues when and how he ought to.

On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both in intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow, which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long, man fall into despair, cowardice, and such like vices.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has sorrow itself for object.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy: and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we should make moderate use, according as the end, for which it is assumed, demands.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(3) Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life?

P(4)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that our souls are contrite for sins even after this life. For the love of charity causes displeasure at sin. Now, after this life, charity remains in some, both as to its act and as to its habit, since “charity never falleth away.” Therefore the displeasure at the sin committed, which is the essence of contrition, remains.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, we should grieve more for sin than for punishment. But the souls in purgatory grieve for their sensible punishment and for the delay of glory. Much more, therefore, do they grieve for the sins they committed.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies for sin.

But satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power of contrition.

Therefore contrition remains after this life.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(3) —

On the contrary, contrition is a part of the sacrament of Penance. But the sacraments do not endure after this life. Neither, therefore, does contrition.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(3) —

Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both guilt and punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory could have contrition, it would be possible for their debt of punishment to be remitted through the power of their contrition, so that they would be delivered from their sensible pain, which is false.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(3) —

I answer that, Three things are to be observed in contrition: first, its genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for it is an act of virtue quickened by charity; thirdly, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious and sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory. Accordingly, after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly country, cannot have contrition, because they are void of sorrow by reason of the fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, have no contrition, for although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which quickens sorrow; while those which are in purgatory have a sorrow for their sins, that is quickened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for they are not in the state of meriting. In this life, however, all these three can be found.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Charity does not cause this sorrow, save in those who are capable of it; but the fulness of joy in the Blessed excludes all capability of sorrow from them: wherefore, though they have charity, they have no contrition.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The souls in purgatory grieve for their sins; but their sorrow is not contrition, because it lacks the efficacy of contrition.

P(4)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The pain which the souls suffer in purgatory, cannot, properly speaking, be called satisfaction, because satisfaction demands a meritorious work; yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the punishment due may be called satisfaction.

QUESTION OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition? (2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely? (3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?

P(4)- Q(5)- A(1) Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition?

P(4)- Q(5)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the forgiveness of sin is not the effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. But we are somewhat the cause of contrition, since it is an act of our own. Therefore contrition is not the cause of forgiveness.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, contrition is an act of virtue. Now virtue follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue and sin are not together in the soul. Therefore contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness of sin.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to receiving the Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Communion before going to confession. Therefore they have not yet received the forgiveness of their sins.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(1) —

On the contrary, a gloss on Psalm 50:19, “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit,” says: “A hearty contrition is the sacrifice by which sins are loosed.”

P(4)- Q(5)- A(1) —

Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted by the same causes, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2. Now sin is committed through the heart’s inordinate love. Therefore it is destroyed by sorrow caused by the heart’s ordinate love; and consequently contrition blots out sin.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(1) —

I answer that, Contrition can be considered in two ways, either as part of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an instrument for the forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments (cf.

Sent. iv, D, 1, Q(1) , A(4) : P(3), Q(62), A(1) ); while, as an act of virtue, it is the quasi-material cause of sin’s forgiveness. For a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification, and a disposition is reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise in the case of an agent’s disposition to act, because this is reduced to the genus of efficient cause.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(1)- RO(1) —

God alone is the principal efficient cause of the forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive cause can be from us also, and likewise the sacramental cause, since the sacramental forms are words uttered by us, having an instrumental power of conferring grace whereby sins are forgiven.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The forgiveness of sin precedes virtue and the infusion of grace, in one way, and, in another, follows: and in so far as it follows, the act elicited by the virtue can be a cause of the forgiveness of sin.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The dispensation of the Eucharist belongs to the ministers of the Church: wherefore a man should not go to Communion until his sin has been forgiven through the ministers of the Church, although his sin may be forgiven him before God.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?

P(4)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that contrition cannot take away the debt of punishment entirely. For satisfaction and confession are ordained for man’s deliverance from the debt of punishment. Now no man is so perfectly contrite as not to be bound to confession and satisfaction.

Therefore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire debt of punishment.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, in Penance the punishment should in some way compensate for the sin. Now some sins are accomplished by members of the body. Therefore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that “by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented” (Wis. 11:17), it seems that the punishment for suchlike sins can never be remitted by contrition.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. Now an infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, sins. Therefore contrition can never be so great as to remit the whole punishment.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The affections of the heart are more acceptable to God than external acts. Now man is absolved from both punishment and guilt by means of external actions; and therefore he is also by means of the heart’s affections, such as contrition is.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(2) —

Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to whom it was said ( Luke 23:43): “This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise,” on account of his one act of repentance.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(2) —

As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always taken away by contrition, this question has already been considered above (Sent. iv, D, 14, Q(2) , AA(1),2 ; P(3), Q(86), A(4) ), where the same question was raised with regard to Penance.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(2) —

I answer that, The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways. First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and in this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the removal of guilt, but also the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of the sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition: and since this sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense as to suffice for the remission of both guilt and punishment.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(1) —

A man cannot be sure that his contrition suffices for the remission of both punishment and guilt: wherefore he is bound to confess and to make satisfaction, especially since his contrition would not be true contrition, unless he had the purpose of confessing united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into effect, on account of the precept given concerning confession.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Just as inward joy redounds into the outward parts of the body, so does interior sorrow show itself in the exterior members: wherefore it is written ( Proverbs 17:22): “A sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones.”

P(4)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in its intensity, even as the punishment due for mortal sin is finite; yet it derives infinite power from charity, whereby it is quickened, and so it avails for the remission of both guilt and punishment.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?

P(4)- Q(5)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that slight contrition does not suffice to blot out great sins. For contrition is the remedy for sin. Now a bodily remedy, that heals a lesser bodily infirmity, does not suffice to heal a greater. Therefore the least contrition does not suffice to blot out very great sins.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it was stated above ( Q(3) , A(3) ) that for greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Now contrition does not blot out sin, unless it fulfills the requisite conditions. Therefore the least contrition does not blot out all sins.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Every sanctifying grace blots out every mortal sin, because it is incompatible therewith. Now every contrition is quickened by sanctifying grace. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all sins.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(3) —

I answer that, As we have often said ( Q(1) , A(2), ad 1; Q(3) , A(1) ; Q(4) , A(1) ), contrition includes a twofold sorrow. One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can be so slight as not to suffice for real contrition, e.g. if a sin were less displeasing to a man, than separation from his last end ought to be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity. The other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself, belong essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor again is it under our control. Accordingly we must say that sorrow, however slight it be, provided it suffice for true contrition, blots out all sin.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Spiritual remedies derive infinite efficacy from the infinite power which operates in them: wherefore the remedy which suffices for healing a slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin. This is seen in Baptism which looses great and small: and the same applies to contrition provided it fulfill the necessary conditions.

P(4)- Q(5)- A(3)- RO(2) —

It follows of necessity that a man grieves more for a greater sin than for a lesser, according as it is more repugnant to the love which causes his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of sorrow for a greater sin, as another has for a lesser, this would suffice for the remission of the sin.

QUESTION OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider confession, about which there are six points for our consideration: (1) The necessity of confession; (2) Its nature; (3) Its minister; (4) Its quality; (5) Its effect; (6) The seal of confession.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation? (2) Whether confession is according to the natural law? (3) Whether all are bound to confession? (4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty? (5) Whether one is bound to confess at once? (6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man?

P(4)- Q(6)- A(1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation?

P(4)- Q(6)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that confession is not necessary for salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is ordained for the sake of the remission of sin. But sin is sufficiently remitted by the infusion of grace.

Therefore confession is not necessary in order to do penance for one’s sins.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, we read of some being forgiven their sins without confession, e.g. Peter, Magdalen and Paul. But the grace that remits sins is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore neither is it necessary for salvation now that man should confess.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, a sin which is contracted from another, should receive its remedy from another. Therefore actual sin, which a man has committed through his own act, must take its remedy from the man himself. Now Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore confession is not necessary for salvation.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, confession is necessary for a judicial sentence, in order that punishment may be inflicted in proportion to the offense. Now a man is able to inflict on himself a greater punishment than even that which might be inflicted on him by another. Therefore it seems that confession is not necessary for salvation.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. i): “If you want the physician to be of assistance to you, you must make your disease known to him.” But it is necessary for salvation that man should take medicine for his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation that man should make his disease known by means of confession.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(1) —

Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the accused. Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought not to be his own judge, but should be judged by another and consequently ought to confess to him.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(1) —

I answer that, Christ’s Passion, without whose power, neither original nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the reception of the sacraments which derive their efficacy from it.

Wherefore for the remission of both actual and original sin, a sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament actually, through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin which is incompatible with salvation, are necessary for salvation: and so just as Baptism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance. And just as a man through asking to be baptized, submits to the ministers of the Church, to whom the dispensation of that sacrament belongs, even so, by confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that, through the sacrament of Penance dispensed by him, he may receive the pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless he be acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the penitent’s confession. Wherefore confession is necessary for the salvation of a man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The infusion of grace suffices for the remission of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, the sinner still owes a debt of temporal punishment. Moreover, the sacraments of grace are ordained in order that man may receive the infusion of grace, and before he receives them, either actually or in his intention, he does not receive grace. This is evident in the case of Baptism, and applies to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates his temporal punishment by undergoing the shame of confession, by the power of the keys to which he submits, and by the enjoined satisfaction which the priest moderates according to the kind of sins made known to him in confession. Nevertheless the fact that confession is necessary for salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for sins, because this punishment to which one remains bound after the remission of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way of salvation remains open, without such punishment being expiated in this life: but it is due to its conducing to the remission of sin, as explained above.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Although we do not read that they confessed, it may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded in writing. Moreover Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments; so that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament without using the things which belong to the sacrament.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The sin that is contracted from another, viz. original sin, can be remedied by an entirely extrinsic cause, as in the case of infants: whereas actual sin, which a man commits of himself, cannot be expiated, without some operation on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself, though he was sufficient to sin by himself, because sin is finite on the part of the thing to which it turns, in which respect the sinner returns to self; while, on the part of the aversion, sin derives infinity, in which respect the remission of sin must needs begin from someone else, because “that which is last in order of generation is first in the order of intention” (Ethic. iii). Consequently actual sin also must needs take its remedy from another.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Satisfaction would not suffice for the expiation of sin’s punishment, by reason of the severity of the punishment which is enjoined in satisfaction, but it does suffice as being a part of the sacrament having the sacramental power; wherefore it ought to be imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and consequently confession is necessary.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(2) Whether confession is according to the natural law?

P(4)- Q(6)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that confession is according to the natural law. For Adam and Cain were bound to none but the precepts of the natural law, and yet they are reproached for not confessing their sin.

Therefore confession of sin is according to the natural law.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, those precepts which are common to the Old and New Law are according to the natural law. But confession was prescribed in the Old Law, as may be gathered from Isaiah 43:26: “Tell, if thou hast anything to justify thyself.” Therefore it is according to the natural law.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, Job was subject only to the natural law.

But he confessed his sins, as appears from his words ( Job 31:33) “If, as a man, I have hid my sin.” Therefore confession is according to the natural law.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v.) that the natural law is the same in all. But confession is not in all in the same way.

Therefore it is not according to the natural law. Further, confession is made to one who has the keys. But the keys of the Church are not an institution of the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(2) —

I answer that, The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the sacraments. And since “the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but a product of a certain innate power,” as Tully states (De Inv. Rhet. ii), consequently the sacraments are not part of the natural law, but of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however, is sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature. But such things are above nature as God reserves to Himself; and these are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of miracles, or in the revelation of mysteries, or in the institution of the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is according to Divine, but not according to natural law.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Adam is reproached for not confessing his sin before God: because the confession which is made to God by the acknowledgment of one’s sin, is according to the natural law. whereas here we are speaking of confession made to a man. We may also reply that in such a case confession of one’s sin is according to the natural law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to confess in a court of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying his sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made voluntarily to a man in order to receive from God the forgiveness of one’s sins, is not according to the natural law.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The precepts of the natural law avail in the same way in the law of Moses and in the New Law. But although there was a kind of confession in the law of Moses, yet it was not after the same manner as in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for in the law of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one’s sin inwardly before God; while in the law of Moses it was necessary for a man to declare his sin by some external sign, as by making a sin-offering, whereby the fact of his having sinned became known to another man; but it was not necessary for him to make known what particular sin he had committed, or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Job is speaking of the man who hides his sin by denying it or excusing himself when he is accused thereof, as we may gather from a gloss [*Cf. Gregory, Moral. xxii, 9] on the passage.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(3) Whether all are bound to confession?

P(4)- Q(6)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for Jerome says on Isaiah 3:9 (“They have proclaimed abroad”), “their sin,” etc.: “Penance is the second plank after shipwreck.”

But some have not suffered shipwreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting them, and consequently neither is confession which is a part of Penance.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is to the judge that confession should be made in any court. But some have no judge over them. Therefore they are not bound to confession.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, some have none but venial sins. Now a man is not bound to confess such sins. Therefore not everyone is bound to confession.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Confession is condivided with satisfaction and contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore all are bound to confession also.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(3) —

Further, this appears from the Decretals (De Poenit. et Remiss. xii), where it is stated that “all of either sex are bound to confess their sins as soon as they shall come to the age of discretion.”

P(4)- Q(6)- A(3) —

I answer that, We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the Divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in this way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into mortal sin after Baptism; secondly, by a precept of positive law, and in this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid down in the general council (Lateran iv, Can. 21) under Innocent III, both in order that everyone may acknowledge himself to be a sinner, because “all have sinned and need the grace of God” ( Romans 3:23); and that the Eucharist may be approached with greater reverence; and lastly, that parish priests may know their flock, lest a wolf may hide therein.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Although it is possible for a man, in this mortal life, to avoid shipwreck, i.e. mortal sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot avoid venial sins, which dispose him to shipwreck, and against which also Penance is ordained; wherefore there is still room for Penance, and consequently for confession, even in those who do not commit mortal sins.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(3)- RO(2) —

All must acknowledge Christ as their judge, to Whom they must confess in the person of His vicar; and although the latter may be the inferior if the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the superior, in so far as the penitent is a sinner, while the confessor is the minister of Christ.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(3)- RO(3) —

A man is bound to confess his venial sins, not in virtue of the sacrament, but by the institution of the Church, and that, when he has no other sins to confess. We may also, with others, answer that the Decretal quoted above does not bind others than those who have mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that it orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot apply to venial sins, because no one can confess all his venial sins. Accordingly, a man who has no mortal sins to confess, is not bound to confess his venial sins, but it suffices for the fulfillment of the commandment of the Church that he present himself before the priest, and declare himself to be unconscious of any mortal sin: and this will count for his confession.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(4) Whether it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed?

P(4)- Q(6)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (Regist. xii), “it is the mark of a good conscience to acknowledge a fault where there is none.” Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience to accuse oneself of those sins which one has not committed.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be praised.

But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he thinks he is.

Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed a more grievous sin than one has.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it be mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess it as mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he has not committed.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, satisfaction originates from confession.

But a man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed.

Therefore he can also confess a sin which he has not done.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells an untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since every untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he has not committed.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(4) —

Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of a crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses.

Now the witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man ought not to accuse himself of a sin which is not on his conscience.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(4) —

I answer that, The penitent should, by his confession, make his state known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does not make his state known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore his confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him only of what is on his conscience.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(4)- RO(1) —

To acknowledge a fault where there is none, may be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of the act, and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an erroneous conscience, to acknowledge having done what one has not done.

Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and thus the saying of Gregory is true, because a just man fears lest, in any act which is good in itself, there should be any defect on his part. thus it is written ( Job 9:28): “I feared all my works.” Wherefore it is also the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words of this fear which he holds in his thoughts.

From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since a just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not as though he had committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in those things which he seems to do well, he may by pride sin more grievously.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(4)- RO(3) —

When a man doubts whether a certain sin be mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt, because he sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, however, affirm that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and what is not.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(4)- RO(4) —

A man does not commit a falsehood by making satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone confesses a sin which he thinks he has not committed. And if he mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he does not lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession thereof tally with his conscience.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(5) Whether one is bound to confess at once?

P(4)- Q(6)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that one is bound to confess at once. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii): “The contempt of confession is inexcusable, unless there be an urgent reason for delay.” But everyone is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is bound to confess as soon as possible.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, everyone is bound to do more to avoid spiritual disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now if a man who is sick in body were to delay sending for the physician, it would be detrimental to his health. Therefore it seems that it must needs be detrimental to a man’s health if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be one at hand.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, that which is due always, is due at once.

But man owes confession to God always. Therefore he is bound to confess at once.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(5) —

On the contrary, A fixed time both for confession and for receiving the Eucharist is determined by the Decretals (Cap. Omnis utriusque sexus: De Poenit. et Remiss.). Now a man does not sin by failing to receive the Eucharist before the fixed time. Therefore he does not sin if he does not confess before that time.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(5) —

Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a commandment bids us to do. If therefore a man is bound to confess at once, and omits to do so, with a priest at hand, he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner at any other time, and so on, so that he would fall into many mortal sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems unreasonable.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(5) —

I answer that, As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition, viz. when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless his sin be forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at hand, he is bound to confess or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to contrition and to have the purpose of confessing.

But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. First, accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do something which he cannot do without committing a mortal sin, unless he go to confession first: for then he is bound to confess; for instance, if he has to receive the Eucharist, to which no one can approach, after committing a mortal sin, without confessing first, if a priest be at hand, and there be no urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church obliges all to confess once a year; because she commands all to receive Holy Communion once a year, viz. at Easter, wherefore all must go to confession before that time.

Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confession; and here the same reason applies to delay of confession as to delay of Baptism, because both are necessary sacraments. Now a man is not bound to receive Baptism as soon as he makes up his mind to be baptized; and so he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: nor is there any fixed time beyond which, if he defer Baptism, he would incur a mortal sin.

Nevertheless the delay of Baptism may amount to a mortal sin, or it may not, and this depends on the cause of the delay, since, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, text. 15), the will does not defer doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable cause. Wherefore if the cause of the delay of Baptism has a mortal sin connected with it, e.g. if a man put off being baptized through contempt, or some like motive, the delay will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same seems to apply to confession which is not more necessary than Baptism. Moreover, since man is bound to fulfill in this life those things that are necessary for salvation, therefore, if he be in danger of death, he is bound, even absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to receive Baptism. For this reason too, James proclaimed at the same time the commandment about making confession and that about receiving Extreme Unction ( James 5:14,16). Therefore the opinion seems probable of those who say that a man is not bound to confess at once, though it is dangerous to delay.

Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to confess at once, as soon as he has a reasonable and proper opportunity. Nor does it matter that the Decretal fixes the time limit to an annual confession, because the Church does not favor delay, but forbids the neglect involved in a further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who delays is excused, not from sin in the tribunal of conscience; but from punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that such a person would not be deprived of proper burial if he were to die before that time. But this seems too severe, because affirmative precepts bind, not at once, but at a fixed time; and this, not because it is most convenient to fulfill them then (for in that case if a man were not to give alms of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in need, he would commit a mortal sin, which is false), but because the time involves urgency. Consequently, if he does not confess at the very first opportunity, it does not follow that he commits a mortal sin, even though he does not await a better opportunity. unless it becomes urgent for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor is it on account of the Church’s indulgence that he is not bound to confess at once, but on account of the nature of an affirmative precept, so that before the commandment was made, there was still less obligation.

Others again say that secular persons are not bound to confess before Lent, which is the time of penance for them; but that religious are bound to confess at once, because, for them, all time is a time for penance. But this is not to the point; for religious have no obligations besides those of other men, with the exception of such as they are bound to by vow.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Hugh is speaking of those who die without this sacrament.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(5)- RO(2) —

It is not necessary for bodily health that the physician be sent for at once, except when there is necessity for being healed: and the same applies to spiritual disease.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(5)- RO(3) —

The retaining of another’s property against the owner’s will is contrary to a negative precept, which binds always and for always, and therefore one is always bound to make immediate restitution.

It is not the same with the fulfillment of an affirmative precept, which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is not bound to fulfill it at once.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(6) Whether one can be dispensed from confession?

P(4)- Q(6)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that one can be dispensed from confessing his sins to a man. For precepts of positive law are subject to dispensation by the prelates of the Church. Now such is confession, as appears from what was said above ( A(3) ). Therefore one may be dispensed from confession.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, a man can grant a dispensation in that which was instituted by a man. But we read of confession being instituted, not by God, but by a man ( James 5:16): “Confess your sins, one to another.” Now the Pope has the power of dispensation in things instituted by the apostles, as appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore he can also dispense a man from confessing.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Penance, whereof confession is a part, is a necessary sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since therefore no one can be dispensed from Baptism, neither can one be dispensed from confession.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(6) —

I answer that, The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church which is founded by God. Wherefore they need to be appointed by the Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the Church is founded on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power to publish new articles of faith, or to do away with those which are already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to abolish those that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ alone, Who is the foundation of the Church.

Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be saved without Baptism, nor that he be saved without confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however, dispense from confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay confession longer than the limit prescribed by the Church.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The precepts of the Divine law do not bind less than those of the natural law: wherefore, just as no dispensation is possible from the natural law, so neither can there be from positive Divine law.

P(4)- Q(6)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The precept about confession was not instituted by a man first of all, though it was promulgated by James: it was instituted by God, and although we do not read it explicitly, yet it was somewhat foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being prepared by John’s Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed their sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the priests, and though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood of the New Testament was foreshadowed in them.

QUESTION OF THE NATURE OF CONFESSION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the nature of confession, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession? (2) Whether confession is an act of virtue? (3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?

P(4)- Q(7)- A(1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?

P(4)- Q(7)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that Augustine defines confession unfittingly, when he says (Super Psalm 21) that confession “lays bare the hidden disease by the hope of pardon.” For the disease against which confession is ordained, is sin. Now sin is sometimes manifest. Therefore it should not be said that confession is the remedy for a “hidden” disease.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the beginning of penance is fear. But confession is a part of Penance. Therefore fear rather than “hope” should be set down as the cause of confession.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, that which is placed under a seal, is not laid bare, but closed up. But the sin which is confessed is placed under the seal of confession. Therefore sin is not laid bare in confession, but closed up.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, other definitions are to be found differing from the above. For Gregory says (Hom. xl in Evang.) that confession is “the uncovering of sins, and the opening of the wound.”

Others say that “confession is a legal declaration of our sins in the presence of a priest.” Others define it thus: “Confession is the sinner’s sacramental self-accusation through shame for what he has done, which through the keys of the Church makes satisfaction for his sins, and binds him to perform the penance imposed on him.” Therefore it seems that the definition in question is insufficient, since it does not include all that these include.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(1) —

I answer that, Several things offer themselves to our notice in the act of confession: first, the very substance or genus of the act, which is a kind of manifestation; secondly, the matter manifested, viz. sin; thirdly, the person to whom the manifestation is made, viz. the priest; fourthly, its cause, viz. hope of pardon; fifthly, its effect, viz. release from part of the punishment, and the obligation to pay the other part.

Accordingly the first definition, given by Augustine, indicates the substance of the act, by saying that “it lays bare” — the matter of confession, by saying that it is a “hidden disease” — its cause, which is “the hope of pardon”; while the other definitions include one or other of the five things aforesaid, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although the priest, as a man, may sometimes have knowledge of the penitent’s sin, yet he does not know it as a vicar of Christ (even as a judge sometimes knows a thing, as a man, of which he is ignorant, as a judge), and in this respect it is made known to him by confession. or we may reply that although the external act may be in the open, yet the internal act, which is the cause of the external act, is hidden; so that it needs to be revealed by confession.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Confession presupposes charity, which gives us life, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now it is in contrition that charity is given; while servile fear, which is void of hope, is previous to charity: yet he that has charity is moved more by hope than by fear.

Hence hope rather than fear is set down as the cause of confession.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(1)- RO(3) —

In every confession sin is laid bare to the priest, and closed to others by the seal of confession.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(1)- RO(4) —

It is not necessary that every definition should include everything connected with the thing defined: and for this reason we find some definitions or descriptions that indicate one cause, and some that indicate another.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(2) Whether confession is an act of virtue?

P(4)- Q(7)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that confession is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue belongs to the natural law, since “we are naturally capable of virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). But confession does not belong to the natural law. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, an act of virtue is more befitting one who is innocent than one who has sinned. But the confession of a sin, which is the confession of which we are speaking now, cannot be befitting an innocent man. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the grace which is in the sacraments differs somewhat from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts. But confession is part of a sacrament. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But confession comes under a precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is meritorious, for “it opens the gate of heaven,” as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore it seems that it is an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(18), AA(6),7 ; P(2b), Q(80) ; P(2b), Q(85), A(3) ; P(2b), Q(109), A(3) ), for an act to belong to a virtue it suffices that it be of such a nature as to imply some condition belonging to virtue. Now, although confession does not include everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name implies the manifestation of that which a man has on his conscience: for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man professes with his lips what he does not hold in his heart, it is not a confession but a fiction. Now to express in words what one has in one’s thoughts is a condition of virtue; and, consequently, confession is a good thing generically, and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it be devoid of other due circumstances.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Natural reason, in a general way, inclines a man to make confession in the proper way, to confess as he ought, what he ought, and when he ought, and in this way confession belongs to the natural law. But it belongs to the Divine law to determine the circumstances, when, how, what, and to whom, with regard to the confession of which we are speaking now. Accordingly it is evident that the natural law inclines a man to confession, by means of the Divine law, which determines the circumstances, as is the case with all matters belonging to the positive law.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Although an innocent man may have the habit of the virtue whose object is a sin already committed, he has not the act, so long as he remains innocent. Wherefore the confession of sins, of which confession we are speaking now, is not befitting an innocent man, though it is an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Though the grace of the sacraments differs from the grace of the virtues, they are not contrary but disparate; hence there is nothing to prevent that which is an act of virtue, in so far as it proceeds from the free-will quickened by grace, from being a sacrament, or part of a sacrament, in so far as it is ordained as a remedy for sin.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?

P(4)- Q(7)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that confession is not an act of the virtue of penance. For an act belongs to the virtue which is its cause. Now the cause of confession is the hope of pardon, as appears from the definition given above ( A(1) ). Therefore it seems that it is an act of hope and not of penance.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, shame is a part of temperance. But confession arises from shame, as appears in the definition given above ( A(1), O(4) ). Therefore it is an act of temperance and not of penance.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the act of penance leans on Divine mercy. But confession leans rather on Divine wisdom, by reason of the truth which is required in it. Therefore it is not an act of penance.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, we are moved to penance by the article of the Creed which is about the Judgment, on account of fear, which is the origin of penance. But we are moved to confession by the article which is about life everlasting, because it arises from hope of pardon. Therefore it is not an act of penance.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, it belongs to the virtue of truth that a man shows himself to be what he is. But this is what a man does when he goes to confession. Therefore confession is an act of that virtue which is called truth, and not of penance.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Penance is ordained for the destruction of sin. Now confession is ordained to this also. Therefore it is an act of penance.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(3) —

I answer that, It must be observed with regard to virtues, that when a special reason of goodness or difficulty is added over and above the object of a virtue, there is need of a special virtue: thus the expenditure of large sums is the object of magnificence, although the ordinary kind of average expenditure and gifts belongs to liberality, as appears from Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1. The same applies to the confession of truth, which, although it belongs to the virtue of truth absolutely, yet, on account of the additional reason of goodness, begins to belong to another kind of virtue. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that a confession made in a court of justice belongs to the virtue of justice rather than to truth. In like manner the confession of God’s favors in praise of God, belongs not to truth, but to religion: and so too the confession of sins, in order to receive pardon for them, is not the elicited act of the virtue of truth, as some say, but of the virtue of penance. It may, however, be the commanded act of many virtues, in so far as the act of confession can be directed to the end of many virtues.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Hope is the cause of confession, not as eliciting but as commanding.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(3)- RO(2) —

In that definition shame is not mentioned as the cause of confession, since it is more of a nature to hinder the act of confession, but rather as the joint cause of delivery from punishment (because shame is in itself a punishment), since also the keys of the Church are the joint cause with confession, to the same effect.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(3)- RO(3) —

By a certain adaptation the parts of Penance can be ascribed to three Personal Attributes, so that contrition may correspond to mercy or goodness, by reason of its being sorrow for evil — confession to wisdom, by reason of its being a manifestation of the truth — and satisfaction to power, on account of the labor it entails. And since contrition is the first part of Penance, and renders the other parts efficacious, for this reason the same is to be said of Penance as a whole, as of contrition.

P(4)- Q(7)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Since confession results from hope rather than from fear, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2), it is based on the article about eternal life which hope looks to, rather than on the article about the Judgment, which fear considers; although penance, in its aspect of contrition, is the opposite.

The Reply to the Fifth Objection is to be gathered from what has been said.

QUESTION OF THE MINISTER OF CONFESSION (SEVEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the minister of confession, under which head there are seven points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest? (2) Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest? (3) Whether outside a case of necessity one who is not a priest can hear the confession of venial sins? (4) Whether it is necessary for a man to confess to his own priest? (5) Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or of the command of a superior? (6) Whether a penitent, in danger of death can be absolved by any priest? (7) Whether the temporal punishment should be enjoined in proportion to the sin?

P(4)- Q(8)- A(1) Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?

P(4)- Q(8)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not necessary to confess to a priest. For we are not bound to confession, except in virtue of its Divine institution. Now its Divine institution is made known to us ( James 5:16): “Confess your sins, one to another,” where there is no mention of a priest. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Penance is a necessary sacrament, as is also Baptism. But any man is the minister of Baptism, on account of its necessity. Therefore any man is the minister of Penance. Now confession should be made to the minister of Penance. Therefore it suffices to confess to anyone.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, confession is necessary in order that the measure of satisfaction should be imposed on the penitent. Now, sometimes another than a priest might be more discreet than many priests are in imposing the measure of satisfaction on the penitent. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, confession was instituted in the Church in order that the rectors might know their sheep by sight. But sometimes a rector or prelate is not a priest. Therefore confession should not always be made to a priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The absolution of the penitent, for the sake of which he makes his confession, is imparted by none but priests to whom the keys are intrusted. Therefore confession should be made to a priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(1) —

Further, confession is foreshadowed in the raising of the dead Lazarus to life. Now our Lord commanded none but the disciples to loose Lazarus ( John 11:44). Therefore confession should be made to a priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(1) —

I answer that, The grace which is given in the sacraments, descends from the Head to the members. Wherefore he alone who exercises a ministry over Christ’s true body is a minister of the sacraments, wherein grace is given; and this belongs to a priest alone, who can consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, since grace is given in the sacrament of Penance, none but a priest is the minister of the sacrament: and consequently sacramental confession which should be made to a minister of the Church, should be made to none but a priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(1)- RO(1) —

James speaks on the presupposition of the Divine institutions: and since confession had already been prescribed by God to be made to a priest, in that He empowered them, in the person of the apostles, to forgive sins, as related in John 20:23, we must take the words of James as conveying an admonishment to confess to priests.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Baptism is a sacrament of greater necessity than Penance, as regards confession and absolution, because sometimes Baptism cannot be omitted without loss of eternal salvation, as in the case of children who have not come to the use of reason: whereas this cannot be said of confession and absolution, which regard none but adults, in whom contrition, together with the purpose of confessing and the desire of absolution, suffices to deliver them from everlasting death. Consequently there is no parity between Baptism and confession.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(1)- RO(3) —

In satisfaction we must consider not only the quantity of the punishment but also its power, inasmuch as it is part of a sacrament. In this way it requires a dispenser of the sacraments, though the quantity of the punishment may be fixed by another than a priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(1)- RO(4) —

It may be necessary for two reasons to know the sheep by sight. First, in order to register them as members of Christ’s flock, and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the pastoral charge and care, which is sometimes the duty of those who are not priests.

Secondly, that they may be provided with suitable remedies for their health; and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the man, i.e. the priest, whose business it is to provide remedies conducive to health, such as the sacrament of the Eucharist, and other like things. It is to this knowledge of the sheep that confession is ordained.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(2) Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?

