QUESTIONS 41-67 QUESTION OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY AS DIRECTED TO AN OFFICE OF NATURE (FOUR ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider matrimony. We must treat of it (1) as directed to an office of nature; (2) as a sacrament; (3) as considered absolutely and in itself.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is of natural law? (2) Whether it is a matter of precept? (3) Whether its act is lawful? (4) Whether its act can be meritorious?

P(4)- Q(41)- A(1) Whether matrimony is of natural law?

P(4)- Q(41)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that matrimony is not natural.

Because “the natural law is what nature has taught all animals” [*Digest. I, i, de justitia et jure, 1]. But in other animals the sexes are united without matrimony. Therefore matrimony is not of natural law.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(1)- O(1) —

Further, that which is of natural law is found in all men with regard to their every state. But matrimony was not in every state of man, for as Tully says (De Inv. Rhet.), “at the beginning men were savages and then no man knew his own children, nor was he bound by any marriage tie,” wherein matrimony consists. Therefore it is not natural.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, natural things are the same among all.

But matrimony is not in the same way among all, since its practice varies according to the various laws. Therefore it is not natural.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, those things without which the intention of nature can be maintained would seem not to be natural. But nature intends the preservation of the species by generation which is possible without matrimony, as in the case of fornicators. Therefore matrimony is not natural.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(1) —

On the contrary, At the commencement of the Digests it is stated: “The union of male and female, which we call matrimony, is of natural law.”

P(4)- Q(41)- A(1) —

Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) says that “man is an animal more inclined by nature to connubial than political society.” But “man is naturally a political and gregarious animal,” as the same author asserts (Polit. i, 2). Therefore he is naturally inclined to connubial union, and thus the conjugal union or matrimony is natural.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(1) —

I answer that, A thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, as resulting of necessity from the principles of nature; thus upward movement is natural to fire. In this way matrimony is not natural, nor are any of those things that come to pass at the intervention or motion of the free-will. Secondly, that is said to be natural to which nature inclines although it comes to pass through the intervention of the free-will; thus acts of virtue and the virtues themselves are called natural; and in this way matrimony is natural, because natural reason inclines thereto in two ways.

First, in relation to the principal end of matrimony, namely the good of the offspring. For nature intends not only the begetting of offspring, but also its education and development until it reach the perfect state of man as man, and that is the state of virtue. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12), we derive three things from our parents, namely “existence,” “nourishment,” and “education.” Now a child cannot be brought up and instructed unless it have certain and definite parents, and this would not be the case unless there were a tie between the man and a definite woman and it is in this that matrimony consists. Secondly, in relation to the secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual services which married persons render one another in household matters. For just as natural reason dictates that men should live together, since one is not self-sufficient in all things concerning life, for which reason man is described as being naturally inclined to political society, so too among those works that are necessary for human life some are becoming to men, others to women. Wherefore nature inculcates that society of man and woman which consists in matrimony. These two reasons are given by the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12).

P(4)- Q(41)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Man’s nature inclines to a thing in two ways.

In one way, because that thing is becoming to the generic nature, and this is common to all animals; in another way because it is becoming to the nature of the difference, whereby the human species in so far as it is rational overflows the genus; such is an act of prudence or temperance.

And just as the generic nature, though one in all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, so neither does it incline in the same way in all, but in a way befitting each one. Accordingly man’s nature inclines to matrimony on the part of the difference, as regards the second reason given above; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12; Polit. i) gives this reason in men over other animals; but as regards the first reason it inclines on the part of the genus; wherefore he says that the begetting of offspring is common to all animals. Yet nature does not incline thereto in the same way in all animals; since there are animals whose offspring are able to seek food immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother; and in these there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those whose offspring needs the support of both parents, although for a short time, there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In man, however, since the child needs the parents’ care for a long time, there is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even the generic nature inclines.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The assertion of Tully may be true of some particular nation, provided we understand it as referring to the proximate beginning of that nation when it became a nation distinct from others; for that to which natural reason inclines is not realized in all things, and this statement is not universally true, since Holy Writ states that there has been matrimony from the beginning of the human race.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(1)- RO(3) —

According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii) “human nature is not unchangeable as the Divine nature is.” Hence things that are of natural law vary according to the various states and conditions of men; although those which naturally pertain to things Divine nowise vary.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Nature intends not only being in the offspring, but also perfect being, for which matrimony is necessary, as shown above.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(2) Whether matrimony still comes under a precept?

P(4)- Q(41)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that matrimony still comes under a precept. For a precept is binding so long as it is not recalled. But the primary institution of matrimony came under a precept, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26); nor do we read anywhere that this precept was recalled, but rather that it was confirmed ( Matthew 19:6): “What... God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” Therefore matrimony still comes under a precept.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the precepts of natural law are binding in respect of all time. Now matrimony is of natural law, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the good of the species is better than the good of the individual, “for the good of the State is more Godlike than the good of one man” (Ethic. i, 2). Now the precept given to the first man concerning the preservation of the good of the individual by the act of the nutritive power is still in force. Much more therefore does the precept concerning matrimony still hold, since it refers to the preservation of the species.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, where the reason of an obligation remains the same, the obligation must remain the same. Now the reason why men were bound to marry in olden times was lest the human race should cease to multiply. Since then the result would be the same, if each one were free to abstain from marriage, it would seem that matrimony comes under a precept.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Corinthians 7:38): “He that giveth not his virgin in marriage doth better [*Vulg.: ‘He that giveth his virgin in marriage doth well, and he that giveth her not doth better’],” namely than he that giveth her in marriage. Therefore the contract of marriage is not now a matter of precept.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(2) —

Further, no one deserves a reward for breaking a precept. Now a special reward, namely the aureole, is due to virgins [*Cf.

Q(96), A(5) ]. Therefore matrimony does not come under a precept.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(2) —

I answer that, Nature inclines to a thing in two ways.

In one way as to that which is necessary for the perfection of the individual, and such an obligation is binding on each one, since natural perfections are common to all. In another way it inclines to that which is necessary for the perfection of the community; and since there are many things of this kind, one of which hinders another, such an inclination does not bind each man by way of precept; else each man would be bound to husbandry and building and to such offices as are necessary to the human community; but the inclination of nature is satisfied by the accomplishment of those various offices by various individuals.

Accordingly, since the perfection of the human community requires that some should devote themselves to the contemplative life to which marriage is a very great obstacle, the natural inclination to marriage is not binding by way of precept even according to the philosophers. Hence Theophrastus proves that it is not advisable for a wise man to marry, as Jerome relates (Contra Jovin. i).

P(4)- Q(41)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This precept has not been recalled, and yet it is not binding on each individual, for the reason given above, except at that time when the paucity of men required each one to betake himself to the begetting of children.

The Replies to objections 2 and 3 are clear from what has been said.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Human nature has a general inclination to various offices and acts, as already stated. But since it is variously in various subjects, as individualized in this or that one, it inclines one subject more to one of those offices, and another subject more to another, according to the difference of temperament of various individuals. And it is owing to this difference, as well as to Divine providence which governs all, that one person chooses one office such as husbandry, and another person another. And so it is too that some choose the married life and some the contemplative. Wherefore no danger threatens.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3) Whether the marriage act is always sinful?

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the marriage act is always sinful. For it is written ( 1 Corinthians 7:29): “That they... who have wives, be as if they had none.” But those who are not married do not perform the marriage act. Therefore even those who are married sin in that act.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, “Your iniquities have divided between you and your God.” Now the marriage act divides man from God wherefore the people who were to see God ( Exodus 19:11) were commanded not to go near their wives ( Exodus 19:20); and Jerome says (Ep. ad Ageruch.: Contra Jovini, 18) that in the marriage act “the Holy Ghost touches not the hearts of the prophets.” Therefore it is sinful.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, that which is shameful in itself can by no means be well done. Now the marriage act is always connected with concupiscence, which is always shameful. Therefore it is always sinful.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, nothing is the object of excuse save sin.

Now the marriage act needs to be excused by the marriage blessings, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it is a sin.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, things alike in species are judged alike.

But marriage intercourse is of the same species as the act of adultery, since its end is the same, namely the human species. Therefore since the act of adultery is a sin, the marriage act is likewise.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3)- O(6) —

Further, excess in the passions corrupts virtue.

Now there is always excess of pleasure in the marriage act, so much so that it absorbs the reason which is man’s principal good, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that “in that act it is impossible to understand anything.” Therefore the marriage act is always a sin.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Corinthians 7:28): “If a virgin marry she hath not sinned,” and ( 1 Timothy 5:14): “I will... that the younger should marry,” and “bear children.” But there can be no bearing of children without carnal union. Therefore the marriage act is not a sin; else the Apostle would not have approved of it.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3) —

Further, no sin is a matter of precept. But the marriage act is a matter of precept ( 1 Corinthians 7:3): “Let the husband render the debt to his life.” Therefore it is not a sin.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3) —

I answer that, If we suppose the corporeal nature to be created by the good God we cannot hold that those things which pertain to the preservation of the corporeal nature and to which nature inclines, are altogether evil; wherefore, since the inclination to beget an offspring whereby the specific nature is preserved is from nature, it is impossible to maintain that the act of begetting children is altogether unlawful, so that it be impossible to find the mean of virtue therein; unless we suppose, as some are mad enough to assert, that corruptible things were created by an evil god, whence perhaps the opinion mentioned in the text is derived (Sent. iv, D, 26); wherefore this is a most wicked heresy.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3)- RO(1) —

By these words the Apostle did not forbid the marriage act, as neither did he forbid the possession of things when he said ( 1 Corinthians 7:31): “They that use this world” (let them be) “as if they used it not.” In each case he forbade enjoyment [*”Fruitionem,” i.e. enjoyment of a thing sought as one’s last end]; which is clear from the way in which he expresses himself; for he did not say “let them not use it,” or “let them not have them,” but let them be “as if they used it not” and “as if they had none.”

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3)- RO(2) —

We are united to God by the habit of grace and by the act of contemplation and love. Therefore whatever severs the former of these unions is always a sin, but not always that which severs the latter, since a lawful occupation about lower things distracts the mind so that it is not fit for actual union with God; and this is especially the case in carnal intercourse wherein the mind is withheld by the intensity of pleasure. For this reason those who have to contemplate Divine things or handle sacred things are enjoined not to have to do with their wives for that particular time; and it is in this sense that the Holy Ghost, as regards the actual revelation of hidden things, did not touch the hearts of the prophets at the time of the marriage act.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The shamefulness of concupiscence that always accompanies the marriage act is a shamefulness not of guilt, but of punishment inflicted for the first sin, inasmuch as the lower powers and the members do not obey reason. Hence the argument does not prove.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Properly speaking, a thing is said to be excused when it has some appearance of evil, and yet is not evil, or not as evil as it seems, because some things excuse wholly, others in part. And since the marriage act, by reason of the corruption of concupiscence, has the appearance of an inordinate act, it is wholly excused by the marriage blessing, so as not to be a sin.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3)- RO(5) —

Although they are the same as to their natural species, they differ as to their moral species, which differs in respect of one circumstance, namely intercourse with one’s wife and with another than one’s wife; just as to kill a man by assault or by justice differentiates the moral species, although the natural species is the same; and yet the one is lawful and the other unlawful.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(3)- RO(6) —

The excess of passions that corrupts virtue not only hinders the act of reason, but also destroys the order of reason.

The intensity of pleasure in the marriage act does not do this, since, although for the moment man is not being directed, he was previously directed by his reason.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(4) Whether the marriage act is meritorious?

P(4)- Q(41)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the marriage act is not meritorious. For Chrysostom [*Hom. i in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says in his commentary on Matthew: “Although marriage brings no punishment to those who use it, it affords them no meed.” Now merit bears a relation to meed. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, to refrain from what is meritorious deserves not praise. Yet virginity whereby one refrains from marriage is praiseworthy. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, he who avails himself of an indulgence granted him, avails himself of a favor received. But a man does not merit by receiving a favor. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, merit like virtue, consists in difficulty.

But the marriage act affords not difficulty but pleasure. Therefore it is not meritorious.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(4)- O(5) —

Further, that which cannot be done without venial sin is never meritorious, for a man cannot both merit and demerit at the same time. Now there is always a venial sin in the marriage act, since even the first movement in such like pleasures is a venial sin. Therefore the aforesaid act cannot be meritorious.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Every act whereby a precept is fulfilled is meritorious if it be done from charity. Now such is the marriage act, for it is said ( 1 Corinthians 7:3): “Let the husband render the debt to his wife.” Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(4) —

Further, every act of virtue is meritorious. Now the aforesaid act is an act of justice, for it is called the rendering of a debt.

Therefore it is meritorious.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(4) —

I answer that, Since no act proceeding from a deliberate will is indifferent, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40, Q(1) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(18), A(9) ), the marriage act is always either sinful or meritorious in one who is in a state of grace. For if the motive for the marriage act be a virtue, whether of justice that they may render the debt, or of religion, that they may beget children for the worship of God, it is meritorious. But if the motive be lust, yet not excluding the marriage blessings, namely that he would by no means be willing to go to another woman, it is a venial sin; while if he exclude the marriage blessings, so as to be disposed to act in like manner with any woman, it is a mortal sin. And nature cannot move without being either directed by reason, and thus it will be an act of virtue, or not so directed, and then it will be an act of lust.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The root of merit, as regards the essential reward, is charity itself; but as regards an accidental reward, the reason for merit consists in the difficulty of an act; and thus the marriage act is not meritorious except in the first way.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The difficulty required for merit of the accidental reward is a difficulty of labor, but the difficulty required for the essential reward is the difficulty of observing the mean, and this is the difficulty in the marriage act.

P(4)- Q(41)- A(4)- RO(3) —

First movements in so far as they are venial sins are movements of the appetite to some inordinate object of pleasure.

This is not the case in the marriage act, and consequently the argument does not prove.

QUESTION OF MATRIMONY AS A SACRAMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider matrimony as a sacrament. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether matrimony is a sacrament? (2) Whether it ought to have been instituted before sin was committed? (3) Whether it confers grace? (4) Whether carnal intercourse belongs to the integrity of matrimony?

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1) Whether matrimony is a sacrament?

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that matrimony is not a sacrament. For every sacrament of the New Law has a form that is essential to the sacrament. But the blessing given by the priest at a wedding is not essential to matrimony. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, a sacrament according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) is “a material element.” But matrimony has not a material element for its matter. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ’s Passion. But matrimony, since it has pleasure annexed to it, does not conform man to Christ’s Passion, which was painful. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, every sacrament of the New Law causes that which it signifies. Yet matrimony does not cause the union of Christ with the Church, which union it signifies. Therefore matrimony is not a sacrament.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, in the other sacraments there is something which is reality and sacrament. But this is not to be found in matrimony, since it does not imprint a character, else it would not be repeated. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Ephesians 5:32): “This is a great sacrament.” Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1) —

Further, a sacrament is the sign of a sacred thing. But such is Matrimony. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1) —

I answer that, A sacrament denotes a sanctifying remedy against sin offered to man under sensible signs [*Cf. P(3), Q(61), A(1) ; P(3), Q(65), A(1) ]. Wherefore since this is the case in matrimony, it is reckoned among the sacraments.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The words whereby the marriage consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, and not the priest’s blessing, which is a sacramental.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The sacrament of Matrimony, like that of Penance, is perfected by the act of the recipient. Wherefore just as Penance has no other matter than the sensible acts themselves, which take the place of the material element, so it is in Matrimony.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Although Matrimony is not conformed to Christ’s Passion as regards pain, it is as regards charity, whereby He suffered for the Church who was to be united to Him as His spouse.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1)- RO(4) —

The union of Christ with the Church is not the reality contained in this sacrament, but is the reality signified and not contained — and no sacrament causes a reality of that kind — but it has another both contained and signified which it causes, as we shall state further on (ad 5). The Master, however (Sent. iv, D, 26), asserts that it is a non-contained reality, because he was of opinion that Matrimony has no reality contained therein.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(1)- RO(5) —

In this sacrament also those three things [*Cf.

P(3), Q(66), A(1) ] are to be found, for the acts externally apparent are the sacrament only; the bond between husband and wife resulting from those acts is reality and sacrament; and the ultimate reality contained is the effect of this sacrament, while the non-contained reality is that which the Master assigns (Sent. iv, D, 26).

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2) Whether this sacrament ought to have been instituted before sin was committed?

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that Matrimony ought not to have been instituted before sin. Because that which is of natural law needs not to be instituted. Now such is Matrimony, as stated above ( Q(41), A(1) ). Therefore it ought not to have been instituted.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, sacraments are medicines against the disease of sin. But a medicine is not made ready except for an actual disease. Therefore it should not have been instituted before sin.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, one institution suffices for one thing.

Now Matrimony was instituted also after sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it was not instituted before sin.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, the institution of a sacrament must come from God. Now before sin, the words relating to Matrimony were not definitely said by God but by Adam; the words which God uttered ( Genesis 1:22), “Increase and multiply,” were addressed also to the brute creation where there is no marriage. Therefore Matrimony was not instituted before sin.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, Matrimony is a sacrament of the New Law. But the sacraments of the New Law took their origin from Christ.

Therefore it ought not to have been instituted before sin.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is said ( Matthew 19:4): “Have ye not read that He Who made man from the beginning ‘made them male and female’”?

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2) —

Further, Matrimony was instituted for the begetting of children. But the begetting of children was necessary to man before sin.

Therefore it behooved Matrimony to be instituted before sin.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2) —

I answer that, Nature inclines to marriage with a certain good in view, which good varies according to the different states of man, wherefore it was necessary for matrimony to be variously instituted in the various states of man in reference to that good. Consequently matrimony as directed to the begetting of children, which was necessary even when there was no sin, was instituted before sin; according as it affords a remedy for the wound of sin, it was instituted after sin at the time of the natural law; its institution belongs to the Mosaic Law as regards personal disqualifications; and it was instituted in the New Law in so far as it represents the mystery of Christ’s union with the Church, and in this respect it is a sacrament of the New Law. As regards other advantages resulting from matrimony, such as the friendship and mutual services which husband and wife render one another, its institution belongs to the civil law. Since, however, a sacrament is essentially a sign and a remedy, it follows that the nature of sacrament applies to matrimony as regards the intermediate institution; that it is fittingly intended to fulfill an office of nature as regards the first institution; and. as regards the lastmentioned institution, that it is directed to fulfill an office of society.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Things which are of natural law in a general way, need to be instituted as regards their determination which is subject to variation according to various states; just as it is of natural law that evildoers be punished, but that such and such a punishment be appointed for such and such a crime is determined by positive law.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Matrimony is not only for a remedy against sin, but is chiefly for an office of nature; and thus it was instituted before sin, not as intended for a remedy.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2)- RO(3) —

There is no reason why matrimony should not have had several institutions corresponding to the various things that had to be determined in connection with marriage. Hence these various institutions are not of the same thing in the same respect.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Before sin matrimony was instituted by God, when He fashioned a helpmate for man out of his rib, and said to them: “Increase and multiply.” And although this was said also to the other animals, it was not to be fulfilled by them in the same way as by men. As to Adam’s words, he uttered them inspired by God to understand that the institution of marriage was from God.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(2)- RO(5) —

As was clearly stated, matrimony was not instituted before Christ as a sacrament of the New Law.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(3) Whether matrimony confers grace?

P(4)- Q(42)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that matrimony does not confer grace. For, according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) “the sacraments, by virtue of their sanctification, confer an invisible grace.” But matrimony has no sanctification essential to it. Therefore grace is not conferred therein.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, every sacrament that confers grace confers it by virtue of its matter and form. Now the acts which are the matter in this sacrament are not the cause of grace (for it would be the heresy of Pelagius to assert that our acts cause grace); and the words expressive of consent are not the cause of grace, since no sanctification results from them. Therefore grace is by no means given in matrimony.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the grace that is directed against the wound of sin is necessary to all who have that wound. Now the wound of concupiscence is to be found in all. Therefore if grace were given in matrimony against the wound of concupiscence, all men ought to contract marriage, and it would be very stupid to refrain from matrimony.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, sickness does not seek a remedy where it finds aggravation. Now concupiscence is aggravated by concupiscence, because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12), “the desire of concupiscence is insatiable, and is increased by congenial actions.”

Therefore it would seem that grace is not conferred in matrimony, as a remedy for concupiscence.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Definition and thing defined should be convertible. Now causality of grace is included in the definition of a sacrament. Since, then, matrimony is a sacrament, it is a cause of grace.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(3) —

Further, Augustine says (De Bono Viduit. viii; Genesis ad lit. ix, 7) that “matrimony affords a remedy to the sick.” But it is not a remedy except in so far as it has some efficacy. Therefore it has some efficacy for the repression of concupiscence. Now concupiscence is not repressed except by grace. Therefore grace is conferred therein.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(3) —

I answer that, There have been three opinions on this point. For some [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iv, D, 2] said that matrimony is nowise the cause of grace, but only a sign thereof. But this cannot be maintained, for in that case it would in no respect surpass the sacraments of the Old Law. Wherefore there would be no reason for reckoning it among the sacraments of the New Law; since even in the Old Law by the very nature of the act it was able to afford a remedy to concupiscence lest the latter run riot when held in too strict restraint.

Hence others [*St. Albert Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 26] said that grace is conferred therein as regards the withdrawal from evil, because the act is excused from sin, for it would be a sin apart from matrimony. But this would be too little, since it had this also in the Old Law. And so they say that it makes man withdraw from evil, by restraining the concupiscence lest it tend to something outside the marriage blessings, but that this grace does not enable a man to do good works. But this cannot be maintained, since the same grace hinders sin and inclines to good, just as the same heat expels cold and gives heat.

Hence others [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 26] say that matrimony, inasmuch as it is contracted in the faith of Christ, is able to confer the grace which enables us to do those works which are required in matrimony. and this is more probable, since wherever God gives the faculty to do a thing, He gives also the helps whereby man is enabled to make becoming use of that faculty; thus it is clear that to all the soul’s powers there correspond bodily members by which they can proceed to act. Therefore, since in matrimony man receives by Divine institution the faculty to use his wife for the begetting of children, he also receives the grace without which he cannot becomingly do so; just as we have said of the sacrament of orders ( Q(35), A(1) ). And thus this grace which is given is the last thing contained in this sacrament.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Just as the baptismal water by virtue of its contact with Christ’s body [*Cf. P(3), Q(66), A(3), ad 4] is able to “touch the body and cleanse the heart” [*St. Augustine, Tract. lxxx in Joan.], so is matrimony able to do so through Christ having represented it by His Passion, and not principally through any blessing of the priest.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Just as the water of Baptism together with the form of words results immediately not in the infusion of grace, but in the imprinting of the character, so the outward acts and the words expressive of consent directly effect a certain tie which is the sacrament of matrimony; and this tie by virtue of its Divine institution works dispositively [*Cf. Q(18), A(1), where St. Thomas uses the same expression; and Editor’s notes at the beginning of the Supplement and on that Article] to the infusion of grace.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(3)- RO(3) —

This argument would hold if no more efficacious remedy could be employed against the disease of concupiscence; but a yet more powerful remedy is found in spiritual works and mortification of the flesh by those who make no use of matrimony.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(3)- RO(4) —

A remedy can be employed against concupiscence in two ways. First, on the part of concupiscence by repressing it in its root, and thus matrimony affords a remedy by the grace given therein. Secondly, on the part of its act, and this in two ways: first, by depriving the act to which concupiscence inclines of its outward shamefulness, and this is done by the marriage blessings which justify carnal concupiscence; secondly, by hindering the shameful act, which is done by the very nature of the act. because concupiscence, being satisfied by the conjugal act, does not incline so much to other wickedness. For this reason the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 7:9): “It is better to marry than to burn.” For though the works congenial to concupiscence are in themselves of a nature to increase concupiscence, yet in so far as they are directed according to reason they repress concupiscence, because like acts result in like dispositions and habits.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(4) Whether carnal intercourse is an integral part of this sacrament?

P(4)- Q(42)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that carnal intercourse is an integral part of marriage. For at the very institution of marriage it was declared ( Genesis 2:24): “They shall be two in one flesh.” Now this is not brought about save by carnal intercourse. Therefore it is an integral part of marriage.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, that which belongs to the signification of a sacrament is necessary for the sacrament, as we have stated above ( A(2) ; Q(9) , A(1) ). Now carnal intercourse belongs to the signification of matrimony, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it is an integral part of the sacrament.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, this sacrament is directed to the preservation of the species. But the species cannot be preserved without carnal intercourse. Therefore it is an integral part of the sacrament.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, Matrimony is a sacrament inasmuch as it affords a remedy against concupiscence; according to the Apostle’s saying ( 1 Corinthians 7:9): “It is better to marry than to burn.” But it does not afford this remedy to those who have no carnal intercourse.

Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(4) —

On the contrary, There was matrimony in Paradise, and yet there was no carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal intercourse is not an integral part of matrimony.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(4) —

Further, a sacrament by its very name denotes a sanctification. But matrimony is holier without carnal intercourse, according to the text (Sent. D, 26). Therefore carnal intercourse is not necessary for the sacrament.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(4) —

I answer that, Integrity is twofold. One regards the primal perfection consisting in the very essence of a thing; the other regards the secondary perfection consisting in operation. Since then carnal intercourse is an operation or use of marriage which gives the faculty for that intercourse, it follows, that carnal intercourse belongs to the latter, and not to the former integrity of marriage [*Cf. P(3), Q(29), A(2) ].

P(4)- Q(42)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Adam expressed the integrity of marriage in regard to both perfections, because a thing is known by its operation.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Signification of the thing contained is necessary for the sacrament. Carnal intercourse belongs not to this signification, but to the thing not contained, as appears from what was said above ( A(1), ad 4,5).

P(4)- Q(42)- A(4)- RO(3) —

A thing does not reach its end except by its own act. Wherefore, from the fact that the end of matrimony is not attained without carnal intercourse, it follows that it belongs to the second and not to the first integrity.

P(4)- Q(42)- A(4)- RO(4) —

Before carnal intercourse marriage is a remedy by virtue of the grace given therein, although not by virtue of the act, which belongs to the second integrity.

QUESTION OF MATRIMONY WITH REGARD TO THE BETROTHAL (THREE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider matrimony absolutely; and here we must treat (1) of the betrothal; (2) of the nature of matrimony; (3) of its efficient cause, namely the consent; (4) of its blessings; (5) of the impediments thereto; (6) of second marriages; (7) of certain things annexed to marriage.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) What is the betrothal? (2) Who can contract a betrothal? (3) Whether a betrothal can be canceled?

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1) Whether a betrothal is a promise of future marriage?

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that a betrothal is not rightly defined “a promise of future marriage,” as expressed in the words of Pope Nicholas I (Resp. ad Consul. Bulgar., iii). For as Isidore says (Etym. iv), “a man is betrothed not by a mere promise, but by giving his troth [spondet] and providing sureties [sponsores]”. Now a person is said to be betrothed by reason of his betrothal. Therefore it is wrongly described as a promise.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, whoever promises a thing must be compelled to fulfill his promise. But those who have contracted a betrothal are not compelled by the Church to fulfill the marriage. Therefore a betrothal is not a promise.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, sometimes a betrothal does not consist of a mere promise, but an oath is added, as also certain pledges. Therefore seemingly it should not be defined as a mere promise.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, marriage should be free and absolute.

But a betrothal is sometimes expressed under a condition even of money to be received. Therefore it is not fittingly described as a promise of marriage.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, promising about the future is blamed in James 4:13, seqq. But there should be nothing blameworthy about the sacraments. Therefore one ought not to make a promise of future marriage.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1)- O(6) —

Further, no man is called a spouse except on account of his espousals. But a man is said to be a spouse on account of actual marriage, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 27). Therefore espousals are not always a promise of future marriage.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1) —

I answer that, Consent to conjugal union if expressed in words of the future does not make a marriage, but a promise of marriage; and this promise is called “a betrothal from plighting one’s troth,” as Isidore says (Etym. iv). For before the use of writing-tablets, they used to give pledges of marriage, by which they plighted their mutual consent under the marriage code, and they provided guarantors. This promise is made in two ways, namely absolutely, or conditionally. Absolutely, in four ways: firstly, a mere promise, by saying: “I will take thee for my wife,” and conversely; secondly, by giving betrothal pledges, such as money and the like; thirdly, by giving an engagement ring; fourthly, by the addition of an oath. If, however, this promise be made conditionally, we must draw a distinction; for it is either an honorable condition, for instance if we say: “I will take thee, if thy parents consent,” and then the promise holds if the condition is fulfilled, and does not hold if the condition is not fulfilled; or else the condition is dishonorable, and this in two ways: for either it is contrary to the marriage blessings, as if we were to say: “I will take thee if thou promise means of sterility,” and then no betrothal is contracted; or else it is not contrary to the marriage blessings, as were one to say: “I will take thee if thou consent to my thefts,” and then the promise holds, but the condition should be removed.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The betrothal itself and giving of sureties are a ratification of the promise, wherefore it is denominated from these as from that which is more perfect.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1)- RO(2) —

By this promise one party is bound to the other in respect of contracting marriage; and he who fulfills not his promise sins mortally, unless a lawful impediment arise; and the Church uses compulsion in the sense that she enjoins a penance for the sin. But he is not compelled by sentence of the court, because compulsory marriages are wont to have evil results; unless the parties be bound by oath, for then he ought to be compelled, in the opinion of some, although others think differently on account of the reason given above, especially if there be fear of one taking the other’s life.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Such things are added only in confirmation of the promise, and consequently they are not distinct from it.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1)- RO(4) —

The condition that is appended does not destroy the liberty of marriage; for if it be unlawful, it should be renounced; and if it be lawful, it is either about things that are good simply, as were one to say, “I will take thee, if thy parents consent,” and such a condition does not destroy the liberty of the betrothal, but gives it an increase of rectitude. or else it is about things that are useful, as were one to say: “I will marry thee if thou pay me a hundred pounds,” and then this condition is appended, not as asking a price for the consent of marriage, but as referring to the promise of a dowry; so that the marriage does not lose its liberty. Sometimes, however, the condition appended is the payment of a sum of money by way of penalty, and then, since marriage should be free, such a condition does not hold, nor can such a penalty be exacted from a person who is unwilling to fulfill the promise of marriage.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1)- RO(5) —

James does not intend to forbid altogether the making of promises about the future, but the making of promises as though one were certain of one’s life; hence he teaches that we ought to add the condition. “If the Lord will,” which, though it be not expressed in words, ought nevertheless to be impressed on the heart.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(1)- RO(6) —

In marriage we may consider both the marriage union and the marriage act; and on account of his promise of the first as future a man is called a “spouse” from his having contracted his espousals by words expressive of the future; but from the promise of the second a man is called a “spouse,” even when the marriage has been contracted by words expressive of the present, because by this very fact he promises [spondet] the marriage act. However, properly speaking, espousals are so called from the promise [sponsione] in the first sense, because espousals are a kind of sacramental annexed to matrimony, as exorcism to baptism.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2) Whether seven years is fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal?

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that seven years is not fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal. For a contract that can be formed by others does not require discretion in those whom it concerns. Now a betrothal can be arranged by the parents without the knowledge of either of the persons betrothed. Therefore a betrothal can be arranged before the age of seven years as well as after.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, just as some use of reason is necessary for the contract of betrothal, so is there for the consent to mortal sin.

Now, as Gregory says (Dial. iv), a boy of five years of age was carried off by the devil on account of the sin of blasphemy. Therefore a betrothal can take place before the age of seven years.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a betrothal is directed to marriage. But for marriage the same age is not assigned to boy and girl.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, one can become betrothed as soon as future marriage can be agreeable to one. Now signs of this agreeableness are often apparent in boys before the age of seven. Therefore they can become betrothed before that age.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, if persons become betrothed before they are seven years old, and subsequently after the age of seven and before the age of maturity renew their promise in words expressive of the present, they are reckoned to be betrothed. Now this is not by virtue of the second contract, since they intend to contract not betrothal but marriage. Therefore it is by the virtue of the first; and thus espousals can be contracted before the age of seven.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- O(6) —

Further, when a thing is done by many persons in common, if one fails he is supplied by another, as in the case of those who row a boat. Now the contract of betrothal is an action common to the contracting parties. Therefore if one be of mature age, he can contract a betrothal with a girl who is not seven years old, since the lack of age in one is more than counterbalanced in the other.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- O(7) —

Further, those who at about the age of puberty, but before it, enter into the marriage contract by words expressive of the present are reputed to be married. Therefore in like manner if they contract marriage by words expressive of the future, before yet close on the age of puberty, they are to be reputed as betrothed.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2) —

I answer that, The age of seven years is fixed reasonably enough by law for the contracting of betrothals, for since a betrothal is a promise of the future, as already stated ( A(1) ), it follows that they are within the competency of those who can make a promise in some way, and this is only for those who can have some foresight of the future, and this requires the use of reason, of which three degrees are to be observed, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 4). The first is when a person neither understands by himself nor is able to learn from another; the second stage is when a man can learn from another but is incapable by himself of consideration and understanding; the third degree is when a man is both able to learn from another and to consider by himself. And since reason develops in man by little and little, in proportion as the movement and fluctuation of the humors is calmed, man reaches the first stage of reason before his seventh year; and consequently during that period he is unfit for any contract, and therefore for betrothal. But he begins to reach the second stage at the end of his first seven years, wherefore children at that age are sent to school. But man begins to reach the third stage at the end of his second seven years, as regards things concerning his person, when his natural reason develops; but as regards things outside his person, at the end of his third seven years. Hence before his first seven years a man is not fit to make any contract, but at the end of that period he begins to be fit to make certain promises for the future, especially about those things to which natural reason inclines us more, though he is not fit to bind himself by a perpetual obligation, because as yet he has not a firm will.

Hence at that age betrothals can be contracted. But at the end of the second seven years he can already bind himself in matters concerning his person, either to religion or to wedlock. And after the third seven years he can bind himself in other matters also; and according to the laws he is given the power of disposing of his property after his twenty-second year.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- RO(1) —

If the parties are betrothed by another person before they reach the age of puberty, either of them or both can demur; wherefore in that case the betrothal does not take effect, so that neither does any affinity result therefrom. Hence a betrothal made between certain persons by some other takes effect, in so far as those between whom the betrothal is arranged do not demur when they reach the proper age, whence they are understood to consent to what others have done.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Some say that the boy of whom Gregory tells this story was not lost, and that he did not sin mortally; and that this vision was for the purpose of making the father sorrowful, for he had sinned in the boy through failing to correct him. But this is contrary to the express intention of Gregory, who says (Dial. iv) that “the boy’s father having neglected the soul of his little son, fostered no little sinner for the flames of hell.” Consequently it must be said that for a mortal sin it is sufficient to give consent to something present, whereas in a betrothal the consent is to something future; and greater discretion of reason is required for looking to the future than for consenting to one present act. Wherefore a man can sin mortally before he can bind himself to a future obligation.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Regarding the age for the marriage contract a disposition is required not only on the part of the use of reason, but also on the part of the body, in that it is necessary to be of an age adapted to procreation. And since a girl becomes apt for the act of procreation in her twelfth year, and a boy at the end of his second seven years, as the Philosopher says (De Hist. Anim. vii), whereas the age is the same in both for attaining the use of reason which is the sole condition for betrothal, hence it is that the one age is assigned for both as regards betrothal, but not as regards marriage.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- RO(4) —

This agreeableness in regard to boys under the age of seven does not result from the perfect use of reason, since they are not as yet possessed of complete self-control; it results rather from the movement of nature than from any process of reason. Consequently, this agreeableness does not suffice for contracting a betrothal.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- RO(5) —

In this case, although the second contract does not amount to marriage, nevertheless the parties show that they ratify their former promise; wherefore the first contract is confirmed by the second.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- RO(6) —

Those who row a boat act by way of one cause, and consequently what is lacking in one can be supplied by another.

But those who make a contract of betrothal act as distinct persons, since a betrothal can only be between two parties; wherefore it is necessary for each to be qualified to contract, and thus the defect of one is an obstacle to their betrothal, nor can it be supplied by the other.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(2)- RO(7) —

It is true that in the matter of betrothal if the contracting parties are close upon the age of seven, the contract of betrothal is valid, since, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 56), “when little is lacking it seems as though nothing were lacking.” Some fix the margin at six months. but it is better to determine it according to the condition of the contracting parties, since the use of reason comes sooner to some than to others.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3) Whether a betrothal can be dissolved?

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that a betrothal cannot be dissolved if one of the parties enter religion. For if I have promised a thing to someone I cannot lawfully pledge it to someone else. Now he who betroths himself promises his body to the woman. Therefore he cannot make a further offering of himself to God in religion.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- O(2) —

Again, seemingly it should not be dissolved when one of the parties leaves for a distant country, because in doubtful matters one should always choose the safer course. Now the safer course would be to wait for him. Therefore she is bound to wait for him.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- O(3) —

Again, neither seemingly is it dissolved by sickness contracted after betrothal, for no man should be punished for being under a penalty. Now the man who contracts an infirmity would be punished if he were to lose his right to the woman betrothed to him.

Therefore a betrothal should not be dissolved on account of a bodily infirmity.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- O(4) —

Again, neither seemingly should a betrothal be dissolved on account of a supervening affinity, for instance if the spouse were to commit fornication with a kinswoman of his betrothed; for in that case the affianced bride would be penalized for the sin of her affianced spouse, which is unreasonable.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- O(5) —

Again, seemingly they cannot set one another free; for it would be a proof of greatest fickleness if they contracted together and then set one another free; and such conduct ought not to be tolerated by the Church. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- O(6) —

Again, neither seemingly ought a betrothal to be dissolved on account of the fornication of one of the parties. For a betrothal does not yet give the one power over the body of the other; wherefore it would seem that they nowise sin against one another if meanwhile they commit fornication. Consequently a betrothal should not be dissolved on that account.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- O(7) —

Again, neither seemingly on account of his contracting with another woman by words expressive of the present. For a subsequent sale does not void a previous sale. Therefore neither should a second contract void a previous one.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- O(8) —

Again, neither seemingly should it be dissolved on account of deficient age; since what is not cannot be dissolved. Now a betrothal is null before the requisite age. Therefore it cannot be dissolved.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3) —

I answer that, In all the cases mentioned above the betrothal that has been contracted is dissolved, but in different ways. For in two of them — namely when a party enters religion, and when either of the affianced spouses contracts with another party by words expressive of the present — the betrothal is dissolved by law, whereas in the other cases it has to be dissolved according to the judgment of the Church.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The like promise is dissolved by spiritual death, for that promise is purely spiritual, as we shall state further on ( Q(61), A(2) ).

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- RO(2) —

This doubt is solved by either party not putting in an appearance at the time fixed for completing the marriage.

Wherefore if it was no fault of that party that the marriage was not completed, he or she can lawfully marry without any sin. But if he or she was responsible for the non-completion of the marriage, this responsibility involves the obligation of doing penance for the broken promise — or oath if the promise was confirmed by oath — and he or she can contract with another if they wish it, subject to the judgment of the Church.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- RO(3) —

If either of the betrothed parties incur an infirmity which notably weakens the subject (as epilepsy or paralysis), or causes a deformity (as loss of the nose or eyes, and the like), or is contrary to the good of the offspring (as leprosy, which is wont to be transmitted to the children), the betrothal can be dissolved, lest the betrothed be displeasing to one another, and the marriage thus contracted have an evil result. Nor is one punished for being under a penalty, although one incurs a loss from one’s penalty, and this is not unreasonable.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- RO(4) —

If the affianced bridegroom has carnal knowledge of a kinswoman of his spouse, or “vice versa,” the betrothal must be dissolved; and for proof it is sufficient that the fact be the common talk, in order to avoid scandal; for causes whose effects mature in the future are voided of their effects, not only by what actually is, but also by what happens subsequently. Hence just as affinity, had it existed at the time of the betrothal, would have prevented that contract, so, if it supervene before marriage, which is an effect of the betrothal, the previous contract is voided of its effect. Nor does the other party suffer in consequence, indeed he or she gains, being set free from one who has become hateful to God by committing fornication.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- RO(5) —

Some do not admit this case. Yet they have against them the Decretal (cap. Praeterea, De spons. et matr.) which says expressly: “Just as those who enter into a contract of fellowship by pledging their faith to one another and afterwards give it back, so it may be patiently tolerated that those who are betrothed to one another should set one another free.” Yet to this they say that the Church allows this lest worse happen rather than because it is according to strict law. But this does not seem to agree with the example quoted by the Decretal.

Accordingly we must reply that it is not always a proof of fickleness to rescind an agreement, since “our counsels are uncertain” (Wis. 9:14).

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- RO(6) —

Although when they become betrothed they have not yet given one another power over one another’s body, yet if this [*Referring to the contention of the Objection] were to happen it would make them suspicious of one another’s fidelity; and so one can ensure himself against the other by breaking off the engagement.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- RO(7) —

This argument would hold if each contract were of the same kind; whereas the second contract of marriage has greater force than the first, and consequently dissolves it.

P(4)- Q(43)- A(3)- RO(8) —

Although it was not a true betrothal, there was a betrothal of a kind; and consequently, lest approval should seem to be given when they come to the lawful age, they should seek a dissolution of the betrothal by the judgment of the Church, for the sake of a good example.

QUESTION OF THE DEFINITION OF MATRIMONY (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the nature of matrimony. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether matrimony is a kind of joining? (2) Whether it is fittingly named? (3) Whether it is fittingly defined?

P(4)- Q(44)- A(1) Whether matrimony is a kind of joining?

P(4)- Q(44)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that matrimony is not a kind of joining. Because the bond whereby things are tied together differs from their joining, as cause from effect. Now matrimony is the bond whereby those who are joined in matrimony are tied together. Therefore it is not a kind of joining.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, every sacrament is a sensible sign. But no relation is a sensible accident. Therefore since matrimony is a sacrament, it is not a kind of relation, and consequently neither is it a kind of joining.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, a joining is a relation of equiparance as well as of equality. Now according to Avicenna the relation of equality is not identically the same in each extreme. Neither therefore is there an identically same joining; and consequently if matrimony is a kind of joining, there is not only one matrimony between man and wife.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is by relation that things are related to one another. Now by matrimony certain things are related to one another; for the husband is the wife’s husband, and the wife is the husband’s wife. Therefore matrimony is a kind of relation, nor is it other than a joining.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(1) —

Further, the union of two things into one can result only from their being joined. Now such is the effect of matrimony ( Genesis 2:24): “They shall be two in one flesh.” Therefore matrimony is a kind of joining.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(1) —

I answer that, A joining denotes a kind of uniting, and so wherever things are united there must be a joining. Now things directed to one purpose are said to be united in their direction thereto, thus many men are united in following one military calling or in pursuing one business, in relation to which they are called fellow-soldiers or business partners. Hence, since by marriage certain persons are directed to one begetting and upbringing of children, and again to one family life, it is clear that in matrimony there is a joining in respect of which we speak of husband and wife; and this joining, through being directed to some one thing, is matrimony; while the joining together of bodies and minds is a result of matrimony.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Matrimony is the bond by which they are tied formally, not effectively, and so it need not be distinct from the joining.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Although relation is not itself a sensible accident, its causes may be sensible. Nor is it necessary in a sacrament for that which is both reality and sacrament [*Cf. P(3), Q(66), A(1) ] to be sensible (for such is the relation of the aforesaid joining to this sacrament), whereas the words expressive of consent, which are sacrament only and are the cause of that same joining, are sensible.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(1)- RO(3) —

A relation is founded on something as its cause — for instance likeness is founded on quality — and on something as its subject — for instance in the things themselves that are like; and on either hand we may find unity and diversity of relation. Since then it is not the same identical quality that conduces to likeness, but the same specific quality in each of the like subjects, and since, moreover, the subjects of likeness are two in number, and the same applies to equality, it follows that both equality and likeness are in every way numerically distinct in either of the like or equal subjects. But the relations of matrimony, on the one hand, have unity in both extremes, namely on the part of the cause, since it is directed to the one identical begetting; whereas on the part of the subject there is numerical diversity. The fact of this relation having a diversity of subjects is signified by the terms “husband” and “wife,” while its unity is denoted by its being called matrimony.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(2) Whether matrimony is fittingly named?

P(4)- Q(44)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that matrimony is unfittingly named. Because a thing should be named after that which ranks higher. But the father ranks above the mother. Therefore the union of father and mother should rather be named after the father.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, a thing should be named from that which is essential to it, since a “definition expresses the nature signified by a name” (Metaph. iv, 28). Now nuptials are not essential to matrimony.

