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| The Addition of a Negative Does Not Change the Predicament.
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Chapter 7.—The Addition of a
Negative Does Not Change the Predicament.
8. This is to be made clear by
examples. And first we must notice, that by the word begotten is
signified the same thing as is signified by the word son. For
therefore a son, because begotten, and because a son, therefore
certainly begotten. By the word unbegotten, therefore, it is
declared that he is not son. But begotten and unbegotten are both
of them terms suitably employed; whereas in Latin we can use the
word “filius,” but the custom of the language does not allow us
to speak of “infilius.” It makes no difference, however, in the
meaning if he is called “non filius;” just as it is precisely
the same thing if he is called “non genitus,” instead of
“ingenitus.” For so the terms of both neighbor and friend are
used relatively, yet we cannot speak of “invicinus” as we can
of “inimicus.” Wherefore, in speaking of this thing or that, we
must not consider what the usage of our own language either allows
or does not allow, but what clearly appears to be the meaning of
the things themselves. Let us not therefore any longer call it
unbegotten, although it can be so called in Latin; but instead of
this let us call it not begotten, which means the same. Is this
then anything else than saying that he is not a son? Now the
prefixing of that negative particle does not make that to be said
according to substance, which, without it, is said relatively; but
that only is denied, which, without it, was affirmed, as in the
other predicaments. When we say he is a man, we denote substance.
He therefore who says he is not a man, enunciates no other kind of
predicament, but only denies that. As therefore I affirm according
to substance in saying he is a man, so I deny according to
substance in saying he is not a man. And when the question is asked
how large he is? and I say he is quadrupedal, that is, four feet in
measure, I affirm according to quantity, and he who says he is
not quadrupedal, denies according to quantity. I say he is white, I
affirm according to quality; if I say he is not white, I deny
according to quality. I say he is near, I affirm according to
relation; if I say he is not near, I deny according to relation. I
affirm according to position, when I say he lies down; I deny
according to position, when I say he does not lie down. I speak
according to condition,571
when I say he is armed; I deny
according to condition, when I say he is not armed; and it comes to
the same thing as if I should say he is unarmed. I affirm according
to time, when I say he is of yesterday; I deny according to time,
when I say he is not of yesterday. And when I say he is at Rome, I
affirm according to place; and I deny according to place, when I
say he is not at Rome. I affirm according to the predicament of
action, when I say he smites; but if I say he does not smite, I
deny according to action, so as to declare that he does not so act.
And when I say he is smitten, I affirm according to the predicament
of passion; and I deny according to the same, when I say he is not
smitten. And, in a word, there is no kind of predicament according
to which we may please to affirm anything, without being proved to
deny according to the same predicament, if we prefix the negative
particle. And since this is so, if I were to affirm according to
substance, in saying son, I should deny according to substance, in
saying not son. But because I affirm relatively when I say he is a
son, for I refer to the father; therefore I deny relatively if I
say he is not a son, for I refer the same negation to the father,
in that I wish to declare that he has not a parent. But if to be
called son is precisely equivalent to the being called begotten (as
we said before), then to be called not begotten is precisely
equivalent to the being called not son. But we deny relatively when
we say he is not son, therefore we deny relatively when we say he
is not begotten. Further, what is unbegotten, unless not begotten?
We do not escape, therefore, from the relative predicament, when he
is called unbegotten. For as begotten is not said in relation to
self, but in that he is of a begetter; so when one is called
unbegotten, he is not so called in relation to himself, but it is
declared that he is not of a begetter. Both meanings,
however, turn upon the same predicament, which is called that of
relation. But that which is asserted relatively does not denote
substance, and accordingly, although begotten and unbegotten are
diverse, they do not denote a different substance; because, as son
is referred to father, and not son to not father, so it follows
inevitably that begotten must be referred to begetter, and
not-begotten to not-begetter.572
| 572 The terms “unbegotten” and
“begotten” are interchangeable with the terms Father and Son.
This follows from the relation of a substantive to its adjective.
In whatever sense a substantive is employed, in the same sense must
the adjective formed from it be employed. Consequently, if the
first person of the Trinity may be called Father in a sense that
implies deity, he may be called Unbegotten in the same sense. And
if the second person may be called Son in a sense implying deity,
he may be called Begotten in the same sense. The Ancient church
often employed the adjective, and spoke of God the Unbegotten and
God the Begotten (Justin Martyr, Apol. i. 25, 53; ii. 12,
13. Clem. Alex. Stromata v. xii.). This phraseology sounds
strange to the Modern church, yet the latter really says the same
thing when it speaks of God the Father, and God the
Son.—W.G.T.S.] | E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
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