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| Plato; Threefold Classification of Principles; His Idea of God; Different Opinions Regarding His Theology and Psychology; His Eschatology and System of Metempsychosis; His Ethical Doctrines; Notions on the Free-Will Question.
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Chapter XVI.—Plato; Threefold Classification of Principles;
His Idea of God; Different Opinions Regarding His Theology and
Psychology; His Eschatology and System of Metempsychosis; His Ethical
Doctrines; Notions on the Free-Will Question.
Plato (lays down) that there are three originating
principles of the universe, (namely) God, and matter, and exemplar; God
as the Maker and Regulator of this universe, and the Being who
exercises providence over it; but matter, as that which underlies all
(phenomena), which (matter) he styles both receptive and a nurse, out
of the arrangement of which proceeded the four elements of which the
world consists; (I mean) fire, air, earth, water, from which all the
rest of what are denominated concrete substances, as well as animals
and plants, have been formed. And that the exemplar, which he
likewise calls ideas, is the intelligence of the Deity, to which, as to
an image in the soul, the Deity attending, fabricated all things.
God, he says, is both incorporeal and shapeless, and comprehensible by
wise men solely; whereas matter is body potentially, but with
potentiality not as yet passing into action, for being itself without
form and without quality, by assuming forms and qualities, it became
body. That matter, therefore, is an originating principle, and
coeval with the Deity, and that in this respect the world is
uncreated. For (Plato) affirms that (the world) was made out of
it. And that (the attribute of) imperishableness necessarily
belongs to (literally “follows”) that which is
uncreated. So far forth, however, as body is supposed to be
compounded out of both many qualities and ideas, so far forth it is
both created and perishable. But some of the followers of Plato
mingled both of these, employing some such example as the
following: That as a waggon can always continue undestroyed,
though undergoing partial repairs from time to time, so that even the
parts each in turn perish, yet itself remains always complete; so after
this manner the world also, although in parts it perishes, yet the
things that are removed, being repaired, and equivalents for them being
introduced, it remains eternal.
Some maintain that Plato asserts the Deity to be
one, ingenerable and incorruptible, as he says in The Laws:
110
| 110 De
Legibus, iv. 7 (p. 109, vol. viii. ed. Bekker). |
“God, therefore, as the ancient account has it, possesses both
the beginning, and end, and middle of all things.” Thus he
shows God to be one, on account of His having pervaded all
things. Others, however, maintain that Plato affirms the
existence of many gods indefinitely, when he uses these words:
“God of gods, of whom I am both the Creator and
Father.”111
| 111
Timæus, c. xvi. (p. 277, vol. vii. ed. Bekker). The
passage runs thus in the original: “Gods of gods, of whom I
am Creator and Father of works, which having been formed by Me, are
indissoluble, through, at all events, My will.” | But others say
that he speaks of a definite number of deities in the following
passage: “Therefore the mighty Jupiter, wheeling his swift
chariot in heaven;” and when he enumerates the offspring of the
children of heaven and earth. But others assert that (Plato)
constituted the gods as generable; and on account of their having been
produced, that altogether they were subject to the necessity of
corruption, but that on account of the will of God they are immortal,
(maintaining this) in the passage already quoted, where, to the words,
“God of gods, of whom I am Creator and Father,” he adds,
“indissoluble through the fiat of My will;” so that if
(God) were disposed that these should be dissolved, they would easily
be dissolved.
And he admits natures (such as those) of demons,
and says that some of them are good, but others worthless. And
some affirm that he states the soul to be uncreated and immortal, when
he uses the following words, “Every soul is immortal, for that
which is always moved is immortal;” and when he demonstrates that
the soul is self-moved, and capable of originating motion.
Others, however, (say that Plato asserted that the soul was) created,
but rendered imperishable through the will of God. But some (will
have it that he considered the soul) a composite (essence), and
generable and corruptible; for even he supposes that there is a
receptacle for it,112
| 112 The
word is literally a cup or bowl, and, being employed by Plato in an
allegorical sense, is evidently intended to signify the anima
mundi (soul of the world), which constituted a sort of depository
for all spiritual existences in the world. | and that it
possesses a luminous body, but that everything generated involves a
necessity of corruption.113
Those, however, who assert the
immortality of the soul are especially strengthened in their opinion by
those passages114
| 114 Or,
“are confirmed by that (philosopher Plato), because he
asserts,” etc.; or, “those who assert the soul’s
immortality are especially confirmed in their opinion, as many as
affirm the existence of a future state of retribution.” | (in Plato’s
writings), where he says, that both there are judgments after death,
and tribunals of justice in Hades, and that the virtuous (souls)
receive a good reward, while the wicked (ones) suitable
punishment. Some notwithstanding assert, that he also
acknowledges a transition of souls from one body to another, and that
different souls, those that were marked out for such a purpose, pass
into different bodies,115
| 115 Or,
“that he changes different souls,” etc. |
according to the desert of each, and that after116
certain definite periods they are sent up
into this world to furnish once more a proof of their choice.
