23. For as to that which we
hear said by you, that some of the gods are good, that others, on the
contrary, are bad, and rather inclined to indulge in wanton
mischief,4871
| 4871
Lit., “more prompt to lust of hurting.” |
and that
the usual rites are paid to the one party that they may show favour,
but to the others that they may not do you harm,—with what reason
this is said, we confess that we cannot understand. For to say
that the gods are most
benevolent, and have
gentle dispositions, is not
only pious and
religious, but also true; but that they are
evil and
sinister, should by no means be listened to, inasmuch as that
divine
power has been
far removed and separated from the disposition which
does harm.
4872
| 4872
Lit., “nature of hurting.” |
But
whatever can occasion calamity, it must first be seen what it is, and
then it should be removed very
far from the name of
deity.
Then, supposing that we should agree with
you that the gods promote good fortune and calamity, not even in this
case is there any reason why you should allure some of them to grant
you prosperity, and, on the other hand, coax others with sacrifices and
rewards not to do you harm. First, because the good gods cannot
act badly, even if they have been worshipped with no honour,—for
whatever is mild and placid by nature, is separated widely from the
practice and devising of mischief; while the bad knows not to restrain
his ferocity, although he should be enticed to do so with a
thousand flocks and a thousand altars. For neither can bitterness
change itself into sweetness, dryness into moisture, the heat of
fire into cold, or what is
contrary to anything take and change into its own nature that which is
its opposite. So that, if you should stroke a viper with your
hand, or caress a poisonous scorpion, the former will attack you with
its fangs, the latter, drawing itself together, will fix its sting
in you; and your caressing will be of no avail, since both
creatures are excited to do mischief, not by the stings of rage, but by
a certain peculiarity of their nature. It is thus of no avail to
wish to deserve well of the sinister deities by means of sacrifices,
since, whether you do this, or on the contrary do not, they follow
their own nature, and by inborn laws and a kind of necessity are led to
those things, to do which4873
| 4873 The ms. reads ad ea quæ facti sunt,
understood seemingly as above by the edd., by supplying ad
before quæ. Oehler, however, proposes
quia—“because they were made for
them.” The reading must be regarded as
doubtful. |
they were made. Moreover, in
this way
4874
| 4874
i.e., if sacrifices avail to counteract the malevolent dispositions of
the gods. |
both
kinds of gods cease to possess their own powers, and to retain
their own characters. For if the good are worshipped that they
may be favourable, and supplication is made in the same way to the
others, on the contrary, that they may not be injurious, it follows
that it should be understood that the propitious
deities will
show no favour if they receive no gifts, and become bad instead of
good;
4875
| 4875
Lit., “these.” This clause, omitted by Oberthür,
is also omitted without remark by Orelli. |
while, on
the contrary, the bad, if they receive
offerings, will lay aside
their mischievous disposition, and become thereafter good: and
thus it is brought to this issue, that neither are these propitious,
nor are those sinister: or, which is impossible, both are
propitious, and both again sinister.
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