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| The Opinion of the Peripatetics and Stoics About Mental Emotions.
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Chapter 4.—The Opinion of the
Peripatetics and Stoics About Mental Emotions.
Among the philosophers there are
two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks
call παθη, while
some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations,336
| 336 De Fin. iii. 20; Tusc. Disp. iii. 4. | some
affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately,
passions. Some say that even the wise man is subject to these
perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which
imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary
bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians;
for Aristotle was Plato’s disciple, and the founder of the
Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion
that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But
Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are
here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in
words than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term
“goods” to external and bodily advantages,337
| 337 The distinction between
bona and commoda is thus given by Seneca (Ep. 87,
ad fin.): Commodum est quod plus usus est quam
molestiæ; bonum sincerum debet esse et ab omni parte
innoxium. | because they reckon that the only
good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the
mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary
phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though
in comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and
of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these
outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the
same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics
are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It
seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is
subject to mental passions, or wholly free from them, the
controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think
that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is
considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the
Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity’s sake
other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I
will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a
man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and
graceful
style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes
Atticæ338
that he once
made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to
relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when
the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the
philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on
board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious
to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men.
When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security
gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a
rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and
rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he
himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the
philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the
Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of
the same character, answered, “You had no cause for anxiety for
the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed
for the soul of Aristippus.” The rich man being thus disposed
of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of
science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear?
And he willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of
knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the
Stoic,339
| 339 See Diog. Laert. ii.
71. | in which
doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of
Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus
Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain
that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external
objects which they call phantasiæ, and that it is not in
the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be
invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and
formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even
of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is
depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of
reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind
accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them.
For this consent is, they think, in a man’s power; there being
this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the
fool, that the fool’s mind yields to these passions and consents
to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being
invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and
steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to
desire or avoid. This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that
he read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines
of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with
his choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with
greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no
difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and
that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and
perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind
and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps
what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which
characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no
taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom remains
undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and
ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages
or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that if
that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he
thought he was forthwith to lose, life and bodily safety, he would
not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by
the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this
mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life
and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to
destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors
good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as
they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they
quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does
it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the
Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of
losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they
hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged
to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened
loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such
things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit
such things as violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which
this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to
prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail
the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over
them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them,
administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to
Æneas by Virgil when he says,
“He stands immovable by
tears,
Nor tenderest words with pity
hears.”340
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