QUESTIONS 1-46 ON FAITH QUESTIONS 1-16 QUESTION OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)

Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.

The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.

About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3) the habit of faith.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth? (2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i.e. whether it is a thing or a proposition? (3) Whether anything false can come under faith? (4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen? (5) Whether it can be anything known? (6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain number of articles? (7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times? (8) Of the number of articles; (9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol; (10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the object of faith is not the First Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also things concerning Christ’s human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth, but also created truth.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(62) , A(3) ). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith is not only the First Truth.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that “faith is about the simple and everlasting truth.” Now this is the First Truth. Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(1) —

I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.

Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation to health.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Things concerning Christ’s human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith, in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.

The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things contained in Holy Writ.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further on ( Q(25) , A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the object of faith is not something complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First Truth, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now the First Truth is something simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: “I believe in God... almighty.” Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a thing.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Corinthians 13:12: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face.

Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known.”

But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about propositions; so that its object is something complex.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(2) —

I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the P(1) Q(85) , A(5) . Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that are complex in themselves.

Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First, as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have faith.

Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.

Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of truth.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This argument considers the object of faith on the part of the thing believed.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge about things through their means, so is it in faith.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The object of the heavenly vision will be the First Truth seen in itself, according to 1 John 3:2: “We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He is”: hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison fails.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that something false can come under faith. For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be the object of faith.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born, according to John 8:56: “Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see My day: he saw it, and was glad.”

But after the time of Abraham, God might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false. Therefore the object of faith can be something false.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ, and many continued so to believe, until they heard the preaching of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore something false can come under faith.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated, and that there was not Christ’s true Body there, but only bread. Therefore something false can come under faith.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(3) —

On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the intellect, as we shall show further on ( Q(4) , AA(2),5 ). Therefore nothing false can come under it.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(3) —

I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated ( A(1) ) that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows therefore that nothing false can come under faith.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect the intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what one is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails.

Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.

In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be; so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual whom we love for God’s sake.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(3)- RO(2) —

That “God would not take flesh,” considered in itself was possible even after Abraham’s time, but in so far as it stands in God’s foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as explained in the P(1) Q(14) , AA(13),15 : and it is thus that it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it cannot be false.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(3)- RO(3) —

After Christ’s birth, to believe in Him, was to believe in Christ’s birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time, wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false opinion to be the outcome of faith.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(3)- RO(4) —

The faith of the believer is not directed to such and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly consecrated.

Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow that anything false comes under faith.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(4) Whether the object of faith can be something seen?

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the object of faith is something seen. For Our Lord said to Thomas ( John 20:29): “Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed.” Therefore vision and faith regard the same object.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of faith, says ( 1 Corinthians 13:12): “We see now through a glass in a dark manner.” Therefore what is believed is seen.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, “Every sense is a kind of sight,” as Augustine states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard, according to Romans 10:17: “Faith... cometh by hearing.”

Therefore faith is of things seen.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Hebrews 11:1) that “faith is the evidence of things that appear not.”

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(4) —

I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways.

First, through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith.

Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the senses or by the intellect.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Thomas “saw one thing, and believed another” [*St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: “My Lord and my God.”

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Those things which come under faith can be considered in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to be believed.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith, the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming to a right faith, and not to assent to others.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(4)- RO(4) —

Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not follow that these things are seen.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(5) Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science (*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration)?

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that those things that are of faith can be an object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things savors of unbelief, according to 1 Timothy 1:13: “I did it ignorantly in unbelief.”

Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith.

Therefore such things can be an object of science.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of science, since a “demonstration is a syllogism that produces science.” Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth.

Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster. 1:Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that “when a thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception.” Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception. Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of science.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(5) —

I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident and therefore “seen” principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a fashion, seen.

Now as stated above ( A(4) ), it is impossible that one and the same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now believe about the Trinity, according to Corinthians 13:12: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face”: which vision the angels possess already; so that what we believe, they see. In like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it by demonstration.

Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about the same things.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above ( A(4), ad 2,3).

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work ( P(1) Q(1) , A(2) ).

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Things which can be proved by demonstration are reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration must know them first of all by faith.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(5)- RO(4) —

As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), “science and opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men,” as we have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the same object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner, one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either opinion or faith, yet for different reasons.

Because science is incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(6) Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain articles?

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that those things that are of faith should not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude, cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous to distinguish certain articles of faith.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated above ( A(1) ), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into articles.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that “an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, exacting [arctans] our belief.” Now belief is a voluntary act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), “no man believes against his will.”

Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be divided into articles.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Isidore says: “An article is a glimpse of Divine truth, tending thereto.” Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into articles.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(6) —

I answer that, the word “article” is apparently derived from the Greek; for the Greek \arthron\ [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which the Latin renders “articulus,” signifies a fitting together of distinct parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: “Your passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes.”

Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated above ( A(4) ).

Consequently any matter that, for a special reason, is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead, wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Some things are proposed to our belief are in themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists in those things which we hope to see, according to Hebrews 11:2: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for,” it follows that those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life. Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc.], the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus’ bones, and the like, which are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct articles.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles. Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(6)- RO(3) —

This definition of an article is taken from an etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of end, since “he that cometh to God must believe that He is,” and “without faith it is impossible to please God,” as the Apostle declares ( Hebrews 11:6).

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(7) Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that the articles of faith have not increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says ( Hebrews 11:1), “faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” Now the same things are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same things are to be believed.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated in Ephesians 2:8: “It is the gift of God.” Since then there can be no lack of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of faith was perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time went on.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii).

Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with perfect things, so that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it most perfectly.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(7)- O(4) —

Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later, according to Deuteronomy 32:7: “Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee.”

Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for “they received them more fully than others, even as they received them earlier,” as a gloss says on Romans 8:23: “Ourselves also who have the first fruits of the Spirit.” Therefore it seems that knowledge of matters of faith has not increased as time went on.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that “the knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time went on... and the nearer they were to Our Savior’s coming, the more fully did they received the mysteries of salvation.”

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(7) —

I answer that, The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: “The same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,” as the Philosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God’s existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to Hebrews 11: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.”

For the existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for man’s salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth.

Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on: since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained, albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence the Lord said to Moses ( Exodus 6:2,3): “I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg.: ‘I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob’]... and My name Adonai I did not show them”:

David also said ( <19B810> Psalm 118:100): “I have had understanding above ancients”: and the Apostle says ( Ephesians 3:5) that the mystery of Christ, “in other generations was not known, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets.”

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Among men the same things were always to be hoped for from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time, the further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the Apostle says ( Hebrews 11:13): “All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off.”

Now the further off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were nigh to Christ’s advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good things to be hoped for.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways.

First, on the part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner; thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple’s capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the Apostle ( Galatians 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament to childhood.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Two causes are requisite before actual generation can take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the active cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is likened to matter in receiving the influx of God’s action. Hence, among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from imperfection to perfection; and, although some men have been after the manner of active causes, through being doctors of faith, nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for the common good, according to 1 Corinthians 12:7; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith, so far as was necessary at the time for the instruction of the people, either openly or in figures.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(7)- RO(4) —

The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the “time of fulness [*Vulg.: ‘fulness of time’]” ( Galatians 4:4). Hence those who were nearest to Christ, wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after, like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith; for even with regard to man’s state we find that the perfection of manhood comes in youth, and that a man’s state is all the more perfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his youth.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8) Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated?

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above ( A(5) ). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God; hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that “there is one God” should not be set down as an article of faith.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to be “all-knowing” and “provident for all,” about both of which points some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should have been made of God’s wisdom and providence, even as of His omnipotence.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know the Son, according to John 14:9: “He that seeth Me, seeth the Father also.” Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8)- O(4) —

Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about the Person of the Father.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8)- O(5) —

Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that “He spoke by the prophets.” Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated to the Son in respect of His Godhead.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8)- O(6) —

Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should have been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that there is not a sufficient number of articles.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8) —

On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the articles thus.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(4),6 ), to faith those things in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation, “by Whom we have access” to the glory of the sons of God, according to Romans 5:2. Hence it is written ( John 17:3): “This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the... true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.”

Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of Christ’s human nature, which is the “mystery of godliness” ( 1 Timothy 3:16).

Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order of nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in one article; while the third refers to the order of glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven articles referring to the Godhead.

In like manner, with regard to Christ’s human nature, there are seven articles, the first of which refers to Christ’s incarnation or conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen articles.

Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into one article.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8)- RO(1) —

By faith we hold many truths about God, which the philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped, all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8)- RO(2) —

The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching over things, as stated in the P(1) Q(13) , A(8) . Now in beings having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and knowledge.

Hence God’s omnipotence includes, in a way, universal knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His providence over them.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8)- RO(3) —

We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way, include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of view, there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one article to the three Persons.

Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain points have to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error, looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the three Persons. For Arius believed in the omnipotence and eternity of the Father, but did not believe the Son to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for an article about the Person of the Son in order to settle this point. In like manner it was necessary to appoint a third article about the Person of the Holy Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way Christ’s conception and birth, just as the resurrection and life everlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one article, in so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from another point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as each one separately presents a special difficulty.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8)- RO(4) —

It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent to sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons of the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is never sent, as we stated in the P(1) Q(43) , A(4) .

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8)- RO(5) —

The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(8)- RO(6) —

Two things may be considered in the sacrament of the Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is that Christ’s body is miraculously contained therein and thus it is included under God’s omnipotence, like all other miracles which are ascribed to God’s almighty power.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9) Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol?

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since it is written ( Deuteronomy 4:2): “You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it.”

Therefore it was unlawful to make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had once been published.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, according to the Apostle ( Ephesians 4:5) there is but “one faith.” Now the symbol is a profession of faith.

Therefore it is not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith.

Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed in the words: “I believe in one God.”

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9)- O(4) —

Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of faith, as stated above ( A(8) ). But the descent into hell is not mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is expressed inadequately.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9)- O(5) —

Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the passage, “You believe in God, believe also in Me” ( John 14:1) says: “We believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing ‘in’ God.” Since then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting to say: “In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.”

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9)- O(6) —

Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly. Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of faith in a symbol.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9) —

On the contrary, The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord’s promise to His disciples ( John 16:13): “When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth.” Now the symbol is published by the authority of the universal Church. Therefore it contains nothing defective.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9) —

I answer that, As the Apostle says ( Hebrews 11:6), “he that cometh to God, must believe that He is.” Now a man cannot believe, unless the truth be proposed to him that he may believe it.

Hence the need for the truth of faith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of maxims of faith that the symbol [*The Greek \symballein\] takes its name.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9)- RO(1) —

The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ, diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9)- RO(2) —

The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave rise to the necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise differ from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy of heretics, one contains more explicitly what another contains implicitly.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9)- RO(3) —

The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol in the person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united together by faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since such is the faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not only outwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they should endeavor to acquire it.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9)- RO(4) —

No error about the descent into hell had arisen among heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that point.

For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the Fathers, but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the Apostles. For a subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather does it expound it, as stated above (ad 2).

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9)- RO(5) —

If we say: “‘In’ the holy Catholic Church,” this must be taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the Holy Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: “I believe in the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church.” But it is better and more in keeping with the common use, to omit the ‘in,’ and say simply, “the holy Catholic Church,” as Pope Leo [*Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.] observes.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(9)- RO(6) —

Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of the symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was already spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it is sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as though it were against the darkness of past and future errors.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(10) Whether it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith?

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(10) - O(1) —

It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as stated above ( A(9) ). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as stated above ( A(7) ).

Since then this reason ceased with the advent of the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more and more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the symbol.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden under pain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden under pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first* council of Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that “after the symbol of the Nicene council had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to utter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined by the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost,” and this under pain of anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote ‘first’ (expunged by Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as the “Latrocinium” and condemned by the Pope.] The same was repeated in the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new edition of the symbol.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung in the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign Pontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of the symbol.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(10) —

On the contrary, The symbol was drawn us by a general council. Now such a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5]. Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(10) —

I answer that, As stated above (OBJ 1), a new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may arise. Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to that authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally, so that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, “to whom the more important and more difficult questions that arise in the Church are referred,” as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence our Lord said to Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff ( Luke 22:32): “I have prayed for thee,” Peter, “that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren.” The reason of this is that there should be but one faith of the whole Church, according to 1 Corinthians 1:10: “That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you”: and this could not be secured unless any question of faith that may arise be decided by him who presides over the whole Church, so that the whole Church may hold firmly to his decision. Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other matters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke a general council and so forth.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(10) - RO(1) —

The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Peter 3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction, it was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly against the errors which arose.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(10) - RO(2) —

This prohibition and sentence of the council was intended for private individuals, who have no business to decide matters of faith: for this decision of the general council did not take away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new edition of the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the same faith with greater explicitness. For every council has taken into account that a subsequent council would expound matters more fully than the preceding council, if this became necessary through some heresy arising. Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, by whose authority the council is convoked, and its decision confirmed.

P(2b)- Q(1)- A(10) - RO(3) —

Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not under the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine, as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith.

QUESTION OF THE ACT OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; (2) the external act.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) What is “to believe,” which is the internal act of faith? (2) In how many ways is it expressed? (3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above natural reason? (4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable by natural reason? (5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things explicitly? (6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith? (7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation? (8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity explicitly? (9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious? (10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(1) Whether to believe is to think with assent?

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that to believe is not to think with assent. Because the Latin word “cogitatio” [thought] implies a research, for “cogitare” [to think] seems to be equivalent to “coagitare,” i.e. “to discuss together.” Now Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that faith is “an assent without research.” Therefore thinking has no place in the act of faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show further on ( Q(4) , A(2) ). Now to think is an act of the cogitative power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the P(1) Q(78) , A(4) . Therefore thought has nothing to do with faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect, but of the will, even as consent is, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(15) , A(1), ad 3).

Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(1) —

On the contrary, This is how “to believe” is defined by Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. ii).

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(1) —

I answer that, “To think” can be taken in three ways.

First, in a general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): “By understanding I mean now the faculty whereby we understand when thinking.” Secondly, “to think” is more strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the intellect’s arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of sight. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16) that “the Son of God is not called the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought realizes what we know and takes form therefrom, it becomes our word. Hence the Word of God must be understood without any thinking on the part of God, for there is nothing there that can take form, or be unformed.” In this way thought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth. Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one of deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to the sensitive part, hence it is that “to think” is taken secondly for an act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the cogitative power.

Accordingly, if “to think” be understood broadly according to the first sense, then “to think with assent,” does not express completely what is meant by “to believe”: since, in this way, a man thinks with assent even when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.], or understands. If, on the other hand, “to think” be understood in the second way, then this expresses completely the nature of the act of believing. For among the acts belonging to the intellect, some have a firm assent without any such kind of thinking, as when a man considers the things that he knows by science, or understands, for this consideration is already formed.

But some acts of the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent, whether they incline to neither side, as in one who “doubts”; or incline to one side rather than the other, but on account of some slight motive, as in one who “suspects”; or incline to one side yet with fear of the other, as in one who “opines.” But this act “to believe,” cleaves firmly to one side, in which respect belief has something in common with science and understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence it is proper to the believer to think with assent: so that the act of believing is distinguished from all the other acts of the intellect, which are about the true or the false.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Faith has not that research of natural reason which demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance that such things have been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(1)- RO(2) —

“To think” is not taken here for the act of the cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The intellect of the believer is determined to one object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the will.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(2) Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God and believing in God?

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in God.

For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is one virtue.

Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three acts of faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should not be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now “to believe God” is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from certain other acts of faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the will, but of the intellect. Therefore “to believe in God,” which implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species of that act.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(2) —

On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who makes this distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi — Tract. xxix in Joan.).

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(2) —

I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends on the relation of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be considered in three ways. For, since “to believe” is an act of the intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above ( A(1), ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.

If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can be observed in the object of faith, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(1) ). One of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of faith is “to believe in a God”; because, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(1) ) nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith is “to believe God,” since, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(1) ) the formal object of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent to Its sake to whatever he believes.

Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is “to believe in God.” For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect of an end.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(2)- RO(1) —

These three do not denote different acts of faith, but one and the same act having different relations to the object of faith.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Unbelievers cannot be said “to believe in a God” as we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not believe that God exists under the conditions that faith determines; hence they do not truly imply believe in a God, since, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) “to know simple things defectively is not to know them at all.”

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(2)- RO(4) —

As stated above ( P(2a), Q(9) , A(1) ) the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in this respect an act of faith is “to believe in God.”

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason?

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now matters of faith, surpass man’s natural reason, since they are things unseen as stated above ( Q(1) , A(4) ). Therefore to believe seems unnecessary for salvation.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters, wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true or false, according to Job 12:11: “Doth not the ear discern words?” Now a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our judgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such matters.

Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, man’s salvation rests on God, according to Psalm 36:39: “But the salvation of the just is from the Lord.” Now “the invisible things” of God “are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity,” according to Romans 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not necessary for man’s salvation, that he should believe certain things.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Hebrews 11:6): “Without faith it is impossible to please God.”

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(3) —

I answer that, Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we find that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature, one of which is in respect of that nature’s proper movement, while the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature. Thus water by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the earth), while according to the movement of the moon, it moves round the centre by ebb and flow. In like manner the planets have their proper movements from west to east, while in accordance with the movement of the first heaven, they have a movement from east to west. Now the created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to God, since other creatures do not attain to the universal, but only to something particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness either in “being” only, as inanimate things, or also in “living,” and in “knowing singulars,” as plants and animals; whereas the rational nature, in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being.

Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness. Hence it was said above ( P(2a), Q(3) , A(8) ) that man’s ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to John 6:45: “Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to Me.” Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by little and little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that “it behooves a learner to believe.”

Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes the master who is teaching him.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Since man’s nature is dependent on a higher nature, natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this way, by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to matters of faith and not to those which are against faith. Consequently “there is no” danger or “condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus,” and whom He has enlightened by faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(3)- RO(3) —

In many respects faith perceives the invisible things of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to God from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): “Many things are shown to thee above the understandings of man.”

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason?

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God’s works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices. Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can be known by natural reason.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, those things must be believed, which are the object of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as stated above ( Q(1) , AA(4),5 ). Since therefore all things that can be known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the others should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is not necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is necessary to believe that God is one and incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(4) —

I answer that, It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by until late in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of God. The second reason is, in order that the knowledge of God may be more general. For many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either through dullness of mind, or through having a number of occupations, and temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom would be altogether deprived of the knowledge of God, unless Divine things were brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The third reason is for the sake of certitude. For human reason is very deficient in things concerning God. A sign of this is that philosophers in their researches, by natural investigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind for the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved by reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and about the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can be an object of faith for another, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(5) ).

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Although all things that can be known by science are of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to beatitude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(5) Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly?

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power.

Now it is not in man’s power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written ( Romans 10:14,15): “How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach unless they be sent?”

Therefore man is not bound to believe anything explicitly.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity, and it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the precept of Our Lord ( Matthew 5:39): “If one strike thee on one [Vulg.: ‘thy right’] cheek, turn to him also the other”; and by others of the same kind, according to Augustine’s exposition (De Serm. Dom. in Monte xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything explicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God proposes to be believed.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according to Romans 1:5: “For obedience to the faith in all nations.”

Now the virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according to <19B806> Psalm 118:60: “I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy commandments.”

Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man should be ready to believe whatever God may propose, without his believing anything explicitly.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Hebrews 11:6): “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.”

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(5) —

I answer that, The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining salvation. Now an act of virtue, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(60) , A(5) ) depends on the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things may be considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is the proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is accidental and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it belongs properly and directly to the object of fortitude, to face the dangers of death, and to charge at the foe with danger to oneself, for the sake of the common good: yet that, in a just war, a man be armed, or strike another with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to the object of fortitude, but indirectly.

Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of a precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate in its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the precept does not require that a virtuous act should terminate in those things which have an accidental or secondary relation to the proper and direct object of that virtue, except in certain places and at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the direct object of faith is that whereby man is made one of the Blessed, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(8) ): while the indirect and secondary object comprises all things delivered by God to us in Holy Writ, for instance that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son of Jesse, and so forth.

Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, but only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he is prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures. Then alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(5)- RO(1) —

If we understand those things alone to be in a man’s power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing grace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for this help “to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully given; and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a punishment of a previous, or at least of original, sin,” as Augustine states (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi [*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct. viii.]).

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Man is bound to love definitely those lovable things which are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely, God and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(5)- RO(3) —

The virtue of obedience is seated, properly speaking, in the will; hence promptness of the will subject to authority, suffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper and direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental or consequent to that proper and direct object.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(6) Whether all are equally bound to have explicit faith?

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that all are equally bound to have explicit faith. For all are bound to those things which are necessary for salvation, as is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is necessary for salvation that certain things should be believed explicitly. Therefore all are equally bound to have explicit faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he is not bound to believe. But simple reasons are sometimes tested in reference to the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are bound to believe everything explicitly.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but only implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the faith of the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the learned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have explicit faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have explicit faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Job 1:14): “The oxen were ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them,” because, as Gregory expounds this passage (Moral. ii, 17), the simple, who are signified by the asses, ought, in matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who are denoted by the oxen.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(6) —

I answer that, The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural reason.

Now Divine revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are over them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the angels, and to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius explains (Coel.

Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding of faith must needs reach men of lower degree through those of higher degree. Consequently, just as the higher angels, who enlighten those who are below them, have a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the lower angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to believe them more explicitly.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The unfolding of the articles of faith is not equally necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher degree, whose duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe explicitly more things than others are.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Simple persons should not be put to the test about subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been corrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple people in such questions. If, however, it is found that they are free from obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(6)- RO(3) —

The simple have no faith implied in that of the learned, except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine teaching. Hence the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 4:16): “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ.” Hence it is not human knowledge, but the Divine truth that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned stray from this rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple ones, who think that the learned believe aright; unless the simple hold obstinately to their individual errors, against the faith of the universal Church, which cannot err, since Our Lord said ( Luke 22:32): “I have prayed for thee,” Peter, “that thy faith fail not.”

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(7) Whether it is necessary for the salvation of all, that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ?

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not necessary for the salvation of all that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.

For man is not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are ignorant about: since the unfolding of faith is the result of Divine revelation, which reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above ( A(6) ; P(1) Q(111), A(1) ). Now even the angels were in ignorance of the mystery of the Incarnation: hence, according to the commentary of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they who ask ( Psalm 23:8): “Who is this king of glory?” and ( Isaiah 63:1): “Who is this that cometh from Edom?” Therefore men were not bound to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, it is evident that John the Baptist was one of the teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him ( Matthew 11:11) that “there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater than” he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to have known the mystery of Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ ( Matthew 11:3): “Art Thou He that art to come, or look we for another?” Therefore even the teachers were not bound to explicit faith in Christ.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the ministry of the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix).

Now it would seem that the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith in Christ, since they received no revelation. Therefore it seems that it was not necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vii; Ep. cxc): “Our faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young is delivered from the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except by the one Mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ.”

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(7) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(5) ; Q(1) , A(8) ), the object of faith includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation and Passion is the way by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written ( Acts 4:12): “There is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved.”

Therefore belief of some kind in the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation was necessary at all times and for all persons, but this belief differed according to differences of times and persons. The reason of this is that before the state of sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ’s Incarnation, in so far as it was intended for the consummation of glory, but not as it was intended to deliver man from sin by the Passion and Resurrection, since man had no foreknowledge of his future sin. He does, however, seem to have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from the fact that he said ( Genesis 2:24): “Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife,” of which the Apostle says ( Ephesians 5:32) that “this is a great sacrament... in Christ and the Church,” and it is incredible that the first man was ignorant about this sacrament.

But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else, have foreshadowed Christ’s Passion by certain sacrifices both before and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the learned explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those sacrifices, believed them to be ordained by God in reference to Christ’s coming, and thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so to speak. And, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(7) ), the nearer they were to Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ’s mysteries.

After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards those which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly proclaimed, such as the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of which we have spoken above ( Q(1) , A(8) ). As to other minute points in reference to the articles of the Incarnation, men have been bound to believe them more or less explicitly according to each one’s state and office.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(7)- RO(1) —

The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not entirely hidden from the angels, as Augustine observes (Genesis ad lit. v, 19), yet certain aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ revealed them to them.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(7)- RO(2) —

It was not through ignorance that John the Baptist inquired of Christ’s advent in the flesh, since he had clearly professed his belief therein, saying: “I saw, and I gave testimony, that this is the Son of God” ( John 1:34). Hence he did not say: “Art Thou He that hast come?” but “Art Thou He that art to come?” thus saying about the future, not about the past. Likewise it is not to be believed that he was ignorant of Christ’s future Passion, for he had already said ( John 1:39): “Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: ‘sin’] of the world,” thus foretelling His future immolation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as may be seen especially in Isaiah 53. We may therefore say with Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked this question, being in ignorance as to whether Christ would descend into hell in His own Person.

But he did not ignore the fact that the power of Christ’s Passion would be extended to those who were detained in Limbo, according to Zechariah 9:11: “Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no water”; nor was he bound to believe explicitly, before its fulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither Himself.

It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on Luke 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the latter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing to the signs of His works.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Many of the gentiles received revelations of Christ, as is clear from their predictions. Thus we read ( Job 19:25): “I know that my Redeemer liveth.” The Sibyl too foretold certain things about Christ, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we read in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine Augustus and his mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a man on whose breast was a golden plate with the inscription: “Christ shall be born of a virgin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the lifetime of Irene and Constantine, thou shalt see me again” [*Cf. Baron, Annal., A.D. 780].

If, however, some were saved without receiving any revelation, they were not saved without faith in a Mediator, for, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in Divine providence, since they believed that God would deliver mankind in whatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the revelation of the Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: “Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth.”

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity?

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says ( Hebrews 11:6): “He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.”

Now one can believe this without believing in the Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further our Lord said ( John 17:5,6): “Father, I have manifested Thy name to men,” which words Augustine expounds (Tract. cvi) as follows: “Not the name by which Thou art called God, but the name whereby Thou art called My Father,” and further on he adds: “In that He made this world, God is known to all nations; in that He is not to be worshipped together with false gods, ‘God is known in Judea’; but, in that He is the Father of this Christ, through Whom He takes away the sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name of His, which hitherto they knew not.” Therefore before the coming of Christ it was not known that Paternity and Filiation were in the Godhead: and so the Trinity was not believed explicitly.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of God is the object of heavenly happiness. Now the object of heavenly happiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in God, without any distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(8) —

On the contrary, In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is written in manifestation of the Trinity: “Let us make man to Our image and likeness” ( Genesis 1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(8) —

I answer that, It is impossible to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of Christ includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the world through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He was conceived by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the mystery of Christ was believed explicitly by the learned, but implicitly and under a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too was it with the mystery of the Trinity. And consequently, when once grace had been revealed, all were bound to explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity: and all who are born again in Christ, have this bestowed on them by the invocation of the Trinity, according to Matthew 28:19: “Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.”

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Explicit faith in those two things was necessary at all times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times and for all people.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Before Christ’s coming, faith in the Trinity lay hidden in the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles it was shown to the world.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(8)- RO(3) —

God’s sovereign goodness as we understand it now through its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of Persons: but as understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it cannot be understood without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the mission of the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(9) Whether to believe is meritorious?

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem that to believe in not meritorious.

For the principle of all merit is charity, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(114), A(4) ). Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore, just as an act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by our natural gifts, so neither is an act of faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known [*Science is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not meritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is not meritorious.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a sufficient motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any merit on his part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to believe: whereas if he has not a sufficient motive for believing, this is a mark of levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: “He that is hasty to give credit, is light of heart,” so that, seemingly, he gains no merit thereby. Therefore to believe is by no means meritorious.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(9) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Hebrews 11:33) that the saints “by faith... obtained promises,” which would not be the case if they did not merit by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(9) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(114), AA(3),4 ), our actions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will moved with grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently the act of faith can be meritorious.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(9)- RO(1) —

Nature is compared to charity which is the principle of merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to charity as the disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that the subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the form, nor can a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but after the advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the chief principle of action, even as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial form of fire. Accordingly neither nature nor faith can, without charity, produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity, the act of faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of nature, and a natural act of the free-will.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(9)- RO(2) —

Two things may be considered in science: namely the scientist’s assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of that fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will, because the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration, wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual consideration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to his free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to consider. Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the good of our neighbor. On the other hand, in the case of faith, both these things are subject to the free-will so that in both respects the act of faith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion, there is no firm assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes (Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a perfect act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the assent, it does not appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards the actual consideration.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(9)- RO(3) —

The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose the merit.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(10) Whether reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith?

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(10) - O(1) —

It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that “there is no merit in believing what is shown by reason.” If, therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith is altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human reasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes the merit of believing.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens the amount of merit, since “happiness is the reward of virtue,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to diminish the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential to faith to be about the unseen, as stated above ( Q(1) , AA(4),5 ). Now the more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it unseen. Therefore human reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the merit of faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, contrary things have contrary causes.

Now an inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so.

Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(10) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Peter 3:15): “Being ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg.: ‘Of that hope which is in you.’ St. Thomas’ reading is apparently taken from Bede.] and hope which is in you.”

Now the Apostle would not give this advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith. Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(10) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(9) ), the act of faith can be meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to the use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of what we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the believer.

First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, unless he be moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason diminishes the merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above ( P(2a), Q(24) , A(3), ad 1; Q(77) , A(6), ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which precedes choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just as a man ought to perform acts of moral virtue, on account of the judgment of his reason, and not on account of a passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not on account of human reason, but on account of the Divine authority.

Secondly, human reasons may be consequent to the will of the believer.

For when a man’s will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again, in moral virtues a consequent passion is the sign of a more prompt will, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(24) , A(3), ad 1). We have an indication of this in the words of the Samaritans to the woman, who is a type of human reason: “We now believe, not for thy saying” ( John 4:42).

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(10) - RO(1) —

Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has no will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons. But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration of some of them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith is not, for that reason, lost or diminished.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(10) - RO(2) —

The reasons which are brought forward in support of the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not cease to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that what faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do not diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand, though demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith [*The Leonine Edition reads: ‘in support of matters of faith which are however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,’ etc.], but not of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith, since they make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not diminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready to believe them, even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit is not diminished.

P(2b)- Q(2)- A(10) - RO(3) —

Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it consist in a man’s thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the merit of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and firm in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through not renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise have greater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on account of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in opposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to faith, do not always diminish the promptness of the will to believe, and therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.

QUESTION OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether confession is an act of faith? (2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that confession is not an act of faith. For the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act of faith.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle ( Ephesians 6:19) asks for prayers that it may be granted him “with confidence, to make known the mystery of the gospel.” Now it belongs to fortitude, which moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from doing good on account of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that confession is not an act of faith, but rather of fortitude or constancy.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess one’s faith outwardly, so does it make one do other external good works, for it is written ( Galatians 5:6) that “faith... worketh by charity.” But other external works are not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore neither is confession an act of faith.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(1) —

On the contrary, A gloss explains the words of Thessalonians 1:11, “and the work of faith in power” as referring to “confession which is a work proper to faith.”

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(1) —

I answer that, Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to whose end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred specifically to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh, and consequently it is an act of abstinence.

Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according to 2 Corinthians 4:13: “Having the same spirit of faith... we believe, and therefore we speak also.”

For the outward utterance is intended to signify the inward thought.

Wherefore, just as the inward thought of matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the outward confession of them.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(1) —

A threefold confession is commended by the Scriptures. One is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a proper act of faith, since it is referred to the end of faith as stated above. Another is the confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is an act of “latria,” for its purpose is to give outward honor to God, which is the end of “latria.”

The third is the confession of sins, which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is the end of penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(2) —

That which removes an obstacle is not a direct, but an indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4). Hence fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith, viz. fear or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession, but an indirect cause so to speak.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all outward acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding, but not eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession as its proper act, without the help of any other virtue.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if it is a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of faith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can be realized without any outward confession. Therefore confession of faith is not necessary for salvation.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his faith to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have to instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple folk are not bound to confess the faith.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb others, is not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says ( Corinthians 10:32): “Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church of God.” Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance among unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Romans 10:10): “With the heart we believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation.”

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(2) —

I answer that, Things that are necessary for salvation come under the precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is something affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept.

Hence its necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an affirmative precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as stated above ( P(2a), Q(71) , A(5), ad 3; P(2a), Q(88) , A(1), ad 2) do not bind for always, although they are always binding; but they bind as to place and time according to other due circumstances, in respect of which human acts have to be regulated in order to be acts of virtue.

Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one’s faith at all times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain times, when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of due honor, or our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him: for instance, if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to remain silent, so as to make people believe either that he is without faith, or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others away from the faith; for in such cases as these, confession of faith is necessary for salvation.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The end of faith, even as of the other virtues, must be referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and our neighbor. Consequently when God’s honor and our neighbor’s good demand, man should not be contented with being united by faith to God’s truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(2)- RO(2) —

In cases of necessity where faith is in danger, every one is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good example and encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check the attacks of unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty of all the faithful to instruct others in the faith.

P(2b)- Q(3)- A(2)- RO(3) —

There is nothing commendable in making a public confession of one’s faith, if it causes a disturbance among unbelievers, without any profit either to the faith or to the faithful. Hence Our Lord said ( Matthew 7:6): “Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine... lest turning upon you, they tear you.”