Therefore matrimony should not be called nuptials.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a species cannot take its proper name from that which belongs to the genus. Now a joining [conjunctio] is the genus of matrimony. Therefore it should not be called a conjugal union.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(2) —

On the contrary, stands the common use of speech.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(2) —

I answer that, Three things may be considered in matrimony. First, its essence, which is a joining together, and in reference to this it is called the “conjugal union”; secondly, its cause, which is the wedding, and in reference to this it is called the “nuptial union” from “nubo” [*The original meaning of ‘nubo’ is ‘to veil’], because at the wedding ceremony, whereby the marriage is completed, the heads of those who are wedded are covered with a veil [*This is still done in some countries]; thirdly, the effect, which is the offspring, and in reference to this it is called “matrimony,” as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), because “a woman’s sole purpose in marrying should be motherhood.”

Matrimony may also be resolved into “matris munium” [*i.e. munus], i.e. a mother’s duty, since the duty of bringing up the children chiefly devolves on the women; or into “matrem muniens,” because it provides the mother with a protector and support in the person of her husband; or into “matrem monens,” as admonishing her not to leave her husband and take up with another man; or into “materia unius,” because it is a joining together for the purpose of providing the matter of one offspring as though it were derived from \monos\ and “materia”; or into “matre” and “nato,” as Isidore says (Etym. ix), because it makes a woman the mother of a child.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Although the father ranks above the mother, the mother has more to do with the offspring than the father has. or we may say that woman was made chiefly in order to be man’s helpmate in relation to the offspring, whereas the man was not made for this purpose.

Wherefore the mother has a closer relation to the nature of marriage than the father has.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Sometimes essentials are known by accidentals, wherefore some things can be named even after their accidentals, since a name is given to a thing for the purpose that it may become known.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Sometimes a species is named after something pertaining to the genus on account of an imperfection in the species, when namely it has the generic nature completely, yet adds nothing pertaining to dignity; thus the accidental property retains the name of property, which is common to it and to the definition. Sometimes, however, it is on account of a perfection, when we find the generic nature completely in one species and not in another; thus animal is named from soul [anima], and this belongs to an animate body, which is the genus of animal; yet animation is not found perfectly in those animate beings that are not animals. It is thus with the case in point. for the joining of husband and wife by matrimony is the greatest of all joinings, since it is a joining of soul and body, wherefore it is called a “conjugal” union.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(3) Whether matrimony is fittingly defined in the text?

P(4)- Q(44)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that matrimony is unfittingly defined in the text* (Sent. iv, D, 27). [*The definition alluded to is as follows: “Marriage is the marital union of man and woman involving living together in undivided partnership.”] For it is necessary to mention matrimony in defining a husband, since it is the husband who is joined to the woman in matrimony. Now “marital union” is put in the definition of matrimony. Therefore in these definitions there would seem to be a vicious circle.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, matrimony makes the woman the man’s wife no less than it makes the man the woman’s husband. Therefore it should not be described as a “marital union” rather than an uxorial union.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, habit [consuetudo] pertains to morals.

Yet it often happens that married persons differ very much in habit.

Therefore the words “involving their living together [consuetudinem] in undivided partnership” should have no place in the definition of matrimony.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, we find other definitions given of matrimony, for according to Hugh (Sum. Sent. vii, 6), “matrimony is the lawful consent of two apt persons to be joined together.” Also, according to some, “matrimony is the fellowship of a common life and a community regulated by Divine and human law”; and we ask how these definitions differ.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ), three things are to be considered in matrimony, namely its cause, its essence, and its effect; and accordingly we find three definitions given of matrimony. For the definition of Hugh indicates the cause, namely the consent, and this definition is self-evident. The definition given in the text indicates the essence of matrimony, namely the “union,” and adds determinate subjects by the words “between lawful persons.” It also points to the difference of the contracting parties in reference to the species, by the word “marital,” for since matrimony is a joining together for the purpose of some one thing, this joining together is specified by the purpose to which it is directed, and this is what pertains to the husband [maritum]. It also indicates the force of this joining — for it is indissoluble — by the words “involving,” etc.

The remaining definition indicates the effect to which matrimony is directed, namely the common life in family matters. And since every community is regulated by some law, the code according to which this community is directed, namely Divine and human law, finds a place in this definition. while other communities, such as those of traders or soldiers, are established by human law alone.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Sometimes the prior things from which a definition ought to be given are not known to us, and consequently certain things are defined from things that are posterior simply, but prior to us; thus in the definition of quality the Philosopher employs the word “such” [quale] when he says (Cap. De Qualitate) that “quality is that whereby we are said to be such.” Thus, too, in defining matrimony we say that it is a “marital union,” by which we mean that matrimony is a union for the purpose of those things required by the marital office, all of which could not be expressed in one word.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(3)- RO(2) —

As stated ( A(2) ), this difference indicates the end of the union. And since, according to the Apostle ( 1 Corinthians 11:9), the “man is not [Vulg.: ‘was not created’] for the woman, but the woman for the man,” it follows that this difference should be indicated in reference to the man rather than the woman.

P(4)- Q(44)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Just as the civic life denotes not the individual act of this or that one, but the things that concern the common action of the citizens, so the conjugal life is nothing else than a particular kind of companionship pertaining to that common action. wherefore as regards this same life the partnership of married persons is always indivisible, although it is divisible as regards the act belonging to each party.

The Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear from what has been said above.

QUESTION OF THE MARRIAGE CONSENT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FIVE ARTICLES)

In the next place we have to consider the consent; and the first point to discuss is the consent considered in itself; the second is the consent confirmed by oath or by carnal intercourse; the third is compulsory consent and conditional consent; and the fourth is the object of the consent.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the consent is the efficient cause of matrimony? (2) Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words? (3) Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage? (4) Whether consent given in words expressive of the present, without inward consent, makes a true marriage outwardly? (5) Whether consent given secretly in words expressive of the present makes a marriage?

P(4)- Q(45)- A(1) Whether consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?

P(4)- Q(45)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that consent is not the efficient cause of matrimony. For the sacraments depend not on the human will but on the Divine institution, as shown above (Sent. iv, D, 2; P(3), Q(64), A(2) ). But consent belongs to the human will. Therefore it is no more the cause of matrimony than of the other sacraments.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, nothing is its own cause. But seemingly matrimony is nothing else than the consent, since it is the consent which signifies the union of Christ with the Church.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, of one thing there should be one cause.

Now there is one marriage between two persons, as stated above ( Q(44), A(1) ); whereas the consents of the two parties are distinct, for they are given by different persons and to different things, since on the one hand there is consent to take a husband, and on the other hand consent to take a wife. Therefore mutual consent is not the cause of matrimony.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: “It is not coition but consent that makes a marriage.”

P(4)- Q(45)- A(1) —

Further, one person does not receive power over that which is at the free disposal of another, without the latter’s consent. Now by marriage each of the married parties receives power over the other’s body ( 1 Corinthians 7:4), whereas hitherto each had free power over his own body. Therefore consent makes a marriage.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(1) —

I answer that, In every sacrament there is a spiritual operation by means of a material operation which signifies it; thus in Baptism the inward spiritual cleansing is effected by a bodily cleansing.

Wherefore, since in matrimony there is a kind of spiritual joining together, in so far as matrimony is a sacrament, and a certain material joining together, in so far as it is directed to an office of nature and of civil life, it follows that the spiritual joining is the effect of the Divine power by means of the material joining. Therefore seeing that the joinings of material contracts are effected by mutual consent, it follows that the joining together of marriage is effected in the same way.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The first cause of the sacraments is the Divine power which works in them the welfare of the soul; but the second or instrumental causes are material operations deriving their efficacy from the Divine institution, and thus consent is the cause in matrimony.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Matrimony is not the consent itself, but the union of persons directed to one purpose, as stated above ( Q(44), A(1) ), and this union is the effect of the consent. Moreover, the consent, properly speaking, signifies not the union of Christ with the Church, but His will whereby His union with the Church was brought about.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Just as marriage is one on the part of the object to which the union is directed, whereas it is more than one on the part of the persons united, so too the consent is one on the part of the thing consented to, namely the aforesaid union, whereas it is more than one on the part of the persons consenting. Nor is the direct object of consent a husband but union with a husband on the part of the wife, even as it is union with a wife on the part of the husband.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(2) Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?

P(4)- Q(45)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that there is no need for the consent to be expressed in words. For a man is brought under another’s power by a vow just as he is by matrimony. Now a vow is binding in God’s sight, even though it be not expressed in words. Therefore consent also makes a marriage binding even without being expressed in words.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, there can be marriage between persons who are unable to express their mutual consent in words, through being dumb or of different languages. Therefore expression of the consent by words is not required for matrimony.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, if that which is essential to a sacrament be omitted for any reason whatever, there is no sacrament. Now there is a case of marriage without the expression of words if the maid is silent through bashfulness when her parents give her away to the bridegroom.

Therefore the expression of words is not essential to matrimony.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Matrimony is a sacrament. Now a sensible sign is required in every sacrament. Therefore it is also required in matrimony, and consequently there must needs be at least words by which the consent is made perceptible to the senses.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(2) —

Further, in matrimony there is a contract between husband and wife. Now in every contract there must be expression of the words by which men bind themselves mutually to one another. Therefore in matrimony also the consent must be expressed in words.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), the marriage union is effected in the same way as the bond in material contracts. And since material contracts are not feasible unless the contracting parties express their will to one another in words, it follows that the consent which makes a marriage must also be expressed in words, so that the expression of words is to marriage what the outward washing is to Baptism.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In a vow there is not a sacramental but only a spiritual bond, wherefore there is no need for it to be done in the same way as material contracts, in order that it be binding, as in the case of matrimony.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Although the like cannot plight themselves to one another in words, they can do so by signs, and such signs count for words.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(2)- RO(3) —

According to Hugh of S. Victor (Tract. vii, Sum. Sent.), persons who are being married should give their consent by accepting one another freely. and this is judged to be the case if they show no dissent when they are being wedded. Wherefore in such a case the words of the parents are taken as being the maid’s, for the fact that she does not contradict them is a sign that they are her words.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(3) Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage?

P(4)- Q(45)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage. For as present is to present, so is future to future. But consent given in words expressive of the present makes a marriage in the present. Therefore consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage in the future.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, in other civil contracts, just as in matrimony, a certain obligation results from the words expressing consent.

Now in other contracts it matters not whether the obligation is effected by words of the present or of the future tense. Therefore neither does it make any difference in matrimony.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, by the religious vow man contracts a spiritual marriage with God. Now the religious vow is expressed in words of the future tense, and is binding. Therefore carnal marriage also can be effected by words of the future tense.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(3) —

On the contrary, A man who consents in words of the future tense to take a particular woman as his wife, and after, by words of the present tense, consents to take another, according to law must take the second for his wife (cap. Sicut ex Litteris, De spons. et matr.). But this would not be the case if consent given in words of the future tense made a marriage, since from the very fact that his marriage with the one is valid, he cannot, as long as she lives, marry another. Therefore consent given in words of the future tense does not make a marriage.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(3) —

Further, he who promises to do a certain thing does it not yet. Now he who consents in words of the future tense, promises to marry a certain woman. Therefore he does not marry her yet.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(3) —

I answer that, The sacramental causes produce their effect by signifying it; hence they effect what they signify. Since therefore when a man expresses his consent by words of the future tense, he does not signify that he is marrying, but promises that he will marry, it follows that a consent expressed in this manner does not make a marriage, but a promise [sponsionem] of marriage, and this promise is known as a betrothal [sponsalia].

P(4)- Q(45)- A(3)- RO(1) —

When consent is expressed in words of the present tense, not only are the words actually present, but consent is directed to the present, so that they coincide in point of time; but when consent is given in words of the future tense, although the words are actually present, the consent is directed to a future time, and hence they do not coincide in point of time. For this reason the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Even in other contracts, a man who uses words referring to the future, does not transfer the power over his property to another person — for instance if he were to say “I will give thee” — but only when he uses words indicative of the present.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(3)- RO(3) —

In the vow of religious profession it is not the spiritual marriage itself that is expressed in words which refer to the future, but an act of the spiritual marriage, namely obedience or observance of the rule. If, however, a man vow spiritual marriage in the future, it is not a spiritual marriage, for a man does not become a monk by taking such a vow, but promises to become one.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(4) Whether, in the absence of inward consent, a marriage is made by consent given in words of the present?

P(4)- Q(45)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that even in the absence of inward consent a marriage is made by consent expressed in words of the present. For “fraud and deceit should benefit no man,” according to the law (cap. Ex Tenore, De Rescrip., cap. Si Vir, De cognat. spir.). Now he who gives consent in words without consenting in heart commits a fraud.

Therefore he should not benefit by it, through being released of the bond of marriage.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the mental consent of one person cannot be known to another, except in so far as it is expressed in words. If then the expression of the words is not enough, and inward consent is required in both parties, neither of them will be able to know that he is truly married to the other; and consequently whenever he uses marriage he will commit fornication.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, if a man is proved to have consented to take a certain woman to wife in words of the present tense, he is compelled under pain of excommunication to take her as his wife, even though he should say that he was wanting in mental consent, notwithstanding that afterwards he may have contracted marriage with another woman by words expressive of consent in the present. But this would not be the case if mental consent were requisite for marriage.

Therefore it is not required.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Innocent III says in a Decretal (cap.

Tua Nos, De Spons. et matr.) in reference to this case: “Other things cannot complete the marriage bond in the absence of consent.”

P(4)- Q(45)- A(4) —

Further, intention is necessary in all the sacraments.

Now he who consents not in his heart has no intention of contracting marriage; and therefore he does not contract a marriage.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(4) —

I answer that, The outward cleansing stands in the same relation to baptism as the expression of words to this sacrament, as stated above ( A(2) ). Wherefore just as were a person to receive the outward cleansing, with the intention, not of receiving the sacrament, but of acting in jest or deceit, he would not be baptized; so, too, expression of words without inward consent makes no marriage.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(4)- RO(1) —

There are two things here, namely the lack of consent — which benefits him in the tribunal of his conscience so that he is not bound by the marriage tie, albeit not in the tribunal of the Church where judgment is pronounced according to the evidence — and the deceit in the words, which does not benefit him, neither in the tribunal of his conscience nor in the tribunal of the Church, since in both he is punished for this.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(4)- RO(2) —

If mental consent is lacking in one of the parties, on neither side is there marriage, since marriage consists in a mutual joining together, as stated above ( Q(44), A(1) ). However one may believe that in all probability there is no fraud unless there be evident signs thereof; because we must presume good of everyone, unless there be proof of the contrary. Consequently the party in whom there is no fraud is excused from sin on account of ignorance.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(4)- RO(3) —

In such a case the Church compels him to hold to his first wife, because the Church judges according to outward appearances; nor is she deceived in justice or right, although she is deceived in the facts of the case. Yet such a man ought to bear the excommunication rather than return to his first wife; or else he should go far away into another country.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(5) Whether consent given secretly in words of the present makes a marriage?

P(4)- Q(45)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that consent given secretly in words of the present does not make a marriage. For a thing that is in one person’s power is not transferred to the power of another without the consent of the person in whose power it was. Now the maid is in her father’s power. Therefore she cannot by marriage be transferred to a husband’s power without her father’s consent. Wherefore if consent be given secretly, even though it should be expressed in words of the present, there will be no marriage.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, in penance, just as in matrimony, our act is as it were essential to the sacrament. But the sacrament of penance is not made complete except by means of the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments. Therefore neither can marriage be perfected without the priest’s blessing.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the Church does not forbid baptism to be given secretly, since one may baptize either privately or publicly. But the Church does forbid the celebration of clandestine marriages (cap. Cum inhibitio, De clandest. despons.). Therefore they cannot be done secretly.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, marriage cannot be contracted by those who are related in the second degree, because the Church has forbidden it.

But the Church has also forbidden clandestine marriages. Therefore they cannot be valid marriages.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Given the cause the effect follows.

Now the sufficient cause of matrimony is consent expressed in words of the present. Therefore whether this be done in public or in private the result is a marriage.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(5) —

Further, wherever there is the due matter and the due form of a sacrament there is the sacrament. Now in a secret marriage there is the due matter, since there are persons who are able lawfully to contract — and the due form, since there are the words of the present expressive of consent. Therefore there is a true marriage.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(5) —

I answer that, Just as in the other sacraments certain things are essential to the sacrament, and if they are omitted there is no sacrament, while certain things belong to the solemnization of the sacrament, and if these be omitted the sacrament is nevertheless validly performed, although it is a sin to omit them; so, too, consent expressed in words of the present between persons lawfully qualified to contract makes a marriage, because these two conditions are essential to the sacrament; while all else belongs to the solemnization of the sacrament, as being done in order that the marriage may be more fittingly performed. Hence if these be omitted it is a true marriage, although the contracting parties sin, unless they have a lawful motive for being excused. [*Clandestine marriages have since been declared invalid by the Council of Trent (sess. xxiv). It must be borne in mind that throughout the treatise on marriage St. Thomas gives the Canon Law of his time.]

P(4)- Q(45)- A(5)- RO(1) — The maid is in her father’s power, not as a female slave without power over her own body, but as a daughter, for the purpose of education. Hence, in so far as she is free, she can give herself into another’s power without her father’s consent, even as a son or daughter, since they are free, may enter religion without their parent’s consent.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(5)- RO(2) —

In penance our act, although essential to the sacrament, does not suffice for producing the proximate effect of the sacrament, namely forgiveness of sins, and consequently it is necessary that the act of the priest intervene in order that the sacrament be perfected.

But in matrimony our acts are the sufficient cause for the production of the proximate effect, which is the marriage bond, because whoever has the right to dispose of himself can bind himself to another. Consequently the priest’s blessing is not required for matrimony as being essential to the sacrament.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(5)- RO(3) —

It is also forbidden to receive baptism otherwise than from a priest, except in a case of necessity. But matrimony is not a necessary sacrament: and consequently the comparison fails.

However, clandestine marriages are forbidden on account of the evil results to which they are liable, since it often happens that one of the parties is guilty of fraud in such marriages; frequently, too, they have recourse to other nuptials when they repent of having married in haste; and many other evils result therefrom, besides which there is something disgraceful about them.

P(4)- Q(45)- A(5)- RO(4) —

Clandestine marriages are not forbidden as though they were contrary to the essentials of marriage, in the same way as the marriages of unlawful persons, who are undue matter for this sacrament; and hence there is no comparison.

QUESTION OF THE CONSENT TO WHICH AN OATH OR CARNAL INTERCOURSE IS APPENDED (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the consent to which an oath or carnal intercourse is appended. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage? (2) Whether carnal intercourse supervening to such a consent makes a marriage?

P(4)- Q(46)- A(1) Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage?

P(4)- Q(46)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that if an oath be added to a consent that is expressed in words of the future tense it makes a marriage.

For no one can bind himself to act against the Divine Law. But the fulfilling of an oath is of Divine law according to Matthew 5:33, “Thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord.” Consequently no subsequent obligation can relieve a man of the obligation to keep an oath previously taken. If, therefore, after consenting to marry a woman by words expressive of the future and confirming that consent with an oath, a man binds himself to another woman by words expressive of the present, it would seem that none the less he is bound to keep his former oath. But this would not be the case unless that oath made the marriage complete.

Therefore an oath affixed to a consent expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Divine truth is stronger than human truth. Now an oath confirms a thing with the Divine truth. Since then words expressive of consent in the present in which there is mere human truth complete a marriage, it would seem that much more is this the case with words of the future confirmed by an oath.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, according to the Apostle ( Hebrews 6:16), “An oath for confirmation is the end of all... controversy”; wherefore in a court of justice at any rate one must stand by an oath rather than by a mere affirmation. Therefore if a man consent to marry a woman by a simple affirmation expressed in words of the present, after having consented to marry another in words of the future confirmed by oath, it would seem that in the judgment of the Church he should be compelled to take the first and not the second as his wife.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the simple uttering of words relating to the future makes a betrothal. But the addition of an oath must have some effect. Therefore it makes something more than a betrothal. Now beyond a betrothal there is nothing but marriage. Therefore it makes a marriage.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(1) —

On the contrary, What is future is not yet. Now the addition of an oath does not make words of the future tense signify anything else than consent to something future. Therefore it is not a marriage yet.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(1) —

Further, after a marriage is complete, no further consent is required for the marriage. But after the oath there is yet another consent which makes the marriage, else it would be useless to swear to a future marriage. Therefore it does not make a marriage.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(1) —

I answer that, An oath is employed in confirmation of one’s words; wherefore it confirms that only which is signified by the words, nor does it change their signification. Consequently, since it belongs to words of the future tense, by their very signification, not to make a marriage, since what is promised in the future is not done yet, even though an oath be added to the promise, the marriage is not made yet, as the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28).

P(4)- Q(46)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The fulfilling of a lawful oath is of Divine law, but not the fulfilling of an unlawful oath. Wherefore if a subsequent obligation makes that oath unlawful, whereas it was lawful before, he who does not keep the oath he took previously does not disobey the Divine law. And so it is in the case in point; since he swears unlawfully who promises unlawfully; and a promise about another’s property is unlawful.

Consequently the subsequent consent by words of the present, whereby a man transfers the power over his body to another woman, makes the previous oath unlawful which was lawful before.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The Divine truth is most efficacious in confirming that to which it is applied. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(1)- RO(4) —

The oath has some effect, not by causing a new obligation, but confirming that which is already made, and thus he who violates it sins more grievously.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(2) Whether carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future makes a marriage?

P(4)- Q(46)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future makes a marriage. For consent by deed is greater than consent by word. But he who has carnal intercourse consents by deed to the promise he has previously made. Therefore it would seem that much more does this make a marriage than if he were to consent to mere words referring to the present.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, not only explicit but also interpretive consent makes a marriage. Now there can be no better interpretation of consent than carnal intercourse. Therefore marriage is completed thereby.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, all carnal union outside marriage is a sin. But the woman, seemingly, does not sin by admitting her betrothed to carnal intercourse. Therefore it makes a marriage.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, “Sin is not forgiven unless restitution be made,” as Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.). Now a man cannot reinstate a woman whom he has violated under the pretense of marriage unless he marry her. Therefore it would seem that even if, after his carnal intercourse, he happen to contract with another by words of the present tense, he is bound to return to the first; and this would not be the case unless he were married to her. Therefore carnal intercourse after consent referring to the future makes a marriage.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Pope Nicholas I says (Resp. ad Consult. Bulg. iii; Cap. Tuas dudum, De clandest. despons.), “Without the consent to marriage, other things, including coition, are of no effect.”

P(4)- Q(46)- A(2) —

Further, that which follows a thing does not make it.

But carnal intercourse follows the actual marriage, as effect follows cause.

Therefore it cannot make a marriage.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(2) —

I answer that, We may speak of marriage in two ways. First, in reference to the tribunal of conscience, and thus in very truth carnal intercourse cannot complete a marriage the promise of which has previously been made in words expressive of the future, if inward consent is lacking, since words, even though expressive of the present, would not make a marriage in the absence of mental consent, as stated above ( Q(45), A(4) ). Secondly, in reference to the judgment of the Church; and since in the external tribunal judgment is given in accordance with external evidence, and since nothing is more expressly significant of consent than carnal intercourse, it follows that in the judgment of the Church carnal intercourse following on betrothal is declared to make a marriage, unless there appear clear signs of deceit or fraud [*According to the pre-Tridentine legislation] (De sponsal. et matrim., cap. Is qui fidem).

P(4)- Q(46)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In reality he who has carnal intercourse consents by deed to the act of sexual union, and does not merely for this reason consent to marriage except according to the interpretation of the law.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(2)- RO(2) —

This interpretation does not alter the truth of the matter, but changes the judgment which is about external things.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(2)- RO(3) —

If the woman admit her betrothed, thinking that he wishes to consummate the marriage, she is excused from the sin, unless there be clear signs of fraud; for instance if they differ considerably in birth or fortune, or some other evident sign appear. Nevertheless the affianced husband is guilty of fornication, and should be punished for this fraud he has committed.

P(4)- Q(46)- A(2)- RO(4) —

In a case of this kind the affianced husband, before his marriage with the other woman, is bound to marry the one to whom he was betrothed, if she be his equal or superior in rank. But if he has married another woman, he is no longer able to fulfill his obligation, wherefore it suffices if he provide for her marriage. Nor is he bound even to do this, according to some, if her affianced husband is of much higher rank than she, or if there be some evident sign of fraud, because it may be presumed that in all probability she was not deceived but pretended to be.

QUESTION OF COMPULSORY AND CONDITIONAL CONSENT (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider compulsory and conditional consent. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether compulsory consent is possible? (2) Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear? (3) Whether compulsory consent invalidates marriage? (4) Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party using compulsion? (5) Whether conditional consent makes a marriage? (6) Whether one can be compelled by one’s father to marry?

P(4)- Q(47)- A(1) Whether a compulsory consent is possible?

P(4)- Q(47)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that no consent can be compulsory. For, as stated above (Sent. ii, D, 25 [* P(2a), Q(6) , A(4) ]) the free-will cannot be compelled. Now consent is an act of the free-will.

Therefore it cannot be compulsory.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, violent is the same as compulsory.

Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), “a violent action is one the principle of which is without, the patient concurring not at all.” But the principle of consent is always within. Therefore no consent can be compulsory.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, every sin is perfected by consent. But that which perfects a sin cannot be compulsory, for, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18), “no one sins in what he cannot avoid.”

Since then violence is defined by jurists (i, ff. de eo quod vi metusve) as the “force of a stronger being that cannot be repulsed,” it would seem that consent cannot be compulsory or violent.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, power is opposed to liberty. But compulsion is allied to power, as appears from a definition of Tully’s in which he says that “compulsion is the force of one who exercises his power to detain a thing outside its proper bounds.” Therefore the free-will cannot be compelled, and consequently neither can consent which is an act thereof.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(1) —

On the contrary, That which cannot be, cannot be an impediment. But compulsory consent is an impediment to matrimony, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 29). Therefore consent can be compelled.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(1) —

Further, in marriage there is a contract. Now the will can be compelled in the matter of contracts; for which reason the law adjudges that restitution should be made of the whole, for it does not ratify “that which was done under compulsion or fear” (Sent. iv, D[29]).

Therefore in marriage also it is possible for the consent to be compulsory.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(1) —

I answer that, Compulsion or violence is twofold.

One is the cause of absolute necessity, and violence of this kind the Philosopher calls (Ethic. iii, 1) “violent simply,” as when by bodily strength one forces a person to move; the other causes conditional necessity, and the Philosopher calls this a “mixed violence,” as when a person throws his merchandise overboard in order to save himself. In the latter kind of violence, although the thing done is not voluntary in itself, yet taking into consideration the circumstances of place and time it is voluntary. And since actions are about particulars, it follows that it is voluntary simply, and involuntary in a certain respect (Cf. P(2a), Q(6) , A(6) ). Wherefore this latter violence or compulsion is consistent with consent, but not the former. And since this compulsion results from one’s fear of a threatening danger, it follows that this violence coincides with fear which, in a manner, compels the will, whereas the former violence has to do with bodily actions. Moreover, since the law considers not merely internal actions, but rather external actions, consequently it takes violence to mean absolute compulsion, for which reason it draws a distinction between violence and fear. Here, however, it is a question of internal consent which cannot be influenced by compulsion or violence as distinct from fear. Therefore as to the question at issue compulsion and fear are the same. Now, according to lawyers fear is “the agitation of the mind occasioned by danger imminent or future” (Ethic. iii, 1).

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for the first set of arguments consider the first kind of compulsion, and the second set of arguments consider the second.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(2) Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?

P(4)- Q(47)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that “a constant man” [*Cap. Ad audientiam, De his quae vi.] cannot be compelled by fear. Because the nature of a constant man is not to be agitated in the midst of dangers. Since then fear is “agitation of the mind occasioned by imminent danger,” it would seem that he is not compelled by fear.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, “Of all fearsome things death is the limit,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), as though it were the most perfect of all things that inspire fear. But the constant man is not compelled by death, since the brave face even mortal dangers. Therefore no fear influences a constant man.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, of all dangers a good man fears most that which affects his good name. But the fear of disgrace is not reckoned to influence a constant man, because, according to the law (vii, ff, de eo quod metus, etc.), “fear of disgrace is not included under the ordinance, ‘That which is done through fear’“ [*Dig. iv, 2, Quod metus causa].

Therefore neither does any other kind of fear influence a constant man.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, in him who is compelled by fear, fear leaves a sin, for it makes him promise what he is unwilling to fulfill, and thus it makes him lie. But a constant man does not commit a sin, not even a very slight one, for fear. Therefore no fear influences a constant man.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Abraham and Isaac were constant.

Yet they were influenced by fear, since on account of fear each said that his wife was his sister ( Genesis 12:12; 26:7).

P(4)- Q(47)- A(2) —

Further, wherever there is mixed violence, it is fear that compels. But however constant a man may be he may suffer violence of that kind, for if he be on the sea, he will throw his merchandise overboard if menaced with shipwreck. Therefore fear can influence a constant man.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(2) —

I answer that, By fear influencing a man we mean his being compelled by fear. A man is compelled by fear when he does that which otherwise he would not wish to do, in order to avoid that which he fears. Now the constant differs from the inconstant man in two respects.

First, in respect of the quality of the danger feared, because the constant man follows right reason, whereby he knows whether to omit this rather than that, and whether to do this rather than that. Now the lesser evil or the greater good is always to be chosen in preference; and therefore the constant man is compelled to bear with the lesser evil through fear of the greater evil, but he is not compelled to bear with the greater evil in order to avoid the lesser. But the inconstant man is compelled to bear with the greater evil through fear of a lesser evil, namely to commit sin through fear of bodily suffering; whereas on the contrary the obstinate man cannot be compelled even to permit or to do a lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater.

Hence the constant man is a mean between the inconstant and the obstinate. Secondly, they differ as to their estimate of the threatening evil, for a constant man is not compelled unless for grave and probable reasons, while the inconstant man is compelled by trifling motives: “The wicked man seeth when no man pursueth” ( Proverbs 28:1).

P(4)- Q(47)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The constant man, like the brave man, is fearless, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 4), not that he is altogether without fear, but because he fears not what he ought not to fear, or where, or when he ought not to fear.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Sin is the greatest of evils, and consequently a constant man can nowise be compelled to sin; indeed a man should die rather than suffer the like, as again the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6,9).

Yet certain bodily injuries are less grievous than certain others; and chief among them are those which relate to the person, such as death, blows, the stain resulting from rape, and slavery. Wherefore the like compel a constant man to suffer other bodily injuries. They are contained in the verse: “Rape, status, blows, and death.” Nor does it matter whether they refer to his own person, or to the person of his wife or children, or the like.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Although disgrace is a greater injury it is easy to remedy it. Hence fear of disgrace is not reckoned to influence a constant man according to law.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(2)- RO(4) —

The constant man is not compelled to lie, because at the time he wishes to give; yet afterwards he wishes to ask for restitution, or at least to appeal to the judge, if he promised not to ask for restitution. But he cannot promise not to appeal, for since this is contrary to the good of justice, he cannot be compelled thereto, namely to act against justice.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(3) Whether compulsory consent invalidates a marriage?

P(4)- Q(47)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that compulsory consent does not invalidate a marriage. For just as consent is necessary for matrimony, so is intention necessary for Baptism. Now one who is compelled by fear to receive Baptism, receives the sacrament. Therefore one who is compelled by fear to consent is bound by his marriage.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), that which is done on account of mixed violence is more voluntary than involuntary. Now consent cannot be compelled except by mixed violence.

Therefore it is not entirely involuntary, and consequently the marriage is valid.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, seemingly he who has consented to marriage under compulsion ought to be counseled to stand to that marriage; because to promise and not to fulfill has an “appearance of evil,” and the Apostle wishes us to refrain from all such things ( 1 Thessalonians 5:22). But that would not be the case if compulsory consent invalidated a marriage altogether. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(3) —

On the contrary, A Decretal says (cap. Cum locum, De sponsal. et matrim.): “Since there is no room for consent where fear or compulsion enters in, it follows that where a person’s consent is required, every pretext for compulsion must be set aside.” Now mutual contract is necessary in marriage. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(3) —

Further, Matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which union is according to the liberty of love. Therefore it cannot be the result of compulsory consent.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(3) —

I answer that, The marriage bond is everlasting. Hence whatever is inconsistent with its perpetuity invalidates marriage. Now the fear which compels a constant man deprives the contract of its perpetuity, since its complete rescission can be demanded. Wherefore this compulsion by fear which influences a constant man, invalidates marriage, but not the other compulsion. Now a constant man is reckoned a virtuous man who, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4), is a measure in all human actions.

However, some say that if there be consent although compulsory, the marriage is valid in conscience and in God’s sight, but not in the eyes of the Church, who presumes that there was no inward consent on account of the fear. But this is of no account, because the Church should not presume a person to sin until it be proved; and he sinned if he said that he consented whereas he did not consent. Wherefore the Church presumes that he did consent, but judges this compulsory consent to be insufficient for a valid marriage.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The intention is not the efficient cause of the sacrament in baptism, it is merely the cause that elicits the action of the agent; whereas the consent is the efficient cause in matrimony. Hence the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Not any kind of voluntariness suffices for marriage: it must be completely voluntary, because it has to be perpetual; and consequently it is invalidated by violence of a mixed nature.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(3)- RO(3) —

He ought not always to be advised to stand to that marriage, but only when evil results are feared from its dissolution.

Nor does he sin if he does otherwise, because there is no appearance of evil in not fulfilling a promise that one has made unwillingly.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(4) Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party who uses compulsion?

P(4)- Q(47)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that compulsory consent makes a marriage, at least as regards the party who uses compulsion. For matrimony is a sign of a spiritual union. But spiritual union which is by charity may be with one who has not charity. Therefore marriage is possible with one who wills it not.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, if she who was compelled consents afterwards, it will be a true marriage. But he who compelled her before is not bound by her consent. Therefore he was married to her by virtue of the consent he gave before.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Matrimony is an equiparant relation.

Now a relation of that kind is equally in both terms. Therefore if there is an impediment on the part of one, there will be no marriage on the part of the other.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(4) —

I answer that, Since marriage is a kind of relation, and a relation cannot arise in one of the terms without arising in the other, it follows that whatever is an impediment to matrimony in the one, is an impediment to matrimony in the other; since it is impossible for a man to be the husband of one who is not his wife, or for a woman to be a wife without a husband, just as it is impossible to be a mother without having a child. Hence it is a common saying that “marriage is not lame.”

P(4)- Q(47)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Although the act of the lover can be directed to one who loves not, there can be no union between them, unless love be mutual. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) that friendship which consists in a kind of union requires a return of love.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Marriage does not result from the consent of her who was compelled before, except in so far as the other party’s previous consent remains in force; wherefore if he were to withdraw his consent there would be no marriage.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(5) Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?

P(4)- Q(47)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that not even a conditional consent makes a marriage, because a statement is not made simply if it is made subject to a condition. But in marriage the words expressive of consent must be uttered simply. Therefore a conditional consent makes no marriage.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, marriage should be certain. But where a statement is made under a condition it is rendered doubtful. Therefore a like consent makes no marriage.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(5) —

On the contrary, In other contracts an obligation is undertaken conditionally, and holds so long as the condition holds.

Therefore since marriage is a contract, it would seem that it can be made by a conditional consent.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(5) —

I answer that, The condition made is either of the present or of the future. If it is of the present and is not contrary to marriage, whether it be moral or immoral, the marriage holds if the condition is verified, and is invalid if the condition is not verified. If, however, it be contrary to the marriage blessings, the marriage is invalid, as we have also said in reference to betrothals ( Q(43), A(1) ). But if the condition refer to the future, it is either necessary, as that the sun will rise tomorrow — and then the marriage is valid, because such future things are present in their causes — or else it is contingent, as the payment of a sum of money, or the consent of the parents, and then the judgment about a consent of this kind is the same as about a consent expressed in words of the future tense; wherefore it makes no marriage.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(6) Whether one can be compelled by one’s father’s command to marry?

P(4)- Q(47)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that one can be compelled by one’s father’s command to marry. For it is written ( Colossians 3:20): “Children, obey your parents in all things.” Therefore they are bound to obey them in this also.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, Isaac charged Jacob ( Genesis 28:1) not to take a wife from the daughters of Chanaan. But he would not have charged him thus unless he had the right to command it. Therefore a son is bound to obey his father in this.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, no one should promise, especially with an oath, for one whom he cannot compel to keep the promise. Now parents promise future marriages for their children, and even confirm their promise by oath. Therefore they can compel their children to keep that promise.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(6)- O(4) —

Further, our spiritual father, the Pope to wit, can by his command compel a man to a spiritual marriage, namely to accept a bishopric. Therefore a carnal father can compel his son to marriage.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(6) —

On the contrary, A son may lawfully enter religion though his father command him to marry. Therefore he is not bound to obey him in this.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(6) —

Further, if he were bound to obey, a betrothal contracted by the parents would hold good without their children’s consent. But this is against the law (cap. Ex litteris, De despon. impub.).

Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(6) —

I answer that, Since in marriage there is a kind of perpetual service, as it were, a father cannot by his command compel his son to marry, since the latter is of free condition: but he may induce him for a reasonable cause; and thus the son will be affected by his father’s command in the same way as he is affected by that cause, so that if the cause be compelling as indicating either obligation or fitness, his father’s command will compel him in the same measure: otherwise he may not compel him.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The words of the Apostle do not refer to those matters in which a man is his own master as the father is. Such is marriage by which the son also becomes a father.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(6)- RO(2) —

There were other motives why Jacob was bound to do what Isaac commanded him, both on account of the wickedness of those women, and because the seed of Chanaan was to be cast forth from the land which was promised to the seed of the patriarchs.

Hence Isaac could command this.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(6)- RO(3) —

They do not swear except with the implied condition “if it please them”; and they are bound to induce them in good faith.

P(4)- Q(47)- A(6)- RO(4) —

Some say that the Pope cannot command a man to accept a bishopric, because consent should be free. But if this be granted there would be an end of ecclesiastical order, for unless a man can be compelled to accept the government of a church, the Church could not be preserved, since sometimes those who are qualified for the purpose are unwilling to accept unless they be compelled. Therefore we must reply that the two cases are not parallel; for there is no bodily service in a spiritual marriage as there is in the bodily marriage; because the spiritual marriage is a kind of office for dispensing the public weal: “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God” ( 1 Corinthians 4:1).

QUESTION OF THE OBJECT OF THE CONSENT (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the object of the consent. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse? (2) Whether consent to marry a person for an immoral motive makes a marriage?

P(4)- Q(48)- A(1) Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse?

P(4)- Q(48)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the consent which makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse. For Jerome [*The words quoted are found implicitly in St. Augustine (De Bono Viduit ix)] says that “for those who have vowed virginity it is wicked, not only to marry, but even to wish to marry.” But it would not be wicked unless it were contrary to virginity, and marriage is not contrary to virginity except by reason of carnal intercourse. Therefore the will’s consent in marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, whatever there is in marriage between husband and wife is lawful between brother and sister except carnal intercourse. But there cannot lawfully be a consent to marriage between them. Therefore the marriage consent is a consent to carnal intercourse.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, if the woman say to the man: “I consent to take thee provided however that you know me not,” it is not a marriage consent, because it contains something against the essence of that consent. Yet this would not be the case unless the marriage consent were a consent to carnal intercourse. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, in everything the beginning corresponds to the consummation. Now marriage is consummated by carnal intercourse. Therefore, since it begins by the consent, it would seem that the consent is to carnal intercourse.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(1) —

On the contrary, No one that consents to carnal intercourse is a virgin in mind and body. Yet Blessed John the evangelist after consenting to marriage was a virgin both in mind and body. Therefore he did not consent to carnal intercourse.

Further, the effect corresponds to its cause. Now consent is the cause of marriage. Since then carnal intercourse is not essential to marriage, seemingly neither is the consent which causes marriage a consent to carnal intercourse.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(1) —

I answer that, The consent that makes a marriage is a consent to marriage, because the proper effect of the will is the thing willed. Wherefore, according as carnal intercourse stands in relation to marriage, so far is the consent that causes marriage a consent to carnal intercourse. Now, as stated above ( Q(44), A(1) ; Q(45), AA(1),2 ), marriage is not essentially the carnal union itself, but a certain joining together of husband and wife ordained to carnal intercourse, and a further consequent union between husband and wife, in so far as they each receive power over the other in reference to carnal intercourse, which joining together is called the nuptial bond. Hence it is evident that they said well who asserted that to consent to marriage is to consent to carnal intercourse implicitly and not explicitly. For carnal intercourse is not to be understood, except as an effect is implicitly contained in its cause, for the power to have carnal intercourse, which power is the object of the consent, is the cause of carnal intercourse, just as the power to use one’s own property is the cause of the use.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The reason why consent to marriage after taking the vow of virginity is sinful, is because that consent gives a power to do what is unlawful: even so would a man sin if he gave another man the power to receive that which he has in deposit, and not only by actually delivering it to him. With regard to the consent of the Blessed Virgin, we have spoken about it above (Sent. iv, D, 3; P(3), Q(29), A(2) ).

P(4)- Q(48)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Between brother and sister there can be no power of one over the other in relation to carnal intercourse, even as neither can there be lawfully carnal intercourse itself. Consequently the argument does not prove.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Such an explicit condition is contrary not only to the act but also to the power of carnal intercourse, and therefore it is contrary to marriage.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Marriage begun corresponds to marriage consummated, as habit or power corresponds to the act which is operation.

The arguments on the contrary side show that consent is not given explicitly to carnal intercourse; and this is true.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2) Whether marriage can result from one person’s consent to take another for a base motive?

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that marriage cannot result from one person’s consent to take another for a base motive. For there is but one reason for one thing. Now marriage is one sacrament. Therefore it cannot result from the intention of any other end than that for which it was instituted by God; namely the begetting of children.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the marriage union is from God, according to Matthew 19:6, “What... God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” But a union that is made for immoral motives is not from God. Therefore it is not a marriage.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, in the other sacraments, if the intention of the Church be not observed, the sacrament is invalid. Now the intention of the Church in the sacrament of matrimony is not directed to a base purpose. Therefore, if a marriage be contracted for a base purpose, it will not be a valid marriage.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, according to Boethius (De Diff., Topic. ii) “a thing is good if its end be good.” But matrimony is always good.

Therefore it is not matrimony if it is done for an evil end.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church; and in this there can be nothing base. Neither therefore can marriage be contracted for a base motive.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2) —

On the contrary, He who baptizes another for the sake of gain baptizes validly. Therefore if a man marries a woman for the purpose of gain it is a valid marriage.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2) —

Further, the same conclusion is proved by the examples and authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30).

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2) —

I answer that, The final cause of marriage may be taken as twofold, namely essential and accidental. The essential cause of marriage is the end to which it is by its very nature ordained, and this is always good, namely the begetting of children and the avoiding of fornication. But the accidental final cause thereof is that which the contracting parties intend as the result of marriage. And since that which is intended as the result of marriage is consequent upon marriage, and since that which comes first is not altered by what comes after, but conversely; marriage does not become good or evil by reason of that cause, but the contracting parties to whom this cause is the essential end. And since accidental causes are infinite in number, it follows that there can be an infinite number of such causes in matrimony, some of which are good and some bad.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This is true of the essential and principal cause; but that which has one essential and principal end may have several secondary essential ends, and an infinite number of accidental ends.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The joining together can be taken for the relation itself which is marriage, and that is always from God, and is good, whatever be its cause; or for the act of those who are being joined together, and thus it is sometimes evil and is not from God simply. Nor is it unreasonable that an effect be from God, the cause of which is evil, such as a child born of adultery; for it is not from that cause as evil, but as having some good in so far as it is from God, although it is not from God simply.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The intention of the Church whereby she intends to confer a sacrament is essential to each sacrament, so that if it be not observed, all sacraments are null. But the intention of the Church whereby she intends an advantage resulting from the sacrament belongs to the well-being and not to the essence of a sacrament; wherefore, if it be not observed, the sacrament is none the less valid. Yet he who omits this intention sins; for instance if in baptism one intend not the healing of the mind which the Church intends. In like manner he who intends to marry, although he fail to direct it to the end which the Church intends, nevertheless contracts a valid marriage.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2)- RO(4) —

This evil which is intended is the end not of marriage, but of the contracting parties.

P(4)- Q(48)- A(2)- RO(5) —

The union itself, and not the action of those who are united, is the sign of the union of Christ with the Church: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

QUESTION OF THE MARRIAGE GOODS* (SIX ARTICLES)

[*”Bona matrimonii,” variously rendered marriage goods, marriage blessings, and advantages of marriage.] In the next place we must consider the marriage goods. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether certain goods are necessary in order to excuse marriage? (2) Whether those assigned are sufficient? (3) Whether the sacrament is the principal among the goods? (4) Whether the marriage act is excused from sin by the aforesaid goods? (5) Whether it can ever be excused from sin without them? (6) Whether in their absence it is always a mortal sin?