P(4)- Q(8)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is never lawful to confess to another than a priest. For confession is a sacramental accusation, as appears from the definition given above ( Q(7) , A(1) ). But the dispensing of a sacrament belongs to none but the minister of a sacrament. Since then the proper minister of Penance is a priest, it seems that confession should be made to no one else.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, in every court of justice confession is ordained to the sentence. Now in a disputed case the sentence is void if pronounced by another than the proper judge; so that confession should be made to none but a judge. But, in the court of conscience, the judge is none but a priest, who has the power of binding and loosing. Therefore confession should be made to no one else.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, in the case of Baptism, since anyone can baptize, if a layman has baptized, even without necessity, the Baptism should not be repeated by a priest. But if anyone confess to a layman in a case of necessity, he is bound to repeat his confession to a priest, when the cause for urgency has passed. Therefore confession should not be made to a layman in a case of necessity.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(2) —

On the contrary, is the authority of the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).

P(4)- Q(8)- A(2) —

I answer that, Just as Baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is Penance. And Baptism, through being a necessary sacrament has a twofold minister: one whose duty it is to baptize, in virtue of his office, viz. the priest, and another, to whom the conferring of Baptism is committed, in a case of necessity. In like manner the minister of Penance, to whom, in virtue of his office, confession should be made, is a priest; but in a case of necessity even a layman may take the place of a priest, and hear a person’s confession.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In the sacrament of Penance there is not only something on the part of the minister, viz. the absolution and imposition of satisfaction, but also something on the part of the recipient, which is also essential to the sacrament, viz. contrition and confession. Now satisfaction originates from the minister in so far as he enjoins it, and from the penitent who fulfills it; and, for the fulness of the sacrament, both these things should concur when possible. But when there is reason for urgency, the penitent should fulfill his own part, by being contrite and confessing to whom he can; and although this person cannot perfect the sacrament, so as to fulfill the part of the priest by giving absolution, yet this defect is supplied by the High Priest. Nevertheless confession made to a layman, through lack* of a priest, is quasi-sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, on account of the absence of the part which belongs to the priest. [*Here and in the Reply to O(2) the Leonine edition reads “through desire for a priest”.]

P(4)- Q(8)- A(2)- RO(2) — Although a layman is not the judge of the person who confesses to him, yet, on account of the urgency, he does take the place of a judge over him, absolutely speaking, in so far as the penitent submits to him, through lack of a priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(2)- RO(3) —

By means of the sacraments man must needs be reconciled not only to God, but also to the Church. Now he cannot be reconciled to the Church, unless the hallowing of the Church reach him. In Baptism the hallowing of the Church reaches a man through the element itself applied externally, which is sanctified by “the word of life” ( Ephesians 5:26), by whomsoever it is conferred: and so when once a man has been baptized, no matter by whom, he must not be baptized again. On the other hand, in Penance the hallowing of the Church reaches man by the minister alone, because in that sacrament there is no bodily element applied externally, through the hallowing of which grace may be conferred. Consequently although the man who, in a case of necessity, has confessed to a layman, has received forgiveness from God, for the reason that he fulfilled, so far as he could, the purpose which he conceived in accordance with God’s command, he is not yet reconciled to the Church, so as to be admitted to the sacraments, unless he first be absolved by a priest, even as he who has received the Baptism of desire, is not admitted to the Eucharist. Wherefore he must confess again to a priest, as soon as there is one at hand, and the more so since, as stated above (ad 1), the sacrament of Penance was not perfected, and so it needs yet to be perfected, in order that by receiving the sacrament, the penitent may receive a more plentiful effect, and that he may fulfill the commandment about receiving the sacrament of Penance.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(3) Whether, outside a case of necessity, anyone who is not a priest may hear the confession of venial sins?

P(4)- Q(8)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that, outside a case of necessity, no one but a priest may hear the confession of venial sins. For the dispensation of a sacrament is committed to a layman by reason of necessity. But the confession of venial sins is not necessary. Therefore it is not committed to a layman.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, Extreme Unction is ordained against venial sin, just as Penance is. But the former may not be given by a layman, as appears from James 5:14. Therefore neither can the confession of venial sins be made to a layman.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(3) —

On the contrary, is the authority of Bede (on James 5:16, “Confess... one to another”) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).

P(4)- Q(8)- A(3) —

I answer that, By venial sin man is separated neither from God nor from the sacraments of the Church: wherefore he does not need to receive any further grace for the forgiveness of such a sin, nor does he need to be reconciled to the Church. Consequently a man does not need to confess his venial sins to a priest. And since confession made to a layman is a sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, and since it proceeds from charity, it has a natural aptitude to remit sins, just as the beating of one’s breast, or the sprinkling of holy water (cf. P(3), Q(87), A(3) ).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection, because there is no need to receive a sacrament for the forgiveness of venial sins. and a sacramental, such as holy water or the like, suffices for the purpose.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Extreme Unction is not given directly as a remedy for venial sin, nor is any other sacrament.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4) Whether it is necessary for one to confess to one’s own priest?

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is nol necessary to confess to one’s own priest. For Gregory [*Cf. Can. Ex auctoritate xvi, Q(1) ] says: “By our apostolic authority and in discharge of our solicitude we have decreed that priests, who as monks imitate the ex. ample of the apostles, may preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose penances, and absolve from sins.” Now monks are not the proper priests of anyone, since they have not the care of souls. Since, therefore confession is made for the sake of absolution it suffices for it to be made to any priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the minister of this sacrament is a priest, as also of the Eucharist. But any priest can perform the Eucharist.

Therefore any priest can administer the sacrament of Penance. Therefore there is no need to confess to one’s own priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, when we are bound to one thing in particular it is not left to our choice. But the choice of a discreet priest is left to us as appears from the authority of Augustine quoted in the text (Sent. ix, D, 17): for he says in De vera et falsa Poenitentia [*Work of an unknown author]: “He who wishes to confess his sins, in order to find grace, must seek a priest who knows how to loose and to bind.” Therefore it seems unnecessary to confess to one’s own priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, there are some, such as prelates, who seem to have no priest of their own, since they have no superior: yet they are bound to confession. Therefore a man is not always bound to confess to his own priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(5) —

Further, “That which is instituted for the sake of charity, does not militate against charity,” as Bernard observes (De Praecept. et Dispens. ii). Now confession, which was instituted for the sake of charity, would militate against charity, if a man were bound to confess to any particular priest: e.g. if the sinner know that his own priest is a heretic, or a man of evil influence, or weak and prone to the very sin that he wishes to confess to him, or reasonably suspected of breaking the seal of confession, or if the penitent has to confess a sin committed against his confessor. Therefore it seems that one need not always confess to one’s own priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(6) —

Further, men should not be straitened in matters necessary for salvation, lest they be hindered in the way of salvation. But it seems a great inconvenience to be bound of necessity to confess to one particular man, and many might be hindered from going to confession, through either fear, shame, or something else of the kind. Therefore, since confession is necessary for salvation, men should not be straitened, as apparently they would be, by having to confess to their own priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4) —

On the contrary, stands a decree of Pope Innocent III in the Fourth Lateran Council (Can. 21), who appointed “all of either sex to confess once a year to their own priest.”

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4) —

Further, as a bishop is to his diocese, so is a priest to his parish. Now it is unlawful, according to canon law (Can. Nullus primas ix, Q(2) ; Can. Si quis episcoporum xvi, Q(5) ), for a bishop to exercise the episcopal office in another diocese. Therefore it is not lawful for one priest to hear the confession of another’s parishioner.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4) —

I answer that, The other sacraments do not consist in an action of the recipient, but only in his receiving something, as is evident with regard to Baptism and so forth. though the action of the recipient is required as removing an obstacle, i.e. insincerity, in order that he may receive the benefit of the sacrament, if he has come to the use of his freewill.

On the other hand, the action of the man who approaches the sacrament of Penance is essential to the sacrament, since contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are acts of the penitent, are parts of Penance. Now our actions, since they have their origin in us, cannot be dispensed by others, except through their command. Hence whoever is appointed a dispenser of this sacrament, must be such as to be able to command something to be done. Now a man is not competent to command another unless he have jurisdiction over him. Consequently it is essential to this sacrament, not only for the minister to be in orders, as in the case of the other sacraments, but also for him to have jurisdiction: wherefore he that has no jurisdiction cannot administer this sacrament any more than one who is not a priest. Therefore confession should be made not only to a priest, but to one’s own priest; for since a priest does not absolve a man except by binding him to do something, he alone can absolve, who, by his command, can bind the penitent to do something.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Gregory is speaking of those monks who have jurisdiction, through having charge of a parish; about whom some had maintained that from the very fact that they were monks, they could not absolve or impose penance, which is false.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The sacrament of the Eucharist does not require the power of command over a man, whereas this sacrament does, as stated above: and so the argument proves nothing. Nevertheless it is not lawful to receive the Eucharist from another than one’s own priest, although it is a real sacrament that one receives from another.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The choice of a discreet priest is not left to us in such a way that we can do just as we like; but it is left to the permission of a higher authority, if perchance one’s own priest happens to be less suitable for applying a salutary remedy to our sins.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(4) —

Since it is the duty of prelates to dispense the sacraments, which the clean alone should handle, they are allowed by law (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Ne pro dilatione) to choose a priest for their confessor; who in this respect is the prelate’s superior; even as one physician is cured by another, not as a physician but as a patient.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(5) —

In those cases wherein the penitent has reason to fear some harm to himself or to the priest by reason of his confessing to him, he should have recourse to the higher authority, or ask permission of the priest himself to confess to another; and if he fails to obtain permission, the case is to be decided as for a man who has no priest at hand; so that he should rather choose a layman and confess to him. Nor does he disobey the law of the Church by so doing, because the precepts of positive law do not extend beyond the intention of the lawgiver, which is the end of the precept, and in this case, is charity, according to the Apostle ( 1 Timothy 1:5). Nor is any slur cast on the priest, for he deserves to forfeit his privilege, for abusing the power intrusted to him.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(6) —

The necessity of confessing to one’s own priest does not straiten the way of salvation, but determines it sufficiently. A priest, however, would sin if he were not easy in giving permission to confess to another, because many are so weak that they would rather die without confession than confess to such a priest. Wherefore those priests who are too anxious to probe the consciences of their subjects by means of confession, lay a snare of damnation for many, and consequently for themselves.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5) Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or a command given by a superior?

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, even in virtue of a privilege or command given by a superior. For no privilege should be given that wrongs a third party. Now it would be prejudicial to the subject’s own priest, if he were to confess to another. Therefore this cannot be allowed by a superior’s privilege, permission, or command.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, that which hinders the observance of a Divine command cannot be the subject of a command or privilege given by man. Now it is a Divine command to the rectors of churches to “know the countenance of their own cattle” ( Proverbs 27:23); and this is hindered if another than the rector hear the confession of his subjects. Therefore this cannot be prescribed by any human privilege or command.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, he that hears another’s confession is the latter’s own judge, else he could not bind or loose him. Now one man cannot have several priests or judges of his own, for then he would be bound to obey several men, which would be impossible, if their commands were contrary or incompatible. Therefore one may not confess to another than one’s own priest, even with the superior’s permission.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, it is derogatory to a sacrament, or at least useless, to repeat a sacrament over the same matter. But he who has confessed to another priest, is bound to confess again to his own priest, if the latter requires him to do so, because he is not absolved from his obedience, whereby he is bound to him in this respect. Therefore it cannot be lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5) —

On the contrary, He that can perform the actions of an order can depute the exercise thereof to anyone who has the same order.

Now a superior, such as a bishop, can hear the confession of anyone belonging to a priest’s parish, for sometimes he reserves certain cases to himself, since he is the chief rector. Therefore he can also depute another priest to hear that man.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5) —

Further, a superior can do whatever his subject can do.

But the priest himself can give his parishioner permission to confess to another. Much more, therefore, can his superior do this.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5) —

Further, the power which a priest has among his people, comes to him from the bishop. Now it is through that power that he can hear confessions. Therefore, in like manner, another can do so, to whom the bishop gives the same power.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5) —

I answer that, A priest may be hindered in two ways from hearing a man’s confession: first, through lack of jurisdiction; secondly, through being prevented from exercising his order, as those who are excommunicate, degraded, and so forth. Now whoever has jurisdiction, can depute to another whatever comes under his jurisdiction; so that if a priest is hindered from hearing a man’s confession through want of jurisdiction, anyone who has immediate jurisdiction over that man, priest, bishop, or Pope, can depute that priest to hear his confession and absolve him. If, on the other hand, the priest cannot hear the confession, on account of an impediment to the exercise of his order, anyone who has the power to remove that impediment can permit him to hear confessions.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5)- RO(1) —

No wrong is done to a person unless what is taken away from him was granted for his own benefit. Now the power of jurisdiction is not granted a man for his own benefit, but for the good of the people and for the glory of God. Wherefore if the higher prelates deem it expedient for the furthering of the people’s salvation and God’s glory, to commit matters of jurisdiction to others, no wrong is done to the inferior prelates, except to those who “seek the things that are their own; not the things that are Jesus Christ’s” ( Philippians 2:21), and who rule their flock, not by feeding it, but by feeding on it.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The rector of a church should “know the countenance of his own cattle” in two ways. First, by an assiduous attention to their external conduct, so as to watch over the flock committed to his care: and in acquiring this knowledge he should not believe his subject, but, as far as possible, inquire into the truth of facts.

Secondly, by the manifestation of confession; and with regard to this knowledge, he cannot arrive at any greater certainty than by believing his subject, because this is necessary that he may help his subject’s conscience. Consequently in the tribunal of confession, the penitent is believed whether he speak for himself or against himself, but not in the court of external judgment: wherefore it suffices for this knowledge that he believe the penitent when he says that he has confessed to one who could absolve him. It is therefore clear that this knowledge of the flock is not hindered by a privilege granted to another to hear confessions.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5)- RO(3) —

It would be inconvenient, if two men were placed equally over the same people, but there is no inconvenience if over the same people two are placed one of whom is over the other. In this way the parish priest, the bishop, and the Pope are placed immediately over the same people, and each of them can commit matters of jurisdiction to some other. Now a higher superior delegates a man in two ways: first, so that the latter takes the superior’s place, as when the Pope or a bishop appoints his penitentiaries; and then the man thus delegated is higher than the inferior prelate, as the Pope’s penitentiary is higher than a bishop, and the bishop’s penitentiary than a parish priest, and the penitent is bound to obey the former rather than the latter. Secondly, so that the delegate is appointed the coadjutor of this other priest; and since a co-adjutor is subordinate to the person he is appointed to help, he holds a lower rank, and the penitent is not so bound to obey him as his own priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(5)- RO(4) —

No man is bound to confess sins that he has no longer. Consequently, if a man has confessed to the bishop’s penitentiary, or to someone else having faculties from the bishop, his sins are forgiven both before the Church and before God, so that he is not bound to confess them to his own priest, however much the latter may insist: but on account of the Ecclesiastical precept (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque) which prescribes confession to be made once a year to one’s own priest, he is under the same obligation as one who has committed none but venial sins. For such a one, according to some, is bound to confess none but venial sins, or he must declare that he is free from mortal sin, and the priest, in the tribunal of conscience, ought, and is bound, to believe him. If, however, he were bound to confess again, his first confession would not be useless, because the more priests one confesses to, the more is the punishment remitted, both by reason of the shame in confessing, which is reckoned as a satisfactory punishment, and by reason of the power of the keys: so that one might confess so often as to be delivered from all punishment. Nor is repetition derogatory to a sacrament, except in those wherein there is some kind of sanctification, either by the impressing of a character, or by the consecration of the matter, neither of which applies to Penance. Hence it would be well for him who hears confessions by the bishop’s authority, to advise the penitent to confess to his own priest, yet he must absolve him, even if he declines to do so.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(6) Whether a penitent, at the point of death, can be absolved by any priest?

P(4)- Q(8)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that a penitent, at the point of death, cannot be absolved by any priest. For absolution requires jurisdiction, as stated above ( A(5) ). Now a priest does not acquire jurisdiction over a man who repents at the point of death. Therefore he cannot absolve him.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, he that receives the sacrament of Baptism, when in danger of death, from another than his own priest, does not need to be baptized again by the latter. If, therefore, any priest can absolve, from any sin, a man who is in danger of death, the penitent, if he survive the danger, need not go to his own priest; which is false, since otherwise the priest would not “know the countenance of his cattle.”

P(4)- Q(8)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, when there is danger of death, Baptism can be conferred not only by a strange priest, but also by one who is not a priest. But one who is not a priest can never absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore neither can a priest absolve a man who is not his subject, when he is in danger of death.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Spiritual necessity is greater than bodily necessity. But it is lawful in a case of extreme necessity, for a man to make use of another’s property, even against the owner’s will, in order to supply a bodily need. Therefore in danger of death, a man may be absolved by another than his own priest, in order to supply his spiritual need.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(6) —

Further, the authorities quoted in the text prove the same (Sent. iv, D, 20, Cap. Non Habet).

I answer that, If we consider the power of the keys, every priest has power over all men equally and over all sins: and it is due to the fact that by the ordination of the Church, he has a limited jurisdiction or none at all, that he cannot absolve all men from all sins. But since “necessity knows no law” [*Cap. Consilium, De observ. jejun.; De reg. jur. (v, Decretal)] in cases of necessity the ordination of the Church does not hinder him from being able to absolve, since he has the keys sacramentally: and the penitent will receive as much benefit from the absolution of this other priest as if he had been absolved by his own. Moreover a man can then be absolved by any priest not only from his sins, but also from excommunication, by whomsoever pronounced, because such absolution is also a matter of that jurisdiction which by the ordination of the Church is confined within certain limits.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(6)- RO(1) —

One person may act on the jurisdiction of another according to the latter’s will, since matters of jurisdiction can be deputed. Since, therefore, the Church recognizes absolution granted by any priest at the hour of death, from this very fact a priest has the use of jurisdiction though he lack the power of jurisdiction.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(6)- RO(2) —

He needs to go to his own priest, not that he may be absolved again from the sins, from which he was absolved when in danger of death, but that his own priest may know that he is absolved. In like manner, he who has been absolved from excommunication needs to go to the judge, who in other circumstances could have absolved him, not in order to seek absolution, but in order to offer satisfaction.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Baptism derives its efficacy from the sanctification of the matter itself, so that a man receives the sacrament whosoever baptizes him: whereas the sacramental power of Penance consists in a sanctification pronounced by the minister, so that if a man confess to a layman, although he fulfills his own part of the sacramental confession, he does not receive sacramental absolution. Wherefore his confession avails him somewhat, as to the lessening of his punishment, owing to the merit derived from his confession and to his repentance. but he does not receive that diminution of his punishment which results from the power of the keys; and consequently he must confess again to a priest; and one who has confessed thus, is more punished hereafter than if he had confessed to a priest.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(7) Whether the temporal punishment is imposed according to the degree of the fault?

P(4)- Q(8)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that the temporal punishment, the debt of which remains after Penance, is not imposed according to the degree of fault. For it is imposed according to the degree of pleasure derived from the sin, as appears from Revelation 18:7: “As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye her.”

Yet sometimes where there is greater pleasure, there is less fault, since “carnal sins, which afford more pleasure than spiritual sins, are less guilty,” according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 2). Therefore the punishment is not imposed according to the degree of fault.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, in the New Law one is bound to punishment for mortal sins, in the same way as in the Old Law. Now in the Old Law the punishment for sin was due to last seven days, in other words, they had to remain unclean seven days for one mortal sin. Since therefore, in the New Testament, a punishment of seven years is imposed for one mortal sin, it seems that the quantity of the punishment does not answer to the degree of fault.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, the sin of murder in a layman is more grievous than that of fornication in a priest, because the circumstance which is taken from the species of a sin, is more aggravating than that which is taken from the person of the sinner. Now a punishment of seven years’ duration is appointed for a layman guilty of murder, while for fornication a priest is punished for ten years, according to Can. Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii. Therefore punishment is not imposed according to the degree of fault.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(7)- O(4) —

Further, a sin committed against the very body of Christ is most grievous, because the greater the person sinned against, the more grievous the sin. Now for spilling the blood of Christ in the sacrament of the altar a punishment of forty days or a little more is enjoined, while a punishment of seven years is prescribed for fornication, according to the Canons (Can. Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii). Therefore the quantity of the punishment does not answer to the degree of fault.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Isaiah 27:8): “In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it.”

Therefore the quantity of punishment adjudicated for sin answers the degree of fault.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(7) —

Further, man is reduced to the equality of justice by the punishment inflicted on him. But this would not be so if the quantity of the fault and of the punishment did not mutually correspond. Therefore one answers to the other.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(7) —

I answer that, After the forgiveness of sin, a punishment is required for two reasons, viz. to pay the debt, and to afford a remedy. Hence the punishment may be imposed in consideration of two things. First, in consideration of the debt, and in this way the quantity of the punishment corresponds radically to the quantity of the fault, before anything of the latter is forgiven: yet the more there is remitted by the first of those things which are of a nature to remit punishment, the less there remains to be remitted or paid by the other, because the more contrition remits of the punishment, the less there remains to be remitted by confession. Secondly, in consideration of the remedy, either as regards the one who sinned, or as regards others: and thus sometimes a greater punishment is enjoined for a lesser sin; either because one man’s sin is more difficult to resist than another’s (thus a heavier punishment is imposed on a young man for fornication, than on an old man, though the former’s sin be less grievous), or because one man’s sin; for instance, a priest’s, is more dangerous to others, than another’s sin, or because the people are more prone to that particular sin, so that it is necessary by the punishment of the one man to deter others. Consequently, in the tribunal of Penance, the punishment has to be imposed with due regard to both these things: and so a greater punishment is not always imposed for a greater sin. on the other hand, the punishment of Purgatory is only for the payment of the debt, because there is no longer any possibility of sinning, so that this punishment is meted only according to the measure of sin, with due consideration however for the degree of contrition, and for confession and absolution, since all these lessen the punishment somewhat: wherefore the priest in enjoining satisfaction should bear them in mind.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(7)- RO(1) —

In the words quoted two things are mentioned with regard to the sin, viz. “glorification” and “delicacies” or “delectation”; the first of which regards the uplifting of the sinner, whereby he resists God; while the second regards the pleasure of sin: and though sometimes there is less pleasure in a greater sin, yet there is greater uplifting; wherefore the argument does not prove.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(7)- RO(2) —

This punishment of seven days did not expiate the punishment due for the sin, so that even if the sinner died after that time, he would be punished in Purgatory: but it was in expiation of the irregularity incurred, from which all the legal sacrifices expiated.

Nevertheless, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously under the New Law than under the Old, on account of the more plentiful sanctification received in Baptism, and on account of the more powerful blessings bestowed by God on the human race. This is evident from Hebrews 29: “How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments,” etc. And yet it is not universally true that a seven years’ penance is exacted for every mortal sin: but it is a kind of general rule applicable to the majority of cases, which must, nevertheless, be disregarded, with due consideration for the various circumstances of sins and penitents.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(7)- RO(3) —

A bishop or priest sins with greater danger to others or to himself; wherefore the canons are more anxious to withdraw him from sin, by inflicting a greater punishment, in as much as it is intended as a remedy; although sometimes so great a punishment is not strictly due. Hence he is punished less in Purgatory.

P(4)- Q(8)- A(7)- RO(4) —

This punishment refers to the case when this happens against the priest’s will: for if he spilled it willingly he would deserve a much heavier punishment.

QUESTION OF THE QUALITY OF CONFESSION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quality of confession: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether confession can be lacking in form? (2) Whether confession ought to be entire? (3) Whether one can confess through another, or by writing? (4) Whether the sixteen conditions, which are assigned by the masters, are necessary for confession?

P(4)- Q(9)- A(1) Whether confession can be lacking in form?

P(4)- Q(9)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that confession cannot be lacking in form. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:26): “Praise [confession] perisheth from the dead as nothing.” But a man without charity is dead, because charity is the life of the soul. Therefore there can be no confession without charity.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, confession is condivided with contrition and satisfaction. But contrition and satisfaction are impossible without charity. Therefore confession is also impossible without charity.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, it is necessary in confession that the word should agree with the thought for the very name of confession requires this. Now if a man confess while remaining attached to sin, his word is not in accord with his thought, since in his heart he holds to sin, while he condemns it with his lips. Therefore such a man does not confess.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Every man is bound to confess his mortal sins. Now if a man in mortal sin has confessed once, he is not bound to confess the same sins again, because, as no man knows himself to have charity, no man would know of him that he had confessed. Therefore it is not necessary that confession should be quickened by charity.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(1) —

I answer that, Confession is an act of virtue, and is part of a sacrament. In so far as it is an act of virtue, it has the property of being meritorious, and thus is of no avail without charity, which is the principle of merit. But in so far as it is part of a sacrament, it subordinates the penitent to the priest who has the keys of the Church, and who by means of the confession knows the conscience of the person confessing. In this way it is possible for confession to be in one who is not contrite, for he can make his sins known to the priest, and subject himself to the keys of the Church: and though he does not receive the fruit of absolution then, yet he will begin to receive it, when he is sincerely contrite, as happens in the other sacraments: wherefore he is not bound to repeat his confession, but to confess his lack of sincerity.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(1)- RO(1) —

These words must be understood as referring to the receiving of the fruit of confession, which none can receive who is not in the state of charity.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Contrition and satisfaction are offered to God: but confession is made to man: hence it is essential to contrition and satisfaction, but not to confession, that man should be united to God by charity.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(1)- RO(3) —

He who declares the sins which he has, speaks the truth; and thus his thought agrees with his lips or words, as to the substance of confession, though it is discordant with the purpose of confession.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(2) Whether confession should be entire?

P(4)- Q(9)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not necessary for confession to be entire, namely, for a man to confess all his sins to one priest. For shame conduces to the diminution of punishment. Now the greater the number of priests to whom a man confesses, the greater his shame. Therefore confession is more fruitful if it be divided among several priests.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, confession is necessary in Penance in order that punishment may be enjoined for sin according to the judgment of the priest. Now a sufficient punishment for different sins can be imposed by different priests. Therefore it is not necessary to confess all one’s sins to one priest.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it may happen that a man after going to confession and performing his penance, remembers a mortal sin, which escaped his memory while confessing, and that his own priest to whom he confessed first is no longer available, so that he can only confess that sin to another priest, and thus he will confess different sins to different priests.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, the sole reason for confessing one’s sins to a priest is in order to receive absolution. Now sometimes, the priest who hears a confession can absolve from some of the sins, but not from all. Therefore in such a case at all events the confession need not be entire.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Hypocrisy is an obstacle to Penance.

But it savors of hypocrisy to divide one’s confession, as Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author]. Therefore confession should be entire. Further, confession is a part of Penance. But Penance should be entire. Therefore confession also should be entire.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(2) —

I answer that, In prescribing medicine for the body, the physician should know not only the disease for which he is prescribing, but also the general constitution of the sick person, since one disease is aggravated by the addition of another, and a medicine which would be adapted to one disease, would be harmful to another. The same is to be said in regard to sins, for one is aggravated when another is added to it; and a remedy which would be suitable for one sin, might prove an incentive to another, since sometimes a man is guilty of contrary sins, as Gregory says (Pastoral. iii, 3). Hence it is necessary for confession that man confess all the sins that he calls to mind, and if he fails to do this, it is not a confession, but a pretense of confession.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Although a man’s shame is multiplied when he makes a divided confession to different confessors, yet all his different shames together are not so great as that with which he confesses all his sins together: because one sin considered by itself does not prove the evil disposition of the sinner, as when it is considered in conjunction with several others, for a man may fall into one sin through ignorance or weakness, but a number of sins proves the malice of the sinner, or his great corruption.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The punishment imposed by different priests would not be sufficient, because each would only consider one sin by itself, and not the gravity which it derives from being in conjunction with another. Moreover sometimes the punishment which would be given for one sin would foster another. Again the priest in hearing a confession takes the place of God, so that confession should be made to him just as contrition is made to God: wherefore as there would be no contrition unless one were contrite for all the sins which one calls to mind, so is there no confession unless one confess all the sins that one remembers committing.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Some say that when a man remembers a sin which he had previously forgotten, he ought to confess again the sins which he had confessed before, especially if he cannot go to the same priest to whom his previous confession was made, in order that the total quantity of his sins may be made known to one priest. But this does not seem necessary, because sin takes its quantity both from itself and from the conjunction of another; and as to the sins which he confessed he had already manifested their quantity which they have of themselves, while as to the sin which he had forgotten, in order that the priest may know the quantity which it has under both the above heads, it is enough that the penitent declare it explicitly, and confess the others in general, saying that he had confessed many sins in his previous confession, but had forgotten this particular one.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Although the priest may be unable to absolve the penitent from all his sins, yet the latter is bound to confess all to him, that he may know the total quantity of his guilt, and refer him to the superior with regard to the sins from which he cannot absolve him.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(3) Whether one may confess through another, or by writing?

P(4)- Q(9)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that one may confess through another, or by writing. For confession is necessary in order that the penitent’s conscience may be made known to the priest. But a man can make his conscience known to the priest, through another or by writing.

Therefore it is enough to confess through another or by writing.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, some are not understood by their own priests on account of a difference of language, and consequently cannot confess save through others. Therefore it is not essential to the sacrament that one should confess by oneself, so that if anyone confesses through another in any way whatever, it suffices for his salvation.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, it is essential to the sacrament that a man should confess to his own priest, as appears from what has been said ( Q(8) , A(5) ). Now sometimes a man’s own priest is absent, so that the penitent cannot speak to him with his own voice. But he could make his conscience known to him by writing. Therefore it seems that he ought to manifest his conscience to him by writing to him.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Man is bound to confess his sins even as he is bound to confess his faith. But confession of faith should be made “with the mouth,” as appears from Romans 10:10: therefore confession of sins should also.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(3) —

Further, who sinned by himself should, by himself, do penance. But confession is part of penance. Therefore the penitent should confess his own sins.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(3) —

I answer that, Confession is not only an act of virtue, but also part of a sacrament. Now, though, in so far as it is an act of virtue it matters not how it is done, even if it be easier to do it in one way than in another, yet, in so far as it is part of a sacrament, it has a determinate act, just as the other sacraments have a determinate matter. And as in Baptism, in order to signify the inward washing, we employ that element which is chiefly used in washing, so in the sacramental act which is intended for manifestation we generally make use of that act which is most commonly employed for the purpose of manifestation, viz. our own words; for other ways have been introduced as supplementary to this.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Just as in Baptism it is not enough to wash with anything, but it is necessary to wash with a determinate element, so neither does it suffice, in Penance, to manifest one’s sins anyhow, but they must be declared by a determinate act.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(3)- RO(2) —

It is enough for one who is ignorant of a language, to confess by writing, or by signs, or by an interpreter, because a man is not bound to do more than he can: although a man is not able or obliged to receive Baptism, except with water, which is from an entirely external source and is applied to us by another: whereas the act of confession is from within and is performed by ourselves, so that when we cannot confess in one way, we must confess as we can.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(3)- RO(3) —

In the absence of one’s own priest, confession may be made even to a layman, so that there is no necessity to confess in writing, because the act of confession is more essential than the person to whom confession is made.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4) Whether the sixteen conditions usually assigned are necessary for confession?

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the conditions assigned by masters, and contained in the following lines, are not requisite for confession:

Simple, humble, pure, faithful, Frequent, undisguised, discreet, voluntary, shamefaced, Entire, secret, tearful, not delayed, Courageously accusing, ready to obey.

For fidelity, simplicity, and courage are virtues by themselves, and therefore should not be reckoned as conditions of confession.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, a thing is “pure” when it is not mixed with anything else: and “simplicity,” in like manner, removes composition and admixture. Therefore one or the other is superfluous.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, no one is bound to confess more than once a sin which he has committed but once. Therefore if a man does not commit a sin again, his penance need not be “frequent.”

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, confession is directed to satisfaction.

But satisfaction is sometimes public. Therefore confession should not always be “secret.”