Yet, if there is hope of profit to the faith, or if there be urgency, a man should disregard the disturbance of unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it is written ( Matthew 15:12) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord that “the Pharisee, when they heard this word, were scandalized,” He answered: “Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind.”

QUESTION OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the cause of faith; fourthly, its effects.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) What is faith? (2) In what power of the soul does it reside? (3) Whether its form is charity? (4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are one identically? (5) Whether faith is a virtue? (6) Whether it is one virtue? (7) Of its relation to the other virtues; (8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual virtues.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1) Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not?” P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting definition of faith ( Hebrews 11:1) when he says: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.”

For no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a theological virtue, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(62) , A(3) ). Therefore it is not a substance.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, different virtues have different objects.

Now things to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should not be included in a definition of faith, as though they were its object.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope, since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on ( A(3) ). Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the same thing should not be placed in different genera. Now “substance” and “evidence” are different genera, and neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to state that faith is both “substance” and “evidence.”

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to speak of “evidence of things that appear not”: and so faith is unfittingly defined.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suffices.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1) —

I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit, should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object. Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above ( Q(2) , AA(2),3 ), which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the will’s command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a theological virtues, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(62) , A(2) ), has one same thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity, be in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated ( Q(1) , AA(1),4 ) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to the Apostle ( Romans 8:25): “We hope for that which we see not”: because to see the truth is to possess it.

Now one hopes not for what one has already, but for what one has not, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(67) , A(4) ). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is the object of the will, is indicated by the words: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” For we are wont to call by the name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when the whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first beginning; for instance, we might say that the first self-evident principles are the substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained in them virtually. In this way then faith is said to be the “substance of things to be hoped for,” for the reason that in us the first beginning of things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of faith, which contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made evident when we were speaking of happiness ( P(2a), Q(3) , A(8) ; P(2a), Q(4) , A(3) ).

The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect, considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words, “evidence of things that appear not,” where “evidence” is taken for the result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of faith is called “evidence” here. Hence another reading has “conviction,” because to wit, the intellect of the believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a definition, he may say that “faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent.”

In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to the intellect. For when we describe it as “evidence,” we distinguish it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, “of things that appear not,” we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is “the substance of things to be hoped for,” we distinguish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for.

Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of this one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.: QQ.

Evang. ii, qu. 39) that “faith is a virtue whereby we believe what we do not see,” and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11) that “faith is an assent without research,” and when others say that “faith is that certainty of the mind about absent things which surpasses opinion but falls short of science,” these all amount to the same as the Apostle’s words: “Evidence of things that appear not”; and when Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that “faith is the solid foundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing forth the truth in him,” comes to the same as “substance of things to be hoped for.”

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(1) —

“Substance” here does not stand for the supreme genus condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope, as we shall prove further on ( Q(18) , A(1) ). For this reason the definition of faith includes the object of hope.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of the absent and the unseen.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(4) —

“Substance” and “evidence” as included in the definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor different acts, but different relationships of one act to different objects, as is clear from what has been said.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing, make it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence referred to in the definition of faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(2) Whether faith resides in the intellect?

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that faith does not reside in the intellect. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that “faith resides in the believer’s will.” Now the will is a power distinct from the intellect.

Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds from the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is in the will, and not in the intellect.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical. Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in De Anima iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas “faith... worketh by charity” ( Galatians 5:6). Likewise, neither is it in the practical intellect, the object of which is some true, contingent thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith is the Eternal Truth, as was shown above ( Q(1) , A(1) ). Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision, according to 1 Corinthians 13:12: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face.” Now vision is in the intellect.

Therefore faith is likewise.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(2) —

I answer that, Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be perfect. Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active principles, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the art, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to act well is a habit, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(49) , A(4), ad 1,2,3). Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected by a habit residing in each of them.

Again, it has been stated above ( Q(2) , AA(1),2 ) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch as the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be perfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the intellect: even as there needs to be the habit of prudence in the reason, besides the habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty, in order that the act of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of that act is “the true,” which pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently faith, which is the proper principle of that act, must needs reside in the intellect.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which is described as depending on the believer’s will, in so far as his intellect assents to matters of faith at the command of the will.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Not only does the will need to be ready to obey but also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command of the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the assenting intellect.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as evidenced by its object. But since this object, which is the First Truth, is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves (De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just as “the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension” (De Anima iii, 10).

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(3) Whether charity is the form of faith?

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity is not the form of faith. For each thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two things are opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of the other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of a division, as different species of virtue ( 1 Corinthians 13:13). Therefore charity is not the form of faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are in one subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in the intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not the form of faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of believing, on the part of the will, according to Romans 1:5: “For obedience to the faith in all nations.” Therefore obedience rather than charity, is the form of faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Each thing works through its form.

Now faith works through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(3) —

I answer that, As appears from what has been said above ( P(2a), Q(1) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(18) , A(6) ), voluntary acts take their species from their end which is the will’s object. Now that which gives a thing its species, is after the manner of a form in natural things. Wherefore the form of any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to which that act is directed, both because it takes its species therefrom, and because the mode of an action should correspond proportionately to the end. Now it is evident from what has been said ( A(1) ), that the act of faith is directed to the object of the will, i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which is the end of faith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper object of charity.

Therefore charity is called the form of faith in so far as the act of faith is perfected and formed by charity.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens the act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being quickened by different habits, so as to be reduced to various species in a certain order, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(18) , AA(6),7 ; P(2a), Q(61) , A(2) ) when we were treating of human acts in general.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(2) —

This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But it is not thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that it quickens the act of faith, as explained above.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity, as we shall show further on ( Q(23) , A(8) ), and consequently charity is spoken of as the form of faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(4) Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless?

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that lifeless faith does not become living, or living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Corinthians 13:10, “when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away.” Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living faith. Therefore when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, so that they are not one identical habit.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now lifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: “Faith without works is dead.” Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, God’s grace, by its advent, has no less effect in a believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it causes the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who hitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of faith in him.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), “accidents cannot be altered.” Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same faith cannot be at one time living, and at another, lifeless.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(4) —

On the contrary, A gloss on the words, “Faith without works is dead” ( James 2:20) adds, “by which it lives once more.” Therefore faith which was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and living.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(4) —

I answer that, There have been various opinions on this question. For some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that living and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner, when a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of lifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting that grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and that a gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal sin.

Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have said that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but that, all the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless faith is not taken away, and that it remains together with the habit of living faith in the same subject.

Yet again it seems unreasonable that the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person having living faith.

We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated by that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which pertains to the intellect.

Again, what pertains to the will, does not pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in respect of something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in respect of something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and lifeless faith are not distinct habits.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The saying of the Apostle refers to those imperfect things from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when the perfect comes the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially “of the things that appear not.” When, however, imperfection is not inseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical thing which was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man and consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes a man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental thereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes living.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(4)- RO(2) —

That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul: consequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith. Hence there is no comparison.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to be in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said above ( P(1) Q(104), A(1) ; P(2a), Q(109), A(9) ) that God is always working man’s justification, even as the sun is always lighting up the air.

Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a believer than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith in both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter by creating it anew.

We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one who has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin does not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a previous mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(4)- RO(4) —

When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith without charity, and at another time, with charity.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(5) Whether faith is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue is directed to the good, since “it is virtue that makes its subject good,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is directed to the true. Therefore faith is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue. Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among the acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species, as stated above ( A(4) ). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since it is not connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living faith a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces ( 1 Corinthians 12:9) and likewise among the fruits ( Galatians 5:23). Therefore faith is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Man is justified by the virtues, since “justice is all virtue,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is justified by faith according to Romans 5:1: “Being justified therefore by faith let us have peace,” etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(5) —

I answer that, As shown above, it is by human virtue that human acts are rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle of a good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living faith. For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth at the command of the will, two things are required that this act may be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should infallibly tend to its object, which is the true; while the other is that the will should be infallibly directed to the last end, on account of which it assents to the true: and both of these are to be found in the act of living faith. For it belongs to the very essence of faith that the intellect should ever tend to the true, since nothing false can be the object of faith, as proved above ( Q(1) , A(3) ): while the effect of charity, which is the form of faith, is that the soul ever has its will directed to a good end. Therefore living faith is a virtue.

On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though the act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the intellect, it has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as if temperance be in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the rational part, temperance is not a virtue, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(65) , A(1) ), because the act of temperance requires both an act of reason, and an act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of faith requires an act of the will, and an act of the intellect.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it is its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to some good in so far as it directs the intellect to the true. Furthermore, it has a relation to the good considered as the object of the will, inasmuch as it is formed by charity.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on human reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of necessity, from its premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence such like faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and consequently its object cannot be anything false; so that faith of this kind can be a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically, as though they belonged to different species. But they differ as perfect and imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless faith, being imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue, for “virtue is a kind of perfection” (Phys. vii, text. 18).

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(5)- RO(4) —

Some say that faith which is numbered among the gratuitous graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason, since the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are not common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle says: “There are diversities of graces,” and again, “To one is given” this grace and “to another” that. Now lifeless faith is common to all members of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part of its substance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must, therefore, say that in that passage, faith denotes a certain excellency of faith, for instance, “constancy in faith,” according to a gloss, or the “word of faith.”

Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss on the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are enumerated, explains faith as being “certainty about the unseen.”

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(6) Whether faith is one virtue?

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith is a gift of God according to Ephesians 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge are numbered among God’s gifts according to Isaiah 11:2.

Now wisdom and knowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and knowledge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 14,15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and also about some temporal things, it seems that faith is not one virtue, but divided into several parts.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above ( Q(3) , A(1) ). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for all: since what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet to come, as appears from Isaiah 7:14: “Behold a virgin shall conceive.”

Therefore faith is not one.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But one accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(6) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Ephesians 4:5): “One Lord, one faith.”

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(6) —

I answer that, If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in two ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one faith. Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by adhering to which we believe whatever is contained in the faith. Secondly, on the part of the subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it is in various subjects. Now it is evident that faith, just as any other habit, takes its species from the formal aspect of its object, but is individualized by its subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit whereby we believe, it is one specifically, but differs numerically according to its various subjects.

If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed, then, again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one same thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in believing, be diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to one.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to something eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(1) ).

Hence there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is different with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and eternal matters under their respective aspects.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(6)- RO(2) —

This difference of past and future arises, not from any difference in the thing believed, but from the different relationships of believers to the one thing believed, as also we have mentioned above ( P(2a), Q(103), A(4) ; P(2a), Q(107), A(1), ad 1).

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(6)- RO(3) —

This objection considers numerical diversity of faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(7) Whether faith is the first of the virtues?

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues. For a gloss on Luke 12:4, “I say to you My friends,” says that fortitude is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that which is founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, a gloss on Psalm 36, “Be not emulous,” says that hope “leads on to faith.” Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state further on ( Q(17) , A(1) ). Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, it was stated above ( A(2) ) that the intellect of the believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent to matters of faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is not the first virtue.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(7)- O(4) —

Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation, as a gloss remarks on 1 Corinthians 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.]. Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above ( A(3) ).

Therefore it is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is the foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the first part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(7)- O(5) —

Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of acts. Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected by charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity precedes faith.

Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(7) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Hebrews 11:1) that “faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” Now the substance of a thing is that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(7) —

I answer that, One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by its very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature, precedes all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in matters of action, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(13) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(34) , A(4), ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last end, must needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the will, since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far as it is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is present in the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by faith, the first of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith, because natural knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly bliss, which is the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards Him.

On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For an accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that hinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to submit himself to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some other virtues, although there are no real virtues, unless faith be presupposed, as Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one cannot hope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this possible, since hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(40) , A(1) ). It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this sense that hope is said to lead to faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes the inclination of the will to fulfil God’s commandments. In this way it is not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue; since all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(100), A(2) ); and thus it is requisite for faith. In another way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the commandments considered as a duty. In this way it is a special virtue, and a part of justice: for a man does his duty by his superior when he obeys him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby man knows that God is his superior, Whom he must obey.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(7)- RO(4) —

To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come first, but also to be connected with the other parts of the building: since the building would not be founded on it unless the other parts adhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is charity, according to Colossians 3:14: “Above all... things have charity which is the bond of perfection.” Consequently faith without charity cannot be the foundation: and yet it does not follow that charity precedes faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(7)- RO(5) —

Some act of the will is required before faith, but not an act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes faith, because the will cannot tend to God with perfect love, unless the intellect possesses right faith about Him.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(8) Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues?

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that faith is not more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to certitude, wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain, through being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less it has of an admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also wisdom are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the believer may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the intellectual virtues.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But “faith is through hearing” according to Romans 10:17; whereas understanding, science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight.

Therefore science and understanding are more certain than faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(8)- O(2) Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more perfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than faith, since faith is the way to understanding, according to another version [*The Septuagint] of Isaiah 7:9: “If you will not believe, you shall not understand [Vulg.: ‘continue’]”: and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that “faith is strengthened by science.” Therefore it seems that science or understanding is more certain than faith.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(8) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Thessalonians 2:15): “When you had received of us the word of the hearing,” i.e. by faith... “you received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God.” Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore science is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(8) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(57) , A(4), ad 2) two of the intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and art; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change, whereas the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science [*In English the corresponding ‘gift’ is called knowledge] and understanding, are about necessary things, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(57) , A(5), ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and understanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3); secondly, for the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first way, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways.

First, on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth, whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason. Secondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and thus the more a man’s intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of faith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged simply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with respect to a disposition on the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more certain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e. for us. Likewise if these three be taken as gifts received in this present life, they are related to faith as to their principle which they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith is more certain.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(8)- RO(1) —

This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith, but on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith with our intellect.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Other things being equal sight is more certain than hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear greatly surpasses that of the seer’s sight, hearing is more certain than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.

P(2b)- Q(4)- A(8)- RO(3) —

The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater clearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But in so far as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the certitude of God’s word, on which faith is founded.

QUESTION OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state? (2) Whether the demons have faith? (3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in others? (4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that there was no faith, either in the angels, or in man, in their original state. For Hugh St. Victor says in his Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that “man cannot see God or things that are in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation.” Now the angels, in their original state, before they were either confirmed in grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes opened to contemplation, since “they saw things in the Word,” according to Augustine (Genesis ad lit. ii, 8). Likewise the first man, while in the state of innocence, seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for Hugh St. Victor says (De Sacram. i, 6) that “in his original state man knew his Creator, not by the mere outward perception of hearing, but by inward inspiration, not as now believers seek an absent God by faith, but by seeing Him clearly present to their contemplation.”

Therefore there was no faith in the angels and man in their original state.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure, according to 1 Corinthians 13:13: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner.” Now in their original state there was not obscurity either in the angels or in man, because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore there could be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original state.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the Apostle says ( Romans 10:17) that “faith... cometh by hearing.” Now this could not apply to angels and man in their original state; for then they could not hear anything from another. Therefore, in that state, there was no faith either in man or in the angels.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Hebrews 11:6): “He that cometh to God, must believe.” Now the original state of angels and man was one of approach to God. Therefore they had need of faith.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(1) —

I answer that, Some say that there was no faith in the angels before they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of Divine things. Since, however, “faith is the evidence of things that appear not,” according to the Apostle ( Hebrews 11:2), and since “by faith we believe what we see not,” according to Augustine (Tract. xl in Joan.; QQ.

Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes faith, which renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith. Now the principal object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of which gives the happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith. Consequently, as the angels before their confirmation in grace, and man before sin, did not possess the happiness whereby God is seen in His Essence, it is evident that the knowledge they possessed was not such as to exclude faith.

It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith. And if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as some [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29] hold, perhaps one might hold that there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in grace, or in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses not only a man’s but even an angel’s natural knowledge about God.

Since, however, we stated in the P(1) Q(62) , A(3) ; P(1) Q(95) , A(1)- that man and the angels were created with the gift of grace, we must needs say that there was in them a certain beginning of hoped-for happiness, by reason of grace received but not yet consummated, which happiness was begun in their will by hope and charity, and in the intellect by faith, as stated above ( Q(4) , A(7) ). Consequently we must hold that the angels had faith before they were confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we must observe that in the object of faith, there is something formal, as it were, namely the First Truth surpassing all the natural knowledge of a creature, and something material, namely, the thing to which we assent while adhering to the First Truth. With regard to the former, before obtaining the happiness to come, faith is common to all who have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: whereas with regard to the things which are proposed as the material object of faith, some are believed by one, and known manifestly by another, even in the present state, as we have shown above ( Q(1) , A(5) ; Q(2) , A(4), ad 2). In this respect, too, it may be said that the angels before being confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest knowledge about certain points in the Divine mysteries, which now we cannot know except by believing them.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although the words of Hugh of St. Victor are those of a master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be said that the contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly contemplation, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence. Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before they were confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet their contemplation was of a higher order than ours, for by its means they approached nearer to God, and had manifest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and mysteries than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them so that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: since by the light of wisdom He was more present to them than He is to us, although He was not so present to them as He is to the Blessed by the light of glory.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(1)- RO(2) —

There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the original state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural obscurity in the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine light: and this obscurity suffices for faith.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(1)- RO(3) —

In the original state there was no hearing anything from man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring inwardly: thus the prophets heard, as expressed by the Psalm 84:9: “I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me.”