P(4)- Q(49)- A(1) Whether certain blessings are necessary in order to excuse marriage?

P(4)- Q(49)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that certain blessings are not necessary in order to excuse marriage. For just as the preservation of the individual which is effected by the nutritive power is intended by nature, so too is the preservation of the species which is effected by marriage; and indeed so much the more as the good of the species is better and more exalted than the good of the individual. But no goods are necessary to excuse the act of the nutritive power. Neither therefore are they necessary to excuse marriage.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) the friendship between husband and wife is natural, and includes the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But that which is virtuous in itself needs no excuse. Therefore neither should any goods be assigned for the excuse of matrimony.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, matrimony was instituted as a remedy and as an office, as stated above ( Q(42), A(2) ). Now it needs no excuse in so far as it is instituted as an office, since then it would also have needed an excuse in paradise, which is false, for there, as Augustine says, “marriage would have been without reproach and the marriage-bed without stain” (Genesis ad lit. ix). In like manner neither does it need an excuse in so far as it is intended as a remedy, any more than the other sacraments which were instituted as remedies for sin. Therefore matrimony does not need these excuses.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the virtues are directed to whatever can be done aright. If then marriage can be righted by certain goods, it needs nothing else to right it besides the virtues of the soul; and consequently there is no need to assign to matrimony any goods whereby it is righted, any more than to other things in which the virtues direct us.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Wherever there is indulgence, there must needs be some reason for excuse. Now marriage is allowed in the state of infirmity “by indulgence” ( 1 Corinthians 7:6). Therefore it needs to be excused by certain goods.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(1) —

Further, the intercourse of fornication and that of marriage are of the same species as regards the species of nature. But the intercourse of fornication is wrong in itself. Therefore, in order that the marriage intercourse be not wrong, something must be added to it to make it right, and draw it to another moral species.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(1) —

I answer that, No wise man should allow himself to lose a thing except for some compensation in the shape of an equal or better good. Wherefore for a thing that has a loss attached to it to be eligible, it needs to have some good connected with it, which by compensating for that loss makes that thing ordinate and right. Now there is a loss of reason incidental to the union of man and woman, both because the reason is carried away entirely on account of the vehemence of the pleasure, so that it is unable to understand anything at the same time, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11); and again because of the tribulation of the flesh which such persons have to suffer from solicitude for temporal things ( 1 Corinthians 7:28). Consequently the choice of this union cannot be made ordinate except by certain compensations whereby that same union is righted. and these are the goods which excuse marriage and make it right.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(1)- RO(1) —

In the act of eating there is not such an intense pleasure overpowering the reason as in the aforesaid action, both because the generative power, whereby original sin is transmitted, is infected and corrupt, whereas the nutritive power, by which original sin is not transmitted, is neither corrupt nor infected; and again because each one feels in himself a defect of the individual more than a defect of the species.

Hence, in order to entice a man to take food which supplies a defect of the individual, it is enough that he feel this defect; but in order to entice him to the act whereby a defect of the species is remedied, Divine providence attached pleasure to that act, which moves even irrational animals in which there is not the stain of original sin. Hence the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(1)- RO(2) —

These goods which justify marriage belong to the nature of marriage, which consequently needs them, not as extrinsic causes of its rectitude, but as causing in it that rectitude which belongs to it by nature.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(1)- RO(3) —

From the very fact that marriage is intended as an office or as a remedy it has the aspect of something useful and right; nevertheless both aspects belong to it from the fact that it has these goods by which it fulfills the office and affords a remedy to concupiscence.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(1)- RO(4) —

An act of virtue may derive its rectitude both from the virtue as its elicitive principle, and from its circumstances as its formal principles; and the goods of marriage are related to marriage as circumstances to an act of virtue which owes it to those circumstances that it can be an act of virtue.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2) Whether the goods of marriage are sufficiently enumerated?

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the goods of marriage are insufficiently enumerated by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31), namely “faith, offspring, and sacrament.” For the object of marriage among men is not only the begetting and feeding of children, but also the partnership of a common life, whereby each one contributes his share of work to the common stock, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12. Therefore as the offspring is reckoned a good of matrimony, so also should the communication of works.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the union of Christ with the Church, signified by matrimony, is the effect of charity. Therefore charity rather than faith should be reckoned among the goods of matrimony.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, in matrimony, just as it is required that neither party have intercourse with another, so is it required that the one pay the marriage debt to the other. Now the former pertains to faith according to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31). Therefore justice should also be reckoned among the goods of marriage on account of the payment of the debt.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, in matrimony as signifying the union of Christ with the Church, just as indivisibility is required, so also is unity, whereby one man has one wife. But the sacrament which is reckoned among the three marriage goods pertains to indivisibility. Therefore there should be something else pertaining to unity.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- O(5) —

On the other hand, it would seem that they are too many. For one virtue suffices to make one act right. Now faith is one virtue. Therefore it was not necessary to add two other goods to make marriage right.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- O(6) —

Further, the same cause does not make a thing both useful and virtuous, since the useful and the virtuous are opposite divisions of the good. Now marriage derives its character of useful from the offspring. Therefore the offspring should not be reckoned among the goods that make marriage virtuous.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- O(7) —

Further, nothing should be reckoned as a property or condition of itself. Now these goods are reckoned to be conditions of marriage. Therefore since matrimony is a sacrament, the sacrament should not be reckoned a condition of matrimony.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2) —

I answer that, Matrimony is instituted both as an office of nature and as a sacrament of the Church. As an office of nature it is directed by two things, like every other virtuous act. one of these is required on the part of the agent and is the intention of the due end, and thus the “offspring” is accounted a good of matrimony; the other is required on the part of the act, which is good generically through being about a due matter; and thus we have “faith,” whereby a man has intercourse with his wife and with no other woman. Besides this it has a certain goodness as a sacrament, and this is signified by the very word “sacrament.”

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Offspring signifies not only the begetting of children, but also their education, to which as its end is directed the entire communion of works that exists between man and wife as united in marriage, since parents naturally “lay up” for their “children” ( Corinthians 12:14); so that the offspring like a principal end includes another, as it were, secondary end.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Faith is not taken here as a theological virtue, but as part of justice, in so far as faith [fides] signifies the suiting of deed to word [fiant dicta] by keeping one’s promises; for since marriage is a contract it contains a promise whereby this man is assigned to this woman.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Just as the marriage promise means that neither party is to have intercourse with a third party, so does it require that they should mutually pay the marriage debt. The latter is indeed the chief of the two, since it follows from the power which each receives over the other. Consequently both these things pertain to faith, although the Book of Sentences mentions that which is the less manifest.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- RO(4) —

By sacrament we are to understand not only indivisibility, but all those things that result from marriage being a sign of Christ’s union with the Church. We may also reply that the unity to which the objection refers pertains to faith, just as indivisibility belongs to the sacrament.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- RO(5) —

Faith here does not denote a virtue, but that condition of virtue which is a part of justice and is called by the name of faith.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- RO(6) —

Just as the right use of a useful good derives its rectitude not from the useful but from the reason which causes the right use, so too direction to a useful good may cause the goodness of rectitude by virtue of the reason causing the right direction; and in this way marriage, through being directed to the offspring, is useful, and nevertheless righteous, inasmuch as it is directed aright.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(2)- RO(7) —

As the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31), sacrament here does not mean matrimony itself, but its indissolubility, which is a sign of the same thing as matrimony is.

We may also reply that although marriage is a sacrament, marriage as marriage is not the same as marriage as a sacrament, since it was instituted not only as a sign of a sacred thing, but also as an office of nature. Hence the sacramental aspect is a condition added to marriage considered in itself, whence also it derives its rectitude. Hence its sacramentality, if I may use the term, is reckoned among the goods which justify marriage; and accordingly this third good of marriage, the sacrament to wit, denotes not only its indissolubility, but also whatever pertains to its signification.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3) Whether the sacrament is the chief of the marriage goods?

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the “sacrament” is not the chief of the marriage goods. For the end is principal in everything. Now the end of marriage is the offspring. Therefore the offspring is the chief marriage good.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, in the specific nature the difference is more important than the genus, even as the form is more important than matter in the composition of a natural thing. Now “sacrament” refers to marriage on the part of its genus, while “offspring” and “faith” refer thereto on the part of the difference whereby it is a special kind of sacrament. Therefore these other two are more important than sacrament in reference to marriage.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, just as we find marriage without “offspring” and without “faith,” so do we find it without indissolubility, as in the case where one of the parties enters religion before the marriage is consummated. Therefore neither from this point of view is “sacrament” the most important marriage good.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, an effect cannot be more important than its cause. Now consent, which is the cause of matrimony, is often changed. Therefore the marriage also can be dissolved and consequently inseparability is not always a condition of marriage.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, the sacraments which produce an everlasting effect imprint a character. But no character is imprinted in matrimony. Therefore it is not conditioned by a lasting inseparability.

Consequently just as there is marriage without “offspring” so is there marriage without “sacrament,” and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3) —

On the contrary, That which has a place in the definition of a thing is most essential thereto. Now inseparability, which pertains to sacrament, is placed in the definition of marriage ( Q(44), A(3) ), while offspring and faith are not. Therefore among the other goods sacrament is the most essential to matrimony.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3) —

Further, the Divine power which works in the sacraments is more efficacious than human power. But “offspring” and “faith” pertain to matrimony as directed to an office of human nature, whereas “sacrament” pertains to it as instituted by God. Therefore sacrament takes a more important part in marriage than the other two.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3) —

I answer that, This or that may be more important to a thing in two ways, either because it is more essential or because it is more excellent. If the reason is because it is more excellent, then “sacrament” is in every way the most important of the three marriage goods, since it belongs to marriage considered as a sacrament of grace; while the other two belong to it as an office of nature; and a perfection of grace is more excellent than a perfection of nature. If, however, it is said to be more important because it is more essential, we must draw a distinction; for “faith” and “offspring” can be considered in two ways.

First, in themselves, and thus they regard the use of matrimony in begetting children and observing the marriage compact; while inseparability, which is denoted by “sacrament,” regards the very sacrament considered in itself, since from the very fact that by the marriage compact man and wife give to one another power the one over the other in perpetuity, it follows that they cannot be put asunder. Hence there is no matrimony without inseparability, whereas there is matrimony without “faith” and “offspring,” because the existence of a thing does not depend on its use; and in this sense “sacrament” is more essential to matrimony than “faith” and “offspring.” Secondly, “faith” and “offspring” may be considered as in their principles, so that “offspring” denote the intention of having children, and “faith” the duty of remaining faithful, and there can be no matrimony without these also, since they are caused in matrimony by the marriage compact itself, so that if anything contrary to these were expressed in the consent which makes a marriage, the marriage would be invalid. Taking “faith” and “offspring” in this sense, it is clear that “offspring” is the most essential thing in marriage, secondly “faith,” and thirdly “sacrament”; even as to man it is more essential to be in nature than to be in grace, although it is more excellent to be in grace.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The end as regards the intention stands first in a thing, but as regards the attainment it stands last. It is the same with “offspring” among the marriage goods; wherefore in a way it is the most important and in another way it is not.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Sacrament, even as holding the third place among the marriage goods, belongs to matrimony by reason of its difference; for it is called “sacrament” from its signification of that particular sacred thing which matrimony signifies.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3)- RO(3) —

According to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. ix), marriage is a good of mortals, wherefore in the resurrection “they shall neither marry nor be married” ( Matthew 22:30). Hence the marriage bond does not last after the life wherein it is contracted, and consequently it is said to be inseparable, because it cannot be sundered in this life, but either by bodily death after carnal union, or by spiritual death after a merely spiritual union.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Although the consent which makes a marriage is not everlasting materially, i.e. in regard to the substance of the act, since that act ceases and a contrary act may succeed it, nevertheless formally speaking it is everlasting, because it is a consent to an ever lasting bond, else it would not make a marriage, for a consent to take a woman for a time makes no marriage. Hence it is everlasting formally, inasmuch as an act takes its species from its object; and thus it is that matrimony derives its inseparability from the consent.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(3)- RO(5) —

In those sacraments wherein a character is imprinted, power is given to perform spiritual actions; but in matrimony, to perform bodily actions. Wherefore matrimony by reason of the power which man and wife receive over one another agrees with the sacraments in which a character is imprinted, and from this it derives its inseparability, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31); yet it differs from them in so far as that power regards bodily acts; hence it does not confer a spiritual character.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(4) Whether the marriage act is excused by the aforesaid goods?

P(4)- Q(49)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the marriage act cannot be altogether excused from sin by the aforesaid goods. For whoever allows himself to lose a greater good for the sake of a lesser good sins because he allows it inordinately. Now the good of reason which is prejudiced in the marriage act is greater than these three marriage goods. Therefore the aforesaid goods do not suffice to excuse marriage intercourse.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, if a moral good be added to a moral evil the sum total is evil and not good, since one evil circumstance makes an action evil, whereas one good circumstance does not make it good. Now the marriage act is evil in itself, else it would need no excuse. Therefore the addition of the marriage goods cannot make the act good.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, wherever there is immoderate passion there is moral vice. Now the marriage goods cannot prevent the pleasure in that act from being immoderate. Therefore they cannot excuse it from being a sin.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15), shame is only caused by a disgraceful deed. Now the marriage goods do not deprive that deed of its shame. Therefore they cannot excuse it from sin.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The marriage act differs not from fornication except by the marriage goods. If therefore these were not sufficient to excuse it marriage would be always unlawful; and this is contrary to what was stated above ( Q(41), A(3) ).

P(4)- Q(49)- A(4) —

Further, the marriage goods are related to its act as its due circumstances, as stated above ( A(1), ad 4). Now the like circumstances are sufficient to prevent an action from being evil. Therefore these goods can excuse marriage so that it is nowise a sin.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(4) —

I answer that, An act is said to be excused in two ways. First, on the part of the agent, so that although it be evil it is not imputed as sin to the agent, or at least not as so grave a sin. thus ignorance is said to excuse a sin wholly or partly. Secondly, an act is said to be excused on its part, so that, namely, it is not evil; and it is thus that the aforesaid goods are said to excuse the marriage act. Now it is from the same cause that an act is not morally evil, and that it is good, since there is no such thing as an indifferent act, as was stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40; P(2a), Q(18), A(9) ). Now a human act is said to be good in two ways. In one way by goodness of virtue, and thus an act derives its goodness from those things which place it in the mean. This is what “faith” and “offspring” do in the marriage act, as stated above ( A(2) ). In another way, by goodness of the “sacrament,” in which way an act is said to be not only good, but also holy, and the marriage act derives this goodness from the indissolubility of the union, in respect of which it signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Thus it is clear that the aforesaid goods sufficiently excuse the marriage act.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(4)- RO(1) —

By the marriage act man does not incur harm to his reason as to habit, but only as to act. Nor is it unfitting that a certain act which is generically better be sometimes interrupted for some less good act; for it is possible to do this without sin, as in the case of one who ceases from the act of contemplation in order meanwhile to devote himself to action.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(4)- RO(2) —

This argument would avail if the evil that is inseparable from carnal intercourse were an evil of sin. But in this case it is an evil not of sin but of punishment alone, consisting in the rebellion of concupiscence against reason; and consequently the conclusion does not follow.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The excess of passion that amounts to a sin does not refer to the passion’s quantitative intensity, but to its proportion to reason; wherefore it is only when a passion goes beyond the bounds of reason that it is reckoned to be immoderate. Now the pleasure attaching to the marriage act, while it is most intense in point of quantity, does not go beyond the bounds previously appointed by reason before the commencement of the act, although reason is unable to regulate them during the pleasure itself.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(4)- RO(4) —

The turpitude that always accompanies the marriage act and always causes shame is the turpitude of punishment, not of sin, for man is naturally ashamed of any defect.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(5) Whether the marriage act can be excused without the marriage goods?

P(4)- Q(49)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods. For he who is moved by nature alone to the marriage act, apparently does not intend any of the marriage goods, since the marriage goods pertain to grace or virtue. Yet when a person is moved to the aforesaid act by the natural appetite alone, seemingly he commits no sin, for nothing natural is an evil, since “evil is contrary to nature and order,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Therefore the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, he who has intercourse with his wife in order to avoid fornication, does not seemingly intend any of the marriage goods. Yet he does not sin apparently, because marriage was granted to human weakness for the very purpose of avoiding fornication ( Corinthians 7:2,6). Therefore the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, he who uses as he will that which is his own does not act against justice, and thus seemingly does not sin. Now marriage makes the wife the husband’s own, and “vice versa.” Therefore, if they use one another at will through the instigation of lust, it would seem that it is no sin; and thus the same conclusion follows.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, that which is good generically does not become evil unless it be done with an evil intention. Now the marriage act whereby a husband knows his wife is generically good. Therefore it cannot be evil unless it be done with an evil intention. Now it can be done with a good intention, even without intending any marriage good, for instance by intending to keep or acquire bodily health. Therefore it seems that this act can be excused even without the marriage goods.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(5) —

On the contrary, If the cause be removed the effect is removed. Now the marriage goods are the cause of rectitude in the marriage act. Therefore the marriage act cannot be excused without them.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(5) —

Further, the aforesaid act does not differ from the act of fornication except in the aforesaid goods. But the act of fornication is always evil. Therefore the marriage act also will always be evil unless it be excused by the aforesaid goods.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(5) —

I answer that, Just as the marriage goods, in so far as they consist in a habit, make a marriage honest and holy, so too, in so far as they are in the actual intention, they make the marriage act honest, as regards those two marriage goods which relate to the marriage act. Hence when married persons come together for the purpose of begetting children, or of paying the debt to one another (which pertains to “faith”) they are wholly excused from sin. But the third good does not relate to the use of marriage, but to its excuse, as stated above ( A(3) ); wherefore it makes marriage itself honest, but not its act, as though its act were wholly excused from sin, through being done on account of some signification.

Consequently there are only two ways in which married persons can come together without any sin at all, namely in order to have offspring, and in order to pay the debt. otherwise it is always at least a venial sin.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The offspring considered as a marriage good includes something besides the offspring as a good intended by nature. For nature intends offspring as safeguarding the good of the species, whereas the offspring as a good of the sacrament of marriage includes besides this the directing of the child to God. Wherefore the intention of nature which intends the offspring must needs be referred either actually or habitually to the intention of having an offspring, as a good of the sacrament: otherwise the intention would go no further than a creature; and this is always a sin.

Consequently whenever nature alone moves a person to the marriage act, he is not wholly excused from sin, except in so far as the movement of nature is further directed actually or habitually to the offspring as a good of the sacrament. Nor does it follow that the instigation of nature is evil, but that it is imperfect unless it be further directed to some marriage good.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(5)- RO(2) —

If a man intends by the marriage act to prevent fornication in his wife, it is no sin, because this is a kind of payment of the debt that comes under the good of “faith.” But if he intends to avoid fornication in himself, then there is a certain superfluity, and accordingly there is a venial sin, nor was the sacrament instituted for that purpose, except by indulgence, which regards venial sins.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(5)- RO(3) —

One due circumstance does not suffice to make a good act, and consequently it does not follow that, no matter how one use one’s own property, the use is good, but when one uses it as one ought according to all the circumstances.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(5)- RO(4) —

Although it is not evil in itself to intend to keep oneself in good health, this intention becomes evil, if one intend health by means of something that is not naturally ordained for that purpose; for instance if one sought only bodily health by the sacrament of baptism, and the same applies to the marriage act in the question at issue.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(6) Whether it is a mortal sin for a man to have knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure?

P(4)- Q(49)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that whenever a man has knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure, he commits a mortal sin. For according to Jerome (Comment. in Ephesians 5:25), as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 31), “the pleasure taken in the embraces of a wanton is damnable in a husband.” Now nothing but mortal sin is said to be damnable. Therefore it is always a mortal sin to have knowledge of one’s wife for mere pleasure.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, consent to pleasure is a mortal sin, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 24). Now whoever knows his wife for the sake of pleasure consents to the pleasure. Therefore he sins mortally.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, whoever fails to refer the use of a creature to God enjoys a creature, and this is a mortal sin. But whoever uses his wife for mere pleasure does not refer that use to God. Therefore he sins mortally.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(6)- O(4) —

Further, no one should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now according to the text (Sent. ii, D, 24) a man who knows his wife for mere pleasure is debarred from entering the Church, as though he were excommunicate. Therefore every such man sins mortally.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(6) —

On the contrary, As stated in the text (Sent. ii, D, 24), according to Augustine (Contra Jul. ii, 10; De Decem Chord. xi; Serm. xli, de Sanct.), carnal intercourse of this kind is one of the daily sins, for which we say the “Our Father.” Now these are not mortal sins. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(6) —

Further, it is no mortal sin to take food for mere pleasure. Therefore in like manner it is not a mortal sin for a man to use his wife merely to satisfy his desire.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(6) —

I answer that, Some say that whenever pleasure is the chief motive for the marriage act it is a mortal sin; that when it is an indirect motive it is a venial sin; and that when it spurns the pleasure altogether and is displeasing, it is wholly void of venial sin; so that it would be a mortal sin to seek pleasure in this act, a venial sin to take the pleasure when offered, but that perfection requires one to detest it. But this is impossible, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 3,4) the same judgment applies to pleasure as to action, because pleasure in a good action is good, and in an evil action, evil; wherefore, as the marriage act is not evil in itself, neither will it be always a mortal sin to seek pleasure therein. Consequently the right answer to this question is that if pleasure be sought in such a way as to exclude the honesty of marriage, so that, to wit, it is not as a wife but as a woman that a man treats his wife, and that he is ready to use her in the same way if she were not his wife, it is a mortal sin; wherefore such a man is said to be too ardent a lover of his wife, because his ardor carries him away from the goods of marriage. If, however, he seek pleasure within the bounds of marriage, so that it would not be sought in another than his wife, it is a venial sin.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(6)- RO(1) —

A man seeks wanton pleasure in his wife when he sees no more in her that he would in a wanton.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Consent to the pleasure of the intercourse that is a mortal sin is itself a mortal sin; but such is not the consent to the marriage act.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Although he does not actually refer the pleasure to God, he does not place his will’s last end therein; otherwise he would seek it anywhere indifferently. Hence it does not follow that he enjoys a creature; but he uses a creature actually for his own sake, and himself habitually, though not actually, for God’s sake.

P(4)- Q(49)- A(6)- RO(4) —

The reason for this statement is not that man deserves to be excommunicated for this sin, but because he renders himself unfit for spiritual things, since in that act, he becomes flesh and nothing more.

QUESTION OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF MARRIAGE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)

In the next place we must consider the impediments of marriage: (1) In general; (2) In particular.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1) Whether it is fitting that impediments should be assigned to marriage?

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem unfitting for impediments to be assigned to marriage. For marriage is a sacrament condivided with the others. But no impediments are assigned to the others. Neither therefore should they be assigned to marriage.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the less perfect a thing is the fewer its obstacles. Now matrimony is the least perfect of the sacraments.

Therefore it should have either no impediments or very few.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, wherever there is disease, it is necessary to have a remedy for the disease. Now concupiscence, a remedy for which is permitted in matrimony ( 1 Corinthians 7:6), is in all.

Therefore there should not be any impediment making it altogether unlawful for a particular person to marry.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, unlawful means against the law. Now these impediments that are assigned to matrimony are not against the natural law, because they are not found to be the same in each state of the human race, since more degrees of kindred come under prohibition at one time than at another. Nor, seemingly, can human law set impediments against marriage, since marriage, like the other sacraments, is not of human but of Divine institution. Therefore impediments should not be assigned to marriage, making it unlawful for a person to marry.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, lawful and unlawful differ as that which is against the law from that which is not, and between these there is no middle term, since they are opposed according to affirmation and negation. Therefore there cannot be impediments to marriage, placing a person in a middle position between those who are lawful and those who are unlawful subjects of marriage.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(6) —

Further, union of man and woman is unlawful save in marriage. Now every unlawful union should be dissolved.

Therefore if anything prevent a marriage being contracted, it will “de facto” dissolve it after it has been contracted; and thus impediments should not be assigned to marriage, which hinder it from being contracted, and dissolve it after it has been contracted.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(7) —

Further, no impediment can remove from a thing that which is part of its definition. Now indissolubility is part of the definition of marriage. Therefore there cannot be any impediments which annul a marriage already contracted.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(8) —

On the other hand, it would seem that there should be an infinite number of impediments to marriage. For marriage is a good. Now good may be lacking in an infinite number of ways, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii). Therefore there is an infinite number of impediments to marriage.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(9) —

Further, the impediments to marriage arise from the conditions of individuals. But such like conditions are infinite in number. Therefore the impediments to marriage are also infinite.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1) —

I answer that, In marriage, as in other sacraments, there are certain things essential to marriage, and others that belong to its solemnization. And since even without the things that pertain to its solemnization it is still a true sacrament, as also in the case of the other sacraments, it follows that the impediments to those things that pertain to the solemnization of this sacrament do not derogate from the validity of the marriage. These impediments are said to hinder the contracting of marriage, but they do not dissolve the marriage once contracted; such are the veto of the Church, or the holy seasons. Hence the verse: “The veto of the Church and holy tide Forbid the knot, but loose it not if tied.” On the other hand, those impediments which regard the essentials of marriage make a marriage invalid, wherefore they are said not only to hinder the contracting of marriage, but to dissolve it if contracted; and they are contained in the following verse: “Error, station, vow, kinship, crime, Difference of worship, force, holy orders, Marriage bond, honesty, affinity, impotence, All these forbid marriage, and annul it though contracted.” The reason for this number may be explained as follows: Marriage may be hindered either on the part of the contract or in regard to the contracting parties. If in the first way, since the marriage contract is made by voluntary consent, and this is incompatible with either ignorance or violence, there will be two impediments to marriage, namely “force,” i.e. compulsion, and “error” in reference to ignorance. Wherefore the Master pronounced on these two impediments when treating of the cause of matrimony (Sent. iv, DD 29,30). Here, however, he is treating of the impediments as arising from the contracting parties, and these may be differentiated as follows. A person may be hindered from contracting marriage either simply, or with some particular person. If simply, so that he be unable to contract marriage with any woman, this can only be because he is hindered from performing the marriage act. This happens in two ways. First, because he cannot “de facto,” either through being altogether unable — and thus we have the impediment of “impotence” — or through being unable to do so freely, and thus we have the impediment of the “condition of slavery.” Secondly, because he cannot do it lawfully, and this because he is bound to continence, which happens in two ways, either through his being bound on account of the office he has undertaken to fulfill — and thus we have the impediment of “Order” — or on account of his having taken a vow — and thus “Vow” is an impediment.

If, however, a person is hindered from marrying, not simply but in reference to a particular person, this is either because he is bound to another person, and thus he who is married to one cannot marry another, which constitutes the impediment of the “bond of marriage” — or through lack of proportion to the other party, and this for three reasons. First, on account of too great a distance separating them, and thus we have “difference of worship”; secondly, on account of their being too closely related, and thus we have three impediments, namely “kinship,” then “affinity,” which denotes the close relationship between two persons, in reference to a third united to one of them by marriage, and the “justice of public honesty,” where we have a close relationship between two persons arising out of the betrothal of one of them to a third person; thirdly, on account of a previous undue union between him and the woman, and thus the “crime of adultery” previously committed with her is an impediment.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(1) —

There may be impediments to the other sacraments also in the omission either of that which is essential, or of that which pertains to the solemnization of the sacrament, as stated above.

However, impediments are assigned to matrimony rather than to the other sacraments for three reasons. First, because matrimony consists of two persons, and consequently can be impeded in more ways than the other sacraments which refer to one person taken individually; secondly, because matrimony has its cause in us and in God, while some of the other sacraments have their cause in God alone. Wherefore penance which in a manner has a cause in us, is assigned certain impediments by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 16), such as hypocrisy, the public games, and so forth; thirdly, because other sacraments are objects of command or counsel, as being more perfect goods, whereas marriage is a matter of indulgence, as being a less perfect good ( 1 Corinthians 7:6). Wherefore, in order to afford an opportunity of proficiency towards a greater good, more impediments are assigned to matrimony than to the other sacraments.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The more perfect things can be hindered in more ways, in so far as more conditions are required for them. And if an imperfect thing requires more conditions, there will be more impediments to it; and thus it is in matrimony.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(3) —

This argument would hold, were there no other and more efficacious remedies for the disease of concupiscence; which is false.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Persons are said to be unlawful subjects for marriage through being contrary to the law whereby marriage is established. Now marriage as fulfilling an office of nature is established by the natural law; as a sacrament, by the Divine law; as fulfilling an office of society, by the civil law. Consequently a person may be rendered an unlawful subject of marriage by any of the aforesaid laws. Nor does the comparison with the other sacraments hold, for they are sacraments only.

And since the natural law is particularized in various ways according to the various states of mankind, and since positive law, too, varies according to the various conditions of men, the Master (Sent. iv, D, 34) asserts that at various times various persons have been unlawful subjects of marriage.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(5) —

The law may forbid a thing either altogether, or in part and in certain cases. Hence between that which is altogether according to the law and that which is altogether against the law (which are opposed by contrariety and not according to affirmation and negation), that which is somewhat according to the law and somewhat against the law is a middle term. For this reason certain persons hold a middle place between those who are simply lawful subjects and those who are simply unlawful.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(6) —

Those impediments which do not annul a marriage already contracted sometimes hinder a marriage from being contracted, by rendering it not invalid but unlawful. And if it be contracted it is a true marriage although the contracting parties sin; just as by consecrating after breaking one’s fast one would sin by disobeying the Church’s ordinance, and yet it would be a valid sacrament because it is not essential to the sacrament that the consecrator be fasting.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(7) —

When we say that the aforesaid impediments annul marriage already contracted, we do not mean that they dissolve a marriage contracted in due form, but that they dissolve a marriage contracted “de facto” and not “de jure.” Wherefore if an impediment supervene after a marriage has been contracted in due form, it cannot dissolve the marriage.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(8) —

The impediments that hinder a good accidentally are infinite in number, like all accidental causes. But the causes which of their own nature corrupt a certain good are directed to that effect, and determinate, even as are the causes which produce that good; for the causes by which a thing is destroyed and those by which it is made are either contrary to one another, or the same but taken in a contrary way.

P(4)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(9) —

The conditions of particular persons taken individually are infinite in number, but taken in general, they may be reduced to a certain number; as instanced in medicine and all operative arts, which consider the conditions of particular persons in whom acts are.

QUESTION OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF ERROR (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediments to matrimony in particular, and in the first place the impediment of error. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether error of its very nature is an impediment to matrimony? (2) What kind of error?

P(4)- Q(51)- A(1) Whether it is right to reckon error as an impediment to marriage?

P(4)- Q(51)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that error should not be reckoned in itself an impediment to marriage. For consent, which is the efficient cause of marriage, is hindered in the same way as the voluntary. Now the voluntary, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), may be hindered by ignorance. But ignorance is not the same as error, because ignorance excludes knowledge altogether, whereas error does not, since “error is to approve the false as though it were true,” according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 11). Therefore ignorance rather than error should have been reckoned here as an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which of its very nature can be an impediment to marriage is in opposition to the good of marriage. But error is not a thing of this kind. Therefore error is not by its very nature an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, just as consent is required for marriage, so is intention required for baptism. Now if one were to baptize John, thinking to baptize Peter, John would be baptized none the less. Therefore error does not annul matrimony.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, there was true marriage between Lia and Jacob, and yet, in this case, there was error. Therefore error does not annul a marriage.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is said in the Digests (Si per errorem, ff. De jurisdic. omn. judic.): “What is more opposed to consent than error?” Now consent is required for marriage. Therefore error is an impediment to matrimony.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(1) —

Further, consent denotes something voluntary. Now error is an obstacle to the voluntary, since “the voluntary,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (De Nat. Hom. xxxii), “is that which has its principle in one who has knowledge of singulars which are the matter of actions.” But this does not apply to one who is in error. Therefore error is an impediment to matrimony.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(1) —

I answer that, Whatever hinders a cause, of its very nature hinders the effect likewise. Now consent is the cause of matrimony, as stated above ( Q(45), A(1) ). Hence whatever voids the consent, voids marriage. Now consent is an act of the will, presupposing an act of the intellect; and if the first be lacking, the second must needs be lacking also.

Hence, when error hinders knowledge, there follows a defect in the consent also, and consequently in the marriage. Therefore it is possible according to the natural law for error to void marriage.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Speaking simply, ignorance differs from error, because ignorance does not of its very nature imply an act of knowledge, while error supposes a wrong judgment of reason about something.

However, as regards being an impediment to the voluntary, it differs not whether we call it ignorance or error, since no ignorance can be an impediment to the voluntary, unless it have error in conjunction with it, because the will’s act presupposes an estimate or judgment about something which is the object of the will. Wherefore if there be ignorance there must needs be error; and for this reason error is set down as being the proximate cause.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Although error is not of itself contrary to matrimony, it is contrary thereto as regards the cause of marriage.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The character of baptism is not caused directly by the intention of the baptizer, but by the material element applied outwardly; and the intention is effective only as directing the material element to its effect; whereas the marriage tie is caused by the consent directly. Hence the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(1)- RO(4) —

According to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 30) the marriage between Lia and Jacob was effected not by their coming together, which happened through an error, but by their consent, which followed afterwards. Yet both are clearly to be excused from sin (Sent. iv, D, 30).

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2) Whether every error is an impediment to matrimony?

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that every error is an impediment to matrimony, and not, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30), only error about the condition or the person. For that which applies to a thing as such applies to it in all its bearings. Now error is of its very nature an impediment to matrimony, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore every error is an impediment to matrimony.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, if error, as such, is an impediment to matrimony, the greater the error the greater the impediment. Now the error concerning faith in a heretic who disbelieves in this sacrament is greater than an error concerning the person. Therefore it should be a greater impediment than error about the person.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, error does not void marriage except as removing voluntariness. Now ignorance about any circumstance takes away voluntariness (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore it is not only error about condition or person that is an impediment to matrimony.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, just as the condition of slavery is an accident affecting the person, so are bodily or mental qualities. But error regarding the condition is an impediment to matrimony. Therefore error concerning quality or fortune is equally an impediment.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, just as slavery or freedom pertains to the condition of person, so do high and low rank, or dignity of position and the lack thereof. Now error regarding the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony. Therefore error about the other matters mentioned is also an impediment.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(6) —

Further, just as the condition of slavery is an impediment, so are difference of worship and impotence, as we shall say further on ( Q(52), A(2) ; Q(58), A(1) ; Q(59), A(1) ). Therefore just as error regarding the condition is an impediment, so also should error about those other matters be reckoned an impediment.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(7) —

On the other hand, it would seem that not even error about the person is an impediment to marriage. For marriage is a contract even as a sale is. Now in buying and selling the sale is not voided if one coin be given instead of another of equal value. Therefore a marriage is not voided if one woman be taken instead of another.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(8) —

Further, it is possible for them to remain in this error for many years and to beget between them sons and daughters. But it would be a grave assertion to maintain that they ought to be separated then. Therefore their previous error did not void their marriage.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(9) —

Further, it might happen that the woman is betrothed to the brother of the man whom she thinks that she is consenting to marry, and that she has had carnal intercourse with him; in which case, seemingly, she cannot go back to the man to whom she thought to give her consent, but should hold on to his brother. Thus error regarding the person is not an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2) —

I answer that, Just as error, through causing involuntariness, is an excuse from sin, so on the same count is it an impediment to marriage. Now error does not excuse from sin unless it refer to a circumstance the presence or absence of which makes an action lawful or unlawful. For if a man were to strike his father with an iron rod thinking it to be of wood, he is not excused from sin wholly, although perhaps in part; but if a man were to strike his father, thinking to strike his son to correct him, he is wholly excused provided he take due care. Wherefore error, in order to void marriage, must needs be about the essentials of marriage. Now marriage includes two things, namely the two persons who are joined together, and the mutual power over one another wherein marriage consists. The first of these is removed by error concerning the person, the second by error regarding the condition, since a slave cannot freely give power over his body to another, without his master’s consent.

For this reason these two errors, and no others, are an impediment to matrimony.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(1) —

It is not from its generic nature that error is an impediment to marriage, but from the nature of the difference added thereto; namely from its being error about one of the essentials to marriage.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(2) —

An error of faith about matrimony is about things consequent upon matrimony, for instance on the question of its being a sacrament, or of its being lawful. Wherefore such error as these is no impediment to marriage, as neither does an error about baptism hinder a man from receiving the character, provided he intend to receive what the Church gives, although he believe it to be nothing.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(3) —

It is not any ignorance of a circumstance that causes the involuntariness which is an excuse from sin, as stated above; wherefore the argument does not prove.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Difference of fortune or of quality does not make a difference in the essentials to matrimony, as the condition of slavery does. Hence the argument does not prove.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(5) —

Error about a person’s rank, as such, does not void a marriage, for the same reason as neither does error about a personal quality. If, however, the error about a person’s rank or position amounts to an error about the person, it is an impediment to matrimony. Hence, if the woman consent directly to this particular person, her error about his rank does not void the marriage; but if she intend directly to consent to marry the king’s son, whoever he may be, then, if another man than the king’s son be brought to her, there is error about the person, and the marriage will be void.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(6) —

Error is an impediment to matrimony, although it be about other impediments to marriage if it concern those things which render a person an unlawful subject of marriage. But (the Master) does not mention error about such things, because they are an impediment to marriage whether there be error about them or not; so that if a woman contract with a subdeacon, whether she know this or not, there is no marriage; whereas the condition of slavery is no impediment if the slavery be known. Hence the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(7) —

In contracts money is regarded as the measure of other things (Ethic. v, 5), and not as being sought for its own sake.

Hence if the coin paid is not what it is thought to be but another of equal value, this does not void the contract. But if there be error about a thing sought for its own sake, the contract is voided, for instance if one were to sell a donkey for a horse; and thus it is in the case in point.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(8) —

No matter how long they have cohabited, unless she be willing to consent again, there is no marriage.

P(4)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(9) —

If she did not consent previously to marry his brother, she may hold to the one whom she took in error. Nor can she return to his brother, especially if there has been carnal intercourse between her and the man she took to husband. If, however, she had previously consented to take the first one in words of the present, she cannot have the second while the first lives. But she may either leave the second or return to the first; and ignorance of the fact excuses her from sin, just as she would be excused if after the consummation of the marriage a kinsman of her husband were to know her by fraud since she is not to be blamed for the other’s deceit.

QUESTION OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF THE CONDITION OF SLAVERY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment of the condition of slavery. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony? (2) Whether a slave can marry without his master’s consent? (3) Whether a man who is already married can make himself a slave without his wife’s consent? (4) Whether the children should follow the condition of their father or of their mother?

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1) Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony?

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the condition of slavery is no impediment to matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to marriage except what is in some way opposed to it. But slavery is in no way opposed to marriage, else there could be no marriage among slaves.

Therefore slavery is no impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which is contrary to nature cannot be an impediment to that which is according to nature. Now slavery is contrary to nature, for as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6), “it is contrary to nature for man to wish to lord it over another man”; and this is also evident from the fact that it was said of man ( Genesis 1:26) that he should “have dominion over the fishes of the sea,” but not that he should have dominion over man. Therefore it cannot be an impediment to marriage, which is a natural thing.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, if it is an impediment, this is either of natural law or of positive law. But it is not of natural law, since according to natural law all men are equal, as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6), while it is stated at the beginning of the Digests (Manumissiones, ff. de just. et jure.) that slavery is not of natural law; and positive law springs from the natural law, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Therefore, according to law, slavery is not an impediment to any marriage.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, that which is an impediment to marriage is equally an impediment whether it be known or not, as in the case of consanguinity. Now the slavery of one party, if it be known to the other, is no impediment to their marriage. Therefore slavery, considered in itself, is unable to void a marriage; and consequently it should not be reckoned by itself as a distinct impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, just as one may be in error about slavery, so as to deem a person free who is a slave, so may one be in error about freedom, so as to deem a person a slave whereas he is free. But freedom is not accounted an impediment to matrimony. Therefore neither should slavery be so accounted.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1)- O(7) —

Further, leprosy is a greater burden to the fellowship of marriage and is a greater obstacle to the good of the offspring than slavery is. Yet leprosy is not reckoned an impediment to marriage.

Therefore neither should slavery be so reckoned.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1) —

On the contrary, A Decretal says (De conjug. servorum, cap. Ad nostram) that “error regarding the condition hinders a marriage from being contracted and voids that which is already contracted.”

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1) —

Further, marriage is one of the goods that are sought for their own sake, because it is qualified by honesty; whereas slavery is one of the things to be avoided for their own sake. Therefore marriage and slavery are contrary to one another; and consequently slavery is an impediment to matrimony.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1) —

I answer that, In the marriage contract one party is bound to the other in the matter of paying the debt; wherefore if one who thus binds himself is unable to pay the debt, ignorance of this inability, on the side of the party to whom he binds himself, voids the contract. Now just as impotence in respect of coition makes a person unable to pay the debt, so that he is altogether disabled, so slavery makes him unable to pay it freely. Therefore, just as ignorance or impotence in respect of coition is an impediment if not known but not if known, as we shall state further on ( Q(58) ), so the condition of slavery is an impediment if not known, but not if it be known.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Slavery is contrary to marriage as regards the act to which marriage binds one party in relation to the other, because it prevents the free execution of that act; and again as regards the good of the offspring who become subject to the same condition by reason of the parent’s slavery. Since, however, it is free to everyone to suffer detriment in that which is his due, if one of the parties knows the other to be a slave, the marriage is none the less valid. Likewise since in marriage there is an equal obligation on either side to pay the debt, neither party can exact of the other a greater obligation than that under which he lies; so that if a slave marry a bondswoman, thinking her to be free, the marriage is not thereby rendered invalid. It is therefore evident that slavery is no impediment to marriage except when it is unknown to the other party, even though the latter be in a condition of freedom; and so nothing prevents marriage between slaves, or even between a freeman and a bondswoman.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Nothing prevents a thing being against nature as to the first intention of nature, and yet not against nature as to its second intention. Thus, as stated in De Coelo, ii, all corruption, defect, and old age are contrary to nature, because nature intends being and perfection, and yet they are not contrary to the second intention of nature, because nature, through being unable to preserve being in one thing, preserves it in another which is engendered of the other’s corruption. And when nature is unable to bring a thing to a greater perfection it brings it to a lesser; thus when it cannot produce a male it produces a female which is “a misbegotten male” (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3). I say then in like manner that slavery is contrary to the first intention of nature. Yet it is not contrary to the second, because natural reason has this inclination, and nature has this desire — that everyone should be good; but from the fact that a person sins, nature has an inclination that he should be punished for his sin, and thus slavery was brought in as a punishment of sin. Nor is it unreasonable for a natural thing to be hindered by that which is unnatural in this way; for thus is marriage hindered by impotence of coition, which impotence is contrary to nature in the way mentioned.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The natural law requires punishment to be inflicted for guilt, and that no one should be punished who is not guilty; but the appointing of the punishment according to the circumstances of person and guilt belongs to positive law. Hence slavery which is a definite punishment is of positive law, and arises out of natural law, as the determinate from that which is indeterminate. And it arises from the determination of the same positive law that slavery if unknown is an impediment to matrimony, lest one who is not guilty be punished; for it is a punishment to the wife to have a slave for husband, and “vice versa.”

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Certain impediments render a marriage unlawful; and since it is not our will that makes a thing lawful or unlawful, but the law to which our will ought to be subject, it follows that the validity or invalidity of a marriage is not affected either by ignorance (such as destroys voluntariness) of the impediment or by knowledge thereof; and such an impediment is affinity or a vow, and others of the same kind. other impediments, however, render a marriage ineffectual as to the payment of the debt; and since it is within the competency of our will to remit a debt that is due to us, it follows that such impediments, if known, do not invalidate a marriage, but only when ignorance of them destroys voluntariness. Such impediments are slavery and impotence of coition.

And, because they have of themselves the nature of an impediment, they are reckoned as special impediments besides error; whereas a change of person is not reckoned a special impediment besides error, because the substitution of another person has not the nature of an impediment except by reason of the intention of one of the contracting parties.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Freedom does not hinder the marriage act, wherefore ignorance of freedom is no impediment to matrimony.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(1)- RO(6) —

Leprosy does not hinder marriage as to its first act, since lepers can pay the debt freely; although they lay a burden upon marriage as to its secondary effects; wherefore it is not an impediment to marriage as slavery is.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2) Whether a slave can marry without his master’s consent?

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that a slave cannot marry without his master’s consent. For no one can give a person that which is another’s without the latter’s consent. Now a slave is his master’s chattel.

Therefore he cannot give his wife power over his body by marrying without his master’s consent.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, a slave is bound to obey his master.