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4)- O(5) —

Further, that which is not in our power is not required of us. But it is not in our power to shed “tears.” Therefore it is not required of those who confess.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4) —

On the contrary, We have the authority of the masters who assigned the above.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4) —

I answer that, Some of the above conditions are essential to confession, and some are requisite for its well-being. Now those things which are essential to confession belong to it either as to an act of virtue, or as to part of a sacrament. If in the first way, it is either by reason of virtue in general, or by reason of the special virtue of which it is the act, or by reason of the act itself. Now there are four conditions of virtue in general, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. The first is knowledge, in respect of which confession is said to be “discreet,” inasmuch as prudence is required in every act of virtue: and this discretion consists in giving greater weight to greater sins. The second condition is choice, because acts of virtue should be voluntary, and in this respect confession is said to be “voluntary.” The third condition is that the act be done for a particular purpose, viz. the due end, and in this respect confession is said to be “pure,” i.e. with a right intention. The fourth condition is that one should act immovably, and in this respect it is said that confession should be “courageous,” viz. that the truth should not be forsaken through shame.

Now confession is an act of the virtue of penance. First of all it takes its origin in the horror which one conceives for the shamefulness of sin, and in this respect confession should be “full of shame,” so as not to be a boastful account of one’s sins, by reason of some worldly vanity accompanying it. Then it goes on to deplore the sin committed, and in this respect it is said to be “tearful.” Thirdly, it culminates in self-abjection, and in this respect it should be “humble,” so that one confesses one’s misery and weakness.

By reason of its very nature, viz. confession, this act is one of manifestation: which manifestation can be hindered by four things: first, by falsehood, and in this respect confession is said to be “faithful,” i.e. true. Secondly, by the use of vague words, and against this confession is said to be “open,” so as not to be wrapped up in vague words; thirdly, by “multiplicity” of words, in which respect it is said to be “simple” indicating that the penitent should relate only such matters as affect the gravity of the sin; fourthly none of those things should be suppressed which should be made known, and in this respect confession should be “entire.”

In so far as confession is part of a sacrament it is subject to the judgment of the priest who is the minister of the sacrament. Wherefore it should be an “accusation” on the part of the penitent, should manifest his “readiness to obey” the priest, should be “secret” as regards the nature of the court wherein the hidden affairs of conscience are tried.

The well-being of confession requires that it should be “frequent”; and “not delayed,” i.e. that the sinner should confess at once.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4)- RO(1) —

There is nothing unreasonable in one virtue being a condition of the act of another virtue, through this act being commanded by that virtue; or through the mean which belongs to one virtue principally, belonging to other virtues by participation.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The condition “pure” excludes perversity of intention, from which man is cleansed: but the condition “simple” excludes the introduction of unnecessary matter.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4)- RO(3) —

This is not necessary for confession, but is a condition of its well-being.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4)- RO(4) —

Confession should be made not publicly but privately, lest others be scandalized, and led to do evil through hearing the sins confessed. On the other hand, the penance enjoined in satisfaction does not give rise to scandal, since like works of satisfaction are done sometimes for slight sins, and sometimes for none at all.

P(4)- Q(9)- A(4)- RO(5) —

We must understand this to refer to tears of the heart.

QUESTION OF THE EFFECT OF CONFESSION (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of confession: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin? (2) Whether confession delivers one in any way from punishment? (3) Whether confession opens Paradise to us? (4) Whether confession gives hope of salvation? (5) Whether a general confession blots out mortal sins that one has forgotten?

P(4)- Q(10)- A(1) Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin?

P(4)- Q(10)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that confession does not deliver one from the death of sin. For confession follows contrition. But contrition sufficiently blots out guilt. Therefore confession does not deliver one from the death of sin.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, just as mortal sin is a fault, so is venial.

Now confession renders venial that which was mortal before, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore confession does not blot out guilt, but one guilt is changed into another.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Confession is part of the sacrament of Penance. But Penance deliver from guilt. Therefore confession does also.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(1) —

I answer that, Penance, as a sacrament, is perfected chiefly in confession, because by the latter a man submits to the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments: for contrition has the desire of confession united thereto, and satisfaction is enjoined according to the judgment of the priest who hears the confession. And since in the sacrament of Penance, as in Baptism, that grace is infused whereby sins are forgiven, therefore confession in virtue of the absolution granted remits guilt, even as Baptism does. Now Baptism delivers one from the death of sin, not only by being received actually, but also by being received in desire, as is evident with regard to those who approach the sacrament of Baptism after being already sanctified. And unless a man offers an obstacle, he receives, through the very fact of being baptized, grace whereby his sins are remitted, if they are not already remitted. The same is to be said of confession, to which absolution is added because it delivered the penitent from guilt through being previously in his desire.

Afterwards at the time of actual confession and absolution he receives an increase of grace, and forgiveness of sins would also be granted to him, if his previous sorrow for sin was not sufficient for contrition, and if at the time he offered no obstacle to grace. Consequently just as it is said of Baptism that it delivers from death, so can it be said of confession.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Contrition has the desire of confession attached to it, and therefore it delivers penitents from death in the same way as the desire of Baptism delivers those who are going to be baptized.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(1)- RO(2) —

In the text venial does not designate guilt, but punishment that is easily expiated. and so it does not follow that one guilt is changed into another but that it is wholly done away. For “venial” is taken in three senses [*Cf. P(2a), Q(88), A(2) ]: first, for what is venial generically, e.g. an idle word: secondly, for what is venial in its cause, i.e. having within itself a motive of pardon, e.g. sins due to weakness: thirdly, for what is venial in the result, in which sense it is understood here, because the result of confession is that man’s past guilt is pardoned.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(2) Whether confession delivers from punishment in some way?

P(4)- Q(10)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that confession nowise delivers from punishment. For sin deserves no punishment but what is either eternal or temporal. Now eternal punishment is remitted by contrition, and temporal punishment by satisfaction. Therefore nothing of the punishment is remitted by confession.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, “the will is taken for the deed” [*Cf.

Can. Magna Pietas, De Poenit., Dist. i], as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now he that is contrite has the intention to confess. wherefore his intention avails him as though he had already confessed, and so the confession which he makes afterwards remits no part of the punishment.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Confession is a penal work. But all penal works expiate the punishment due to sin. Therefore confession does also.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(2) —

I answer that, Confession together with absolution has the power to deliver from punishment, for two reasons. First, from the power of absolution itself: and thus the very desire of absolution delivers a man from eternal punishment, as also from the guilt. Now this punishment is one of condemnation and total banishment: and when a man is delivered therefrom he still remains bound to a temporal punishment, in so far as punishment is a cleansing and perfecting remedy; and so this punishment remains to be suffered in Purgatory by those who also have been delivered from the punishment of hell. Which temporal punishment is beyond the powers of the penitent dwelling in this world, but is so far diminished by the power of the keys, that it is within the ability of the penitent, and he is able, by making satisfaction, to cleanse himself in this life. Secondly, confession diminishes the punishment in virtue of the very nature of the act of the one who confesses, for this act has the punishment of shame attached to it, so that the oftener one confesses the same sins, the more is the punishment diminished.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The will is not taken for the deed, if this is done by another, as in the case of Baptism: for the will to receive Baptism is not worth as much as the reception of Baptism. But a man’s will is taken for the deed, when the latter is something done by him, entirely.

Again, this is true of the essential reward, but not of the removal of punishment and the like, which come under the head of accidental and secondary reward. Consequently one who has confessed and received absolution will be less punished in Purgatory than one who has gone no further than contrition.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(3) Whether confession opens paradise?

P(4)- Q(10)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that confession does not open Paradise. For different sacraments have different effects. But it is the effect of Baptism to open Paradise. Therefore it is not the effect of confession.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is impossible to enter by a closed door before it be opened. But a dying man can enter heaven before making his confession. Therefore confession does not open Paradise.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Confession makes a man submit to the keys of the Church. But Paradise is opened by those keys. Therefore it is opened by confession.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(3) —

I answer that, Guilt and the debt of punishment prevent a man from entering into Paradise: and since confession removes these obstacles, as shown above ( AA(1),2 ), it is said to open Paradise.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Although Baptism and Penance are different sacraments, they act in virtue of Christ’s one Passion, whereby a way was opened unto Paradise.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(3)- RO(2) —

If the dying man was in mortal sin Paradise was closed to him before he conceived the desire to confess his sin, although afterwards it was opened by contrition implying a desire for confession, even before he actually confessed. Nevertheless the obstacle of the debt of punishment was not entirely removed before confession and satisfaction.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(4) Whether confession gives hope of salvation?

P(4)- Q(10)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that hope of salvation should not be reckoned an effect of confession. For hope arises from all meritorious acts. Therefore, seemingly, it is not the proper effect of confession.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, we arrive at hope through tribulation, as appears from Romans 5:3,4. Now man suffers tribulation chiefly in satisfaction. Therefore, satisfaction rather than confession gives hope of salvation.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(4) —

On the contrary, ” Confession makes a man more humble and more wary,” as the Master states in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).

But the result of this is that man conceives a hope of salvation. Therefore it is the effect of confession to give hope of salvation.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(4) —

I answer that, We can have no hope for the forgiveness of our sins except through Christ: and since by confession a man submits to the keys of the Church which derive their power from Christ’s Passion, therefore do we say that confession gives hope of salvation.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(4)- RO(1) —

It is not our actions, but the grace of our Redeemer, that is the principal cause of the hope of salvation: and since confession relies upon the grace of our Redeemer, it gives hope of salvation, not only as a meritorious act, but also as part of a sacrament.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Tribulation gives hope of salvation, by making us exercise our own virtue, and by paying off the debt of punishment: while confession does so also in the way mentioned above.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(5) Whether a general confession suffices to blot out forgotten mortal sins?

P(4)- Q(10)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that a general confession does not suffice to blot out forgotten mortal sins. For there is no necessity to confess again a sin which has been blotted out by confession. If, therefore, forgotten sins were forgiven by a general confession, there would be no need to confess them when they are called to mind.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, whoever is not conscious of sin, either is not guilty of sin, or has forgotten his sin. If, therefore, mortal sins are forgiven by a general confession, whoever is not conscious of a mortal sin, can be certain that he is free from mortal sin, whenever he makes a general confession: which is contrary to what the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 4:4), “I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified.”

P(4)- Q(10)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, no man profits by neglect. Now a man cannot forget a mortal sin without neglect, before it is forgiven him.

Therefore he does not profit by his forgetfulness so that the sin is forgiven him without special mention thereof in confession.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, that which the penitent knows nothing about is further from his knowledge than that which he has forgotten. Now a general confession does not blot out sins committed through ignorance, else heretics, who are not aware that certain things they have done are sinful, and certain simple people, would be absolved by a general confession, which is false. Therefore a general confession does not take away forgotten sins.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 33:6): “Come ye to Him and be enlightened, and your faces shall not be confounded.”

Now he who confesses all the sins of which he is conscious, approaches to God as much as he can: nor can more be required for him. Therefore he will not be confounded by being repelled, but will be forgiven.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(5) —

Further, he that confesses is pardoned unless he be insincere. But he who confesses all the sins that he calls to mind, is not insincere through forgetting some, because he suffers from ignorance of fact, which excuses from sin. Therefore he receives forgiveness, and then the sins which he has forgotten, are loosened, since it is wicked to hope for half a pardon.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(5) —

I answer that, Confession produces its effect, on the presupposition that there is contrition which blots out guilt: so that confession is directly ordained to the remission of punishment, which it causes in virtue of the shame which it includes, and by the power of the keys to which a man submits by confessing. Now it happens sometimes that by previous contrition a sin has been blotted out as to the guilt, either in a general way (if it was not remembered at the time) or in particular (and yet is forgotten before confession): and then general sacramental confession works for the remission of the punishment in virtue of the keys, to which man submits by confessing, provided he offers no obstacle so far as he is concerned: but so far as the shame of confessing a sin diminishes its punishment, the punishment for the sin for which a man does not express his shame, through failing to confess it to the priest, is not diminished.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(5)- RO(1) —

In sacramental confession, not only is absolution required, but also the judgment of the priest who imposes satisfaction is awaited. Wherefore although the latter has given absolution, nevertheless the penitent is bound to confess in order to supply what was wanting to the sacramental confession.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(5)- RO(2) —

As stated above, confession does not produce its effect, unless contrition be presupposed; concerning which no man can know whether it be true contrition, even as neither can one know for certain if he has grace. Consequently a man cannot know for certain whether a forgotten sin has been forgiven him in a general confession, although he may think so on account of certain conjectural signs.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(5)- RO(3) —

He does not profit by his neglect, since he does not receive such full pardon, as he would otherwise have received, nor is his merit so great. Moreover he is bound to confess the sin when he calls it to mind.

P(4)- Q(10)- A(5)- RO(4) —

Ignorance of the law does not excuse, because it is a sin by itself: but ignorance of fact does excuse. Therefore if a man omits to confess a sin, because he does not know it to be a sin, through ignorance of the Divine law, he is not excused from insincerity. on the other hand, he would be excused, if he did not know it to be a sin, through being unaware of some particular circumstance, for instance, if he had knowledge of another’s wife, thinking her his own. Now forgetfulness of an act of sin comes under the head of ignorance of fact, wherefore it excuses from the sin of insincerity in confession, which is an obstacle to the fruit of absolution and confession.

QUESTION OF THE SEAL OF CONFESSION (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now inquire about the seal of confession, about which there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether in every case a man is bound to hide what he knows under the seal of confession? (2) Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession? (3) Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession? (4) Whether, by permission of the penitent, the priest can make known to another, a sin of his which he knew under the seal of confession? (5) Whether he is bound to hide even what he knows through other sources besides?

P(4)- Q(11)- A(1) Whether in every case the priest is bound to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession?

P(4)- Q(11)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the priest is not bound in every case to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession.

For, as Bernard says (De Proecep. et Dispens. ii), “that which is instituted for the sake of charity does not militate against charity.” Now the secret of confession would militate against charity in certain cases: for instance, if a man knew through confession that a certain man was a heretic, whom he cannot persuade to desist from misleading the people; or, in like manner, if a man knew, through confession, that certain people who wish to marry are related to one another. Therefore such ought to reveal what they know through confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which is obligatory solely on account of a precept of the Church need not be observed, if the commandment be changed to the contrary. Now the secret of confession was introduced solely by a precept of the Church. If therefore the Church were to prescribe that anyone who knows anything about such and such a sin must make it known, a man that had such knowledge through confession would be bound to speak.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, a man is bound to safeguard his conscience rather than the good name of another, because there is order in charity. Now it happens sometimes that a man by hiding a sin injures his own conscience — for instance, if he be called upon to give witness of a sin of which he has knowledge through confession, and is forced to swear to tell the truth — or when an abbot knows through confession the sin of a prior who is subject to him, which sin would be an occasion of ruin to the latter, if he suffers him to retain his priorship, wherefore he is bound to deprive him of the dignity of his pastoral charge, and yet in depriving him he seem to divulge the secret of confession. Therefore it seems that in certain cases it is lawful to reveal a confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, it is possible for a priest through hearing a man’s confession to be conscious that the latter is unworthy of ecclesiastical preferment. Now everyone is bound to prevent the promotion of the unworthy, if it is his business. Since then by raising an objection he seems to raise a suspicion of sin, and so to reveal the confession somewhat, it seems that it is necessary sometimes to divulge a confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Decretal says (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque): “Let the priest beware lest he betray the sinner, by word, or sign, or in any other way whatever.”

P(4)- Q(11)- A(1) —

Further, the priest should conform himself to God, Whose minister he is. But God does not reveal the sins which are made known to Him in confession, but hides them. Neither, therefore, should the priest reveal them.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(1) —

I answer that, Those things which are done outwardly in the sacraments are the signs of what takes place inwardly: wherefore confession, whereby a man subjects himself to a priest, is a sign of the inward submission, whereby one submits to God. Now God hides the sins of those who submit to Him by Penance; wherefore this also should be signified in the sacrament of Penance, and consequently the sacrament demands that the confession should remain hidden, and he who divulges a confession sins by violating the sacrament. Besides this there are other advantages in this secrecy, because thereby men are more attracted to confession, and confess their sins with greater simplicity.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Some say that the priest is not bound by the seal of confession to hide other sins than those in respect of which the penitent promises amendment; otherwise he may reveal them to one who can be a help and not a hindrance. But this opinion seems erroneous, since it is contrary to the truth of the sacrament; for just as, though the person baptized be insincere, yet his Baptism is a sacrament, and there is no change in the essentials of the sacrament on that account, so confession does not cease to be sacramental although he that confesses, does not purpose amendment. Therefore, this notwithstanding, it must be held secret; nor does the seal of confession militate against charity on that account, because charity does not require a man to find a remedy for a sin which he knows not: and that which is known in confession, is, as it were, unknown, since a man knows it, not as man, but as God knows it.

Nevertheless in the cases quoted one should apply some kind of remedy, so far as this can be done without divulging the confession, e.g. by admonishing the penitent, and by watching over the others lest they be corrupted by heresy. He can also tell the prelate to watch over his flock with great care, yet so as by neither word nor sign to betray the penitent.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The precept concerning the secret of confession follows from the sacrament itself. Wherefore just as the obligation of making a sacramental confession is of Divine law, so that no human dispensation or command can absolve one therefrom, even so, no man can be forced or permitted by another man to divulge the secret of confession. Consequently if he be commanded under pain of excommunication to be incurred “ipso facto,” to say whether he knows anything about such and such a sin, he ought not to say it, because he should assume that the intention of the person in commanding him thus, was that he should say what he knew as man. And even if he were expressly interrogated about a confession, he ought to say nothing, nor would he incur the excommunication, for he is not subject to his superior, save as a man, and he knows this not as a man, but as God knows it.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(1)- RO(3) —

A man is not called upon to witness except as a man, wherefore without wronging his conscience he can swear that he knows not, what he knows only as God knows it. In like manner a superior can, without wronging his conscience, leave a sin unpunished which he knows only as God knows it, or he may forbear to apply a remedy, since he is not bound to apply a remedy, except according as it comes to his knowledge. Wherefore with regard to matters which come to his knowledge in the tribunal of Penance, he should apply the remedy, as far as he can, in the same court: thus as to the case in point, the abbot should advise the prior to resign his office, and if the latter refuse, he can absolve him from the priorship on some other occasion, yet so as to avoid all suspicion of divulging the confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(1)- RO(4) —

A man is rendered unworthy of ecclesiastical preferment, by many other causes besides sin, for instance, by lack of knowledge, age, or the like: so that by raising an objection one does not raise a suspicion of crime or divulge the secret of confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(2) Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession?

P(4)- Q(11)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the seal of confession extends to other matters besides those which have reference to confession.

For sins alone have reference to confession. Now sometimes besides sins other matters are told which have no reference to confession. Therefore, since such things are told to the priest, as to God, it seems that the seal of confession extends to them also.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, sometimes one person tells another a secret, which the latter receives under the seal of confession. Therefore the seal of confession extends to matters having no relation to confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The seal of confession is connected with sacramental confession. But those things which are connected with a sacrament, do not extend outside the bounds of the sacrament. Therefore the seal of confession does not extend to matters other than those which have reference to sacramental confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(2) —

I answer that, The seal of confession does not extend directly to other matters than those which have reference to sacramental confession, yet indirectly matters also which are not connected with sacramental confession are affected by the seal of confession, those, for instance, which might lead to the discovery of a sinner or of his sin.

Nevertheless these matters also must be most carefully hidden, both on account of scandal, and to avoid leading others into sin through their becoming familiar with it.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(2)- RO(2) —

A confidence ought not easily to be accepted in this way: but if it be done the secret must be kept in the way promised, as though one had the secret through confession, though not through the seal of confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(3) Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?

P(4)- Q(11)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession. For sometimes a priest hears a confession through an interpreter, if there be an urgent reason for so doing. But it seems that the interpreter is bound to keep the confession secret.

Therefore one who is not a priest knows something under the seal of confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is possible sometimes in cases of urgency for a layman to hear a confession. But he is bound to secrecy with regard to those sins, since they are told to him as to God. Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, it may happen that a man pretends to be a priest, so that by this deceit he may know what is on another’s conscience: and it would seem that he also sins if he divulges the confession. Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(3) —

On the contrary, A priest alone is the minister of this sacrament. But the seal of confession is connected with this sacrament.

Therefore the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(3) —

Further, the reason why a man is bound to keep secret what he hears in confession, is because he knows them, not as man but as God knows them. But the priest alone is God’s minister. Therefore he alone is bound to secrecy.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(3) —

I answer that, The seal of confession affects the priest as minister of this sacrament: which seal is nothing else than the obligation of keeping the confession secret, even as the key is the power of absolving. Yet, as one who is not a priest, in a particular case has a kind of share in the act of the keys, when he hears a confession in a case of urgency, so also does he have a certain share in the act of the seal of confession, and is bound to secrecy, though, properly speaking, he is not bound by the seal of confession.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(4) Whether by the penitent’s permission, a priest may reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal of confession?

P(4)- Q(11)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that a priest may not, by the penitent’s permission, reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal of confession. For an inferior may not do what his superior may not.

Now the Pope cannot give permission for anyone to divulge a sin which he knows through confession. Neither therefore can the penitent give him such a permission.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, that which is instituted for the common good of the Church cannot be changed at the will of an individual. Now the secrecy of confession was instituted for the good of the whole Church, in order that men might have greater confidence in approaching the confessional. Therefore the penitent cannot allow the priest to divulge his confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, if the priest could grant such a permission, this would seem to palliate the wickedness of bad priests, for they might pretend to have received the permission and so they might sin with impunity, which would be unbecoming. Therefore it seems that the penitent cannot grant this permission.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, the one to whom this sin is divulged does not know that sin under the seal of confession, so that he may publish a sin which is already blotted out, which is unbecoming. Therefore this permission cannot be granted.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(4) —

On the contrary, If the sinner consent, a superior may refer him by letter to an inferior priest. Therefore with the consent of the penitent, the priest may reveal a sin of his to another.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(4) —

Further, whosoever can do a thing of his own authority, can do it through another. But the penitent can by his own authority reveal his sin to another. Therefore he can do it through the priest.

I answer that There are two reasons for which the priest is bound to keep a sin secret: first and chiefly, because this very secrecy is essential to the sacrament, in so far as the priest knows that sin, as it is known to God, Whose place he holds in confession: secondly, in order to avoid scandal.

Now the penitent can make the priest know, as a man, what he knew before only as God knows it, and he does this when he allows him to divulge it: so that if the priest does reveal it, he does not break the seal of confession. Nevertheless he should beware of giving scandal by revealing the sin, lest he be deemed to have broken the seal.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The Pope cannot permit a priest to divulge a sin, because he cannot make him to know it as a man, whereas he that has confessed it, can.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(4)- RO(2) —

When that is told which was known through another source, that which is instituted for the common good is not done away with, because the seal of confession is not broken.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(4)- RO(3) —

This does not bestow impunity on wicked priests, because they are in danger of having to prove that they had the penitent’s permission to reveal the sin, if they should be accused of the contrary.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(4)- RO(4) —

He that is informed of a sin through the priest with the penitent’s consent, shares in an act of the priest’s, so that the same applies to him as to an interpreter, unless perchance the penitent wish him to know it unconditionally and freely.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(5) Whether a man may reveal that which he knows through confession and through some other source besides?

P(4)- Q(11)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man may not reveal what he knows through confession and through some other source besides. For the seal of confession is not broken unless one reveals a sin known through confession. If therefore a man divulges a sin which he knows through confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise, he seems to break the seal.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, whoever hears someone’s confession, is under obligation to him not to divulge his sins. Now if one were to promise someone to keep something secret, he would be bound to do so, even if he knew it through some other source. Therefore a man is bound to keep secret what he knows through the confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the stronger of two things draws the other to itself. Now the knowledge whereby a man knows a sin as God knows it, is stronger and more excellent than the knowledge whereby he knows a sin as man. Therefore it draws the latter to itself: and consequently a man cannot reveal that sin, because this is demanded by his knowing it as God knows it.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, the secrecy of confession was instituted in order to avoid scandal, and to prevent men being shy of going to confession. But if a man might say what he had heard in confession, though he knew it otherwise, scandal would result all the same. Therefore he can nowise say what he has heard.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(5) —

On the contrary, No one can put another under a new obligation, unless he be his superior, who can bind him by a precept. Now he who knew of a sin by witnessing it was not bound to keep it secret.

Therefore he that confesses to him, not being his superior, cannot put him under an obligation of secrecy by confessing to him.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(5) —

Further, the justice of the Church would be hindered if a man, in order to escape a sentence of excommunication, incurred on account of some sin, of which he has been convicted, were to confess to the person who has to sentence him. Now the execution of justice falls under a precept. Therefore a man is not bound to keep a sin secret, which he has heard in confession, but knows from some other source.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(5) —

I answer that, There are three opinions about this question. For some say that a man can by no means tell another what he has heard in confession, even if he knew it from some other source either before or after the confession: while others assert that the confession debars him from speaking of what he knew already, but not from saying what he knew afterwards and in another way. Now both these opinions, by exaggerating the seal of confession, are prejudicial to the truth and to the safeguarding of justice. For a man might be more inclined to sin, if he had no fear of being accused by his confessor supposing that he repeated the sin in his presence: and furthermore it would be most prejudicial to justice if a man could not bear witness to a deed which he has seen committed again after being confessed to him. Nor does it matter that, as some say, he ought to declare that he cannot keep it secret, for he cannot make such a declaration until the sin has already been confessed to him, and then every priest could, if he wished, divulge a sin, by making such a declaration, if this made him free to divulge it. Consequently there is a third and truer opinion, viz. that what a man knows through another source either before or after confession, he is not bound to keep secret, in so far as he knows it as a man, for he can say: “I know so end so since I saw it.” But he is bound to keep it secret in so far as he knows it as God knows it, for he cannot say: “I heard so and so in confession.”

Nevertheless, on account of the scandal he should refrain from speaking of it unless there is an urgent reason.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(5)- RO(1) —

If a man says that he has seen what he has heard in the confessional, he does not reveal what he heard in confession, save indirectly: even as one who knows something through hearing and seeing it, does not, properly speaking, divulge what he saw, if he says he heard it, but only indirectly, because he says he has heard what he incidentally saw. Wherefore he does not break the seal of confession.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The confessor is not forbidden to reveal a sin simply, but to reveal it as heard in confession: for in no case is he allowed to say that he has heard it in the confessional.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(5)- RO(3) —

This is true of things that are in opposition to one another: whereas to know a sin as God knows it, and to know it as man knows it, are not in opposition; so that the argument proves nothing.

P(4)- Q(11)- A(5)- RO(4) —

It would not be right to avoid scandal so as to desert justice: for the truth should not be gainsayed for fear of scandal.

Wherefore when justice and truth are in the balance, a man should not be deterred by the fear of giving scandal, from divulging what he has heard in confession, provided he knows it from some other source: although he ought to avoid giving scandal, as far as he is able.

QUESTION OF SATISFACTION, AS TO ITS NATURE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider satisfaction; about which four things have to be considered: (1) Its nature; (2) Its possibility; (3) Its quality; (4) The means whereby man offers satisfaction to God.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue? (2) Whether it is an act of justice? (3) Whether the definition of satisfaction contained in the text is suitable?

P(4)- Q(12)- A(1) Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?

P(4)- Q(12)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that satisfaction is neither a virtue nor an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is meritorious; whereas, seemingly, satisfaction is not, since merit is gratuitous, while satisfaction answers to a debt. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, every act of virtue is voluntary. But sometimes a man has to make satisfaction for something against his will, as when anyone is punished by the judge for an offense against another.

Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13): “Choice holds the chief place in moral virtue.” But satisfaction is not an act of choice but regards chiefly external works. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Satisfaction belongs to penance.

Now penance is a virtue. Therefore satisfaction is also an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(1) —

Further, none but an act of virtue has the effect of blotting out sin, for one contrary is destroyed by the other. Now satisfaction destroys sin altogether. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(1) —

I answer that, An act is said to be the act of a virtue in two ways. First, materially; and thus any act which implies no malice, or defect of a due circumstance, may be called an act of virtue, because virtue can make use of any such act for its end, e.g. to walk, to speak, and so forth. Secondly, an act is said to belong to a virtue formally, because its very name implies the form and nature of virtue; thus to suffer courageously is an act of courage. Now the formal element in every moral virtue is the observance of a mean. wherefore every act that implies the observance of a mean is formally an act of virtue. And since equality is the mean implied in the name of satisfaction (for a thing is said to be satisfied by reason of an equal proportion to something), it is evident that satisfaction also is formally an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although to make satisfaction is due in itself, yet, in so far as the deed is done voluntarily by the one who offers satisfaction, it becomes something gratuitous on the part of the agent, so that he makes a virtue of necessity. For debt diminishes merit through being necessary and consequently against the will, so that if the will consent to the necessity, the element of merit is not forfeited.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(1)- RO(2) —

An act of virtue demands voluntariness not in the patient but in the agent, for it is his act. Consequently since he on whom the judge wreaks vengeance is the patient and not the agent as regards satisfaction, it follows that satisfaction should be voluntary not in him but in the judge as agent.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The chief element of virtue can be understood in two ways. First, as being the chief element of virtue as virtue, and thus the chief element of virtue denotes whatever belongs to the nature of virtue or is most akin thereto; thus choice and other internal acts hold the chief place in virtue. Secondly, the chief element of virtue may be taken as denoting that which holds the first place in such and such a virtue; and then the first place belongs to that which gives its determination. Now the interior act, in certain virtues, is determined by some external act, since choice, which is common to all virtues, becomes proper to such and such a virtue through being directed to such and such an act. Thus it is that external acts hold the chief place in certain virtues; and this is the case with satisfaction.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(2) Whether satisfaction is an act of justice?

P(4)- Q(12)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that satisfaction is not an act of justice. Because the purpose of satisfaction is that one may be reconciled to the person offended. But reconciliation, being an act of love, belongs to charity. Therefore satisfaction is an act of charity and not of justice.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the causes of sin in us are the passions of the soul, which incline us to evil. But justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,3), is not about passions, but about operations.

Since therefore satisfaction aims at removing the causes of sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), it seems that it is not an act of justice.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, to be careful about the future is not an act of justice but of prudence of which caution is a part. But it belongs to satisfaction, “to give no opening to the suggestions of sin” Therefore satisfaction is not an act of justice.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(2) —

On the contrary, No virtue but justice considers the notion of that which is due. But satisfaction gives due honor to God, as Anselm states (Cur Deus Homo i). Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(2) —

Further, no virtue save justice establishes equality between external things. But this is done by satisfaction which establishes equality between amendment and the previous offense. Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(2) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3,4), the mean of justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing and thing according to a certain proportion. Wherefore, since the very name of satisfaction implies an equation of the kind, because the adverb “satis” [enough] denotes an equality of proportion, it is evident that satisfaction is formally an act of justice. Now the act of justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,4), is either an act done by one man to another, as when a man pays another what he owes him, or an act done by one man between two others, as when a judge does justice between two men. When it is an act of justice of one man to another, the equality is set up in the agent, while when it is something done between two others, the equality is set up in the subject that has suffered an injustice. And since satisfaction expresses equality in the agent, it denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one man to another. Now a man may do justice to another either in actions and passions or in external things; even as one may do an injustice to another, either by taking something away, or by a hurtful action. And since to give is to use an external thing, the act of justice, in so far as it establishes equality between external things, signifies, properly speaking, a giving back: but to make satisfaction clearly points to equality between actions, although sometimes one is put for the other. Now equalization concerns only such things as are unequal, wherefore satisfaction presupposes inequality among actions, which inequality constitutes an offense; so that satisfaction regards a previous offense. But no part of justice regards a previous offense, except vindictive justice, which establishes equality indifferently, whether the patient be the same subject as the agent, as when anyone punishes himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes another man, since vindictive justice deals with both cases. The same applies to penance, which implies equality in the agent only, since it is the penitent who holds to the penance [poenam tenet], so that penance is in a way a species of vindictive justice. This proves that satisfaction, which implies equality in the agent with respect to a previous offense, is a work of justice, as to that part which is called penance.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Satisfaction, as appears from what has been said, is compensation for injury inflicted. Wherefore as the injury inflicted entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently an inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings back directly equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship. And since an act is elicited by the habit to whose end it is immediately directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is directed ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is commanded by charity.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Although justice is chiefly about operations, yet it is consequently about passions, in so far as they are the causes of operations. Wherefore as justice curbs anger, lest it inflict an unjust injury on another, and concupiscence from invading another’s marriage right, so satisfaction removes the causes of other sins.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Each moral virtue shares in the act of prudence, because this virtue completes in it the conditions essential to virtue, since each moral virtue takes its mean according to the ruling of prudence, as is evident from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3) Whether the definition of satisfaction given in the text is suitable?