Others, however, (do not admit this to be his doctrine, but will have it that Plato
affirms that the souls) obtain a place according to the desert of each;
and they employ as a testimony the saying of his, that some good men
are with Jove, and that others are ranging abroad (through heaven) with
other gods; whereas that others are involved in eternal punishments, as
many as during this life have committed wicked and unjust deeds.
And people affirm that Plato says, that some
things are without a mean, that others have a mean, that others are a
mean. (For example, that) waking and sleep, and such like, are
conditions without an intermediate state; but that there are things
that had means, for instance virtue and vice; and there are means
(between extremes), for instance grey between white and black, or some
other colour. And they say, that he affirms that the things
pertaining to the soul are absolutely alone good, but that the things
pertaining to the body, and those external (to it), are not any longer
absolutely good, but reputed blessings. And that frequently he
names these means also, for that it is possible to use them both well
and ill. Some virtues, therefore, he says, are extremes in regard
of intrinsic worth, but in regard of their essential nature means, for
nothing is more estimable than virtue. But whatever excels or
falls short of these terminates in vice. For instance, he says
that there are four virtues—prudence, temperance, justice,
fortitude—and that on each of these is attendant two vices,
according to excess and defect: for example, on prudence,
recklessness according to defect, and knavery according to excess; and
on temperance, licentiousness according to defect, stupidity according
to excess; and on justice, foregoing a claim according to defect,
unduly pressing it according to excess; and on fortitude, cowardice
according to defect, foolhardiness according to excess. And that
these virtues, when inherent in a man, render him perfect, and afford
him happiness. And happiness, he says, is assimilation to the
Deity, as far as this is possible; and that assimilation to God takes
place when any one combines holiness and justice with prudence.
For this he supposes the end of supreme wisdom and virtue. And he
affirms that the virtues follow one another in turn,117
| 117 Diogenes
Laertius, in describing the system of the Stoics, employs the same word
in the case of their view of virtue. | and are uniform, and are never antagonistic
to each other; whereas that vices are multiform, and sometimes follow
one the other, and sometimes are antagonistic to each other. He
asserts that fate exists; not, to be sure, that all things are produced
according to fate, but that there is even something in our power, as in
the passages where he says, “The fault is his who chooses, God is
blameless;” and “the following law118
| 118
This is supplied from the original; the passage occurs in the
Phædrus, c. lx. (p. 86, vol. i. ed. Bekker). | of Adrasteia.”119
| 119 The word
Adrasteia was a name for Nemesis, and means here unalterable
destiny. | And thus some (contend for his
upholding) a system of fate, whereas others one of free-will. He
asserts, however, that sins are involuntary. For into what is
most glorious of the things in our power, which is the soul, no one
would (deliberately) admit what is vicious, that is, transgression, but
that from ignorance and an erroneous conception of virtue, supposing
that they were achieving something honourable, they pass into
vice. And his doctrine on this point is most clear in The
Republic,120
| 120 The
passage occurs in Clilophon (p. 244, vol. vi. ed.
Bekker). | where he says,
“But, again, you presume to assert that vice is disgraceful and
abhorred of God; how then, I may ask, would one choose such an evil
thing? He, you reply, (would do so) who is worsted by
pleasures.121
| 121 The text,
as given by Miller, is scarcely capable of any meaning. The
translation is therefore conjectural, in accordance with alterations
proposed by Schneidewin. | Therefore this
also is involuntary, if to gain a victory be voluntary; so that, in
every point of view, the committing an act of turpitude, reason
proves122
to be
involuntary.” Some one, however, in opposition to this
(Plato), advances the contrary statement, “Why then are men
punished if they sin involuntary?” But he replies, that he
himself also, as soon as possible, may be emancipated from vice, and
undergo punishment. For that the undergoing punishment is not an
evil, but a good thing, if it is likely to prove a purification of
evils; and that the rest of mankind, hearing of it, may not transgress,
but guard against such an error. (Plato, however, maintains) that
the nature of evil is neither created by the Deity, nor possesses
subsistence of itself, but that it derives existence from contrariety
to what is good, and from attendance upon it, either by excess and
defect, as we have previously affirmed concerning the virtues.
Plato unquestionably then, as we have already stated, collecting
together the three departments of universal philosophy, in this manner
formed his speculative system.E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
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