But his master may command him not to consent to marry. Therefore he cannot marry without his consent.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, after marriage, a slave is bound even by a precept of the Divine law to pay the debt to his wife. But at the time that his wife asks for the debt his master may demand of him a service which he will be unable to perform if he wish to occupy himself in carnal intercourse. Therefore if a slave can marry without his master’s consent, the latter would be deprived of a service due to him without any fault of his; and this ought not to be.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, a master may sell his slave into a foreign country, where the latter’s wife is unable to follow him, through either bodily weakness, or imminent danger to her faith; for instance if he be sold to unbelievers, or if her master be unwilling, supposing her to be a bondswoman; and thus the marriage will be dissolved, which is unfitting.

Therefore a slave cannot marry without his master’s consent.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, the burden under which a man binds himself to the Divine service is more advantageous than that whereby a man subjects himself to his wife. But a slave cannot enter religion or receive orders without his master’s consent. Much less therefore can he be married without his consent.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2) —

On the contrary, “In Christ Jesus... there is neither bond nor free” ( Galatians 3:26,28). Therefore both freeman and bondsman enjoy the same liberty to marry in the faith of Christ Jesus.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2) —

Further, slavery is of positive law; whereas marriage is of natural and Divine law. Since then positive law is not prejudicial to the natural or the Divine law, it would seem that a slave can marry without his master’s consent.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1), ad 3), the positive law arises out of the natural law, and consequently slavery, which is of positive law, cannot be prejudicious to those things that are of natural law. Now just as nature seeks the preservation of the individual, so does it seek the preservation of the species by means of procreation; wherefore even as a slave is not so subject to his master as not to be at liberty to eat, sleep, and do such things as pertain to the needs of his body, and without which nature cannot be preserved, so he is not subject to him to the extent of being unable to marry freely, even without his master’s knowledge or consent.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2)- RO(1) —

A slave is his master’s chattel in matters superadded to nature, but in natural things all are equal. Wherefore, in things pertaining to natural acts, a slave can by marrying give another person power over his body without his master’s consent.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2)- RO(2) —

A slave is bound to obey his master in those things which his master can command lawfully; and just as his master cannot lawfully command him not to eat or sleep, so neither can he lawfully command him to refrain from marrying. For it is the concern of the lawgiver how each one uses his own, and consequently if the master command his slave not to marry, the slave is not bound to obey his master.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2)- RO(3) —

If a slave has married with his master’s consent, he should omit the service commanded by his master and pay the debt to his wife; because the master, by consenting to his slave’s marriage, implicitly consented to all that marriage requires. If, however, the marriage was contracted without the master’s knowledge or consent, he is not bound to pay the debt, but in preference to obey his master, if the two things are incompatible. Nevertheless in such matters there are many particulars to be considered, as in all human acts, namely the danger to which his wife’s chastity is exposed, and the obstacle which the payment of the debt places in the way of the service commanded, and other like considerations, all of which being duly weighed it will be possible to judge which of the two in preference the slave is bound to obey, his master or his wife.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2)- RO(4) —

In such a case it is said that the master should be compelled not to sell the slave in such a way as to increase the weight of the marriage burden, especially since he is able to obtain anywhere a just price for his slave.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(2)- RO(5) —

By entering religion or receiving orders a man is bound to the Divine service for all time; whereas a husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife not always, but at a fitting time; hence the comparison fails. Moreover, he who enters religion or receives orders binds himself to works that are superadded to natural works, and in which his master has power over him, but not in natural works to which a man binds himself by marriage. Hence he cannot vow continence without his master’s consent.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(3) Whether slavery can supervene to marriage?

P(4)- Q(52)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that slavery cannot supervene to marriage, by the husband selling himself to another as slave. Because what is done by fraud and to another’s detriment should not hold. But a husband who sells himself for a slave, does so sometimes to cheat marriage, and at least to the detriment of his wife. Therefore such a sale should not hold as to the effect of slavery.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, two favorable things outweigh one that is not favorable. Now marriage and freedom are favorable things and are contrary to slavery, which in law is not a favorable thing. Therefore such a slavery ought to be entirely annulled in marriage.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, in marriage husband and wife are on a par with one another. Now the wife cannot surrender herself to be a slave without her husband’s consent. Therefore neither can the husband without his wife’s consent.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, in natural things that which hinders a thing being generated destroys it after it has been generated. Now bondage of the husband, if unknown to the wife, is an impediment to the act of marriage before it is performed. Therefore if it could supervene to marriage it would dissolve it; which is unreasonable.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Everyone can give another that which is his own. Now the husband is his own master since he is free.

Therefore he can surrender his right to another.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(3) —

Further, a slave can marry without his master’s consent, as stated above ( A(2) ). Therefore a husband can in like manner subject himself to a master, without his wife’s consent.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(3) —

I answer that, A husband is subject to his wife in those things which pertain to the act of nature; in these things they are equal, and the subjection of slavery does not extend thereto. Wherefore the husband, without his wife’s knowledge, can surrender himself to be another’s slave. Nor does this result in a dissolution of the marriage, since no impediment supervening to marriage can dissolve it, as stated above ( Q(50), A(1), ad 7).

P(4)- Q(52)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The fraud can indeed hurt the person who has acted fraudulently, but it cannot be prejudicial to another person: wherefore if the husband, to cheat his wife, surrender himself to be another’s slave, It will be to his own prejudice, through his losing the inestimable good of freedom; whereas this can nowise be prejudicial to the wife, and he is bound to pay her the debt when she asks, and to do all that marriage requires of him for he cannot be taken away from these obligations by his master’s command.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(3)- RO(2) —

In so far as slavery is opposed to marriage, marriage is prejudicial to slavery, since the slave is bound then to pay the debt to his wife, though his master be unwilling.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Although husband and wife are considered to be on a par in the marriage act and in things relating to nature, to which the condition of slavery does not extend, nevertheless as regards the management of the household, and other such additional matters the husband is the head of the wife and should correct her, and not “vice versa.” Hence the wife cannot surrender herself to be a slave without her husband’s consent.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(3)- RO(4) —

This argument considers corruptible things; and yet even in these there are many obstacles to generation that are not capable of destroying what is already generated. But in things which have stability it is possible to have an impediment which prevents a certain thing from beginning to be, yet does not cause it to cease to be; as instanced by the rational soul. It is the same with marriage, which is a lasting tie so long as this life lasts.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(4) Whether children should follow the condition of their father?

P(4)- Q(52)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that children should follow the condition of their father. Because dominion belongs to those of higher rank. Now in generating the father ranks above the mother. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the being of a thing depends on the form more than on the matter. Now in generation the father gives the form, and the mother the matter (De Gener. Animal. ii, 4). Therefore the child should follow the condition of the father rather than of the mother.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, a thing should follow that chiefly to which it is most like. Now the son is more like the father than the mother, even as the daughter is more like the mother. Therefore at least the son should follow the father in preference, and the daughter the mother.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, in Holy Writ genealogies are not traced through the women but through the men. Therefore the children follow the father rather than the mother.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(4) —

On the contrary, If a man sows on another’s land, the produce belongs to the owner of the land. Now the woman’s womb in relation to the seed of man is like the land in relation to the sower.

Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(4) —

Further, we observe that in animals born from different species the offspring follows the mother rather that the father, wherefore mules born of a mare and an ass are more like mares than those born of a she-ass and a horse. Therefore it should be the same with men.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(4) —

I answer that, According to civil law (XIX, ff. De statu hom. vii, cap. De rei vendit.) the offspring follows the womb: and this is reasonable since the offspring derives its formal complement from the father, but the substance of the body from the mother. Now slavery is a condition of the body, since a slave is to the master a kind of instrument in working; wherefore children follow the mother in freedom and bondage; whereas in matters pertaining to dignity as proceeding from a thing’s form, they follow the father, for instance in honors, franchise, inheritance and so forth. The canons are in agreement with this (cap. Liberi, 32, qu. iv, in gloss.: cap. Inducens, De natis ex libero ventre) as also the law of Moses ( Exodus 21).

In some countries, however, where the civil law does not hold, the offspring follows the inferior condition, so that if the father be a slave the children will be slaves although the mother be free; but not if the father gave himself up as a slave after his marriage and without his wife’s consent; and the same applies if the case be reversed. And if both be of servile condition and belong to different masters, the children, if several, are divided among the latter, or if one only, the one master will compensate the other in value and will take the child thus born for his slave. However it is incredible that this custom have as much reason in its favor as the decision of the time-honored deliberations of many wise men.

Moreover in natural things it is the rule that what is received is in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient and not according to the mode of the giver; wherefore it is reasonable that the seed received by the mother should be drawn to her condition.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Although the father is a more noble principle than the mother, nevertheless the mother provides the substance of the body, and it is to this that the condition of slavery attaches.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(4)- RO(2) —

As regards things pertaining to the specific nature the son is like the father rather than the mother, but in material conditions should be like the mother rather than the father, since a thing has its specific being from its form, but material conditions from matter.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The son is like the father in respect of the form which is his, and also the father’s, complement. Hence the argument is not to the point.

P(4)- Q(52)- A(4)- RO(4) —

It is because the son derives honor from his father rather than from his mother that in the genealogies of Scripture, and according to common custom, children are named after their father rather than from their mother. But in matters relating to slavery they follow the mother by preference.

QUESTION OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF VOWS AND ORDERS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment of vows and orders. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether a simple vow is a diriment impediment to matrimony? (2) Whether a solemn vow is a diriment impediment? (3) Whether order is an impediment to matrimony? (4) Whether a man can receive a sacred order after being married?

P(4)- Q(53)- A(1) Whether marriage already contracted should be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow?

P(4)- Q(53)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that a marriage already contracted ought to be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow. For the stronger tie takes precedence of the weaker. Now a vow is a stronger tie than marriage, since the latter binds man to man, but the former binds man to God.

Therefore the obligation of a vow takes precedence of the marriage tie.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, God’s commandment is no less binding than the commandment of the Church. Now the commandment of the Church is so binding that a marriage is void if contracted in despite thereof; as instanced in the case of those who marry within the degrees of kindred forbidden by the Church. Therefore, since it is a Divine commandment to keep a vow, it would seem that if a person marry in despite of a vow his marriage should be annulled for that reason.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, in marriage a man may have carnal intercourse without sin. Yet he who has taken a simple vow of chastity can never have carnal intercourse with his wife without sin. Therefore a simple vow annuls marriage. The minor is proved as follows. It is clear that it is a mortal sin to marry after taking a simple vow of continence, since according to Jerome [*Cf. St. Augustine, De Bono Viduit, ix] “for those who vow virginity it is damnable not only to marry, but even to wish to marry.” Now the marriage contract is not contrary to the vow of continence, except by reason of carnal intercourse: and therefore he sins mortally the first time he has intercourse with his wife, and for the same reason every other time, because a sin committed in the first instance cannot be an excuse for a subsequent sin.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, husband and wife should be equal in marriage, especially as regards carnal intercourse. But he who has taken a simple vow of continence can never ask for the debt without a sin, for this is clearly against his vow of continence, since he is bound to continence by vow. Therefore neither can he pay the debt without sin.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Pope Clement [*Alexander III] says (cap. Consuluit, De his qui cler. vel vovent.) that a “simple vow is an impediment to the contract of marriage, but does not annul it after it is contracted.”

P(4)- Q(53)- A(1) —

I answer that, A thing ceases to be in one man’s power from the fact that it passes into the power of another. Now the promise of a thing does not transfer it into the power of the person to whom it is promised, wherefore a thing does not cease to be in a person’s power for the reason that he has promised it. Since then a simple vow contains merely a simple promise of one’s body to the effect of keeping continence for God’s sake, a man still retains power over his own body after a simple vow, and consequently can surrender it to another, namely his wife; and in this surrender consists the sacrament of matrimony, which is indissoluble. Therefore although a simple vow is an impediment to the contracting of a marriage, since it is a sin to marry after taking a simple vow of continence, yet since the contract is valid, the marriage cannot be annulled on that account.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(1)- RO(1) —

A vow is a stronger tie than matrimony, as regards that to which man is tied, and the obligation under which he lies. because by marriage a man is tied to his wife, with the obligation of paying the debt, whereas by a vow a man is tied to God, with the obligation of remaining continent. But as to the manner in which he is tied marriage is a stronger tie than a simple vow, since by marriage a man surrenders himself actually to the power of his wife, but not by a simple vow as explained above: and the possessor is always in the stronger position. In this respect a simple vow binds in the same way as a betrothal; wherefore a betrothal must be annulled on account of a simple vow.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The contracting of a marriage between blood relations is annulled by the commandment forbidding such marriages, not precisely because it is a commandment of God or of the Church, but because it makes it impossible for the body of a kinswoman to be transferred into the power of her kinsman: whereas the commandment forbidding marriage after a simple vow has not this effect, as already stated. Hence the argument is void for it assigns as a cause that which is not cause.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(1)- RO(3) —

If after taking a simple vow a man contract marriage by words of the present, he cannot know his wife without mortal sin, because until the marriage is consummated he is still in a position to fulfill the vow of continence. But after the marriage has been consummated, thenceforth through his fault it is unlawful for him not to pay the debt when his wife asks: wherefore this is not covered by his obligation to his vow, as explained above (ad 1). Nevertheless he should atone for not keeping continence, by his tears of repentance.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(1)- RO(4) —

After contracting marriage he is still bound to keep his vow of continence in those matters wherein he is not rendered unable to do so. Hence if his wife die he is bound to continence altogether.

And since the marriage tie does not bind him to ask for the debt, he cannot ask for it without sin, although he can pay the debt without sin on being asked, when once he has incurred this obligation through the carnal intercourse that has already occurred. And this holds whether the wife ask expressly or interpretively, as when she is ashamed and her husband feels that she desires him to pay the debt, for then he may pay it without sin.

This is especially the case if he fears to endanger her chastity: nor does it matter that they are equal in the marriage act, since everyone may renounce what is his own. Some say, however, that he may both ask and pay lest the marriage become too burdensome to the wife who has always to ask; but if this be looked into aright, it is the same as asking interpretively.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(2) Whether a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted?

P(4)- Q(53)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that not even a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted. For according to a Decretal (cap.

Rursus, De his qui cler. vel vovent.) “in God’s sight a simple vow is no less binding than a solemn one.” Now marriage stands or falls by virtue of the Divine acceptance. Therefore since a simple vow does not dissolve marriage, neither will a solemn vow dissolve it.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, a solemn vow does not add the same force to a simple vow as an oath does. Now a simple vow, even though an oath be added thereto, does not dissolve a marriage already contracted.

Neither therefore does a solemn vow.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a solemn vow has nothing that a simple vow cannot have. For a simple vow may give rise to scandal since it may be public, even as a solemn vow. Again the Church could and should ordain that a simple vow dissolves a marriage already contracted, so that many sins may be avoided. Therefore for the same reason that a simple vow does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, neither should a solemn vow dissolve it.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(2) —

On the contrary, He who takes a solemn vow contracts a spiritual marriage with God, which is much more excellent than a material marriage. Now a material marriage already contracted annuls a marriage contracted afterwards. Therefore a solemn vow does also.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(2) —

Further, the same conclusion may be proved by many authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28).

P(4)- Q(53)- A(2) —

I answer that, All agree that as a solemn vow is an impediment to the contracting of marriage, so it invalidates the contract.

Some assign scandal as the reason. But this is futile, because even a simple vow sometimes leads to scandal since it is at times somewhat public.

Moreover the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the truth of life [*Cf.

P(1), Q(16), A(4), ad 3; P(1), Q(21), A(2), ad 2; P(2b), Q(109), A(3), ad 3], which truth is not to be set aside on account of scandal. Wherefore others say that it is on account of the ordinance of the Church. But this again is insufficient, since in that case the Church might decide the contrary, which is seemingly untrue. Wherefore we must say with others that a solemn vow of its very nature dissolves the marriage contract, inasmuch namely as thereby a man has lost the power over his own body, through surrendering it to God for the purpose of perpetual continence.

Wherefore he is unable to surrender it to the power of a wife by contracting marriage. And since the marriage that follows such a vow is void, a vow of this kind is said to annul the marriage contracted.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(2)- RO(1) —

A simple vow is said to be no less binding in God’s sight than a solemn vow, in matters pertaining to God, for instance the separation from God by mortal sin, because he who breaks a simple vow commits a mortal sin just as one who breaks a solemn vow, although it is more grievous to break a solemn vow, so that the comparison be understood as to the genus and not as to the definite degree of guilt. But as regards marriage, whereby one man is under an obligation to another, there is no need for it to be of equal obligation even in general, since a solemn vow binds to certain things to which a simple vow does not bind.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(2)- RO(2) —

An oath is more binding than a vow on the part of the cause of the obligation: but a solemn vow is more binding as to the manner in which it binds, in so far as it is an actual surrender of that which is promised; while an oath does not do this actually. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(2)- RO(3) —

A solemn vow implies the actual surrender of one’s body, whereas a simple vow does not, as stated above ( A(1) ). Hence the argument does not suffice to prove the conclusion.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3) Whether order is an impediment to matrimony?

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that order is not an impediment to matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to a thing except its contrary.

But order is not contrary to matrimony. Therefore it is not an impediment thereto.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, orders are the same with us as with the Eastern Church. But they are not an impediment to matrimony in the Eastern Church. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Now this is most fittingly signified in those who are Christ’s ministers, those namely who are ordained. Therefore order is not an impediment to matrimony.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, all the orders are directed to spiritual things. Now order cannot be an impediment to matrimony except by reason of its spirituality. Therefore if order is an impediment to matrimony, every order will be an impediment, and this is untrue.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, every ordained person can have ecclesiastical benefices, and can enjoy equally the privilege of clergy. If, therefore, orders are an impediment to marriage, because married persons cannot have an ecclesiastical benefice, nor enjoy the privilege of clergy, as jurists assert (cap. Joannes et seqq., De cler. conjug.), then every order ought to be an impediment. Yet this is false, as shown by the Decretal of Alexander III (De cler. conjug., cap. Si Quis): and consequently it would seem that no order is an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3) —

On the contrary, the Decretal says (De cler. conjug., cap. Si Quis): “any person whom you shall find to have taken a wife after receiving the subdiaconate or the higher orders, you shall compel to put his wife away.” But this would not be so if the marriage were valid.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3) —

Further, no person who has vowed continence can contract marriage. Now some orders have a vow of continence connected with them, as appears from the text (Sent. iv, D, 37). Therefore in that case order is an impediment to matrimony.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3) —

I answer that, By a certain fittingness the very nature of holy order requires that it should be an impediment to marriage: because those who are in holy orders handle the sacred vessels and the sacraments: wherefore it is becoming that they keep their bodies clean by continence [*Cf. Isaiah 52:11]. But it is owing to the Church’s ordinance that it is actually an impediment to marriage. However it is not the same with the Latins as with the Greeks; since with the Greeks it is an impediment to the contracting of marriage, solely by virtue of order; whereas with the Latins it is an impediment by virtue of order, and besides by virtue of the vow of continence which is annexed to the sacred orders; for although this vow is not expressed in words, nevertheless a person is understood to have taken it by the very fact of his being ordained. Hence among the Greeks and other Eastern peoples a sacred order is an impediment to the contracting of matrimony but it does not forbid the use of marriage already contracted: for they can use marriage contracted previously, although they cannot be married again. But in the Western Church it is an impediment both to marriage and to the use of marriage, unless perhaps the husband should receive a sacred order without the knowledge or consent of his wife, because this cannot be prejudicial to her.

Of the distinction between sacred and non-sacred orders now and in the early Church we have spoken above ( Q(37), A(3) ).

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Although a sacred order is not contrary to matrimony as a sacrament, it has a certain incompatibility with marriage in respect of the latter’s act which is an obstacle to spiritual acts.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The objection is based on a false statement: since order is everywhere an impediment to the contracting of marriage, although it has not everywhere a vow annexed to it.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Those who are in sacred orders signify Christ by more sublime actions, as appears from what has been said in the treatise on orders ( Q(37), AA(2),4 ), than those who are married.

Consequently the conclusion does not follow.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Those who are in minor orders are not forbidden to marry by virtue of their order; for although those orders are entrusted with certain spiritualities, they are not admitted to the immediate handling of sacred things, as those are who are in sacred orders.

But according to the laws of the Western Church, the use of marriage is an impediment to the exercise of a non-sacred order, for the sake of maintaining a greater honesty in the offices of the Church. And since the holding of an ecclesiastical benefice binds a man to the exercise of his order, and since for this very reason he enjoys the privilege of clergy, it follows that in the Latin Church this privilege is forfeit to a married cleric.

This suffices for the Reply to the last Objection.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4) Whether a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony?

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony. For the stronger prejudices the weaker. Now a spiritual obligation is stronger than a bodily tie. Therefore if a married man be ordained, this will prejudice the wife, so that she will be unable to demand the debt, since order is a spiritual, and marriage a bodily bond.

Hence it would seem that a man cannot receive a sacred order after consummating marriage.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, after consummating the marriage, one of the parties cannot vow continence without the other’s consent [*Cf.

Q(61), A(1) ]. Now a sacred order has a vow of continence annexed to it.

Therefore if the husband be ordained without his wife’s consent, she will be bound to remain continent against her will, since she cannot marry another man during her husband’s lifetime.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, a husband may not even for a time devote himself to prayer without his wife’s consent ( 1 Corinthians 7:5).

But in the Eastern Church those who are in sacred orders are bound to continence for the time when they exercise their office. Therefore neither may they be ordained without their wife’s consent, and much less may the Latins.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, husband and wife are on a par with one another. Now a Greek priest cannot marry again after his wife’s death.

Therefore neither can his wife after her husband’s death. But she cannot be deprived by her husband’s act of the right to marry after his death.

Therefore her husband cannot receive orders after marriage.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4)- O(5) —

Further, order is as much opposed to marriage as marriage to order. Now a previous order is an impediment to a subsequent marriage. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Religious are bound to continence like those who are in sacred orders. But a man may enter religion after marriage, if his wife die, or if she consent. Therefore he can also receive orders.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4) —

Further, a man may become a man’s bondsman after marriage. Therefore he can become a bondsman of God by receiving orders.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4) —

I answer that, Marriage is not an impediment to the receiving of sacred orders, since if a married man receive sacred orders, even though his wife be unwilling, he receives the character of order: but he lacks the exercise of his order. If, however, his wife consent, or if she be dead, he receives both the order and the exercise.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The bond of orders dissolves the bond of marriage as regards the payment of the debt, in respect of which it is incompatible with marriage, on the part of the person ordained, since he cannot demand the debt, nor is the wife bound to pay it. But it does not dissolve the bond in respect of the other party, since the husband is bound to pay the debt to the wife if he cannot persuade her to observe continence.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4)- RO(2) —

If the husband receive sacred orders with the knowledge and consent of his wife, she is bound to vow perpetual continence, but she is not bound to enter religion, if she has no fear of her chastity being endangered through her husband having taken a solemn vow: it would have been different, however, if he had taken a simple vow. On the other hand, if he be ordained without her consent, she is not bound in this way, because the result is not prejudicial to her in any way.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4)- RO(3) —

It would seem more probable, although some say the contrary, that even a Greek ought not to receive sacred orders without his wife’s consent, since at least at the time of his ministry she would be deprived of the payment of the debt, of which she cannot be deprived according to law if the husband should have been ordained without her consent or knowledge.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4)- RO(4) —

As stated, among the Greeks the wife, by the very fact of consenting to her husband’s receiving a sacred order, binds herself never to marry another man, because the signification of marriage would not be safeguarded, and this is especially required in the marriage of a priest. If, however, he be ordained without her consent, seemingly she would not be under that obligation.

P(4)- Q(53)- A(4)- RO(5) —

Marriage has for its cause our consent: not so order, which has a sacramental cause appointed by God. Hence matrimony may be impeded by a previous order; so as not to be true marriage: whereas order cannot be impeded by marriage, so as not to be true order, because the power of the sacraments is unchangeable, whereas human acts can be impeded.

QUESTION OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF CONSANGUINITY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the impediment of consanguinity. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether consanguinity is rightly defined by some? (2) Whether it is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines? (3) Whether certain degrees are by natural law an impediment to marriage? (4) Whether the impediment degrees can be fixed by the ordinance of the Church?

P(4)- Q(54)- A(1) Whether consanguinity is rightly defined?

P(4)- Q(54)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that consanguinity is unsuitably defined by some as follows: “Consanguinity is the tie contracted between persons descending from the same common ancestor by carnal procreation.” For all men descend from the same common ancestor, namely Adam, by carnal procreation. Therefore if the above definition of consanguinity is right, all men would be related by consanguinity: which is false.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, a tie is only between things in accord with one another, since a tie unites. Now there is not greater accordance between persons descended from a common ancestor than there is between other men, since they accord in species but differ in number, just as other men do. Therefore consanguinity is not a tie.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, carnal procreation, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. ii, 19), is effected from the surplus food [*Cf. P(1), Q(119), A(2) ]. Now this surplus has more in common with that which is eaten, since it agrees with it in substance, than with him who eats. Since then no tie of consanguinity arises between the person born of semen and that which he eats, neither will there be any tie of kindred between him and the person of whom he is born by carnal procreation.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, Laban said to Jacob ( Genesis 29:14): “Thou art my bone and my flesh,” on account of the relationship between them. Therefore such a kinship should be called flesh-relationship rather than blood-relationship [consanguinitas].

P(4)- Q(54)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, carnal procreation is common to men and animals. But no tie of consanguinity is contracted among animals from carnal procreation. Therefore neither is there among men.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(1) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11, 12) “all friendship is based on some kind of fellowship.” And since friendship is a knot or union, it follows that the fellowship which is the cause of friendship is called “a tie.” Wherefore in respect of any kind of a fellowship certain persons are denominated as though they were tied together: thus we speak of fellow-citizens who are connected by a common political life, of fellow-soldiers who are connected by the common business of soldiering, and in the same way those who are connected by the fellowship of nature are said to be tied by blood [consanguinei]. Hence in the above definition “tie” is included as being the genus of consanguinity; the “persons descending from the same common ancestor,” who are thus tied together are the subject of this tie. while “carnal procreation” is mentioned as being its origin.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(1)- RO(1) —

An active force is not received into an instrument in the same degree of perfection as it has in the principal agent.

And since every moved mover is an instrument, it follows that the power of the first mover in a particular genus when drawn out through many mediate movers fails at length, and reaches something that is moved and not a mover. But the power of a begetter moves not only as to that which belongs to the species, but also as to that which belongs to the individual, by reason of which the child is like the parent even in accidentals and not only in the specific nature. And yet this individual power of the father is not so perfect in the son as it was in the father, and still less so in the grandson, and thus it goes on failing: so that at length it ceases and can go no further. Since then consanguinity results from this power being communicated to many through being conveyed to them from one person by procreation, it destroys itself by little and little, as Isidore says (Etym. ix). Consequently in defining consanguinity we must not take a remote common ancestor but the nearest, whose power still remains in those who are descended from him.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(1)- RO(2) —

It is clear from what has been said that blood relations agree not only in the specific nature but also in that power peculiar to the individual which is conveyed from one to many: the result being that sometimes the child is not only like his father, but also his grandfather or his remote ancestors (De Gener. Anim. iv, 3).

P(4)- Q(54)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Likeness depends more on form whereby a thing is actually, than on matter whereby a thing is potentially: for instance, charcoal has more in common with fire than with the tree from which the wood was cut. In like manner food already transformed by the nutritive power into the substance of the person fed has more in common with the subject nourished than with that from which the nourishment was taken. The argument however would hold according to the opinion of those who asserted that the whole nature of a thing is from its matter and that all forms are accidents: which is false.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(1)- RO(4) —

It is the blood that is proximately changed into the semen, as proved in De Gener. Anim. i, 18. Hence the tie contracted by carnal procreation is more fittingly called blood-relationship than fleshrelationship.

That sometimes one relation is called the flesh of another, is because the blood which is transformed into the man’s seed or into the menstrual fluid is potentially flesh and bone.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Some say that the reason why the tie of consanguinity is contracted among men through carnal procreation, and not among other animals, is because whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in all men was in our first parent: which does not apply to other animals. But according to this, matrimonial consanguinity would never come to an end. However the above theory was disproved in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30: P(1), Q(119), A(1) ). Wherefore we must reply that the reason for this is that animals are not united together in the union of friendship through the begetting of many from one proximate parent, as is the case with men, as stated above.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2) Whether consanguinity is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines?

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that consanguinity is unfittingly distinguished by degrees and lines. For a line of consanguinity is described as “the ordered series of persons related by blood, and descending from a common ancestor in various degrees.” Now consanguinity is nothing else but a series of such persons. Therefore a line of consanguinity is the same as consanguinity. Now a thing ought not to be distinguished by itself.

Therefore consanguinity is not fittingly distinguished into lines.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, that by which a common thing is divided should not be placed in the definition of that common thing. Now descent is placed in the above definition of consanguinity. Therefore consanguinity cannot be divided into ascending, descending and collateral lines.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a line is defined as being between two points. But two points make but one degree. Therefore one line has but one degree, and for this reason it would seem that consanguinity should not be divided into lines and degrees.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, a degree is defined as “the relation between distant persons, whereby is known the distance between them.”

Now since consanguinity is a kind of propinquity, distance between persons is opposed to consanguinity rather than a part thereof.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, if consanguinity is distinguished and known by its degrees, those who are in the same degree ought to be equally related. But this is false since a man’s great-uncle and greatnephew are in the same degree, and yet they are not equally related according to a Decretal (cap. Porro; cap. Parenteloe, 35, qu. v). Therefore consanguinity is not rightly divided into degrees.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- O(6) —

Further, in ordinary things a different degree results from the addition of one thing to another, even as every additional unity makes a different species of number. Yet the addition of one person to another does not always make a different degree of consanguinity, since father and uncle are in the same degree of consanguinity, for they are side by side. Therefore consanguinity is not rightly divided into degrees.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- O(7) —

Further, if two persons be akin to one another there is always the same measure of kinship between them, since the distance from one extreme to the other is the same either way. Yet the degrees of consanguinity are not always the same on either side, since sometimes one relative is in the third and the other in the fourth degree.

Therefore the measure of consanguinity cannot be sufficiently known by its degrees.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2) —

I answer that, Consanguinity as stated ( A(1) ) is a certain propinquity based on the natural communication by the act of procreation whereby nature is propagated. Wherefore according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) this communication is threefold. one corresponds to the relationship between cause and effect, and this is the consanguinity of father to son, wherefore he says that “parents love their children as being a part of themselves.” Another corresponds to the relation of effect to cause, and this is the consanguinity of son to father, wherefore he says that “children love their parents as being themselves something which owes its existence to them.” The third corresponds to the mutual relation between things that come from the same cause, as brothers, “who are born of the same parents,” as he again says (Ethic. viii, 12). And since the movement of a point makes a line, and since a father by procreation may be said to descend to his son, hence it is that corresponding to these three relationships there are three lines of consanguinity, namely the “descending” line corresponding to the first relationship, the “ascending” line corresponding to the second, and the “collateral” line corresponding to the third. Since however the movement of propagation does not rest in one term but continues beyond, the result is that one can point to the father’s father and to the son’s son, and so on, and according to the various steps we take we find various degrees in one line. And seeing that the degrees of a thing are parts of that thing, there cannot be degrees of propinquity where there is no propinquity.

Consequently identity and too great a distance do away with degrees of consanguinity; since no man is kin to himself any more than he is like himself: for which reason there is no degree of consanguinity where there is but one person, but only when one person is compared to another.

Nevertheless there are different ways of counting the degrees in various lines. For the degree of consanguinity in the ascending and descending line is contracted from the fact that one of the parties whose consanguinity is in question, is descended from the other. Wherefore according to the canonical as well as the legal reckoning, the person who occupies the first place, whether in the ascending or in the descending line, is distant from a certain one, say Peter, in the first degree — for instance father and son; while the one who occupies the second place in either direction is distant in the second degree, for instance grandfather, grandson and so on. But the consanguinity that exists between persons who are in collateral lines is contracted not through one being descended from the other, but through both being descended from one: wherefore the degrees of consanguinity in this line must be reckoned in relation to the one principle whence it arises.

Here, however, the canonical and legal reckonings differ: for the legal reckoning takes into account the descent from the common stock on both sides, whereas the canonical reckoning takes into account only one, that namely on which the greater number of degrees are found. Hence according to the legal reckoning brother and sister, or two brothers, are related in the second degree, because each is separated from the common stock by one degree; and in like manner the children of two brothers are distant from one another in the fourth degree. But according to the canonical reckoning, two brothers are related in the first degree, since neither is distant more than one degree from the common stock: but the children of one brother are distant in the second degree from the other brother, because they are at that distance from the common stock. Hence, according to the canonical reckoning, by whatever degree a person is distant from some higher degree, by so much and never by less is he distant from each person descending from that degree, because “the cause of a thing being so is yet more so.”

Wherefore although the other descendants from the common stock be related to some person on account of his being descended from the common stock, these descendants of the other branch cannot be more nearly related to him than he is to the common stock. Sometimes, however, a person is more distantly related to a descendant from the common stock, than he himself is to the common stock, because this other person may be more distantly related to the common stock than he is: and consanguinity must be reckoned according to the more distant degree.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This objection is based on a false premise: for consanguinity is not the series but a mutual relationship existing between certain persons, the series of whom forms a line of consanguinity.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Descent taken in a general sense attaches to every line of consanguinity, because carnal procreation whence the tie of consanguinity arises is a kind of descent: but it is a particular kind of descent, namely from the person whose consanguinity is in question, that makes the descending line.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- RO(3) —

A line may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken properly for the dimension itself that is the first species of continuous quantity: and thus a straight line contains actually but two points which terminate it, but infinite points potentially, any one of which being actually designated, the line is divided, and becomes two lines. But sometimes a line designates things which are arranged in a line, and thus we have line and figure in numbers, in so far as unity added to unity involves number. Thus every unity added makes a degree in a particular line: and it is the same with the line of consanguinity: wherefore one line contains several degrees.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Even as there cannot be likeness without a difference, so there is no propinquity without distance. Hence not every distance is opposed to consanguinity, but such as excludes the propinquity of blood-relationship.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- RO(5) —

Even as whiteness is said to be greater in two ways, in one way through intensity of the quality itself, in another way through the quantity of the surface, so consanguinity is said to be greater or lesser in two ways. First, intensively by reason of the very nature of consanguinity: secondly, extensively as it were, and thus the degree of consanguinity is measured by the persons between whom there is the propagation of a common blood, and in this way the degrees of consanguinity are distinguished. Wherefore it happens that of two persons related to one person in the same degree of consanguinity, one is more akin to him than the other, if we consider the quantity of consanguinity in the first way: thus a man’s father and brother are related to him in the first degree of consanguinity, because in neither case does any person come in between; and yet from the point of view of intensity a man’s father is more closely related to him than his brother, since his brother is related to him only because he is of the same father. Hence the nearer a person is to the common ancestor from whom the consanguinity descends, the greater is his consanguinity although he be not in a nearer degree. In this way a man’s great-uncle is more closely related to him than his great-nephew, although they are in the same degree.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- RO(6) —

Although a man’s father and uncle are in the same degree in respect of the root of consanguinity, since both are separated by one degree from the grandfather, nevertheless in respect of the person whose consanguinity is in question, they are not in the same degree, since the father is in the first degree, whereas the uncle cannot be nearer than the second degree, wherein the grandfather stands.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(2)- RO(7) —

Two persons are always related in the same degree to one another, although they are not always distant in the same number of degrees from the common ancestor, as explained above.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3) Whether consanguinity is an impediment to marriage by virtue of the natural law?

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that consanguinity is not by natural law an impediment to marriage. For no woman can be more akin to a man than Eve was to Adam, since of her did he say ( Genesis 2:23): “This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh.” Yet Eve was joined in marriage to Adam. Therefore as regards the natural law no consanguinity is an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the natural law is the same for all. Now among the uncivilized nations no person is debarred from marriage by reason of consanguinity. Therefore, as regards the law of nature, consanguinity is no impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the natural law is what “nature has taught all animals,” as stated at the beginning of the Digests (i, ff. De just. et jure). Now brute animals copulate even with their mother. Therefore it is not of natural law that certain persons are debarred from marriage on account of consanguinity.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, nothing that is not contrary to one of the goods of matrimony is an impediment to marriage. But consanguinity is not contrary to any of the goods of marriage. Therefore it is not an impediment thereto.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, things which are more akin and more similar to one another are better and more firmly united together. Now matrimony is a kind of union. Since then consanguinity is a kind of kinship, it does not hinder marriage but rather strengthens the union.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3) —

On the contrary, According to the natural law whatever is an obstacle to the good of the offspring is an impediment to marriage. Now consanguinity hinders the good of the offspring, because in the words of Gregory (Regist., epis. xxxi) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 40): “We have learnt by experience that the children of such a union cannot thrive.” Therefore according to the law of nature consanguinity is an impediment to matrimony.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3) —

Further, that which belongs to human nature when it was first created is of natural law. Now it belonged to human nature from when it was first created that one should be debarred from marrying one’s father or mother: in proof of which it was said ( Genesis 2:24): “Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother”: which cannot be understood of cohabitation, and consequently must refer to the union of marriage. Therefore consanguinity is an impediment to marriage according to the natural law.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3) —

I answer that, In relation to marriage a thing is said to be contrary to the natural law if it prevents marriage from reaching the end for which it was instituted. Now the essential and primary end of marriage is the good of the offspring. and this is hindered by a certain consanguinity, namely that which is between father and daughter, or son and mother. It is not that the good of the offspring is utterly destroyed, since a daughter can have a child of her father’s semen and with the father rear and teach that child in which things the good of the offspring consists, but that it is not effected in a becoming way. For it is out of order that a daughter be mated to her father in marriage for the purpose of begetting and rearing children, since in all things she ought to be subject to her father as proceeding from him. Hence by natural law a father and mother are debarred from marrying their children; and the mother still more than the father, since it is more derogatory to the reverence due to parents if the son marry his mother than if the father marry his daughter; since the wife should be to a certain extent subject to her husband. The secondary essential end of marriage is the curbing of concupiscence; and this end would be forfeit if a man could marry any blood-relation, since a wide scope would be afforded to concupiscence if those who have to live together in the same house were not forbidden to be mated in the flesh.

Wherefore the Divine law debars from marriage not only father and mother, but also other kinsfolk who have to live in close intimacy with one another and ought to safeguard one another’s modesty. The Divine law assigns this reason ( Leviticus 18:10): “Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness” of such and such a one, “because it is thy own nakedness.”

But the accidental end of marriage is the binding together of mankind and the extension of friendship: for a husband regards his wife’s kindred as his own. Hence it would be prejudicial to this extension of friendship if a man could take a woman of his kindred to wife since no new friendship would accrue to anyone from such a marriage. Wherefore, according to human law and the ordinances of the Church, several degrees of consanguinity are debarred from marriage.

Accordingly it is clear from what has been said that consanguinity is by natural law an impediment to marriage in regard to certain persons, by Divine law in respect of some, and by human law in respect of others.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Although Eve was formed from Adam she was not Adam’s daughter, because she was not formed from him after the manner in which it is natural for a man to beget his like in species, but by the Divine operation, since from Adam’s rib a horse might have been formed in the same way as Eve was. Hence the natural connection between Eve and Adam was not so great as between daughter and father, nor was Adam the natural principle of Eve as a father is of his daughter.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3)- RO(2) —

That certain barbarians are united carnally to their parents does not come from the natural law but from the passion of concupiscence which has clouded the natural law in them.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Union of male and female is said to be of natural law, because nature has taught this to animals: yet she has taught this union to various animals in various ways according to their various conditions. But carnal copulation with parents is derogatory to the reverence due to them. For just as nature has instilled into parents solicitude in providing for their offspring, so has it instilled into the offspring reverence towards their parents: yet to no kind of animal save man has she instilled a lasting solicitude for his children or reverence for parents; but to other animals more or less, according as the offspring is more or less necessary to its parents, or the parents to their offspring.

Hence as the Philosopher attests (De Animal. ix, 47) concerning the camel and the horse, among certain animals the son abhors copulation with its mother as long as he retains knowledge of her and a certain reverence for her. And since all honest customs of animals are united together in man naturally, and more perfectly than in other animals, it follows that man naturally abhors carnal knowledge not only of his mother, but also of his daughter, which is, however, less against nature, as stated above.

Moreover consanguinity does not result from carnal procreation in other animals as in man, as stated above ( A(1), ad 5). Hence the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3)- RO(4) —

It has been shown how consanguinity between married persons is contrary to the goods of marriage. Hence the Objection proceeds from false premises.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(3)- RO(5) —

It is not unreasonable for one of two unions to be hindered by the other, even as where there is identity there is not likeness. In like manner the tie of consanguinity may hinder the union of marriage.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4) Whether the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could be fixed by the Church?

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could not be fixed by the Church so as to reach to the fourth degree. For it is written ( Matthew 19:6): “What God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” But God joined those together who are married within the fourth degree of consanguinity, since their union is not forbidden by the Divine law. Therefore they should not be put asunder by a human law.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, matrimony is a sacrament as also is baptism. Now no ordinance of the Church could prevent one who is baptized from receiving the baptismal character, if he be capable of receiving it according to the Divine law. Therefore neither can an ordinance of the Church forbid marriage between those who are not forbidden to marry by the Divine law.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, positive law can neither void nor extend those things which are natural. Now consanguinity is a natural tie which is in itself of a nature to impede marriage. Therefore the Church cannot by its ordinance permit or forbid certain people to marry, any more than she can make them to be kin or not kin.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, an ordinance of positive law should have some reasonable cause, since it is for this reasonable cause that it proceeds from the natural law. But the causes that are assigned for the number of degrees seem altogether unreasonable, since they bear no relation to their effect; for instance, that consanguinity be an impediment as far as the fourth degree on account of the four elements as far as the sixth degree on account of the six ages of the world, as far as the seventh degree on account of the seven days of which all time is comprised.