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(2) Whether in the demons there is faith?

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the demons have no faith.

For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that “faith depends on the believer’s will”: and this is a good will, since by it man wishes to believe in God. Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good, as stated above ( P(1) Q(64) , A(2), ad 5), it seems that in the demons there is no faith.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to Ephesians 2:8: “By grace you are saved through faith... for it is the gift of God.” Now, according to a gloss on Hosea 3:1, “They look to strange gods, and love the husks of the grapes,” the demons lost their gifts of grace by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons after they sinned.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins, as Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on John 15:22, “If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have no excuse for their sin.”

Now the sin of unbelief is in some men. Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty of a sin graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable. Therefore in the demons there is no faith.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( James 2:19): “The devils... believe and tremble.”

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(1) , A(4) ; Q(2) , A(1) ), the believer’s intellect assents to that which he believes, not because he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident principles, but because his will commands his intellect to assent. Now, that the will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two causes. First, through the will being directed to the good, and in this way, to believe is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, because the intellect is convinced that it ought to believe what is said, though that conviction is not based on objective evidence. Thus if a prophet, while preaching the word of God, were to foretell something, and were to give a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the intellect of a witness would be convinced so as to recognize clearly that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the thing itself foretold would not be evident in itself, and consequently the essence of faith would not be removed.

Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in the faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not in the demons, but only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby they recognize that the teaching of the Church is from God, although they do not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for instance that there are three Persons in God, and so forth.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe, by the evidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for their belief.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when that faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have, is not a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through their natural intellectual acumen.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident, that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so that their malice is by no means diminished by their believe.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(3) Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles?

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a catholic. Now a catholic’s intellect needs the aid of the gift of faith in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of lifeless faith.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may possess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe some articles of faith without believing the others.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law.

Now a man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can believe some articles, and disbelieve others.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does faith, after a man disbelieves one article.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(3) —

I answer that, Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith.

The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit cannot remain.

Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth.

Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(3)- RO(1) —

A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith, about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The various conclusions of a science have their respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without another, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the Church who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The various precepts of the Law may be referred either to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept without another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one commandment, according to James 2:10: “Whosoever shall... offend in one point is become guilty of all.”

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(4) Whether faith can be greater in one man than in another?

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man than in another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its object.

Now whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith, since by failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as stated above ( A(3) ).

Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater in one than in another.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, those things which consist in something supreme cannot be “more” or “less.” Now faith consists in something supreme, because it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above all things. Therefore faith cannot be “more” or “less.”

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding of principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of faith are the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above ( Q(1) , A(7) ). Now the understanding of principles is possessed in equal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree by all the faithful.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Wherever we find great and little, there we find more or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little, for Our Lord said to Peter ( Matthew 14:31): “O thou of little faith, why didst thou doubt?” And to the woman he said ( Matthew 15:28): “O woman, great is thy faith!” Therefore faith can be greater in one than in another.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(52) , AA(1),2 ; P(2a), Q(112), A(4) ), the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of view: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of its participation by the subject.

Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material object which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of faith is one and simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(1) ). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among believers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above ( Q(4) , A(6) ). But the things which are proposed as the matter of our belief are many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in this respect one man can believe explicitly more things than another, so that faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more explicit.

If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of its participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the act of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as stated above ( Q(2) , AA(1),2 ; Q(4) , A(2) ). Consequently a man’s faith may be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his intellect, on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in another way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater promptitude, devotion, or confidence.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(4)- RO(1) —

A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of faith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly believe all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. In this respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the part of the object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(4)- RO(2) —

It is essential to faith that one should give the first place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit to it with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way faith is greater in one than in another.

P(2b)- Q(5)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The understanding of principles results from man’s very nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from the gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above ( P(2a), Q(112), A(4) ). Hence the comparison fails.

Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.

QUESTION OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether faith is infused into man by God? (2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(1) Whether faith is infused into man by God?

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that “science begets faith in us, and nourishes, defends and strengthens it.” Now those things which science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing, seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written ( John 4:53): “The father... knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole house”; and ( Romans 10:17) it is said that “faith is through hearing.” Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, that which depends on a man’s will can be acquired by him. But “faith depends on the believer’s will,” according to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Ephesians 2:8,9): “By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves... that no man may glory... for it is the gift of God.”

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(1) —

I answer that, Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man’s knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith, according to Romans 10:15: “How shall they preach, unless they be sent?”

As regards the second, viz. man’s assent to the things which are of faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some do not.

Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to matters of faith.

The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man’s free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(1)- RO(2) —

This argument again refers to the cause that proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to believe by words or deeds.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(1)- RO(3) —

To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer: but man’s will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as stated above ( Q(2) , A(3) ).

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God. For it is written ( Deuteronomy 32:4) that “the works of God are perfect.” Now lifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of God.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through lacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless [informis] when it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not from God, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(79) , A(2), ad 2). Therefore neither is lifeless faith from God.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is written ( John 7:23): “If a man receive circumcision on the sabbath-day, that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?”

Now faith heals man from unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God the gift of faith, is at the same time healed from all his sins. But this is not done except by living faith. Therefore living faith alone is a gift of God: and consequently lifeless faith is not from God.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(2) —

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Corinthians 13:2 says that “the faith which lacks charity is a gift of God.” Now this is lifeless faith. Therefore lifeless faith is a gift of God.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(2) —

I answer that, Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted that privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas sometimes it is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of its proper species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the humors is essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not essential to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since, therefore, when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign the cause of that thing as existing in its proper species, it follows that what is not the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the cause of the thing to which that privation belongs as being essential to its species. For we cannot assign as the cause of a sickness, something which is not the cause of a disturbance in the humors: though we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something which is not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the diaphanous body.

Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of faith, since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic form, as stated above ( Q(4) , A(4) ). Consequently the cause of lifeless faith is that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this is God, as stated above ( A(1) ). It follows, therefore, that lifeless faith is a gift of God.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with the perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a perfection that suffices for the essential notion of faith.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The deformity of an act is essential to the act’s species, considered as a moral act, as stated above ( P(1) Q(48) , A(1), ad 2; P(2a), Q(18) , A(5) ): for an act is said to be deformed through being deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of the act’s circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though He is the cause of the act as such.

We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a due form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is compared to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the deformed act is not from God, so neither is a false faith; and as lifeless faith is from God, so too, acts that are good generically, though not quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in sinners, are from God.

P(2b)- Q(6)- A(2)- RO(3) —

He who receives faith from God without charity, is healed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous unbelief is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing from committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that a man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to desist, without desisting from another act of sin, through the instigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is granted by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the gift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like, is given to some without charity.

QUESTION OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether fear is an effect of faith? (2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith.

For an effect does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): “Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him.” Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. Now fear and hope are contraries, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(23) , A(2) ): and faith begets hope, as a gloss observes on Matthew 1:2. Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, one contrary does not cause another.

Now the object of faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object of fear is an evil, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(42) , A(1) ). Again, acts take their species from the object, according to what was stated above ( P(2a), Q(18) , A(2) ). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( James 2:19): “The devils... believe and tremble.”

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(1) —

I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(41) , A(1) ). Now the principle of all appetitive movements is the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the principle of fear and of every appetitive movement must be an apprehension. Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension of certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with the Divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of the fear whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and this is servile fear.

It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be separated from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself to Him, and holds Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate God as an unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the greatest evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of the first fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith is the cause, while living faith is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it makes man adhere to God and to be subject to Him by charity.

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith, because if we knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and punishments, concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear Him. If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain articles of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then reverential fear follows, the result of which is that man submits his intellect to God, so as to believe in all the Divine promises. Hence the text quoted continues: “And your reward shall not be made void.”

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The same thing in respect of contraries can be the cause of contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith begets hope, in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which God awards to the just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it makes us appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on sinners.

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The primary and formal object of faith is the good which is the First Truth; but the material object of faith includes also certain evils; for instance, that it is an evil either not to submit to God, or to be separated from Him, and that sinners will suffer penal evils from God: in this way faith can be the cause of fear.

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(2) Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart?

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith is in the intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying the heart.

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible with impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may be seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not purify the heart.

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any way, it would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not purify the intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge.

Therefore faith nowise purifies the heart.

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Peter said ( Acts 15:9): “Purifying their hearts by faith.”

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(2) —

I answer that, A thing is impure through being mixed with baser things: for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which betters it, but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that the rational creature is more excellent than all transient and corporeal creatures; so that it becomes impure through subjecting itself to transient things by loving them. From this impurity the rational creature is purified by means of a contrary movement, namely, by tending to that which is above it, viz. God. The first beginning of this movement is faith: since “he that cometh to God must believe that He is,” according to Hebrews 11:6. Hence the first beginning of the heart’s purifying is faith; and if this be perfected through being quickened by charity, the heart will be perfectly purified thereby.

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Things that are in the intellect are the principles of those which are in the appetite, in so far as the apprehended good moves the appetite.

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity which is contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the human intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself, through wishing to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible objects. But when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible with any kind of impurity, because “charity covereth all sins” ( Proverbs 10:12).

P(2b)- Q(7)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity of sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect, according to the present state of life.

QUESTION OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gifts of understand and knowledge, which respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of understanding there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost? (2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person? (3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is only speculative, or practical also? (4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of understanding? (5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace? (6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other gifts; (7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift? (8) Which of the fruits?

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of nature, since they are given in addition to the latter. Now understanding is a natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident principles are known, as stated in Ethic. vi, 6. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures according to their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv).

Now the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a sign of understanding), but discursively (which is a sign of reason), as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine knowledge which is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason rather than a gift of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9,10). Now no gift of the Holy Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost should receive the name of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Isaiah 11:2): “The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding.”

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(1) —

I answer that, Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for “intelligere” [to understand] is the same as “intus legere” [to read inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned with external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge penetrates into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” as stated in De Anima iii, 6.

Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa. Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all these things.

Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things as it were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the understanding, the further can it penetrate into the heart of things. Now the natural light of our understanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach to a certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernatural light in order to penetrate further still so as to know what it cannot know by its natural light: and this supernatural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The natural light instilled within us, manifests only certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since man is ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above ( Q(2) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(3) , A(8) ), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for which he requires the gift of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The discourse of reason always begins from an understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of reason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we ignored. Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something previously understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the light of nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore this addition is not called “reason” but “understanding,” since the additional light is in comparison with what we know supernaturally, what the natural light is in regard to those things which we known from the first.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(1)- RO(3) —

“Will” denotes simply a movement of the appetite without indicating any excellence; whereas “understanding” denotes a certain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of things. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding rather than after the will.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(2) Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith?

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the gift of understanding is incompatible with faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15) that “the thing which is understood is bounded by the comprehension of him who understands it.” But the thing which is believed is not comprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippians 3:12: “Not as though I had already comprehended [Douay: ‘attained’], or were already perfect.”

Therefore it seems that faith and understanding are incompatible in the same subject.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, whatever is understood is seen by the understanding. But faith is of things that appear not, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(4) ; Q(4) , A(1) ). Therefore faith is incompatible with understanding in the same subject.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, understanding is more certain than science. But science and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated above ( Q(1) , AA(4),5 ). Much less, therefore, can understanding and faith be in the same subject.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that “understanding enlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard.”

Now one who has faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard; thus it is written ( Luke 24:27,32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures to His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore understanding is compatible with faith.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(2) —

I answer that, We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on the side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.

On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain things, of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery to three Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son; whereas other things come under faith, through being subordinate, in one way or another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that is contained in the Divine Scriptures.

On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that there are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way, we understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the essence of the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in itself of the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the state of faith lasts, we cannot understand those things which are the direct object of faith: although certain other things that are subordinate to faith can be understood even in this way.

In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of a thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity or mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward appearances, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we understand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the sake of things that appear externally. In this way, even during the state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those things which are the direct object of faith.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to the understanding of matters subordinate to faith.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(3) Whether the gift of understanding is merely speculative or also practical?

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according to Gregory (Moral. i, 32), “understanding penetrates certain more exalted things.” But the practical intellect is occupied, not with exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions are concerned. Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not practical.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the gift of understanding is something more excellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the intellectual virtue of understanding is concerned with none but necessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much more, therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about necessary things, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and which may result from man’s activity. Therefore the gift of understanding is not practical.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in matters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with which the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural reason, which is the directing principle in matters of action, as was made clear above ( P(2a), Q(58) , A(2) ; P(2a), Q(71) , A(6) ). Therefore the gift of understanding is not practical.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( <19B001> Psalm 110:10): \\“A good understanding to all that do it.”

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ), the gift of understanding is not only about those things which come under faith first and principally, but also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good actions have a certain relationship to faith: since “faith worketh through charity,” according to the Apostle ( Galatians 5:6). Hence the gift of understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though these were its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our actions is the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by the gift of understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting it, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The things with which human actions are concerned are not surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred to the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness, they are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The excellence of the gift of understanding consists precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not only as they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is the more excellent, according to the greater extent of its object.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The rule of human actions is the human reason and the eternal law, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(71) , A(6) ). Now the eternal law surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(4) Whether the gift of understanding is in all who are in a state of grace?

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that “the gift of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness of mind.”

Now many who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of mind.

Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, of all the things that are connected with knowledge, faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by faith Christ dwells in our hearts, according to Ephesians 3:17. Now the gift of understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who have faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not necessary for salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in a state of grace.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, those things which are common to all who are in a state of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of understanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself profitably, for, at times, “when the mind is puffed up with understanding sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base and vile things,” as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 81:5): “They have not known or understood, they walk on in darkness.” But no one who is in a state of grace walks in darkness, according to John 8:12: “He that followeth Me, walketh not in darkness.” Therefore no one who is in a state of grace is without the gift of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(4) —

I answer that, In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs be rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man’s will for good, according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will cannot be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some knowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good understood, as stated in De Anima iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy Ghost directs man’s will by the gift of charity, so as to move it directly to some supernatural good; so also, by the gift of understanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that it knows some supernatural truth, to which the right will needs to tend.

Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer dulness of mind with regard to things that are not necessary for salvation; but with regard to those that are necessary for salvation, they are sufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 John 2:27: “His unction teacheth you of all things.”

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Although not all who have faith understand fully the things that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that they ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate from them.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(4)- RO(3) —

With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift of understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in order that they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes with regard to other things, so that their mind is unable to penetrate all things clearly.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(5) Whether the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not sanctifying grace?

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in expounding the words of <19B820> Psalm 118:20: “My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications,” says: “Understanding flies ahead, and man’s will is weak and slow to follow.” But in all who have sanctifying grace, the will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of understanding can be in those who have not sanctifying grace.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Daniel 10:1) that “there is need of understanding in a” prophetic “vision,” so that, seemingly, there is no prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be prophecy without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Matthew 7:22, where those who say: “We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg.: ‘Have we not prophesied in Thy name?],” are answered with the words: “I never knew you.” Therefore the gift of understanding can be without sanctifying grace.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith, according to Isaiah 7:9, following another reading [*The Septuagint]: “If you will not believe you shall not understand.”

Now faith can be without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding can be without it.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Our Lord said ( John 6:45): “Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.”

Now it is by the intellect, as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn or understand what we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of understanding, cometh to Christ, which is impossible without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be without sanctifying grace.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(5) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(68) , AA(1),2 ) the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of grace is called the gift of understanding, in so far as man’s understanding is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of which movement depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore unless the human intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to have a right estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of understanding, however much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in regard to other truths that are preambles to the faith.

Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in error about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest good: and no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in moral matters a man has a right estimate about the end through a habit of virtue. Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without sanctifying grace.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(5)- RO(1) —

By understanding Augustine means any kind of intellectual light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions of a gift, unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a right estimate about the end.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The understanding that is requisite for prophecy, is a kind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things revealed to the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind with regard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs to the gift of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed but understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which perception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard the end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between understanding and faith.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(6) Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts?

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that the gift of understanding is not distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between things whose opposites are not distinct. Now “wisdom is contrary to folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance,” as Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference between folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does understanding differ from the other gifts.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not about any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally self-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first principles in supernatural knowledge, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(7) ). Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other intellectual gifts.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as stated above ( A(3) ). Therefore it is not distinct from the other intellectual gifts, but comprises them all.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(6) —

On the contrary, When several things are enumerated together they must be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction is the origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated together with the other gifts, as appears from Isaiah 11:2.

