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| Chapter XX
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Chapter
XX.
It is,
then, universally acknowledged that we must believe the Deity to be not
only almighty, but just, and good, and wise, and everything else that
suggests excellence. It follows, therefore, in the present dispensation
of things, that it is not the case that some particular one1993
| 1993 τὸ μέν τι (for τοι). There is the same
variety of reading in c. i. and xxi., where Krabinger has preserved
the τι: he well quotes Synesius, de Prov. ii. 2; ῾Ο
μέν τις
ἀποθνήσκει
πληγεὶς, ὁ δὲ
κ.τ.λ. (and refers to his note
there). | of these Divine attributes freely displays
itself in creation, while there is another that is not present there;
for, speaking once for all, no one of those exalted terms, when
disjoined from the rest, is by itself alone a virtue, nor is the good
really good unless allied with what is just, and wise, and mighty (for
what is unjust, or unwise, or powerless, is not good, neither is power,
when disjoined from the principle of justice and of wisdom, to be
considered in the light of virtue; such species of power is brutal and
tyrannous; and so, as to the rest, if what is wise be carried beyond
the limits of what is just, or if what is just be not contemplated
along with might and goodness, cases of that sort one would more
properly call vice; for how can what comes short of perfection be
reckoned among things that are good?). If, then, it is fitting that all
excellences should be combined in the views we have of God, let us see
whether this Dispensation as regards man fails in any of those
conceptions which we should entertain of Him. The object of our inquiry
in the case of God is before all things the indications of His
goodness. And what testimony to His goodness could there be more
palpable than this, viz. His regaining to Himself the allegiance of one
who had revolted to the opposite side, instead of allowing the fixed
goodness of His nature to be affected by the variableness of the human
will? For, as David says, He had not come to save us had not
“goodness” created in Him such a purpose1994
| 1994 Ps. cvi. (cv.) 4, 5;
cxix. (cxviii.) 65, 66, 68. In the first passage
the LXX. has τοῦ
ἰδεῖν ἐν τῇ
χρηστότητι
τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν
σου (Heb. “the felicity of
Thy chosen”): evidently referring to God’s
εὐδοκία in them; He, good Himself (χρηστὸς, v. 1), will save them,
“in order to approve their goodness.” The second passage
mentions four times this χρηστότης
(bonitas). | ; and yet His goodness had not advanced His
purpose had not wisdom given efficacy to His love for man. For, as in
the case of persons who are in a sickly condition, there are probably
many who wish that a man were not in such evil plight, but it is only
they in whom there is some technical ability operating in behalf of the
sick, who bring their good-will on their behalf to a practical issue,
so it is absolutely needful that wisdom should be conjoined with
goodness. In what way, then, is wisdom contemplated in combination with
goodness; in the actual events, that is, which have taken place?
because one cannot observe a good purpose in the abstract; a purpose
cannot possibly be revealed unless it has the light of some events upon
it. Well, the things accomplished, progressing as they did in orderly
series and sequence, reveal the wisdom and the skill of the Divine
economy. And since, as has been before remarked, wisdom, when combined
with justice, then absolutely becomes a virtue, but, if it be disjoined
from it, cannot in itself alone be good, it were well moreover in this
discussion of the Dispensation in regard to man, to consider
attentively in the light of each other these two qualities; I mean, its
wisdom and its justice.E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
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