Therefore seemingly this prohibition is of no force.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- O(5) —

Further, where the cause is the same there should be the same effect. Now the causes for which consanguinity is an impediment to marriage are the good of the offspring, the curbing of concupiscence, and the extension of friendship, as stated above ( A(3) ), which are equally necessary for all time. Therefore the degrees of consanguinity should have equally impeded marriage at all times: yet this is not true since consanguinity is now an impediment to marriage as far as the fourth degree, whereas formerly it was an impediment as far as the seventh.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- O(6) —

Further, one and the same union cannot be a kind of sacrament and a kind of incest. But this would be the case if the Church had the power of fixing a different number in the degrees which are an impediment to marriage. Thus if certain parties related in the fifth degree were married when that degree was an impediment, their union would be incestuous, and yet this same union would be a marriage afterwards when the Church withdrew her prohibition. And the reverse might happen if certain degrees which were not an impediment were subsequently to be forbidden by the Church. Therefore seemingly the power of the Church does not extend to this.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- O(7) —

Further, human law should copy the Divine law. Now according to the Divine law which is contained in the Old Law, the prohibition of degrees does not apply equally in the ascending and descending lines: since in the Old Law a man was forbidden to marry his father’s sister but not his brother’s daughter. Therefore neither should there remain now a prohibition in respect of nephews and uncles.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples ( Luke 10:16): “He that heareth you heareth Me.” Therefore a commandment of the Church has the same force as a commandment of God. Now the Church sometimes has forbidden and sometimes allowed certain degrees which the Old Law did not forbid. Therefore those degrees are an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4) —

Further, even as of old the marriages of pagans were controlled by the civil law, so now is marriage controlled by the laws of the Church. Now formerly the civil law decided which degrees of consanguinity impede marriage, and which do not. Therefore this can be done now by a commandment of the Church.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4) —

I answer that, The degrees within which consanguinity has been an impediment to marriage have varied according to various times. For at the beginning of the human race father and mother alone were debarred from marrying their children, because then mankind were few in number, and then it was necessary for the propagation of the human race to be ensured with very great care, and consequently only such persons were to be debarred as were unfitted for marriage even in respect of its principal end which is the good of the offspring, as stated above ( A(3) ). Afterwards however, the human race having multiplied, more persons were excluded by the law of Moses, for they already began to curb concupiscence. Wherefore as Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) all those persons were debarred from marrying one another who are wont to live together in one household, because if a lawful carnal intercourse were possible between them, this would prove a very great incentive to lust. Yet the Old Law permitted other degrees of consanguinity, in fact to a certain extent it commanded them; to wit that each man should take a wife from his kindred, in order to avoid confusion of inheritances: because at that time the Divine worship was handed down as the inheritance of the race. But afterwards more degrees were forbidden by the New Law which is the law of the spirit and of love, because the worship of God is no longer handed down and spread abroad by a carnal birth but by a spiritual grace: wherefore it was necessary that men should be yet more withdrawn from carnal things by devoting themselves to things spiritual, and that love should have a yet wider play. Hence in olden times marriage was forbidden even within the more remote degrees of consanguinity, in order that consanguinity and affinity might be the sources of a wider natural friendship; and this was reasonably extended to the seventh degree, both because beyond this it was difficult to have any recollection of the common stock, and because this was in keeping with the sevenfold grace of the Holy Ghost. Afterwards, however, towards these latter times the prohibition of the Church has been restricted to the fourth degree, because it became useless and dangerous to extend the prohibition to more remote degrees of consanguinity. Useless, because charity waxed cold in many hearts so that they had scarcely a greater bond of friendship with their more remote kindred than with strangers: and it was dangerous because through the prevalence of concupiscence and neglect men took no account of so numerous a kindred, and thus the prohibition of the more remote degrees became for many a snare leading to damnation. Moreover there is a certain fittingness in the restriction of the above prohibition to the fourth degree. First because men are wont to live until the fourth generation, so that consanguinity cannot lapse into oblivion, wherefore God threatened ( Exodus 20:5) to visit the parent’s sins on their children to the third and fourth generation. Secondly, because in each generation the blood, the identity of which causes consanguinity, receives a further addition of new blood, and the more another blood is added the less there is of the old. And because there are four elements, each of which is the more easily mixed with another, according as it is more rarefied it follows that at the first admixture the identity of blood disappears as regards the first element which is most subtle; at the second admixture, as regards the second element; at the third, as to the third element; at the fourth, as to the fourth element. Thus after the fourth generation it is fitting for the carnal union to be repeated.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Even as God does not join together those who are joined together against the Divine command, so does He not join together those who are joined together against the commandment of the Church, which has the same binding force as a commandment of God.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Matrimony is not only a sacrament but also fulfills an office; wherefore it is more subject to the control of the Church’s ministers than baptism which is a sacrament only: because just as human contracts and offices are controlled by human laws, so are spiritual contracts and offices controlled by the law of the Church.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Although the tie of consanguinity is natural, it is not natural that consanguinity forbid carnal intercourse, except as regards certain degrees, as stated above ( A(3) ). Wherefore the Church’s commandment does not cause certain people to be kin or not kin, because they remain equally kin at all times: but it makes carnal intercourse to be lawful or unlawful at different times for different degrees of consanguinity.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- RO(4) —

The reasons assigned are given as indicating aptness and congruousness rather than causality and necessity.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- RO(5) —

The reason for the impediment of consanguinity is not the same at different times: wherefore that which it was useful to allow at one time, it was beneficial to forbid at another.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- RO(6) —

A commandment does not affect the past but the future. Wherefore if the fifth degree which is now allowed were to be forbidden at any time, those in the fifth degree who are married would not have to separate, because no impediment supervening to marriage can annul it; and consequently a union which was a marriage from the first would not be made incestuous by a commandment of the Church. In like manner, if a degree which is now forbidden were to be allowed, such a union would not become a marriage on account of the Church’s commandment by reason of the former contract, because they could separate if they wished. Nevertheless, they could contract anew, and this would be a new union.

P(4)- Q(54)- A(4)- RO(7) —

In prohibiting the degrees of consanguinity the Church considers chiefly the point of view of affection. And since the reason for affection towards one’s brother’s son is not less but even greater than the reasons for affection towards one’s father’s brother, inasmuch as the son is more akin to the father than the father to the son (Ethic. viii, 12), therefore did the Church equally prohibit the degrees of consanguinity in uncles and nephews. On the other hand the Old Law in debarring certain persons looked chiefly to the danger of concupiscence arising from cohabitation; and debarred those persons who were in closer intimacy with one another on account of their living together. Now it is more usual for a niece to live with her uncle than an aunt with her nephew: because a daughter is more identified with her father, being part of him, whereas a sister is not in this way identified with her brother, for she is not part of him but is born of the same parent. Hence there was not the same reason for debarring a niece and an aunt.

QUESTION OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF AFFINITY (ELEVEN ARTICLES)

We must consider next the impediment of affinity. Under this head there are eleven points of inquiry: (1) Whether affinity results from matrimony? (2) Whether it remains after the death of husband or wife? (3) Whether it is caused through unlawful intercourse? (4) Whether it arises from a betrothal? (5) Whether affinity is caused through affinity? (6) Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage? (7) Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees? (8) Whether its degrees extend as far as the degrees of consanguinity? (9) Whether marriages of persons related to one another by consanguinity or affinity should always be dissolved by divorce? (10) Whether the process for the dissolution of like marriages should always be by way of accusation? (11) Whether witnesses should be called in such a case?

P(4)- Q(55)- A(1) Whether a person contracts affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation?

P(4)- Q(55)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that a person does not contract affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation. For “the cause of a thing being so is yet more so.” Now the wife is not connected with her husband’s kindred except by reason of the husband. Since then she does not contract affinity with her husband, neither does she contract it with her husband’s kindred.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, if certain things be separate from one another and something be connected with one of them, it does not follow that it is connected with the other. Now a person’s blood relations are separate from one another. Therefore it does not follow, if a certain woman be married to a certain man, that she is therefore connected with all his kindred.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, relations result from certain things being united together. Now the kindred of the husband do not become united together by the fact of his taking a wife. Therefore they do not acquire any relationship of affinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Husband and wife are made one flesh. Therefore if the husband is related in the flesh to all his kindred, for the same reason his wife will be related to them all.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(1) —

Further, this is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41).

P(4)- Q(55)- A(1) —

I answer that, A certain natural friendship is founded on natural fellowship. Now natural fellowship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12), arises in two ways; first, from carnal procreation; secondly, from connection with orderly carnal procreation, wherefore he says (Ethic. viii, 12) that the friendship of a husband towards his wife is natural. Consequently even as a person through being connected with another by carnal procreation is bound to him by a tie of natural friendship, so does one person become connected with another through carnal intercourse. But there is a difference in this, that one who is connected with another through carnal procreation, as a son with his father, shares in the same common stock and blood, so that a son is connected with his father’s kindred by the same kind of tie as the father was, the tie, namely of consanguinity, albeit in a different degree on account of his being more distant from the stock: whereas one who is connected with another through carnal intercourse does not share in the same stock, but is as it were an extraneous addition thereto: whence arises another kind of tie known by the name of “affinity.” This is expressed in the verse: Marriage makes a new kind of connection, While birth makes a new degree, because, to wit, the person begotten is in the same kind of relationship, but in a different degree, whereas through carnal intercourse he enters into a new kind of relationship.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although a cause is more potent than its effect, it does not always follow that the same name is applicable to the cause as to the effect, because sometimes that which is in the effect, is found in the cause not in the same but in a higher way; wherefore it is not applicable to both cause and effect under the same name or under the same aspect, as is the case with all equivocal effective causes. Thus, then, the union of husband and wife is stronger than the union of the wife with her husband’s kindred, and yet it ought not to be named affinity, but matrimony which is a kind of unity; even as a man is identical with himself, but not with his kinsman.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Blood-relations are in a way separate, and in a way connected: and it happens in respect of their connection that a person who is connected with one of them is in some way connected with all of them. But on account of their separation and distance from one another it happens that a person who is connected with one of them in one way is connected with another in another way, either as to the kind of connection or as to the degree.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Further, a relation results sometimes from a movement in each extreme, for instance fatherhood and sonship, and a relation of this kind is really in both extremes. Sometimes it results from the movement of one only, and this happens in two ways. In one way when a relation results from the movement of one extreme without any movement previous or concomitant of the other extreme; as in the Creator and the creature, the sensible and the sense, knowledge and the knowable object: and then the relation is in one extreme really and in the other logically only. In another way when the relation results from the movement of one extreme without any concomitant movement, but not without a previous movement of the other; thus there results equality between two men by the increase of one, without the other either increasing or decreasing then, although previously he reached his actual quantity by some movement or change, so that this relation is founded really in both extremes. It is the same with consanguinity and affinity, because the relation of brotherhood which results in a grown child on the birth of a boy, is caused without any movement of the former’s at the time, but by virtue of that previous movement of his wherein he was begotten; wherefore at the time it happens that there results in him the aforesaid relation through the movement of another. Likewise because this man descends through his own birth from the same stock as the husband, there results in him affinity with the latter’s wife, without any new change in him.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(2) Whether affinity remains after the death of husband or wife?

P(4)- Q(55)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that affinity does not remain after the death of husband or wife, between the blood-relations of husband and wife or “vice versa.” Because if the cause cease the effect ceases. Now the cause of affinity was the marriage, which ceases after the husband’s death, since then “the woman... is loosed from the law of the husband” ( Romans 7:2). Therefore the aforesaid affinity ceases also.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, consanguinity is the cause of affinity.

Now the consanguinity of the husband with his blood-relations ceases at his death. Therefore, the wife’s affinity with them ceases also.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Affinity is caused by consanguinity.

Now consanguinity binds persons together for all time as long as they live.

Therefore affinity does so also: and consequently affinity (between two persons) is not dissolved through the dissolution of the marriage by the death of a third person.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(2) —

I answer that, A relation ceases in two ways: in one way through the corruption of its subject, in another way by the removal of its cause; thus likeness ceases when one of the like subjects dies, or when the quality that caused the likeness is removed. Now there are certain relations which have for their cause an action, or a passion or movement (Metaph. v, 20): and some of these are caused by movement, through something being moved actually; such is the relation between mover and moved: some of them are caused through something being adapted to movement, for instance the relations between the motive power and the movable, or between master and servant; and some of them result from something, having been moved previously, such as the relation between father and son, for the relation between them is caused not by (the con) being begotten now, but by his having been begotten. Now aptitude for movement and for being moved is transitory; whereas the fact of having been moved is everlasting, since what has been never ceases having been. Consequently fatherhood and sonship are never dissolved through the removal of the cause, but only through the corruption of the subject, that is of one of the subjects. The same applies to affinity, for this is caused by certain persons having been joined together not by their being actually joined. Wherefore it is not done away, as long as the persons between whom affinity has been contracted survive, although the person die through whom it was contracted.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The marriage tie causes affinity not only by reason of actual union, but also by reason of the union having been effected in the past.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Consanguinity is not the chief cause of affinity, but union with a blood-relation, not only because that union is now, but because it has been. Hence the argument does not prove.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(3) Whether unlawful intercourse causes affinity?

P(4)- Q(55)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that unlawful intercourse does not cause affinity. For affinity is an honorable thing. Now honorable things do not result from that which is dishonorable. Therefore affinity cannot be caused by a dishonorable intercourse.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, where there is consanguinity there cannot be affinity; since affinity is a relationship between persons that results from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of blood-relationship.

Now if unlawful intercourse were a cause of affinity, it would sometimes happen that a man would contract affinity with his blood-relations and with himself: for instance when a man is guilty of incest with a bloodrelation.

Therefore affinity is not caused by unlawful intercourse.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, unlawful intercourse is according to nature or against nature. Now affinity is not caused by unnatural unlawful intercourse as decided by law (can. Extraordinaria, xxxv, qu. 2,3).

Therefore it is not caused only by unlawful intercourse according to nature.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(3) —

On the contrary, He who is joined to a harlot is made one body ( 1 Corinthians 6:16). Now this is the reason why marriage caused affinity. Therefore unlawful intercourse does so for the same reason.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(3) —

Further, carnal intercourse is the cause of affinity, as shown by the definition of affinity, which definition is as follows:

Affinity is the relationship of persons which results from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of blood-relationship. But there is carnal copulation even in unlawful intercourse. Therefore unlawful intercourse causes affinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(3) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) the union of husband and wife is said to be natural chiefly on account of the procreation of offspring, and secondly on account of the community of works: the former of which belongs to marriage by reason of carnal copulation, and the latter, in so far as marriage is a partnership directed to a common life. Now the former is to be found in every carnal union where there is a mingling of seeds, since such a union may be productive of offspring, but the latter may be wanting. Consequently since marriage caused affinity, in so far as it was a carnal mingling, it follows that also an unlawful intercourse causes affinity in so far as it has something of natural copulation.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(3)- RO(1) —

In an unlawful intercourse there is something natural which is common to fornication and marriage, and in this respect it causes affinity. There is also something which is inordinate whereby it differs from marriage, and in this respect it does not cause affinity. Hence affinity remains honorable, although its cause is in a way dishonorable.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(3)- RO(2) —

There is no reason why diverse relations should not be in the same subject by reason of different things.

Consequently there can be affinity and consanguinity between two persons, not only on account of unlawful but also on account of lawful intercourse: for instance if a blood-relation of mine on my father’s side marries a blood-relation of mine on my mother’s side. Hence in the above definition the words “which is altogether void of blood-relationship” apply to affinity as such. Nor does it follow that a man by having intercourse with his blood-relation contracts affinity with himself, since affinity, like consanguinity, requires diversity of subjects, as likeness does.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(3)- RO(3) —

In unnatural copulation there is no mingling of seeds that makes generation possible: wherefore a like intercourse does not cause affinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(4) Whether affinity is caused by betrothal?

P(4)- Q(55)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that affinity cannot be caused by betrothal. For affinity is a lasting tie: whereas a betrothal is sometimes broken off. Therefore it cannot cause affinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further if the hymen be penetrated without the deed being consummated, affinity is not contracted. Yet this is much more akin to carnal intercourse than a betrothal. Therefore betrothal does not cause affinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, betrothal is nothing but a promise of future marriage. Now sometimes there is a promise of future marriage without affinity being contracted, for instance if it take place before the age of seven years; or if a man having a perpetual impediment of impotence promise a woman future marriage; or if a like promise be made between persons to whom marriage is rendered unlawful by a vow; or in any other way whatever. Therefore betrothal cannot cause affinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Pope Alexander (cap. Ad audiendem, De spons. et matrim.) forbade a certain woman to marry a certain man, because she had been betrothed to his brother. Now this would not be the case unless affinity were contracted by betrothal.

Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(4) —

I answer that, Just as a betrothal has not the conditions of a perfect marriage, but is a preparation for marriage, so betrothal causes not affinity as marriage does, but something like affinity.

This is called “the justice of public honesty,” which is an impediment to marriage even as affinity and consanguinity are, and according to the same degrees, and is defined thus: “The justice of public honesty is a relationship arising out of betrothal, and derives its force from ecclesiastical institution by reason of its honesty.” This indicates the reason of its name as well as its cause, namely that this relationship was instituted by the Church on account of its honesty.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Betrothal, by reason not of itself but of the end to which it is directed, causes this kind of affinity known as “the justice of public honesty”: wherefore just as marriage is a lasting tie, so is the aforesaid kind of affinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(4)- RO(2) —

In carnal intercourse man and woman become one flesh by the mingling of seeds. Wherefore it is not every invasion or penetration of the hymen that causes affinity to be contracted, but only such as is followed by a mingling of seeds. But marriage causes affinity not only on account of carnal intercourse, but also by reason of the conjugal fellowship, in respect of which also marriage is according to nature.

Consequently affinity results from the marriage contract itself expressed in words of the present and before its consummation, and in like manner there results from betrothal, which is a promise of conjugal fellowship, something akin to affinity, namely the justice of public honesty.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(4)- RO(3) —

All those impediments which void a betrothal prevent affinity being contracted through a promise of marriage. Hence whether he who actually promises marriage be lacking in age, or be under a solemn vow of continence or any like impediment, no affinity nor anything akin to it results because the betrothal is void. If however, a minor, laboring under insensibility or malefice, having a perpetual impediment, is betrothed before the age of puberty and after the age of seven years, with a woman who is of age, from such a contract there results the impediment called “justice of public honesty,” because at the time the impediment was not actual, since at that age the boy who is insensible is equally impotent in respect of the act in question.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5) Whether affinity is a cause of affinity?

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that affinity also is a cause of affinity. For Pope Julius I says (cap. Contradicimus 35, qu. iii): “No man may marry his wife’s surviving blood-relation”: and it is said in the next chapter (cap. Porro duorum) that “the wives of two cousins are forbidden to marry, one after the other, the same husband.” But this is only on account of affinity being contracted through union with a person related by affinity. Therefore affinity is a cause of affinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, carnal intercourse makes persons akin even as carnal procreation, since the degrees of affinity and consanguinity are reckoned equally. But consanguinity causes affinity. Therefore affinity does also.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, things that are the same with one and the same are the same with one another. But the wife contracts the same relations with all her husband’s kindred. Therefore all her husband’s kindred are made one with all who are related by affinity to the wife, and thus affinity is the cause of affinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5)- O(4) —

On the contrary, If affinity is caused by affinity a man who has connection with two women can marry neither of them, because then the one would be related to the other by affinity. But this is false. Therefore affinity does not cause affinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5)- O(5) —

Further, if affinity arose out of affinity a man by marrying another man’s widow would contract affinity with all her first husband’s kindred, since she is related to them by affinity. But this cannot be the case because he would become especially related by affinity to her deceased husband. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5)- O(6) —

Further, consanguinity is a stronger tie than affinity. But the blood-relations of the wife do not become blood-relations of the husband. Much less, therefore, does affinity to the wife cause affinity to her blood-relations, and thus the same conclusion follows.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5) —

I answer that, There are two ways in which one thing proceeds from another: in one way a thing proceeds from another in likeness of species, as a man is begotten of a man: in another way one thing proceeds from another, not in likeness of species; and this process is always towards a lower species, as instanced in all equivocal agents. The first kind of procession, however often it be repeated, the same species always remains: thus if one man be begotten of another by an act of the generative power, of this man also another man will be begotten, and so on. But the second kind of procession, just as in the first instance it produces another species, so it makes another species as often as it is repeated. Thus by movement from a point there proceeds a line and not a point, because a point by being moved makes a line; and from a line moved lineally, there proceeds not a line but a surface, and from a surface a body, and in this way the procession can go no further. Now in the procession of kinship we find two kinds whereby this tie is caused: one is by carnal procreation, and this always produces the same species of relationship; the other is by the marriage union, and this produces a different kind of relationship from the beginning: thus it is clear that a married woman is related to her husband’s blood-relations not by blood but by affinity.

Wherefore if this kind of process be repeated, the result will be not affinity but another kind of relationship; and consequently a married party contracts with the affines of the other party a relation not of affinity but of some other kind which is called affinity of the second kind. And again if a person through marriage contracts relationship with an affine of the second kind, it will not be affinity of the second kind, but of a third kind, as indicated in the verse quoted above ( A(1) ). Formerly these two kinds were included in the prohibition, under the head of the justice of public honesty rather than under the head of affinity, because they fall short of true affinity, in the same way as the relationship arising out of betrothal.

Now however they have ceased to be included in the prohibition, which now refers only to the first kind of affinity in which true affinity consists.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5)- RO(1) —

A husband contracts affinity of the first kind with his wife’s male blood-relation, and affinity of the second kind with the latter’s wife: wherefore if the latter man dies the former cannot marry his widow on account of the second kind of affinity. Again if a man A marry a widow B, C, a relation of her former husband being connected with B by the first kind of affinity, contracts affinity of the second kind with her husband A; and D, the wife of this relation C being connected, by affinity of the second kind, with B, this man’s wife contracts affinity of the third kind with her husband A. And since the third kind of affinity was included in the prohibition on account of a certain honesty more than by reason of affinity, the canon (cap. Porro duorum 35, qu. iii) says: “The justice of public honesty forbids the wives of two cousins to be married to the same man, the one after the other.” But this prohibition is done away with.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Although carnal intercourse is a cause of people being connected with one another, it is not the same kind of connection.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5)- RO(3) —

The wife contracts the same connection with her husband’s relatives as to the degree but not as to the kind of connection.

Since however the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show that no tie is caused by affinity, we must reply to them lest the timehonored prohibition of the Church seem unreasonable.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5)- RO(4) —

As stated above, a woman does not contract affinity of the first kind with the man to whom she is united in the flesh, wherefore she does not contract affinity of the second kind with a woman known by the same man; and consequently if a man marry one of these women, the other does not contract affinity of the third kind with him.

And so the laws of bygone times did not forbid the same man to marry successively two women known by one man.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5)- RO(5) —

As a man is not connected with his wife by affinity of the first kind, so he does not contract affinity of the second kind with the second husband of the same wife. Wherefore the argument does not prove.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(5)- RO(6) —

One person is not connected with me through another, except they be connected together. Hence through a woman who is affine to me, no person becomes connected with me, except such as is connected with her. Now this cannot be except through carnal procreation from her, or through connection with her by marriage: and according to the olden legislation, I contracted some kind of connection through her in both ways: because her son even by another husband becomes affine to me in the same kind and in a different degree of affinity, as appears from the rule given above: and again her second husband becomes affine to me in the second kind of affinity. But her other blood-relations are not connected with him, but she is connected with them, either as with father or mother, inasmuch as she descends from them, or, as with her brothers, as proceeding from the same principle; wherefore the brother or father of my affine does not become affine to me in any kind of affinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(6) Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?

P(4)- Q(55)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that affinity is not an impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage except what is contrary thereto. But affinity is not contrary to marriage since it is caused by it. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, by marriage the wife becomes a possession of the husband. Now the husband’s kindred inherit his possessions after his death. Therefore they can succeed to his wife, although she is affine to them, as shown above ( A(5) ). Therefore affinity is not an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Leviticus 18:8): “Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father’s wife.” Now she is only affine. Therefore affinity is an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(6) —

I answer that, Affinity that precedes marriage hinders marriage being contracted and voids the contract, for the same reason as consanguinity. For just as there is a certain need for blood-relations to live together, so is there for those who are connected by affinity: and just as there is a tie of friendship between blood-relations, so is there between those who are affine to one another. If, however, affinity supervene to matrimony, it cannot void the marriage, as stated above ( Q(50), A(7) ).

P(4)- Q(55)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Affinity is not contrary to the marriage which causes it, but to a marriage being contracted with an affine, in so far as the latter would hinder the extension of friendship and the curbing of concupiscence, which are sought in marriage.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The husband’s possessions do not become one with him as the wife is made one flesh with him. Wherefore just as consanguinity is an impediment to marriage or union with the husband according to the flesh, so is one forbidden to marry the husband’s wife.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(7) Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?

P(4)- Q(55)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that affinity in itself admits of degrees. For any kind of propinquity can itself be the subject of degrees.

Now affinity is a kind of propinquity. Therefore it has degrees in itself apart from the degrees of consanguinity by which it is caused.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41) that the child of a second marriage could not take a consort from within the degrees of affinity of the first husband. But this would not be the case unless the son of an affine were also affine. Therefore affinity like consanguinity admits itself of degrees.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Affinity is caused by consanguinity.

Therefore all the degrees of affinity are caused by the degrees of consanguinity: and so it has no degrees of itself.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(7) —

I answer that, A thing does not of itself admit of being divided except in reference to something belonging to it by reason of its genus: thus animal is divided into rational and irrational and not into white and black. Now carnal procreation has a direct relation to consanguinity, because the tie of consanguinity is immediately contracted through it; whereas it has no relation to affinity except through consanguinity which is the latter’s cause. Wherefore since the degrees of relationship are distinguished in reference to carnal procreation, the distinction of degrees is directly and immediately referable to consanguinity, and to affinity through consanguinity. Hence the general rule in seeking the degrees of affinity is that in whatever degree of consanguinity I am related to the husband, in that same degree of affinity I am related to the wife.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(7)- RO(1) —

The degrees in propinquity of relationship can only be taken in reference to ascent and descent of propagation, to which affinity is compared only through consanguinity. Wherefore affinity has no direct degrees, but derives them according to the degrees of consanguinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Formerly it used to be said that the son of my affine by a second marriage was affine to me, not directly but accidentally as it were: wherefore he was forbidden to marry on account of the justice of public honesty rather than affinity. And for this reason this prohibition is now revoked.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(8) Whether the degrees of affinity extend in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity?

P(4)- Q(55)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that the degrees of affinity do not extend in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity. For the tie of affinity is less strong than the tie of consanguinity, since affinity arises from consanguinity in diversity of species, as from an equivocal cause.

Now the stronger the tie the longer it lasts. Therefore the tie of affinity does not last to the same number of degrees as consanguinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, human law should imitate Divine law.

Now according to the Divine law certain degrees of consanguinity were forbidden, in which degrees affinity was not an impediment to marriage: as instanced in a brother’s wife whom a man could marry although he could not marry her sister. Therefore now too the prohibition of affinity and consanguinity should not extend to the same degrees.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(8) —

On the contrary, A woman is connected with me by affinity from the very fact that she is married to a blood-relation of mine.

Therefore in whatever degree her husband is related to me by blood she is related to me in that same degree by affinity: and so the degrees of affinity should be reckoned in the same number as the degrees of consanguinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(8) —

I answer that, Since the degrees of affinity are reckoned according to the degrees of consanguinity, the degrees of affinity must needs be the same in number as those of consanguinity.

Nevertheless, affinity being a lesser tie than consanguinity, both formerly and now, a dispensation is more easily granted in the more remote degrees of affinity than in the remote degrees of consanguinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(8)- RO(1) —

The fact that the tie of affinity is less than the tie of consanguinity causes a difference in the kind of relationship but not in the degrees. Hence this argument is not to the point.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(8)- RO(2) —

A man could not take his deceased brother’s wife except, in the case when the latter died without issue, in order to raise up seed to his brother. This was requisite at a time when religious worship was propagated by means of the propagation of the flesh, which is not the case now. Hence it is clear that he did not marry her in his own person as it were, but as supplying the place of his brother.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(9) Whether a marriage contracted by persons with the degrees of affinity or consanguinity should always be annulled?

P(4)- Q(55)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem that a marriage contracted by persons within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity ought not always to be annulled by divorce. For “what God hath joined together let no man put asunder” ( Matthew 19:6). Since then it is understood that what the Church does God does, and since the Church sometimes through ignorance joins such persons together, it would seem that if subsequently this came to knowledge they ought not to be separated.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, the tie of marriage is less onerous than the tie of ownership. Now after a long time a man may acquire by prescription the ownership of a thing of which he was not the owner.

Therefore by length of time a marriage becomes good in law, although it was not so before.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, of like things we judge alike. Now if a marriage ought to be annulled on account of consanguinity, in the case when two brothers marry two sisters, if one be separated on account of consanguinity, the other ought to be separated for the same reason. and yet this is not seemly. Therefore a marriage ought not to be annulled on account of affinity or consanguinity.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(9) —

On the contrary, Consanguinity and affinity forbid the contracting of a marriage and void the contract. Therefore if affinity or consanguinity be proved, the parties should be separated even though they have actually contracted marriage.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(9) —

I answer that, Since all copulation apart from lawful marriage is a mortal sin, which the Church uses all her endeavors to prevent, it belongs to her to separate those between whom there cannot be valid marriage, especially those related by blood or by affinity, who cannot without incest be united in the flesh.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(9)- RO(1) —

Although the Church is upheld by God’s gift and authority, yet in so far as she is an assembly of men there results in her acts something of human frailty which is not Divine. Therefore a union effected in the presence of the Church who is ignorant of an impediment is not indissoluble by Divine authority, but is brought about contrary to Divine authority through man’s error, which being an error of fact excuses from sin, as long as it remains. Hence when the impediment comes to the knowledge of the Church, she ought to sever the aforesaid union.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(9)- RO(2) —

That which cannot be done without sin is not ratified by any prescription, for as Innocent III says (Conc. Later. iv, can. 50: cap. Non debent, De consang. et affinit.), “length of time does not diminish sin but increases it”: nor can it in any way legitimize a marriage which could not take place between unlawful persons.

P(4)- Q(55)- A(9)- RO(3) —

In contentious suits between two persons the verdict does not prejudice a third party, wherefore although the one brother’s marriage with the one sister is annulled on account of consanguinity, the Church does not therefore annul the other marriage against which no action is taken. Yet in the tribunal of the conscience the other brother ought not on this account always to be bound to put away his wife, because such accusations frequently proceed from ill-will, and are proved by false witnesses. Hence he is not bound to form his conscience on what has been done about the other marriage: but seemingly one ought to draw a distinction, because either he has certain knowledge of the impediment of his marriage, or he has an opinion about it, or he has neither. In the first case, he can neither seek nor pay the debt, in the second, he must pay, but not ask, in the third he can both pay and ask.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(10) Whether it is necessary to proceed by way of accusation for the annulment of a marriage contracted by persons related to each other by affinity or consanguinity?

P(4)- Q(55)-A(10)- O(1) —

It would seem that one ought not to proceed by way of accusation in order to sever a marriage contracted between persons related by affinity or consanguinity. Because accusation is preceded by inscription* whereby a man binds himself to suffer the punishment of retaliation, if he fail to prove his accusation. [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation; Cf. P(2b), Q(33), A(7) ]. But this is not required when a matrimonial separation is at issue. Therefore accusation has no place then.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(10)- O(2) —

Further, in a matrimonial lawsuit only the relatives are heard, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41). But in accusations even strangers are heard. Therefore in a suit for matrimonial separation the process is not by way of accusation.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(10)- O(3) —

Further, if a marriage ought to be denounced this should be done especially where it is least difficult to sever the tie.

Now this is when only the betrothal has been contracted, and then it is not the marriage that is denounced. Therefore accusation should never take place at any other time.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(10)- O(4) —

Further, a man is not prevented from accusing by the fact that he does not accuse at once. But this happens in marriage, for if he was silent at first when the marriage was being contracted, he cannot denounce the marriage afterwards without laying himself open to suspicion. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(10) —

On the contrary, Whatever is unlawful can be denounced. But the marriage of relatives by affinity and consanguinity is unlawful. Therefore it can be denounced.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(10) —

I answer that, Accusation is instituted lest the guilty be tolerated as though they were innocent. Now just as it happens through ignorance of fact that a guilty man is reputed innocent, so it happens through ignorance of a circumstance that a certain fact is deemed lawful whereas it is unlawful. Wherefore just as a man is sometimes accused, so is a fact sometimes an object of accusation. It is in this way that a marriage is denounced, when through ignorance of an impediment it is deemed lawful, whereas it is unlawful.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(10)- RO(1) —

The punishment of retaliation takes place when a person is accused of a crime, because then action is taken that he may be punished. But when it is a deed that is accused, action is taken not for the punishment of the doer, but in order to prevent what is unlawful.

Hence in a matrimonial suit the accuser does not bind himself to a punishment. Moreover, the accusation may be made either in words or in writing, provided the person who denounces the marriage denounced, and the impediment for which it is denounced, be expressed.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(10)- RO(2) —

Strangers cannot know of the consanguinity except from the relatives, since these know with greater probability. Hence when these are silent, a stranger is liable to be suspected of acting from illwill unless he wish the relatives to prove his assertion. Wherefore a stranger is debarred from accusing when there are relatives who are silent, and by whom he cannot prove his accusation. On the other hand the relatives, however nearly related they be, are not debarred from accusing, when the marriage is denounced on account of a perpetual impediment, which prevents the contracting of the marriage and voids the contract.

When, however, the accusation is based on a denial of the contract having taken place, the parents should be debarred from witnessing as being liable to suspicion, except those of the party that is inferior in rank and wealth, for they, one is inclined to think, would be willing for the marriage to stand.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(10)- RO(3) —

If the marriage is not yet contracted and there is only a betrothal, there can be no accusation, for what is not, cannot be accused. But the impediment can be denounced lest the marriage be contracted.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(10)- RO(4) —

He who is silent at first is sometimes heard afterwards if he wish to denounce the marriage, and sometimes he is repulsed. This is made clear by the Decretal (cap. Cum in tua, De his qui matrim. accus. possunt.) which runs as follows: “If an accuser present himself after the marriage has been contracted, since he did not declare himself when according to custom, the banns were published in church, we may rightly ask whether he should be allowed to voice his accusation. In this matter we deem that a distinction should be made, so that if he who lodges information against persons already married was absent from the diocese at the time of the aforesaid publication, or if for some other reason this could not come to his knowledge, for instance if through exceeding stress of weakness and fever he was not in possession of his faculties, or was of so tender years as to be too young to understand such matters, or if he were hindered by some other lawful cause, his accusation should be heard. otherwise without doubt he should be repulsed as open to suspicion, unless he swear that the information lodged by him came to his knowledge subsequently and that he is not moved by ill-will to make his accusation.”

P(4)- Q(55)-A(11) Whether in a suit of this kind one should proceed by hearing witnesses in the same way as in other suits?

P(4)- Q(55)-A(11)- O(1) —

It would seem that in such a suit one ought not to proceed by hearing witnesses, in the same way as in other suits where any witnesses may be called provided they be unexceptionable. But here strangers are not admitted, although they be unexceptionable. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(11)- O(2) —

Further, witnesses who are suspected of private hatred or love are debarred from giving evidence. Now relatives are especially open to suspicion of love for one party, and hatred for the other. Therefore their evidence should not be taken.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(11)- O(3) —

Further, marriage is a more favorable suit than those others in which purely corporeal questions are at stake. Now in these the same person cannot be both accuser and witness. Neither therefore can this be in a matrimonial suit; and so it would appear that it is not right to proceed by hearing witnesses in a suit of this kind.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(11) —

On the contrary, Witnesses are called in a suit in order to give the judge evidence concerning matters of doubt. Now evidence should be afforded the judge in this suit as in other suits, since he must not pronounce a hasty judgment on what is not proven. Therefore here as in other lawsuits witnesses should be called.

P(4)- Q(55)-A(11) —

I answer that, In this kind of lawsuit as in others, truth must be unveiled by witnesses: yet, as the lawyers say, there are many things peculiar to this suit; namely that “the same person can be accuser and witness; that evidence is not taken ‘on oath of calumny,’ since it is a quasi-spiritual lawsuit; that relatives are allowed as witnesses; that the juridical order is not perfectly observed, since if the denunciation has been made, and the suit is uncontested, the defendant may be excommunicated if contumacious; that hearsay evidence is admitted; and that witnesses may be called after the publication of the names of the witnesses.” All this is in order to prevent the sin that may occur in such a union (cap. Quoties aliqui; cap. Super eo, De test. et attest.; cap. Literas, De juram. calumn.).

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

QUESTION OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment of spiritual relationship: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage? (2) From what cause is it contracted? (3) Between whom? (4) Whether it passes from husband to wife? (5) Whether it passes to the father’s carnal children?

P(4)- Q(56)- A(1) Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?

P(4)- Q(56)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that spiritual relationship is not an impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage save what is contrary to a marriage good. Now spiritual relationship is not contrary to a marriage good. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, a perpetual impediment to marriage cannot stand together with marriage. But spiritual relationship sometimes stands together with marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42), as when a man in a case of necessity baptizes his own child, for then he contracts a spiritual relationship with his wife, and yet the marriage is not dissolved. Therefore spiritual relationship is not an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, union of the spirit does not pass to the flesh. But marriage is a union of the flesh. Therefore since spiritual relationship is a union of the spirit, it cannot become an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, contraries have not the same effects.

Now spiritual relationship is apparently contrary to disparity of worship, since spiritual relationship is a kinship resulting from the giving of a sacrament or the intention of so doing [*See next Article, ad 3]: whereas disparity of worship consists in the lack of a sacrament, as stated above ( Q(50), A(1) ). Since then disparity of worship is an impediment to matrimony, it would seem that spiritual relationship has not this effect.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The holier the bond, the more is it to be safeguarded. Now a spiritual bond is holier than a bodily tie: and since the tie of bodily kinship is an impediment to marriage, it follows that spiritual relationship should also be an impediment.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(1) —

Further, in marriage the union of souls ranks higher than union of bodies, for it precedes it. Therefore with much more reason can a spiritual relationship hinder marriage than bodily relationship does.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(1) —

I answer that, Just as by carnal procreation man receives natural being, so by the sacraments he receives the spiritual being of grace. Wherefore just as the tie that is contracted by carnal procreation is natural to man, inasmuch as he is a natural being, so the tie that is contracted from the reception of the sacraments is after a fashion natural to man, inasmuch as he is a member of the Church. Therefore as carnal relationship hinders marriage, even so does spiritual relationship by command of the Church. We must however draw a distinction in reference to spiritual relationship, since either it precedes or follows marriage. If it precedes, it hinders the contracting of marriage and voids the contract. If it follows, it does not dissolve the marriage bond: but we must draw a further distinction in reference to the marriage act. For either the spiritual relationship is contracted in a case of necessity, as when a father baptizes his child who is at the point of death — and then it is not an obstacle to the marriage act on either side — or it is contracted without any necessity and through ignorance, in which case if the person whose action has occasioned the relationship acted with due caution, it is the same with him as in the former case — or it is contracted purposely and without any necessity, and then the person whose action has occasioned the relationship, loses the right to ask for the debt; but is bound to pay if asked, because the fault of the one party should not be prejudicial to the other.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although spiritual relationship does not hinder any of the chief marriage goods, it hinders one of the secondary goods, namely the extension of friendship, because spiritual relationship is by itself a sufficient reason for friendship: wherefore intimacy and friendship with other persons need to be sought by means of marriage.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Marriage is a lasting bond, wherefore no supervening impediment can sever it. Hence it happens sometimes that marriage and an impediment to marriage stand together, but not if the impediment precedes.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(1)- RO(3) —

In marriage there is not only a bodily but also a spiritual union: and consequently kinship of spirit proves an impediment thereto, without spiritual kinship having to pass into a bodily relationship.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(1)- RO(4) —

There is nothing unreasonable in two things that are contrary to one another being contrary to the same thing, as great and small are contrary to equal. Thus disparity of worship and spiritual relationship are opposed to marriage, because in one the distance is greater, and in the other less, than required by marriage. Hence there is an impediment to marriage in either case.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2) Whether spiritual relationship is contracted by baptism only?

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that spiritual relationship is contracted by Baptism only. For as bodily kinship is to bodily birth, so is spiritual kinship to spiritual birth. Now Baptism alone is called spiritual birth. Therefore spiritual kinship is contracted by Baptism only, even as only by carnal birth is carnal kinship contracted.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, a character is imprinted in order as in Confirmation. But spiritual relationship does not result from receiving orders. Therefore it does not result from Confirmation but only from Baptism.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, sacraments are more excellent than sacramentals. Now spiritual relationship does not result from certain sacraments, for instance from Extreme Unction. Much less therefore does it result from catechizing, as some maintain.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, many other sacramentals are attached to Baptism besides catechizing. Therefore spiritual relationship is not contracted from catechism any more than from the others.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, prayer is no less efficacious than instruction of catechism for advancement in good. But spiritual relationship does not result from prayer. Therefore it does not result from catechism.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- O(6) —

Further, the instruction given to the baptized by preaching to them avails no less than preaching to those who are not yet baptized. But no spiritual relationship results from preaching. Neither therefore does it result from catechism.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- O(7) —

On the other hand, It is written ( Corinthians 4:15): “In Christ Jesus by the gospel I have begotten you.”

Now spiritual birth causes spiritual relationship. Therefore spiritual relationship results from the preaching of the gospel and instruction, and not only from Baptism.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- O(8) —

Further, as original sin is taken away by Baptism, so is actual sin taken away by Penance. Therefore just as Baptism causes spiritual relationship, so also does Penance.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- O(9) —

Further, “father” denotes relationship. Now a man is called another’s spiritual father in respect of Penance, teaching, pastoral care and many other like things. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted from many other sources besides Baptism and Confirmation.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2) —

I answer that, There are three opinions on this question. Some say that as spiritual regeneration is bestowed by the sevenfold grace of the Holy Ghost, it is caused by means of seven things, beginning with the first taste of blessed salt and ending with Confirmation given by the bishop: and they say that spiritual relationship is contracted by each of these seven things. But this does not seem reasonable, for carnal relationship is not contracted except by a perfect act of generation.

Wherefore affinity is not contracted except there be mingling of seeds, from which it is possible for carnal generation to follow. Now spiritual generation is not perfected except by a sacrament: wherefore it does not seem fitting for spiritual relationship to be contracted otherwise than through a sacrament. Hence others say that spiritual relationship is only contracted through three sacraments, namely catechism, Baptism and Confirmation, but these do not apparently know the meaning of what they say, since catechism is not a sacrament but a sacramental. Wherefore others say that it is contracted through two sacraments only, namely Confirmation and Baptism, and this is the more common opinion. Some however of these say that catechism is a weak impediment, since it hinders the contracting of marriage but does not void the contract.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Carnal birth is twofold. The first is in the womb, wherein that which is born is a weakling and cannot come forth without danger: and to this birth regeneration by Baptism is likened; wherein a man is regenerated as though yet needing to be fostered in the womb of the Church. The second is birth from out of the womb, when that which was born in the womb is so far strengthened that it can without danger face the outer world which has a natural corruptive tendency. To this is likened Confirmation, whereby man being strengthened goes forth abroad to confess the name of Christ. Hence spiritual relationship is fittingly contracted through both these sacraments.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The effect of the sacrament of order is not regeneration but the bestowal of power, for which reason it is not conferred on women, and consequently no impediment to marriage can arise therefrom. Hence this kind of relationship does not count.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- RO(3) —

In catechism one makes a profession of future Baptism, just as in betrothal one enters an engagement of future marriage.

Wherefore just as in betrothal a certain kind of propinquity is contracted, so is there in catechism, whereby marriage is rendered at least unlawful, as some say; but not in the other sacraments.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- RO(4) —

There is not made a profession of faith in the other sacramentals of Baptism, as in catechism: wherefore the comparison fails.

The same answer applies to the Fifth and Sixth Objections.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- RO(7) —

The Apostle had instructed them in the faith by a kind of catechism; and consequently his instruction was directed to their spiritual birth.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- RO(8) —

Properly speaking a spiritual relationship is not contracted through the sacrament of Penance. Wherefore a priest’s son can marry a woman whose confession the priest has heard, else in the whole parish he could not find a woman whom he could marry. Nor does it matter that by Penance actual sin is taken away, for this is not a kind of birth, but a kind of healing. Nevertheless Penance occasions a kind of bond between the woman penitent and the priest, that has a resemblance to spiritual relationship, so that if he have carnal intercourse with her, he sins as grievously as if she were his spiritual daughter. The reason of this is that the relations between priest and penitent are most intimate, and consequently in order to remove the occasion of sin this prohibition [*Can. Omnes quos, and seqq., Caus. xxx] was made.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(2)- RO(9) —

A spiritual father is so called from his likeness to a carnal father. Now as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) a carnal father gives his child three things, being nourishment and instruction: and consequently a person’s spiritual father is so called from one of these three things. Nevertheless he has not, through being his spiritual father, a spiritual relationship with him, unless he is like a (carnal) father as to generation which is the way to being. This solution may also be applied to the foregoing Eighth Objection.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(3) Whether spiritual relationship is contracted between the person baptized and the perso who raises him from the sacred font?

P(4)- Q(56)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that spiritual relationship is not contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him from the sacred font. For in carnal generation carnal relationship is contracted only on the part of the person of whose seed the child is born; and not on the part of the person who receives the child after birth.

Therefore neither is spiritual relationship contracted between the receiver and the received at the sacred font.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, he who raises a person from the sacred font is called \anadochos\ by Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii): and it is part of his office to instruct the child. But instruction is not a sufficient cause of spiritual relationship, as stated above ( A(2) ). Therefore no relationship is contracted between him and the person whom he raises from the sacred font.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, it may happen that someone raises a person from the sacred font before he himself is baptized. Now spiritual relationship is not contracted in such a case, since one who is not baptized is not capable of spirituality. Therefore raising a person from the sacred font is not sufficient to contract a spiritual relationship.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(3) —

On the contrary, There is the definition of spiritual relationship quoted above ( A(1) ), as also the authorities mentioned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).

P(4)- Q(56)- A(3) —

I answer that, Just as in carnal generation a person is born of a father and mother, so in spiritual generation a person is born again a son of God as Father, and of the Church as Mother. Now while he who confers the sacrament stands in the place of God, whose instrument and minister he is, he who raises a baptized person from the sacred font, or holds the candidate for Confirmation, stands in the place of the Church.

Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted with both.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Not only the father, of whose seed the child is born, is related carnally to the child, but also the mother who provides the matter, and in whose womb the child is begotten. So too the godparent who in place of the Church offers and raises the candidate for Baptism and holds the candidate for Confirmation contracts spiritual relationship.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(3)- RO(2) —

He contracts spiritual relationship not by reason of the instruction it is his duty to give, but on account of the spiritual birth in which he co-operates.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(3)- RO(3) —

A person who is not baptized cannot raise anyone from the sacred font, since he is not a member of the Church whom the godparent in Baptism represents: although he can baptize, because he is a creature of God Whom the baptizer represents. And yet he cannot contract a spiritual relationship, since he is void of spiritual life to which man is first born by receiving Baptism.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(4) Whether spiritual relationship passes from husband to wife?

