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| How It Was Brought About that the Greeks Speak of Three Hypostases, the Latins of Three Persons. Scripture Nowhere Speaks of Three Persons in One God. PREVIOUS SECTION - NEXT SECTION - HELP
Chapter 4.—How
It Was Brought About that the Greeks Speak of Three Hypostases, the
Latins of Three Persons. Scripture Nowhere Speaks of Three Persons
in One God.
7. For the sake, then, of speaking
of things that cannot be uttered, that we may be able in some way
to utter what we are able in no way to utter fully, our Greek
friends have spoken of one essence, three substances; but the
Latins of one essence or substance, three persons; because, as we
have already said,646 essence usually means nothing else
than substance in our language, that is, in Latin. And provided
that what is said is understood only in a mystery, such a way of
speaking was sufficient, in order that there might be something to
say when it was asked what the three are, which the true faith
pronounces to be three, when it both declares that the Father is
not the Son, and that the Holy Spirit, which is the gift of God, is
neither the Father nor the Son. When, then, it is asked what the
three are, or who the three are, we betake ourselves to the finding
out of some special or general name under which we may embrace
these three; and no such name occurs to the mind, because the
super-eminence of the Godhead surpasses the power of customary
speech. For God is more truly thought than He is altered, and
exists more truly than He is thought. For when we say that Jacob
was not the same as Abraham, but that Isaac was neither Abraham nor
Jacob, certainly we confess that they are three, Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob. But when it is asked what three, we reply three men,
calling them in the plural by a specific name; but if we were to
say three animals, then by a generic name; for man, as the ancients
have defined him, is a rational, mortal animal: or again, as our
Scriptures usually speak, three souls, since it is fitting to
denominate the whole from the better part, that is, to denominate
both body and soul, which is the whole man, from the soul; for so
it is said that seventy-five souls went down into Egypt with Jacob,
instead of saying so many men.647 Again, when we say that your horse
is not mine, and that a third belonging to some one else is neither
mine nor yours, then we confess that there are three; and if any
one ask what three, we answer three horses by a specific name, but
three animals by a generic one. And yet again, when we say that an
ox is not a horse, but that a dog is neither an ox nor a horse, we
speak of a three; and if any one questions us what three, we do not
speak now by a specific name of three horses, or three oxen, or
three dogs, because the three are not contained under the same
species, but by a generic name, three animals; or if under a higher
genus, three substances, or three creatures, or three natures. But
whatsoever things are expressed in the plural number specifically
by one name, can also be expressed generically by one name. But all
things which are generically called by one name cannot also be
called specifically by one name. For three horses, which is a
specific name, we also call three animals; but, a horse, and an ox,
and a dog, we call only three animals or substances, which are
generic names, or anything else that can be spoken generically
concerning them; but we cannot speak of them as three horses, or
oxen, or dogs, which are specific names; for we express those
things by one name, although in the plural number, which have that
in common that is signified by the name. For Abraham, and Isaac,
and Jacob, have in common that which is man; therefore they are
called three men: a horse also, and an ox, and a dog, have in
common that which is animal; therefore they are called three
animals. So three several laurels we also call three trees; but a
laurel, and a myrtle, and an olive, we call only three trees, or
three substances, or three natures: and so three stones we call
also three bodies; but stone, and wood, and iron, we call only
three bodies, or by any other higher generic name by which they can
be called. Of the Father, therefore, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,
seeing that they are three, let us ask what three they are, and
what they have in common. For the being the Father is not common to
them, so that they should be interchangeably fathers to one
another: as friends, since they are so called relatively to each
other, can be called three friends, because they are so mutually to
each other. But this is not the case in the Trinity, since the
Father only is there father; and not Father of two, but of the Son
only. Neither are they three Sons, since the Father there is not
the Son, nor is the Holy Spirit. Neither three Holy Spirits,
because the Holy Spirit also, in that proper meaning by which He is
also called the gift of God, is neither the Father nor the Son.
What three therefore? For if three persons, then that which is
meant by person is common to them; therefore this name is either
specific or generic to them, according to the manner of speaking.
But where there is no difference of nature, there things that are
several in number are so expressed generically, that they can also
be expressed specifically. For the difference of nature causes,
that a laurel, and a myrtle, and an olive, or a horse, and an ox,
and a dog, are not called by the specific name, the former of three
laurels, or the latter of three oxen, but by the generic name, the
former of three trees, and the latter of three animals. But here,
where there is no difference of essence, it is necessary that these
three should have a specific name, which yet is not to be found.