Therefore the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(6) —

I answer that, The difference between the gift of understanding and three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident, since the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while the three belong to the appetitive power.

But the difference between this gift of understanding and the remaining three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also belong to the cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.

Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of understanding differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in that these two belong to practical knowledge, while the gift of understanding belongs to speculative knowledge; and that it differs from the gift of wisdom, which also belongs to speculative knowledge, in that wisdom is concerned with judgment, while understanding renders the mind apt to grasp the things that are proposed, and to penetrate into their very heart. And in this sense we have assigned the number of the gifts, above ( P(2a), Q(68) , A(4) ).

But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters, as stated above ( A(3) ), and likewise, the gift of knowledge regards both matters, as we shall show further on ( Q(9) , A(3) ), and consequently, we must take their distinction in some other way. For all these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which, in us, takes its foundation from faith. Now “faith is through hearing” ( Romans 10:17). Hence some things must be proposed to be believed by man, not as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by faith. But faith, first and principally, is about the First Truth, secondarily, about certain considerations concerning creatures, and furthermore extends to the direction of human actions, in so far as it works through charity, as appears from what has been said above ( Q(4) , A(2), ad 3).

Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief, two things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated or grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these things aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these things, and to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The foregoing difference between those four gifts is clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which Gregory assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to sharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp, when it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are proposed to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind unable to pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a fool if he judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore folly is properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright about the universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind, even about any particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to knowledge, which gives man a right judgment about particular causes, viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to counsel, whereby man does not proceed to action before deliberating with his reason.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The gift of understanding is about the first principles of that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise than faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it belongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the things that are said.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(6)- RO(3) —

The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment, but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(7) Whether the sixth beatitude, “Blessed are the clean of heart,” etc., responds to the gift of understanding?

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that the sixth beatitude, “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God,” does not respond to the gift of understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly to the appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the appetite, but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not respond to the gift of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Acts 15:9): “Purifying their hearts by faith.” Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart being purified. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is related to the virtue of faith rather than to the gift of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the present state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the present life, since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(3) , A(8) ). Therefore the sixth beatitude which comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): “The sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to the clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye hath not seen.”

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(7) —

I answer that, Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as also in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the other by way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(69) , AA(2),4 ), and each of these, in some way, responds to the gift of understanding.

For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to seeing God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of inordinate affections: and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and gifts belonging to the appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart is a kind of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of the mind that is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the truths which are proposed to it about God, no longer by way of corporeal phantasms, nor infected with heretical misrepresentations: and this cleanness is the result of the gift of understanding.

Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God’s Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though we see not what God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God belongs to the gift of understanding; the first, to the gift of understanding in its state of perfection, as possessed in heaven; the second, to the gift of understanding in its state of inchoation, as possessed by wayfarers.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while the third refers to the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in this life by way of inchoation, and will be fulfilled, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(69) , A(2) ).

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(8) Whether faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding?

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not respond to the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit of faith, since it is written ( Isaiah 7:9) according to another reading [*The Septuagint]: “If you will not believe you shall not understand,” where our version has: “If you will not believe, you shall not continue.” Therefore fruit is not the fruit of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what follows. But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the foundation of the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above ( Q(4) , AA(1),7 ).

Therefore faith is not the fruit of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect; namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite. Therefore faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more than to wisdom, knowledge or counsel.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(8) —

On the contrary, The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith, which certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Galatians 5:22 says that the “faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen.”

Therefore faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(8) —

I answer that, The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(70) , A(1) ), when we were discussing them, are so called because they are something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of the Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an end, which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be, after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to the other powers.

Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will. In this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to the gift of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while the fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the will.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a virtue. But we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind of certitude of faith, to which man attains by the gift of understanding.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it would be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to be believed, without understanding it in some way. However, the perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith: which perfection of understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty of faith.

P(2b)- Q(8)- A(8)- RO(3) —

The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist in that very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand, speculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which belongs only to practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of its own: while the gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge, which can belongs also to speculative knowledge, have but one corresponding fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith. The reason why there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive faculty, is because, as already stated, the character of end, which the word fruit implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the intellective part.

QUESTION OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether knowledge is a gift? (2) Whether it is about Divine things? (3) Whether it is speculative or practical? (4) Which beatitude responds to it?

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(1) Whether knowledge is a gift?

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge implies an effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that a “demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge.”

Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy persons, as stated above ( Q(8) , A(4) ; P(2a), Q(68) , A(5) ). Now Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that “many of the faithful lack knowledge though they have faith.” Therefore knowledge is not a gift.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(68) , A(8) ). Therefore one gift suffices for the perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith, as stated above ( Q(8) , A(2) ). Therefore the gift of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are perfections of virtues, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(68) , AA(1),2 ), it seems that knowledge is not a gift.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts ( Isaiah 11:2).

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(1) —

I answer that, Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore, does not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature. Now, when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to some truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth: first, because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment on it.

Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human intellect may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of these is that he should have a sound grasp of the things that are proposed to be believed, and this pertains to the gift of understanding, as stated above ( Q(8) , A(6) ): while the other is that he should have a sure and right judgment on them, so as to discern what is to be believed, from what is not to be believed, and for this the gift of knowledge is required.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures, according to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms a sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his reason: and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative reasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without any discursive process, by simple intuition, as was stated in the P(1) Q(14) , A(7) ; wherefore God’s knowledge is not discursive, or argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is likened which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated likeness thereof.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(1)- RO(2) —

A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief. One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning things to be believed from things not to be believe: in this way knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what one ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to induce others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted, adds: “It is one thing for a man merely to know what he ought to believe, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to the godly, and to defend it against the ungodly.”

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The gifts are more perfect than the moral and intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the theological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is not unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological virtue.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(2) Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things?

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that “knowledge begets, nourishes and strengthens faith.” Now faith is about Divine things, because its object is the First Truth, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(1) ).

Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, according to Romans 1:20, “the invisible things of God... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”

If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems that there is also knowledge of Divine things.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): “The knowledge of Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of human affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge.”

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(2) —

I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing formed chiefly from its cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed through the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed through the first cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.

Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms, that which signifies “what a thing is,” is given the special name of “definition,” but the convertible terms which fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called “proper” terms.

Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment as stated above ( A(1) ), if this certitude of the judgment is derived from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of all matters by that cause: and a wise man “absolutely,” is one who knows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the knowledge of Divine things is called “wisdom,” while the knowledge of human things is called “knowledge,” this being the common name denoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment which is formed through second causes.

Accordingly, if we take knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or created things.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer.

Hence to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge, but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man’s mind to God.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(2)- RO(2) —

This argument takes knowledge in the generic acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through created things.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As stated above ( Q(1) , A(1) ), every cognitive habit regards formally the mean through which things are known, and materially, the things that are known through the mean. And since that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from mathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical sciences, though, as to their matter they have more in common with physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated in Phys. ii, 2 that they are more akin to physics.

Accordingly, since man knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to “knowledge,” to which it belongs formally, rather than to “wisdom,” to which it belongs materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to Divine things, this pertains to “wisdom” rather than to “knowledge.”

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(3) Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge?

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered among the gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14) that “knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we make use of external things.” But the knowledge which is concerned about actions is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is practical.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): “Knowledge is nought if it hath not its use for piety... and piety is very useless if it lacks the discernment of knowledge.” Now it follows from this authority that knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a speculative science. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the righteous, as stated above ( Q(9) , A(5) ). But speculative knowledge can be also in the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: “To him... who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin.”

Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): “Knowledge on her own day prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in the mind.” Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is both speculative and practical.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(9) , A(8) ), the gift of knowledge, like the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of faith. Now faith consists primarily and principally in speculation, in as much as it is founded on the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also the last end for the sake of which our works are done, hence it is that faith extends to works, according to Galatians 5:6: “Faith... worketh by charity.”

The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what he ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works, since we are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of faith, and of conclusions drawn therefrom.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge, in so far as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge, yet not action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.

Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(3)- RO(3) —

As we have already stated ( Q(8) , A(5) ) about the gift of understanding, not everyone who understands, has the gift of understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of grace: and so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about matters of faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as never to wander from the straight path of justice. This is the knowledge of holy things, according to Wis. 10:10: “She conducted the just... through the right ways... and gave him the knowledge of holy things.”

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(4) Whether the third beatitude, “Blessed are they that mourn,” etc. corresponds to the gift of knowledge?

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the third beatitude, “Blessed are they that mourn,” does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even as evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy.

Now knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter is known through evil: for “the straight line rules both itself and the crooked line” (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there joy, since it is written (Wis. 8:16): “Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness.”

Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with the gift of knowledge.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation, before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow does not correspond to it, since “the speculative intellect is not concerned about things to be sought or avoided” (De Anima iii, 9).

Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to correspond with the gift of knowledge.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): “Knowledge befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by the evil which he coveted as though it were good.”

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(4) —

I answer that, Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man’s aversion from God is occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: “Creatures... are turned to an abomination... and a snare to the feet of the unwise,” of those, namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they deem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a right judgment of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be the occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift of knowledge.

Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of knowledge.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right judgment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in this beatitude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the reward; which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to come.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers: it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.

P(2b)- Q(9)- A(4)- RO(3) —

No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it consists in speculation, because man’s beatitude consists, not in considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man’s beatitude does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is not ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are about Divine things.

QUESTION OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief, which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are contrary to knowledge and understanding.

As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy; (3) apostasy from the faith.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether unbelief is a sin? (2) What is its subject? (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? (4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin? (5) Of the species of unbelief; (6) Of their comparison, one with another; (7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers? (8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith? (9) Whether we ought to have communications with them? (10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians? (11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated? (12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against their parents’ will?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4).

Now unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that “to be capable to having faith, just as to be capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful.” Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man’s power to avoid unbelief, for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says ( Romans 10:14): \\“How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not heard?

And how shall they hear without a preacher?”

Therefore unbelief does not seem to be a sin.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(84) , A(4) ), there are seven capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not seem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue, and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(1) —

I answer that, Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises it, according to Isaiah 53:1: “Who hath believed our report?” It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that unbelief is a sin.

If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, not of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine things is a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like unbelievers are damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief. Hence Our Lord said ( John 15:22) “If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin”; which Augustine expounds (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as “referring to the sin whereby they believed not in Christ.”

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(1)- RO(1) —

To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it is part of human nature that man’s mind should not thwart his inner instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way, unbelief is contrary to nature.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(1)- RO(2) —

This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure negation.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride, through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that “presumptuous innovations arise from vainglory.”

It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital vices.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(2) Whether unbelief is in the intellect as its subject?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as its subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above ( A(1) ).

Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore unbelief is in the will.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Corinthians 11:14 “Satan... transformeth himself into an angel of light,” says that if “a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does or says what is becoming to a good angel.” This seems to be because of the rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel, since his intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin of unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and, consequently, it does not reside in the intellect.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Things which are contrary to one another are in the same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in the intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(74) , AA(1),2 ), sin is said to be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a sinful act may have two principles: one is its first and universal principle, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will, because every sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act: thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and lust, wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as assent is.

Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate subject.

But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which way every sin is said to be in the will.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The will’s contempt causes the intellect’s dissent, which completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of unbelief is in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(2)- RO(3) —

He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one, does not dissent from a matter of faith, because “his bodily senses are deceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and right judgment” as the gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But, according to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to invite one to his abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is not without sin.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(3) Whether unbelief is the greatest of sin?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): “I should hesitate to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a heretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact that he is a heretic.” But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not, seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes sin: for the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 1:12,13): “I... before was a blasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained... mercy... because I did it ignorantly in unbelief.”

Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment, according to Deuteronomy 25:2: “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.”

Now a greater punishment is due to believers than to unbelievers, according to Hebrews 10:29: “How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?”

Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on John 15:22, “If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin,” says (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.): “Under the general name, He refers to a singularly great sin. For this,” viz. infidelity, “is the sin to which all others may be traced.” Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(3) —

I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(71) , A(6) ; P(2a), Q(73) , A(3) ). Hence the more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach Him, but is severed from Him.

Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God. Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated further on ( Q(20) , A(3) ; Q(34) , A(2), ad 2; Q(39) , A(2), ad 3).

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not sinning otherwise, because although the heretic’s sin is more grave generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and conversely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be aggravated.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this ignorance, it has a certain reason for excuse, especially when a man sins not from malice, as was the case with the Apostle.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(3)- RO(3) —

An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery, committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and which he insults by committing sin.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(4) Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin. Because a gloss on Romans 14:23, “All that is not of faith is sin,” says: “The whole life of unbelievers is a sin.”

Now the life of unbelievers consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among unbelievers, no action can be good.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of all the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in unbelievers, they can do no good work, but sin in every action of theirs.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever ( Acts 10:4,31), that his alms were acceptable to God.

Therefore not every action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are good.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(85) , AA(2),4 ) mortal sin takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them. Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature suffices.

Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to the end of his unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence the same authority adds: “Because every one that lives or acts according to his unbelief, sins grievously.”

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Faith directs the intention with regard to the supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct the intention in respect of a connatural good.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them, whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not an unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, whom none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the truth of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to give him fuller instruction in the faith.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(5) Whether there are several species of unbelief?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that there are not several species of unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another, they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends not on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not several species of unbelief, according to the various points which the unbeliever disbelieves.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of our consideration.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the same thing does not belong to different species. Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different points of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of species of unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue, because “good happens in one way, but evil in many ways,” according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(5) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(55) , A(4) ; P(2a), Q(64) , A(1) ), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter, whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are opposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with regard to their different relations to the virtue: and in this way there are determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and another, by falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed to one virtue may be considered in respect of the corruption of the various conditions required for that virtue. In this way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g. temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in which the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that the rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans held evil to be infinite.

Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in number. For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way, reckon these three as species of unbelief.

If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to the various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin, and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect, considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives its various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of vice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by turning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because unbelievers follow many false opinions.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(5)- RO(2) —

This argument considers the various species of unbelief according to various points in which errors occur.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Since faith is one because it believes in many things in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things, be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily diseases.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(6) Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver according as it endangers the health of a more important member of the body, so does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which is most important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which the heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest of all.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in more numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since they do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who receive neither Testament.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 2 Peter 2:21): “It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back.”

Now the heathens have not known the way of justice, whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(6) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(5) ), two things may be considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since, however, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.

The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens do.

Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of view of guilt; since, as stated above ( A(1) ) unbelief has the character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere absence of faith, for the latter as was stated ( A(1) ) seems rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely, the unbelief of heretics is the worst.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(7) Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that one ought not to dispute with unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says ( 2 Timothy 2:14): “Contend not in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers.”

But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute publicly with unbelievers.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the canons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus: “It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which have once been judged and disposed of.” Now all matters of faith have been decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public about matters of faith.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments. But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: whereas things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters of faith.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Acts 9:22,29) that “Saul increased much more in strength, and confounded the Jews,” and that “he spoke... to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks.”

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(7) —

I answer that, In disputing about the faith, two things must be observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about the faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or for practice.

On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith, there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their presence. But as to simpleminded people, we must make a distinction; because either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for instance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or else they are not subject to provocation in this matter, as in those countries where there are not unbelievers. In the first case it is necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting errors; since in this way simple people are strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to deceive, while if those who ought to withstand the perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): “Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might have been instructed.” On the other hand, in the second case it is dangerous to dispute in public about the faith, in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very reason is more firm, that they have never heard anything differing from what they believe.

Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have to say against the faith.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(7)- RO(1) —

The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than of sound speeches.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(7)- RO(2) —

That law forbade those public disputations about the faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are for the safeguarding thereof.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(7)- RO(3) —

One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known, and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by defending the faith, according to 1 Peter 3:15: “Being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in you [*Vulg.: ‘Of that hope which is in you’ St. Thomas’ reading is apparently taken from Bede].”

Sometimes again, it is necessary, in order to convince those who are in error, according to Titus 1:9: “That he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers.”

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(8) Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be compelled to the faith. For it is written ( Matthew 13:28) that the servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked him: “Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?” and that he answered: “No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also together with it”: on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in Matth.): “Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of men. For it is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will necessarily slay many innocent persons.” Therefore it seems that for the same reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De Judaeis): “The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that for the future, none are to be compelled to believe.” Therefore, in like manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that “it is possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot believe unless he is willing.” Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(8)- O(4) —

It is said in God’s person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]): “I desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: ‘of him that dieth’].” Now we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(19) , AA(9),10 ). Therefore we should not even wish unbelievers to be put to death.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(8) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Luke 14:23): “Go out into the highways and hedges; and compel them to come in.” Now men enter into the house of God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be compelled to the faith.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(8) —

I answer that, Among unbelievers there are some who have never received the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this reason that Christ’s faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them, and take them prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ.