P(4)- Q(56)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife. For spiritual and bodily union are disparate and differ generically. Therefore carnal union which is between husband and wife cannot be the means of contracting a spiritual relationship.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the godfather and godmother have more in common in the spiritual birth that is the cause of spiritual relationship, than a husband, who is godfather, has with his wife. Now godfather and godmother do not hereby contract spiritual relationship. Therefore neither does a wife contract a spiritual relationship through her husband being godfather to someone.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, it may happen that the husband is baptized, and his wife not, for instance when he is converted from unbelief without his wife being converted. Now spiritual relationship cannot be contracted by one who is not baptized. Therefore it does not always pass from husband to wife.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, husband and wife together can raise a person from the sacred font, since no law forbids it. If therefore spiritual relationship passed from husband to wife, it would follow that each of them is twice godfather or godmother of the same individual: which is absurd.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Spiritual goods are more communicable than bodily goods. But the bodily consanguinity of the husband passes to his wife by affinity. Much more therefore does spiritual relationship.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(4) —

I answer that, A may become co-parent with B in two ways. First, by the act of another (B), who baptizes A’s child, or raises him in Baptism. In this way spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife, unless perchance it be his wife’s child, for then she contracts spiritual relationship directly, even as her husband. Secondly, by his own act, for instance when he raises B’s child from the sacred font, and thus spiritual relationship passes to the wife if he has already had carnal knowledge of her, but not if the marriage be not yet consummated, since they are not as yet made one flesh: and this is by way of a kind of affinity; wherefore it would seem on the same grounds to pass to a woman of whom he has carnal knowledge, though she be not his wife. Hence the verse: “I may not marry my own child’s godmother, nor the mother of my godchild: but I may marry the godmother of my wife’s child.”

P(4)- Q(56)- A(4)- RO(1) —

From the fact that corporal and spiritual union differ generically we may conclude that the one is not the other, but not that the one cannot cause the other, since things of different genera sometimes cause one another either directly or indirectly.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The godfather and godmother of the same person are not united in that person’s spiritual birth save accidentally, since one of them would be self-sufficient for the purpose. Hence it does not follow from this that any spiritual relationship results between them whereby they are hindered from marrying one another. Hence the verse: “Of two co-parents one is always spiritual, the other carnal: this rule is infallible.” On the other hand, marriage by itself makes husband and wife one flesh: wherefore the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(4)- RO(3) —

If the wife be not baptized, the spiritual relationship will not reach her, because she is not a fit subject, and not because spiritual relationship cannot pass from husband to wife through marriage.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(4)- RO(4) —

Since no spiritual relationship results between godfather and godmother, nothing prevents husband and wife from raising together someone from the sacred font. Nor is it absurd that the wife become twice godmother of the same person from different causes, just as it is possible for her to be connected in carnal relationship both by affinity and consanguinity to the same person.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(5) Whether spiritual relationship passes to the godfather’s carnal children?

P(4)- Q(56)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass to the godfather’s carnal children. For no degrees are assigned to spiritual relationship. Yet there would be degrees if it passed from father to son, since the person begotten involves a change of degree, as stated above ( Q(55), A(5) ). Therefore it does not pass to the godfather’s carnal sons.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, father and son are related in the same degree as brother and brother. If therefore spiritual relationship passes from father to son, it will equally pass from brother to brother: and this is false.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(5) —

On the contrary, This is proved by authority quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).

P(4)- Q(56)- A(5) —

I answer that, A son is something of his father and not conversely (Ethic. viii, 12): wherefore spiritual relationship passes from father to his carnal son and not conversely. Thus it is clear that there are three spiritual relationships: one called spiritual fatherhood between godfather and godchild; another called co-paternity between the godparent and carnal parent of the same person; and the third is called spiritual brotherhood, between godchild and the carnal children of the same parent.

Each of these hinders the contracting of marriage and voids the contract.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The addition of a person by carnal generation entails a degree with regard to a person connected by the same kind of relationship, but not with regard to one connected by another kind of relationship. Thus a son is connected with his father’s wife in the same degree as his father, but by another kind of relationship. Now spiritual relationship differs in kind from carnal. Wherefore a godson is not related to his godfather’s carnal son in the same degree as the latter’s father is related to him, through whom the spiritual relationship is contracted.

Consequently it does not follow that spiritual relationship admits of degrees.

P(4)- Q(56)- A(5)- RO(2) —

A man is not part of his brother as a son is of his father. But a wife is part of her husband, since she is made one with him in body. Consequently the relationship does not pass from brother to brother, whether the brother be born before or after spiritual brotherhood.

QUESTION OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS BY ADOPTION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider legal relationship which is by adoption. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) What is adoption? (2) Whether one contracts through it a tie that is an impediment to marriage? (3) Between which persons is this tie contracted.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1) Whether adoption is rightly defined?

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that adoption is not rightly defined: “Adoption is the act by which a person lawfully takes for his child or grandchild and so on one who does not belong to him.” For the child should be subject to its father. Now, sometimes the person adopted does not come under the power of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not always the taking of someone as a child.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, “Parents should lay up for their children” ( 2 Corinthians 12:14). But the adoptive father does not always necessarily lay up for his adopted child, since sometimes the adopted does not inherit the goods of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone as a child.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, adoption, whereby someone is taken as a child, is likened to natural procreation whereby a child is begotten naturally. Therefore whoever is competent to beget a child naturally is competent to adopt. But this is untrue, since neither one who is not his own master, nor one who is not twenty-five years of age, nor a woman can adopt, and yet they can beget a child naturally. Therefore, properly speaking, adoption is not the taking of someone as a child.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, to take as one’s child one who is not one’s own seems necessary in order to supply the lack of children begotten naturally. Now one who is unable to beget, through being a eunuch or impotent, suffers especially from the absence of children of his own begetting. Therefore he is especially competent to adopt someone as his child. But he is not competent to adopt. Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone as one’s child.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, in spiritual relationship, where someone is taken as a child without carnal procreation, it is of no consequence whether an older person become the father of a younger, or “vice versa,” since a youth can baptize an old man and “vice versa.”

Therefore, if by adoption a person is taken as a child without being carnally begotten, it would make no difference whether an older person adopted a younger, or a younger an older person; which is not true.

Therefore the same conclusion follows.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(6) —

Further, there is no difference of degree between adopted and adopter. Therefore whoever is adopted, is adopted as a child; and consequently it is not right to say that one may be adopted as a grandchild.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(7) —

Further, adoption is a result of love, wherefore God is said to have adopted us as children through charity. Now we should have greater charity towards those who are connected with us than towards strangers. Therefore adoption should be not of a stranger but of someone connected with us.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1) —

I answer that, Art imitates nature and supplies the defect of nature where nature is deficient. Hence just as a man begets by natural procreation, so by positive law which is the art of what is good and just, one person can take to himself another as a child in likeness to one that is his child by nature, in order to take the place of the children he has lost, this being the chief reason why adoption was introduced. And since taking implies a term “wherefrom,” for which reason the taker is not the thing taken, it follows that the person taken as a child must be a stranger. Accordingly, just as natural procreation has a term “whereto,” namely the form which is the end of generation, and a term “wherefrom,” namely the contrary form, so legal generation has a term “whereto,” namely a child or grandchild, and a term “wherefrom,” namely, a stranger.

Consequently the above definition includes the genus of adoption, for it is described as a “lawful taking,” and the term “wherefrom,” since it is said to be the taking of “a stranger,” and the term “whereto,” because it says, “as a child or grandchild .”

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The sonship of adoption is an imitation of natural sonship. Wherefore there are two species of adoption, one which imitates natural sonship perfectly, and this is called “arrogatio,” whereby the person adopted is placed under the power of the adopter; and one who is thus adopted inherits from his adopted father if the latter die intestate, nor can his father legally deprive him of a fourth part of his inheritance.

But no one can adopt in this way except one who is his own master, one namely who has no father or, if he has, is of age. There can be no adoption of this kind without the authority of the sovereign. The other kind of adoption imitates natural sonship imperfectly, and is called “simple adoption,” and by this the adopted does not come under the power of the adopter: so that it is a disposition to perfect adoption, rather than perfect adoption itself. In this way even one who is not his own master can adopt, without the consent of the sovereign and with the authority of a magistrate: and one who is thus adopted does not inherit the estate of the adopter, nor is the latter bound to bequeath to him any of his goods in his will, unless he will.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Natural procreation is directed to the production of the species; wherefore anyone in whom the specific nature is not hindered is competent to be able to beget naturally. But adoption is directed to hereditary succession, wherefore those alone are competent to adopt who have the power to dispose of their estate. Consequently one who is not his own master, or who is less than twenty-five years of age, or a woman, cannot adopt anyone, except by special permission of the sovereign.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- RO(4) —

An inheritance cannot pass to posterity through one who has a perpetual impediment from begetting: hence for this very reason it ought to pass to those who ought to succeed to him by right of relationship; and consequently he cannot adopt, as neither can he beget. Moreover greater is sorrow for children lost than for children one has never had. Wherefore those who are impeded from begetting need no solace for their lack of children as those who have had and have lost them, or could have had them but have them not by reason of some accidental impediment.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Spiritual relationship is contracted through a sacrament whereby the faithful are born again in Christ, in Whom there is no difference between male and female, bondman and free, youth and old age ( Galatians 3:28; Colossians 3:11). Wherefore anyone can indifferently become another’s godfather. But adoption aims at hereditary succession and a certain subjection of the adopted to the adopter: and it is not fitting that older persons should be subjected to younger in the care of the household. Consequently a younger person cannot adopt an older; but according to law the adopted person must be so much younger than the adopter, that he might have been the child of his natural begetting.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- RO(6) —

One may lose one’s grandchildren and so forth even as one may lose one’s children. Wherefore since adoption was introduced as a solace for children lost, just as someone may be adopted in place of a child, so may someone be adopted in place of a grandchild and so on.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(1)- RO(7) —

A relative ought to succeed by right of relationship; and therefore such a person is not competent to be chosen to succeed by adoption. And if a relative, who is not competent to inherit the estate, be adopted, he is adopted not as a relative, but as a stranger lacking the right of succeeding to the adopter’s goods.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(2) Whether a tie that is an impediment to marriage is contracted through adoption?

P(4)- Q(57)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that there is not contracted through adoption a tie that is an impediment to marriage. For spiritual care is more excellent than corporeal care. But no tie of relationship is contracted through one’s being subjected to another’s spiritual care: else all those who dwell in the parish would be related to the parish priest and would be unable to marry his son. Neither therefore can this result from adoption which places the adopted under the care of the adopter.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, no tie of relationship results from persons conferring a benefit on another. But adoption is nothing but the conferring of a benefit. Therefore no tie of relationship results from adoption.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a natural father provides for his child chiefly in three things, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), namely by giving him being, nourishment and education; and hereditary succession is subsequent to these. Now no tie of relationship is contracted by one’s providing for a person’s nourishment and education, else a person would be related to his nourishers, tutors and masters, which is false. Therefore neither is any relationship contracted through adoption by which one inherits another’s estate.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, the sacraments of the Church are not subject to human laws. Now marriage is a sacrament of the Church. Since then adoption was introduced by human law, it would seem that a tie contracted from adoption cannot be an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Relationship is an impediment to marriage. Now a kind of relationship results from adoption, namely legal relationship, as evidenced by its definition, for “legal relationship is a connection arising out of adoption.” Therefore adoption results in a tie which is an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(2) —

Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).

P(4)- Q(57)- A(2) —

I answer that, The Divine law especially forbids marriage between those persons who have to live together lest, as Rabbi Moses observes (Doc. Perp. iii, 49), if it were lawful for them to have carnal intercourse, there should be more room for concupiscence to the repression of which marriage is directed. And since the adopted child dwells in the house of his adopted father like one that is begotten naturally human laws forbid the contracting of marriage between the like, and this prohibition is approved by the Church. Hence it is that legal adoption is an impediment to marriage. This suffices for the Replies to the first three Objections, because none of those things entails such a cohabitation as might be an incentive to concupiscence. Therefore they do not cause a relationship that is an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(2)- RO(4) —

The prohibition of a human law would not suffice to make an impediment to marriage, unless the authority of the Church intervenes by issuing the same prohibition.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(3) Whether legal relationship is contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child?

P(4)- Q(57)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that a relationship of this kind is contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child. For it would seem that it ought above all to be contracted between the adopting father and the natural mother of the adopted, as happens in spiritual relationship. Yet there is no legal relationship between them. Therefore it is not contracted between any other persons besides the adopter and adopted.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the relationship that impedes marriage is a perpetual impediment. But there is not a perpetual impediment between the adopted son and the naturally begotten daughter of the adopted; because when the adoption terminates at the death of the adopter, or when the adopted comes of age, the latter can marry her.

Therefore he was not related to her in such a way as to prevent him from marrying her.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, spiritual relationship passes to no person incapable of being a god-parent; wherefore it does not pass to one who is not baptized. Now a woman cannot adopt, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2). Therefore legal relationship does not pass from husband to wife.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, spiritual relationship is stronger than legal. But spiritual relationship does not pass to a grandchild. Neither, therefore, does legal relationship.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Legal relationship is more in agreement with carnal union or procreation than spiritual relationship is.

But spiritual relationship passes to another person. Therefore legal relationship does so also.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(3) —

Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).

P(4)- Q(57)- A(3) —

I answer that, Legal relationship is of three kinds. The first is in the descending order as it were, and is contracted between the adoptive father and the adopted child, the latter’s child grandchild and so on; the second is between the adopted child and the naturally begotten child; the third is like a kind of affinity, and is between the adoptive father and the wife of the adopted son, or contrariwise between the adopted son and the wife of the adoptive father. Accordingly the first and third relationships are perpetual impediments to marriage: but the second is not, but only so long as the adopted person remains under the power of the adoptive father, wherefore when the father dies or when the child comes of age, they can be married.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(3)- RO(1) —

By spiritual generation the son is not withdrawn from the father’s power, as in the case of adoption, so that the godson remains the son of both at the same time, whereas the adopted son does not. Hence no relationship is contracted between the adoptive father and the natural mother or father, as was the case in spiritual relationship.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Legal relationship is an impediment to marriage on account of the parties dwelling together: hence when the need for dwelling together ceases, it is not unreasonable that the aforesaid tie cease, for instance when he ceases to be under the power of the same father. But the adoptive father and his wife always retain a certain authority over their adopted son and his wife, wherefore the tie between them remains.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Even a woman can adopt by permission of the sovereign, wherefore legal relationship passes also to her. Moreover the reason why spiritual relationship does not pass to a non-baptized person is not because such a person cannot be a god-parent but because he is not a fit subject of spirituality.

P(4)- Q(57)- A(3)- RO(4) —

By spiritual relationship the son is not placed under the power and care of the godfather, as in legal relationship: because it is necessary that whatever is in the son’s power pass under the power of the adoptive father. Wherefore if a father be adopted the children and grandchildren who are in the power of the person adopted are adopted also.

QUESTION OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF IMPOTENCE, SPELL, FRENZY OR MADNESS, INCEST AND DEFECTIVE AGE (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider five impediments to marriage, namely the impediments of impotence, spell, frenzy or madness, incest, and defective age. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage? (2) Whether a spell is? (3) Whether frenzy or madness is? (4) Whether incest is? (5) Whether defective age is?

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1) Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that impotence is not an impediment to marriage. For carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, since marriage is more perfect when both parties observe continency by vow. But impotence deprives marriage of nothing save carnal copulation.

Therefore it is not a diriment impediment to the marriage contract.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, just as impotence prevents carnal copulation so does frigidity. But frigidity is not reckoned an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither should impotence be reckoned as such.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, all old people are frigid. Yet old people can marry. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, if the woman knows the man to be frigid when she marries him, the marriage is valid. Therefore frigidity, considered in itself, is not an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, calidity may prove a sufficient incentive to carnal copulation with one who is not a virgin, but not with one who is, because it happens to be so weak as to pass away quickly, and is therefore insufficient for the deflowering of a virgin. Or again it may move a man sufficiently in regard to a beautiful woman, but insufficiently in regard to an uncomely one. Therefore it would seem that frigidity, although it be an impediment in regard to one, is not an impediment absolutely.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(6) —

Further, generally speaking woman is more frigid than man. But women are not debarred from marriage. Neither therefore should men be debarred on account of frigidity.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, De Frigidis et Malefic., cap. Quod Sedem): “Just as a boy who is incapable of marital intercourse is unfit to marry, so also those who are impotent are deemed most unfit for the marriage contract.” Now persons affected with frigidity are the like. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1) —

Further, no one can bind himself to the impossible.

Now in marriage man binds himself to carnal copulation; because it is for this purpose that he gives the other party power over his body. Therefore a frigid person, being incapable of carnal copulation, cannot marry.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1) —

I answer that, In marriage there is a contract whereby one is bound to pay the other the marital debt: wherefore just as in other contracts, the bond is unfitting if a person bind himself to what he cannot give or do, so the marriage contract is unfitting, if it be made by one who cannot pay the marital debt. This impediment is called by the general name of impotence as regards coition, and can arise either from an intrinsic and natural cause, or from an extrinsic and accidental cause, for instance spell, of which we shall speak later ( A(2) ). If it be due to a natural cause, this may happen in two ways. For either it is temporary, and can be remedied by medicine, or by the course of time, and then it does not void a marriage: or it is perpetual and then it voids marriage, so that the party who labors under this impediment remains for ever without hope of marriage, while the other may “marry to whom she will... in the Lord” ( 1 Corinthians 7:39). In order to ascertain whether the impediment be perpetual or not, the Church has appointed a fixed time, namely three years, for putting the matter to a practical proof: and if after three years, during which both parties have honestly endeavored to fulfil their marital intercourse, the marriage remain unconsummated, the Church adjudges the marriage to be dissolved. And yet the Church is sometimes mistaken in this, because three years are sometimes insufficient to prove impotence to be perpetual.

Wherefore if the Church find that she has been mistaken, seeing that the subject of the impediment has completed carnal copulation with another or with the same person, she reinstates the former marriage and dissolves the subsequent one, although the latter has been contracted with her permission. [*”Nowadays it is seldom necessary to examine too closely into this matter, as all cases arising from it are treated as far as possible under the form of dispensations of non-consummated marriages.” Cf.

Catholic Encyclopedia, article Canonical Impediments.]

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(1) — Although the act of carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, ability to fulfill the act is essential, because marriage gives each of the married parties power over the other’s body in relation to marital intercourse.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Excessive calidity can scarcely be a perpetual impediment. If, however, it were to prove an impediment to marital intercourse for three years it would be adjudged to be perpetual.

Nevertheless, since frigidity is a greater and more frequent impediment (for it not only hinders the mingling of seeds but also weakens the members which co-operate in the union of bodies), it is accounted an impediment rather than calidity, since all natural defects are reduced to frigidity.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Although old people have not sufficient calidity to procreate, they have sufficient to copulate. Wherefore they are allowed to marry, in so far as marriage is intended as a remedy, although it does not befit them as fulfilling an office of nature.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(4) —

In all contracts it is agreed on all hands that anyone who is unable to satisfy an obligation is unfit to make a contract which requires the fulfilling of that obligation. Now this inability is of two kinds. First, because a person is unable to fulfill the obligation “de jure,” and such inability renders the contract altogether void, whether the party with whom he contracts knows of this or not. Secondly, because he is unable to fulfill “de facto”; and then if the party with whom he contracts knows of this and, notwithstanding, enters the contract, this shows that the latter seeks some other end from the contract, and the contract stands.

But if he does not know of it the contract is void. Consequently frigidity which causes such an impotence that a man cannot “de facto” pay the marriage debt, as also the condition of slavery, whereby a man cannot “de facto” give his service freely, are impediments to marriage, when the one married party does not know that the other is unable to pay the marriage debt. But an impediment whereby a person cannot pay the marriage debt “de jure,” for instance consanguinity, voids the marriage contract, whether the other party knows of it or not. For this reason the Master holds (Sent. iv, D, 34) that these two impediments, frigidity and slavery, make it not altogether unlawful for their subjects to marry.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(5) —

A man cannot have a perpetual natural impediment in regard to one person and not in regard to another. But if he cannot fulfill the carnal act with a virgin, while he can with one who is not a virgin, the hymeneal membrane may be broken by a medical instrument, and thus he may have connection with her. Nor would this be contrary to nature, for it would be done not for pleasure but for a remedy. Dislike for a woman is not a natural cause, but an accidental extrinsic cause: and therefore we must form the same judgment in its regard as about spells, of which we shall speak further on ( A(2) ).

P(4)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(6) —

The male is the agent in procreation, and the female is the patient, wherefore greater calidity is required in the male than in the female for the act of procreation. Hence the frigidity which renders the man impotent would not disable the woman. Yet there may be a natural impediment from another cause, namely stricture, and then we must judge of stricture in the woman in the same way as of frigidity in the man.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(2) Whether a spell can be an impediment to marriage?

P(4)- Q(58)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that a spell cannot be an impediment to marriage. For the spells in question are caused by the operation of demons. But the demons have no more power to prevent the marriage act than other bodily actions; and these they cannot prevent, for thus they would upset the whole world if they hindered eating and walking and the like. Therefore they cannot hinder marriage by spells.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, God’s work is stronger than the devil’s. But a spell is the work of the devil. Therefore it cannot hinder marriage which is the work of God.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, no impediment, unless it be perpetual, voids the marriage contract. But a spell cannot be a perpetual impediment, for since the devil has no power over others than sinners, the spell will be removed if the sin be cast out, or by another spell, or by the exorcisms of the Church which are employed for the repression of the demon’s power.

Therefore a spell cannot be an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, carnal copulation cannot be hindered, unless there be an impediment to the generative power which is its principle. But the generative power of one man is equally related to all women. Therefore a spell cannot be an impediment in respect of one woman without being so also in respect of all.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. 1, cap. iv): “If by sorcerers or witches... ,” and further on, “if they be incurable, they must be separated.”

P(4)- Q(58)- A(2) —

Further, the demons’ power is greater than man’s: “There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him who was made to fear no one” ( Job 41:24).

Now through the action of man, a person may be rendered incapable of carnal copulation by some power or by castration; and this is an impediment to marriage. Therefore much more can this be done by the power of a demon.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(2) —

I answer that, Some have asserted that witchcraft is nothing in the world but an imagining of men who ascribed to spells those natural effects the causes of which are hidden. But this is contrary to the authority of holy men who state that the demons have power over men’s bodies and imaginations, when God allows them: wherefore by their means wizards can work certain signs. Now this opinion grows from the root of unbelief or incredulity, because they do not believe that demons exist save only in the imagination of the common people, who ascribe to the demon the terrors which a man conjures from his thoughts, and because, owing to a vivid imagination, certain shapes such as he has in his thoughts become apparent to the senses, and then he believes that he sees the demons. But such assertions are rejected by the true faith whereby we believe that angels fell from heaven, and that the demons exist, and that by reason of their subtle nature they are able to do many things which we cannot; and those who induce them to do such things are called wizards.

Wherefore others have maintained that witchcraft can set up an impediment to carnal copulation, but that no such impediment is perpetual: hence it does not void the marriage contract, and they say that the laws asserting this have been revoked. But this is contrary to actual facts and to the new legislation which agrees with the old.

We must therefore draw a distinction: for the inability to copulate caused by witchcraft is either perpetual and then it voids marriage, or it is not perpetual and then it does not void marriage. And in order to put this to practical proof the Church has fixed the space of three years in the same way as we have stated with regard to frigidity ( A(1) ). There is, however this difference between a spell and frigidity, that a person who is impotent through frigidity is equally impotent in relation to one as to another, and consequently when the marriage is dissolved, he is not permitted to marry another woman. whereas through witchcraft a man may be rendered impotent in relation to one woman and not to another, and consequently when the Church adjudges the marriage to be dissolved, each party is permitted to seek another partner in marriage.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The first corruption of sin whereby man became the slave of the devil was transmitted to us by the act of the generative power, and for this reason God allows the devil to exercise his power of witchcraft in this act more than in others. Even so the power of witchcraft is made manifest in serpents more than in other animals according to Genesis 3, since the devil tempted the woman through a serpent.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(2)- RO(2) —

God’s work may be hindered by the devil’s work with God’s permission; not that the devil is stronger than God so as to destroy His works by violence.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Some spells are so perpetual that they can have no human remedy, although God might afford a remedy by coercing the demon, or the demon by desisting. For, as wizards themselves admit, it does not always follow that what was done by one kind of witchcraft can be destroyed by another kind, and even though it were possible to use witchcraft as a remedy, it would nevertheless be reckoned to be perpetual, since nowise ought one to invoke the demon’s help by witchcraft. Again, if the devil has been given power over a person on account of sin, it does not follow that his power ceases with the sin, because the punishment sometimes continues after the fault has been removed. And again, the exorcisms of the Church do not always avail to repress the demons in all their molestations of the body, if God will it so, but they always avail against those assaults of the demons against which they are chiefly instituted.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Witchcraft sometimes causes an impediment in relation to all, sometimes in relation to one only: because the devil is a voluntary cause not acting from natural necessity. Moreover, the impediment resulting from witchcraft may result from an impression made by the demon on a man’s imagination, whereby he is deprived of the concupiscence that moves him in regard to a particular woman and not to another.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(3) Whether madness is an impediment to marriage?

P(4)- Q(58)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that madness is not an impediment to marriage. For spiritual marriage which is contracted in Baptism is more excellent than carnal marriage. But mad persons can be baptized. Therefore they can also marry.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, frigidity is an impediment to marriage because it impedes carnal copulation, which is not impeded by madness.

Therefore neither is marriage impeded thereby.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, marriage is not voided save by a perpetual impediment. But one cannot tell whether madness is a perpetual impediment. Therefore it does not void marriage.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, the impediments that hinder marriage are sufficiently contained in the verses given above ( Q(50) ). But they contain no mention of madness. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Madness removes the use of reason more than error does. But error is an impediment to marriage. Therefore madness is also.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(3) —

Further, mad persons are not fit for making contracts.

But marriage is a contract. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(3) —

I answer that, The madness is either previous or subsequent to marriage. If subsequent, it nowise voids the marriage, but if it be previous, then the mad person either has lucid intervals, or not. If he has, then although it is not safe for him to marry during that interval, since he would not know how to educate his children, yet if he marries, the marriage is valid. But if he has no lucid intervals, or marries outside a lucid interval, then, since there can be no consent without use of reason, the marriage will be invalid.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The use of reason is not necessary for Baptism as its cause, in which way it is necessary for matrimony. Hence the comparison fails. We have, however, spoken of the Baptism of mad persons ( P(3), Q(68), A[12] ).

P(4)- Q(58)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Madness impedes marriage on the part of the latter’s cause which is the consent, although not on the part of the act as frigidity does. Yet the Master treats of it together with frigidity, because both are defects of nature (Sent. iv, D, 34).

P(4)- Q(58)- A(3)- RO(3) —

A passing impediment which hinders the cause of marriage, namely the consent, voids marriage altogether. But an impediment that hinders the act must needs be perpetual in order to void the marriage.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(3)- RO(4) —

This impediment is reducible to error, since in either case there is lack of consent on the part of the reason.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(4) Whether marriage is annulled by the husband committing incest with his wife’s sister?

P(4)- Q(58)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that marriage is not annulled by the husband committing incest with his wife’s sister. For the wife should not be punished for her husband’s sin. Yet she would be punished if the marriage were annulled. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, it is a greater sin to know one’s own relative, than to know the relative of one’s wife. But the former sin is not an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither is the second.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, if this is inflicted as a punishment of the sin, it would seem, if the incestuous husband marry even after his wife’s death, that they ought to be separated: which is not true.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, this impediment is not mentioned among those enumerated above ( Q(50) ). Therefore it does not void the marriage contract.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(4) —

On the contrary, By knowing his wife’s sister he contracts affinity, with his wife. But affinity voids the marriage contract.

Therefore the aforesaid incest does also.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(4) —

Further, by whatsoever a man sinneth, by the same also is he punished. Now such a man sins against marriage. Therefore he ought to be punished by being deprived of marriage.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(4) —

I answer that, If a man has connection with the sister or other relative of his wife before contracting marriage, even after his betrothal, the marriage should be broken off on account of the resultant affinity. If, however, the connection take place after the marriage has been contracted and consummated, the marriage must not be altogether dissolved: but the husband loses his right to marital intercourse, nor can he demand it without sin. And yet he must grant it if asked, because the wife should not be punished for her husband’s sin. But after the death of his wife he ought to remain without any hope of marriage, unless he receive a dispensation on account of his frailty, through fear of unlawful intercourse. If, however, he marry without a dispensation, he sins by contravening the law of the Church, but his marriage is not for this reason to be annulled. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, for incest is accounted an impediment to marriage not so much for its being a sin as on account of the affinity which it causes. For this reason it is not mentioned with the other impediments, but is included in the impediment of affinity.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5) Whether defective age is an impediment to marriage?

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that deficient age is not an impediment to marriage. For according to the laws children are under the care of a guardian until their twenty-fifth year. Therefore it would seem that before that age their reason is not sufficiently mature to give consent, and consequently that ought seemingly to be the age fixed for marrying.

Yet marriage can be contracted before that age. Therefore lack of the appointed age is not an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, just as the tie of religion is perpetual so is the marriage tie. Now according to the new legislation (cap. Non Solum, De regular. et transeunt.) no one can be professed before the fourteenth year of age. Therefore neither could a person marry if defective age were an impediment.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, just as consent is necessary for marriage on the part of the man, so is it on the part of the woman. Now a woman can marry before the age of fourteen. Therefore a man can also.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, inability to copulate, unless it be perpetual and not known, is not an impediment to marriage. But lack of age is neither perpetual nor unknown. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5)- O(5) —

Further, it is not included under any of the aforesaid impediments ( Q(50) ), and consequently would seem not to be an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5) —

On the contrary, A Decretal (cap. Quod Sedem, De frigid et malefic.) says that “a boy who is incapable of marriage intercourse is unfit to marry.” But in the majority of cases he cannot pay the marriage debt before the age of fourteen (De Animal. vii). Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5) —

Further, “There is a fixed limit of size and growth for all things in nature” according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4): and consequently it would seem that, since marriage is natural, it must have a fixed age by defect of which it is impeded.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5) —

I answer that, Since marriage is effected by way of a contract, it comes under the ordinance of positive law like other contracts.

Consequently according to law (cap. Tua, De sponsal. impub.) it is determined that marriage may not be contracted before the age of discretion when each party is capable of sufficient deliberation about marriage, and of mutual fulfilment of the marriage debt, and that marriages otherwise contracted are void. Now for the most part this age is the fourteenth year in males and the twelfth year in women: but since the ordinances of positive law are consequent upon what happens in the majority of cases, if anyone reach the required perfection before the aforesaid age, so that nature and reason are sufficiently developed to supply the lack of age, the marriage is not annulled. Wherefore if the parties who marry before the age of puberty have marital intercourse before the aforesaid age, their marriage is none the less perpetually indissoluble.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5)- RO(1) —

In matters to which nature inclines there is not required such a development of reason in order to deliberate, as in other matters: and therefore it is possible after deliberation to consent to marriage before one is able to manage one’s own affairs in other matters without a guardian.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The same answer applies, since the religious vow is about matters outside the inclination of nature, and which offer greater difficulty than marriage.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5)- RO(3) —

It is said that woman comes to the age of puberty sooner than man does (De Animal. ix); hence there is no parallel between the two.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5)- RO(4) —

In this case there is an impediment not only as to inability to copulate, but also on account of the defect of the reason, which is not yet qualified to give rightly that consent which is to endure in perpetuity.

P(4)- Q(58)- A(5)- RO(5) —

The impediment arising from defective age, like that which arises from madness, is reducible to the impediment of error; because a man has not yet the full use of his free-will.

QUESTION OF DISPARITY OF WORSHIP AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider disparity of worship as an impediment to marriage.

Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever? (2) Whether there is marriage between unbelievers? (3) Whether a husband being converted to the faith can remain with his wife if she be unwilling to be converted? (4) Whether he may leave his unbelieving wife? (5) Whether after putting her away he may take another wife? (6) Whether a husband may put aside his wife on account of other sins as he may for unbelief?

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1) Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that a believer can marry an unbeliever. For Joseph married an Egyptian woman, and Esther married Assuerus: and in both marriages there was disparity of worship, since one was an unbeliever and the other a believer. Therefore disparity of worship previous to marriage is not an impediment thereto.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the Old Law teaches the same faith as the New. But according to the Old Law there could be marriage between a believer and an unbeliever, as evidenced by Deuteronomy 21:10 seqq.: “If thou go out to the fight... and seest in the number of the captives a beautiful woman and lovest her, and wilt have her to wife... thou shalt go in unto her, and shalt sleep with her, and she shall be thy wife.” Therefore it is lawful also under the New Law.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, betrothal is directed to marriage. Now there can be a betrothal between a believer and an unbeliever in the case where a condition is made of the latter’s future conversion. Therefore under the same condition there can be marriage between them.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, every impediment to marriage is in some way contrary to marriage. But unbelief is not contrary to marriage, since marriage fulfills an office of nature whose dictate faith surpasses.

Therefore disparity of worship is not an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, there is sometime disparity of worship even between two persons who are baptized, for instance when, after Baptism, a person falls into heresy. Yet if such a person marry a believer, it is nevertheless a valid marriage. Therefore disparity of worship is not an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 2 Corinthians 6:14): “What concord hath light with darkness? [*Vulg.: ‘What fellowship hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial?’]” Now there is the greatest concord between husband and wife. Therefore one who is in the light of faith cannot marry one who is in the darkness of unbelief.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1) —

Further, it is written ( Malachi 2:11): “Juda hath profaned the holiness of the Lord, which he loved, and hath married the daughter of a strange god.”

But such had not been the case if they could have married validly.

Therefore disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1) —

I answer that, The chief good of marriage is the offspring to be brought up to the worship of God. Now since education is the work of father and mother in common, each of them intends to bring up the child to the worship of God according to their own faith.

Consequently if they be of different faith, the intention of the one will be contrary to the intention of the other, and therefore there cannot be a fitting marriage between them. For this reason disparity of faith previous to marriage is an impediment to the marriage contract.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1)- RO(1) —

In the Old Law it was allowable to marry with certain unbelievers, and forbidden with others. It was however especially forbidden with regard to inhabitants of the land of Canaan, both because the Lord had commanded them to be slain on account of their obstinacy, and because it was fraught with a greater danger, lest to wit they should pervert to idolatry those whom they married or their children, since the Israelites were more liable to adopt their rites and customs through dwelling among them. But it was permitted in regard to other unbelievers, especially when there could be no fear of their being drawn into idolatry.

And thus Joseph, Moses, and Esther married unbelievers. But under the New Law which is spread throughout the whole world the prohibition extends with equal reason to all unbelievers. Hence disparity of worship previous to marriage is an impediment to its being contracted and voids the contract.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1)- RO(2) —

This law either refers to other nations with whom they could lawfully marry, or to the case when the captive woman was willing to be converted to the faith and worship of God.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Present is related to present in the same way as future to future. Wherefore just as when marriage is contracted in the present, unity of worship is required in both contracting parties, so in the case of a betrothal, which is a promise of future marriage, it suffices to add the condition of future unity of worship.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1)- RO(4) —

It has been made clear that disparity of worship is contrary to marriage in respect of its chief good, which is the good of the offspring.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Matrimony is a sacrament: and therefore so far as the sacramental essentials are concerned, it requires purity with regard to the sacrament of faith, namely Baptism, rather than with regard to interior faith. For which reason also this impediment is not called disparity of faith, but disparity of worship which concerns outward service, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 9, Q(1) , A(1), qu. 1). Consequently if a believer marry a baptized heretic, the marriage is valid, although he sins by marrying her if he knows her to be a heretic: even so he would sin were he to marry an excommunicate woman, and yet the marriage would not be void: whereas on the other hand if a catechumen having right faith but not having been baptized were to marry a baptized believer, the marriage would not be valid.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2) Whether there can be marriage between unbelievers?

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that there can be no marriage between unbelievers. For matrimony is a sacrament of the Church. Now Baptism is the door of the sacraments. Therefore unbelievers, since they are not baptized, cannot marry any more than they can receive other sacraments.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, two evils are a greater impediment to good than one. But the unbelief of only one party is an impediment to marriage. Much more, therefore, is the unbelief of both, and consequently there can be no marriage between unbelievers.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, just as there is disparity of worship between believer and unbeliever, so can there be between two unbelievers, for instance if one be a heathen and the other a Jew. Now disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore there can be no valid marriage at least between unbelievers of different worship.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, in marriage there is real chastity. But according to Augustine (De Adult. Conjug. i, 18) there is no real chastity between an unbeliever and his wife, and these words are quoted in the Decretals (XXVIII, qu. i, can. Sic enim.). Neither therefore is there a true marriage.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, true marriage excuses carnal intercourse from sin. But marriage contracted between unbelievers cannot do this, since “the whole life of unbelievers is a sin,” as a gloss observes on Romans 14:23, “All that is not of faith is sin.” Therefore there is no true marriage between unbelievers.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Corinthians 7:12): “If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she consent to dwell with him, let him not put her away.”

But she is not called his wife except by reason of marriage. Therefore marriage between unbelievers is a true marriage.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2) —

Further, the removal of what comes after does not imply the removal of what comes first. Now marriage belongs to an office of nature, which precedes the state of grace, the principle of which is faith.

Therefore unbelief does not prevent the existence of marriage between unbelievers.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2) —

I answer that, Marriage was instituted chiefly for the good of the offspring, not only as to its begetting — since this can be effected even without marriage — but also as to its advancement to a perfect state, because everything intends naturally to bring its effect to perfection. Now a twofold perfection is to be considered in the offspring. one is the perfection of nature, not only as regards the body but also as regards the soul, by those means which are of the natural law. The other is the perfection of grace: and the former perfection is material and imperfect in relation to the latter. Consequently, since those things which are for the sake of the end are proportionate to the end, the marriage that tends to the first perfection is imperfect and material in comparison with that which tends to the second perfection. And since the first perfection can be common to unbelievers and believers, while the second belongs only to believers, it follows that between unbelievers there is marriage indeed, but not perfected by its ultimate perfection as there is between believers.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Marriage was instituted not only as a sacrament, but also as an office of nature. And therefore, although marriage is not competent to unbelievers, as a sacrament dependent on the dispensation of the Church’s ministers, it is nevertheless competent to them as fulfilling an office of nature. And yet even a marriage of this kind is a sacrament after the manner of a habit, although it is not actually since they do not marry actually in the faith of the Church.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage, not by reason of unbelief, but on account of the difference of faith. For disparity of worship hinders not only the second perfection of the offspring, but also the first, since the parents endeavor to draw their children in different directions, which is not the case when both are unbelievers.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As already stated (ad 1) there is marriage between unbelievers, in so far as marriage fulfills an office of nature. Now those things that pertain to the natural law are determinable by positive law: and therefore if any law among unbelievers forbid the contracting of marriage with unbelievers of a different rite, the disparity of worship will be an impediment to their intermarrying. They are not, however, forbidden by Divine law, because before God, however much one may stray from the faith, this makes no difference to one’s being removed from grace: nor is it forbidden by any law of the Church who has not to judge of those who are without.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2)- RO(4) —

The chastity and other virtues of unbelievers are said not to be real, because they cannot attain the end of real virtue, which is real happiness. Thus we say it is not a real wine if it has not the effect of wine.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(2)- RO(5) —

An unbeliever does not sin in having intercourse with his wife, if he pays her the marriage debt, for the good of the offspring, or for the troth whereby he is bound to her: since this is an act of justice and of temperance which observes the due circumstance in pleasure of touch; even as neither does he sin in performing acts of other civic virtues. Again, the reason why the whole life of unbelievers is said to be a sin is not that they sin in every act, but because they cannot be delivered from the bondage of sin by that which they do.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3) Whether the husband, being converted to the faith, may remain with his wife is she be unwilling to be converted?

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that when a husband is converted to the faith he cannot remain with his wife who is an unbeliever and is unwilling to be converted, and whom he had married while he was yet an unbeliever. For where the danger is the same one should take the same precautions. Now a believer is forbidden to marry an unbeliever for fear of being turned away from the faith. Since then if the believer remain with the unbeliever whom he had married previously, the danger is the same, in fact greater, for neophytes are more easily perverted than those who have been brought up in the faith, it would seem that a believer, after being converted, cannot remain with an unbeliever.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, “An unbeliever cannot remain united to her who has been received into the Christian faith” (Decretals, XXVIII, qu. 1, can. Judaei). Therefore a believer is bound to put away a wife who does not believe.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, a marriage contracted between believers is more perfect than one contracted between unbelievers. Now, if believers marry within the degrees forbidden by the Church, their marriage is void.

Therefore the same applies to unbelievers, and thus a believing husband cannot remain with an unbelieving wife, at any rate, if as an unbeliever he married her within the forbidden degrees.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, sometimes an unbeliever has several wives recognized by his law. If, then, he can remain with those whom he married while yet an unbeliever, it would seem that even after his conversion he can retain several wives.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, it may happen that after divorcing his first wife he has married a second, and that he is converted during this latter marriage. It would seem therefore that at least in this case he cannot remain with this second wife.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The Apostle counsels him to remain ( 1 Corinthians 7:12).

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3) —

Further, no impediment that supervenes upon a true marriage dissolves it. Now it was a true marriage when they were both unbelievers. Therefore when one of them is converted, the marriage is not annulled on that account; and thus it would seem that they may lawfully remain together.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3) —

I answer that, The faith of a married person does not dissolve but perfects the marriage. Wherefore, since there is true marriage between unbelievers, as stated above ( A(2), ad 1), the marriage tie is not broken by the fact that one of them is converted to the faith, but sometimes while the marriage tie remains, the marriage is dissolved as to cohabitation and marital intercourse, wherein unbelief and adultery are on a par, since both are against the good of the offspring. Consequently, the husband has the same power to put away an unbelieving wife or to remain with her, as he has to put away an adulterous wife or to remain with her.

For an innocent husband is free to remain with an adulterous wife in the hope of her amendment, but not if she be obstinate in her sin of adultery, lest he seem to approve of her disgrace; although even if there be hope of her amendment he is free to put her away. In like manner the believer after his conversion may remain with the unbeliever in the hope of her conversion, if he see that she is not obstinate in her unbelief, and he does well in remaining with her, though not bound to do so: and this is what the Apostle counsels ( 1 Corinthians 7:12).

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3)- RO(1) —

It is easier to prevent a thing being done than to undo what is rightly done. Hence there are many things that impede the contracting of marriage if they precede it, which nevertheless cannot dissolve it if they follow it. Such is the case with affinity ( Q(55), A(6) ): and it is the same with disparity of worship.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3)- RO(2) —

In the early Church at the time of the apostles, both Jews and Gentiles were everywhere converted to the faith: and consequently the believing husband could then have a reasonable hope for his wife’s conversion, even though she did not promise to be converted.

Afterwards, however, as time went on the Jews became more obstinate than the Gentiles, because the Gentiles still continued to come to the faith, for instance, at the time of the martyrs, and at the time of Constantine and thereabouts. Wherefore it was not safe then for a believer to cohabit with an unbelieving Jewish wife, nor was there hope for her conversion as for that of a Gentile wife. Consequently, then, the believer could, after his conversion, cohabit with his wife if she were a Gentile, but not if she were a Jewess, unless she promised to be converted. This is the sense of that decree. Now, however, they are on a par, namely Gentiles and Jews, because both are obstinate; and therefore unless the unbelieving wife be willing to be converted, he is not allowed to cohabit with her, be she Gentile or Jew.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Non-baptized unbelievers are not bound by the laws of the Church, but they are bound by the ordinances of the Divine law. Hence unbelievers who have married within the degrees forbidden by the Divine law, whether both or one of them be converted to the faith, cannot continue in a like marriage. But if they have married within the degrees forbidden by a commandment of the Church, they can remain together if both be converted, or if one be converted and there be hope of the other’s conversion.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3)- RO(4) —

To have several wives is contrary to the natural law by which even unbelievers are bound. Wherefore an unbeliever is not truly married save to her whom he married first. Consequently if he be converted with all his wives, he may remain with the first, and must put the others away. If, however, the first refuse to be converted, and one of the others be converted, he has the same right to marry her again as he would have to marry another. We shall treat of this matter further on ( A(5) ).

P(4)- Q(59)- A(3)- RO(5) —

To divorce a wife is contrary to the law of nature, wherefore it is not lawful for an unbeliever to divorce his wife.

Hence if he be converted after divorcing one and marrying another, the same judgment is to be pronounced in this case as in the case of a man who had several wives, because if he wish to be converted he is bound to take the first whom he had divorced and to put the other away.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4) Whether a believer can, after his conversion, put away his unbelieving wife if she be willing to cohabit with him without insult to the Creator?

