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| Chapter II
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Chapter
II.
As,
then, by the higher mystical ascent1948
| 1948 by
the higher mystical ascent, ἀναγωγικῶς. The common reading was ἀναλογικῶς, which Hervetus and Morell have translated. But Krabinger,
from all his Codd. but one, has rightly restored ἀναγωγικῶς. It is not “analogy,” but rather
“induction,” that is here meant; i.e. the arguing
from the known to the unknown, from the facts of human nature
(τὰ
καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς) to those of the Godhead, or from history to spiritual
events. ᾽Αναγωγή is the chief instrument in Origen’s interpretation of
the Bible; it is more important than allegory. It alone gives the
“heavenly” meaning, as opposed to the moral and practical
though still mystical (cf. Guericke, Hist. Schol. Catech.
ii. p. 60) meaning. Speaking of the Tower of Babel, he says that there
is a “riddle” in the account. “A competent exposition
will have a more convenient season for dealing with this, when there is
a direct necessity to explain the passage in its higher mystical
meaning” (c. Cels. iv. p. 173). Gregory imitates his
master in constantly thus dealing with the Old Testament, i.e.
making inductions about the highest spiritual truths from the
“history.” So Basil would treat the prophecies (in
Isai. v. p. 948). Chrysostom, on the Songs of
“Degrees” in the Psalms, says that they are so called
because they speak of the going up from Babylon, according to history;
but, according to their high mysticism, because they lift us into the
way of excellence. Here Gregory uses the facts of human nature neither
in the way of mere analogy nor of allegory: he argues straight from
them, as one reality, to another reality almost of the same
class, as it were, as the first, man being “in the image
of God”; and so ἀναγωγή here
comes nearer induction than anything else. | from matters
that concern ourselves to that transcendent nature we gain a
knowledge of the Word, by the same method we shall be led on to a
conception of the Spirit, by observing in our own nature certain
shadows and resemblances of His ineffable power. Now in us the spirit
(or breath) is the drawing of the air, a matter other than ourselves,
inhaled and breathed out for the necessary sustainment of the body.
This, on the occasion of uttering the word, becomes an utterance which
expresses in itself the meaning of the word. And in the case of the
Divine nature it has been deemed a point of our religion that there is
a Spirit of God, just as it has been allowed that there is a Word of
God, because of the inconsistency of the Word of God being deficient as
compared with our word, if, while this word of ours is contemplated in
connection with spirit, that other Word were to be believed to be quite
unconnected with spirit. Not indeed that it is a thought proper to
entertain of Deity, that after the manner of our breath something
foreign from without flows into God, and in Him becomes the Spirit; but
when we think of God’s Word we do not deem the Word to be
something unsubstantial, nor the result of instruction, nor an
utterance of the voice, nor what after being uttered passes away, nor
what is subject to any other condition such as those which are observed
in our word, but to be essentially self-subsisting, with a faculty of
will ever-working, all-powerful. The like doctrine have we received as
to God’s Spirit; we regard it as that which goes with the Word
and manifests its energy, and not as a mere effluence of the breath;
for by such a conception the grandeur of the Divine power would be
reduced and humiliated, that is, if the Spirit that is in it were
supposed to resemble ours. But we conceive of it as an essential power,
regarded as self-centred in its own proper person, yet equally
incapable of being separated from God in Whom it is, or from the Word
of God whom it accompanies, as from melting into nothingness; but as
being, after the likeness of God’s Word, existing as a person1949
| 1949 καθ᾽
ὑπόστασιν. Ueberweg (Hist. of Philosophy, vol. i. 329)
remarks: “That the same argumentation, which in the last analysis
reposes only on the double sense of ὑπόστασις (viz. : (a) real subsistence; (b) individually
independent, not attributive subsistence), could be used with reference
to each of the Divine attributes, and so for the complete restoration
of polytheism, Gregory leaves unnoticed.” Yet Gregory doubtless
was well aware of this, for he says, just below, that even a severe
study of the mystery can only result in a moderate amount of
apprehension of it. | , able to will, self-moved, efficient, ever
choosing the good, and for its every purpose having its power
concurrent with its will.E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
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