10. But, passing over in the
mean while the depth of knowledge, to deal with you as I think I
ought to deal with my intimate friend; that is, as I have myself
power, not as I have wondered at the power of very learned men;
there are three kinds of error, whereby men err, when they read
anything. I will speak of them one by one. The first kind is,
wherein that which is false is thought true, whereas the writer
thought otherwise. A second kind, although not so extensive, yet
not less hurtful, when that, which is false, is thought
true, yet the thought is the same as that of the writer. A third
kind, when from the writing of another some truth is understood,
whereas the writer understood it not. In which kind there is no
little profit, rather, if you consider carefully, the whole entire
fruit of reading. An instance of the first kind is, as if any one,
for example, should say and believe that Rhadamanthus hears and
judges the causes of the dead in the realms below, because he hath
so read in the strain of Maro.1724
| 1724 Virg. Æn. vi.
566–569. |
For this one errs in two ways:
both in that he believes a thing not to be believed, and also in
that he, whom he reads, is not to be thought to have believed it.
The second
kind may be thus noticed: if one, because Lucretius
writes that the
soul is formed of atoms, and that after
death it is
dissolved into the same atoms and
perishes, were to think this to
be true and what he ought to believe. For this one also is not less
wretched, if, in a matter of so great moment, he hath
persuaded
himself of that which is false, as certain; although Lucretius, by
whose books he hath been
deceived, held this opinion. For what doth
it
profit this one to be assured of the meaning of the
author,
whereas he hath chosen him to himself not so as through him to
escape error, but so as with him to err. An instance suited to the
third
kind is, if one, after having read in the books of Epicurus
some place wherein he
praises continence, were to assert that he
had made the
chief good to consist in
virtue, and that therefore he
is not to be
blamed. For how is this man
injured by the error of
Epicurus, what though Epicurus believe that bodily
pleasure is the
chief good of man: whereas he hath not surrendered up himself to so
base and hurtful an opinion, and is pleased with Epicurus for no
other reason, than that he thinks him not to have held sentiments
which ought not to be holden. This error is not only
natural to
man,
1725
but often
also most worthy of a man. For what, if word were brought to me,
concerning some one whom I
loved, that, when now he was of bearded
age, he had said, in the hearing of many, that he was so pleased
with boyhood and childhood, as even to
swear that he wished to
live
after the same fashion, and that that was so
proved to me, as that
I should be shameless to deny it: I should not, should I, seem
worthy of
blame, if I thought that, in saying this, he wished to
show, that he was pleased with the
innocence, and with the temper
of
mind alien from those desires in which the race of man is
wrapped up, and from this circumstance should
love him yet more and
more, than I used to
love him before; although perhaps he had been
foolish enough to
love in the age of
children a certain
freedom in
play and
food, and an idle ease? For suppose that he had
died after
this
report had reached me, and that I had been unable to make any
inquiry of him, so as for him to open his meaning; would there be
any one so shameless as to be
angry with me, for praising the
man’s purpose and wish, through those very words which I had
heard? What, that even a just
judge of matters would not hesitate
perhaps to praise my sentiment and wish, in that both I was pleased
with innocence, and, as man of man, in a matter of doubt, preferred
to think well, when it was in my power also to think
ill?
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