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that a believer, after his conversion, cannot put away his unbelieving wife if she be willing to cohabit with him without insult to the Creator. For the husband is more bound to his wife than a slave to his master. But a converted slave is not freed from the bond of slavery, as appears from 1 Corinthians 7:21; <540601> Timothy 6:1. Therefore neither can a believing husband put away his unbelieving wife.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, no one may act to another’s prejudice without the latter’s consent. Now the unbelieving wife had a right in the body of her unbelieving husband. If, then, her husband’s conversion to the faith could be prejudicial to the wife, so that he would be free to put her away, the husband could not be converted to the faith without his wife’s consent, even as he cannot receive orders or vow continence without her consent.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, if a man, whether slave or free, knowingly marry a bondwoman, he cannot put her away on account of her different condition. Since, then, the husband, when he married an unbeliever, knew that she was an unbeliever, it would seem that in like manner he cannot put her away on account of her unbelief.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, a father is in duty bound to work for the salvation of his children. But if he were to leave his unbelieving wife, the children of their union would remain with the mother, because “the offspring follows the womb,” and thus their salvation would be imperiled.

Therefore he cannot lawfully put away his unbelieving wife.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4)- O(5) —

Further, an adulterous husband cannot put away an adulterous wife, even after he has done penance for his adultery.

Therefore if an adulterous and an unbelieving husband are to be judged alike, neither can the believer put aside the unbeliever, even after his conversion to the faith.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4) —

On the contrary, are the words of the Apostle ( Corinthians 7:15,16).

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4) —

Further, spiritual adultery is more grievous than carnal. But a man can put his wife away, as to cohabitation, on account of carnal adultery. Much more, therefore, can he do so on account of unbelief, which is spiritual adultery.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4) —

I answer that, Different things are competent and expedient to man according as his life is of one kind or of another.

Wherefore he who dies to his former life is not bound to those things to which he was bound in his former life. Hence it is that he who vowed certain things while living in the world is not bound to fulfill them when he dies to the world by adopting the religious life. Now he who is baptized is regenerated in Christ and dies to his former life, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, and consequently he is freed from the obligation whereby he was bound to pay his wife the marriage debt, and is not bound to cohabit with her when she is unwilling to be converted, although in a certain case he is free to do so, as stated above ( A(3) ), just as a religious is free to fulfill the vows he took in the world, if they be not contrary to his religious profession, although he is not bound to do so.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Bondage is not inconsistent with the perfection of the Christian religion, which makes a very special profession of humility. But the obligation to a wife, or the conjugal bond, is somewhat derogatory to the perfection of Christian life, the highest state of which is in the possession of the continent: hence the comparison fails.

Moreover one married party is not bound to the other as the latter’s possession, as a slave to his master, but by way of a kind of partnership, which is unfitting between unbeliever and believer as appears from Corinthians 6:15; hence there is no comparison between a slave and a married person.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The wife had a right in the body of her husband only as long as he remained in the life wherein he had married, since also when the husband dies the wife “is delivered from the law of her husband” ( Romans 7:3). Wherefore if the husband leave her after he has changed his life by dying to his former life, this is nowise prejudicial to her. Now he who goes over to the religious life dies but a spiritual death and not a bodily death. Wherefore if the marriage be consummated, the husband cannot enter religion without his wife’s consent, whereas he can before carnal connection when there is only a spiritual connection. On the other hand, he who is baptized is even corporeally buried together with Christ unto death; and therefore he is freed from paying the marriage debt even after the marriage has been consummated.

We may also reply that it is through her own fault in refusing to be converted that the wife suffers prejudice.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Disparity of worship makes a person simply unfit for lawful marriage, whereas the condition of bondage does not, but only where it is unknown. Hence there is no comparison between an unbeliever and a bondswoman.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4)- RO(4) —

Either the child has reached a perfect age, and then it is free to follow either the believing father or the unbelieving mother, or else it is under age, and then it should be given to the believer notwithstanding that it needs the mother’s care for its education.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(4)- RO(5) —

By doing penance the adulterer does not enter another life as an unbeliever by being baptized. Hence the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5) Whether the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife can take another wife?

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife cannot take another wife. For indissolubility is of the nature of marriage, since it is contrary to the natural law to divorce one’s wife. Now there was true marriage between them as unbelievers. Therefore their marriage can nowise be dissolved. But as long as a man is bound by marriage to one woman he cannot marry another. Therefore a believer who leaves his unbelieving wife cannot take another wife.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, a crime subsequent to marriage does not dissolve the marriage. Now, if the wife be willing to cohabit without insult to the Creator, the marriage tie is not dissolved, since the husband cannot marry another. Therefore the sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator does not dissolve the marriage so that her husband be free to take another wife.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, husband and wife are equal in the marriage tie. Since, then, it is unlawful for the unbelieving wife to marry again while her husband lives, it would seem that neither can the believing husband do so.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, the vow of continence is more favorable than the marriage contract. Now seemingly it is not lawful for the believing husband to take a vow of continence without the consent of his unbelieving wife, since then the latter would be deprived of marriage if she were afterwards converted. Much less therefore is it lawful for him to take another wife.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5)- O(5) —

Further, the son who persists in unbelief after his father’s conversion loses the right to inherit from his father: and yet if he be afterwards converted, the inheritance is restored to him even though another should have entered into possession thereof. Therefore it would seem that in like manner, if the unbelieving wife be converted, her husband ought to be restored to her even though he should have married another wife: yet this would be impossible if the second marriage were valid.

Therefore he cannot take another wife.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Matrimony is not ratified without the sacrament of Baptism. Now what is not ratified can be annulled.

Therefore marriage contracted in unbelief can be annulled, and consequently, the marriage tie being dissolved, it is lawful for the husband to take another wife.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5) —

Further, a husband ought not to cohabit with an unbelieving wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator. If therefore it were unlawful for him to take another wife he would be forced to remain continent, which would seem unreasonable, since then he would be at a disadvantage through his conversion.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5) —

I answer that, When either husband or wife is converted to the faith the other remaining in unbelief, a distinction must be made. For if the unbeliever be willing to cohabit without insult to the Creator — that is without drawing the other to unbelief — the believer is free to part from the other, but by parting is not permitted to marry again.

But if the unbeliever refuse to cohabit without insult to the Creator, by making use of blasphemous words and refusing to hear Christ’s name, then if she strive to draw him to unbelief, the believing husband after parting from her may be united to another in marriage.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( A(2) ), the marriage of unbelievers is imperfect, whereas the marriage of believers is perfect and consequently binds more firmly. Now the firmer tie always looses the weaker if it is contrary to it, and therefore the subsequent marriage contracted in the faith of Christ dissolves the marriage previously contracted in unbelief. Therefore the marriage of unbelievers is not altogether firm and ratified, but is ratified afterwards by Christ’s faith.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator frees the husband from the tie whereby he was bound to his wife so as to be unable to marry again during her lifetime.

It does not however dissolve the marriage at once, since if she were converted from her blasphemy before he married again, her husband would be restored to her. But the marriage is dissolved by the second marriage which the believing husband would be unable to accomplish unless he were freed from his obligation to his wife by her own fault.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5)- RO(3) —

After the believer has married, the marriage tie is dissolved on either side, because the marriage is not imperfect as to the bond, although it is sometimes imperfect as to its effect. Hence it is in punishment of the unbelieving wife rather than by virtue of the previous marriage that she is forbidden to marry again. If however she be afterwards converted, she may be allowed by dispensation to take another husband, should her husband have taken another wife.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5)- RO(4) —

The husband ought not to take a vow of continence nor enter into a second marriage, if after his conversion there be a reasonable hope of the conversion of his wife, because the wife’s conversion would be more difficult if she knew she was deprived of her husband. If however there be no hope of her conversion, he can take Holy orders or enter religion, having first besought his wife to be converted. And then if the wife be converted after her husband has received Holy orders, her husband must not be restored to her, but she must take it as a punishment of her tardy conversion that she is deprived of her husband.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(5)- RO(5) —

The bond of fatherhood is not dissolved by disparity of worship, as the marriage bond is: wherefore there is no comparison between an inheritance and a wife.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6) Whether other sins dissolve marriage?

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that other sins besides unbelief dissolve marriage. For adultery is seemingly more directly opposed to marriage than unbelief is. But unbelief dissolves marriage in a certain case so that it is lawful to marry again. Therefore adultery has the same effect.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, just as unbelief is spiritual fornication, so is any kind of sin. If, then unbelief dissolves marriage because it is spiritual fornication, for the same reason any kind of sin will dissolve marriage.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, it is said ( Matthew 5:30): “If thy right hand scandalize thee, pluck it off and cast it from thee,” and a gloss of Jerome says that “by the hand and the right eye we may understand our brother, wife, relatives and children.” Now these become obstacles to us by any kind of sin. Therefore marriage can be dissolved on account of any kind of sin.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6)- O(4) —

Further, covetousness is idolatry according to Ephesians 5:5. Now a wife may be put away on account of idolatry.

Therefore in like manner she can be put away on account of covetousness, as also on account of other sins graver than covetousness.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6)- O(5) —

Further, the Master says this expressly (Sent. iv, D, 30).

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is said ( Matthew 5:32): “Whosoever shall put away his wife, excepting for the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit adultery.”

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6) —

Further, if this were true, divorces would be made all day long, since it is rare to find a marriage wherein one of the parties does not fall into sin.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6) —

I answer that, Bodily fornication and unbelief have a special contrariety to the goods of marriage, as stated above ( A(3) ). Hence they are specially effective in dissolving marriages. Nevertheless it must be observed that marriage is dissolved in two ways. In one way as to the marriage tie, and thus marriage cannot be dissolved after it is ratified, neither by unbelief nor by adultery. But if it be not ratified, the tie is dissolved, if the one party remain in unbelief, and the other being converted to the faith has married again. On the other hand the aforesaid tie is not dissolved by adultery, else the unbeliever would be free to give a bill of divorce to his adulterous wife, and having put her away, could take another wife, which is false. In another way marriage is dissolved as to the act, and thus it can be dissolved on account of either unbelief or fornication. But marriage cannot be dissolved even as to the act on account of other sins, unless perchance the husband wish to cease from intercourse with his wife in order to punish her by depriving her of the comfort of his presence.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Although adultery is opposed to marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, more directly than unbelief, it is the other way about if we consider marriage as a sacrament of the Church, from which source it derives perfect stability, inasmuch as it signifies the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church. Wherefore the marriage that is not ratified can be dissolved as to the marriage tie on account of unbelief rather than on account of adultery.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The primal union of the soul to God is by faith, and consequently the soul is thereby espoused to God as it were, according to Hosea 2:20, “I will espouse thee to Me in faith.” Hence in Holy Writ idolatry and unbelief are specially designated by the name of fornication: whereas other sins are called spiritual fornications by a more remote signification.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6)- RO(3) —

This applies to the case when the wife proves a notable occasion of sin to her husband, so that he has reason to fear his being in danger: for then the husband can withdraw from living with her, as stated above ( A(5) ).

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6)- RO(4) —

Covetousness is said to be idolatry on account of a certain likeness of bondage, because both the covetous and the idolater serve the creature rather than the Creator; but not on account of likeness of unbelief, since unbelief corrupts the intellect whereas covetousness corrupts the affections.

P(4)- Q(59)- A(6)- RO(5) —

The words of the Master refer to betrothal, because a betrothal can be rescinded on account of a subsequent crime. Or, if he is speaking of marriage, they must be referred to the severing of mutual companionship for a time, as stated above, or to the case when the wife is unwilling to cohabit except on the condition of sinning, for instance, if she were to say: “I will not remain your wife unless you amass wealth for me by theft,” for then he ought to leave her rather than thieve.

QUESTION OF WIFE-MURDER (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider wife-murder, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether in a certain case it is lawful to kill one’s wife? (2) Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?

P(4)- Q(60)- A(1) Whether it is lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery?

P(4)- Q(60)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery. For the Divine law commanded adulterous wives to be stoned. Now it is not a sin to fulfill the Divine law.

Neither therefore is it a sin to kill one’s own wife if she be an adulteress.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which the law can rightly do, can be rightly done by one whom the law has commissioned to do it. But the law can rightly kill an adulterous wife or any other person deserving of death. Since then the law has commissioned the husband to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery, it would seem that he can rightly do so.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the husband has greater power over his adulterous wife than over the man who committed adultery with her. Now if the husband strike a cleric whom he found with his wife he is not excommunicated. Therefore it would seem lawful for him even to kill his own wife if she be discovered in adultery.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the husband is bound to correct his wife. But correction is given by inflicting a just punishment. Since then the just punishment of adultery is death, because it is a capital sin, it would seem lawful for a husband to kill his adulterous wife.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37) that “the Church of God is never bound by the laws of this world, for she has none but a spiritual sword.” Therefore it would seem that he who wishes to belong to the Church cannot rightly take advantage of the law which permits a man to kill his wife.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(1) —

Further, husband and wife are judged on a par. But it is not lawful for a wife to kill her husband if he be discovered in adultery.

Neither therefore may a husband kill his wife.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(1) —

I answer that, It happens in two ways that a husband kills his wife. First, by a civil judgment; and thus there is no doubt that a husband, moved by zeal for justice and not by vindictive anger or hatred can, without sin, bring a criminal accusation of adultery upon his wife before a secular court, and demand that she receive capital punishment as appointed by the law; just as it is lawful to accuse a person of murder or any other crime. Such an accusation however cannot be made in an ecclesiastical court, because, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37), the Church does not wield a material sword. Secondly, a husband can kill his wife himself without her being convicted in court, and thus to kill her outside of the act of adultery is not lawful, neither according to civil law nor according to the law of conscience, whatever evidence he may have of her adultery. The civil law however considers it, as though it were lawful, that he should kill her in the very act, not by commanding him to do so, but by not inflicting on him the punishment for murder, on account of the very great provocation which the husband receives by such a deed to kill his wife. But the Church is not bound in this matter by human laws, neither does she acquit him of the debt of eternal punishment, nor of such punishment as may be awarded him by an ecclesiastical tribunal for the reason that he is quit of any punishment to be inflicted by a secular court.

Therefore in no case is it lawful for a husband to kill his wife on his own authority.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The law has committed the infliction of this punishment not to private individuals, but to public persons, who are deputed to this by their office. Now the husband is not his wife’s judge: wherefore he may not kill her, but may accuse her in the judge’s presence.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The civil law has not commissioned the husband to kill his wife by commanding him to do so, for thus he would not sin, just as the judge’s deputy does not sin by killing the thief condemned to death: but it has permitted this by not punishing it. For which reason it has raised certain obstacles to prevent the husband from killing his wife.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(1)- RO(3) —

This does not prove that it is lawful simply, but that it is lawful as regards immunity from a particular kind of punishment, since excommunication is also a kind of punishment.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(1)- RO(4) —

There are two kinds of community: the household, such as a family; and the civil community, such as a city or kingdom. Accordingly, he who presides over the latter kind of community, a king for instance, can punish an individual both by correcting and by exterminating him, for the betterment of the community with whose care he is charged. But he who presides over a community of the first kind, can inflict only corrective punishment, which does not extend beyond the limits of amendment, and these are exceeded by the punishment of death.

Wherefore the husband who exercises this kind of control over his wife may not kill her, but he may accuse or chastise her in some other way.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(2) Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?

P(4)- Q(60)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that wife-murder is not an impediment to marriage. For adultery is more directly opposed to marriage than murder is. Now adultery is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, it is a more grievous sin to kill one’s mother than one’s wife, for it is never lawful to strike one’s mother, whereas it is sometimes lawful to strike one’s wife. But matricide is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it is a greater sin for a man to kill another man’s wife on account of adultery than to kill his own wife, inasmuch as he has less motive and is less concerned with her correction.

But he who kills another man’s wife is not hindered from marrying.

Neither therefore is he who kills his own wife.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. But the sin of murder can be removed by repentance. Therefore the consequent impediment to marriage can be removed also: and consequently it would seem that after he has done penance he is not forbidden to marry.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(2) —

On the contrary, A canon (caus. xxxiii, qu. ii, can.

Interfectores) says: “The slayers of their own wives must be brought back to penance, and they are absolutely forbidden to marry.” Further, in whatsoever a man sins, in that same must he be punished. But he who kills his wife sins against marriage. Therefore he must be punished by being deprived of marriage.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(2) —

I answer that, By the Church’s decree wife-murder is an impediment to marriage. Sometimes however it forbids the contracting of marriage without voiding the contract, when to wit the husband kills his wife on account of adultery or even through hatred; nevertheless if there be fear lest he should prove incontinent, he may be dispensed by the Church so as to marry lawfully. Sometimes it also voids the contract, as when a man kills his wife in order to marry her with whom he has committed adultery, for then the law declares him simply unfit to marry her, so that if he actually marry her his marriage is void. He is not however hereby rendered simply unfit by law in relation to other women: wherefore if he should have married another, although he sin by disobeying the Church’s ordinance, the marriage is nevertheless not voided for this reason.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Murder and adultery in certain cases forbid the contracting of marriage and void the contract, as we say here in regard to wife-murder, and shall say further on (Sent. iv, Q(62), A(2) ) in regard to adultery. We may also reply that wife-murder is contrary to the substance of wedlock, whereas adultery is contrary to the good of fidelity due to marriage. Hence adultery is not more opposed to marriage than wifemurder, and the argument is based on a false premiss.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Simply speaking it is a more grievous sin to kill one’s mother than one’s wife, as also more opposed to nature, since a man reveres his mother naturally. Consequently he is less inclined to matricide and more prone to wife-murder; and it is to repress this proneness that the Church has forbidden marriage to the man who has murdered his wife.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Such a man does not sin against marriage as he does who kills his own wife; wherefore the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(60)- A(2)- RO(4) —

It does not follow that because guilt has been remitted therefore the entire punishment is remitted, as evidenced by irregularity. For repentance does not restore a man to his former dignity, although it can restore him to his former state of grace, as stated above ( Q(38), A(1), ad 3).

QUESTION OF THE IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE, ARISING FROM A SOLEMN VOW (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the impediments which supervene to marriage. We shall consider (1) the impediment which affects an unconsummated marriage, namely a solemn vow: (2) the impediment which affects a consummated marriage, namely fornication.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether either party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other’s consent? (2) Whether they can enter religion before the consummation of the marriage? (3) Whether the wife can take another husband if her former husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?

P(4)- Q(61)- A(1) Whether one party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other’s consent?

P(4)- Q(61)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that even after the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other’s consent. For the Divine law ought to be more favorable to spiritual things than human law. Now human law has allowed this. Therefore much more should the Divine law permit it.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the lesser good does not hinder the greater. But the married state is a lesser good than the religious state, according to 1 Corinthians 7:38. Therefore marriage ought not to hinder a man from being able to enter religion.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, in every form of religious life there is a kind of spiritual marriage. Now it is lawful to pass from a less strict religious order to one that is stricter. Therefore it is also allowable to pass from a less strict — namely a carnal — marriage to a stricter marriage, namely that of the religious life, even without the wife’s consent.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Married persons are forbidden ( Corinthians 7:5) to abstain from the use of marriage even for a time without one another’s consent, in order to have time for prayer.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(1) —

Further, no one can lawfully do that which is prejudicial to another without the latter’s consent. Now the religious vow taken by one consort is prejudicial to the other, since the one has power over the other’s body. Therefore one of them cannot take a religious vow without the other’s consent.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(1) —

I answer that, No one can make an offering to God of what belongs to another. Wherefore since by a consummated marriage the husband’s body already belongs to his wife, he cannot by a vow of continence offer it to God without her consent.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Human law considers marriage merely as fulfilling an office of nature: whereas the Divine law considers it as a sacrament, by reason of which it is altogether indissoluble. Hence the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(1)- RO(2) —

It is not unreasonable that a greater good be hindered by a lesser which is contrary to it, just as good is hindered by evil.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(1)- RO(3) —

In every form of religious life marriage is contracted with one person, namely Christ; to Whom, however, a person contracts more obligations in one religious order than in another. But in carnal marriage and religious marriage the contract is not with the same person: wherefore that comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(2) Whether before the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other’s consent?

P(4)- Q(61)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that even before the marriage has been consummated one consort cannot enter religion without the other’s consent. For the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the sacrament of matrimony, inasmuch, namely, as it signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Now marriage is a true sacrament before its consummation, and after consent has been expressed in words of the present. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by one of them entering religion.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, by virtue of the consent expressed in words of the present, the one consort has given power over his body to the other. Therefore the one can forthwith ask for the marriage debt, and the other is bound to pay: and so the one cannot enter religion without the other’s consent.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it is said ( Matthew 19:6): “What God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” But the union which precedes marital intercourse was made by God. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by the will of man.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(2) —

On the contrary, According to Jerome [*Prolog. in Joan.] our Lord called John from his wedding.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(2) —

I answer that, Before marital intercourse there is only a spiritual bond between husband and wife, but afterwards there is a carnal bond between them. Wherefore, just as after marital intercourse marriage is dissolved by carnal death, so by entering religion the bond which exists before the consummation of the marriage is dissolved, because religious life is a kind of spiritual death, whereby a man dies to the world and lives to God.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Before consummation marriage signifies the union of Christ with the soul by grace, which is dissolved by a contrary spiritual disposition, namely mortal sin. But after consummation it signifies the union of Christ with the Church, as regards the assumption of human nature into the unity of person, which union is altogether indissoluble.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Before consummation the body of one consort is not absolutely delivered into the power of the other, but conditionally, provided neither consort meanwhile seek the fruit of a better life. But by marital intercourse the aforesaid delivery is completed, because then each of them enters into bodily possession of the power transferred to him.

Wherefore also before consummation they are not bound to pay the marriage debt forthwith after contracting marriage by words of the present, but a space of two months is allowed them for three reasons. First that they may deliberate meanwhile about entering religion; secondly, to prepare what is necessary for the solemnization of the wedding. thirdly, lest the husband think little of a gift he has not longed to possess (cap.

Institutum, caus. xxvi, qu. ii).

P(4)- Q(61)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The marriage union, before consummation, is indeed perfect as to its primary being, but is not finally perfect as to its second act which is operation. It is like bodily possession and consequently is not altogether indissoluble.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(3) Whether the wife may take another husband if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?

P(4)- Q(61)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the wife may not take another husband, if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage. For that which is consistent with marriage does not dissolve the marriage tie. Now the marriage tie still remains between those who equally take religious vows. Therefore by the fact that one enters religion, the other is not freed from the marriage tie. But as long as she remains tied to one by marriage, she cannot marry another.

Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, after entering religion and before making his profession the husband can return to the world. If then the wife can marry again when her husband enters religion, he also can marry again when he returns to the world: which is absurd.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, by a new decree (cap. Non solum, de regular. et transeunt.) a profession, if made before the expiry of a year, is accounted void. Therefore if he return to his wife after making such a profession, she is bound to receive him. Therefore neither by her husband’s entry into religion, nor by his taking a vow, does the wife receive the power to marry again.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(3) —

On the contrary, No one can bind another to those things which belong to perfection. Now continence is of those things that belong to perfection. Therefore a wife is not bound to continence on account of her husband entering religion, and consequently she can marry.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(3) —

I answer that, Just as bodily death of the husband dissolves the marriage tie in such a way that the wife may marry whom she will, according to the statement of the Apostle ( 1 Corinthians 7:39); so too after the husband’s spiritual death by entering religion, she can marry whom she will.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(3)- RO(1) —

When both consorts take a like vow of continence, neither renounces the marriage tie, wherefore it still remains: but when only one takes the vow, then for his own part he renounces the marriage tie, wherefore the other is freed therefrom.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(3)- RO(2) —

A person is not accounted dead to the world by entering religion until he makes his profession, and consequently his wife is bound to wait for him until that time.

P(4)- Q(61)- A(3)- RO(3) —

We must judge of a profession thus made before the time fixed by law, as of a simple vow. Wherefore just as when the husband has taken a simple vow his wife is not bound to pay him the marriage debt, and yet has not the power to marry again, so is it in this case.

QUESTION OF THE IMPEDIMENT THAT SUPERVENES TO MARRIAGE AFTER ITS CONSUMMATION, NAMELY FORNICATION (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment that supervenes upon marriage after its consummation, namely fornication, which is an impediment to a previous marriage as regards the act, although the marriage tie remains.

Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful for a husband to put his wife away on account of fornication? (2) Whether he is bound to do so? (3) Whether he may put her away at his own judgment? (4) Whether in this matter husband and wife are of equal condition? (5) Whether, after being divorced, they must remain unmarried? (6) Whether they can be reconciled after being divorced?

P(4)- Q(62)- A(1) Whether it is lawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of fornication?

P(4)- Q(62)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem unlawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of fornication. For we must not return evil for evil. But the husband, by putting away his wife on account of fornication, seemingly returns evil for evil. Therefore this is not lawful.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the sin is greater if both commit fornication, than if one only commits it. But if both commit fornication, they cannot be divorced on that account. Neither therefore can they be, if only one commits fornication.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, spiritual fornication and certain other sins are more grievous than carnal fornication. But separation from bed cannot be motived by those sins. Neither therefore can it be done on account of fornication.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the unnatural vice is further removed from the marriage goods than fornication is, the manner of which is natural.

Therefore it ought to have been a cause of separation rather than fornication.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(1) —

On the contrary, are the words of Matthew 5:32.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(1) —

Further, one is not bound to keep faith with one who breaks his faith. But a spouse by fornication breaks the faith due to the other spouse. Therefore one can put the other away on account of fornication.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(1) —

I answer that, Our Lord permitted a man to put away his wife on account of fornication, in punishment of the unfaithful party and in favor of the faithful party, so that the latter is not bound to marital intercourse with the unfaithful one. There are however seven cases to be excepted in which it is not lawful to put away a wife who has committed fornication, when either the wife is not to be blamed, or both parties are equally blameworthy. The first is if the husband also has committed fornication; the second is if he has prostituted his wife; the third is if the wife, believing her husband dead on account of his long absence, has married again; the fourth is if another man has fraudulently impersonated her husband in the marriage-bed; the fifth is if she be overcome by force; the sixth is if he has been reconciled to her by having carnal intercourse with her after she has committed adultery; the seventh is if both having been married in the state of unbelief, the husband has given his wife a bill of divorce and she has married again; for then if both be converted the husband is bound to receive her back again.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(1)- RO(1) —

A husband sins if through vindictive anger he puts away his wife who has committed fornication, but he does not sin if he does so in order to avoid losing his good name, lest he seem to share in her guilt, or in order to correct his wife’s sin, or in order to avoid the uncertainty of her offspring.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Divorce on account of fornication is effected by the one accusing the other. And since no one can accuse who is guilty of the same crime, a divorce cannot be pronounced when both have committed fornication, although marriage is more sinned against when both are guilty of fornication that when only one is.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Fornication is directly opposed to the good of marriage, since by it the certainty of offspring is destroyed, faith is broken, and marriage ceases to have its signification when the body of one spouse is given to several others. Wherefore other sins, though perhaps they be more grievous than fornication, are not motives for a divorce.

Since, however, unbelief which is called spiritual fornication, is also opposed to the good of marriage consisting in the rearing of the offspring to the worship of God, it is also a motive for divorce, yet not in the same way as bodily fornication. Because one may take steps for procuring a divorce on account of one act of carnal fornication, not, however, on account of one act of unbelief, but on account of inveterate unbelief which is a proof of obstinacy wherein unbelief is perfected.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Steps may be taken to procure a divorce on account also of the unnatural vice: but this is not mentioned in the same way, both because it is an unmentionable passion, and because it does not so affect the certainty of offspring.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2) Whether the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife when she is guilty of fornication?

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife who is guilty of fornication. For since the husband is the head of his wife, he is bound to correct his wife. Now separation from bed is prescribed as a correction of the wife who is guilty of fornication. Therefore he is bound to separate from her.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, he who consents with one who sins mortally, is also guilty of mortal sin. Now the husband who retains a wife guilty of fornication would seem to consent with her, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 35). Therefore he sins unless he puts her away.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( 1 Corinthians 6:16): “He who is joined to a harlot is made one body.” Now a man cannot at once be a member of a harlot and a member of Christ ( 1 Corinthians 6:15). Therefore the husband who is joined to a wife guilty of fornication ceases to be a member of Christ, and therefore sins mortally.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, just as relationship voids the marriage tie, so does fornication dissolve the marriage-bed. Now after the husband becomes cognizant of his consanguinity with his wife, he sins mortally if he has carnal intercourse with her. Therefore he also sins mortally if he does so after knowing her to be guilty of fornication.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(5) —

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Corinthians 7:11, “Let not the husband put away his wife” says that “Our Lord permitted a wife to be put away on account of fornication.” Therefore it is not a matter of precept.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(6) —

Further, one can always pardon the sin that another has committed against oneself. Now the wife, by committing fornication, sinned against her husband. Therefore the husband may spare her by not putting her away.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2) —

I answer that, The putting away of a wife guilty of fornication was prescribed in order that the wife might be corrected by means of that punishment. Now a corrective punishment is not required when amendment has already taken place. Wherefore, if the wife repent of her sin, her husband is not bound to put her away: whereas if she repent not, he is bound to do so, lest he seem to consent to her sin, by not having recourse to her due correction.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The wife can be corrected for her sin of fornication not only by this punishment but also by words and blows; wherefore if she be ready to be corrected otherwise, her husband is not bound to have recourse to the aforesaid punishment in order to correct her.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The husband seems to consent with her when he retains her, notwithstanding that she persists in her past sin: if, however, she has mended her ways, he does not consent with her.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(3) —

She can no longer be called a harlot since she has repented of her sin. Wherefore her husband, by being joined to her, does not become a member of a harlot. We might also reply that he is joined to her not as a harlot but as his wife.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(4) —

There is no parallel, because the effect of consanguinity is that there is no marriage tie between them, so that carnal intercourse between them becomes unlawful. Whereas fornication does not remove the said tie, so that the act remains, in itself, lawful, unless it become accidentally unlawful, in so far as the husband seems to consent to his wife’s lewdness.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(5) —

This permission is to be understood as an absence of prohibition: and thus it is not in contradistinction with a precept, for that which is a matter of precept is also not forbidden.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(6) —

The wife sins not only against her husband, but also against herself and against God, wherefore her husband cannot entirely remit the punishment, unless amendment has followed.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3) Whether the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of fornication?

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of fornication. For when sentence has been pronounced by the judge, it is lawful to carry it out without any further judgment. But God, the just Judge, has pronounced this judgment, that a husband may put his wife away on account of fornication.

Therefore no further judgment is required for this.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is stated ( Matthew 1:19) that Joseph... being a just man... “was minded to put” Mary “away privately.”

Therefore it would seem that a husband may privately pronounce a divorce without the judgment of the Church.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, if after becoming cognizant of his wife’s fornication a husband has marital intercourse with his wife, he forfeits the action which he had against the adulteress. Therefore the refusal of the marriage debt, which pertains to a divorce, ought to precede the judgment of the Church.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, that which cannot be proved ought not to be submitted to the judgment of the Church. Now the crime of fornication cannot be proved, since “the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness” ( Job 24:15). Therefore the divorce in question ought not to be made on the judgment of the Church.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, accusation should be preceded by inscription [*Cf. P(2b), Q(33), A(7) ], whereby a person binds himself under the pain of retaliation, if he fails to bring proof. But this is impossible in this matter, because then, in every event the husband would obtain his end, whether he put his wife away, or his wife put him away.

Therefore she ought not to be summoned by accusation to receive the judgment of the Church.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3)- O(6) —

Further, a man is more bound to his wife than to a stranger. Now a man ought not to refer to the Church the crime of another, even though he be a stranger, without previously admonishing him privately ( Matthew 18:15). Much less therefore may the husband bring his wife’s crime before the Church, unless he has previously rebuked her in private.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3) —

On the contrary, No one should avenge himself. But if a husband were by his own judgment to put away his wife on account of fornication, he would avenge himself. Therefore this should not be done.

Further, no man is prosecutor and judge in the same cause. But the husband is the prosecutor by suing his wife for the offense she has committed against him. Therefore he cannot be the judge, and consequently he cannot put her away on his own judgment.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3) —

I answer that, A husband can put away his wife in two ways. First as to bed only, and thus he may put her away on his own judgment, as soon as he has evidence of her fornication: nor is he bound to pay her the marriage debt at her demand, unless he be compelled by the Church, and by paying it thus he nowise prejudices his own case.

Secondly, as to bed and board, and in this way she cannot be put away except at the judgment of the Church; and if she has been put away otherwise, he must be compelled to cohabit with her unless the husband can at once prove the wife’s fornication. Now this putting away is called a divorce: and consequently it must be admitted that a divorce cannot be pronounced except at the judgment of the Church.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The sentence is an application of the general law to a particular fact. Wherefore God gave out the law according to which the sentence of the court has to be pronounced.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Joseph was minded to put away the Blessed Virgin not as suspected of fornication, but because in reverence for her sanctity, he feared to cohabit with her. Moreover there is no parallel, because then the sentence at law was not only divorce but also stoning, but not now when the case is brought to the Church for judgment. The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Sometimes when the husband suspects his wife of adultery he watches her secretly that together with witnesses he may discover her in the sin of fornication, and so proceed to accusation.

Moreover, if he has no evidence of the fact, there may be strong suspicions of fornication, which suspicions being proved the fornication seems to be proved: for instance if they be found together alone, at a time and place which are open to suspicion, or “nudas cum nuda.”

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3)- RO(5) —

A husband may accuse his wife of adultery in two ways. First, he may seek a separation from bed before a spiritual judge, and then there is no need for an inscription to be made under the pain of retaliation, since thus the husband would gain his end, as the objection proves. Secondly, he may seek for the crime to be punished in a secular court, and then it is necessary for inscription to precede, whereby he binds himself under pain of retaliation if he fail to prove his case.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(3)- RO(6) —

According to a Decretal (Extra, De Simonia, cap. Licet), “there are three modes of procedure in criminal cases. First, by inquisition, which should be preceded by notoriety; secondly, by accusation, which should be preceded by inscription; [*Cf. P(2b), Q(33), A(7) ] thirdly, by denunciation, which should be preceded by fraternal correction.” Accordingly the saying of our Lord refers to the case where the process is by way of denunciation, and not by accusation, because then the end in view is not only the correction of the guilty party, but also his punishment, for the safeguarding of the common good, which would be destroyed if justice were lacking.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4) Whether in a case of divorce husband and wife should be judged on a par with each other?

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that, in a case of divorce, husband and wife ought not to be judged on a par with each other. For divorce under the New Law takes the place of the divorce [repudium] recognized by the Old Law ( Matthew 5:31,32). Now in the “repudium” husband and wife were not judged on a par with each other, since the husband could put away his wife, but not “vice versa.” Therefore neither in divorce ought they to be judged on a par with each other.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, it is more opposed to the natural law that a wife have several husbands than that a husband have several wives: wherefore the latter has been sometimes lawful, but the former never.

Therefore the wife sins more grievously in adultery than the husband, and consequently they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, where there is greater injury to one’s neighbor, there is a greater sin. Now the adulterous wife does a greater injury to her husband, than does the adulterous husband to his wife, since a wife’s adultery involves uncertainty of the offspring, whereas the husband’s adultery does not. Therefore the wife’s sin is the greater, and so they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, divorce is prescribed in order to punish the crime of adultery. Now it belongs to the husband who is the head of the wife ( 1 Corinthians 11:3) to correct his wife, rather than “vice versa.” Therefore they should not be judged on a par with each other for the purpose of divorce, but the husband ought to have the preference.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4)- O(5) —

On the contrary, It would seem in this matter the wife ought to have the preference. For the more frail the sinner the more is his sin deserving of pardon. Now there is greater frailty in women than in men, for which reason Chrysostom [*Hom. xl in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that “lust is a passion proper to women,” and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “properly speaking women are not said to be continent on account of their being easily inclined to concupiscence,” for neither can dumb animals be continent, because they have nothing to stand in the way of their desires.

Therefore women are rather to be spared in the punishment of divorce.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4)- O(6) —

Further, the husband is placed as the head of the woman in order to correct her. Therefore his sin is greater than the woman’s and so he should be punished the more.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4) —

I answer that, In a case of divorce husband and wife are judged on a par with each other, in the sense that the same things are lawful or unlawful to the one as to the other: but they are not judged on a par with each other in reference to those things, since the reason for divorce is greater in one spouse than in the other, although there is sufficient reason for divorce in both. For divorce is a punishment of adultery, in so far as it is opposed to the marriage goods. Now as regards the good of fidelity to which husband and wife are equally bound towards each other, the adultery of one is as great a sin against marriage as the adultery of the other, and this is in either of them a sufficient reason for divorce. But as regards the good of the offspring the wife’s adultery is a greater sin against marriage than the husband’s wherefore it is a greater reason for divorce in the wife than in the husband: and thus they are under an equal obligation, but not for equal reasons. Nor is this unjust for on either hand there is sufficient reason for the punishment in question, just as there is in two persons condemned to the punishment of death, although one of them may have sinned more grievously than the other.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The only reason why divorce was permitted, was to avoid murder. And since there was more danger of this in men than in women, the husband was allowed to put away his wife by a bill of divorce, but not “vice versa.”

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4)- RO(2,3) —

These arguments are based on the fact that in comparison with the good of the offspring there is more reason for divorce in an adulterous wife than in an adulterous husband. It does not follow, however, that they are not judged on a par with each other.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4)- RO(4) —

Although the husband is the head of the wife, he is her pilot as it were, and is no more her judge than she is his.

Consequently in matters that have to be submitted to a judge, the husband has no more power over his wife, than she over him.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4)- RO(5) —

In adultery there is the same sinful character as in simple fornication, and something more which aggravates it, namely the lesion to marriage. Accordingly if we consider that which is common to adultery and fornication, the sin of the husband and that of the wife are compared the one to the other as that which exceeds to that which is exceeded, for in women the humors are more abundant, wherefore they are more inclined to be led by their concupiscences, whereas in man there is abundance of heat which excites concupiscence. Simply speaking, however, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously in simple fornication than a woman, because he has more of the good of reason, which prevails over all movements of bodily passions. But as regards the lesion to marriage which adultery adds to fornication and for which reason it is an occasion for divorce, the woman sins more grievously than the man, as appears from what we have said above. And since it is more grievous than simple fornication, it follows that, simply speaking, the adulterous wife sins more grievously than the adulterous husband, other things being equal.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(4)- RO(6) —

Although the control which the husband receives over his wife is an aggravating circumstance, nevertheless the sin is yet more aggravated by this circumstance which draws the sin to another species, namely by the lesion to marriage, which lesion becomes a kind of injustice, through the fraudulent substitution of another’s child.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(5) Whether a husband can marry again after having a divorce?

P(4)- Q(62)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that a husband can marry again after having a divorce. For no one is bound to perpetual continence. Now in some cases the husband is bound to put away his wife forever on account of fornication, as stated above ( A(2) ). Therefore seemingly at least in this case he can marry again.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, a sinner should not be given a greater occasion of sin. But if she who is put away on account of the sin of fornication is not allowed to seek another marriage, she is given a greater occasion of sin: for it is improbable that one who was not continent during marriage will be able to be continent afterwards. Therefore it would seem lawful for her to marry again.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the wife is not bound to the husband save as regards the payment of the marriage debt and cohabitation. But she is freed from both obligations by divorce. Therefore “she is loosed from the law of her husband” [* Romans 7:2]. Therefore she can marry again; and the same applies to her husband.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, it is said ( Matthew 19:9):

Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another committeth adultery.”

Therefore seemingly he does not commit adultery if he marry again after putting away his wife on account of fornication, and consequently this will be a true marriage.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Corinthians 7:10,11): “Not I, but the Lord, commandeth that the wife depart not from her husband. and, if she depart, that she remain unmarried.”

P(4)- Q(62)- A(5) —

Further, no one should gain advantage from sin. But the adulteress would if she were allowed to contract another and more desired marriage; and an occasion of adultery would be afforded those who wish to marry again. Therefore it is unlawful both to the wife and to the husband to contract a second marriage.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(5) —

I answer that, Nothing supervenient to marriage can dissolve it: wherefore adultery does not make a marriage cease to be valid.

For, according to Augustine (De Nup. et Concup. i, 10), “as long as they live they are bound by the marriage tie, which neither divorce nor union with another can destroy.” Therefore it is unlawful for one, while the other lives, to marry again.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Although no one is absolutely bound to continence, he may be bound accidentally; for instance, if his wife contract an incurable disease that is incompatible with carnal intercourse. And it is the same if she labor under a spiritual disease, namely fornication, so as to be incorrigible.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The very shame of having been divorced ought to keep her from sin: and if it cannot keep her from sin, it is a lesser evil that she alone sin than that her husband take part in her sin.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Although after divorce the wife is not bound to her husband as regards paying him the marriage debt and cohabiting with him, the marriage tie, whereby she was bound to this, remains, and consequently she cannot marry again during her husband’s lifetime. She can, however, take a vow of continence, against her husband’s will, unless it seem that the Church has been deceived by false witnesses in pronouncing the divorce; for in that case, even if she has made her vow of profession she ought to be restored to her husband, and would be bound to pay the marriage debt, but it would be unlawful for her to demand it.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(5)- RO(4) —

The exception expressed in our Lord’s words refers to the putting away of the wife. Hence the objection is based on a false interpretation.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6) Whether husband and wife may be reconciled after being divorced?

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that husband and wife may not be reconciled after being divorced. For the law contains the rule (Can.

Quod bene semel, Caus. vi, qu. iv): “That which has been once well decided must not be subsequently withdrawn.” Now it has been decided by the judgment of the Church that they ought to be separated. Therefore they cannot subsequently be reconciled.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, if it were allowable for them to be reconciled, the husband would seem bound to receive his wife, especially after she has repented. But he is not bound, for the wife, in defending herself before the judge, cannot allege her repentance against her husband’s accusation of fornication. Therefore in no way is reconciliation allowable.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, if reconciliation were allowable, it would seem that the adulterous wife is bound to return to her husband if her husband asks her. But she is not bound, since they are separated by the Church. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6)- O(4) —

Further, if it were lawful to be reconciled to an adulterous wife, this would especially be the case when the husband is found to have committed adultery after the divorce. But in this case the wife cannot compel him to be reconciled, since the divorce has been justly pronounced. Therefore she may nowise be reconciled.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6)- O(5) —

Further, if a husband whose adultery is unknown put away his wife, who is convicted of adultery by the sentence of the Church, the divorce would seem to have been pronounced unjustly.

And yet the husband is not bound to be reconciled to his wife, because she is unable to prove his adultery in court. Much less, therefore, is reconciliation allowable when the divorce has been granted justly.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Corinthians 7:11): “And if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband.”

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6) —

Further, it is allowable for the husband not to put her away after fornication. Therefore, for the same reason, he can be reconciled to her after divorce.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6) —

I answer that, If the wife has mended her ways by repenting of her sin after the divorce, her husband may become reconciled to her; but if she remain incorrigible in her sin, he must not take her back, for the same reason which forbade him to retain her while she refused to desist from sin.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The sentence of the Church in pronouncing the divorce did not bind them to separate, but allowed them to do so.

Therefore reconciliation may be effected or ensue without any withdrawal of the previous sentence.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The wife’s repentance should induce the husband not to accuse or put away the wife who is guilty of fornication.

He cannot, however, be compelled to this course of action, nor can his wife oppose her repentance to his accusation, because although she is no longer guilty, neither in act nor in the stain of sin, there still remains something of the debt of punishment, and though this has been taken away in the sight of God, there still remains the debt of punishment to be inflicted by the judgment of man, because man sees not the heart as God does.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6)- RO(3) —

That which is done in a person’s favor does him no prejudice. Wherefore since the divorce has been granted in favor of the husband, it does not deprive him of the right of asking for the marriage debt, or of asking his wife to return to him. Hence his wife is bound to pay the debt, and to return to him, if he ask her, unless with his consent she has taken a vow of continence.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6)- RO(4) —

According to strict law, a husband who was previously innocent should not be compelled to receive an adulterous wife on account of his having committed adultery after the divorce. But according to equity, the judge is bound by virtue of his office first of all to admonish him to beware of imperiling his own soul and of scandalizing others; although the wife may not herself seek reconciliation.

P(4)- Q(62)- A(6)- RO(5) —

If the husband’s adultery is secret, this does not deprive his adulterous wife of the right to allege it in self-defense, although she cannot prove it. Wherefore the husband sins by seeking a divorce, and if, after the sentence of divorce, his wife asks for the marriage debt or for a reconciliation, the husband is bound to both.