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the definition of satisfaction given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15) and quoted from Augustine [*Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] is unsuitable — viz. that “satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sins, and to give no opening to the suggestions thereof.” For the cause of actual sin is the fomes. [*”Fomes” signifies literally “fuel,” and metaphorically, “incentive.” As used by the theologian, it denotes the quasi-material element and effect of original sin, and sometimes goes under the name of “concupiscence,” Cf. P(2a), Q(82), A(3) .] But we cannot remove the “fomes” in this life. Therefore satisfaction does not consist in removing the causes of sins.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the cause of sin is stronger than sin itself. But man by himself cannot remove sin. Much less therefore can he remove the cause of sin; and so the same conclusion follows.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, since satisfaction is a part of Penance, it regards the past and not the future. Now “to give no opening to the suggestions of sin” regards the future. Therefore it should not be put in the definition of satisfaction.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, satisfaction regards a past offense. Yet no mention is made of this. Therefore the definition of satisfaction is unsuitable.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, Anselm gives another definition (Cur Deus homo i): “Satisfaction consists in giving God due honor,” wherein no reference is made to the things mentioned by Augustine [*Gennadius, O(1) ] in this definition. Therefore one or the other is unsuitable.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3)- O(6) —

Further, an innocent man can give due honor to God: whereas satisfaction is not compatible with innocence. Therefore Anselm’s definition is faulty.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3) —

I answer that, Justice aims not only at removing inequality already existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding equality for the future, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) “punishments are medicinal.” Wherefore satisfaction which is the act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins and preserving from future sins: so that when one man makes satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for the past, and takes heed for the future.

Accordingly satisfaction may be defined in two ways, first with regard to past sin, which it heals by making compensation, and thus it is defined as “compensation for an inflicted injury according to the equality of justice.”

The definition of Anselm amounts to the same, for he says that “satisfaction consists in giving God due honor”; where duty is considered in respect of the sin committed. Secondly, satisfaction may be defined, considered as preserving us from future sins; and as Augustine (Cf. O(1) ) defines it. Now preservation from bodily sickness is assured by removing the causes from which the sickness may ensue, for if they be taken away the sickness cannot follow. But it is not thus in spiritual diseases, for the free-will cannot be forced, so that even in the presence of their causes, they can, though with difficulty, be avoided, while they can be incurred even when their causes are removed. Hence he puts two things in the definition of satisfaction, viz. removal of the causes, as to the first, and the free-will’s refusal to sin.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3)- RO(1) —

By “causes” we must understand the proximate causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the lust of sin through the habit or act of a sin that has been given up, and those things which are called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions of sin, such as place, bad company and so forth. Such causes are removed by satisfaction in this life, albeit the “fomes,” which is the remote cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by satisfaction in this life though it is weakened.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Since the cause of evil or of privation (according as it has a cause) is nothing else than a defective good, and since it is easier to destroy good than to set it up, it follows that it is easier to uproot the causes of privation and of evil than to remove the evil itself, which can only be removed by setting up good, as may be seen in the case of blindness and its causes. Yet the aforesaid are not sufficient causes of sin, for sin does not, of necessity, ensue therefrom, but they are occasions of sin. Nor again can satisfaction be made without God’s help, since it is not possible without charity, as we shall state further on ( Q(14), A(2) ).

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Although Penance was primarily instituted and intended with a view to the past, yet, as a consequence, it regards the future, in so far as it is a safeguarding remedy; and the same applies to satisfaction.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Augustine [*Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl.

Dogm. liv] defined satisfaction, as made to God, from Whom, in reality, nothing can be taken, though the sinner, for his own part, takes something away. Consequently in such like satisfaction, amendment for future time is of greater weight than compensation for the past. Hence Augustine defines satisfaction from this point of view. And yet it is possible to gauge the compensation for the past from the heed taken for the future, for the latter regards the same object as the former, but in the opposite way: since when looking at the past we detest the causes of sins on account of the sins themselves, which are the starting-point of the movement of detestation: whereas when taking heed of the future, we begin from the causes, that by their removal we may avoid sins the more easily.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3)- RO(5) —

There is no reason why the same thing should not be described in different ways according to the various things found in it: and such is the case here, as explained above.

P(4)- Q(12)- A(3)- RO(6) —

By debt is meant the debt we owe to God by reason of the sins we have committed, because Penance regards a debt, as stated above ( A(2) ).

QUESTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SATISFACTION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the possibility of satisfaction, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether man can make satisfaction to God? (2) Whether one man can make satisfaction for another?

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1) Whether man can make satisfaction to God?

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that man cannot make satisfaction to God. For satisfaction should balance the offense, as shown above ( Q(12), AA(2),3 ). But an offense against God is infinite, since it is measured by the person against whom it is committed, for it is a greater offense to strike a prince than anyone else. Therefore, as no action of man can be infinite, it seems that he cannot make satisfaction to God.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, a slave cannot make compensation for a debt, since all that he has is his master’s. But we are the slaves of God, and whatever good we have, we owe to Him. Therefore, as satisfaction is compensation for a past offense, it seems that we cannot offer it to God.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, if all that a man has suffices not to pay one debt, he cannot pay another debt. Now all that man is, all that he can do, and all that he has, does not suffice to pay what he owes for the blessing of creation, wherefore it is written ( Isaiah 40:16) that “the wood of Libanus shall not be enough for a burnt offering [*Vulg.: ‘Libanus shall not be enough to burn, nor the beasts thereof for a burnt offering’].”

Therefore by no means can he make satisfaction for the debt resulting from the offense committed.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, man is bound to spend all his time in the service of God. Now time once lost cannot be recovered, wherefore, as Seneca observes (Lib. i, Ep. i, ad Lucilium) loss of time is a very grievous matter. Therefore man cannot make compensation to God, and the same conclusion follows as before.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, mortal actual sin is more grievous than original sin. But none could satisfy for original sin unless he were both God and man. Neither, therefore, can he satisfy for actual sin.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Fidei ad Damasum] says: “Whoever maintains that God has commanded anything impossible to man, let him be anathema.” But satisfaction is commanded ( Luke 3:8): “Bring forth... fruits worthy of penance.” Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to God.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1) —

Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to make satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to God.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1) —

Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment balances the fault, since “justice is the same as counterpassion,” as the Pythagoreans said [*Aristotle, Ethic. v, 5; Cf.

P(2b), Q(61), A(4) ]. Now punishment may equal the pleasure contained in a sin committed. Therefore satisfaction can be made to God.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1) —

I answer that, Man becomes God’s debtor in two ways; first, by reason of favors received, secondly, by reason of sin committed: and just as thanksgiving or worship or the like regard the debt for favors received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed.

Now in giving honor to one’s parents or to the gods, as indeed the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14), it is impossible to repay them measure for measure, but it suffices that man repay as much as he can, for friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is possible.

Yet even this is equal somewhat, viz. according to proportion, for as the debt due to God is, in comparison with God, so is what man can do, in comparison with himself, so that in another way the form of justice is preserved. It is the same as regards satisfaction. Consequently man cannot make satisfaction to God if “satis” [enough] denotes quantitative equality; but he can, if it denote proportionate equality, as explained above, and as this suffices for justice, so does it suffice for satisfaction.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Just as the offense derived a certain infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so does satisfaction derive a certain infinity from the infinity of Divine mercy, in so far as it is quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to repay becomes acceptable. Others, however, say that the offense is infinite as regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned gratuitously, but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, in which respect it is possible to make satisfaction for it. But this is not to the point, since satisfaction does not answer to sin, except as this is an offense against God, which is a matter, not of turning to a creature but of turning away from God. Others again say that even as regards the aversion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in virtue of Christ’s merit, which was, in a way, infinite. And this comes to the same as what we said before, since grace is given to believers through faith in the Mediator. If, however, He were to give grace otherwise, satisfaction would suffice in the way explained above.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Man, who was made to God’s image, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as he is master of his actions through his free-will; so that, through acting by his free-will, he can make satisfaction to God, for though it belongs to God, in so far as it was bestowed on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on him, that he might be his own master, which cannot be said of a slave.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1)- RO(3) —

This argument proves that it is impossible to make equivalent satisfaction to God, but not that it is impossible to make sufficient satisfaction to Him. For though man owes God all that he is able to give Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation that he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is impossible for him, according to his present state of life, to put forth his whole power into any one single thing, since he has to be heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain measure, viz. the fulfillment of God’s commandments, over and above which he can offer something by way of satisfaction.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Though man cannot recover the time that is past, he can in the time that follows make compensation for what he should have done in the past, since the commandment did not exact from him the fulfillment of his whole power, as stated above (ad 3).

P(4)- Q(13)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Though original sin has less of the nature of sin than actual sin has, yet it is a more grievous evil, because it is an infection of human nature itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it could not be expiated by the satisfaction of a mere man.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(2) Whether one man can fulfill satisfactory punishment for another?

P(4)- Q(13)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that one man cannot fulfill satisfactory punishment for another. Because merit is requisite for satisfaction. Now one man cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written ( Psalm 61:12): “Thou wilt render to every man according to his works.” Therefore one man cannot make satisfaction for another.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, satisfaction is condivided with contrition and confession. But one man cannot be contrite or confess for another. Neither therefore can one make satisfaction for another.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, by praying for another one merits also for oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfaction for another, he satisfies for himself by satisfying for another, so that if a man satisfy for another he need not make satisfaction for his own sins.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, if one can satisfy for another, as soon as he takes the debt of punishment on himself, this other is freed from his debt. Therefore the latter will go straight to heaven, if he die after the whole of his debt of punishment has been taken up by another; else, if he be punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid for the same sin, viz. by him who has begun to make satisfaction, and by him who is punished in Purgatory.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Galatians 6:2): “Bear ye one another’s burdens.” Therefore it seems that one can bear the burden of punishment laid upon another.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(2) —

Further, charity avails more before God than before man. Now before man, one can pay another’s debt for love of him. Much more, therefore, can this be done before the judgment seat of God.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(2) —

I answer that, Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin. Accordingly, as a remedy against future sin, the satisfaction of one does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by another’s fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing, through the actions of another, except accidentally, in so far as a man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another, since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin. But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction. on the other hand, as regards the payment of the debt, one man can satisfy for another, provided he be in a state of charity, so that his works may avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satisfies for another should undergo a greater punishment than the principal would have to undergo (as some maintain, who argue that a man profits more by his own punishment than by another’s), because punishment derives its power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man bears it. And since greater charity is evidenced by a man satisfying for another than for himself, less punishment is required of him who satisfies for another, than of the principal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 5) of one who for love of his brother did penance for a sin which his brother had not committed, and that on account of his charity his brother was released from a sin which he had committed. Nor is it necessary that the one for whom satisfaction is made should be unable to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were able, he would be released from his debt when the other satisfied in his stead. But this is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment is medicinal: so that a man is not to be allowed to do penance for another, unless there be evidence of some defect in the penitent, either bodily, so that he is unable to bear it, or spiritual, so that he is not ready to undergo it.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The essential reward is bestowed on a man according to his disposition, because the fulness of the sight of God will be according to the capacity of those who see Him. Wherefore just as one man is not disposed thereto by another’s act, so one man does not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit has infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby children come to eternal life through Baptism.

On the other hand, the temporal punishment due to sin after the guilt has been forgiven is not measured according to the disposition of the man to whom it is due, since sometimes the better man owes a greater debt of punishment. Consequently one man can merit for another as regards release from punishment, and one man’s act becomes another’s, by means of charity whereby we are “all one in Christ” ( Galatians 3:28).

P(4)- Q(13)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Contrition is ordained against the guilt which affects a man’s disposition to goodness or malice, so that one man is not freed from guilt by another’s contrition. In like manner by confession a man submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor can one man receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacrament grace is given to the recipient, not to another. Consequently there is no comparison between satisfaction and contrition and confession.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(2)- RO(3) —

In the payment of the debt we consider the measure of the punishment, whereas in merit we regard the root which is charity: wherefore he that, through charity, merits for another, at least congruously, merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies for another does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure of the punishment does not suffice for the sins of both, although by satisfying for another he merits something greater than the release from punishment, viz. eternal life.

P(4)- Q(13)- A(2)- RO(4) —

If this man bound himself to undergo a certain punishment, he would not be released from the debt before paying it: wherefore he himself will suffer the punishment, as long as the other makes satisfaction for him: and if he do not this, then both are debtors in respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin committed, the other for his omission, so that it does not follow that one sin is twice punished.

QUESTION OF THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quality of satisfaction, under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another? (2) Whether if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins which were pardoned him through his contrition? (3) Whether a man’s previous satisfaction begins to avail when he recovers charity? (4) Whether works done without charity merit any good? (5) Whether such works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?

P(4)- Q(14)- A(1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?

P(4)- Q(14)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another. Because when several things are not connected together one can be taken away without another. Now sins are not connected together, else whoever had one would have them all.

Therefore one sin can be expiated by satisfaction, without another.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, God is more merciful than man. But man accepts the payment of one debt without the payment of another.

Therefore God accepts satisfaction for one sin without the other.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), “satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sin, and give no opening to the suggestions thereof.” Now this can be done with regard to one sin and not another, as when a mall curbs his lust and perseveres in covetousness.

Therefore we can make satisfaction for one sin without satisfying for another.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The fast of those who fasted “for debates and strifes” ( Isaiah 58:4,5) was not acceptable to God, though fasting be a work of satisfaction. Now satisfaction cannot be made save by works that are acceptable to God. Therefore he that has a sin on his conscience cannot make satisfaction to God.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(1) —

Further, satisfaction is a remedy for the healing of past sins, and for preserving from future sins, as stated above ( Q(12), A(3) ). But without grace it is impossible to avoid sins. Therefore, since each sin excludes grace, it is not possible to make satisfaction for one sin and not for another.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(1) —

I answer that, Some have held that it is possible to make satisfaction for one sin and not for another, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 15). But this cannot be. For since the previous offense has to be removed by satisfaction, the mode of satisfaction must needs be consistent with the removal of the offense. Now removal of offense is renewal of friendship: wherefore if there be anything to hinder the renewal of friendship there can be no satisfaction. Since, therefore, every sin is a hindrance to the friendship of charity, which is the friendship of man for God, it is impossible for man to make satisfaction for one sin while holding to another: even as neither would a man make satisfaction to another for a blow, if while throwing himself at his feet he were to give him another.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As sins are not connected together in some single one, a man can incur one without incurring another; whereas all sins are remitted by reason of one same thing, so that the remissions of various sins are connected together. Consequently satisfaction cannot be made for one and not for another.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(1)- RO(2) —

When a man is under obligation to another by reason of a debt, the only inequality between them is that which is opposed to justice, so that for restitution nothing further is required than that the equality of justice should be reinstated, and this can be done in respect of one debt without another. But when the obligation is based on an offense, there is inequality not only of justice but also of friendship, so that for the offense to be removed by satisfaction, not only must the equality of justice be restored by the payment of a punishment equal to the offense, but also the equality of friendship must be reinstated, which is impossible so long as an obstacle to friendship remains.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(1)- RO(3) —

By its weight, one sin drags us down to another, as Gregory says (Moral. xxv): so that when a man holds to one sin, he does not sufficiently cut himself off from the causes of further sin.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(2) Whether, when deprived of charity, a man can make satisfaction for sins for which he was previously contrite?

P(4)- Q(14)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins which were already pardoned him through his contrition.

For Daniel said to Nabuchodonosor ( Daniel 4:24): “Redeem thou thy sins with alms.” Yet he was still a sinner, as is shown by his subsequent punishment. Therefore a man can make satisfaction while in a state of sin.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, “Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred” ( Ecclesiastes 9:1). If therefore one cannot make satisfaction unless one be in a state of charity, it would be impossible to know whether one had made satisfaction, which would be unseemly.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a man’s entire action takes its form from the intention which he had at the beginning. But a penitent is in a state of charity when he begins to repent. Therefore his whole subsequent satisfaction will derive its efficacy from the charity which quickens his intention.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, satisfaction consists in a certain equalization of guilt to punishment. But these things can be equalized even in one who is devoid of charity. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(2) —

On the contrary, “Charity covereth all sins” ( Proverbs 10:12). But satisfaction has the power of blotting out sins.

Therefore it is powerless without charity.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(2) —

Further, the chief work of satisfaction is almsdeeds.

But alms given by one who is devoid of charity avail nothing, as is clearly stated 1 Corinthians 13:3, “If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor... and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.”

Therefore there can be no satisfaction with mortal sin.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(2) —

I answer that, Some have said that if, when all a man’s sins have been pardoned through contrition, and before he has made satisfaction for them, he falls into sin, and then makes satisfaction, such satisfaction will be valid, so that if he die in that sin, he will not be punished in hell for the other sins.

But this cannot be, because satisfaction requires the reinstatement of friendship and the restoration of the equality of justice, the contrary of which destroys friendship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 1,3). Now in satisfaction made to God, the equality is based, not on equivalence but rather on God’s acceptation: so that, although the offense be already removed by previous contrition, the works of satisfaction must be acceptable to God, and for this they are dependent on charity.

Consequently works done without charity are not satisfactory.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Daniel’s advice meant that he should give up sin and repent, and so make satisfaction by giving alms.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Even as man knows not for certain whether he had charity when making satisfaction, or whether he has it now, so too he knows not for certain whether he made full satisfaction: wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:5): “Be not without fear about sin forgiven.” And yet man need not, on account of that fear, repeat the satisfaction made, if he is not conscious of a mortal sin. For although he may not have expiated his punishment by that satisfaction, he does not incur the guilt of omission through neglecting to make satisfaction; even as he who receives the Eucharist without being conscious of a mortal sin of which he is guilty, does not incur the guilt of receiving unworthily.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(2)- RO(3) —

His intention was interrupted by his subsequent sin, so that it gives no virtue to the works done after that sin.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Sufficient equalization is impossible both as to the Divine acceptation and as to equivalence: so that the argument proves nothing.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(3) Whether previous satisfaction begins to avail after man is restored to charity?

P(4)- Q(14)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that when a man has recovered charity his previous satisfaction begins to avail, because a gloss on Leviticus 25:25, “If thy brother being impoverished,” etc., says that “the fruit of a man’s good works should be counted from the time when he sinned.” But they would not be counted, unless they derived some efficacy from his subsequent charity. Therefore they begin to avail after he recovers charity.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, as the efficacy of satisfaction is hindered by sin, so the efficacy of Baptism is hindered by insincerity.

Now Baptism begins to avail when insincerity ceases. Therefore satisfaction begins to avail when sin is taken away.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, if a man is given as a penance for the sins he has committed, to fast for several days, and then, after falling again into sin, he completes his penance, he is not told, when he goes to confession a second time, to fast once again. But he would be told to do so, if he did not fulfill his duty of satisfaction by them. Therefore his previous works become valid unto satisfaction, through his subsequent repentance.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Works done without charity were not satisfactory, through being dead works. But they are not quickened by penance. Therefore they do not begin to be satisfactory.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(3) —

Further, charity does not quicken a work, unless in some way that work proceeds therefrom. But works cannot be acceptable to God, and therefore cannot be satisfactory, unless they be quickened by charity. Since then the works done without charity, in no way proceeded from charity, nor ever can proceed therefrom, they can by no means count towards satisfaction.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(3) —

I answer that, Some have said that works done while in a state of charity, which are called living works, are meritorious in respect of eternal life, and satisfactory in respect of paying off the debt of punishment; and that by subsequent charity, works done without charity are quickened so as to be satisfactory, but not so as to be meritorious of eternal life. But this is impossible, because works done in charity produce both these effects for the same reason, viz. because they are pleasing to God: wherefore just as charity by its advent cannot make works done without charity to be pleasing in one respect, so neither can it make them pleasing in the other respect.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(3)- RO(1) —

This means that the fruits are reckoned, not from the time when he was first in sin, but from the time when he ceased to sin, when, to wit, he was last in sin; unless he was contrite as soon as he had sinned, and did many good actions before he confessed. Or we may say that the greater the contrition the more it alleviates the punishment, and the more good actions a man does while in sin, the more he disposes himself to the grace of contrition, so that it is probable that he owes a smaller debt of punishment. For this reason the priest should use discretion in taking them into account, so as to give him a lighter penance, according as he finds him better disposed.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Baptism imprints a character on the soul, whereas satisfaction does not. Hence on the advent of charity, which removes both insincerity and sin, it causes Baptism to have its effect, whereas it does not do this for satisfaction. Moreover Baptism confers justification in virtue of the deed [ex opere operato] which is not man’s deed but God’s, wherefore it does not become a lifeless deed as satisfaction does, which is a deed of man.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Sometimes satisfaction is such as to leave an effect in the person who makes satisfaction, even after the act of satisfaction has been done; thus fasting leaves the body weak, and almsdeeds result in a diminution of a person’s substance, and so on. In such cases there is no need to repeat the works of satisfaction if they have been done while in a state of sin, because through penance they are acceptable to God in the result they leave behind. But when a work of satisfaction leaves behind no effect in the person that does satisfaction, it needs to be repeated, as in the case of prayer and so forth. Interior works, since they pass away altogether, are nowise quickened, and must be repeated.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(4) Whether works done without charity merit any, at least temporal, good?

P(4)- Q(14)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that works done without charity merit some, at least a temporal, good. For as punishment is to the evil act, so is reward to a good act. Now no evil deed is unpunished by God the just judge. Therefore no good deed is unrewarded, and so every good deed merits some good.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, reward is not given except for merit.

Now some reward is given for works done without charity, wherefore it is written ( Matthew 6:2,5,16) of those who do good actions for the sake of human glory, that “they have received their reward.” Therefore those works merit some good.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, if there be two men both in sin, one of whom does many deeds that are good in themselves and in their circumstances, while the other does none, they are not equally near to the reception of good things from Gods else the latter need not be advised to do any good deeds. Now he that is nearer to God receives more of His good things. Therefore the former, on account of his good works, merits some good from God.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Augustine says that “the sinner is not worthy of the bread he eats.” Therefore he cannot merit anything from God.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(4) —

Further, he that is nothing, can merit nothing. But a sinner, through not having charity, is nothing in respect of spiritual being, according to 1 Corinthians 13:2. Therefore he can merit nothing.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(4) —

I answer that, Properly speaking a merit is an action on account of which it is just that the agent should be given something.

Now justice is twofold: first, there is justice properly so called, which regards something due on the part of the recipient. Secondly, there is metaphorical justice, so to speak, which regards something due on the part of the giver, for it may be right for the giver to give something to which the receiver has no claim. In this sense the “fitness of the Divine goodness” is justice; thus Anselm says (Proslog. x) that “God is just when He spares the sinner, because this is befitting.” And in this way merit is also twofold.

The first is an act in respect of which the agent himself has a claim to receive something, and this is called merit of “condignity.” The second is an act the result of which is that there is a duty of giving in the giver by reason of fittingness, wherefore it is called merit of “congruity.” Now since in all gratuitous givings, the primary reason of the giving is love, it is impossible for anyone, properly speaking, to lay claim to a gift, if he lack friendship. Wherefore, as all things, whether temporal or eternal, are bestowed on us by the bounty of God, no one can acquire a claim to any of them, save through charity towards God: so that works done without charity are not condignly meritorious of any good from God either eternal or temporal. But since it is befitting the goodness of God, that wherever He finds a disposition He should grant the perfection, a man is said to merit congruously some good by means of good works done without charity. Accordingly suchlike works avail for a threefold good, acquisition of temporal goods, disposition to grace, habituation to good works. Since, however, this is not merit properly so called, we should grant that such works are not meritorious of any good, rather than that they are.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(4)- RO(1) —

As the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), since no matter what a son may do, he can never give back to his father the equal of what he has received from him a father can never become his son’s debtor: and much less can man make God his debtor on account of equivalence of work. Consequently no work of ours can merit a reward by reason of its measure of goodness, but it can by reason of charity, which makes friends hold their possessions in common. Therefore, no matter how good a work may be, if it be done without charity, it does not give man a claim to receive anything from God. On the other hand, an evil deed deserves an equivalent punishment according to the measure of its malice, because no evil has been done to us on the part of God, like the good which He has done. Therefore, although an evil deed deserves condign punishment, nevertheless a good deed without charity does not merit condign reward.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(4)- RO(2,3) —

These arguments consider merit of congruity; while the other arguments consider merit of condignity.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(5) Whether the aforesaid works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?

P(4)- Q(14)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that the aforesaid works do not avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell. For the measure of punishment in hell will answer to the measure of guilt. But works done without charity do not diminish the measure of guilt. Neither, therefore, do they lessen the pains of hell.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, the pain of hell, though infinite in duration, is nevertheless finite in intensity. Now anything finite is done away with by finite subtraction. If therefore works done without charity canceled any of the punishment due for sins, those works might be so numerous, that the pain of hell would be done away with altogether: which is false.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the suffrages of the Church are more efficacious than works done without charity. But, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cx), “the suffrages of the Church do not profit the damned in hell.” Much less therefore are those pains mitigated by works done without charity.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Augustine also says (Enchiridion cx): “Whomsoever they profit, either receive a full pardon, or at least find damnation itself more tolerable.”

P(4)- Q(14)- A(5) —

Further, it is a greater thing to do a good deed than to omit an evil deed. But the omission of an evil deed always avoids a punishment, even in one who lacks charity. Much more, therefore, do good deeds void punishment.

P(4)- Q(14)- A(5) —

I answer that, Mitigation of the pains of hell can be understood in two ways: first, as though one were delivered from the punishment which he already deserved, and thus, since no one is delivered from punishment unless he be absolved from guilt, (for an effect is not diminished or taken away unless its cause be diminished or taken away), the pain of hell cannot be mitigated by works done without charity, since they are unable to remove or diminish guilt. Secondly, so that the demerit of punishment is hindered; and thus the aforesaid works diminish the pain of hell — first because he who does such works escapes being guilty of omitting them — secondly, because such works dispose one somewhat to good, so that a man sins from less contempt, and indeed is drawn away from many sins thereby.

These works do, however merit a diminution or postponement of temporal punishment, as in the case of Achab ( 1 Kings 21:27, seqq.), as also the acquisition of temporal goods.

Some, however, say that they mitigate the pains of hell, not by subtracting any of their substance, but by strengthening the subject, so that he is more able to bear them. But this is impossible, because there is no strengthening without a diminution of passibility. Now passibility is according to the measure of guilt, wherefore if guilt is not removed, neither can the subject be strengthened.

Some again say that the punishment is mitigated as to the remorse of conscience, though not as to the pain of fire. But neither will this stand, because as the pain of fire is equal to the guilt, so also is the pain of the remorse of conscience: so that what applies to one applies to the other.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

QUESTION OF THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the means of making satisfaction, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works? (2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are satisfactory? (3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer?

P(4)- Q(15)- A(1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?

P(4)- Q(15)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for the offense committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given to God by penal works, for God does not delight in our sufferings, as appears from Tobias 3:22. Therefore satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the greater the charity from which a work proceeds, the less penal is that work, for “charity hath no pain [*Vulg.: ‘Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain’]” according to 1 John 4:18. If therefore works of satisfaction need to be penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will they be: which is false.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, “Satisfaction,” as Anselm states (Cur Deus homo i) “consists in giving due honor to God.” But this can be done by other means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by means of penal works.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): “It is just that the sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so much the greater suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself by his sin.”

P(4)- Q(15)- A(1) —

Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly healed by satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore satisfaction should be made by means of penal works.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(12), A(3) ), satisfaction regards both the past offense, for which compensation is made by its means, and also future sin wherefrom we are preserved thereby: and in both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works.

For compensation for an offense implies equality, which must needs be between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization in human justice consists in taking away from one that which he has too much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been taken.

And, although nothing can be taken away from God, so far as He is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him of something by sinning as stated above ( Q(12), AA(3),4 ). Consequently, in order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that may conduce to the glory of God must be taken away from the sinner. Now a good work, as such, does not deprive the agent of anything, but perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work unless it be penal. Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it needs to be good that it may conduce to God’s honor, and it must be penal, so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.

Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of the punishment.

Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) punishments are medicinal.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Though God does not delight in our punishments as such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and thus they can be satisfactory.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note the penality of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its difficulty. Now if the difficulty of the work itself be diminished, other things being equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the difficulty be diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will, this does not diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like manner, diminution of the penality of a work, on account of the will being made more prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of satisfaction, but increases it.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(1)- RO(3) —

That which is due for sin is compensation for the offense, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner. It is of this debt that Anselm speaks.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(2) Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory?

P(4)- Q(15)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the scourges whereby we are punished by God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. For nothing but what is meritorious can be satisfactory, as is clear from what has been said ( Q(14), A(2) ). But we do not merit except by what is in our own power.

Since therefore the scourges with which God punishes us are not in our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, only the good make satisfaction. But these scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, and are deserved by them most of all. Therefore they cannot be satisfactory.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, satisfaction regards past sins. But these scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who have no sins, as in the case of Job. Therefore it seems that they are not satisfactory.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Romans 5:3,4) “Tribulation worketh patience, and patience trial, i.e. deliverance from sin,” as a gloss explains it.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(2) —

Further, Ambrose says (Super <19B801> Psalm 118): “Although faith,” i.e. the consciousness of sin, “be lacking, the punishment satisfies.” Therefore the scourges of this life are satisfactory.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(2) —

I answer that, Compensation for a past offense can be enforced either by the offender or by another. When it is enforced by another, such compensation is of a vindictive rather than of a satisfactory nature, whereas when it is made by the offender, it is also satisfactory.

Consequently, if the scourges, which are inflicted by God on account of sin, become in some way the act of the sufferer they acquire a satisfactory character. Now they become the act of the sufferer in so far as he accepts them for the cleansing of his sins, by taking advantage of them patiently.

If, however, he refuse to submit to them patiently, then they do not become his personal act in any way, and are not of a satisfactory, but merely of a vindictive character.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Although these scourges are not altogether in our power, yet in some respect they are, in so far as we use them patiently. In this way man makes a virtue of necessity, so that such things can become both meritorious and satisfactory.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(2)- RO(2) —

As Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 8), even as “the same fire makes gold glisten and straw reek,” so by the same scourges are the good cleansed and the wicked worsened on account of their impatience. Hence, though the scourges are common to both, satisfaction is only on the side of the good.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(2)- RO(3) —

These scourges always regard past guilt, not always the guilt of the person, but sometimes the guilt of nature. For had there not been guilt in human nature, there would have been no punishment. But since guilt preceded in nature, punishment is inflicted by God on a person without the person’s fault, that his virtue may be meritorious, and that he may avoid future sin. Moreover, these two things are necessary in satisfaction. For the work needs to be meritorious, that honor may be given to God, and it must be a safeguard of virtue, that we may be preserved from future sins.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably enumerated?

P(4)- Q(15)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the works of satisfaction are unsuitably enumerated by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer. For a work of satisfaction should be penal. But prayer is not penal, since it is a remedy against penal sorrow, and is a source of pleasure, wherefore it is written ( James 5:13): “Is any of you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him sing.” Therefore prayer should not be reckoned among the works of satisfaction.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, every sin is either carnal or spiritual.

Now, as Jerome says on Mark 9:28, “This kind” of demons “can go out by nothing, but by prayer and fasting: Diseases of the body are healed by fasting, diseases of the mind, by prayer.” Therefore no other work of satisfaction is necessary.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, satisfaction is necessary in order for us to be cleansed from our sins. But almsgiving cleanses from all sins, according to Luke 11:41: “Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you.” Therefore the other two are in excess.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(3)- O(4) —

On the other hand, it seems that there should be more. For contrary heals contrary. But there are many more than three kinds of sin. Therefore more works of satisfaction should be enumerated.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, pilgrimages and scourgings are also enjoined as works of satisfaction, and are not included among the above.

Therefore they are not sufficiently enumerated.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(3) —

I answer that, Satisfaction should be of such a nature as to involve something taken away from us for the honor of God. Now we have but three kinds of goods, bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or external goods. By alms-deeds we deprive ourselves of some goods of fortune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to goods of the soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves of any of them, either in whole or in part, since thereby we become acceptable to God, but we should submit them entirely to God, which is done by prayer.

