7. In the first place, you
yourselves, too,3437
| 3437
So Gelenius, followed by Canterus and Orelli, reading primum et
ipsi, by rejecting one word of the ms. (et quæ). Canterus plausibly
combines both words into
itaque—“therefore.” LB. reads
ecquid—“do you at all,” etc., with which
Orelli so far agrees, that he makes the whole sentence
interrogative. |
see
clearly that, if you ever discuss obscure subjects, and
seek to lay
bare the
mysteries of
nature, on the one
hand you do not know the very
things which you speak
of, which you
affirm, which you uphold very often with especial
zeal,
and that each one
defends with obstinate resistance his own
suppositions as though they were
proved and ascertained
truths. For how can we of ourselves know whether
we
3438
| 3438
So restored by Stewechius; in the first ed. perspiciam (instead
of am-us) “if I perceive the truth,” etc. |
perceive
the
truth, even if all ages be employed in seeking out
knowledge—
we whom some
envious power3439
| 3439
So the ms. very intelligibly and
forcibly, res…invida, but the common reading is
invid-i-a—“whom something…with
envy.” The train of thought which is merely started here is
pursued at some length a little later. |
brought forth, and formed so ignorant
and
proud, that, although we know nothing at all, we yet
deceive
ourselves, and are uplifted by
pride and arrogance so as to suppose
ourselves
possessed of
knowledge? For, to pass by
divine things,
and those plunged in
natural obscurity, can any man explain that which
in the Phædrus
3440
| 3440
The ms. gives fedro, but
all editions, except the first, Hildebrand, and Oehler, read
Phædone, referring, however, to a passage in the
first Alcibiades (st. p. 129), which is manifestly absurd, as in it,
while Alcibiades “cannot tell what man is,” Socrates at
once proceeds to lead him to the required knowledge by the usual
dialectic. Nourry thinks that there is a general reference to
Phædr., st. p. 230,—a passage in which Socrates says
that he disregards mythological questions that he may study
himself. [P. 447, note 2, infra.] |
the well-known Socrates cannot comprehend—what man is, or whence
he is, uncertain, changeable,
deceitful, manifold, of many kinds? for
what purposes he was produced? by whose ingenuity he was devised? what
he does in the
world? (C) why he undergoes such countless ills? whether
the
earth gave
life to him as to
worms and mice, being affected with
decay through the action of some
moisture;
3441
| 3441
Lit., “changed with the rottenness of some
moisture.” The reference is probably to the statement by
Socrates (Phædo, st. p. 96) of the questions with regard to
the origin of life, its progress and development, which interested him
as a young man. |
or whether he received
3442
| 3442
So the ms., LB., and Oehler, but the
other edd. make the verb plural, and thus break the
connection. |
these outlines of body, and
this
cast of face, from the
hand of some
maker and framer? Can he, I
say, know these things, which
lie open to all, and are recognisable
by
3443
| 3443
Lit., “established in the common senses.” |
the senses
common
to all,—by what causes we are plunged into
sleep,
by what we
awake? in what ways
dreams are produced, in what they are
seen? nay rather—as to which Plato in the
Theætetus3444
| 3444
Arnobius overstates the fact here. In the passage referred
to (Th., st. p. 158), Socrates is represented as developing the
Protagorean theory from its author’s standpoint, not as stating
his own opinions. |
is in doubt—whether we are ever
awake, or whether that very
state which is called waking is part of an
unbroken
slumber? and what we seem to do when we say that we see a
dream? whether we see by means of rays of
light proceeding towards the
object,
3445
| 3445
Lit., “by the stretching out of rays and of light.”
This, the doctrine of the Stoics, is naturally contrasted in the next
clause with that of Epicurus. |
or images of
the objects
fly to and alight on the pupils of our
eyes? whether the
flavour is in the things
tasted, or arises from their touching
the palate? from what causes
hairs lay aside their
natural darkness,
and do not become gray all at once, but by adding little by little? why
it is that all fluids, on mingling, form one whole;
that oil,
on the contrary, does not
suffer the others to be poured into
it,
3446
| 3446
Lit., “oil refuses to suffer immersion into itself,” i.e.,
of other fluids. |
but is ever
brought together clearly into its own impenetrable
3447
| 3447 So
LB., followed by Orelli, reading impenetrabil-em, for the
ms. impenetrabil-is, which is
corrected in both Roman edd. by Gelenius, Canterus, and Elmenhorst
-e, to agree with the subject oleum—“being
impenetrable is ever,” etc. |
substance? finally, why the
soul also,
which is said by you to be
immortal and
divine,
3448
is
sick in
men who are sick,
senseless in
children, worn out in doting,
silly,
3449
| 3449 So
the edd., generally reading fatua for the ms. futura, which is clearly corrupt.
Hildebrand turns the three adjectives into corresponding verbs, and
Heinsius emends deliret (ms. -ra) et fatue et
insane—“dotes both sillily and crazily.”
Arnobius here follows Lucr., iii. 445 sqq. |
and crazy old age? Now the
weakness and wretched ignorance of these
theories is greater on
this account, that while it may happen that we at times say something
which is true,
3450
| 3450 Lit.,
“something of truth.” |
we cannot be
sure even of this very thing, whether we have spoken the truth at
all.
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