QUESTION OF SECOND MARRIAGES (TWO ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider second marriage. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful? (2) Whether it is a sacrament?

P(4)- Q(63)- A(1) Whether a second marriage is lawful?

P(4)- Q(63)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that a second marriage is unlawful. Because we should judge of things according to truth. Now Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that “to take a second husband is in truth fornication,” which is unlawful. Therefore neither is a second marriage lawful.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, whatever is not good is unlawful. Now Ambrose [*On 1 Corinthians 7:40 and De Viduis] says that a second marriage is not good. Therefore it is unlawful.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, no one should be debarred from being present at such things as are becoming and lawful. Yet priests are debarred from being present at second marriages, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore they are unlawful.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, no one incurs a penalty save for sin.

Now a person incurs the penalty of irregularity on account of being married twice. Therefore a second marriage is unlawful.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(1) —

On the contrary, We read of Abraham having contracted a second marriage ( Genesis 25:1).

P(4)- Q(63)- A(1) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 5:14): “I will... that the younger,” namely widows, “should marry, bear children.”

Therefore second marriages are lawful.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(1) —

I answer that, The marriage tie lasts only until death ( Romans 7:2), wherefore at the death of either spouse the marriage tie ceases: and consequently when one dies the other is not hindered from marrying a second time on account of the previous marriage. Therefore not only second marriages are lawful, but even third and so on.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Chrysostom is speaking in reference to the cause which is wont at times to incite a person to a second marriage, namely concupiscence which incites also to fornication.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(1)- RO(2) —

A second marriage is stated not to be good, not that it is unlawful, but because it lacks the honor of the signification which is in a first marriage, where one husband has one wife, as in the case of Christ and the Church.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Men who are consecrated to Divine things are debarred not only from unlawful things, but even from things which have any appearance of turpitude; and consequently they are debarred from second marriages, which lack the decorum which was in a first marriage.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Irregularity is not always incurred on account of a sin, and may be incurred through a defect in a sacrament [*”Defectus sacramenti,” i.e. defect of signification; Cf. A(2), O(3) ]. Hence the argument is not to the point.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(2) Whether a second marriage is a sacrament?

P(4)- Q(63)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that a second marriage is not a sacrament. For he who repeats a sacrament injures the sacrament. But no sacrament should be done an injury. Therefore if a second marriage were a sacrament, marriage ought nowise to be repeated.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, in every sacrament some kind of blessing is given. But no blessing is given in a second marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore no sacrament is conferred therein.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, signification is essential to a sacrament.

But the signification of marriage is not preserved in a second marriage, because there is not a union of only one woman with only one man, as in the case of Christ and the Church. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, one sacrament is not an impediment to receiving another. But a second marriage is an impediment to receiving orders. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Marital intercourse is excused from sin in a second marriage even as in a first marriage. Now marital intercourse is excused [*Cf. Q(69) , A(1) ] by the marriage goods which are fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. Therefore a second marriage is a sacrament.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(2) —

Further, irregularity is not contracted through a second and non-sacramental union, such as fornication. Yet irregularity is contracted through a second marriage. Therefore it is a sacramental union.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(2) —

I answer that, Wherever we find the essentials of a sacrament, there is a true sacrament. Wherefore, since in a second marriage we find all the essentials of the sacrament of marriage (namely the due matter — which results from the parties having the conditions prescribed by law — and the due form, which is the expression of the inward consent by words of the present), it is clear that a second marriage is a sacrament even as a first.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This is true of a sacrament which causes an everlasting effect: for then, if the sacrament be repeated, it is implied that the first was not effective, and thus an injury is done to the first, as is clear in all those sacraments which imprint a character. But those sacraments which have not an everlasting effect can be repeated without injury to the sacrament, as in the case of Penance. And, since the marriage tie ceases with death, no injury is done to the sacrament if a woman marry again after her husband’s death.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Although the second marriage, considered in itself, is a perfect sacrament, yet if we consider it in relation to the first marriage, it is somewhat a defective sacrament, because it has not its full signification, since there is not a union of only one woman with only one man as in the marriage of Christ with the Church. And on account of this defect the blessing is omitted in a second marriage. This, however, refers to the case when it is a second marriage on the part of both man and woman, or on the part of the woman only. For if a virgin marry a man who has had another wife, the marriage is blessed nevertheless. Because the signification is preserved to a certain extent even in relation to the former marriage, since though Christ has but one Church for His spouse, there are many persons espoused to Him in the one Church. But the soul cannot be espoused to another besides Christ, else it commits fornication with the devil. Nor is there a spiritual marriage. For this reason when a woman marries a second time the marriage is not blessed on account of the defect in the sacrament.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The perfect signification is found in a second marriage considered in itself, not however if it be considered in relation to the previous marriage, and it is thus that it is a defective sacrament.

P(4)- Q(63)- A(2)- RO(4) —

A second marriage in so far as there is a defect in the sacrament, but not as a sacrament, is an impediment to the sacrament of Order.

QUESTION OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO MARRIAGE, AND FIRST OF THE PAYMENT OF THE MARRIAGE DEBT (TEN ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider those things which are annexed to marriage: (1) the payment of the marriage debt; (2) plurality of wives; (3) bigamy; (4) the bill of divorce; (5) illegitimate children.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether one spouse is bound to pay the marriage debt to the other? (2) Whether one is sometimes bound to pay without being asked? (3) Whether a wife may demand the debt during the menses? (4) Whether she is bound to pay it at that time? (5) Whether husband and wife are equal in this matter? (6) Whether the one without the other’s consent may take a vow that prohibits the payment of the debt? (7) Whether it is forbidden to ask for the debt at any particular time? (8) Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for it at a holy time? (9) Whether it is an obligation to pay it at the time of a festival? (10) Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times?

P(4)- Q(64)- A(1) Whether husband and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the marriage debt?

P(4)- Q(64)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that husband and wife are not mutually bound, under the obligation of a precept, to the payment of the marriage debt. For no one is forbidden to receive the Eucharist on account of fulfilling a precept. Yet he who has had intercourse with his wife cannot partake of the flesh of the Lamb according to Jerome [*Serm. de Esu Agni viii] quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 32). Therefore the payment of the debt does not come under the obligation of a precept.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is lawful to everyone to abstain from what is hurtful to his person. But it is sometimes harmful to a person to pay the debt when asked, whether on account of sickness, or because they have already paid it. Therefore it would seem allowable to refuse the one who asks.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, it is a sin to render oneself unfit to fulfill an obligation of precept. If, therefore, the payment of the debt comes under the obligation of a precept, it would seem sinful to render oneself unfit for paying the debt, by fasting or otherwise weakening the body: but apparently this is untrue.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12), marriage is directed to the begetting and rearing of children, as well as to the community of life. Now leprosy is opposed to both these ends of marriage, for since it is a contagious disease, the wife is not bound to cohabit with a leprous husband; and besides this disease is often transmitted to the offspring. Therefore it would seem that a wife is not bound to pay the debt to a leprous husband.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(1) —

On the contrary, As the slave is in the power of his master, so is one spouse in the power of the other ( 1 Corinthians 7:4).

But a slave is bound by an obligation of precept to pay his master the debt of his service according to Romans 13:7, “Render... to all men their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due,” etc. Therefore husband and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the marriage debt.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(1) —

Further, marriage is directed to the avoiding of fornication ( 1 Corinthians 7:2). But this could not be the effect of marriage, if the one were not bound to pay the debt to the other when the latter is troubled with concupiscence. Therefore the payment of the debt is an obligation of precept.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(1) —

I answer that, Marriage was instituted especially as fulfilling an office of nature. Wherefore in its act the movement of nature must be observed according to which the nutritive power administers to the generative power that alone which is in excess of what is required for the preservation of the individual: for the natural order requires that a thing should be first perfected in itself, and that afterwards it should communicate of its perfection to others: and this is also the order of charity which perfects nature. And therefore, since the wife has power over her husband only in relation to the generative power and not in relation to things directed to the preservation of the individual, the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife, in matters pertaining to the begetting of children, with due regard however to his own welfare.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(1)- RO(1) —

It is possible through fulfilling a precept to render oneself unfit for the exercise of a sacred duty: thus a judge becomes irregular by sentencing a man to death. In like manner he who pays the marriage debt, in fulfillment of the precept, becomes unfit for the exercise of divine offices, not because the act in question is sinful, but on account of its carnal nature. And so, according to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 32), Jerome is speaking only of the ministers of the Church, and not of others who should be left to use their own discretion, because without sin they may either abstain out of reverence or receive Christ’s body out of devotion.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The wife has no power over her husband’s body, except as is consistent with the welfare of his person, as stated above. Wherefore if she go beyond this in her demands, it is not a request for the debt, but an unjust exaction; and for this reason the husband is not bound to satisfy her.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(1)- RO(3) —

If the husband be rendered incapable of paying the debt through a cause consequent upon marriage, for instance through having already paid the debt and being unable to pay it, the wife has no right to ask again, and in doing so she behaves as a harlot rather than as a wife. But if he be rendered incapable through some other cause, then if this be a lawful cause, he is not bound, and she cannot ask, but if it be an unlawful cause, then he sins, and his wife’s sin, should she fall into fornication on this account, is somewhat imputable to him. Hence he should endeavor to do his best that his wife may remain continent.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Leprosy voids a betrothal but not a marriage.

Wherefore a wife is bound to pay the debt even to a leprous husband. But she is not bound to cohabit with him, because she is not so liable to infection from marital intercourse as from continual cohabitation. And though the child begotten of them be diseased, it is better to be thus than not at all.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(2) Whether a husband is bound to pay the debt if his wife does not ask for it?

P(4)- Q(64)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the husband is not bound to pay the marriage debt if his wife does not ask for it. For an affirmative precept is binding only at a certain time. But the time fixed for the payment of the debt can only be when it is asked for. Therefore he is not bound to payment otherwise.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, we ought to presume the better things of everyone. Now even for married people it is better to be continent than to make use of marriage. Therefore unless she ask expressly for the debt, the husband should presume that it pleases her to be continent, and so he is not bound to pay her the debt.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, as the wife has power over her husband, so has a master over his slave. Now a slave is not bound to serve his master save when the latter commands him. Therefore neither is a husband bound to pay the debt to his wife except when she demands it.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, the husband can sometimes request his wife not to exact the debt when she asks for it. Much more therefore may he not pay it when he is not asked.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(2) —

On the contrary, By the payment of the debt a remedy is afforded against the wife’s concupiscence. Now a physician who has the care of a sick person is bound to remedy the disease without being asked. Therefore the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife although she ask not for it. Further, a superior is bound to apply a remedy for the sins of his subjects even though they rebel against it. But the payment of the debt on the husband’s part is directed against the sins of his wife. Therefore sometimes the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife even though she ask it not of him.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(2) —

I answer that, The debt may be demanded in two ways. First, explicitly, as when they ask one another by words; secondly, implicitly, when namely the husband knows by certain signs that the wife would wish him to pay the debt, but is silent through shame. And so even though she does not ask for the debt explicitly in words, the husband is bound to pay it, whenever his wife shows signs of wishing him to do so.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The appointed time is not only when it is demanded but also when on account of certain signs there is fear of danger (to avoid which is the purpose of the payment of the debt) unless it be paid then.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The husband may presume this of his wife when he perceives in her no signs of the contrary; but it would be foolish of him to admit this presumption if he does see such signs.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The master is not ashamed to demand of his slave the duty of his service, as a wife is to ask the marriage debt of her husband. Yet if the master were not to demand it, either through ignorance or some other cause, the slave would nevertheless be bound to fulfill his duty, if some danger were threatening. For this is what is meant by “not serving to the eye” ( Ephesians 6:6; Colossians 3:22) which is the Apostle’s command to servants.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(2)- RO(4) —

A husband should not dissuade his wife from asking for the debt, except for a reasonable cause; and even then he should not be too insistent, on account of the besetting danger.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(3) Whether it is allowable for a menstruous wif to ask for the marriage debt? (*This and the Fourth Article are omitted in the Leonine edition.) P(4)- Q(64)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem lawful for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage debt. For in the Law a man who had an issue of seed was unclean, even as a menstruous woman. Yet a man who has an issue of seed may ask for the debt. Therefore a menstruous wife may also.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, leprosy is a worse complaint than suffering from monthly periods, and would seem to cause a greater corruption in the offspring. Yet a leper can ask for the debt. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, if a menstruous wife is not allowed to ask for the debt, this can only be because it is feared this may be detrimental to the offspring. Yet if the wife be unfruitful there is no such fear. Therefore, seemingly, at least an unfruitful wife may ask for the debt during her menses.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(3) —

On the contrary, “Thou shalt not approach to a woman having her flowers” ( Leviticus 18:19) where Augustine observes: “Although he has already sufficiently forbidden this he repeats the prohibition here lest he seem to have spoken figuratively.”

P(4)- Q(64)- A(3) —

Further, “All our justices” are become “as the rag of a menstruous woman” ( Isaiah 64:6) where Jerome observes: “Men ought then to keep away from their wives because thus is a deformed blind lame leprous offspring conceived: so that those parents who are not ashamed to come together in sexual intercourse have their sin made obvious to all”: and thus the same conclusion follows.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(3) —

I answer that, It was forbidden in the Law to approach to a menstruous woman, for two reasons both on account of her uncleanness, and on account of the harm that frequently resulted to the offspring from such intercourse. With regard to the first reason, it was a ceremonial precept, but with regard to the second it was a moral precept.

For since marriage is chiefly directed to the good of the offspring, all use of marriage which is intended for the good of the offspring is in order.

Consequently this precept is binding even in the New Law on account of the second reason, although not on account of the first. Now, the menstrual issue may be natural or unnatural. The natural issue is that to which women are subject at stated periods when they are in good health; and it is unnatural when they suffer from an issue of blood through some disorder resulting from sickness. Accordingly if the menstrual flow be unnatural it is not forbidden in the New Law to approach to a menstruous woman both on account of her infirmity since a woman in that state cannot conceive, and because an issue of this kind is lasting and continuous, so that the husband would have to abstain for always. When however the woman is subject to a natural issue of the menstruum, she can conceive; moreover, the said issue lasts only a short time, wherefore it is forbidden to approach to her. In like manner a woman is forbidden to ask for the debt during the period of that issue.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The issue of seed in a man is the result of infirmity, nor is the seed in this case apt for generation. Moreover a complaint of this kind is continual or lasting like leprosy: wherefore the comparison falls.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(3)- RO(3) —

As long as a woman is subject to the menses it cannot be certain that she is sterile. For some are sterile in youth, and in course of time become fruitful, and “vice versa,” as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Anim. xvi).

P(4)- Q(64)- A(4) Whether a menstruous woman should or may lawfully pay the marriage debt to her husband if he ask for it? (*This and the previous article are omitted in the Leonine edition.) P(4)- Q(64)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that a menstruous wife may not pay the marriage debt to her husband at his asking. For it is written ( Leviticus 20:18) that if any man approach to a menstruous woman both shall be put to death. Therefore it would seem that both he who asks and she who grants are guilty of mortal sin.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, “Not only they that do them but they also that consent to them are worthy of death” ( Romans 1:32). Now he who knowingly asks for the debt from a menstruous woman sins mortally.

Therefore she also sins mortally by consenting to pay the debt.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, a madman must not be given back his sword lest he kill himself or another. Therefore in like manner neither should a wife give her body to her husband during her menses, lest he be guilty of spiritual murder.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(4) —

On the contrary, “The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband” ( 1 Corinthians 7:4). Therefore at his asking his wife must pay the debt even during her menses.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(4) —

Further, the menstruous wife should not be an occasion of sin to her husband. But she would give her husband an occasion of sin, if she paid him not the debt at his asking; since he might commit fornication. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(4) —

I answer that, In this regard some have asserted that a menstruous woman may not pay the debt even as she may not ask for it.

For just as she would not be bound to pay it if she had some personal ailment so as to make it dangerous for herself, so is she not bound to pay for fear of danger to the offspring. But this opinion would seem to derogate from marriage, by which the husband is given entire power of his wife’s body with regard to the marriage act. Nor is there any parallel between bodily affliction of the offspring and the danger to her own body: since, if the wife be ailing, it is quite certain that she would be endangered by the carnal act, whereas this is by no means so certain with regard to the offspring which perhaps would not be forthcoming.

Wherefore others say that a menstruous woman is never allowed to ask for the debt; and that if her husband ask, he does so either knowingly or in ignorance. If knowingly, she ought to dissuade him by her prayers and admonitions; yet not so insistently as possibly to afford him an occasion of falling into other, and those sinful, practices, if he be deemed that way inclined. If however, he ask in ignorance, the wife may put forward some motive, or allege sickness as a reason for not paying the debt, unless there be fear of danger to her husband. If, however, the husband ultimately persists in his request, she must yield to his demand. But it would not be safe for her to make known [*”Indicare,” as in the commentary on the Sentences; the Leonine edition reads “judicare.”] her disaffection, lest this make her husband entertain a repulsion towards her, unless his prudence may be taken for granted.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(4)- RO(1) —

This refers to the case when both willingly consent, but not when the woman pays the debt by force as it were.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Since there is no consent without the concurrence of the will, the woman is not deemed to consent in her husband’s sin unless she pay the debt willingly. For when she is unwilling she is passive rather than consenting.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(4)- RO(3) —

A madman should be given back his sword if a greater danger were feared from its not being returned to him: and thus it is in the case in point.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(5) Whether husband and wife are equal in the marriage act?

P(4)- Q(64)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that husband and wife are not equal in the marriage act. For according to Augustine (Genesis ad lit. xii) the agent is more noble than the patient. But in the marriage act the husband is as agent and the wife as patient. Therefore they are not equal in that act.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, the wife is not bound to pay her husband the debt without being asked; whereas he is so bound, as stated above ( AA(1),2 ). Therefore they are not equal in the marriage act.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the woman was made on the man’s account in reference to marriage according to Genesis 2:18, “Let us make him a help like unto himself.” But that on account of which another thing is, is always the principal. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the marriage act. But in marriage “the husband is the head of the wife” ( Ephesians 5:23). Therefore they are not equal in the aforesaid act.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Corinthians 7:4): “The husband... hath not power of his own body,” and the same is said of the wife. Therefore they are equal in the marriage act.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(5) —

Further, Marriage is a relation of equiparence, since it is a kind of union, as stated above ( Q(44) , AA(1),3 ). Therefore husband and wife are equal in the marriage act.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(5) —

I answer that, Equality is twofold, of quantity and of proportion. Equality of quantity is that which is observed between two quantities of the same measure, for instance a thing two cubits long and another two cubits in length. But equality of proportion is that which is observed between two proportions of the same kind as double to double.

Accordingly, speaking of the first equality, husband and wife are not equal in marriage; neither as regards the marriage act, wherein the more noble part is due to the husband, nor as regards the household management, wherein the wife is ruled and the husband rules. But with reference to the second kind of equality, they are equal in both matters, because just as in both the marriage act and in the management of the household the husband is bound to the wife in all things pertaining to the husband, so is the wife bound to the husband in all things pertaining to the wife. It is in this sense that it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 32) that they are equal in paying and demanding the debt.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Although it is more noble to be active than passive, there is the same proportion between patient and passivity as between agent and activity; and accordingly there is equality of proportion between them.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(5)- RO(2) —

This is accidental. For the husband having the more noble part in the marriage act, it is natural that he should be less ashamed than the wife to ask for the debt. Hence it is that the wife is not bound to pay the debt to her husband without being asked, whereas the husband is bound to pay it to the wife.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(5)- RO(3) —

This proves that they are not equal absolutely, but not that they are not equal in proportion.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(5)- RO(4) —

Although the head is the principal member, yet just as the members are bound to the head in their own respective capacities, so is the head in its own capacity bound to the members: and thus there is equality of proportion between them.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(6) Whether husband and wife can take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent?

P(4)- Q(64)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that husband and wife may take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent. For husband and wife are equally bound to pay the debt, as stated above ( A(5) ). Now it is lawful for the husband, even if his wife be unwilling, to take the cross in defense of the Holy Land: and consequently this is also lawful to the wife. Therefore, since this prevents the payment of the debt, either husband or wife may without the other’s consent take the aforesaid vow.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, in taking a vow one should not await the consent of another who cannot dissent without sin. Now the husband or wife cannot, without sin, refuse their consent to the other’s taking a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time; because to prevent a person’s spiritual progress is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore the one can take a vow of continence either absolutely or for a time, without the other’s consent.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, in the marriage act, the debt has to be demanded just as it has to be paid. Now the one can, without the other’s consent, vow not to demand the debt, since in this he is within his own rights. Therefore he can equally take a vow not to pay the debt.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(6)- O(4) —

Further, no one can be bound by the command of a superior to do what he cannot lawfully vow or do simply, since one must not obey in what is unlawful. Now the superior authority might command the husband not to pay the debt to his wife for a time, by occupying him in some service. Therefore he might, of his own accord, do or vow that which would hinder him from paying the debt.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Corinthians 7:5): “Defraud not one another, except... by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer.”

P(4)- Q(64)- A(6) —

Further, no one can vow that which belongs to another. Now “the husband... hath not power of his own body, but the wife” ( 1 Corinthians 7:4).

Therefore, without her consent, the husband cannot take a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(6) —

I answer that, A vow is a voluntary act, as its very name implies: and consequently a vow can only be about those goods which are subject to our will, and those in which one person is bound to another do not come under this head. Therefore in matters of this kind one person cannot take a vow without the consent of the one to whom he is bound. Consequently, since husband and wife are mutually bound as regards the payment of the debt which is an obstacle to continence, the one cannot vow continence without the other’s consent; and if he take the vow he sins, and must not keep the vow, but must do penance for an illtaken vow [*Cf. Q(53) , AA(1),4 ; Q(61) , A(1) ].

P(4)- Q(64)- A(6)- RO(1) —

It is sufficiently probable that the wife ought to be willing to remain continent for a time, in order to succor the need of the universal Church. Hence in favor of the business for which the cross is given to him, it is laid down that the husband may take the cross without his wife’s consent, even as he might go fighting without the consent of his landlord whose land he has leased. And yet the wife is not entirely deprived of her right, since she can follow him. Nor is there a parallel between wife and husband: because, since the husband has to rule the wife and not “vice versa,” the wife is bound to follow her husband rather than the husband the wife. Moreover there would be more danger to the wife’s chastity as a result of wandering from country to country, than to the husband’s, and less profit to the Church. Wherefore the wife cannot take this vow without her husband’s consent.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The one spouse, by refusing to consent to the other’s vow of continence, does not sin, because the object of his dissent is to hinder not the other’s good, but the harm to himself.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(6)- RO(3) —

There are two opinions on this point. For some say that one can without the other’s consent vow not to demand the debt, not however not to pay it, because in the former case they are both within their own rights, but not in the second. Seeing, however, that if one were never to ask for the debt, marriage would become too burdensome to the other who would always have to undergo the shame of asking for the debt, others assert with greater probability that neither vow can be lawfully taken by one spouse without the other’s consent.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(6)- RO(4) —

Just as the wife receives power over her husband’s body, without prejudice to the husband’s duty to his own body, so also is it without prejudice to his duty to his master. Hence just as a wife cannot ask her husband for the debt to the detriment of his bodily health, so neither can she do this so as to hinder him in his duty to his master. And yet the master cannot for this reason prevent her from paying the debt.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(7) Whether it is forbidden to demand the debt on holy days?

P(4)- Q(64)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that a person ought not to be forbidden to ask for the debt on holy days. For the remedy should be applied when the disease gains strength. Now concupiscence may possibly gain strength on a feast day. Therefore the remedy should be applied then by asking for the debt.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, the only reason why the debt should not be demanded on feast days is because they are devoted to prayer. Yet on those days certain hours are appointed for prayer. Therefore one may ask for the debt at some other time.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Just as certain places are holy because they are devoted to holy things, so are certain times holy for the same reason. But it is not lawful to demand the debt in a holy place.

Therefore neither is it lawful at a holy time.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(7) —

I answer that, Although the marriage act is void of sin, nevertheless since it oppresses the reason on account of the carnal pleasure, it renders man unfit for spiritual things. Therefore, on those days when one ought especially to give one’s time to spiritual things, it is not lawful to ask for the debt.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(7)- RO(1) —

At such a time other means may be employed for the repression of concupiscence; for instance, prayer and many similar things, to which even those who observe perpetual continence have recourse.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Although one is not bound to pray at all hours, one is bound throughout the day to keep oneself fit for prayer.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(8) Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time?

P(4)- Q(64)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time. For Gregory says (Dial. i) that the devil took possession of a woman who had intercourse with her husband at night and came in the morning to the procession. But this would not have happened had she not sinned mortally. Therefore, etc.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, whoever disobeys a Divine command commits a mortal sin. Now the Lord commanded ( Exodus 19:15): “Come not near your wives,” when namely they were about to receive the Law. Much more therefore do husbands sin mortally if they have intercourse with their wives at a time when they should be intent on the sacred observances of the New Law.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(8) —

On the contrary, No circumstance aggravates infinitely. But undue time is a circumstance. Therefore it does not aggravate a sin infinitely, so as to make mortal what was otherwise venial.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(8) —

I answer that, To ask for the debt on a feast day is not a circumstance drawing a sin into another species; wherefore it cannot aggravate infinitely. Consequently a wife or husband does not sin mortally by asking for the debt on a feast day. It is however a more grievous sin to ask for the sake of mere pleasure, than through fear of the weakness of the flesh.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(8)- RO(1) —

This woman was punished not because she paid the debt, but because afterwards she rashly intruded into the divine service against her conscience.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(8)- RO(2) —

The authority quoted shows not that it is a mortal sin but that it is unbecoming. For under the Old Law which was given to a carnal people many things were required under an obligation of precept, for the sake of bodily cleanness, which are not required in the New Law which is the law of the spirit.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(9) Whether one spouse is bound to pay the debt to the other at a festal time?

P(4)- Q(64)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem that neither are they bound to pay the debt at a festal time. For those who commit a sin as well as those who consent thereto are equally punished ( Romans 1:32). But the one who pays the debt consents with the one that asks, who sins. Therefore he sins also.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, it is an affirmative precept that binds us to pray, and therefore we are bound to do so at a fixed time. Therefore one ought not to pay the debt at a time when one is bound to pray, as neither ought one at a time when one is bound to fulfill a special duty towards a temporal master.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(9) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Corinthians 7:5): “Defraud not one another, except by consent, for a time,” etc. Therefore when one spouse asks the other must pay.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(9) —

I answer that, Since the wife has power of her husband’s body, and “vice versa,” with regard to the act of procreation, the one is bound to pay the debt to the other, at any season or hour, with due regard to the decorum required in such matters, for this must not be done at once openly.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(9)- RO(1) —

As far as he is concerned he does not consent, but grants unwillingly and with grief that which is exacted of him; and consequently he does not sin. For it is ordained by God, on account of the weakness of the flesh, that the debt must always be paid to the one who asks lest he be afforded an occasion of sin.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(9)- RO(2) —

No hour is fixed for praying, but that compensation can be made at some other hour; wherefore the argument is not cogent.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(10) Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times? (*This article is omitted in the Leonine edition.) P(4)- Q(64)- A(10) - O(1) —

It would seem that weddings ought not to be forbidden at certain times. For marriage is a sacrament: and the celebration of the others sacraments is not forbidden at those times. Therefore neither should the celebration of marriage be forbidden then.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, asking for the marriage debt is more unbecoming on feast days than the celebration of marriage. Yet the debt may be asked for on those days. Therefore also marriages may be solemnized.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, marriages that are contracted in despite of the law of the Church ought to be dissolved. Yet marriages are not dissolved if they be contracted at those times. Therefore it should not be forbidden by a commandment of the Church.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(10) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Ecclesiastes 3:5): “A time to embrace, and a time to be far from embraces.”

P(4)- Q(64)- A(10) —

I answer that, When the newly married spouse is given to her husband, the minds of husband and wife are taken up with carnal preoccupations by reason of the very newness of things, wherefore weddings are wont to be signalized by much unrestrained rejoicing. On this account it is forbidden to celebrate marriages at those times when men ought especially to arise to spiritual things. Those times are from Advent until the Epiphany because of the Communion which, according to the ancient Canons, is wont to be made at Christmas (as was observed in its proper place, P(3), Q(30) ), from Septuagesima until the octave day of Easter, on account of the Easter Communion, and from the three days before the Ascension until the octave day of Pentecost, on account of the preparation for Communion to be received at that time.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(10) - RO(1) —

The celebration of marriage has a certain worldly and carnal rejoicing connected with it, which does not apply to the other sacraments. Hence the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(10) - RO(2) —

There is not such a distraction of minds caused by the payment of a request for the debt as by the celebration of a marriage; and consequently the comparison fails.

P(4)- Q(64)- A(10) - RO(3) —

Since time is not essential to a marriage contracted within the forbidden seasons, the marriage is nevertheless a true sacrament. Nor is the marriage dissolved absolutely, but for a time, that they may do penance for having disobeyed the commandment of the Church. It is thus that we are to understand the statement of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 33), namely that should a marriage have been contracted or a wedding celebrated at the aforesaid times, those who have done so “ought to be separated.” Nor does he say this on his own authority, but in reference to some canonical ordinance, such as that of the Council of Lerida, which decision is quoted by the Decretals.

QUESTION OF PLURALITY OF WIVES (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the plurality of wives. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives? (2) Whether this was ever lawful? (3) Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine? (5) Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1) Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not against the natural law to have several wives. For custom does not prejudice the law of nature. But “it was not a sin” to have several wives “when this was the custom,” according to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xv) as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 33). Therefore it is not contrary to the natural law to have several wives.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, whoever acts in opposition to the natural law, disobeys a commandment, for the law of nature has its commandments even as the written law has. Now Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xv; De Civ. Dei xv, 38) that “it was not contrary to a commandment” to have several wives, “because by no law was it forbidden.” Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting of offspring. But one man may get children of several women, by causing them to be pregnant. Therefore It is not against the natural law to have several wives.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, “Natural right is that which nature has taught all animals,” as stated at the beginning of the Digests (1, i, ff. De just. et jure). Now nature has not taught all animals that one male should be united to but one female, since with many animals the one male is united to several females. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), in the begetting of offspring the male is to the female as agent to patient, and as the craftsman is to his material. But it is not against the order of nature for one agent to act on several patients, or for one craftsman to work in several materials. Therefore neither is it contrary to the law of nature for one husband to have many wives.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(6) —

On the contrary, That which was instilled into man at the formation of human nature would seem especially to belong to the natural law. Now it was instilled into him at the very formation of human nature that one man should have one wife, according to Genesis 2:24, “They shall be two in one flesh.” Therefore it is of natural law.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(7) —

Further, it is contrary to the law of nature that man should bind himself to the impossible, and that what is given to one should be given to another. Now when a man contracts with a wife, he gives her the power of his body, so that he is bound to pay her the debt when she asks. Therefore it is against the law of nature that he should afterwards give the power of his body to another, because it would be impossible for him to pay both were both to ask at the same time.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(8) —

Further, “Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself” [*Cf. Tobias 4:16] is a precept of the natural law. But a husband would by no means be willing for his wife to have another husband. Therefore he would be acting against the law of nature, were he to have another wife in addition.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(9) —

Further, whatever is against the natural desire is contrary to the natural law. Now a husband’s jealousy of his wife and the wife’s jealousy of her husband are natural, for they are found in all.

Therefore, since jealousy is “love impatient of sharing the beloved,” it would seem to be contrary to the natural law that several wives should share one husband.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1) —

I answer that, All natural things are imbued with certain principles whereby they are enabled not only to exercise their proper actions, but also to render those actions proportionate to their end, whether such actions belong to a thing by virtue of its generic nature, or by virtue of its specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to be borne downwards by virtue of its generic nature, and to attract iron by virtue of its specific nature. Now just as in those things which act from natural necessity the principle of action is the form itself, whence their proper actions proceed proportionately to their end, so in things which are endowed with knowledge the principles of action are knowledge and appetite. Hence in the cognitive power there needs to be a natural concept, and in the appetitive power a natural inclination, whereby the action befitting the genus or species is rendered proportionate to the end. Now since man, of all animals, knows the aspect of the end, and the proportion of the action to the end, it follows that he is imbued with a natural concept, whereby he is directed to act in a befitting manner, and this is called “the natural law” or “the natural right,” but in other animals “the natural instinct.” For brutes are rather impelled by the force of nature to do befitting actions, than guided to act on their own judgment. Therefore the natural law is nothing else than a concept naturally instilled into man, whereby he is guided to act in a befitting manner in his proper actions, whether they are competent to him by virtue of his generic nature, as, for instance, to beget, to eat, and so on, or belong to him by virtue of his specific nature, as, for instance, to reason and so forth. Now whatever renders an action improportionate to the end which nature intends to obtain by a certain work is said to be contrary to the natural law. But an action may be improportionate either to the principal or to the secondary end, and in either case this happens in two ways. First, on account of something which wholly hinders the end; for instance a very great excess or a very great deficiency in eating hinders both the health of the body, which is the principal end of food, and aptitude for conducting business, which is its secondary end. Secondly, on account of something that renders the attainment of the principal or secondary end difficult, or less satisfactory, for instance eating inordinately in respect of undue time.

Accordingly if an action be improportionate to the end, through altogether hindering the principal end directly, it is forbidden by the first precepts of the natural law, which hold the same place in practical matters, as the general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. If, however, it be in any way improportionate to the secondary end, or again to the principal end, as rendering its attainment difficult or less satisfactory, it is forbidden, not indeed by the first precepts of the natural law, but by the second which are derived from the first even as conclusions in speculative matters receive our assent by virtue of self-known principles: and thus the act in question is said to be against the law of nature.

Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of children, and this end is competent to man according to his generic nature, wherefore it is common to other animals (Ethic. viii, 12), and thus it is that the “offspring” is assigned as a marriage good. But for its secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), it has, among men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life, as stated above ( Q(41) , A(1) ). And in reference to this they owe one another “fidelity” which is one of the goods of marriage. Furthermore it has another end, as regards marriage between believers, namely the signification of Christ and the Church: and thus the “sacrament” is said to be a marriage good. Wherefore the first end corresponds to the marriage of man inasmuch as he is an animal: the second, inasmuch as he is a man; the third, inasmuch as he is a believer. Accordingly plurality of wives neither wholly destroys nor in any way hinders the first end of marriage, since one man is sufficient to get children of several wives, and to rear the children born of them. But though it does not wholly destroy the second end, it hinders it considerably for there cannot easily be peace in a family where several wives are joined to one husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy the requisitions of several wives, and again because the sharing of several in one occupation is a cause of strife: thus “potters quarrel with one another” [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 4], and in like manner the several wives of one husband. The third end, it removes altogether, because as Christ is one, so also is the Church one. It is therefore evident from what has been said that plurality of wives is in a way against the law of nature, and in a way not against it.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Custom does not prejudice the law of nature as regards the first precepts of the latter, which are like the general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. But those which are drawn like conclusions from these custom enforces, as Tully declares (De Inv.

Rhet. ii), or weakens. Such is the precept of nature in the matter of having one wife.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii), “fear of the law and religion have sanctioned those things that come from nature and are approved by custom.” Wherefore it is evident that those dictates of the natural law, which are derived from the first principles as it were of the natural law, have not the binding force of an absolute commandment, except when they have been sanctioned by Divine or human law. This is what Augustine means by saying that “they did not disobey the commandments of the law, since it was not forbidden by any law.”

The Reply to the Third Objection follows from what has been said.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Natural right has several significations. First a right is said to be natural by its principle, because it is instilled by nature: and thus Tully defines it (De Inv. Rhet. ii) when he says: “Natural right is not the result of opinion but the product of an innate force.” And since even in natural things certain movements are called natural, not that they be from an intrinsic principle, but because they are from a higher moving principle — thus the movements that are caused in the elements by the impress of heavenly bodies are said to be natural, as the Commentator states (De Coelo et Mundo iii, 28), therefore those things that are of Divine right are said to be of natural right, because they are caused by the impress and influence of a higher principle, namely God. Isidore takes it in this sense, when he says (Etym. v) that “the natural right is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel.” Thirdly, right is said to be natural not only from its principle but also from its matter, because it is about natural things. And since nature is contradistinguished with reason, whereby man is a man, it follows that if we take natural right in its strictest sense, those things which are dictated by natural reason and pertain to man alone are not said to be of natural right, but only those which are dictated by natural reason and are common to man and other animals. Thus we have the aforesaid definition, namely: “Natural right is what nature has taught all animals.” Accordingly plurality of wives, though not contrary to natural right taken in the third sense, is nevertheless against natural right taken in the second sense, because it is forbidden by the Divine law. It is also against natural right taken in the first sense, as appears from what has been said, for such is nature’s dictate to every animal according to the mode befitting its nature. Wherefore also certain animals, the rearing of whose offspring demands the care of both, namely the male and female, by natural instinct cling to the union of one with one, for instance the turtle-dove, the dove, and so forth.

The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.

Since, however, the arguments adduced “on the contrary side” would seem to show that plurality of wives is against the first principles of the natural law, we must reply to them.

Accordingly we reply to the Sixth Objection that human nature was founded without any defect, and consequently it is endowed not only with those things without which the principal end of marriage is impossible of attainment, but also with those without which the secondary end of marriage could not be obtained without difficulty: and in this way it sufficed man when he was first formed to have one wife, as stated above.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- RO(7) —

In marriage the husband gives his wife power of his body, not in all respects, but only in those things that are required by marriage. Now marriage does not require the husband to pay the debt every time his wife asks for it, if we consider the principal end for which marriage was instituted, namely the good of the offspring, but only as far as is necessary for impregnation. But in so far as it is instituted as a remedy (which is its secondary end), marriage does require the debt to be paid at all times on being asked for. Hence it is evident that by taking several wives a man does not bind himself to the impossible, considering the principal end of marriage; and therefore plurality of wives is not against the first principles of the natural law.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- RO(8) —

This precept of the natural law, “Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself,” should be understood with the proviso that there be equal proportion. For if a superior is unwilling to be withstood by his subject, he is not therefore bound not to withstand his subject. Hence it does not follow in virtue of this precept that as a husband is unwilling for his wife to have another husband, he must not have another wife: because for one man to have several wives is not contrary to the first principles of the natural law, as stated above: whereas for one wife to have several husbands is contrary to the first principles of the natural law, since thereby the good of the offspring which is the principal end of marriage is, in one respect, entirely destroyed, and in another respect hindered. For the good of the offspring means not only begetting, but also rearing. Now the begetting of offspring, though not wholly voided (since a woman may be impregnated a second time after impregnation has already taken place, as stated in De Gener.

Animal. 7:4), is nevertheless considerably hindered, because this can scarcely happen without injury either to both fetus or to one of them. But the rearing of the offspring is altogether done away, because as a result of one woman having several husbands there follows uncertainty of the offspring in relation to its father, whose care is necessary for its education.

Wherefore the marriage of one wife with several husbands has not been sanctioned by any law or custom, whereas the converse has been.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(1)- RO(9) —

The natural inclination in the appetitive power follows the natural concept in the cognitive power. And since it is not so much opposed to the natural concept for a man to have several wives as for a wife to have several husbands, it follows that a wife’s love is not so averse to another sharing the same husband with her, as a husband’s love is to another sharing the same wife with him. Consequently both in man and in other animals the male is more jealous of the female than “vice versa.”

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2) Whether it was ever lawful to have several wives?

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that it can never have been lawful to have several wives. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7), “The natural law has the same power at all times and places.” Now plurality of wives is forbidden by the natural law, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore as it is unlawful now, it was unlawful at all times.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, if it was ever lawful, this could only be because it was lawful either in itself, or by dispensation. If the former, it would also be lawful now; if the latter, this is impossible, for according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3), “as God is the founder of nature, He does nothing contrary to the principles which He has planted in nature.”

Since then God has planted in our nature the principle that one man should be united to one wife, it would seem that He has never dispensed man from this.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, if a thing be lawful by dispensation, it is only lawful for those who receive the dispensation. Now we do not read in the Law of a general dispensation having been granted to all. Since then in the Old Testament all who wished to do so, without any distinction, took to themselves several wives, nor were reproached on that account, either by the law or by the prophets, it would seem that it was not made lawful by dispensation.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, where there is the same reason for dispensation, the same dispensation should be given. Now we cannot assign any other reason for dispensation than the multiplying of the offspring for the worship of God, and this is necessary also now.

Therefore this dispensation would be still in force, especially as we read nowhere of its having been recalled.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, in granting a dispensation the greater good should not be overlooked for the sake of a lesser good. Now fidelity and the sacrament, which it would seem impossible to safeguard in a marriage where one man is joined to several wives, are greater goods than the multiplication of the offspring. Therefore this dispensation ought not to have been granted with a view to this multiplication.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is stated ( Galatians 3:19) that the Law “was set because of transgressors [Vulg.: ‘transgressions’],” namely in order to prohibit them. Now the Old Law mentions plurality of wives without any prohibition thereof, as appears from Deuteronomy 21:15, “If a man have two wives,” etc. Therefore they were not transgressors through having two wives; and so it was lawful.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2) —

Further, this is confirmed by the example of the holy patriarchs, who are stated to have had several wives, and yet were most pleasing to God, for instance Jacob, David, and several others. Therefore at one time it was lawful.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1), ad 7,8), plurality of wives is said to be against the natural law, not as regards its first precepts, but as regards the secondary precepts, which like conclusions are drawn from its first precepts. Since, however, human acts must needs vary according to the various conditions of persons, times, and other circumstances, the aforesaid conclusions do not proceed from the first precepts of the natural law, so as to be binding in all cases, but only in the majority. for such is the entire matter of Ethics according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7). Hence, when they cease to be binding, it is lawful to disregard them. But because it is not easy to determine the above variations, it belongs exclusively to him from whose authority he derives its binding force to permit the non-observance of the law in those cases to which the force of the law ought not to extend, and this permission is called a dispensation. Now the law prescribing the one wife was framed not by man but by God, nor was it ever given by word or in writing, but was imprinted on the heart, like other things belonging in any way to the natural law. Consequently a dispensation in this matter could be granted by God alone through an inward inspiration, vouchsafed originally to the holy patriarchs, and by their example continued to others, at a time when it behooved the aforesaid precept not to be observed, in order to ensure the multiplication of the offspring to be brought up in the worship of God.

For the principal end is ever to be borne in mind before the secondary end.

Wherefore, since the good of the offspring is the principal end of marriage, it behooved to disregard for a time the impediment that might arise to the secondary ends, when it was necessary for the offspring to be multiplied; because it was for the removal of this impediment that the precept forbidding a plurality of wives was framed, as stated above ( A(1) ).

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The natural law, considered in itself, has the same force at all times and places; but accidentally on account of some impediment it may vary at certain times and places, as the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7) instances in the case of other natural things. For at all times and places the right hand is better than the left according to nature, but it may happen accidentally that a person is ambidextrous, because our nature is variable; and the same applies to the natural, just as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 3,7).

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2)- RO(2) —

In a Decretal (De divortiis, cap. Gaudemus) it is asserted that is was never lawful to have several wives without having a dispensation received through Divine inspiration. Nor is the dispensation thus granted a contradiction to the principles which God has implanted in nature, but an exception to them, because those principles are not intended to apply to all cases but to the majority, as stated. Even so it is not contrary to nature when certain occurrences take place in natural things miraculously, by way of exception to more frequent occurrences.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Dispensation from a law should follow the quality of the law. Wherefore, since the law of nature is imprinted on the heart, it was not necessary for a dispensation from things pertaining to the natural law to be given under the form of a written law but by internal inspiration.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2)- RO(4) —

When Christ came it was the time of the fulness of the grace of Christ, whereby the worship of God was spread abroad among all nations by a spiritual propagation. Hence there is not the same reason for a dispensation as before Christ’s coming, when the worship of God was spread and safeguarded by a carnal propagation.

P(4)- Q(65)- A(2)- RO(5) —

The offspring, considered as one of the marriage goods, includes the keeping of faith with God, because the reason why it is reckoned a marriage good is because it is awaited with a view to its being brought up in the worship of God. Now the faith to be kept with God is of greater import than the faith to be kept with a wife, which is reckoned a marriage good, and than the signification which pertains to the sacrament, since the signification is subordinate to the knowledge of faith.

Hence it is not unfitting if something is taken from the two other goods for the sake of the good of the offspring. Nor are they entirely done away, since there remains faith towards several wives; and the sacrament remains after a fashion, for though it did not signify the union of Christ with the Church as one, nevertheless the plurality of wives signified the distinction of degrees in the Church, which distinction is not only in the Church militant but also in the Church triumphant. Consequently their marriages signified somewhat the union of Christ not only with the Church militant, as some say, but also with the Church triumphant where there are “many mansions” [* John 19:2].