This number is shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction uproots the causes of sin, for these are reckoned to be three ( 1 John 2:16), viz. “concupiscence of the flesh,” “concupiscence of the eyes,” and “pride of life.” Fasting is directed against concupiscence of the “flesh,” alms-deeds against concupiscence of the “eyes,” and “prayer” against “pride of life,” as Augustine says (Enarr. in Psalm 42).

This number is also shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction does not open a way to the suggestions of sin, because every sin is committed either against God, and this is prevented by “prayer,” or against our neighbor, and this is remedied by “alms-deeds,” or against ourselves, and this is forestalled by “fasting.”

P(4)- Q(15)- A(3)- RO(1) —

According to some, prayer is twofold. There is the prayer of contemplatives whose “conversation is in heaven”: and this, since it is altogether delightful, is not a work of satisfaction. The other is a prayer which pours forth sighs for sin; this is penal and a part of satisfaction.

It may also be replied, and better, that every prayer has the character of satisfaction, for though it be sweet to the soul it is painful to the body, since, as Gregory says (Super Ezech., Hom. xiv), “doubtless, when our soul’s love is strengthened, our body’s strength is weakened”; hence we read ( Genesis 32:25) that the sinew of Jacob’s thigh shrank through his wrestling with the angel.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Carnal sin is twofold; one which is completed in carnal delectation, as gluttony and lust. and, another which is completed in things relating to the flesh, though it be completed in the delectation of the soul rather than of the flesh, as covetousness. Hence such like sins are between spiritual and carnal sins, so that they need a satisfaction proper to them, viz. almsdeeds.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Although each of these three, by a kind of likeness, is appropriated to some particular kind of sin because it is reasonable that, whereby a man sins, in that he should be punished, and that satisfaction should cut out the very root of the sin committed, yet each of them can satisfy for any kind of sin. Hence if a man is unable to perform one of the above, another is imposed on him, chiefly almsdeeds, which can take the place of the others, in so far as in those to whom a man gives alms he purchases other works of satisfaction thereby. Consequently even if almsgiving washes all sins away, it does not follow that other works are in excess.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Though there are many kinds of sins, all are reduced to those three roots or to those three kinds of sin, to which, as we have said, the aforesaid works of satisfaction correspond.

P(4)- Q(15)- A(3)- RO(5) —

Whatever relates to affliction of the body is all referred to fasting, and whatever is spent for the benefit of one’s neighbor is a kind of alms, and whatever act of worship is given to God becomes a kind of prayer, so that even one work can be satisfactory in several ways.

QUESTION OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the recipients of the sacrament of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether penance can be in the innocent? (2) Whether it can be in the saints in glory? (3) Whether in the good or bad angels?

P(4)- Q(16)- A(1) Whether penance can be in the innocent?

P(4)- Q(16)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that penance cannot be in the innocent. For penance consists in bewailing one’s evil deeds: whereas the innocent have done no evil. Therefore penance cannot be in them.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the very name of penance [poenitentia] implies punishment [poena]. But the innocent do not deserve punishment.

Therefore penance is not in them.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, penance coincides with vindictive justice. But if all were innocent, there would be no room for vindictive justice. Therefore there would be no penance, so that there is none in the innocent.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(1) —

On the contrary, All the virtues are infused together.

But penance is a virtue. Since, therefore, other virtues are infused into the innocent at Baptism, penance is infused with them.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(1) —

Further, a man is said to be curable though he has never been sick in body: therefore in like manner, one who has never been sick spiritually. Now even as there can be no actual cure from the wound of sin without an act of penance, so is there no possibility of cure without the habit of penance. Therefore one who has never had the disease of sin, has the habit of penance.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(1) —

I answer that, Habit comes between power and act: and since the removal of what precedes entails the removal of what follows, but not conversely, the removal of the habit ensues from the removal of the power to act, but not from the removal of the act. And because removal of the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can be no act without the matter into which it passes, hence the habit of a virtue is possible in one for whom the matter is not available, for the reason that it can be available, so that the habit can proceed to its act — thus a poor man can have the habit of magnificence, but not the act, because he is not possessed of great wealth which is the matter of magnificence, but he can be possessed thereof.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although the innocent have committed no sin, nevertheless they can, so that they are competent to have the habit of penance. Yet this habit can never proceed to its act, except perhaps with regard to their venial sins, because mortal sins destroy the habit.

Nevertheless it is not without its purpose, because it is a perfection of the natural power.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Although they deserve no punishment actually, yet it is possible for something to be in them for which they would deserve to be punished.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(1)- RO(3) —

So long as the power to sin remains, there would be room for vindictive justice as to the habit, though not as to the act, if there were no actual sins.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(2) Whether the saints in glory have penance?

P(4)- Q(16)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the saints in glory have not penance. For, as Gregory says (Moral. iv), “the blessed remember their sins, even as we, without grief, remember our griefs after we have been healed.” But penance is grief of the heart. Therefore the saints in heaven have not penance.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the saints in heaven are conformed to Christ. But there was no penance in Christ, since there was no faith which is the principle of penance. Therefore there will be no penance in the saints in heaven.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a habit is useless if it is not reduced to its act. But the saints in heaven will not repent actually, because, if they did, there would be something in them against their wish. Therefore the habit of penance will not be in them.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(2)- O(4) —

On the other hand, penance is a part of justice.

But justice is “perpetual and immortal” (Wis. 1:15), and will remain in heaven. Therefore penance will also.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers, that one of them said that even Abraham will repent of not having done more good. But one ought to repent of evil done more than of good left undone, and which one was not bound to do, for such is the good in question. Therefore repentance will be there of evil done.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(2) —

I answer that, The cardinal virtues will remain in heaven, but only as regards the acts which they exercise in respect of their end. Wherefore, since the virtue of penance is a part of justice which is a cardinal virtue, whoever has the habit of penance in this life, will have it in the life to come: but he will not have the same act as now, but another, viz. thanksgiving to God for His mercy in pardoning his sins.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This argument proves that they do not have the same act as penance has now; and we grant this.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Christ could not sin, wherefore the matter of this virtue was lacking in His respect both actually and potentially: so that there is no comparison between Him and others.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Repentance, properly speaking, considered as that act of penance which is in this life, will not be in heaven: and yet the habit will not be without its use, for it will have another act.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(2)- RO(4,5) —

We grant the Fourth argument. But since the Fifth Objection proves that there will be the same act of penance in heaven as now, we answer the latter by saying that in heaven one will be altogether conformed to the will of God. Wherefore, as God, by His antecedent will, but not by His consequent will, wishes that all things should be good, and therefore that there should be no evil, so is it with the blessed. It is this will that this holy father improperly calls penance.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(3) Whether an angel can be the subject of penance?

P(4)- Q(16)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that even a good or bad angel can be a subject of penance. For fear is the beginning of penance. But fear is in the angels, according to James 2:19: “The devils... believe and tremble.”

Therefore there can be penance in them.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that “evil men are full of repentance, and this is a great punishment for them.”

Now the devils are exceeding evil, nor is there any punishment that they lack. Therefore they can repent.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, a thing is more easily moved to that which is according to its nature than to that which is against its nature: thus water which has by violence been heated, of itself returns to its natural property. Now angels can be moved to sin which is contrary to their common nature. Much more therefore can they return to that which is in accord with their nature. But this is done by penance. Therefore they are susceptible to penance.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, what applies to angels, applies equally to separated souls, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). But there can be penance in separated souls, as some say, as in the souls of the blessed in heaven. Therefore there can be penance in the angels.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(3) —

On the contrary, By penance man obtains pardon for the sin he has committed. But this is impossible in the angels. Therefore they are not subjects of penance.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(3) —

Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that man is subject to penance on account of the weakness of his body. But the angels are not united to a body. Therefore no penance can be in them.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(3) —

I answer that, In us, penance is taken in two senses; first, as a passion, and thus it is nothing but pain or sorrow on account of a sin committed: and though, as a passion it is only in the concupiscible part, yet, by way of comparison, the name of penance is given to that act of the will, whereby a man detests what he has done, even as love and other passions are spoken of as though they were in the intellectual appetite. Secondly, penance is taken as a virtue, and in this way its act consists in the detestation of evil done, together with the purpose of amendment and the intention of expiating the evil, or of placating God for the offense committed. Now detestation of evil befits a person according as he is naturally ordained to good. And since this order or inclination is not entirely destroyed in any creature, it remains even in the damned, and consequently the passion of repentance, or something like it, remains in them too, as stated in Wis. 5:3 “(saying) within themselves, repenting,” etc. This repentance, as it is not a habit, but a passion or act, can by no means be in the blessed angels, who have not committed any sins: but it is in the wicked angels, since the same applies to them as to the lost souls, for, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4), “death is to men what sin is to an angel.” But no forgiveness is possible for the sin of an angel.

Now sin is the proper object of the virtue itself which we call penance, in so far as it can be pardoned or expiated. Therefore, since the wicked angels cannot have the matter, they have not the power to produce the act, so that neither can they have the habit. Hence the angels cannot be subjects of the virtue of penance.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(3)- RO(1) —

A certain movement of penance is engendered in them from fear, but not such as is a virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Whatever is natural in them is entirely good, and inclines to good: but their free-will is fixed on evil. And since the movement of virtue and vice follows the inclination, not of nature, but of the free-will, there is no need that there should be movements of virtue in them either actually or possibly, although they are inclined to good by nature.

P(4)- Q(16)- A(3)- RO(4) —

There is no parity between the holy angels and the beatified souls, because in the latter there has been or could have been a sin that could be pardoned, but not in the former: so that though they are like as to their present state, they differ as to their previous states, which penance regards directly.

QUESTION OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the power of the ministers of this sacrament, which power depends on the keys. As to this matter, in the first place we shall treat of the keys, secondly, of excommunication, thirdly, of indulgences, since these two things are connected with the power of the keys. The first of these considerations will be fourfold: (1) the nature and meaning of the keys. (2) the use of the keys; (3) the ministers of the keys; (4) those on whom the use of the keys can be exercised.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there ought to be keys in the Church? (2) Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.? (3) Whether there are two keys or only one?

P(4)- Q(17)- A(1) Whether there should be keys in the Church?

P(4)- Q(17)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that there is no necessity for keys in the Church. For there is no need for keys that one may enter a house the door of which is open. But it is written ( Revelation 4:1): “I looked and behold a door was opened in heaven,” which door is Christ, for He said of Himself ( John 10:7): “I am the door.” Therefore the Church needs no keys for the entrance into heaven.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, a key is needed for opening and shutting. But this belongs to Christ alone, “Who openeth and no man shutteth, shutteth and no man openeth” ( Revelation 3:7). Therefore the Church has no keys in the hands of her ministers.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, hell is opened to whomever heaven is closed, and vice versa. Therefore whoever has the keys of heaven, has the keys of hell. But the Church is not said to have the keys of hell. Therefore neither has she the keys of heaven.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Matthew 16:19): “To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven.”

P(4)- Q(17)- A(1) —

Further, every dispenser should have the keys of the things that he dispenses. But the ministers of the Church are the dispensers of the divine mysteries, as appears from 1 Corinthians 4:1.

Therefore they ought to have the keys.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(1) —

I answer that, In material things a key is an instrument for opening a door. Now the door of the kingdom is closed to us through sin, both as to the stain and as to the debt of punishment.

Wherefore the power of removing this obstacle is called a key. Now this power is in the Divine Trinity by authority; hence some say that God has the key of “authority.” But Christ Man had the power to remove the above obstacle, through the merit of His Passion, which also is said to open the door; hence some say that He has the keys of “excellence.” And since “the sacraments of which the Church is built, flowed from the side of Christ while He lay asleep on the cross” [*Augustine, Enarr. in Psalm 138], the efficacy of the Passion abides in the sacraments of the Church.

Wherefore a certain power for the removal of the aforesaid obstacle is bestowed on the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments, not by their own, but by a Divine power and by the Passion of Christ. This power is called metaphorically the Church’s key, and is the key of “ministry.”

P(4)- Q(17)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The door of heaven, considered in itself, is ever open, but it is said to be closed to someone, on account of some obstacle against entering therein, which is in himself. The obstacle which the entire human nature inherited from the sin of the first man was removed by Christ’s Passion; hence, after the Passion, John saw an opened door in heaven. Yet that door still remains closed to this or that man, on account of the original sin which he has contracted, or the actual sin which he has committed: hence we need the sacraments and the keys of the Church.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(1)- RO(2) —

This refers to His closing Limbo, so that thenceforth no one should go there, and to His opening of Paradise, the obstacle of nature being removed by His Passion.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The key whereby hell is opened and closed, is the power of bestowing grace, whereby hell is opened to man, so that he is taken out from sin which is the door of hell, and closed, so that by the help of grace man should no more fall into sin. Now the power of bestowing grace belongs to God alone, wherefore He kept this key to Himself. But the key of the kingdom is also the power to remit the debt of temporal punishment, which debt prevents man from entering the kingdom Consequently the key of the kingdom can be given to man rather than the key of hell, for they are not the same, as is clear from what has been said.

For a man may be set free from hell by the remission of the debt of eternal punishment, without being at once admitted to the kingdom, on account of his yet owing a debt of temporal punishment.

It may also be replied, as some state, that the key of heaven is also the key of hell, since if one is opened to a man, the other, for that very reason, is closed to him, but it takes its name from the better of the two.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(2) Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.?

P(4)- Q(17)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the key is not the power of binding and loosing, whereby “the ecclesiastical judge has to admit the worthy to the kingdom and exclude the unworthy” therefrom, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 16). For the spiritual power conferred in a sacrament is the same as the character. But the key and the character do not seem to be the same, since by the character man is referred to God, whereas by the key he is referred to his subjects. Therefore the key is not a power.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, an ecclesiastical judge is only one who has jurisdiction, which is not given at the same time as orders. But the keys are given in the conferring of orders. Therefore there should have been no mention of the ecclesiastical judge in the definition of the keys.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, when a man has something of himself, he needs not to be reduced to act by some active power. Now a man is admitted to the kingdom from the very fact that he is worthy. Therefore it does not concern the power of the keys to admit the worthy to the kingdom.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, sinners are unworthy of the kingdom.

But the Church prays for sinners, that they may go to heaven. Therefore she does not exclude the unworthy, but admits them, so far as she is concerned.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, in every ordered series of agents, the last end belongs to the principal and not to the instrumental agent. But the principal agent in view of man’s salvation is God. Therefore admission to the kingdom, which is the last end, belongs to Him, and not to those who have the keys, who are as instrumental or ministerial agents.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(2) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text. 33), “powers are defined from their acts.” Wherefore, since the key is a kind of power, it should be defined from its act or use, and reference to the act should include its object from which it takes its species, and the mode of acting whereby the power is shown to be wellordered.

Now the act of the spiritual power is to open heaven, not absolutely, since it is already open, as stated above ( A(1), ad 1), but for this or that man; and this cannot be done in an orderly manner without due consideration of the worthiness of the one to be admitted to heaven. Hence the aforesaid definition of the key gives the genus, viz. “power,” the subject of the power, viz. the “ecclesiastical judge,” and the act, viz. “of excluding or admitting,” corresponding to the two acts of a material key which are to open and shut; the object of which act is referred to in the words “from the kingdom,” and the mode, in the words, “worthy” and “unworthy,” because account is taken of the worthiness or unworthiness of those on whom the act is exercised.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The same power is directed to two things, of which one is the cause of the other, as heat, in fire, is directed to make a thing hot and to melt it. And since every grace and remission in a mystical body comes to it from its head, it seems that it is essentially the same power whereby a priest can consecrate, and whereby he can loose and bind, if he has jurisdiction, and that there is only a logical difference, according as it is referred to different effects, even as fire in one respect is said to have the power of heating, and in another, the power of melting.

And because the character of the priestly order is nothing else than the power of exercising that act to which the priestly order is chiefly ordained (if we maintain that it is the same as a spiritual power), therefore the character, the power of consecrating, and the power of the keys are one and the same essentially, but differ logically.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(2)- RO(2) —

All spiritual power is conferred by some kind of consecration. Therefore the key is given together with the order: yet the use of the key requires due matter, i.e. a people subject through jurisdiction, so that until he has jurisdiction, the priest has the keys, but he cannot exercise the act of the keys. And since the key is defined from its act, its definition contains a reference to jurisdiction.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(2)- RO(3) —

A person may be worthy to have something in two ways, either so as to have a right to possess it, and thus whoever is worthy has heaven already opened to him — or so that it is meet that he should receive it, and thus the power of the keys admits those who are worthy, but to whom heaven is not yet altogether opened.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Even as God hardens not by imparting malice, but by withholding grace, so a priest is said to exclude, not as though he placed an obstacle to entrance, but because he does not remove an obstacle which is there, since he cannot remove it unless God has already removed it. [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. P(3), Q(62), A(1) ; P(3), Q(64), A(1) ; P(3), Q(86), A(6) .] Hence God is prayed that He may absolve, so that there may be room for the priest’s absolution.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(2)- RO(5) —

The priest’s act does not bear immediately on the kingdom, but on the sacraments, by means of which man wins to the kingdom.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(3) Whether there are two keys or only one?

P(4)- Q(17)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that there are not two keys but only one. For one lock requires but one key. Now the lock for the removal of which the keys of the Church are required, is sin. Therefore the Church does not require two keys for one sin.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the keys are given when orders are conferred. But knowledge is not always due to infusion, but sometimes is acquired, nor is it possessed by all those who are ordained, and is possessed by some who are not ordained. Therefore knowledge is not a key, so that there is but one key, viz. the power of judging.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the power which the priest has over the mystic body of Christ flows from the power which he has over Christ’s true body. Now the power of consecrating Christ’s true body is but one. Therefore the power which regards Christ’s mystic body is but one. But this is a key. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(3)- O(4) —

On the other hand, It seems that there are more than two keys. For just as knowledge and power are requisite for man to act, so is will. But the knowledge of discretion is reckoned as a key, and so is the power of judging. Therefore the will to absolve should be counted as a key.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, all three Divine Persons remit sins.

Now the priest, through the keys, is the minister for the remission of sins.

Therefore he should have three keys, so that he may be conformed to the Trinity.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(3) —

I answer that, Whenever an act requires fitness on the part of the recipient, two things are necessary in the one who has to perform the act, viz. judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and accomplishment of the act. Therefore in the act of justice whereby a man is given what he deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to discern whether he deserves to receive. Again, an authority or power is necessary for both these things, for we cannot give save what we have in our power; nor can there be judgment, without the right to enforce it, since judgment is determined to one particular thing, which determination it derives, in speculative matters, from the first principles which cannot be gainsaid, and, in practical matters, from the power of command vested in the one who judges. And since the act of the key requires fitness in the person on whom it is exercised — because the ecclesiastical judge, by means of the key, “admits the worthy and excludes the unworthy,” as may be seen from the definition given above ( A(2) ) — therefore the judge requires both judgment of discretion whereby he judges a man to be worthy, and also the very act of receiving (that man’s confession); and for both these things a certain power or authority is necessary. Accordingly we may distinguish two keys, the first of which regards the judgment about the worthiness of the person to be absolved, while the other regards the absolution.

These two keys are distinct, not in the essence of authority, since both belong to the minister by virtue of his office, but in comparison with their respective acts, one of which presupposes the other.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(3)- RO(1) —

One key is ordained immediately to the opening of one lock, but it is not unfitting that one key should be ordained to the act of another. Thus it is in the case in point. For it is the second key, which is the power of binding and loosing, that opens the lock of sin immediately, but the key of knowledge shows to whom that lock should be opened.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(3)- RO(2) —

There are two opinions about the key of knowledge. For some say that knowledge considered as a habit, acquired or infused, is the key in this case, and that it is not the principal key, but is called a key through being subordinate to another key: so that it is not called a key when the other key is wanting, for instance, in an educated man who is not a priest. And although priests lack this key at times, through being without knowledge, acquired or infused, of loosing and binding, yet sometimes they make use of their natural endeavors, which they who hold this opinion call a little key, so that although knowledge be not bestowed together with orders, yet with the conferring of orders the knowledge becomes a key which it was not before. This seems to have been the opinion of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 19).

But this does not seem to agree with the words of the Gospel, whereby the keys are promised to Peter ( Matthew 16:19), so that not only one but two are given in orders. For which reason the other opinion holds that the key is not knowledge considered as a habit, but the authority to exercise the act of knowledge, which authority is sometimes without knowledge, while the knowledge is sometimes present without the authority. This may be seen even in secular courts, for a secular judge may have the authority to judge, without having the knowledge of the law, while another man, on the contrary, has knowledge of the law without having the authority to judge. And since the act of judging to which a man is bound through the authority which is vested in him, and not through his habit of knowledge, cannot be well performed without both of the above, the authority to judge, which is the key of knowledge, cannot be accepted without sin by one who lacks knowledge; whereas knowledge void of authority can be possessed without sin.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The power of consecrating is directed to only one act of another kind, wherefore it is not numbered among the keys, nor is it multiplied as the power of the keys, which is directed to different acts, although as to the essence of power and authority it is but one, as stated above.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Everyone is free to will, so that no one needs authority to will; wherefore will is not reckoned as a key.

P(4)- Q(17)- A(3)- RO(5) —

All three Persons remit sins in the same way as one Person, wherefore there is no need for the priest, who is the minister of the Trinity, to have three keys: and all the more, since the will, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, requires no key, as stated above (ad 4).

QUESTION OF THE EFFECT OF THE KEYS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of the keys under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt? (2) Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment? (3) Whether a priest can bind in virtue of the power of the keys? (4) Whether he can loose and bind according to his own judgment?

P(4)- Q(18)- A(1) Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt? [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. P(3), Q(62), A(1) ; P(3), Q(64), A(1) ; P(3), Q(86), A(6) ]

P(4)- Q(18)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt. For it was said to the disciples ( John 20:23): “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.” Now this was not said in reference to the declaration only, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 18), for in that case the priest of the New Testament would have no more power than the priest of the Old Testament. Therefore he exercises a power over the remission of the guilt.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, in Penance grace is given for the remission of sin. Now the priest is the dispenser of this sacrament by virtue of the keys. Therefore, since grace is opposed to sin, not on the part of the punishment, but on the part of the guilt, it seems that the priest operates unto the remission of sin by virtue of the keys.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the priest receives more power by his consecration than the baptismal water by its sanctification. Now the baptismal water receives the power “to touch the body and cleanse the heart,” as Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.). Much more, therefore, does the priest, in his consecration, receive the power to cleanse the heart from the stain of sin.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Master stated above (Sent. iv, D, 18) that God has not bestowed on the minister the power to co-operate with Him in the inward cleansing. Now if he remitted sins as to the guilt, he would co-operate with God in the inward cleansing. Therefore the power of the keys does not extend to the remission of guilt.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(1) —

Further, sin is not remitted save by the Holy Ghost.

But no man has the power to give the Holy Ghost, as the Master said above (Sent. i, D, 14). Neither therefore can he remit sins as to their guilt.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(1) —

I answer that, According to Hugh (De Sacram. ii), “the sacraments, by virtue of their sanctification, contain an invisible grace.” Now this sanctification is sometimes essential to the sacrament both as regards the matter and as regards the minister, as may be seen in Confirmation, and then the sacramental virtue is in both together.

Sometimes, however, the essence of the sacrament requires only sanctification of the matter, as in Baptism, which has no fixed minister on whom it depends necessarily, and then the whole virtue of the sacrament is in the matter. Again, sometimes the essence of the sacrament requires the consecration or sanctification of the minister without any sanctification of the matter, and then the entire sacramental virtue is in the minister, as in Penance. Hence the power of the keys which is in the priest, stands in the same relation to the effect of Penance, as the virtue in the baptismal water does to the effect of Baptism. Now Baptism and the sacrament of Penance agree somewhat in their effect, since each is directly ordained against guilt, which is not the case in the other sacraments: yet they differ in this, that the sacrament of Penance, since the acts of the recipient are as its matter, cannot be given save to adults, who need to be disposed for the reception of the sacramental effect; whereas Baptism is given, sometimes to adults, sometimes to children and others who lack the use of reason, so that by Baptism children receive grace and remission of sin without any previous disposition, while adults do not, for they require to be disposed by the removal of insincerity. This disposition sometimes precedes their Baptism by priority of time, being sufficient for the reception of grace, before they are actually baptized, but not before they have come to the knowledge of the truth and have conceived the desire for Baptism. At other times this disposition does not precede the reception of Baptism by a priority of time, but is simultaneous with it, and then the grace of the remission of guilt is bestowed through the reception of Baptism. On the other hand, grace is never given through the sacrament of Penance unless the recipient be disposed either simultaneously or before.

Hence the power of the keys operates unto the remission of guilt, either through being desired or through being actually exercised, even as the waters of Baptism. But just as Baptism acts, not as a principal agent but as an instrument, and does not go so far as to cause the reception itself of grace, even instrumentally [*See note at beginning of this article], but merely disposes the recipient to the grace whereby his guilt is remitted, so is it with the power of the keys. Wherefore God alone directly remits guilt, and Baptism acts through His power instrumentally, as an inanimate instrument, and the priest as an animate instrument, such as a servant is, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11): and consequently the priest acts as a minister. Hence it is clear that the power of the keys is ordained, in a manner, to the remission of guilt, not as causing that remission, but as disposing thereto. Consequently if a man, before receiving absolution, were not perfectly disposed for the reception of grace, he would receive grace at the very time of sacramental confession and absolution, provided he offered no obstacle. For if the key were in no way ordained to the remission of guilt, but only to the remission of punishment, as some hold, it would not be necessary to have a desire of receiving the effect of the keys in order to have one’s sins forgiven, just as it is not necessary to have a desire of receiving the other sacraments which are ordained, not to the remission of guilt, but against punishment. But this enables us to see that it is not ordained unto the remission of guilt, because the use of the keys, in order to be effective, always requires a disposition on the part of the recipient of the sacrament. And the same would apply to Baptism, were it never given save to adults.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18), the power of forgiving sins was entrusted to priests, not that they may forgive them, by their own power, for this belongs to God, but that, as ministers, they may declare [*See note at the beginning of this article] the operation of God Who forgives. Now this happens in three ways.

First, by a declaration, not of present, but of future forgiveness, without co-operating therein in any way: and thus the sacraments of the Old Law signified the Divine operation, so that the priest of the Old Law did but declare and did not operate the forgiveness of sins. Secondly, by a declaration of present forgiveness without co-operating in it at all: and thus some say that the sacraments of the New Law signify the bestowal of grace, which God gives when the sacraments are conferred, without the sacraments containing any power productive of grace, according to which opinion, even the power of the keys would merely declare the Divine operation that has its effect in the remission of guilt when the sacrament is conferred. Thirdly, by signifying the Divine operation causing then and there the remission of guilt, and by co-operating towards this effect dispositively and instrumentally: and then, according to another and more common opinion, the sacraments of the New Law declare the cleansing effected by God. In this way also the priest of the New Testament declares the recipient to be absolved from guilt, because in speaking of the sacraments, what is ascribed to the power of the ministers must be consistent with the sacrament. Nor is it unreasonable that the keys of the Church should dispose the penitent to the remission of his guilt, from the fact that the guilt is already remitted, even as neither is it unreasonable that Baptism, considered in itself, causes a disposition in one who is already sanctified.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Neither the sacrament of Penance, nor the sacrament of Baptism, by its operation, causes grace, or the remission of guilt, directly, but only dispositively [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. P(3), Q(62), A(1) ; P(3), Q(64), A(1) ; P(3), Q(86), A(6) ]. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

The other arguments show that the power of the keys does not effect the remission of guilt directly, and this is to be granted.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(2) Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?

P(4)- Q(18)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that a priest cannot remit sin as to the punishment. For sin deserves eternal and temporal punishment. But after the priest’s absolution the penitent is still obliged to undergo temporal punishment either in Purgatory or in this world. Therefore the priest does not remit the punishment in any way.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the priest cannot anticipate the judgment of God. But Divine justice appoints the punishment which penitents have to undergo. Therefore the priest cannot remit any part of it.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a man who has committed a slight sin, is not less susceptible to the power of the keys, than one who has committed a graver sin. Now if the punishment for the graver sin be lessened in any way through the priestly administrations, it would be possible for a sin to be so slight that the punishment which it deserves is no greater than that which has been remitted for the graver sin. Therefore the priest would be able to remit the entire punishment due for the slight sin: which is false.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, the whole of the temporal punishment due for a sin is of one kind. If, therefore, by a first absolution something is taken away from the punishment, it will be possible for something more to be taken away by a second absolution, so that the absolution can be so often repeated, that by virtue of the keys the whole punishment will be taken away, since the second absolution is not less efficacious than the first: and consequently that sin will be altogether unpunished, which is absurd.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The key is the power of binding and loosing. But the priest can enjoin a temporal punishment. Therefore he can absolve from punishment.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(2) —

Further, the priest cannot remit sin either as to the guilt [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. P(3), Q(62), A(1) ; P(3), Q(64), A(1) ; P(3), Q(86), A(6) ], as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18), or as to the eternal punishment, for a like reason. If therefore he cannot remit sin as to the temporal punishment, he would be unable to remit sin in any way, which is altogether contrary to the words of the Gospel.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(2) —

I answer that, Whatever may be said of the effect of Baptism conferred on one who has already received grace, applies equally to the effect of the actual exercise of the power of the keys on one who has already been contrite. For a man may obtain the grace of the remission of his sins as to their guilt, through faith and contrition, previous to Baptism; but when, afterwards, he actually receives Baptism, his grace is increased, and he is entirely absolved from the debt of punishment, since he is then made a partaker of the Passion of Christ. In like manner when a man, through contrition, has received the pardon of his sins as to their guilt, and consequently as to the debt of eternal punishment, (which is remitted together with the guilt) by virtue of the keys which derive their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, his grace is increased and the temporal punishment is remitted, the debt of which remained after the guilt had been forgiven. However, this temporal punishment is not entirely remitted, as in Baptism, but only partly, because the man who is regenerated in Baptism is conformed to the Passion of Christ, by receiving into himself entirely the efficacy of Christ’s Passion, which suffices for the blotting out of all punishment, so that nothing remains of the punishment due to his preceding actual sins. For nothing should be imputed to a man unto punishment, save what he has done himself, and in Baptism man begins a new life, and by the baptismal water becomes a new man, as that no debt for previous sin remains in him. on the other hand, in Penance, a man does not take on a new life, since therein he is not born again, but healed.

Consequently by virtue of the keys which produce their effect in the sacrament of Penance, the punishment is not entirely remitted, but something is taken off the temporal punishment, the debt of which could remain after the eternal punishment had been remitted. Nor does this apply only to the temporal punishment which the penitent owes at the time of confession, as some hold, (for then confession and sacramental absolution would be mere burdens, which cannot be said of the sacraments of the New Law), but also to the punishment due in Purgatory, so that one who has been absolved and dies before making satisfaction, is less punished in Purgatory, than if he had died before receiving absolution.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The priest does not remit the entire temporal punishment, but part of it; wherefore the penitent still remains obliged to undergo satisfactory punishment.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Christ’s Passion was sufficiently satisfactory for the sins of the whole world, so that without prejudice to Divine justice something can be remitted from the punishment which a sinner deserves, in so far as the effect of Christ’s Passion reaches him through the sacraments of the Church.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Some satisfactory punishment must remain for each sin, so as to provide a remedy against it. Wherefore though, by virtue of the absolution some measure of the punishment due to a grave sin is remitted, it does not follow that the same measure of punishment is remitted for each sin, because in that case some sin would remain without any punishment at all: but, by virtue of the keys, the punishments due to various sins are remitted in due proportion.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Some say that at the first absolution, as much as possible is remitted by virtue of the keys, and that, nevertheless, the second confession is valid, on account of the instruction received, on account of the additional surety, on account of the prayers of the priest or confessor, and lastly on account of the merit of the shame.

But this does not seem to be true, for though there might be a reason for repeating the confession, there would be no reason for repeating the absolution, especially if the penitent has no cause to doubt about his previous absolution; for he might just as well doubt after the second as after the first absolution: even as we see that the sacrament of Extreme Unction is not repeated during the same sickness, for the reason that all that could be done through the sacrament, has been done once. Moreover, in the second confession, there would be no need for the confessor to have the keys, if the power of the keys had no effect therein.