On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil what they have promised, and hold what they, at one time, received.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid, not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii) of himself: “It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with arguments.

However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law was so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our chains asunder.” Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord’s words, “Suffer both to grow until the harvest,” must be gathered from those which precede, “lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root the wheat also together with it.”

For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) “these words show that when this is not to be feared, that is to say, when a man’s crime is so publicly known, and so hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as might cause a schism, the severity of discipline should not slacken.”

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in the same chapter.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(8)- RO(3) —

Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep. clxxxv): “What do these people mean by crying out continually: ‘We may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ compel?’ They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards taught Him.”

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(8)- RO(4) —

As Augustine says in the same letter, “none of us wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war which he had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gathers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations.”

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(9) Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers. For the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 10:27): “If any of them that believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that is set before you.”

And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad Heb.): “If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without any reservation.” Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate with him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 5:12): “What have I to do to judge them that are without?” Now unbelievers are without. When, therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with certain people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews, or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully communicate with them.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(9) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 7:2,3): “Thou shalt make no league with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make marriages with them”: and a gloss on Leviticus 15:19, “The woman who at the return of the month,” etc. says: “It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we should not come in touch with idolaters or their disciples, nor have any dealings with them.”

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(9) —

I answer that, Communication with a particular person is forbidden to the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can be gathered from the Apostle’s words ( 1 Corinthians 5:6).

For after he had pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: “Know you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump?” and afterwards he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the sentence of the Church when he says ( 1 Corinthians 5:12): “Do not you judge them that are within?”

Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication on both.

With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time.

For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith. These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or to communicate with them without necessity.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(9)- RO(2) —

The Church does not exercise judgment against unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them: but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church, for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication with certain unbelievers.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(9)- RO(3) —

There is more probability that a servant who is ruled by his master’s commands, will be converted to the faith of his master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however, the master were in danger, through communicating with such a servant, he should send him away, according to Our Lord’s command ( Matthew 18:8): “If... thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee.”

With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition gives this solution before the RO(2) ] sense the reply is that the Lord gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry, so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those nations, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes on ( Deuteronomy 7:4): “For she will turn away thy son from following Me.”

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(10) Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(10) - O(1) —

It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says ( <540601> Timothy 6:1): “Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor”: and it is clear that he is speaking of unbelievers, since he adds ( 1 Timothy 6:2): “But they that have believing masters, let them not despise them.” Moreover it is written ( Peter 2:18): “Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward.”

Now this command would not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, all the members of a prince’s household are his subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes’ households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians ( 4:22): “All the saints salute you, especially they that are of Caesar’s household,” referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a slave is his master’s instrument in matters concerning everyday life, even as a craftsman’s laborer is his instrument in matters concerning the working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever’s farm. Therefore unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(10) —

On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says ( <460601> Corinthians 6:1): “Dare any of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the unjust,” i.e. unbelievers, “and not before the saints?” Therefore it seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(10) —

I answer that, That this question may be considered in two ways. First, we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful as of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority over them in any capacity whatever.

Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force: and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers, considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of unbelievers over the faithful.

Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted into children of God.

This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without paying any price, if he should be a “vernaculus,” i.e. born in slavery; and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought for his service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he should be offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church harm them in this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church, she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular princes have enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in favor of liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the above law to those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her members, in temporal matters, although she has the right to do so: and this, in order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed ( Matthew 17:25,26) that He could be excused from paying the tribute, because “the children are free,” yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in order to avoid giving scandal.

Thus Paul too, after saying that servants should honor their masters, adds, “lest the name of the Lord and His doctrine be blasphemed.”

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(10) - RO(2) —

The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction of faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor’s household, that they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and, the while, remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace of Diocletian.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(10) - RO(3) —

Slaves are subject to their masters for their whole lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything: whereas the craftsman’s laborer is subject to him for certain special works. Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have dominion or authority over the faithful, than that they should be allowed to employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits Christians to work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail their living together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 1 Kings 5:6. Yet, if there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by such communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(11) - O(1) —

It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent therein, as a gloss observes on Romans 1:32: “Not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them.”

Therefore it is a sin to tolerate their rites.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(11) - O(2) —

Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry, because a gloss on Galatians 5:1, “Be not held again under the yoke of bondage,” says: “The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of idolatry.” But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as Augustine relates (De Civ.

Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(11) - O(3) —

Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above ( A(3) ). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites of unbelievers to be tolerated.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(11) —

On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf.

Decret., dist. xlv, can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: “They should be allowed to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers have for ages observed them.”

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(11) —

I answer that, Human government is derived from the Divine government, and should imitate it. Now although God is allpowerful and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): “If you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust.” Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there follows this good — that our very enemies bear witness to our faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.

On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents’ will?

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) - O(1) —

It would seem that the children of Jews and of other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents’ will. For the bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over children, since the right of parental authority can be made to cease, when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be severed by man, according to Matthew 19:6: “What... God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” And yet the marriage bond is broken on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 7:15): “If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases”: and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima, and Idololatria, qu. i] says that “if the unbelieving partner is unwilling to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator, then the other partner is not bound to cohabitation.” Much more, therefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents’ authority over their children: and consequently their children may be baptized against their parents’ will.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) - O(2) —

Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death. Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they be left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and instructed in the faith.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) - O(3) —

Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen, and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings and princes: therefore their children are also.

Consequently kings and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against their parents’ wishes.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) - O(4) —

Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents, and consecrated to God in Baptism.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) - O(5) —

Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to the words of Ezekiel 33:6 about the man who “sees the sword coming and sounds not the trumpet.” Much more therefore, if Jewish children are lost through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) —

On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not be baptized against their parents’ will.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) —

I answer that, The custom of the Church has very great authority and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church.

Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the will of their parents, although at times past there have been many very powerful catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom most holy bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the children of Jews should be baptized against their parents’ wishes, in contradiction to the Church’s custom observed hitherto.

There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason, afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith.

The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother’s womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father’s care.

Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents’ custody, or anything done to it against its parents’ wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against its parents’ wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason.

Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it is the parents’ duty to look after the salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use of reason.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) - RO(1) —

In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the other’s consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) - RO(2) —

No one should be snatched from natural death against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the danger of everlasting death.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) - RO(3) —

Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) - RO(4) —

Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents’ reason, under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all matters relating to God.

P(2b)- Q(10)- A(12) - RO(5) —

The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching. Hence it had already been said ( Ezekiel 3:17): “I have made thee a watchman to the children [Vulg.: ‘house’] of Israel.” On the other hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their children fail to obtain salvation.

QUESTION OF HERESY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief? (2) Of the matter about which it is; (3) Whether heretics should be tolerated? (4) Whether converts should be received?

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(1) Whether heresy is a species of unbelief?

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief. For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above ( Q(10) , A(2) ). Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Galatians 5:19: [*Cf.

Decretals xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] “The works of the flesh are manifest:

Heresy is derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby a man makes choice of that school which he deems best.” But choice is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(13) , A(1) ). Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that “he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer.” Now the end of heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De Util. Credendi i) that “a heretic is one who either devises or follows false and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit, especially that he may lord and be honored above others.” Therefore heresy is a species of pride rather than of unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of the flesh, for the Apostle says ( Galatians 5:19): “The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness,” and among the others, he adds, “dissensions, sects,” which are the same as heresies.

Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Falsehood is contrary to truth.

Now a heretic is one who devises or follows false or new opinions.

Therefore heresy is opposed to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it is a species of unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(1) —

I answer that, The word heresy as stated in the first objection denotes a choosing. Now choice as stated above ( P(2a), Q(13) , A(3) ) is about things directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in matters of faith, the will assents to some truth, as to its proper good, as was shown above ( Q(4) , A(3) ): wherefore that which is the chief truth, has the character of last end, while those which are secondary truths, have the character of being directed to the end.

Now, whoever believes, assents to someone’s words; so that, in every form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by holding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place. Consequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong to His doctrine.

Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in respect of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in pagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to Christ, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the suggestions of his own mind.

Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the will regards faith, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Vices take their species from their proximate end, while, from their remote end, they take their genus and cause. Thus in the case of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is the species of adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the ultimate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result of the theft, and is included under it, as an effect under its cause, or a species under its genus, as appears from what we have said about acts in general ( P(2a), Q(18) , A(7) ).

Wherefore, as to the case in point also, the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one’s own false opinion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote end reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Just as heresy is so called from its being a choosing [*From the Greek \airein\ [hairein], to cut off], so does sect derive its name from its being a cutting off [secando], as Isidore states (Etym. viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing, and each belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the act itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by reason of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in which way it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second objection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to error, as the Philosopher states in Metaph. iv; Ed. Did. iii, 5), for this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, in as much as its act is independent on a bodily organ.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(2) Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith?

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters of faith. For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians, so were there among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes (Etym. viii, 3,4,5). Now their dissensions were not about matters of faith. Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though they were its proper matter.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now heresy is not only about things, but also about works, and about interpretations of Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Galatians 5:20 that “whoever expounds the Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy Ghost by Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though he may not have left the Church”: and elsewhere he says that “heresies spring up from words spoken amiss.” [*St. Thomas quotes this saying elsewhere, in Sent. iv, D, 13, and TP, Q(16) , A(8), but it is not to be found in St. Jerome’s works.] Therefore heresy is not properly about the matter of faith.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about matters pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on the question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet this was without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not properly about the matter of faith.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xviii, 51]: “In Christ’s Church, those are heretics, who hold mischievous and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may think soundly and rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing to mend their pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending them.” Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which are contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby “the just man liveth” ( Romans 1:17). Therefore heresy is about matters of faith, as about its proper matter.

I answer that, We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a corruption of the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption of the Christian faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that are not of faith, for instance, in questions of geometry and so forth, which cannot belong to the faith by any means; but only when a person has a false opinion about things belonging to the faith.

Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above ( P(1) Q(32) , A(4) ; P(2a), Q(1) , A(6), ad 1; P(2a), Q(2) , A(5) ), in one way, directly and principally, e.g. the articles of faith; in another way, indirectly and secondarily, e.g. those matters, the denial of which leads to the corruption of some article of faith; and there may be heresy in either way, even as there can be faith.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees were about opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies among Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(2)- RO(2) —

A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another sense than that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the meaning of Holy Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has revealed. Hence it is written ( Ezekiel 13:6) about the false prophets: “They have persisted to confirm what they have said,” viz. by false interpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by the words that he utters, since confession is an act of faith, as stated above ( Q(3) , A(1) ). Wherefore inordinate words about matters of faith may lead to corruption of the faith; and hence it is that Pope Leo says in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: “The enemies of Christ’s cross lie in wait for our every deed and word, so that, if we but give them the slightest pretext, they may accuse us mendaciously of agreeing with Nestorius.”

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it stated in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): “By no means should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when they have found the truth,” because, to wit, they do not make a choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly, certain doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding of which in this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined by the Church; although if anyone were obstinately to deny them after they had been defined by the authority of the universal Church, he would be deemed a heretic. This authority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff. For we read [*Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can.

Quoties]: “Whenever a question of faith is in dispute, I think, that all our brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the matter to none other than Peter, as being the source of their name and honor, against whose authority neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of the holy doctors defended their opinion.” Hence Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol [*Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]): “This, most blessed Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in the Catholic Church. If anything therein has been incorrectly or carelessly expressed, we beg that it may be set aright by you who hold the faith and see of Peter. If however this, our profession, be approved by the judgment of your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that he himself is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic but a heretic.”

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(3) Whether heretics ought to be tolerated?

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the Apostle says ( 2 Timothy 2:24,25): “The servant of the Lord must not wrangle... with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if peradventure God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from the snares of the devil.”

Now if heretics are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of repentance. Therefore it seems contrary to the Apostle’s command.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be tolerated. Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 11:19): “There must be... heresies, that they... who are reproved, may be manifest among you.”

Therefore it seems that heretics should be tolerated.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the Master commanded his servants ( Matthew 13:30) to suffer the cockle “to grow until the harvest,” i.e. the end of the world, as a gloss explains it. Now holy men explain that the cockle denotes heretics. Therefore heretics should be tolerated.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Titus 3:10,11): “A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that he, that is such an one, is subverted.”

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(3) —

I answer that, With regard to heretics two points must be observed: one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death.

On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but “after the first and second admonition,” as the Apostle directs: after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death. For Jerome commenting on Galatians 5:9, “A little leaven,” says: “Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame.”

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(3)- RO(1) —

This very modesty demands that the heretic should be admonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to retract, he must be reckoned as already “subverted,” as we may gather from the words of the Apostle quoted above.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the intention of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the faithful being put to the test, and “makes us shake off our sluggishness, and search the Scriptures more carefully,” as Augustine states (De Genesis cont.

Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the corruption of the faith, which is to inflict very great harm indeed. Consequently we should consider what they directly intend, and expel them, rather than what is beside their intention, and so, tolerate them.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(3)- RO(3) —

According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can.

Notandum), “to be excommunicated is not to be uprooted.” A man is excommunicated, as the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 5:5) that his “spirit may be saved in the day of Our Lord.” Yet if heretics be altogether uprooted by death, this is not contrary to Our Lord’s command, which is to be understood as referring to the case when the cockle cannot be plucked up without plucking up the wheat, as we explained above ( Q(10) , A(8), ad 1), when treating of unbelievers in general.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(4) Whether the Church should receive those who return from heresy?

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to receive those who return from heresy. For it is written ( Jeremiah 3:1) in the person of the Lord: “Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me saith the Lord.” Now the sentence of the Church is God’s sentence, according to Deuteronomy 1:17: “You shall hear the little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man’s person, because it is the judgment of God.”

Therefore even those who are guilty of the prostitution of unbelief which is spiritual prostitution, should be received all the same.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, Our Lord commanded Peter ( Matthew 18:22) to forgive his offending brother “not” only “till seven times, but till seventy times seven times,” which Jerome expounds as meaning that “a man should be forgiven, as often as he has sinned.”

Therefore he ought to be received by the Church as often as he has sinned by falling back into heresy.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other unbelievers who wish to be converted are received by the Church.

Therefore heretics also should be received.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix) says that “those who are found to have relapsed into the error which they had already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal.” Therefore they should not be received by the Church.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(4) —

I answer that, In obedience to Our Lord’s institution, the Church extends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who persecute her, according to Matthew 5:44: “Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you.” Now it is part of charity that we should both wish and work our neighbor’s good. Again, good is twofold: one is spiritual, namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the object of charity, since it is this chiefly that we should wish for one another. Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who return after falling no matter how often, are admitted by the Church to Penance whereby the way of salvation is opened to them.

The other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz. temporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions, good repute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by charity to wish others this good, except in relation to the eternal salvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of these goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eternal salvation in many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a good to that person, rather should we desire him to be without it, both because eternal salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and because the good of the many is to be preferred to the good of one. Now if heretics were always received on their return, in order to save their lives and other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial to the salvation of others, both because they would infect others if they relapsed again, and because, if they escaped without punishment, others would feel more assured in lapsing into heresy. For it is written ( Ecclesiastes 8:11): “For because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without any fear.”

For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who return from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their lives, and sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the ecclesiastical dignities which they may have had before, should their conversion appear to be sincere: we read of this as having frequently been done for the good of peace. But when they fall again, after having been received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in faith, wherefore when they return again, they are admitted to Penance, but are not delivered from the pain of death.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(4)- RO(1) —

In God’s tribunal, those who return are always received, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who return in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for she presumes that those who relapse after being once received, are not sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the way of salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence of death.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed against oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and spare our brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied to sins committed against one’s neighbor or against God, for it is not left to our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says on Matthew 18:15, “If thy brother shall offend against thee.” Yet even in this matter the law prescribes limits according as God’s honor or our neighbor’s good demands.

P(2b)- Q(11)- A(4)- RO(3) —

When other unbelievers, who have never received the faith are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy in faith, as relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails.

QUESTION OF APOSTASY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief? (2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to unbelief. For that which is the origin of all sins, does not, seemingly, pertain to unbelief, since many sins there are without unbelief. Now apostasy seems to be the origin of every sin, for it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): “The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: ‘to fall off’] from God,” and further on, (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride is the beginning of all sin.” Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance, or even in some inward act of the will, for it is written ( Proverbs 6:12-14): “A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh with a perverse mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the foot, speaketh with the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil, and at all times he soweth discord.”

Moreover if anyone were to have himself circumcised, or to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would be deemed an apostate. Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to unbelief, it would follow that it is a determinate species of unbelief, which does not seem to agree with what has been said ( Q(10) , A(5) ). Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( John 6:67): “Many of his disciples went back,” i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously ( John 6:65): “There are some of you that believe not.”

