25. Wherefore it now remains
to consider, in what manner we ought not to follow these,
who
profess that they will lead by reason. For how we may without fault
follow those who bid us to believe, hath been already said: but
unto these who make promises of reason certain think that they
come, not only without blame, but also with some praise: but it is
not so. For there are two (classes of) persons, praiseworthy in
religion; one of those who have already found, whom also we must
needs judge most blessed; another of those who are seeking with all
earnestness and in the right way. The first, therefore, are already
in very possession, the other on the way, yet on that way whereby
they are most sure to arrive.1737
| 1737 cf. Retract. b. i. ch.
xiv. 2. “I also said, ‘For there are two &c.’ In these
words of mine if ‘those who have already found’ whom we have
said to be ‘now in possession,’ are in such sort understood to
be ‘most happy,’ as that they are so not in this life, but in
that we hope for, and aim at by the path of faith, the meaning is
free from error: for they are to be judged to have found that which
is to be sought, who are now there, whither we by seeking and
believing, that is by keeping the path of faith, do seek to come.
But if they are thought to be or to have been such in this life
that seems to me not to be true: not that in this life no truth at
all can be found that can be discerned by the mind, not believed on
faith; but because it is but so much, what there is of it, as not
to make men ‘most blessed.’ For neither is that which the
Apostle says, We see now through a glass in a riddle and
now I know in part (1 Cor. xiii.
12), incapable of being discerned by the mind. It is
discerned, clearly, but does not yet make us most blessed. For that
makes men most blessed which he saith, but then face to
face, and, then I shall know even as I am known. They
that have found this, they are to be said to stand in possession of
bliss, to which leads that path of faith which we keep, and whither
we desire to arrive at by believing. But who are those most
blessed, who are already in that possession whither this path
leads, is a great question. And for the holy Angels indeed, there
is no question but they be there. But of holy men already departed,
whether so much may yet be said of them as that they stand already
in that possession, is fairly made a question. For they are already
freed from the corruptible body that weigheth down the soul
(Wisdom 9" id="iv.vi.xxvi-p2.3" parsed="|Wis|9|0|0|0" osisRef="Bible:Wis.9">Wisd. 9.), but they
still wait for the redemption of their body (Rom. 8.), and their
flesh resteth in hope, nor is yet glorified in the incorruption
that is to come. (Ps. 16.) But whether
for all that they are none the less qualified to contemplate the
truth with the eyes of the heart, as it is said, Face to
face, there is not space to discuss here.” |
There are three other kinds of men
altogether to be disapproved of and
detested. One is of those who
hold an opinion,
1738
that is, of those who think that
they know what they know not. Another is of those who are indeed
aware that they know not, but do not so
seek as to be able to find.
A third is of those who neither think that they know, nor wish to
seek. There are also three things, as it were bordering upon one
another, in the minds of men well worth distinguishing;
understanding, belief, opinion. And, if these be considered by
themselves, the first is always without fault, the second sometimes
with fault, the third never without fault. For the understanding of
matters great, and
honorable, and even
divine, is most
blessed.
1739
| 1739 cf. Retract. b. i. ch. 14.
2. “Also what I said, ‘for to know great and noble and even
divine things,’ we should refer to the same blessedness. For in
this life whatsoever there be of it known amounts not to perfect
bliss, because that part of it which remains unknown is far more
without all comparison.” |
But the
understanding of things unnecessary is no injury; but perhaps the
learning was an injury, in that it took up the time of necessary
matters. But on the matters themselves that are injurious, it is
not the understanding, but the doing or suffering them, that is
wretched. For not, in case any understand how an
enemy may be slain
without
danger to himself, is he
guilty from the mere
understanding, not the wish; and, if the wish be absent, what can
be called more
innocent? But belief is then worthy of
blame, when
either any thing is believed of
God which is unworthy of Him, or
any thing is over easily believed of man. But in all other matters
if any believe aught,
provided he understand that he knows it not,
there is no fault. For I believe that very
wicked conspirators were
formerly put to
death by the
virtue of Cicero; but this I not only
know not, but also I know for certain that I can by no means know.
But opinion is on two accounts very base; in that both he who hath
persuaded himself that he already knows, cannot
learn;
provided
only it may be learnt; and in itself rashness is a sign of a
mind
not well disposed. For even if any suppose that he know what I said
of Cicero, (although it be no hindrance to him from learning, in
that the matter itself is incapable of being grasped by any
knowledge;) yet, (in that he understands not that there is a great
difference, whether any thing be grasped by sure reason of
mind,
which we call understanding, or whether for practical purposes it
be entrusted to common
fame or writing, for posterity to believe
it,) he assuredly errs, and no error is without what is base. What
then we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe, to
authority; what we have an opinion on, to error.
1740
| 1740 cf. Retract. b. i. ch.
xiv. 3. “And what I said ‘that there is a great difference
whether anything be grasped by sure reason of mind, which we call
knowing, or whether for practical purposes it be entrusted to
common fame or writing, for posterity to believe it,’ and
presently after, ‘what therefore we know, we owe to reason; what
we believe to authority;’ is not to be so taken as that in
conversation we should fear to say we ‘know’ what we believe of
suitable witnesses. For when we speak strictly we are said to know
that only which by the mind’s own firm reason we comprehend. But
when we speak in words more suited to common use, as also Divine
Scripture speaketh, we should not hesitate to say we know both what
we have perceived with our bodily senses, and what we believe of
trustworthy witnesses, whilst however between one and the other we
are aware what difference exists.” |
But every one who understands also
believes, and also every one who has an opinion believes; not every
one who believes understands, no one who has an opinion
understands. Therefore if these three things be referred unto the
five kinds of men, which we mentioned a little above; that is, two
kinds to be approved, which we set first, and three that remain
faulty; we find that the first
kind, that of the
blessed, believe
the
truth itself; but the second
kind, that of such as are earnest
after, and
lovers of, the
truth, believe
authority. In which kinds,
of the two, the act of belief is praiseworthy. But in the first of
the faulty kinds, that is, of those who have an opinion that they
know what they know not, there is an altogether faulty credulity.
The other two kinds that are to be disapproved believe nothing,
both they who
seek the
truth despairing of finding it, and they who
seek it not at all. And this only in matters which pertain unto any
system of teaching. For in the other
business of
life, I am utterly
ignorant by what means a man can believe nothing. Although in the
case of those also they who say that in practical matters they
follow probabilities, would seem rather to be unable to know than
unable to believe. For who believes not what he approves?
1741
or how is
what they follow probable, if it be not approved? Wherefore there
may be two kinds of such as oppose the
truth: one of those who
assail
knowledge alone, not
faith; the other of those who
condemn
both: and yet again, I am ignorant whether these can be found in
matters of human
life. These things have been said, in order that
we might understand, that, in retaining
faith, even of those things
which as yet we comprehend not, we are set free from the rashness
of such as have an opinion. For they, who say that we are to
believe nothing but what we know, are on their
guard against that
one name “opining,”
1742
which must be confessed to be base
and very wretched, but, if they consider carefully that there is a
very great difference, whether one think that he knows, or moved by
some authority believe that which he understands that he knows not,
surely he will escape the charge of error, and inhumanity, and
pride.
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