For these reasons others say that even in the second absolution something of the punishment is remitted by virtue of the keys, because when absolution is given a second time, grace is increased, and the greater the grace received, the less there remains of the blemish of the previous sin, and the less punishment is required to remove that blemish. Wherefore even when a man is first absolved, his punishment is more or less remitted by virtue of the keys, according as he disposes himself more or less to receive grace; and this disposition may be so great, that even by virtue of his contrition the whole punishment is remitted, as we have already stated ( Q(5) , A(2) ). Consequently it is not unreasonable, if by frequent confession even the whole punishment be remitted, that a sin remain altogether unpunished, since Christ made satisfaction for its punishment.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(3) Whether the priest can bind through the power of the keys?

P(4)- Q(18)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the priest cannot bind by virtue of the power of the keys. For the sacramental power is ordained as a remedy against sin. Now binding is not a remedy for sin, but seemingly is rather conducive to an aggravation of the disease. Therefore, by the power of the keys, which is a sacramental power, the priest cannot bind.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, just as to loose or to open is to remove an obstacle, so to bind is to place an obstacle. Now an obstacle to heaven is sin, which cannot be placed on us by an extrinsic cause, since no sin is committed except by the will. Therefore the priest cannot bind.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the keys derive their efficacy from Christ’s Passion. But binding is not an effect of the Passion. Therefore the priest cannot bind by the power of the keys.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Matthew 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound also in heaven.”

P(4)- Q(18)- A(3) —

Further, rational powers are directed to opposites.

But the power of the keys is a rational power, since it has discretion connected with it. Therefore it is directed to opposites. Therefore if it can loose, it can bind.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(3) —

I answer that, The operation of the priest in using the keys, is conformed to God’s operation, Whose minister he is. Now God’s operation extends both to guilt and to punishment; to the guilt indeed, so as to loose it directly. but to bind it indirectly, in so far as He is said to harden, when He withholds His grace; whereas His operation extends to punishment directly, in both respects, because He both spares and inflicts it. In like manner, therefore, although the priest, in absolving, exercises an operation ordained to the remission of guilt, in the way mentioned above ( A(1) ), nevertheless, in binding, he exercises no operation on the guilt; (unless he be said to bind by not absolving the penitent and by declaring him to be bound), but he has the power both of binding and of loosing with regard to the punishment. For he looses from the punishment which he remits, while he binds as to the punishment which remains. This he does in two ways — first as regards the quantity of the punishment considered in general, and thus he does not bind save by not loosing, and declaring the penitent to be bound, secondly, as regards this or that particular punishment, and thus he binds to punishment by imposing it.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The remainder of the punishment to which the priest binds the penitent, is the medicine which cleanses the latter from the blemish of sin.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Not only sin, but also punishment is an obstacle to heaven: and how the latter is enjoined by the priest, has been said in the article.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Even the Passion of Christ binds us to some punishment whereby we are conformed to Him.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(4) Whether the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment?

P(4)- Q(18)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment. For Jerome [*Cf. Can. 86, Mensuram, De Poenit. Dist. i] says: “The canons do not fix the length of time for doing penance so precisely as to say how each sin is to be amended, but leave the decision of this matter to the judgment of a discreet priest.” Therefore it seems that he can bind and loose according to his own judgment.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, “The Lord commended the unjust steward, forasmuch as he had done wisely” ( Luke 16:5), because he had allowed a liberal discount to his master’s debtors. But God is more inclined to mercy than any temporal lord. Therefore it seems that the more punishment the priest remits, the more he is to be commended.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, Christ’s every action is our instruction. Now on some sinners He imposed no punishment, but only amendment of life, as in the case of the adulterous woman ( John 8).

Therefore it seems that the priest also, who is the vicar of Christ, can, according to his own judgment, remit the punishment, either wholly or in part.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Gregory VII [*Cf. Act. Concil.

Romans v, Can. 5] says: “We declare it a mock penance if it is not imposed according to the authority of the holy fathers in proportion to the sin.” Therefore it seems that it does not altogether depend on the priest’s judgment.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(4) —

Further, the act of the keys requires discretion. Now if the priest could remit and impose as much as he liked of a penance, he would have no need of discretion, because there would be no room for indiscretion. Therefore it does not altogether depend on the priest’s judgment.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(4) —

I answer that, In using the keys, the priest acts as the instrument and minister of God. Now no instrument can have an efficacious act, except in so far as it is moved by the principal agent.

Wherefore, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccl. cap. ult.) that “priests should use their hierarchical powers, according as they are moved by God.” A sign of this is that before the power of the keys was conferred on Peter ( Matthew 16:19) mention is made of the revelation vouchsafed to him of the Godhead; and the gift of the Holy Ghost, whereby “the sons of God are led” ( Romans 8:14), is mentioned before power was given to the apostles to forgive sins. Consequently if anyone were to presume to use his power against that Divine motion, he would not realize the effect, as Dionysius states (Hier. Eccl., cap. ult.), and, besides, he would be turned away from the Divine order, and consequently would be guilty of a sin. Moreover, since satisfactory punishments are medicinal, just as the medicines prescribed by the medical art are not suitable to all, but have to be changed according to the judgment of a medical man, who follows not his own will, but his medical science, so the satisfactory punishments appointed by the canons are not suitable to all, but have to be varied according to the judgment of the priest guided by the Divine instinct.

Therefore just as sometimes the physician prudently refrains from giving a medicine sufficiently efficacious to heal the disease, lest a greater danger should arise on account of the weakness of nature so the priest, moved by Divine instinct, some times refrains from enjoining the entire punishment due to one sin, lest by the severity of the punishment, the sick man come to despair and turn away altogether from repentance.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(4)- RO(1) —

This judgment should be guided entirely by the Divine instinct.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The steward is commended also for having done wisely. Therefore in the remission of the due punishment, there is need for discretion.

P(4)- Q(18)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Christ had the power of “excellence” in the sacraments, so that, by His own authority, He could remit the punishment wholly or in part, just as He chose. Therefore there is no comparison between Him and those who act merely as ministers.

QUESTION OF THE MINISTERS OF THE KEYS (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the ministers and the use of the keys: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the priest of the Law had the keys? (2) Whether Christ had the keys? (3) Whether priests alone have the keys? (4) Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys or their use? (5) Whether wicked priests have the effective use of the keys? (6) Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded, have the use of the keys?

P(4)- Q(19)- A(1) Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?

P(4)- Q(19)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the priests of the Law had the keys. For the possession of the keys results from having orders. But they had orders since they were called priests. Therefore the priests of the Law had the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 18), there are two keys, knowledge of discretion, and power of judgment. But the priests of the Law had authority for both of these: therefore they had the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the priests of the Law had some power over the rest of the people, which power was not temporal, else the kingly power would not have differed from the priestly power. Therefore it was a spiritual power; and this is the key. Therefore they had the key.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The keys are ordained to the opening of the heavenly kingdom, which could not be opened before Christ’s Passion. Therefore the priest of the Law had not the keys.

Further, the sacraments of the old Law did not confer grace. Now the gate of the heavenly kingdom could not be opened except by means of grace.

Therefore it could not be opened by means of those sacraments, so that the priests who administered them, had not the keys of the heavenly kingdom.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(1) —

I answer that, Some have held that, under the Old Law, the keys of the kingdom were in the hands of the priests, because the right of imposing punishment for sin was conferred on them, as related in Leviticus 5, which right seems to belong to the keys; but that these keys were incomplete then, whereas now they are complete as bestowed by Christ on the priests of the New Law.

But this seems to be contrary to the intent of the Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews ( Hebrews 9:11-12). For there the priesthood of Christ is given the preference over the priesthood of the Law, inasmuch as Christ came, “a high priest of the good things to come,” and brought us “by His own blood” into a tabernacle not made with hand, whither the priesthood of the Old Law brought men “by the blood of goats and of oxen.” Hence it is clear that the power of that priesthood did not reach to heavenly things but to the shadow of heavenly things: and so, we must say with others that they had not the keys, but that the keys were foreshadowed in them.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The keys of the kingdom go with the priesthood whereby man is brought into the heavenly kingdom, but such was not the priesthood of Levi; hence it had the keys, not of heaven, but of an earthly tabernacle.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The priests of the Old Law had authority to discern and judge, but not to admit those they judged into heaven, but only into the shadow of heavenly things.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(1)- RO(3) —

They had no spiritual power, since, by the sacraments of the Law, they cleansed men not from their sins but from irregularities, so that those who were cleansed by them could enter into a tabernacle which was “made with hand.”

P(4)- Q(19)- A(2) Whether Christ had the key?

P(4)- Q(19)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that Christ did not have the key.

For the key goes with the character of order. But Christ did not have a character. Therefore He had not the key.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Christ had power of “excellence” in the sacraments, so that He could produce the sacramental effect without the sacramental rite. Now the key is something sacramental. Therefore He needed no key, and it would have been useless to Him to have it.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 3:7): “These things saith... He that hath the key of David,” etc.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(2) —

I answer that, The power to do a thing is both in the instrument and in the principal agent, but not in the same way since it is more perfectly in the latter. Now the power of the keys which we have, like other sacramental powers, is instrumental: whereas it is in Christ as principal agent in the matter of our salvation, by authority, if we consider Him as God, by merit, if we consider Him as man [*For St. Thomas’ later teaching on this point, Cf. P(3), Q(48), A(6) ; P(2a), Q(112), A(1), AD 1].

But the very notion of a key expresses a power to open and shut, whether this be done by the principal agent or by an instrument. Consequently we must admit that Christ had the key, but in a higher way than His ministers, wherefore He is said to have the key of “excellence.”

P(4)- Q(19)- A(2)- RO(1) —

A character implies the notion of something derived from another, hence the power of the keys which we receive from Christ results from the character whereby we are conformed to Christ, whereas in Christ it results not from a character, but from the principal form.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The key, which Christ had was not sacramental, but the origin of the sacramental key.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(3) Whether priests alone have the keys?

P(4)- Q(19)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that not only priests have the keys. For Isidore says (Etym. vii, 12) that the “doorkeepers have to tell the good from the bad, so as to admit the good and keep out the bad.”

Now this is the definition of the keys, as appears from what has been said ( Q(17), A(2) ). Therefore not only priests but even doorkeepers have the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the keys are conferred on priests when by being anointed they receive power from God. But kings of Christian peoples also receive power from God and are consecrated by being anointed. Therefore not only priests have the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the priesthood is an order belonging to an individual person. But sometimes a number of people together seem to have the key, because certain Chapters can pass a sentence of excommunication, which pertains to the power of the keys. Therefore not only priests have the key.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, a woman is not capable of receiving the priesthood, since she is not competent to teach, according to the Apostle ( 1 Corinthians 14:34). But some women (abbesses, for instance, who exercise a spiritual power over their subjects), seem to have the keys.

Therefore not only priests have the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Poenit. i): “This right,” viz. of binding and loosing, “is granted to priests alone.”

P(4)- Q(19)- A(3) —

Further, by receiving the power of the keys, a man is set up between the people and God. But this belongs to the priest alone, who is “ordained... in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins” ( Hebrews 5:1).

Therefore only priests have the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(3) —

I answer that, There are two kinds of key. one reaches to heaven itself directly, by remitting sin and thus removing the obstacles to the entrance into heaven; and this is called the key of “order.”

Priests alone have this key, because they alone are ordained for the people in the things which appertain to God directly. The other key reaches to heaven, not directly but through the medium of the Church Militant. By this key a man goes to heaven, since, by its means, a man is shut out from or admitted to the fellowship of the Church Militant, by excommunication or absolution. This is called the key of “jurisdiction” in the external court, wherefore even those who are not priests can have this key, e.g. archdeacons, bishops elect, and others who can excommunicate. But it is not properly called a key of heaven, but a disposition thereto.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The doorkeepers have the key for taking care of those things which are contained in a material temple, and they have to judge whether a person should be excluded from or admitted to that temple; which judgment they pronounce, not by their own authority, but in pursuance to the priest’s judgment, so that they appear to be the administrators of the priestly power.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Kings have no power in spiritual matters, so that they do not receive the key of the heavenly kingdom. Their power is confined to temporal matters, and this too can only come to them from God, as appears from Romans 13:1. Nor are they consecrated by the unction of a sacred order: their anointing is merely a sign that the excellence of their power comes down to them from Christ, and that, under Christ, they reign over the Christian people.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Just as in civil matters the whole power is sometimes vested in a judge, as in a kingdom, whereas sometimes it is vested in many exercising various offices but acting together with equal rights (Ethic. viii, 10,11), so too, spiritual jurisdiction may be exercised both by one alone, e.g. a bishop, and by many together, e.g. by a Chapter, and thus they have the key of jurisdiction, but they have not all together the key of order.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(3)- RO(4) —

According to the Apostle ( 1 Timothy 2:11; Titus 2:5), woman is in a state of subjection: wherefore she can have no spiritual jurisdiction, since the Philosopher also says (Ethic. viii) that it is a corruption of public life when the government comes into the hands of a woman. Consequently a woman has neither the key of order nor the key of jurisdiction. Nevertheless a certain use of the keys is allowed to women, such as the right to correct other women who are under them, on account of the danger that might threaten if men were to dwell under the same roof.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(4) Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys?

P(4)- Q(19)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that holy men, even those who are not priests, have the use of the keys. For loosing and binding, which are the effects of the keys, derive their efficacy from the merit of Christ’s Passion. Now those are most conformed to Christ’s Passion, who follow Christ, suffering by patience and other virtues. Therefore it seems that even if they have not the priestly order, they can bind and loose.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Hebrews 7:7): “Without all contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg.: ‘better’].” Now “in spiritual matters,” according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), “to be better is to be greater.” Therefore those who are better, i.e. who have more charity, can bless others by absolving them. Hence the same conclusion follows.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(4) —

On the contrary, “Action belongs to that which has the power,” as the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil. i). But the key which is a spiritual power belongs to priests alone. Therefore priests alone are competent to have the use of the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(4) —

I answer that, There is this difference between a principal and an instrumental agent, that the latter does not produce, in the effect, its own likeness, but the likeness of the principal agent, whereas the principal agent produces its own likeness. Consequently a thing becomes a principal agent through having a form, which it can reproduce in another, whereas an instrumental agent is not constituted thus, but through being applied by the principal agent in order to produce a certain effect. Since therefore in the act of the keys the principal agent by authority is Christ as God, and by merit is Christ as man,* it follows that on account of the very fulness of Divine goodness in Him, and of the perfection of His grace, He is competent to exercise the act of the keys. [*For St. Thomas’ later teaching on this point, cf. P(3), Q(48), A(6) ; P(2a), Q(112), A(1), ad 1].

But another man is not competent to exercise this act as principal agent, since neither can he give another man grace whereby sins are remitted, nor can he merit sufficiently, so that he is nothing more than an instrumental agent. Consequently the recipient of the effect of the keys, is likened, not to the one who uses the keys, but to Christ. Therefore, no matter how much grace a man may have, he cannot produce the effect of the keys, unless he be appointed to that purpose by receiving orders.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Just as between instrument and effect there is need or likeness, not of a similar form, but of aptitude in the instrument for the effect, so is it as regards the instrument and the principal agent.

The former is the likeness between holy men and the suffering Christ, nor does it bestow on them the use of the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Although a mere man cannot merit grace for another man condignly, yet the merit of one man can co-operate in the salvation of another. Hence there is a twofold blessing. One proceeds from a mere man, as meriting by his own act: this blessing can be conferred by any holy person in whom Christ dwells by His grace, in so far as he excels in goodness the person whom he blesses. The other blessing is when a man blesses, as applying a blessing instrumentally through the merit of Christ, and this requires excellence of order and not of virtue.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(5) Whether wicked priests have the use of the keys?

P(4)- Q(19)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that wicked priests have not the use of the keys. For in the passage where the use of the keys is bestowed on the apostles ( John 20:22,23), the gift of the Holy Ghost is promised.

But wicked men have not the Holy Ghost. Therefore they have not the use of the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, no wise king entrusts his enemy with the dispensation of his treasure. Now the use of the keys consists in dispensing the treasure of the King of heaven, Who is Wisdom itself.

Therefore the wicked, who are His enemies on account of sin, have not the use of the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (De Bapt. v, 21) that God “gives the sacrament of grace even through wicked men, but grace itself only by Himself or through His saints.” Hence He forgives sin by Himself, or by those who are members of the Dove. But the remission of sins is the use of the keys. Therefore sinners, who are not “members of the Dove,” have not the use of the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, the prayer of a wicked priest cannot effect reconciliation, for, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 11), “if an unacceptable person is sent to intercede, anger is provoked to yet greater severity.” But the use of the keys implies a kind of intercession, as appears in the form of absolution. Therefore wicked priests cannot use the keys effectively.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(5) —

On the contrary, No man can know whether another man is in the state of grace. If, therefore, no one could use the keys in giving absolution unless he were in a state of grace, no one would know that he had been absolved, which would be very unfitting.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(5) —

Further, the wickedness of the minister cannot void the liberality of his lord. But the priest is no more than a minister.

Therefore he cannot by his wickedness take away from us the gift which God has given through him.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(5) —

I answer that, Just as participation of a form to be induced into an effect does not make a thing to be an instrument, so neither does the loss of that form prevent that thing being used as an instrument.

Consequently, since man is merely an instrument in the use of the keys, however much he may through sin be deprived of grace, whereby sins are forgiven, yet he is by no means deprived of the use of the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The gift of the Holy Ghost is requisite for the use of the keys, not as being indispensable for the purpose, but because it is unbecoming for the user to use them without it, though he that submits to them receives their effect.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(5)- RO(2) —

An earthly king can be cheated and deceived in the matter of his treasure, and so he does not entrust his enemy with the dispensation thereof. But the King of heaven cannot be cheated, because all tends to His own glory, even the abuse of the keys by some, for He can make good come out of evil, and produce many good effects through evil men. Hence the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Augustine speaks of the remission of sins in so far as holy men co-operate therein, not by virtue of the keys, but by merit of congruity. Hence He says that God confers the sacraments even through evil men, and among the other sacraments, absolution which is the use of the keys should be reckoned: but that through “members of the Dove,” i.e. holy men, He grants forgiveness of sins, in so far as He remits sins on account of their intercession.

We might also reply that by “members of the Dove” he means all who are not cut off from the Church, for those who receive the sacraments from them, receive grace, whereas those who receive the sacraments from those who are cut off from the Church, do not receive grace, because they sin in so doing, except in the case of Baptism, which, in cases of necessity, may be received even from one who is excommunicate.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(5)- RO(4) —

The prayer which the wicked priest proffers on his own account, is not efficacious: but that which he makes as a minister of the Church, is efficacious through the merit of Christ. Yet in both ways the priest’s prayer should profit those who are subject to him.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(6) Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys?

P(4)- Q(19)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys.

For just as the power of the keys results from orders, so does the power of consecration. But the above cannot lose the use of the power of consecration, since if they do consecrate it is valid, though they sin in doing so. Therefore neither can they lose the use of the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, any active spiritual power in one who has the use of his free-will can be exercised by him when he wills. Now the power of the keys remains in the aforesaid, for, since it is only conferred with orders, they would have to be reordained when they return to the Church. Therefore, since it is an active power, they can exercise it when they will.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, spiritual grace is hindered by guilt more than by punishment. Now excommunication, suspension and degradation are punishments. Therefore, since a man does not lose the use of the keys on account of guilt, it seems that he does not lose it on account of the aforesaid.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. cxxi in Joan.) that the “charity of the Church forgives sins.” Now it is the charity of the Church which unites its members. Since therefore the above are disunited from the Church, it seems that they have not the use of the keys in remitting sins.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(6) —

Further, no man is absolved from sin by sinning. Now it is a sin for anyone to seek absolution of his sins from the above, for he disobeys the Church in so doing. Therefore he cannot be absolved by them: and so the same conclusion follows.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(6) —

I answer that, In all the above the power of the keys remains as to its essence, but its use is hindered on account of the lack of matter. For since the use of the keys requires in the user authority over the person on whom they are used, as stated above ( Q(17), A(2), ad 2), the proper matter on whom one can exercise the use of the keys is a man under one’s authority. And since it is by appointment of the Church that one man has authority over another, so a man may be deprived of his authority over another by his ecclesiastical superiors. Consequently, since the Church deprives heretics, schismatics and the like, by withdrawing their subjects from them either altogether or in some respect, in so far as they are thus deprived, they cannot have the use of the keys.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist, on which the priest exercises his power, is not a man but wheaten bread, and in Baptism, the matter is simply a man. Wherefore, just as, were a heretic to be without wheaten bread, he could not consecrate, so neither can a prelate absolve if he be deprived of his authority, yet he can baptize and consecrate, albeit to his own damnation.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The assertion is true, provided matter be not lacking as it is in the case in point.

P(4)- Q(19)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Sin, of itself, does not remove matter, as certain punishments do: so that punishment is a hindrance not because it is contrary to the effect, but for the reason stated.

QUESTION OF THOSE ON WHOM THE POWER OF THE KEYS CAN BE EXERCISED (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider those on whom the power of the keys can be exercised. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether a priest can use the key, which he has, on any man? (2) Whether a priest can always absolve his subject? (3) Whether anyone can use the keys on his superior?

P(4)- Q(20)- A(1) Whether a priest can use the key which he has, on any man?

P(4)- Q(20)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that a priest can use the key which he has, on any man. For the power of the keys was bestowed on priests by Divine authority in the words: “Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them” ( John 20:22,23).

But this was said without any restriction. Therefore he that has the key, can use it on any without restriction.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, a material key that opens one lock, opens all locks of the same pattern. Now every sin of every man is the same kind of obstacle against entering into heaven. Therefore if a priest can, by means of the key which he has, absolve one man, he can do the same for all others.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more perfect than that of the Old Testament. But the priest of the Old Testament could use the power which he had of discerning between different kinds of leprosy, with regard to all indiscriminately. Much more therefore can the priest of the Gospel use his power with regard to all.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written in the Appendix of Gratian: “It is not lawful for every priest to loose or bind another priest’s parishioner.” Therefore a priest cannot absolve everybody.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(1) —

Further, judgment in spiritual matters should be better regulated than in temporal matters. But in temporal matters a judge cannot judge everybody. Therefore, since the use of the keys is a kind of judgment, it is not within the competency of a priest to use his key with regard to everyone.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(1) —

I answer that, That which has to do with singular matters is not equally in the power of all. Thus, even as besides the general principles of medicine, it is necessary to have physicians, who adapt those general principles to individual patients or diseases, according to their various requirements, so in every kingdom, besides that one who proclaims the universal precepts of law, there is need for others to adapt those precepts to individual cases, according as each case demands. For this reason, in the heavenly hierarchy also, under the Powers who rule indiscriminately, a place is given to the Principalities, who are appointed to individual kingdoms, and to the Angels who are given charge over individual men, as we have explained above ( P(1), Q(113), AA(1),2 ).

Consequently there should be a like order of authority in the Church Militant, so that an indiscriminate authority over all should be vested in one individual, and that there should be others under him, having distinct authority over various people. Now the use of the keys implies a certain power to exercise authority, whereby the one on whom the keys are used, becomes the proper matter of that act. Therefore he that has power over all indiscriminately, can use the keys on all, whereas those who have received authority over distinct persons, cannot use the keys on everyone, but only on those over whom they are appointed, except in cases of necessity, when the sacraments should be refused to no one.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(1)- RO(1) —

A twofold power is required in order to absolve from sins, namely, power of order and power of jurisdiction. The former power is equally in all priests, but not the latter. And therefore, when our Lord ( John 20:23) gave all the apostles in general, the power of forgiving sins, this is to be understood of the power which results from receiving orders, wherefore these words are addressed to priests when they are ordained. But to Peter in particular He gave the power of forgiving sins ( Matthew 16:19), that we may understand that he has the power of jurisdiction before the others. But the power of orders, considered in itself, extends to all who can be absolved: wherefore our Lord said indeterminately, “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them,” on the understanding that this power should be used in dependence on the power given to Peter, according to His appointment.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(1)- RO(2) —

A material key can open only its own lock. nor can any active force act save on its own matter. Now a man becomes the matter of the power of order by jurisdiction: and consequently no one can use the key in respect of another over whom he has not jurisdiction.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The people of Israel were one people, and had but one temple, so that there was no need for a distinction in priestly jurisdiction, as there is now in the Church which comprises various peoples and nations.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(2) Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?

P(4)- Q(20)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that a priest cannot always absolve his subject. For, as Augustine says (De vera et false Poenitentia [*Work of an unknown author]), “no man should exercise the priestly office, unless he be free from those things which he condemns in others.”

But a priest might happen to share in a sin committed by his subject, e.g. by knowledge of a woman who is his subject. Therefore it seems that he cannot always use the power of the keys on his subjects.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, by the power of the keys a man is healed of all his shortcomings. Now it happens sometimes that a sin has attached to it a defect of irregularity or a sentence of excommunication, from which a simple priest cannot absolve. Therefore it seems that he cannot use the power of the keys on such as are shackled by these things in the above manner.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the judgment and power of our priesthood was foreshadowed by the judgment of the ancient priesthood.

Now according to the Law, the lesser judges were not competent to decide all cases, and had recourse to the higher judges, according to Exodus 24:14: “If any question shall arise” among you, “you shall refer it to them.” It seems, therefore, that a priest cannot absolve his subject from graver sins, but should refer him to his superior.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Whoever has charge of the principal has charge of the accessory. Now priests are charged with the dispensation of the Eucharist to their subjects, to which sacrament the absolution of sins is subordinate [*Cf. Q(17), A(2), ad 1]. Therefore, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, a priest can absolve his subject from any sins whatever.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(2) —

Further, grace, however small, removes all sin. But a priest dispenses sacraments whereby grace is given. Therefore, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, he can absolve from all sins.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(2) —

I answer that, The power of order, considered in itself, extends to the remission of all sins. But since, as stated above, the use of this power requires jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their superiors, it follows that the superior can reserve certain matters to himself, the judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior; otherwise any simple priest who has jurisdiction can absolve from any sin.

Now there are five cases in which a simple priest must refer his penitent to his superior. The first is when a public penance has to be imposed, because in that case the bishop is the proper minister of the sacrament.

The second is the case of those who are excommunicated when the inferior priest cannot absolve a penitent through the latter being excommunicated by his superior. The third case is when he finds that an irregularity has been contracted, for the dispensation of which he has to have recourse to his superior. The fourth is the case of arson. The fifth is when it is the custom in a diocese for the more heinous crimes to be reserved to the bishop, in order to inspire fear, because custom in these cases either gives the power or takes it away.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In this case the priest should not hear the confession of his accomplice, with regard to that particular sin, but must refer her to another: nor should she confess to him but should ask permission to go to another, or should have recourse to his superior if he refused, both on account of the danger, and for the sake of less shame. If, however, he were to absolve her it would be valid*: because when Augustine says that they should not be guilty of the same sin, he is speaking of what is congruous, not of what is essential to the sacrament. [*Benedict XIV declared the absolution of an accomplice “in materia turpi” to be invalid.]

P(4)- Q(20)- A(2)- RO(2) — Penance delivers man from all defects of guilt, but not from all defects of punishment, since even after doing penance for murder, a man remains irregular. Hence a priest can absolve from a crime, but for the remission of the punishment he must refer the penitent to the superior, except in the case of excommunication, absolution from which should precede absolution from sin, for as long as a man is excommunicated, he cannot receive any sacrament of the Church.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(2)- RO(3) —

This objection considers those cases in which superiors reserve the power of jurisdiction to themselves.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(3) Whether a man can use the keys with regard to his superior?

P(4)- Q(20)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man cannot use the keys in respect of a superior. For every sacramental act requires its proper matter.

Now the proper matter for the use of the keys, is a person who is subject, as stated above ( Q(19), A(6) ). Therefore a priest cannot use the keys in respect of one who is not his subject.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the Church Militant is an image of the Church Triumphant. Now in the heavenly Church an inferior angel never cleanses, enlightens or perfects a higher angel. Therefore neither can an inferior priest exercise on a superior a hierarchical action such as absolution.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the judgment of Penance should be better regulated than the judgment of an external court. Now in the external court an inferior cannot excommunicate or absolve his superior. Therefore, seemingly, neither can he do so in the penitential court.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The higher prelate is also “compassed with infirmity,” and may happen to sin. Now the power of the keys is the remedy for sin. Therefore, since he cannot use the key on himself, for he cannot be both judge and accused at the same time, it seems that an inferior can use the power of the keys on him.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(3) —

Further, absolution which is given through the power of the keys, is ordained to the reception of the Eucharist. But an inferior can give Communion to his superior, if the latter asks him to. Therefore he can use the power of the keys on him if he submit to him.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(3) —

I answer that, The power of the keys, considered in itself, is applicable to all, as stated above ( A(2) ): and that a priest is unable to use the keys on some particular person is due to his power being limited to certain individuals. Therefore he who limited his power can extend it to whom he wills, so that he can give him power over himself, although he cannot use the power of the keys on himself, because this power requires to be exercised on a subject, and therefore on someone else, for no man can be subject to himself.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Although the bishop whom a simple priest absolves is his superior absolutely speaking, yet he is beneath him in so far as he submits himself as a sinner to him.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(3)- RO(2) —

In the angels there can be no defect by reason of which the higher angel can submit to the lower, such as there can happen to be among men; and so there is no comparison.

P(4)- Q(20)- A(3)- RO(3) —

External judgment is according to men, whereas the judgment of confession is according to God, in Whose sight a man is lessened by sinning, which is not the case in human prelacy.

Therefore just as in external judgment no man can pass sentence of excommunication on himself, so neither can he empower another to excommunicate him. On the other hand, in the tribunal of conscience he can give another the power to absolve him, though he cannot use that power himself.

It may also be replied that absolution in the tribunal of the confessional belongs principally to the power of the keys and consequently to the power of jurisdiction, whereas excommunication regards jurisdiction exclusively. And, as to the power of orders, all are equal, but not as to jurisdiction. Wherefore there is no comparison.

QUESTION OF THE DEFINITION, CONGRUITY AND CAUSE OF EXCOMMUNICATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now treat of excommunication: we shall consider: (1) the definition, congruity and cause of excommunication; (2) who has the power to excommunicate; (3) communication with excommunicated persons; (4) absolution from excommunication.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether excommunication is suitably defined? (2) Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone? (3) Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm? (4) Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?

P(4)- Q(21)- A(1) Whether excommunication is suitably defined as separation from the communion of the Church, etc?

P(4)- Q(21)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that excommunication is unsuitably defined by some thus: “Excommunication is separation from the communion of the Church, as to fruit and general suffrages.” For the suffrages of the Church avail for those for whom they are offered. But the Church prays for those who are outside the Church, as, for instance, for heretics and pagans. Therefore she prays also for the excommunicated, since they are outside the Church, and so the suffrages of the Church avail for them.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, no one loses the suffrages of the Church except by his own fault. Now excommunication is not a fault, but a punishment. Therefore excommunication does not deprive a man of the general suffrages of the Church.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the fruit of the Church seems to be the same as the Church’s suffrages, for it cannot mean the fruit of temporal goods, since excommunication does not deprive a man of these. Therefore there is no reason for mentioning both.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, there is a kind of excommunication called minor*, by which man is not deprived of the suffrages of the Church. [*Minor excommunication is no longer recognized by Canon Law.] Therefore this definition is unsuitable.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(1) —

I answer that, When a man enters the Church by Baptism, he is admitted to two things, viz. the body of the faithful and the participation of the sacraments: and this latter presupposes the former, since the faithful are united together in the participation of the sacraments.

Consequently a person may be expelled from the Church in two ways.

First, by being deprived merely of the participation of the sacraments, and this is the minor excommunication. Secondly, by being deprived of both, and this is the major excommunication, of which the above is the definition. Nor can there be a third, consisting in the privation of communion with the faithful, but not of the participation of the sacraments, for the reason already given, because, to wit, the faithful communicate together in the sacraments. Now communion with the faithful is twofold. One consists in spiritual things, such as their praying for one another, and meeting together for the reception of sacred things; while another consists in certain legitimate bodily actions. These different manners of communion are signified in the verse which declares that those who are excommunicate are deprived of — “os, orare, vale, communio, mensa.” “Os,” i.e. we must not give them tokens of goodwill; “orare,” i.e. we must not pray with them; “vale,” we must not give them marks of respect; “communio,” i.e. we must not communicate with them in the sacraments; “mensa,” i.e. we must not take meals with them. Accordingly the above definition includes privation of the sacraments in the words “as to the fruit,” and from partaking together with the faithful in spiritual things, in the words, “and the general prayers of the Church.”