Therefore apostasy pertains to unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(1) —

I answer that, Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may happen in various ways according to the different kinds of union between man and God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by faith; secondly, by having his will duly submissive in obeying His commandments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to supererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or Holy Orders.

Now if that which follows be removed, that which precedes, remains, but the converse does not hold. Accordingly a man may apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the religious life to which he was bound by profession, or from the Holy Order which he had received: and this is called “apostasy from religious life” or “Orders.” A man may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in his mind against the Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize in both the above ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.

But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called “apostasy of perfidy.” In this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(1)- RO(1) —

This objection refers to the second kind of apostasy, which denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God’s commandments, an act that is to be found in every mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(1)- RO(2) —

It belongs to faith not only that the heart should believe, but also that external words and deeds should bear witness to the inward faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this way too, certain external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far as they are signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said itself to be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be understood as referring to every kind of apostate, yet it applies most truly to an apostate from the faith.

For since faith is the first foundation of things to be hoped for, and since, without faith it is “impossible to please God”; when once faith is removed, man retains nothing that may be useful for the obtaining of eternal salvation, for which reason it is written ( Proverbs 6:12): “A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man”: because faith is the life of the soul, according to Romans 1:17: “The just man liveth by faith.” Therefore, just as when the life of the body is taken away, man’s every member and part loses its due disposition, so when the life of justice, which is by faith, is done away, disorder appears in all his members. First, in his mouth, whereby chiefly his mind stands revealed; secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of movement; fourthly, in his will, which tends to evil. The result is that “he sows discord,” endeavoring to sever others from the faith even as he severed himself.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The species of a quality or form are not diversified by the fact of its being the term “wherefrom” or “whereto” of movement: on the contrary, it is the movement that takes its species from the terms. Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term “whereto” of the movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not imply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance thereof, according to 2 Peter 2:21: “It had been better for them not to know the truth [Vulg.: ‘the way of justice’], than after they had known it, to turn back.”

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(2) Whether a prince forfeits his dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, so that they no longer owe him allegiance?

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, that they no longer owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine, Super <19C403> Psalm 124:3] says that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate, nevertheless had under him Christian soldiers, who when he said to them, “Fall into line for the defense of the republic,” were bound to obey.

Therefore subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to their prince on account of his apostasy.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now we find that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph served Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served Assuerus. Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects from allegiance to their sovereign.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns away from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of apostasy from the faith, princes were to lose their right to command those of their subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it on account of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his apostatizing from the faith.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): “Holding to the institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic authority, absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or through the sacred bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated persons: and we absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance to such persons, until these shall have made amends.” Now apostates from the faith, like heretics, are excommunicated, according to the Decretal [*Extra, De Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam]. Therefore princes should not be obeyed when they have apostatized from the faith.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(10) , A(10) ), unbelief, in itself, is not inconsistent with dominion, since dominion is a device of the law of nations which is a human law: whereas the distinction between believers and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not annul human right. Nevertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced to the loss of his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on account of other sins.

Now it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief in those who have never received the faith, according to the saying of the Apostle ( 1 Corinthians 5:12): “What have I to do to judge them that are without?” She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the unbelief of those who have received the faith: and it is fitting that they should be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their subjects: for this same allegiance might conduce to great corruption of the faith, since, as was stated above ( A(1), O(2) ), “a man that is an apostate... with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and... soweth discord,” in order to sever others from the faith. Consequently, as soon as sentence of excommunication is passed on a man on account of apostasy from the faith, his subjects are “ipso facto” absolved from his authority and from the oath of allegiance whereby they were bound to him.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(2)- RO(1) —

At that time the Church was but recently instituted, and had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes; and so she allowed the faithful to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that were not contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet greater danger.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(2)- RO(2) —

As stated in the article, it is not a question of those unbelievers who have never received the faith.

P(2b)- Q(12)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether, as stated above ( A(1) ), which is not the case in any other sin.

QUESTION OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith? (2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin? (3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin? (4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned?

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or insult against the Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God rather than to unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of faith.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, on Ephesians 4:31, “Let blasphemy... be put away from you,” a gloss says, “that which is committed against God or the saints.” But confession of faith, seemingly, is not about other things than those pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith. Therefore blasphemy is not always opposed to the confession of faith.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, according to some, there are three kinds of blasphemy. The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed of God; the second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and the third, when something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, so that, seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His creatures. Now the object of faith is God. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to confession of faith.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 1:12,13): “I... before was a blasphemer and a persecutor,” and afterwards, “I did it ignorantly in” my “unbelief.” Hence it seems that blasphemy pertains to unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(1) —

I answer that, The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement of some surpassing goodness, especially that of God.

Now God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness. Hence whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does not befit Him, is far removed from the perfection of goodness which is His Essence. Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting God, or affirms anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine goodness.

Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it may happen merely in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the second way this opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections, even as, on the other hand, faith in God is perfected by love of Him. Accordingly this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in the intellect alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought only, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself outwardly in speech it is blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(1)- RO(1) —

He that speaks against God, with the intention of reviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of the falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness of his will, whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due to God, and this is perfect blasphemy.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as praise is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does blasphemy against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in this way divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things, or to deny fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and negation.

For this diversity does not cause distinct species of habits, since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made known by the same knowledge, and it is the same ignorance which errs in either way, since negatives are proved by affirmatives, according to Poster. i, 25. Again to ascribe to creatures things that are proper to God, seems to amount to the same as affirming something unfitting of Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and to ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God, is to assert that God is the same as a creature.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin. Because a gloss on the words, “Now lay you also all away,” etc. ( Colossians 3:8) says: “After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins”: and yet among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy is comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to any of them. Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not mortal: hence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede the deliberation of the reason, as was shown above ( P(2a), Q(74) , AA(3),10 ). Now blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the reason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Leviticus 24:16): “He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die.” Now the death punishment is not inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(72) , A(5) ), a mortal sin is one whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual life, which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever things are contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their genus.

Now blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity, because, as stated above ( A(1) ), it disparages the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal sin, by reason of its genus.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all the sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those mentioned previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned afterwards are less grievous; and yet among the latter some more grievous sins are included.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Since, as stated above ( A(1) ), blasphemy is contrary to the confession of faith, its prohibition is comprised under the prohibition of unbelief, expressed by the words: “I am the Lord thy God,” etc. ( Exodus 20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: “Thou shalt not take the name of... God in vain” ( Exodus 20:7). Because he who asserts something false about God, takes His name in vain even more than he who uses the name of God in confirmation of a falsehood.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(2)- RO(3) —

There are two ways in which blasphemy may occur unawares and without deliberation. In the first way, by a man failing to advert to the blasphemous nature of his words, and this may happen through his being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out into words suggested by his imagination, without heeding to the meaning of those words: this is a venial sin, and is not a blasphemy properly so called. In the second way, by adverting to the meaning of his words, and to their blasphemous nature: in which case he is not excused from mortal sin, even as neither is he who, in a sudden movement of anger, kills one who is sitting beside him.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(3) Whether the sin of blasphemy is the greatest sin?

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the sin of blasphemy is not the greatest sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing is said to be evil because it does harm. Now the sin of murder, since it destroys a man’s life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy, which can do no harm to God. Therefore the sin of murder is more grievous than that of blasphemy.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, a perjurer calls upon God to witness to a falsehood, and thus seems to assert that God is false. But not every blasphemer goes so far as to say that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more grievous sin than blasphemy.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, on Psalm 74:6, “Lift not up your horn on high,” a gloss says: “To excuse oneself for sin is the greatest sin of all.” Therefore blasphemy is not the greatest sin.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(3) —

On the contrary, On Isaiah 18:2, “To a terrible people,” etc. a gloss says: “In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight.”

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief: while the sin is aggravated if the will’s detestation is added thereto, and yet more, if it breaks out into words, even as love and confession add to the praise of faith.

Therefore, since, as stated above ( Q(10) , A(3) ), unbelief is the greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy also is a very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as unbelief and being an aggravated form of that sin.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(3)- RO(1) —

If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the objects of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin committed directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a sin against one’s neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them in respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for murder does more harm to one’s neighbor, than blasphemy does to God. Since, however, the gravity of a sin depends on the intention of the evil will, rather than on the effect of the deed, as was shown above ( P(2a), Q(73) , A(8) ), it follows that, as the blasphemer intends to do harm to God’s honor, absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously that the murderer.

Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to punishment, among sins committed against our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(3)- RO(2) —

A gloss on the words, “Let... blasphemy be put away from you” ( Ephesians 4:31) says: “Blasphemy is worse than perjury.” The reason is that the perjurer does not say or think something false about God, as the blasphemer does: but he calls God to witness to a falsehood, not that he deems God a false witness, but in the hope, as it were, that God will not testify to the matter by some evident sign.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(3)- RO(3) —

To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that aggravates every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the most grievous sin, for as much as it makes every sin more grievous.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(4) Whether the damned blaspheme?

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the damned do not blaspheme. Because some wicked men are deterred from blaspheming now, on account of the fear of future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these punishments, so that they abhor them yet more.

Therefore, much more are they restrained from blaspheming.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, since blasphemy is a most grievous sin, it is most demeritorious. Now in the life to come there is no state of meriting or demeriting. Therefore there will be no place for blasphemy.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( Ecclesiastes 11:3) that “the tree... in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be”: whence it clearly follows that, after this life, man acquires neither merit nor sin, which he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be damned who were not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore, will they blaspheme in the life to come.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Revelation 16:9): “The men were scorched with great heat, and they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power over these plagues,” and a gloss on these words says that “those who are in hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will nevertheless complain that God is so powerful as to torture them thus.” Now this would be blasphemy in their present state: and consequently it will also be in their future state.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(1),3 ), detestation of the Divine goodness is a necessary condition of blasphemy.

Now those who are in hell retain their wicked will which is turned away from God’s justice, since they love the things for which they are punished, would wish to use them if they could, and hate the punishments inflicted on them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins which they have committed, not because they hate them, but because they are punished for them. Accordingly this detestation of the Divine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy of the heart: and it is credible that after the resurrection they will blaspheme God with the tongue, even as the saints will praise Him with their voices.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(4)- RO(1) —

In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy through fear of punishment which they think they can escape: whereas, in hell, the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they are borne towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Merit and demerit belong to the state of a wayfarer, wherefore good is meritorious in them, while evil is demeritorious. In the blessed, on the other hand, good is not meritorious, but is part of their blissful reward, and, in like manner, in the damned, evil is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation.

P(2b)- Q(13)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will that detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in this respect there can be blasphemy in him.

QUESTION OF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed through certain malice? (2) Of the species of this sin; (3) Whether it can be forgiven? (4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost before committing other sins?

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(1) Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed through certain malice?

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice. Because the sin against the Holy Ghost is the sin of blasphemy, according to Matthew 12:32. But not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of blasphemy: since many other kinds of sin may be committed through certain malice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the sin committed through certain malice is condivided with sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed through weakness: whereas the sin against the Holy Ghost is condivided with the sin against the Son of Man ( Matthew 12:32).

Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice, since things whose opposites differ, are themselves different.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is itself a generic sin, having its own determinate species: whereas sin committed through certain malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition or general circumstance of sin, which can affect any kind of sin at all. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43) that “to sin against the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in the malice of sin for its own sake.” Now this is to sin through certain malice. Therefore it seems that the sin committed through certain malice is the same as the sin against the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(1) —

I answer that, Three meanings have been given to the sin against the Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz. Athanasius (Super Matth. xii, 32), Hilary (Can. xii in Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc. xii, 10), Jerome (Super Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in Matth.), say that the sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to utter a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit we understand the essential name applicable to the whole Trinity, each Person of which is a Spirit and is holy, or the personal name of one of the Persons of the Trinity, in which sense blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is distinct from the blasphemy against the Son of Man ( Matthew 12:32), for Christ did certain things in respect of His human nature, by eating, drinking, and such like actions, while He did others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out devils, raising the dead, and the like: which things He did both by the power of His own Godhead and by the operation of the Holy Ghost, of Whom He was full, according to his human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said ( Matthew 11:19) that He was “a glutton... a wine drinker,” and a “friend of publicans”: but afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, when they ascribed to the prince of devils those works which Christ did by the power of His own Divine Nature and by the operation of the Holy Ghost.

Augustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi), says that blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost, is final impenitence when, namely, a man perseveres in mortal sin until death, and that it is not confined to utterance by word of mouth, but extends to words in thought and deed, not to one word only, but to many. Now this word, in this sense, is said to be uttered against the Holy Ghost, because it is contrary to the remission of sins, which is the work of the Holy Ghost, Who is the charity both of the Father and of the Son. Nor did Our Lord say this to the Jews, as though they had sinned against the Holy Ghost, since they were not yet guilty of final impenitence, but He warned them, lest by similar utterances they should come to sin against the Holy Ghost: and it is in this sense that we are to understand Mark 3:29,30, where after Our Lord had said: “But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost,” etc. the Evangelist adds, “because they said: He hath an unclean spirit.”

But others understand it differently, and say that the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is a sin committed against that good which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost: because goodness is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, just a power is appropriated to the Father, and wisdom to the Son. Hence they say that when a man sins through weakness, it is a sin “against the Father”; that when he sins through ignorance, it is a sin “against the Son”; and that when he sins through certain malice, i.e. through the very choosing of evil, as explained above ( P(2a), Q(78) , AA(1),3 ), it is a sin “against the Holy Ghost.”

Now this may happen in two ways. First by reason of the very inclination of a vicious habit which we call malice, and, in this way, to sin through malice is not the same as to sin against the Holy Ghost. In another way it happens that by reason of contempt, that which might have prevented the choosing of evil, is rejected or removed; thus hope is removed by despair, and fear by presumption, and so on, as we shall explain further on (QQ(20) ,21 ). Now all these things which prevent the choosing of sin are effects of the Holy Ghost in us; so that, in this sense, to sin through malice is to sin against the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Just as the confession of faith consists in a protestation not only of words but also of deeds, so blasphemy against the Holy Ghost can be uttered in word, thought and deed.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(1)- RO(2) —

According to the third interpretation, blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is condivided with blasphemy against the Son of Man, forasmuch as He is also the Son of God, i.e. the “power of God and the wisdom of God” ( 1 Corinthians 1:24). Wherefore, in this sense, the sin against the Son of Man will be that which is committed through ignorance, or through weakness.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Sin committed through certain malice, in so far as it results from the inclination of a habit, is not a special sin, but a general condition of sin: whereas, in so far as it results from a special contempt of an effect of the Holy Ghost in us, it has the character of a special sin. According to this interpretation the sin against the Holy Ghost is a special kind of sin, as also according to the first interpretation: whereas according to the second, it is not a species of sin, because final impenitence may be a circumstance of any kind of sin.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(2) Whether it is fitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost?

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem unfitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, viz. despair, presumption, impenitence, obstinacy, resisting the known truth, envy of our brother’s spiritual good, which are assigned by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to deny God’s justice or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a man rejects God’s mercy, and by presumption, His justice. Therefore each of these is a kind of unbelief rather than of the sin against the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, impenitence, seemingly, regards past sins, while obstinacy regards future sins. Now past and future time do not diversify the species of virtues or vices, since it is the same faith whereby we believe that Christ was born, and those of old believed that He would be born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not be reckoned as two species of sin against the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, “grace and truth came by Jesus Christ” ( John 1:17). Therefore it seem that resistance of the known truth, and envy of a brother’s spiritual good, belong to blasphemy against the Son rather than against the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et Praecept. xi) that “to refuse to obey is to resist the Holy Ghost.”

Moreover a gloss on Leviticus 10:16, says that “a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the Holy Ghost.” Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to the Holy Ghost by Whom the Church is united together. Therefore it seems that the species of sins against the Holy Ghost are insufficiently enumerated.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] (De Fide ad Petrum iii) says that “those who despair of pardon for their sins, or who without merits presume on God’s mercy, sin against the Holy Ghost,” and (Enchiridion lxxxiii) that “he who dies in a state of obstinacy is guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost,” and (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that “impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost,” and (De Serm.

Dom. in Monte xxii), that “to resist fraternal goodness with the brands of envy is to sin against the Holy Ghost,” and in his book De unico Baptismo (De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 35) he says that “a man who spurns the truth, is either envious of his brethren to whom the truth is revealed, or ungrateful to God, by Whose inspiration the Church is taught,” and therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(2) —

I answer that, The above species are fittingly assigned to the sin against the Holy Ghost taken in the third sense, because they are distinguished in respect of the removal of contempt of those things whereby a man can be prevented from sinning through choice. These things are either on the part of God’s judgment, or on the part of His gifts, or on the part of sin. For, by consideration of the Divine judgment, wherein justice is accompanied with mercy, man is hindered from sinning through choice, both by hope, arising from the consideration of the mercy that pardons sins and rewards good deeds, which hope is removed by “despair”; and by fear, arising from the consideration of the Divine justice that punishes sins, which fear is removed by “presumption,” when, namely, a man presumes that he can obtain glory without merits, or pardon without repentance.

