
Bad Advertisement?
Are you a Christian?
Online Store:Visit Our Store
| He says that all things that are in creation have been named by man, if, as is the case, they are called differently by every nation, as also the appellation of “Ungenerate” is conferred by us: but that the proper appellation of the Divine essence itself which expresses the Divine Nature, either does not exist at all, or is unknown to us. PREVIOUS SECTION - NEXT SECTION - HELP
§4. He says that all
things that are in creation have been named by man, if, as is the case,
they are called differently by every nation, as also the appellation of
“Ungenerate” is conferred by us: but that the proper
appellation of the Divine essence itself which expresses the Divine
Nature, either does not exist at all, or is unknown to
us.
But Peter and Paul, he says,
were named by men, and hence it comes that it is possible in their case
to change the appellations. Why, what existing thing has not
been named by men? I call you to testify on behalf of my argument. For
if you make change of names a sign of things having been named by men,
you will thereby surely allow that every name has been imposed upon
things by us, since the same appellations of objects have not obtained
universally. For as in the case of Paul who was once Saul, and of Peter
who was formerly Simon, so earth and sky and air and sea and all the
parts of the creation have not been named alike by all, but are named
in one way by the Hebrews, and in another way by us, and are denoted by
every nation by different names. If then Eunomius’ argument is
valid when he maintains that it was for this reason, to wit, that their
names had been imposed by men, that Peter and Paul were named afresh,
our teaching will surely be valid also, starting as it does from like
premises, which says that all things are named by us, on the ground
that their appellations vary according to the distinctions of nations.
Now if all things are so, surely the Generate and the Ungenerate are
not exceptions, for even they are among the things that change their
name. For when we gather, as it were, into the form of a name the
conception of any subject that arises in us, we declare our concept by
words that vary at different times, not making, but
signifying, the thing by the name we give it. For the things
remain in themselves as they naturally are, while the mind, touching on
existing things, reveals its thought by such words as are available.
And just as the essence of Peter was not changed with the change of his
name, so neither is any other of the things we contemplate changed in
the process of mutation of names. And for this reason we say that the
term “Ungenerate” was applied by us to the true and first
Father Who is the Cause of all, and that no harm would result as
regards the signifying of the Subject, if we were to acknowledge the
same concept under another name. For it is allowable instead of speaking
of Him as “Ungenerate,” to call Him the “First
Cause” or “Father of the Only-begotten,” or to speak
of Him as “existing without cause,” and many such
appellations which lead to the same thought; so that Eunomius confirms
our doctrines by the very arguments in which he makes complaint against
us, because we know no name significant of the Divine Nature. We are
taught the fact of Its existence, while we assert that an appellation
of such force as to include the unspeakable and infinite Nature, either
does not exist at all, or at any rate is unknown to us. Let him then
leave his accustomed language of fable, and show us the names which
signify the essences, and then proceed further to divide the subject by
the divergence of their names. But so long as the saying of the
Scripture is true that Abraham and Moses were not capable of the
knowledge of the Name, and that “no man hath seen God at any
time839 ,” and that “no man hath seen Him,
nor can see840 ,” and that the light around Him
is unapproachable841 , and “there is
no end of His greatness842 ”;—so long
as we say and believe these things, how like is an argument that
promises any comprehension and expression of the infinite Nature, by
means of the significance of names, to one who thinks that he can
enclose the whole sea in his own hand! for as the hollow of one’s
hand is to the whole deep, so is all the power of language in
comparison with that Nature which is unspeakable and
incomprehensible.E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
|