Another definition is given which expresses the privation of both kinds of acts, and is as follows: “Excommunication is the privation of all lawful communion with the faithful.”

P(4)- Q(21)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Prayers are said for unbelievers, but they do not receive the fruit of those prayers unless they be converted to the faith.

In like manner prayers may be offered up for those who are excommunicated, but not among the prayers that are said for the members of the Church. Yet they do not receive the fruit so long as they remain under the excommunication, but prayers are said for them that they may receive the spirit of repentance, so that they may be loosed from excommunication.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(1)- RO(2) —

One man’s prayers profit another in so far as they can reach to him. Now the action of one man may reach to another in two ways. First, by virtue of charity which unites all the faithful, making them one in God, according to <19B806> Psalm 118:63: “I am a partaker with all them that fear Thee.” Now excommunication does not interrupt this union, since no man can be justly excommunicated except for a mortal sin, whereby a man is already separated from charity, even without being excommunicated. An unjust excommunication cannot deprive a man of charity, since this is one of the greatest of all goods, of which a man cannot be deprived against his will. Secondly, through the intention of the one who prays, which intention is directed to the person he prays for, and this union is interrupted by excommunication, because by passing sentence of excommunication, the Church severs a man from the whole body of the faithful, for whom she prays. Hence those prayers of the Church which are offered up for the whole Church, do not profit those who are excommunicated. Nor can prayers be said for them among the members of the Church as speaking in the Church’s name, although a private individual may say a prayer with the intention of offering it for their conversion.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The spiritual fruit of the Church is derived not only from her prayers, but also from the sacraments received and from the faithful dwelling together.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(1)- RO(4) —

The minor excommunication does not fulfill all the conditions of excommunication but only a part of them, hence the definition of excommunication need not apply to it in every respect, but only in some.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(2) Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?

P(4)- Q(21)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the Church ought not to excommunicate anyone, because excommunication is a kind of curse, and we are forbidden to curse ( Romans 12:14). Therefore the Church should not excommunicate.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the Church Militant should imitate the Church Triumphant. Now we read in the epistle of Jude (verse 9) that “when Michael the Archangel disputing with the devil contended about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of railing speech, but said: The Lord command thee.” Therefore the Church Militant ought not to judge any man by cursing or excommunicating him.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, no man should be given into the hands of his enemies, unless there be no hope for him. Now by excommunication a man is given into the hands of Satan, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 5:5.

Since then we should never give up hope about anyone in this life, the Church should not excommunicate anyone.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Apostle ( 1 Corinthians 5:5) ordered a man to be excommunicated.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(2) —

Further, it is written ( Matthew 18:17) about the man who refuses to hear the Church: “Let him be to thee as the heathen or publican.” But heathens are outside the Church. Therefore they also who refuse to hear the Church, should be banished from the Church by excommunication.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(2) —

I answer that, The judgment of the Church should be conformed to the judgment of God. Now God punishes the sinner in many ways, in order to draw him to good, either by chastising him with stripes, or by leaving him to himself so that being deprived of those helps whereby he was kept out of evil, he may acknowledge his weakness, and humbly return to God Whom he had abandoned in his pride. In both these respects the Church by passing sentence of excommunication imitates the judgment of God. For by severing a man from the communion of the faithful that he may blush with shame, she imitates the judgment whereby God chastises man with stripes; and by depriving him of prayers and other spiritual things, she imitates the judgment of God in leaving man to himself, in order that by humility he may learn to know himself and return to God.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(2)- RO(1) —

A curse may be pronounced in two ways: first, so that the intention of the one who curses is fixed on the evil which he invokes or pronounces, and cursing in this sense is altogether forbidden.

Secondly, so that the evil which a man invokes in cursing is intended for the good of the one who is cursed, and thus cursing is sometimes lawful and salutary: thus a physician makes a sick man undergo pain, by cutting him, for instance, in order to deliver him from his sickness.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The devil cannot be brought to repentance, wherefore the pain of excommunication cannot do him any good.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(2)- RO(3) —

From the very fact that a man is deprived of the prayers of the Church, he incurs a triple loss, corresponding to the three things which a man acquires through the Church’s prayers. For they bring an increase of grace to those who have it, or merit grace for those who have it not; and in this respect the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. iv, D, 18): “The grace of God is taken away by excommunication.”

They also prove a safeguard of virtue; and in this respect he says that “protection is taken away,” not that the excommunicated person is withdrawn altogether from God’s providence, but that he is excluded from that protection with which He watches over the children of the Church in a more special way. Moreover, they are useful as a defense against the enemy, and in this respect he says that “the devil receives greater power of assaulting the excommunicated person, both spiritually and corporally.”

Hence in the early Church, when men had to be enticed to the faith by means of outward signs (thus the gift of the Holy Ghost was shown openly by a visible sign), so too excommunication was evidenced by a person being troubled in his body by the devil. Nor is it unreasonable that one, for whom there is still hope, be given over to the enemy, for he is surrendered, not unto damnation, but unto correction, since the Church has the power to rescue him from the hands of the enemy, whenever he is willing.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(3) Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?

P(4)- Q(21)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that no man should be excommunicated for inflicting a temporal harm. For the punishment should not exceed the fault. But the punishment of excommunication is the privation of a spiritual good, which surpasses all temporal goods.

Therefore no man should be excommunicated for temporal injuries.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, we should render to no man evil for evil, according to the precept of the Apostle ( Romans 12:17). But this would be rendering evil for evil, if a man were to be excommunicated for doing such an injury. Therefore this ought by no means to be done.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Peter sentenced Ananias and Saphira to death for keeping back the price of their piece of land ( Acts 5:1-10).

Therefore it is lawful for the Church to excommunicate for temporal injuries.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(3) —

I answer that, By excommunication the ecclesiastical judge excludes a man, in a sense, from the kingdom. Wherefore, since he ought not to exclude from the kingdom others than the unworthy, as was made clear from the definition of the keys ( Q(17), A(2) ), and since no one becomes unworthy, unless, through committing a mortal sin, he lose charity which is the way leading to the kingdom, it follows that no man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. And since by injuring a man in his body or in his temporalities, one may sin mortally and act against charity, the Church can excommunicate a man for having inflicted temporal injury on anyone. Yet, as excommunication is the most severe punishment, and since punishments are intended as remedies, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii), and again since a prudent physician begins with lighter and less risky remedies, therefore excommunication should not be inflicted, even for a mortal sin, unless the sinner be obstinate, either by not coming up for judgment, or by going away before judgment is pronounced, or by failing to obey the decision of the court. For then, if, after due warning, he refuse to obey, he is reckoned to be obstinate, and the judge, not being able to proceed otherwise against him, must excommunicate him.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(3)- RO(1) —

A fault is not measured by the extent of the damage a man does, but by the will with which he does it, acting against charity. Wherefore, though the punishment of excommunication exceeds the harm done, it does not exceed the measure of the sin.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(3)- RO(2) —

When a man is corrected by being punished, evil is not rendered to him, but good: since punishments are remedies, as stated above.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(4) Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?

P(4)- Q(21)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that an excommunication which is pronounced unjustly has no effect at all. Because excommunication deprives a man of the protection and grace of God, which cannot be forfeited unjustly. Therefore excommunication has no effect if it be unjustly pronounced.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, Jerome says (on Matthew 16:19: “I will give to thee the keys”): “It is a pharisaical severity to reckon as really bound or loosed, that which is bound or loosed unjustly.” But that severity was proud and erroneous. Therefore an unjust excommunication has no effect.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(4) —

On the contrary, According to Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.), “the sentence of the pastor is to be feared whether it be just or unjust.” Now there would be no reason to fear an unjust excommunication if it did not hurt. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(4) —

I answer that, An excommunication may be unjust for two reasons. First, on the part of its author, as when anyone excommunicates through hatred or anger, and then, nevertheless, the excommunication takes effect, though its author sins, because the one who is excommunicated suffers justly, even if the author act wrongly in excommunicating him. Secondly, on the part of the excommunication, through there being no proper cause, or through the sentence being passed without the forms of law being observed. In this case, if the error, on the part of the sentence, be such as to render the sentence void, this has no effect, for there is no excommunication; but if the error does not annul the sentence, this takes effect, and the person excommunicated should humbly submit (which will be credited to him as a merit), and either seek absolution from the person who has excommunicated him, or appeal to a higher judge. If, however, he were to contemn the sentence, he would “ipso facto” sin mortally.

But sometimes it happens that there is sufficient cause on the part of the excommunicator, but not on the part of the excommunicated, as when a man is excommunicated for a crime which he has not committed, but which has been proved against him: in this case, if he submit humbly, the merit of his humility will compensate him for the harm of excommunication.

P(4)- Q(21)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Although a man cannot lose God’s grace unjustly, yet he can unjustly lose those things which on our part dispose us to receive grace. for instance, a man may be deprived of the instruction which he ought to have. It is in this sense that excommunication is said to deprive a man of God’s grace, as was explained above ( A(2), ad 3).

P(4)- Q(21)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Jerome is speaking of sin not of its punishments, which can be inflicted unjustly by ecclesiastical superiors.

QUESTION OF THOSE WHO CAN EXCOMMUNICATE OR BE EXCOMMUNICATED (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider those who can excommunicate or be excommunicated. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether every priest can excommunicate? (2) Whether one who is not a priest can excommunicate? (3) Whether one who is excommunicated or suspended, can excommunicate? (4) Whether anyone can excommunicate himself, or an equal, or a superior? (5) Whether a multitude can be excommunicated? (6) Whether one who is already excommunicated can be excommunicated again?

P(4)- Q(22)- A(1) Whether every priest can excommunicate?

P(4)- Q(22)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that every priest can excommunicate. For excommunication is an act of the keys. But every priest has the keys. Therefore every priest can excommunicate.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is a greater thing to loose and bind in the tribunal of penance than in the tribunal of judgment. But every priest can loose and bind his subjects in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore every priest can excommunicate his subjects.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Matters fraught with danger should be left to the decision of superiors. Now the punishment of excommunication is fraught with many dangers, unless it be inflicted with moderation. Therefore it should not be entrusted to every priest.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(1) —

I answer that, In the tribunal of conscience the plea is between man and God, whereas in the outward tribunal it is between man and man. Wherefore the loosing or binding of one man in relation to God alone, belongs to the tribunal of Penance, whereas the binding or loosing of a man in relation to other men, belongs to the public tribunal of external judgment. And since excommunication severs a man from the communion of the faithful, it belongs to the external tribunal. Consequently those alone can excommunicate who have jurisdiction in the judicial tribunal. Hence, of their own authority, only bishops and higher prelates, according to the more common opinion can excommunicate, whereas parish priests can do so only by commission or in certain cases, as those of theft, rapine and the like, in which the law allows them to excommunicate. Others, however, have maintained that even parish priests can excommunicate: but the former opinion is more reasonable.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Excommunication is an act of the keys not directly, but with respect to the external judgment. The sentence of excommunication, however, though it is promulgated by an external verdict, still, as it belongs somewhat to the entrance to the kingdom, in so far as the Church Militant is the way to the Church Triumphant, this jurisdiction whereby a man is competent to excommunicate, can be called a key. It is in this sense that some distinguish between the key of orders, which all priests have, and the key of jurisdiction in the tribunal of judgment, which none have but the judges of the external tribunal.

Nevertheless God bestowed both on Peter ( Matthew 16:19), from whom they are derived by others, whichever of them they have.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Parish priests have jurisdiction indeed over their subjects, in the tribunal of conscience, but not in the judicial tribunal, for they cannot summons them in contentious cases. Hence they cannot excommunicate, but they can absolve them in the tribunal of Penance. And though the tribunal of Penance is higher, yet more solemnity is requisite in the judicial tribunal, because therein it is necessary to make satisfaction not only to God but also to man.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(2) Whether those who are not priests can excommunicate?

P(4)- Q(22)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that those who are not priests cannot excommunicate. Because excommunication is an act of the keys, as stated in Sent. iv, D, 18. But those who are not priests have not the keys.

Therefore they cannot excommunicate.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, more is required for excommunication than for absolution in the tribunal of Penance. But one who is not a priest cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Neither therefore can he excommunicate.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Archdeacons, legates and bishopselect excommunicate, and yet sometimes they are not priests. Therefore not only priests can excommunicate.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(2) —

I answer that, Priests alone are competent to dispense the sacraments wherein grace is given: wherefore they alone can loose and bind in the tribunal of Penance. On the other hand excommunication regards grace, not directly but consequently, in so far as it deprives a man of the Church’s prayers, by which he is disposed for grace or preserved therein. Consequently even those who are not priests, provided they have jurisdiction in a contentious court, can excommunicate.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Though they have not the key of orders, they have the key of jurisdiction.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(2)- RO(2) —

These two are related to one another as something exceeding and something exceeded [*Cf. A(1), a(2) ; Q(24), A(1), ad 1], and consequently one of them may be within the competency of someone while the other is not.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(3) Whether a man who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another?

P(4)- Q(22)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another. For such a one has lost neither orders nor jurisdiction, since neither is he ordained anew when he is absolved, nor is his jurisdiction renewed. But excommunication requires nothing more than orders or jurisdiction. Therefore even one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further. it is a greater thing to consecrate the body of Christ than to excommunicate. But such persons can consecrate.

Therefore they can excommunicate.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(3) —

On the contrary, one whose body is bound cannot bind another. But spiritual gyves are stronger than bodily fetters.

Therefore one who is excommunicated cannot excommunicate another, since excommunication is a spiritual chain.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(3) —

I answer that, Jurisdiction can only be used in relation to another man. Consequently, since every excommunicated person is severed from the communion of the faithful, he is deprived of the use of jurisdiction. And as excommunication requires jurisdiction, an excommunicated person cannot excommunicate, and the same reason applies to one who is suspended from jurisdiction. For if he be suspended from orders only, then he cannot exercise his order, but he can use his jurisdiction, while, on the other hand, if he be suspended from jurisdiction and not from orders. he cannot use his jurisdiction, though he can exercise his order: and if he be suspended from both, he can exercise neither.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Although an excommunicated or suspended person does not lose his jurisdiction, yet he does lose its use.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The power of consecration results from the power of the character which is indelible, wherefore, from the very fact that a man has the character of order, he can always consecrate, though not always lawfully. It is different with the power of excommunication which results from jurisdiction, for this can be taken away and bound.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(4) Whether a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior?

P(4)- Q(22)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior. For an angel of God was greater than Paul, according to Matthew 11:11: “He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater then he, a greater” than whom “hath not risen among men that are born of women.” Now Paul excommunicated an angel from heaven ( Galatians 1:8). Therefore a man can excommunicate his superior.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, sometimes a priest pronounces a general excommunication for theft or the like. But it might happen that he, or his equal, or a superior has done such things. Therefore a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or a superior.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, a man can absolve his superior or his equal in the tribunal of Penance, as when a bishop confesses to his subject, or one priest confesses venial sins to another. Therefore it seems that a man may also excommunicate his superior, or his equal.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Excommunication is an act of jurisdiction. But no man has jurisdiction over himself (since one cannot be both judge and defendant in the same trial), or over his superior, or over an equal. Therefore a man cannot excommunicate his superior, or his equal, or himself.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(4) —

I answer that, Since, by jurisdiction, a man is placed above those over whom he has jurisdiction, through being their judge, it follows that no man has jurisdiction over himself, his superior, or his equal, and that, consequently, no one can excommunicate either himself, or his superior, or his equal.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The Apostle is speaking hypothetically, i.e. supposing an angel were to sin, for in that case he would not be higher than the Apostle, but lower. Nor is it absurd that, if the antecedent of a conditional sentence be impossible, the consequence be impossible also.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(4)- RO(2) —

In that case no one would be excommunicated, since no man has power over his peer.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Loosing and binding in the tribunal of confession affects our relation to God only, in Whose sight a man from being above another sinks below him through sin; while on the other hand excommunication is the affair of an external tribunal in which a man does not forfeit his superiority on account of sin. Hence there is no comparison between the two tribunals. Nevertheless, even in the tribunal of confession, a man cannot absolve himself, or his superior, or his equal, unless the power to do so be committed to him. This does not apply to venial sins, because they can be remitted through any sacraments which confer grace, hence remission of venial sins follows the power of orders.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(5) Whether a sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men?

P(4)- Q(22)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men. Because it is possible for a number of people to be united together in wickedness. Now when a man is obstinate in his wickedness he should be excommunicated.

Therefore a body of men can be excommunicated.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, the most grievous effect of an excommunication is privation of the sacraments of the Church. But sometimes a whole country is laid under an interdict. Therefore a body of people can be excommunicated.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(5) —

On the contrary, A gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Ep. ccl] on Matthew 12 asserts that the sovereign and a body of people cannot be excommunicated.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(5) —

I answer that, No man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now sin consists in an act: and acts do not belong to communities, but, generally speaking, to individuals. Wherefore individual members of a community can be excommunicated, but not the community itself. And although sometimes an act belongs to a whole multitude, as when many draw a boat, which none of them could draw by himself, yet it is not probable that a community would so wholly consent to evil that there would be no dissentients. Now God, Who judges all the earth, does not condemn the just with the wicked ( Genesis 18:25).

Therefore the Church, who should imitate the judgments of God, prudently decided that a community should not be excommunicated, lest the wheat be uprooted together with the tares and cockle.

The Reply to the First Objection is evident from what has been said.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Suspension is not so great a punishment as excommunication, since those who are suspended are not deprived of the prayers of the Church, as the excommunicated are. Wherefore a man can be suspended without having committed a sin himself, just as a whole kingdom is laid under an interdict on account of the king’s crime. Hence there is no comparison between excommunication and suspension.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(6) Whether a man can be excommunicated who is already under sentence of excommunication?

P(4)- Q(22)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man who is already under sentence of excommunication cannot be excommunicated any further. For the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 5:12): “What have I to do to judge them that are without?” Now those who are excommunicated are already outside the Church. Therefore the Church cannot exercise any further judgment on them, so as to excommunicate them again.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, excommunication is privation of divine things and of the communion of the faithful. But when a man has been deprived of a thing, he cannot be deprived of it again. Therefore one who is excommunicated cannot be excommunicated again

P(4)- Q(22)- A(6) — On the contrary, Excommunication is a punishment and a healing medicine. Now punishments and medicines are repeated when necessary. Therefore excommunication can be repeated.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(6) —

I answer that, A man who is under sentence of one excommunication, can be excommunicated again, either by a repetition of the same excommunication, for his greater confusion, so that he may renounce sin, or for some other cause. And then there are as many principal excommunications, as there are causes for his being excommunicated.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The Apostle is speaking of heathens and of other unbelievers who have no (sacramental) character, whereby they are numbered among the people of God. But since the baptismal character whereby a man is numbered among God’s people, is indelible, one who is baptized always belongs to the Church in some way, so that the Church is always competent to sit in judgment on him.

P(4)- Q(22)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Although privation does not receive more or less in itself, yet it can, as regards its cause. In this way an excommunication can be repeated, and a man who has been excommunicated several times is further from the Church’s prayers than one who has been excommunicated only once.

QUESTION OF COMMUNICATION WITH EXCOMMUNICATED PERSONS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider communication with those who are excommunicated. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful to communicate in matters purely corporal with one who is excommunicated? (2) Whether one who communicates with an excommunicated person is excommunicated? (3) Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in matters not permitted by law?

P(4)- Q(23)- A(1) Whether it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person?

P(4)- Q(23)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person. For excommunication is an act of the keys. But the power of the keys extends only to spiritual matters. Therefore excommunication does not prevent one from communicating with another in matters corporal.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, “What is instituted for the sake of charity, does not militate against charity” (Cf. Q(11), A(1), O(1) ). But we are bound by the precept of charity to succor our enemies, which is impossible without some sort of communication. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with an excommunicated person in corporal matters.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Corinthians 5:11): “With such an one not so much as to eat.”

P(4)- Q(23)- A(1) —

I answer that, Excommunication is twofold: there is minor excommunication, which deprives a man merely of a share in the sacraments, but not of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is lawful to communicate with a person lying under an excommunication of this kind, but not to give him the sacraments. The other is major excommunication which deprives a man of the sacraments of the Church and of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is not lawful to communicate with one who lies under such an excommunication. But, since the Church resorts to excommunication to repair and not to destroy, exception is made from this general law, in certain matters wherein communication is lawful, viz. in those which concern salvation, for one is allowed to speak of such matters with an excommunicated person; and one may even speak of other matters so as to put him at his ease and to make the words of salvation more acceptable. Moreover exception is made in favor of certain people whose business it is to be in attendance on the excommunicated person, viz. his wife, child, slave, vassal or subordinate.

This, however, is to be understood of children who have not attained their majority, else they are forbidden to communicate with their father: and as to the others, the exception applies to them if they have entered his service before his excommunication, but not if they did so afterwards.

Some understand this exception to apply in the opposite way, viz. that the master can communicate with his subjects: while others hold the contrary. At any rate it is lawful for them to communicate with others in matters wherein they are under an obligation to them, for just as subjects are bound to serve their master, so is the master bound to look after his subjects. Again certain cases are excepted; as when the fact of the excommunication is unknown, or in the case of strangers or travelers in the country of those who are excommunicated, for they are allowed to buy from them, or to receive alms from them. Likewise if anyone were to see an excommunicated person in distress: for then he would be bound by the precept of charity to assist him. These are all contained in the following line: “Utility, law, lowliness, ignorance of fact, necessity,” where “utility” refers to salutary words, “law” to marriage, “lowliness” to subjection. The others need no explanation.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Corporal matters are subordinate to spiritual matters. Wherefore the power which extends to spiritual things, can also extend to matters touching the body: even as the art which considers the end commands in matters ordained to the end.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(1)- RO(2) —

In a case where one is bound by the precept of charity to hold communication, the prohibition ceases, as is clear from what has been said.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(2) Whether a person incurs excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated?

P(4)- Q(23)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that a person does not incur excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated.

For a heathen or a Jew is more separated from the Church than a person who is excommunicated. But one does not incur excommunication for communicating with a heathen or a Jew. Neither, therefore, does one for communicating with an excommunicated Christian.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, if a man incurs excommunication for communicating with an excommunicated person, for the same reason a third would incur excommunication for communicating with him, and thus one might go on indefinitely, which would seem absurd. Therefore one does not incur excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(2) —

On the contrary, An excommunicated person is banished from communion. Therefore whoever communicates with him leaves the communion of the Church: and hence he seems to be excommunicated.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(2) —

I answer that, A person may incur excommunication in two ways. First, so that the excommunication includes both himself and whosoever communicates with him: and then, without any doubt, whoever communicates with him, incurs a major excommunication. Secondly, so that the excommunication is simply pronounced on him; and then a man may communicate with him either in his crime, by counsel, help or favor, in which case again he incurs the major excommunication, or he may communicate with him in other things by speaking to him, greeting him, or eating with him, in which case he incurs the minor excommunication.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The Church has no intention of correcting unbelievers as well as the faithful who are under her care: hence she does not sever those, whom she excommunicates, from the fellowship of unbelievers, as she does from the communion of the faithful over whom she exercises a certain power.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(2)- RO(2) —

It is lawful to hold communion with one who has incurred a minor excommunication, so that excommunication does not pass on to a third person.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in which it is allowed?

P(4)- Q(23)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in which it is allowed. Because a certain decretal (Cap. Sacris: De his quae vi, metuve, etc.) declares that “not even through fear of death should anyone hold communion with an excommunicated person, since one ought to die rather than commit a mortal sin.” But this would be no reason unless it were always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is a mortal sin to act against a commandment of the Church. But the Church forbids anyone to hold communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, no man is debarred from receiving the Eucharist on account of a venial sin. But a man who holds communion with an excommunicated person, outside those cases in which it is allowed, is debarred from receiving the Eucharist, since he incurs a minor excommunication. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, save in those cases in which it is allowed.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, no one should incur a major excommunication save for a mortal sin. Now according to the law (Can.

Praecipue, seqq., caus. xi) a man may incur a major excommunication for holding communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(3) —

On the contrary, None can absolve a man from mortal sin unless he have jurisdiction over him. But any priest can absolve a man for holding communion with those who are excommunicated. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(3) —

Further, the measure of the penalty should be according to the measure of the sin, as stated in Deuteronomy 25:3.

Now the punishment appointed by common custom for holding communion with an excommunicated person is not that which is inflicted for mortal sin, but rather that which is due for venial sin. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(3) —

I answer that, Some hold that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, by word or in any of the forbidden ways mentioned above ( A(2) ), except in those cases allowed by law (Cap. Quoniam). But since it seems very hard that a man should be guilty of a mortal sin by uttering just a slight word to an excommunicated person, and that by excommunicating a person one would endanger the salvation of many, and lay a snare which might turn to one’s own hurt, it seems to others more probable that he is not always guilty of a mortal sin, but only when he holds communion with him in a criminal deed, or in an act of Divine worship, or through contempt of the Church.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(3)- RO(1) —

This decretal is speaking of holding communion in Divine worship. It may also be replied that the same reason applies both to mortal and venial sin, since just as one cannot do well by committing a mortal sin, so neither can one by committing a venial sin: so that just as it is a man’s duty to suffer death rather than commit a mortal sin, so is it his duty to do so sooner than commit a venial sin, inasmuch as it is his duty to avoid venial sin.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The commandment of the Church regards spiritual matters directly, and legitimate actions as a consequence: hence by holding communion in Divine worship one acts against the commandment, and commits a mortal sin; but by holding communion in other matters, one acts beside the commandment, and sins venially.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Sometimes a man is debarred from the Eucharist even without his own fault, as in the case of those who are suspended or under an interdict, because these penalties are sometimes inflicted on one person for the sin of another who is thus punished.

P(4)- Q(23)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Although it is a venial sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated, yet to do so obstinately is a mortal sin: and for this reason one may be excommunicated according to the law.

QUESTION OF ABSOLUTION FROM EXCOMMUNICATION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider absolution from excommunication: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication? (2) Whether a man can be absolved from excommunication against his will? (3) Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from another?

P(4)- Q(24)- A(1) Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication?

P(4)- Q(24)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication. For the chains of sin are stronger than those of excommunication. But any priest can absolve his subject from sin.

Therefore much more can he absolve him from excommunication.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, if the cause is removed the effect is removed. But the cause of excommunication is a mortal sin. Therefore since any priest can absolve (his subject) from that mortal sin, he is able likewise to absolve him from the excommunication.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It belongs to the same power to excommunicate as to absolve from excommunication. But priests of inferior degree cannot excommunicate their subjects. Neither, therefore, can they absolve them.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(1) —

I answer that, Anyone can absolve from minor excommunication who can absolve from the sin of participation in the sin of another. But in the case of a major excommunication, this is pronounced either by a judge, and then he who pronounced sentence or his superior can absolve — or it is pronounced by law, and then the bishop or even a priest can absolve except in the six cases which the Pope, who is the maker of laws, reserves to himself: the first is the case of a man who lays hands on a cleric or a religious; the second is of one who breaks into a church and is denounced for so doing; the third is of the man who sets fire to a church and is denounced for the deed; the fourth is of one who knowingly communicates in the Divine worship with those whom the Pope has excommunicated by name; the fifth is the case of one who tampers with the letters of the Holy See; the sixth is the case of one who communicates in a crime of one who is excommunicated. For he should not be absolved except by the person who excommunicated him, even though he be not subject to him, unless, by reason of the difficulty of appearing before him, he be absolved by the bishop or by his own priest, after binding himself by oath to submit to the command of the judge who pronounced the excommunication on him.

There are however eight exceptions to the first case: (1) In the hour of death, when a person can be absolved by any priest from any excommunication; (2) if the striker be the doorkeeper of a man in authority, and the blow be given neither through hatred nor of set purpose; (3) if the striker be a woman; (4) if the striker be a servant, whose master is not at fault and would suffer from his absence; (5) if a religious strike a religious, unless he strike him very grievously; (6) if the striker be a poor man; (7) if he be a minor, an old man, or an invalid; (8) if there be a deadly feud between them.

There are, besides, seven cases in which the person who strikes a cleric does not incur excommunication: (1) if he do it for the sake of discipline, as a teacher or a superior; (2) if it be done for fun; (3) if the striker find the cleric behaving with impropriety towards his wife his mother, his sister or his daughter; (4) if he return blow for blow at once; (5) if the striker be not aware that he is striking a cleric; (6) if the latter be guilty of apostasy after the triple admonition; (7) if the cleric exercise an act which is altogether contrary to the clerical life, e.g. if he become a soldier, or if he be guilty of bigamy [*Namely, that which is known by canonists as “similar bigamy”].

P(4)- Q(24)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although the chains of sin are in themselves greater than those of excommunication, yet in a certain respect the chains of excommunication are greater, inasmuch as they bind a man not only in the sight of God, but also in the eye of the Church. Hence absolution from excommunication requires jurisdiction in the external forum, whereas absolution from sin does not. Nor is there need of giving one’s word by oath, as in the case of absolution from excommunication, because, as the Apostle declares ( Hebrews 6:16), controversies between men are decided by oath.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As an excommunicated person has no share in the sacraments of the Church, a priest cannot absolve him from his guilt, unless he be first absolved from excommunication.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(2) Whether anyone can be absolved against his will?

P(4)- Q(24)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that no man can be absolved against his will. For spiritual things are not conferred on anyone against his will. Now absolution from excommunication is a spiritual favor. Therefore it cannot be granted to a man against his will.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the cause of excommunication is contumacy. But when, through contempt of the excommunication, a man is unwilling to be absolved, he shows a high degree of contumacy.

Therefore he cannot be absolved.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Excommunication can be pronounced on a man against his will. Now things that happen to a man against his will, can be removed from him against his will, as in the case of the goods of fortune. Therefore excommunication can be removed from a man against his will.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(2) —

I answer that, Evil of fault and evil of punishment differ in this, that the origin of fault is within us, since all sin is voluntary, whereas the origin of punishment is sometimes without, since punishment does not need to be voluntary, in fact the nature of punishment is rather to be against the will. Wherefore, just as a man commits no sin except willingly, so no sin is forgiven him against his will. On the other hand just as a person can be excommunicated against his will, so can he be absolved therefrom.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The assertion is true of those spiritual goods which depend on our will, such as the virtues, which we cannot lose unwillingly; for knowledge, although a spiritual good, can be lost by a man against his will through sickness. Hence the argument is not to the point.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(2)- RO(2) —

It is possible for excommunication to be removed from a man even though he be contumacious, if it seem to be for the good of the man for whom the excommunication was intended as a medicine.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(3) Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from all?

P(4)- Q(24)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man cannot be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from all. For an effect should be proportionate to its cause. Now the cause of excommunication is a sin. Since then a man cannot be absolved from one sin without being absolved from all, neither can this happen as regards excommunication.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, absolution from excommunication is pronounced in the Church. But a man who is under the ban of one excommunication is outside the Church. Therefore so long as one remains, a man cannot be loosed from another.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Excommunication is a punishment.

Now a man can be loosed from one punishment, while another remains.

Therefore a man can be loosed from one excommunication and yet remain under another.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(3) —

I answer that, Excommunications are not connected together in any way, and so it is possible for a man to be absolved from one, and yet remain under another.

It must be observed however that sometimes a man lies under several excommunications pronounced by one judge; and then, when he is absolved from one, he is understood to be absolved from all, unless the contrary be expressed, or unless he ask to be absolved from excommunication on one count only, whereas he was excommunicated under several. On the other hand sometimes a man lies under several sentences of excommunication pronounced by several judges; and then, when absolved from one excommunication, he is not therefore absolved from the others, unless at his prayer they all confirm his absolution, or unless they all depute one to absolve him.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(3)- RO(1) —

All sins are connected together in aversion from God, which is incompatible with the forgiveness of sin: wherefore one sin cannot be forgiven without another. But excommunications have no such connection. Nor again is absolution from excommunication hindered by contrariety of the will, as stated above ( A(2) ). Hence the argument does not prove.

P(4)- Q(24)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Just as such a man was for several reasons outside the Church so is it possible for his separation to be removed on one count and to remain on another.

