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| Difference Between the Mind and the Soul, and the Relation Between Them.
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Chapter
XII.—Difference Between the Mind and the Soul, and the Relation
Between Them.
In like manner the mind also, or animus,
which the Greeks designate ΝΟΥΣ, is taken by us in no other
sense than as indicating that faculty or apparatus1571
which is inherent and implanted in the soul,
and naturally proper to it, whereby it acts, whereby it acquires
knowledge, and by the possession of which it is capable of a
spontaneity of motion within itself, and of thus appearing to be
impelled by the mind, as if it were another substance, as is maintained
by those who determine the soul to be the moving principle of the
universe1572
| 1572 Comp. The
Apology, c. xlviii.; August. De Civ. Dei, xiii.
17. | —the god of
Socrates, Valentinus’ “only-begotten” of his
father1573
| 1573 Comp. Adv.
Valentin. vii. infra. | Bythus,
and his mother
Sige. How confused is the opinion of Anaxagoras! For,
having imagined the mind to be the initiating principle of all things,
and suspending on its axis the balance of the universe; affirming,
moreover, that the mind is a simple principle, unmixed, and incapable
of admixture, he mainly on this very consideration separates it from
all amalgamation with the soul; and yet in another passage he actually
incorporates it with1574
the soul. This
(inconsistency) Aristotle has also observed: but whether he meant his
criticism to be constructive, and to fill up a system of his own,
rather than destructive of the principles of others, I am hardly able
to decide. As for himself, indeed, although he postpones his definition
of the mind, yet he begins by mentioning, as one of the two natural
constituents of the mind,1575
| 1575 Alterum animi
genus. | that divine
principle which he conjectures to be impassible, or incapable of
emotion, and thereby removes from all association with the soul. For
whereas it is evident that the soul is susceptible of those emotions
which it falls to it naturally to suffer, it must needs suffer either
by the mind or with the mind. Now if the soul is by nature associated
with the mind, it is impossible to draw the conclusion that the mind is
impassible; or again, if the soul suffers not either by the mind or
with the mind, it cannot possibly have a natural association with the
mind, with which it suffers nothing, and which suffers nothing
itself. Moreover, if the soul suffers nothing by the mind and
with the mind, it will experience no sensation, nor will it acquire any
knowledge, nor will it undergo any emotion through the agency of the
mind, as they maintain it will. For Aristotle makes even the senses
passions, or states of emotion. And rightly too. For to exercise
the senses is to suffer emotion, because to suffer is to feel. In like
manner, to acquire knowledge is to exercise the senses; and to undergo
emotion is to exercise the senses; and the whole of this is a state of
suffering. But we see that the soul experiences nothing of these
things, in such a manner as that the mind also is affected by the
emotion, by which, indeed, and with which, all is effected. It follows,
therefore, that the mind is capable of admixture, in opposition to
Anaxagoras; and passible or susceptible of emotion, contrary to the
opinion of Aristotle. Besides, if a separate condition between the soul
and mind is to be admitted, so that they be two things in substance,
then of one of them, emotion and sensation, and every sort of taste,
and all action and motion, will be the characteristics; whilst of the
other the natural condition will be calm, and repose, and stupor. There
is therefore no alternative: either the mind must be useless and void,
or the soul. But if these affections may certainly be all of them
ascribed to both, then in that case the two will be one and the same,
and Democritus will carry his point when he suppresses all distinction
between the two. The question will arise how two can be
one—whether by the confusion of two substances, or by the
disposition of one? We, however, affirm that the mind coalesces
with1576
the soul,—not indeed as being distinct
from it in substance, but as being its natural function and
agent.1577
| 1577 Substantiæ
officium. | E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
|
