15. The judges
said: We need not inquire as to the manner in which that
primitive commerce took place until we have first seen it proved that
there are two natural principles. For when once it is made clear
that there are two unbegotten natures, then others of your averments
may also gain our assent, even although something in them may not seem
to fit in very readily with what is credible. For as the power of
pronouncing judgment has been committed to us, we shall declare what
may make itself clear to our mind. We may, however, also grant to
Archelaus the liberty of speaking to these statements of yours, so
that, by comparing what is said by each of you, we may be able to give
our decision in accordance with the truth. Archelaus
said: Notwithstanding, the adversary’s intent is
replete with gross audacity and blasphemy. Manes
said: Hear, O judges, what he has said of the
adversary.1581
| 1581 The
text is “quid dixerit adversarii;” some propose
“quod” or “quia dixerit,” etc. |
He
admits, then, that there are two objects.
Archelaus
said: It seems to me that this man is full of madness rather
than of
prudence, who would stir up a
controversy with me to-day
because I chance to speak of the
adversary. But this
objection of yours may be removed with few words, notwithstanding that
you have supposed from this expression of mine that I shall allow that
there are these two natures.
1582
| 1582 The
manuscript reading is, “tam si quidem ex hoc arbitratus est se
affirmaturum.” For this it is proposed to read, as in the
translation, “tametsi quidem ex hoc arbitratus es me
affirmaturum.” |
You have come forward with a most
extravagant
1583
| 1583 The
text gives ingentem. Routh suggests inscientem,
stupid. |
doctrine; for
neither of the assertions made by you holds good. For it is quite
possible that one who is an
adversary, not by
nature, but by
determination, may be made a
friend, and cease to be an
adversary; and
thus, when the one of us has come to acquiesce with the other, we twain
shall appear to be, as it were, one and the same object. This
account also indicates that rational creatures have been entrusted with
free-will,
1584
| 1584
[Vol. iii. 301–302. See Coleridge (on Donne),
English Divines, vol. i. p. 87.] |
in
virtue of
which they also admit of conversions. And consequently there
cannot be
two unbegotten natures.
1585
| 1585
Adopting the proposed reading, “et ideo duæ,
ingenitæ naturæ esse non possunt.” The text omits
the duæ, however; and in that case the sense would be
simply, And consequently there cannot be unbegotten natures; or
perhaps, And so they (the creatures) cannot be of an unbegotten
nature. |
What do you say, then? Are
these two natures inconvertible? or are they convertible? or is one of
them
converted?
Manes, however, held back, because he did
not find a suitable reply; for he was pondering the conclusion which
might be drawn from either of two answers which he might make, turning
the matter over thus in his thoughts: If I say that they are
converted, he will meet me with that statement which is
recorded in the
Gospel about the
trees;
1586
but if I say that they are not
convertible, he will necessarily ask me to explain the condition and
cause of their intermingling. In the meantime, after a little
delay,
Manes replied: They are indeed both inconvertible
in so
far as contraries are concerned; but they are convertible as
far
as properties
1587
are
concerned.
Archelaus then said: You seem to me to be
out of your mind, and
oblivious of your own propositions; yea, you do not appear even to
recognise the powers or qualities of the very words which you have been
learning.
1588
| 1588
Didicisti. But perhaps we ought to read dixisti, which you
have been uttering. |
For you
do not understand either what conversion is, or what is meant by
unbegotten, or what duality implies, or what is past, or what is
present, or what is future, as I have gathered from the opinions to
which you have just now given expression. For you have affirmed,
indeed, that each of these two natures is inconvertible so far as
regards contraries, but convertible so far as regards properties.
But I maintain that one who moves in properties does not pass out of
himself, but subsists in these same properties, in which he is ever
inconvertible; while in the case of one who is susceptible of
conversion, the effect is that he is placed outside the pale of
properties, and passes within the sphere of accidents.
1589
| 1589
Aliena, of what is alien. |
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