11. But if any man supposes
that the reason why it is right for a person to tell a lie for
another is, that he may live the while, or not be offended in those
things which he much loveth, to the end he may attain unto eternal
truth by being taught: that man doth not understand, in the first
place, that there is no flagitious thing which he may not upon the
same ground be compelled to commit, as has been above demonstrated;
and in the next place, that the authority of the doctrine itself is
cut off and altogether undone if those whom we essay to bring
thereunto, are by our lie made to think that it is somewhiles right
to lie. For seeing the doctrine which bringeth salvation consisteth
partly in things to be believed, partly in things to be understood;
and there is no attaining unto those things which are to be
understood, unless first those things are believed, which are to be
believed; how can there be any believing one who thinks it is
sometimes right to lie, lest haply he lie at the moment when he
teacheth us to believe? For how can it be known whether he have at
that moment some cause, as he thinks, for a well-meant2329
lie,
deeming that by a false
story a man may be frightened and kept from
lust, and in this way account that by telling a
lie he is doing
good even in
spiritual things? Which
kind of
lie once admitted and
approved, all
discipline of
faith is subverted altogether; and this
being subverted, neither is there any attaining to understanding,
for the receiving of which that
discipline nurtureth the
babes: and so all the
doctrine of
truth is done away, giving place
to most licentious
falsehood, if a
lie, even well-meant, may from
any quarter have place opened for it to enter in. For either whoso
tells a
lie prefers temporal
advantages, his own or another’s, to
truth; than which what can be more
perverse? or when by aid of a
lie he wishes to make a person fit for gaining the
truth, he bars
the approach to
truth, for by wishing when he
lies to be
accommodating,
2330
it comes
to pass that when he speaks the
truth, he cannot be depended upon.
Wherefore, either we must not believe good men, or we must believe
those whom we think obliged sometimes to tell a lie, or we must not
believe that good men sometimes tell lies: of these three the first
is pernicious, the second foolish; it remains therefore that good
men should never tell lies.
E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