QUESTION OF INDULGENCES (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider indulgence: (1) in itself; (2) those who grant indulgence; (3) those who receive it.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether an indulgence remits any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins? (2) Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be? (3) Whether an indulgence should be granted for temporal assistance?

P(4)- Q(25)- A(1) Whether an indulgence can remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins?

P(4)- Q(25)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that an indulgence cannot remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins. Because a gloss on 2 Timothy 2:13, “He cannot deny Himself,” says: “He would do this if He did not keep His word.” Now He said ( Deuteronomy 25:2): “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.”

Therefore nothing can be remitted from the satisfactory punishment which is appointed according to the measure of sin.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, an inferior cannot absolve from an obligation imposed by his superior. But when God absolves us from sin He binds us to temporal punishment, as Hugh of St. Victor declares (Tract. vi Sum. Sent. [*Of doubtful authenticity]). Therefore no man can absolve from that punishment, by remitting any part of it.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the granting of the sacramental effect without the sacraments belongs to the power of excellence. Now none but Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments. Since then satisfaction is a part of the sacrament of Penance, conducing to the remission of the punishment due, it seems that no mere man can remit the debt of punishment without satisfaction.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the power of the ministers of the Church was given them, not “unto destruction,” but “unto edification” ( 2 Corinthians 10:8). But it would be conducive to destruction, if satisfaction, which was intended for our good, inasmuch as it serves for a remedy, were done away with. Therefore the power of the ministers of the Church does not extend to this.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 2 Corinthians 2:10): “For, what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ,” and a gloss adds: i.e. “as though Christ Himself had pardoned.” But Christ could remit the punishment of a sin without any satisfaction, as evidenced in the case of the adulterous woman ( John 8). Therefore Paul could do so likewise. Therefore the Pope can too, since his power in the Church is not less than Paul’s.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(1) —

Further, the universal Church cannot err; since He Who “was heard for His reverence” ( Hebrews 5:7) said to Peter, on whose profession of faith the Church was founded ( Luke 22:32): “I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not.” Now the universal Church approves and grants indulgences. Therefore indulgences have some value.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(1) —

I answer that, All admit that indulgences have some value, for it would be blasphemy to say that the Church does anything in vain. But some say that they do not avail to free a man from the debt of punishment which he has deserved in Purgatory according to God’s judgment, and that they merely serve to free him from the obligation imposed on him by the priest as a punishment for his sins, or from the canonical penalties he has incurred. But this opinion does not seem to be true. First, because it is expressly opposed to the privilege granted to Peter, to whom it was said ( Matthew 16:19) that whatsoever he should loose on earth should be loosed also in heaven. Wherefore whatever remission is granted in the court of the Church holds good in the court of God. Moreover the Church by granting such indulgences would do more harm than good, since, by remitting the punishment she had enjoined on a man, she would deliver him to be punished more severely in Purgatory.

Hence we must say on the contrary that indulgences hold good both in the Church’s court and in the judgment of God, for the remission of the punishment which remains after contrition, absolution, and confession, whether this punishment be enjoined or not. The reason why they so avail is the oneness of the mystical body in which many have performed works of satisfaction exceeding the requirements of their debts; in which, too, many have patiently borne unjust tribulations whereby a multitude of punishments would have been paid, had they been incurred. So great is the quantity of such merits that it exceeds the entire debt of punishment due to those who are living at this moment: and this is especially due to the merits of Christ: for though He acts through the sacraments, yet His efficacy is nowise restricted to them, but infinitely surpasses their efficacy.

Now one man can satisfy for another, as we have explained above ( Q(13), A(2) ). And the saints in whom this super-abundance of satisfactions is found, did not perform their good works for this or that particular person, who needs the remission of his punishment (else he would have received this remission without any indulgence at all), but they performed them for the whole Church in general, even as the Apostle declares that he fills up “those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ... for His body, which is the Church” to whom he wrote ( Colossians 1:24). These merits, then, are the common property of the whole Church. Now those things which are the common property of a number are distributed to the various individuals according to the judgment of him who rules them all.

Hence, just as one man would obtain the remission of his punishment if another were to satisfy for him, so would he too if another’s satisfactions be applied to him by one who has the power to do so.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The remission which is granted by means of indulgences does not destroy the proportion between punishment and sin, since someone has spontaneously taken upon himself the punishment due for another’s guilt, as explained above.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(1)- RO(2) —

He who gains an indulgence is not, strictly speaking, absolved from the debt of punishment, but is given the means whereby he may pay it.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The effect of sacramental absolution is the removal of a man’s guilt, an effect which is not produced by indulgences.

But he who grants indulgences pays the debt of punishment which a man owes, out of the common stock of the Church’s goods, as explained above.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Grace affords a better remedy for the avoidance of sin than does habituation to (good) works. And since he who gains an indulgence is disposed to grace through the love which he conceives for the cause for which the indulgence is granted, it follows that indulgences provide a remedy against sin. Consequently it is not harmful to grant indulgences unless this be done without discretion. Nevertheless those who gain indulgences should be advised, not, on this account, to omit the penitential works imposed on them, so that they may derive a remedy from these also, even though they may be quit of the debt of punishment; and all the more, seeing that they are often more in debt than they think.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2) Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be. For indulgences have no effect save from the power of the keys. Now by the power of the keys, he who has that power can only remit some fixed part of the punishment due for sin, after taking into account the measure of the sin and of the penitent’s sorrow. Since then indulgences depend on the mere will of the grantor, it seems that they are not as effective as they claim to be.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the debt of punishment keeps man back from the attainment of glory, which he ought to desire above all things. Now, if indulgences are as effective as they claim to be, a man by setting himself to gain indulgences might become immune from all debt of temporal punishment. Therefore it would seem that a man ought to put aside all other kinds of works, and devote himself to gain indulgences.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, sometimes an indulgence whereby a man is remitted a third part of the punishment due for his sins is granted if he contribute towards the erection of a certain building. If, therefore, indulgences produce the effect which is claimed for them, he who gives a penny, and then another, and then again another, would obtain a plenary absolution from all punishment due for his sins, which seems absurd.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, sometimes an indulgence is granted, so that for visiting a church a man obtains a seven years’ remission. If, then, an indulgence avails as much as is claimed for it a man who lives near that church, or the clergy attached thereto who go there every day, obtain as much indulgence as one who comes from a distance (which would appear unjust); moreover, seemingly, they would gain the indulgence several times a day, since they go there repeatedly.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, to remit a man’s punishment beyond a just estimate seems to amount to the same as to remit it without reason; because in so far as he exceeds that estimate, he limits the compensation.

Now he who grants an indulgence cannot without cause remit a man’s punishment either wholly or partly, even though the Pope were to say to anyone: “I remit to all the punishment you owe for your sins.” Therefore it seems that he cannot remit anything beyond the just estimate. Now indulgences are often published which exceed that just estimate. Therefore they do not avail as much as is claimed for them.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Job 13:7): “Hath God any need of your lie, that you should speak deceitfully for Him?”

Therefore the Church, in publishing indulgences, does not lie; and so they avail as much as is claimed for them.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 15:14): “If... our preaching is vain, your faith is also vain.” Therefore whoever utters a falsehood in preaching, so far as he is concerned, makes faith void. and so sins mortally. If therefore indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be, all who publish indulgences would commit a mortal sin: which is absurd.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2) —

I answer that, on this point there are many opinions.

For some maintain that indulgences have not the efficacy claimed for them, but that they simply avail each individual in proportion to his faith and devotion. And consequently those who maintain this, say that the Church publishes her indulgences in such a way as, by a kind of pious fraud, to induce men to do well, just as a mother entices her child to walk by holding out an apple. But this seems a very dangerous assertion to make.

For as Augustine states (Ep. ad Hieron. lxxviii), “if any error were discovered in Holy Writ, the authority of Holy Writ would perish.” In like manner, if any error were to be found in the Church’s preaching, her doctrine would have no authority in settling questions of faith.

Hence others have maintained that indulgences avail as much as is claimed for them, according to a just estimate, not of him who grants it — who perhaps puts too high a value on it — nor of the recipient — for he may prize too highly the gift he receives, but a just estimate according to the estimate of good men who consider the condition of the person affected, and the utility and needs of the Church, for the Church’s needs are greater at one time than at another. Yet, neither, seemingly, can this opinion stand.

First, because in that case indulgences would no longer be a remission, but rather a mere commutation. Moreover the preaching of the Church would not be excused from untruth, since, at times, indulgences are granted far in excess of the requirements of this just estimate, taking into consideration all the aforesaid conditions, as, for example, when the Pope granted to anyone who visited a certain church, an indulgence of seven years, which indulgence was granted by Blessed Gregory for the Roman Stations.

Hence others say that the quantity of remission accorded in an indulgence is not to be measured by the devotion of the recipient, as the first opinion suggested, nor according to the quantity of what is given, as the second opinion held; but according to the cause for which the indulgence is granted, and according to which a person is held deserving of obtaining such an indulgence. Thus according as a man approached near to that cause, so would he obtain remission in whole or in part. But neither will this explain the custom of the Church, who assigns, now a greater, now a lesser indulgence, for the same cause: thus, under the same circumstances, now a year’s indulgence, now one of only forty days, according to the graciousness of the Pope, who grants the indulgence, is granted to those who visit a church. Wherefore the amount of the remission granted by the indulgence is not to be measured by the cause for which a person is worthy of an indulgence.

We must therefore say otherwise that the quantity of an effect is proportionate to the quantity of the cause. Now the cause of the remission of punishment effected by indulgences is no other than the abundance of the Church’s merits, and this abundance suffices for the remission of all punishment. The effective cause of the remission is not the devotion, or toil, or gift of the recipient; nor, again, is it the cause for which the indulgence was granted. We cannot, then, estimate the quantity of the remission by any of the foregoing, but solely by the merits of the Church — and these are always superabundant. Consequently, according as these merits are applied to a person so does he obtain remission. That they should be so applied demands, firstly, authority to dispense this treasure. secondly, union between the recipient and Him Who merited it — and this is brought about by charity; thirdly, there is required a reason for so dispensing this treasury, so that the intention, namely, of those who wrought these meritorious works is safeguarded, since they did them for the honor of God and for the good of the Church in general. Hence whenever the cause assigned tends to the good of the Church and the honor of God, there is sufficient reason for granting an indulgence.

Hence, according to others, indulgences have precisely the efficacy claimed for them, provided that he who grants them have the authority, that the recipient have charity, and that, as regards the cause, there be piety which includes the honor of God and the profit of our neighbor. Nor in this view have we “too great a market of the Divine mercy” [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 20], as some maintain, nor again does it derogate from Divine justice, for no punishment is remitted, but the punishment of one is imputed to another.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( Q(19), A(3) ) there are two keys, the key of orders and the key of jurisdiction. The key of orders is a sacramental: and as the effects of the sacraments are fixed, not by men but by God, the priest cannot decide in the tribunal of confession how much shall be remitted by means of the key of orders from the punishment due; it is God Who appoints the amount to be remitted. On the other hand the key of jurisdiction is not something sacramental, and its effect depends on a man’s decision. The remission granted through indulgences is the effect of this key, since it does not belong to the dispensation of the sacraments, but to the distribution of the common property of the Church: hence it is that legates, even though they be not priests, can grant indulgences.

Consequently the decision of how much punishment is to be remitted by an indulgence depends on the will of the one who grants that indulgence.

If, however, he remits punishment without sufficient reason, so that men are enticed to substitute mere nothings, as it were, for works of penance, he sins by granting such indulgences, although the indulgence is gained fully.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Although indulgences avail much for the remission of punishment, yet works of satisfaction are more meritorious in respect of the essential reward, which infinitely transcends the remission of temporal punishment.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2)- RO(3) —

When an indulgence is granted in a general way to anyone that helps towards the building of a church, we must understand this to mean a help proportionate to the giver: and in so far as he approaches to this, he will gain the indulgence more or less fully.

Consequently a poor man by giving one penny would gain the full indulgence, not so a rich man, whom it would not become to give so little to so holy and profitable a work; Just as a king would not be said to help a man if he gave him an “obol.”

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2)- RO(4) —

A person who lives near the church, and the priest and clergy of the church, gain the indulgence as much as those who come perhaps a distance of a thousand days’ journey: because the remission, as stated above, is proportionate, not to the toil, but to the merits which are applied. Yet he who toils most gains most merit. This, however, is to be understood of those cases in which an indulgence is given in an undeterminate manner. For sometimes a distinction is expressed: thus the Pope at the time of general absolution grants an indulgence of five years to those who come from across the seas, and one of three years to those who come from across the mountains, to others an indulgence of one year. Nor does a person gain the indulgence each time he visits the church during the term of indulgence, because sometimes it is granted for a fixed time; thus when it is said, “Whoever visits such and such a church until such and such a day, shall gain so much indulgence,” we must understand that it can be gained only once. on the other hand if there be a continual indulgence in a certain church, as the indulgence of forty days to be gained in the church of the Blessed Peter, then a person gains the indulgence as often as he visits the church.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(2)- RO(5) —

An indulgence requires a cause, not as a measure of the remission of punishment, but in order that the intention of those whose merits are applied, may reach to this particular individual.

Now one person’s good is applied to another in two ways: first, by charity; and in this way, even without indulgences, a person shares in all the good deeds done, provided he have charity: secondly, by the intention of the person who does the good action; and in this way, provided there be a lawful cause, the intention of a person who has done something for the profit of the Church, may reach to some individual through indulgences.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(3) Whether an indulgence ought to be granted for temporal help?

P(4)- Q(25)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that an indulgence ought not to be granted for temporal help. Because the remission of sins is something spiritual. Now to exchange a spiritual for a temporal thing is simony.

Therefore this ought not to be done.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, spiritual assistance is more necessary than temporal. But indulgences do not appear to be granted for spiritual assistance. Much less therefore ought they to be granted for temporal help.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(3) —

On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Church in granting indulgences for pilgrimages and almsgiving.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(3) —

I answer that, Temporal things are subordinate to spiritual matters, since we must make use of temporal things on account of spiritual things. Consequently an indulgence must not be granted for the sake of temporal matters as such, but in so far as they are subordinate to spiritual things: such as the quelling of the Church’s enemies, who disturb her peace; or such as the building of a church, of a bridge, and other forms of almsgiving. It is therefore evident that there is no simony in these transactions, since a spiritual thing is exchanged, not for a temporal but for a spiritual commodity.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

P(4)- Q(25)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Indulgences can be, and sometimes are, granted even for purely spiritual matters. Thus Pope Innocent IV granted an indulgence of ten days to all who prayed for the king of France; and in like manner sometimes the same indulgence is granted to those who preach a crusade as to those who take part in it.

QUESTION OF THOSE WHO CAN GRANT INDULGENCES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those who can grant indulgences: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences? (2) Whether a deacon or another, who is not a priest, can grant indulgences? (3) Whether a bishop can grant them? (4) Whether they can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?

P(4)- Q(26)- A(1) Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?

P(4)- Q(26)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that every parish priest can grant indulgences. For an indulgence derives its efficacy from the superabundance of the Church’s merits. Now there is no congregation without some superabundance of merits. Therefore every priest, who has charge of a congregation, can grant indulgences, and, in like manner, so can every prelate.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, every prelate stands for a multitude, just as an individual stands for himself. But any individual can assign his own goods to another and thus offer satisfaction for a third person.

Therefore a prelate can assign the property of the multitude subject to him, and so it seems that he can grant indulgences.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(1) —

On the contrary, To excommunicate is less than to grant indulgences. But a parish priest cannot do the former. Therefore he cannot do the latter.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(1) —

I answer that, Indulgences are effective, in as much as the works of satisfaction done by one person are applied to another, not only by virtue of charity, but also by the intention of the person who did them being directed in some way to the person to whom they are applied.

Now a person’s intention may be directed to another in three ways, specifically, generically and individually. Individually, as when one person offers satisfaction for another particular person; and thus anyone can apply his works to another. Specifically, as when a person prays for the congregation to which he belongs, for the members of his household, or for his benefactors, and directs his works of satisfaction to the same intention: in this way the superior of a congregation can apply those works to some other person, by applying the intention of those who belong to his congregation to some fixed individual. Generically, as when a person directs his works for the good of the Church in general; and thus he who presides over the whole Church can communicate those works, by applying his intention to this or that individual. And since a man is a member of a congregation, and a congregation is a part of the Church, hence the intention of private good includes the intention of the good of the congregation, and of the good of the whole Church. Therefore he who presides over the Church can communicate what belongs to an individual congregation or to an individual man: and he who presides over a congregation can communicate what belongs to an individual man, but not conversely. Yet neither the first nor the second communication is called an indulgence, but only the third; and this for two reasons. First, because, although those communications loose man from the debt of punishment in the sight of God, yet he is not freed from the obligation of fulfilling the satisfaction enjoined, to which he is bound by a commandment of the Church; whereas the third communication frees man even from this obligation. Secondly, because in one person or even in one congregation there is not such an unfailing supply of merits as to be sufficient both for the one person or congregation and for all others; and consequently the individual is not freed from the entire debt of punishment unless satisfaction is offered for him individually, to the very amount that he owes. On the other hand, in the whole Church there is an unfailing supply of merits, chiefly on account of the merit of Christ. Consequently he alone who is at the head of the Church can grant indulgences. Since, however, the Church is the congregation of the faithful, and since a congregation of men is of two kinds, the domestic, composed of members of the same family, and the civil, composed of members of the same nationality, the Church is like to a civil congregation, for the people themselves are called the Church; while the various assemblies, or parishes of one diocese are likened to a congregation in the various families and services. Hence a bishop alone is properly called a prelate of the Church, wherefore he alone, like a bridegroom, receives the ring of the Church. Consequently full power in the dispensation of the sacraments, and jurisdiction in the public tribunal, belong to him alone as the public person, but to others by delegation from him. Those priests who have charge of the people are not prelates strictly speaking, but assistants, hence, in consecrating priests the bishop says: “The more fragile we are, the more we need these assistants”: and for this reason they do not dispense all the sacraments. Hence parish priests, or abbots or other like prelates cannot grant indulgences.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(2) Whether a deacon or another who is not a priest can grant an indulgence?

P(4)- Q(26)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that a deacon, or one that is not a priest cannot grant an indulgence. Because remission of sins is an effect of the keys. Now none but a priest has the keys. Therefore a priest alone can grant indulgences.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, a fuller remission of punishment is granted by indulgences than by the tribunal of Penance. But a priest alone has power in the latter, and, therefore, he alone has power in the former.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The distribution of the Church’s treasury is entrusted to the same person as the government of the Church.

Now this is entrusted sometimes to one who is not a priest. Therefore he can grant indulgences, since they derive their efficacy from the distribution of the Church’s treasury.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(2) —

I answer that, The power of granting indulgences follows jurisdiction, as stated above ( Q(25), A(2) ). And since deacons and others, who are not priests, can have jurisdiction either delegated, as legates, or ordinary, as bishops-elect, it follows that even those who are not priests can grant indulgences, although they cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance, since this follows the reception of orders. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the granting of indulgences belongs to the key of jurisdiction and not to the key of orders.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(3) Whether a bishop can grant indulgences?

P(4)- Q(26)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that even a bishop cannot grant indulgences. Because the treasury of the Church is the common property of the whole Church. Now the common property of the whole Church cannot be distributed save by him who presides over the whole Church.

Therefore the Pope alone can grant indulgences.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, none can remit punishments fixed by law, save the one who has the power to make the law. Now punishments in satisfaction for sins are fixed by law. Therefore the Pope alone can remit these punishments, since he is the maker of the law.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(3) —

On the contrary, stands the custom of the Church in accordance with which bishops grant indulgences.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(3) —

I answer that, The Pope has the plenitude of pontifical power, being like a king in his kingdom: whereas the bishops are appointed to a share in his solicitude, like judges over each city. Hence them alone the Pope, in his letters, addresses as “brethren,” whereas he calls all others his “sons.” Therefore the plenitude of the power of granting indulgences resides in the Pope, because he can grant them, as he lists, provided the cause be a lawful one: while, in bishops, this power resides subject to the Pope’s ordination, so that they can grant them within fixed limits and not beyond.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(4) Whether indulgences can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?

P(4)- Q(26)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that indulgences cannot be granted by one who is in mortal sin. For a stream can no longer flow if cut off from its source. Now the source of grace which is the Holy Ghost is cut off from one who is in mortal sin. Therefore such a one can convey nothing to others by granting indulgences.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, it is a greater thing to grant an indulgence than to receive one. But one who is in mortal sin cannot receive an indulgence, as we shall show presently ( Q(27), A(1) ). Neither, therefore, can he grant one.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Indulgences are granted in virtue of the power conferred on the prelates of the Church. Now mortal sin takes away, not power but goodness. Therefore one who is in mortal sin can grant indulgences.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(4) —

I answer that, The granting of indulgences belongs to jurisdiction. But a man does not, through sin, lose jurisdiction.

Consequently indulgences are equally valid, whether they be granted by one who is in mortal sin, or by a most holy person; since he remits punishment, not by virtue of his own merits, but by virtue of the merits laid up in the Church’s treasury.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The prelate who, while in a state of mortal sin, grants an indulgence, does not pour forth anything of his own, and so it is not necessary that he should receive an inflow from the source, in order that he may grant a valid indulgence.

P(4)- Q(26)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Further, to grant an indulgence is more than to receive one, if we consider the power, but it is less, if we consider the personal profit.

QUESTION OF THOSE WHOM INDULGENCES AVAIL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those whom indulgences avail: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether indulgences avail those who are in mortal sin? (2) Whether they avail religious? (3) Whether they avail a person who does not fulfill the conditions for which the indulgence is given? (4) Whether they avail him who grants them?

P(4)- Q(27)- A(1) Whether an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin?

P(4)- Q(27)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin. For one person can merit grace and many other good things for another, even though he be in mortal sin. Now indulgences derive their efficacy from the application of the saints’ merits to an individual. Therefore they are effective in one who is in mortal sin.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the greater the need, the more room there is for pity. Now a man who is in mortal sin is in very great need.

Therefore all the more should pity be extended to him by indulgence.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(1) —

On the contrary, A dead member receives no inflow from the other members that are living. But one who is in mortal sin, is like a dead member. Therefore he receives no inflow, through indulgences, from the merits of living members.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(1) —

I answer that, Some hold that indulgences avail those even who are in mortal sin, for the acquiring of grace, but not for the remission of their punishment, since none can be freed from punishment who is not yet freed from guilt. For he who has not yet been reached by God’s operation unto the remission of guilt, cannot receive the remission of his punishment from the minister of the Church neither by indulgences nor in the tribunal of Penance.

But this opinion seems to be untrue. Because, although those merits which are applied by means of an indulgence, might possibly avail a person so that he could merit grace (by way of congruity and impetration), yet it is not for this reason that they are applied, but for the remission of punishment. Hence they do not avail those who are in mortal sin, and consequently, true contrition and confession are demanded as conditions for gaining all indulgences. If however the merits were applied by such a form as this: “I grant you a share in the merits of the whole Church — or of one congregation, or of one specified person,” then they might avail a person in mortal sin so that he could merit something, as the foregoing opinion holds.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Although he who is in mortal sin is in greater need of help, yet he is less capable of receiving it.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(2) Whether indulgences avail religious?

P(4)- Q(27)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that indulgences do not avail religious. For there is no reason to bring supplies to those who supply others out of their own abundance. Now indulgences are derived from the abundance of works of satisfaction to be found in religious. Therefore it is unreasonable for them to profit by indulgences.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, nothing detrimental to religious life should be done in the Church. But, if indulgences were to avail religious, this would be detrimental to regular discipline, because religious would become lax on account of indulgences, and would neglect the penances imposed in chapter. Therefore indulgences do not avail religious.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Good brings harm to no man. But the religious life is a good thing. Therefore it does not take away from religious the profit to be derived from indulgences.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(2) —

I answer that, Indulgences avail both seculars and religious, provided they have charity and satisfy the conditions for gaining the indulgences: for religious can be helped by indulgences no less than persons living in the world.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Although religious are in the state of perfection, yet they cannot live without sin: and so if at times they are liable to punishment on account of some sin, they can expiate this debt by means of indulgences. For it is not unreasonable that one who is well off absolutely speaking, should be in want at times and in some respect, and thus need to be supplied with what he lacks. Hence it is written ( Galatians 6:2): “Bear ye one another’s burdens.”

P(4)- Q(27)- A(2)- RO(2) —

There is no reason why indulgences should be detrimental to religious observance, because, as to the reward of eternal life, religious merit more by observing their rule than by gaining indulgences; although, as to the remission of punishment, which is a lesser good, they merit less. Nor again do indulgences remit the punishment enjoined in chapter, because the chapter is a judicial rather than a penitential tribunal. hence even those who are not priests hold chapter.

Absolution from punishment enjoined or due for sin is given in the tribunal of Penance.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(3) Whether an indulgence can ever be granted to one who does not fulfill the conditions required?

P(4)- Q(27)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that an indulgence can sometimes be granted to one who does not fulfill the required conditions. Because when a person is unable to perform a certain action his will is taken for the deed. Now sometimes an indulgence is to be gained by giving an alms, which a poor man is unable to do, though he would do so willingly.

Therefore he can gain the indulgence.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, one man can make satisfaction for another. Now an indulgence is directed to the remission of punishment, just as satisfaction is. Therefore one man can gain an indulgence for another; and so a man can gain an indulgence without doing that for which the indulgence is given.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(3) —

On the contrary, If the cause is removed, the effect is removed. If therefore a person fails to do that for which an indulgence is granted, and which is the cause of the indulgence, he does not gain the indulgence.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(3) —

I answer that, Failing the condition of a grant, no grant ensues. Hence, as an indulgence is granted on the condition that a person does or gives a certain thing, if he fails in this, he does not gain the indulgence.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(3)- RO(1) —

This is true of the essential reward, but not of certain accidental rewards, such as the remission of punishment and the like.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(3)- RO(2) —

A person can by his intention apply his own action to whomever he lists, and so he can make satisfaction for whomever he chooses. On the other hand, an indulgence cannot be applied to someone, except in accordance with the intention of the grantor. Hence, since he applies it to the doer or giver of a particular action or thing, the doer cannot transfer this intention to another. If, however, the indulgence were expressed thus: “Whosoever does this, or for whomsoever this is done, shall gain so much indulgence,” it would avail the person for whom it is done. Nor would the person who does this action, give the indulgence to another, but he who grants the indulgence in this form.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(4) Whether an indulgence avails the person who grants it?

P(4)- Q(27)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that an indulgence does not avail him who grants it. For the granting of an indulgence belongs to jurisdiction.

Now no one can exercise jurisdiction on himself. thus no one can excommunicate himself. Therefore no one can participate in an indulgence granted by himself.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, if this were possible, he who grants an indulgence might gain the remission of the punishment of all his sins for some small deed, so that he would sin with impunity, which seems senseless.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, to grant indulgences and to excommunicate belong to the same power. Now a man cannot excommunicate himself. Therefore he cannot share in the indulgence of which he is the grantor.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(4) —

On the contrary, He would be worse off than others if he could not make use of the Church’s treasury which he dispenses to others.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(4) —

I answer that, An indulgence should be given for some reason, in order for anyone to be enticed by the indulgence to perform some action that conduces to the good of the Church and to the honor of God. Now the prelate to whom is committed the care of the Church’s good and of the furthering of God’s honor, does not need to entice himself thereto. Therefore he cannot grant an indulgence to himself alone; but he can avail himself of an indulgence that he grants for others, since it is based on a cause for granting it to them.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(4)- RO(1) —

A man cannot exercise an act of jurisdiction on himself, but a prelate can avail himself of those things which are granted to others by the authority of his jurisdiction, both in temporal and in spiritual matters: thus also a priest gives himself the Eucharist which he gives to others. And so a bishop too can apply to himself the suffrages of the Church which he dispenses to others, the immediate effect of which suffrages, and not of his jurisdiction, is the remission of punishment by means of indulgences.

The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what had been said.

P(4)- Q(27)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Excommunication is pronounced by way of sentence, which no man can pronounce on himself, for the reason that in the tribunal of justice the same man cannot be both judge and accused. On the other hand an indulgence is not given under the form of a sentence, but by way of dispensation, which a man can apply to himself.

QUESTION OF THE SOLEMN RITE OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the solemn rite of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether a penance can be published or solemnized? (2) Whether a solemn penance can be repeated? (3) Whether public penance should be imposed on women?

P(4)- Q(28)- A(1) Whether a penance should be published or solemnized?

P(4)- Q(28)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that a penance should not be published or solemnized. Because it is not lawful for a priest, even through fear, to divulge anyone’s sin, however notorious it may be. Now a sin is published by a solemn penance. Therefore a penance should not be solemnized.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the judgment should follow the nature of the tribunal. Now penance is a judgment pronounced in a secret tribunal. Therefore it should not be published or solemnized.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, “Every deficiency is made good by penance” as Ambrose [*Cf. Hypognost. iii, among the spurious works ascribed to St. Augustine] states. Now solemnization has a contrary effect, since it involves the penitent in many deficiencies: for a layman cannot be promoted to the ranks of the clergy nor can a cleric be promoted to higher orders, after doing solemn penance. Therefore Penance should not be solemnized.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Penance is a sacrament. Now some kind of solemnity is observed in every sacrament. Therefore there should be some solemnity in Penance.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(1) —

Further, the medicine should suit the disease. Now a sin is sometimes public, and by its example draws many to sin. Therefore the penance which is its medicine should also be public and solemn so as to give edification to many.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(1) —

I answer that, Some penances should be public and solemn for four reasons. First, so that a public sin may have a public remedy; secondly, because he who has committed a very grave crime deserves the greatest confusion even in this life; thirdly, in order that it may deter others; fourthly, that he may be an example of repentance, lest those should despair, who have committed grievous sins.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The priest does not divulge the confession by imposing such a penance, though people may suspect the penitent of having committed some great sin. For a man is not certainly taken to be guilty, because he is punished, since sometimes one does penance for another: thus we read in the Lives of the Fathers of a certain man who, in order to incite his companion to do penance, did penance together with him. And if the sin be public, the penitent, by fulfilling his penance, shows that he has been to confession.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(1)- RO(2) —

A solemn penance, as to its imposition, does not go beyond the limits of a secret tribunal, since, just as the confession is made secretly, so the penance is imposed secretly. It is the execution of the penance, that goes beyond the limits of the secret tribunal: and there is nothing objectionable in this.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Although Penance cancels all deficiencies, by restoring man to his former state of grace, yet it does not always restore him to his former dignity. Hence women after doing penance for fornication are not given the veil, because they do not recover the honor of virginity. In like manner, after doing public penance, a sinner does not recover his former dignity so as to be eligible for the clerical state and a bishop who would ordain such a one ought to be deprived of the power of ordaining, unless perhaps the needs of the Church or custom require it. In that case such a one would be admitted to minor orders by way of exception, but not to the sacred orders. First, on account of the dignity of the latter; secondly, for fear of relapse; thirdly, in order to avoid the scandal which the people might take through recollection of his former sins; fourthly, because he would not have the face to correct others, by reason of the publicity of his own sin.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(2) Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?

P(4)- Q(28)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that a solemn penance can be repeated. For those sacraments which do not imprint a character, can be solemnized a second time, such as the Eucharist, Extreme Unction and the like. But Penance does not imprint a character, therefore it can be solemnized over again.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, penance is solemnized on account of the gravity and publicity of the sin. Now, after doing penance, a person may commit the same sins over again, or even more grievous sins.

Therefore the solemn penance should be imposed again.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Solemn penance signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise. Now this was done but once.

Therefore solemn penance should be imposed once only.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(2) —

I answer that, Solemn penance ought not to be repeated, for three reasons. First, lest frequency bring it into contempt.

Secondly, on account of its signification; for it signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise, which happened only once; thirdly, because the solemnization indicates, in a way, that one makes profession of continual repentance. Wherefore repetition is inconsistent with solemnization. And if the sinner fall again, he is not precluded from doing penance, but a solemn penance should not be imposed on him again.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In those sacraments which are solemnized again and again, repetition is not inconsistent with solemnity, as it is in the present case. Hence the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Although, if we consider his crime, he ought to do the same penance again, yet the repeated solemnization is not becoming, for the reasons stated above.

P(4)- Q(28)- A(3) Whether solemn penance should be imposed on women and clerics, and whether any priest can impose it?