For person is a generic name, insomuch that man also can be so
called, although there is so great a difference between man and
God.
8. Further, in regard to that very
generic (generalis) word, if on this account we say three
persons, because that which person means is common to them
(otherwise they can in no way be so called, just as they are not
called three sons, because that which son means is not common to
them); why do we not also say three Gods? For certainly, since the
Father is a person, and the Son a person, and the Holy Spirit a
person, therefore there are three persons: since then the Father is
God, and the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God, why not three Gods?
Or else, since on account of their ineffable union these three are
together one God, why not also one person; so that we could not say
three persons, although we call each a person singly, just as we
cannot say three Gods, although we call each singly God, whether
the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit? Is it because Scripture
does not say three Gods? But neither do we find that Scripture
anywhere mentions three persons. Or is it because Scripture does
not call these three, either three persons or one person (for we
read of the person of the Lord, but not of the Lord as a person),
that therefore it was lawful through the mere necessity of speaking
and reasoning to say three persons, not because Scripture says it,
but because Scripture does not contradict it: whereas, if we were
to say three Gods, Scripture would contradict it, which says,
“Hear, O Israel; the Lord thy God is one God?”648 Why then is
it not also lawful to say three essences; which, in like manner, as
Scripture does not say, so neither does it contradict? For if
essence is a specific (specialis) name common to three, why
are They not to be called three essences, as Abraham, Isaac, and
Jacob are called three men, because man is the specific name common
to all men? But if essence is not a specific name, but a generic
one, since man, and cattle, and tree, and constellation, and angel,
are called essences; why are not these called three essences, as
three horses are called three animals, and three laurels are called
three trees, and three stones three bodies? Or if they are not
called three essences, but one essence, on account of the unity of
the Trinity, why is it not the case, that on account of the same
unity of the Trinity they are not to be called three substances or
three persons, but one substance and one person? For as the name of
essence is common to them, so that each singly is called essence,
so the name of either substance or person is common to them. For
that which must be understood of persons according to our usage,
this is to be understood of substances according to the Greek
usage; for they say three substances, one essence, in the same way
as we say three persons, one essence or substance.
9. What therefore remains, except
that we confess that these terms sprang from the necessity of
speaking, when copious reasoning was required against the devices
or errors of the heretics? For when human weakness endeavored to
utter in speech to the senses of man what it grasps in the secret
places of the mind in proportion to its comprehension respecting
the Lord God its creator, whether by devout faith, or by any
discernment whatsoever; it feared to say three essences, lest any
difference should be understood to exist in that absolute equality.
Again, it could not say that there were not three somewhats
(tria quædam), for it was because Sabellius said this that
he fell into heresy. For it must be devoutly believed, as most
certainly known from the Scriptures, and must be grasped by the
mental eye with undoubting perception, that there is both
Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit; and that the Son is
not the same with the Father, nor the Holy Spirit the same with the
Father or the Son. It sought then what three it should call them,
and answered substances or persons; by which names it did not
intend diversity to be meant, but singleness to be denied: that not
only unity might be understood therein from the being called one
essence, but also Trinity from the being called three substances or
persons. For if it is the same thing with God to be (esse)
as to subsist (subsistere), they were not to be called three
substances, in such sense as they are not called three essences;
just as, because it is the same thing with God to be as to be wise,
as we do not say three essences, so neither three wisdoms. For so,
because it is the same thing to Him to be God as to be, it is not
right to say three essences, as it is not right to say three Gods.
But if it is one thing to God to be, another to subsist, as it is
one thing to God to be, another to be the Father or the Lord (for
that which He is, is spoken in respect to Himself, but He is called
Father in relation to the Son, and Lord in relation to the creature
which serves Him); therefore He subsists relatively, as He begets
relatively, and bears rule relatively: so then substance will be no
longer substance, because it will be relative. For as from being,
He is called essence, so from subsisting, we speak of substance.
But it is absurd that substance should be spoken relatively, for
everything subsists in respect to itself; how much more God?649
649 [Augustin’s meaning is, that the
term “substance” is not an adequate one whereby to denote a
trinitarian distinction, because in order to denote such a
distinction it must be employed relatively, while in itself it has
an absolute signification. In the next chapter he proceeds to show
this.—W.G.T.S.] | E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
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