God’s gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are two: one is the acknowledgment of the truth, against which there is the “resistance of the known truth,” when, namely, a man resists the truth which he has acknowledged, in order to sin more freely: while the other is the assistance of inward grace, against which there is “envy of a brother’s spiritual good,” when, namely, a man is envious not only of his brother’s person, but also of the increase of Divine grace in the world.

On the part of sin, there are two things which may withdraw man therefrom: one is the inordinateness and shamefulness of the act, the consideration of which is wont to arouse man to repentance for the sin he has committed, and against this there is “impenitence,” not as denoting permanence in sin until death, in which sense it was taken above (for thus it would not be a special sin, but a circumstance of sin), but as denoting the purpose of not repenting. The other thing is the smallness or brevity of the good which is sought in sin, according to Romans 6:21: “What fruit had you therefore then in those things, of which you are now ashamed?”

The consideration of this is wont to prevent man’s will from being hardened in sin, and this is removed by “obstinacy,” whereby man hardens his purpose by clinging to sin. Of these two it is written ( Jeremiah 8:6): “There is none that doth penance for his sin, saying: What have I done?” as regards the first; and, “They are all turned to their own course, as a horse rushing to the battle,” as regards the second.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The sins of despair and presumption consist, not in disbelieving in God’s justice and mercy, but in contemning them.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only in respect of past and future time, but also in respect of certain formal aspects by reason of the diverse consideration of those things which may be considered in sin, as explained above.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Grace and truth were the work of Christ through the gifts of the Holy Ghost which He gave to men.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(2)- RO(4) —

To refuse to obey belongs to obstinacy, while a feigned repentance belongs to impenitence, and schism to the envy of a brother’s spiritual good, whereby the members of the Church are united together.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(3) Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven?

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi): “We should despair of no man, so long as Our Lord’s patience brings him back to repentance.” But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would be possible to despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, no sin is forgiven, except through the soul being healed by God. But “no disease is incurable to an all-powerful physician,” as a gloss says on <19A203> Psalm 102:3, “Who healeth all thy diseases.” Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the free-will is indifferent to either good or evil. Now, so long as man is a wayfarer, he can fall away from any virtue, since even an angel fell from heaven, wherefore it is written ( Job 4:18,19): “In His angels He found wickedness: how much more shall they that dwell in houses of clay?”

Therefore, in like manner, a man can return from any sin to the state of justice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Matthew 12:32): “He that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come” and Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22) that “so great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot submit to the humiliation of asking for pardon.”

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(3) —

I answer that, According to the various interpretations of the sin against the Holy Ghost, there are various ways in which it may be said that it cannot be forgiven. For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost we understand final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable, since in no way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a man perseveres until death will not be forgiven in the life to come, since it was not remitted by repentance in this life.

According to the other two interpretations, it is said to be unpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven, but because, considered in itself, it deserves not to be pardoned: and this in two ways. First, as regards the punishment, since he that sins through ignorance or weakness, deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins through certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his punishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the Son of Man before His Godhead was revealed, could have some excuse, on account of the weakness of the flesh which they perceived in Him, and hence, they deserved less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against His very Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works of the Holy Ghost, had no excuse in diminution of their punishment.

Wherefore, according to Chrysostom’s commentary (Hom. xlii in Matth.), the Jews are said not to be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in the world to come, because they were punished for it, both in the present life, through the Romans, and in the life to come, in the pains of hell. Thus also Athanasius adduces the example of their forefathers who, first of all, wrangled with Moses on account of the shortage of water and bread; and this the Lord bore with patience, because they were to be excused on account of the weakness of the flesh: but afterwards they sinned more grievously when, by ascribing to an idol the favors bestowed by God Who had brought them out of Egypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against the Holy Ghost, saying ( Exodus 32:4): “These are thy gods, O Israel, that have brought thee out of the land of Egypt.” Therefore the Lord both inflicted temporal punishment on them, since “there were slain on that day about three and twenty thousand men” ( Exodus 32:28), and threatened them with punishment in the life to come, saying, ( Exodus 32:34): “I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin... of theirs.”

Secondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt: thus a disease is said to be incurable in respect of the nature of the disease, which removes whatever might be a means of cure, as when it takes away the power of nature, or causes loathing for food and medicine, although God is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be unpardonable, by reason of its nature, in so far as it removes those things which are a means towards the pardon of sins. This does not, however, close the way of forgiveness and healing to an all-powerful and merciful God, Who, sometimes, by a miracle, so to speak, restores spiritual health to such men.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(3)- RO(1) —

We should despair of no man in this life, considering God’s omnipotence and mercy. But if we consider the circumstances of sin, some are called ( Ephesians 2:2) “children of despair” [*’Filios diffidentiae,’ which the Douay version renders ‘children of unbelief.’].

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(3)- RO(2) —

This argument considers the question on the part of God’s omnipotence, not on that of the circumstances of sin.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(3)- RO(3) —

In this life the free-will does indeed ever remain subject to change: yet sometimes it rejects that whereby, so far as it is concerned, it can be turned to good. Hence considered in itself this sin is unpardonable, although God can pardon it.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(4) Whether a man can sin first of all against the Holy Ghost?

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man cannot sin first of all against the Holy Ghost, without having previously committed other sins.

For the natural order requires that one should be moved to perfection from imperfection. This is evident as regards good things, according to Proverbs 4:18: “The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards and increases even to perfect day.”

Now, in evil things, the perfect is the greatest evil, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. v, text. 21). Since then the sin against the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it seems that man comes to commit this sin through committing lesser sins.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice, or through choice. Now man cannot do this until he has sinned many times; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6,9) that “although a man is able to do unjust deeds, yet he cannot all at once do them as an unjust man does,” viz. from choice. Therefore it seems that the sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be committed except after other sins.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, repentance and impenitence are about the same object. But there is no repentance, except about past sins.

Therefore the same applies to impenitence which is a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost presupposes other sins.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(4) —

On the contrary, “It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make a poor man rich” (Ecclus. 11:23). Therefore, conversely, it is possible for a man, according to the malice of the devil who tempts him, to be led to commit the most grievous of sins which is that against the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), in one way, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice. Now one may sin through certain malice in two ways, as stated in the same place: first, through the inclination of a habit; but this is not, properly speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to commit this sin all at once, in as much as sinful acts must precede so as to cause the habit that induces to sin. Secondly, one may sin through certain malice, by contemptuously rejecting the things whereby a man is withdrawn from sin.

This is, properly speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above ( A(1) ); and this also, for the most part, presupposes other sins, for it is written ( Proverbs 18:3) that “the wicked man, when he is come into the depth of sins, contemneth.”

Nevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sinful act, to sin against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both on account of his free-will, and on account of the many previous dispositions, or again, through being vehemently moved to evil, while but feebly attached to good. Hence never or scarcely ever does it happen that the perfect sin all at once against the Holy Ghost: wherefore Origen says (Peri Archon. i, 3): “I do not think that anyone who stands on the highest step of perfection, can fail or fall suddenly; this can only happen by degrees and bit by bit.”

The same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be taken literally for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For such blasphemy as Our Lord speaks of, always proceeds from contemptuous malice.

If, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) we understand the sin against the Holy Ghost to denote final impenitence, it does not regard the question in point, because this sin against the Holy Ghost requires persistence in sin until the end of life.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Movement both in good and in evil is made, for the most part, from imperfect to perfect, according as man progresses in good or evil: and yet in both cases, one man can begin from a greater (good or evil) than another man does. Consequently, that from which a man begins can be perfect in good or evil according to its genus, although it may be imperfect as regards the series of good or evil actions whereby a man progresses in good or evil.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(4)- RO(2) —

This argument considers the sin which is committed through certain malice, when it proceeds from the inclination of a habit.

P(2b)- Q(14)- A(4)- RO(3) —

If by impenitence we understand with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) persistence in sin until the end, it is clear that it presupposes sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we take it for habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a sin against the Holy Ghost, it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is possible for a man who has never sinned to have the purpose either of repenting or of not repenting, if he should happen to sin.

QUESTION OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and understanding.

Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins ( P(2a), Q[76] ), we must now inquire about blindness of mind and dulness of sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding; and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin? (2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind? (3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh?

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that blindness of mind is not a sin. Because, seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin.

Now blindness of mind excuses from sin; for it is written ( John 9:41): “If you were blind, you should not have sin.” Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, punishment differs from guilt. But blindness of mind is a punishment as appears from Isaiah 6:10, “Blind the heart of this people,” for, since it is an evil, it could not be from God, were it not a punishment. Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary, since, as Augustine says (Confess. x), “all love to know the resplendent truth,” and as we read in Ecclesiastes 11:7, “the light is sweet and it is delightful for the eyes to see the sun.” Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons blindness of mind among the vices arising from lust.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(1) —

I answer that, Just as bodily blindness is the privation of the principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the privation of the principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has a threefold principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light, since it pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never forfeit from the soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented from exercising its proper act, through being hindered by the lower powers which the human intellect needs in order to understand, for instance in the case of imbeciles and madmen, as stated in the P(1) Q(84) , AA(7),8 .

Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual light superadded to the natural light of reason, which light is sometimes forfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a punishment, in so far as the privation of the light of grace is a punishment. Hence it is written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): “Their own malice blinded them.”

A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible principle, through which a man understands other things; to which principle a man may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens in two ways. Sometimes it is due to the fact that a man’s will is deliberately turned away from the consideration of that principle, according to Psalm 35:4, “He would not understand, that he might do well”: whereas sometimes it is due to the mind being more busy about things which it loves more, so as to be hindered thereby from considering this principle, according to Psalm 57:9, “Fire,” i.e. of concupiscence, “hath fallen on them and they shall not see the sun.” In either of these ways blindness of mind is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The blindness that excuses from sin is that which arises from the natural defect of one who cannot see.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(1)- RO(2) —

This argument considers the second kind of blindness which is a punishment.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(1)- RO(3) —

To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by all; and yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a man is hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin from blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now dulness is opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding denotes a principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking of dulness describes it as “dullness of sense in respect of understanding.”

Now dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as a defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be chiefly in the fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated above ( A(1) ), while dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural defect is not a sin: so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would not be a sin, which is contrary to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he reckons it among the sins arising from gluttony.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Different causes produce different effects. Now Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from gluttony, and that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these others are different vices. Therefore those are different vices also.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(2) —

I answer that, Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through being obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of metaphor, is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its object from a distance or is able by penetration as it were to perceive the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence in corporeal things the senses are said to be acute when they can perceive a sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing, or scent, while on the other hand they are said to be dull, through being unable to perceive, except sensible objects that are near at hand, or of great power.

Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect of certain primals and extremes, as stated in Ethic. vi, even as the senses are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of knowledge. Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does not perceive its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but through certain other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a thing’s essence through a property thereof, and the cause through its effect. Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in connection with his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a property or effect of a thing, he understands the nature or the thing itself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its slightest details: whereas a man is said to have a dull sense in connection with his understanding, if he cannot arrive at knowing the truth about a thing, without many explanations; in which case, moreover, he is unable to obtain a perfect perception of everything pertaining to the nature of that thing.

Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes a certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual goods; while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the knowledge of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of understanding, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehending them, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost nature. This dulness has the character of sin, just as blindness of mind has, that is, in so far as it is voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to his affection for carnal things, dislikes or neglects the careful consideration of spiritual things.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(3) Whether blindness of mind and dulness of sense arise from sins of the flesh?

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that blindness of mind and dulness of sense do not arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine (Retract. i, 4) retracts what he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, “God Who didst wish none but the clean to know the truth,” and says that one might reply that “many, even those who are unclean, know many truths.” Now men become unclean chiefly by sins of the flesh. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are not caused by sins of the flesh.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, blindness of mind and dulness of sense are defects in connection with the intellective part of the soul: whereas carnal sins pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does not act on the soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the flesh do not cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, all things are more passive to what is near them than to what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer the mind than carnal vices are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are caused by spiritual rather than by carnal vices.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(3) —

I answer that, The perfect intellectual operation in man consists in an abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the more a man’s intellect is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly will it be able to consider things intelligible, and to set in order all things sensible. Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to be “detached” in order to command, and that the agent must have power over matter, in order to be able to move it. Now it is evident that pleasure fixes a man’s attention on that which he takes pleasure in: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4,5) that we all do best that which we take pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do them either not at all, or in a faint-hearted fashion.

Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most impetuous of all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices cause man’s attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so that in consequence man’s operation in regard to intelligible things is weakened, more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as sexual pleasures are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore lust gives rise to blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely the knowledge of spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from gluttony, which makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible things. On the other hand, the contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and chastity, dispose man very much to the perfection of intellectual operation. Hence it is written ( Daniel 1:17) that “to these children” on account of their abstinence and continency, “God gave knowledge and understanding in every book, and wisdom.”

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Although some who are the slaves of carnal vices are at times capable of subtle considerations about intelligible things, on account of the perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit superadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the pleasures of the body, it must needs happen that their attention is frequently withdrawn from this subtle contemplation: wherefore the unclean can know some truths, but their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not by altering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid manner.

P(2b)- Q(15)- A(3)- RO(3) —

It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are further removed from the mind, that they distract the mind’s attention to more remote things, so that they hinder the mind’s contemplation all the more.

QUESTION OF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) The precepts concerning faith; (2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding.

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1) Whether in the Old Law there should have been given precepts of faith?

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that, in the Old Law, there should have been given precepts of faith. Because a precept is about something due and necessary. Now it is most necessary for man that he should believe, according to Hebrews 11:6, “Without faith it is impossible to please God.” Therefore there was very great need for precepts of faith to be given.

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the New Testament is contained in the Old, as the reality in the figure, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(107), A(3) ).

Now the New Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance John 14:1: “You believe in God; believe also in Me.” Therefore it seems that some precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law also.

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the same as to forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many precepts forbidding unbelief: thus ( Exodus 20:3): “Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me,” and ( Deuteronomy 13:1-3) they were forbidden to hear the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them away from their faith in God. Therefore precepts of faith should have been given in the Old Law also.

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above ( Q(3) , A(1) ). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the confession and the promulgation of faith: for they were commanded ( Exodus 12:27) that, when their children should ask them, they should tell them the meaning of the paschal observance, and ( Deuteronomy 13:9) they were commanded to slay anyone who disseminated doctrine contrary to faith. Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained in the Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said ( John 15:25) that it was written in the Law: “They have hated Me without cause,” although this is found written in Psalm 34 and <196801> 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): “Ye that fear the Lord, believe Him.” Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Apostle ( Romans 3:27) calls the Old Law the “law of works” which he contrasts with the “law of faith.” Therefore the Old Law ought not to have contained precepts of faith.

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1) —

I answer that, A master does not impose laws on others than his subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone who receives the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the primary subjection of man to God is by faith, according to Hebrews 11:6: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is.” Hence faith is presupposed to the precepts of the Law: for which reason ( Exodus 20:2) that which is of faith, is set down before the legal precepts, in the words, “I am the Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of Egypt,” and, likewise ( Deuteronomy 6:4), the words, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy [Vulg.: ‘our’] God is one,” precede the recording of the precepts.

Since, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith whereby we believe that God is, which is the first and chief of all articles of faith, as stated above ( Q(1) , AA(1),7 ), it follows that, if we presuppose faith in God, whereby man’s mind is subjected to Him, it is possible for precepts to be given about other articles of faith. Thus Augustine expounding the words: “This is My commandment” ( John 15:12) says (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.) that we have received many precepts of faith. In the Old Law, however, the secret things of faith were not to be set before the people, wherefore, presupposing their faith in one God, no other precepts of faith were given in the Old Law.

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Faith is necessary as being the principle of spiritual life, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the Law.

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of faith, namely belief in one God, when He said: “You believe in God,” and commanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one Person is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs to the faith of the New Testament, wherefore He added: “Believe also in Me.”

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which corrupt virtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(18) , A(4), ad 3; P(2a), Q(19) , A(6), ad 1, A(7), ad 3).

Therefore faith in one God being presupposed, prohibitive precepts had to be given in the Old Law, so that men might be warned off those particular defects whereby their faith might be corrupted.

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also presuppose man’s submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law could contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of faith, rather than to faith itself.

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(1)- RO(5) —

In this passage again that faith is presupposed whereby we believe that God is; hence it begins, “Ye that fear the Lord,” which is not possible without faith. The words which follow — ”believe Him” — must be referred to certain special articles of faith, chiefly to those things which God promises to them that obey Him, wherefore the passage concludes — ”and your reward shall not be made void.”

P(2b)- Q(16)- A(2) Whether the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were fittingly set down in the Old Law?