QUESTIONS 17-22 QUESTION OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)

After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; (2) the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding precepts.

The first of these points gives rise to a twofold consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether hope is a virtue? (2) Whether its object is eternal happiness? (3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another’s happiness? (4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man? (5) Whether hope is a theological virtue? (6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues? (7) Of its relation to faith; (8) Of its relation to charity.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(1) Whether hope is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For “no man makes ill use of a virtue,” as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope, like the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, no virtue results from merits, since “God works virtue in us without us,” as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib.

Arb. xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, “virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing” (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have. Therefore hope is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore hope is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(1) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) “the virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good likewise.” Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper measurement. But, as we stated above ( Q(8) , A(3), ad 3) human acts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God: wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For, as we have already stated ( P(2a), Q(40) , A(1) ), when we were treating of the passion of hope, the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as stated in Ethic. 3:Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything as being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our hope attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to attain its due rule.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(1)- RO(1) —

In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue.

Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man’s attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we speak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show further on ( A(5) ; Q(18) , A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our merits, but from grace alone.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(1)- RO(3) —

He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help he leans.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(2) Whether eternal happiness is the proper object of hope?

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses every movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul.

Now eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human soul, for the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 2:9) that it hath not “entered into the heart of man.” Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written ( Psalm 36:5): “Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He will do it.” Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord’s Prayer, to be delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man.

Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Hebrews 6:19) that we have hope “which entereth in,” i.e. maketh us to enter... “within the veil,” i.e. into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of a gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal happiness.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), the hope of which we speak now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause.

Wherefore the good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an infinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper and principal object of hope is eternal happiness.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apostle says pointedly ( Hebrews 6:19) that hope “enters in, even within the veil,” because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to speak.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(2)- RO(2) —

We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are referred to God, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(2)- RO(3) —

To him that longs for something great, all lesser things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness, nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, as compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such things in reference to its principal object.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(3) Whether one man may hope for another’s eternal happiness?

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that one may hope for another’s eternal happiness. For the Apostle says ( Philippians 1:6): “Being confident of this very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ.”

Now the perfection of that day will be eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another’s eternal happiness.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him. But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to James 5:16: “Pray for one another that you may be saved.”

Therefore we can hope for another’s eternal happiness.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it is possible to despair of another’s eternal happiness, else Augustine would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can also hope for another’s eternal salvation.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that “hope is only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them.”

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(3) —

I answer that, We can hope for something in two ways: first, absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous good. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always towards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved. Therefore hope regards directly one’s own good, and not that which pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another eternal’s life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(4) Whether a man can lawfully hope in man?

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(4)- O(1) —

It wold seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says (Dial. i, 8) that “predestination is furthered by the saints’ prayers.”

Therefore one may hope in man.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jeremiah 9:4: “Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any brother of his.” Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above ( A(2), O(2) ). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something.

Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Jeremiah 17:5): “Cursed be the man that trusteth in man.”

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(4) —

I answer that, Hope, as stated above ( A(1) ; P(2a), Q(40) , A(7) ), regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a secondary cause.

For the principal end is the last end, while the secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance as the first cause leading to happiness.

Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save happiness, as one’s last end, but only as something referred to final happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature, as though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is, however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the saints, and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this reason some are blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two vices, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(64) , A(4) ). But hope is a mean between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Hope is enumerated ( <461301> Corinthians 13) together with faith and charity, which are theological virtues.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(5) —

I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.

Now it has been stated above ( A(1) ) that hope has the character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that has God for its object, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(62) , A(1) ), it is evident that hope is a theological virtue.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause, as stated above ( A(4) ).

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(5)- RO(2) —

In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes. Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is its proper object.

Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to follow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with regard to something that is referred to its principal object. Thus faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of the things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of things of which he is capable.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(5)- RO(3) —

The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(5)- RO(4) —

Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of obtaining something that is within one’s power, wherefore its proper object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by another’s help, as stated above ( A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(6) Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues?

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(54) , A(2) ). Now the object of hope is the same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession of faith, we say: “I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.” Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as stated above ( A(5) ). Therefore hope is not distinct from faith.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(6) —

On the contrary, There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says (Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(6) —

I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from having God for the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.

On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.

Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance for obtaining happiness.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(6)- RO(1) —

God is the object of these virtues under different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the object suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(54) , A(2) ).

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on ( A(7) ).

Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity, properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(7) Whether hope precedes faith?

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that hope precedes faith.

Because a gloss on Psalm 36:3, “Trust in the Lord, and do good,” says: “Hope is the entrance to faith and the beginning of salvation.” But salvation is by faith whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, that which is included in a definition should precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in the definition of faith ( Hebrews 11:1): “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” Therefore hope precedes faith.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 9:10): “He that plougheth should plough in hope... to receive fruit.” But the act of faith is meritorious.

Therefore hope precedes faith.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Matthew 1:2): “Abraham begot Isaac,” i.e. “Faith begot hope,” according to a gloss.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(7) —

I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order, therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way, eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as explained above ( A(2) ; A(6), ad 3): and both of these are proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is ready for us, according to Hebrews 11:6 “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.”

Therefore it is evident that faith precedes hope.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(7)- RO(1) —

As the same gloss observes further on, “hope” is called “the entrance” to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called the “entrance to faith,” because thereby man begins to be established and perfected in faith.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(7)- RO(2) —

The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a circumlocution by something resulting from faith.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it suffices for it to accompany or follow it.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(8) Whether charity precedes hope?

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says on Luke 27:6, “If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed,” etc.: “Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity.” But faith precedes charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that “good emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity.”

Now to hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul.

Therefore it flows from charity.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by charity.

Therefore charity precedes hope.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(8) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 1:5): “The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience,” i.e. “from hope,” according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(8) —

I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(27) , A(4) ; P(2a), Q(28) , A(6), ad 2; P(2a), Q(40) , A(7) ) in the treatise on the passions.

Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to God for His own sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes, intends to obtain possession of something for himself.

Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for his sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too, hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments. On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense that Ambrose states ( O(1) ) that charity flows from hope: so that this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a friend.

P(2b)- Q(17)- A(8)- RO(3) —

The Master is speaking of living hope, which is naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.

QUESTION OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject? (2) Whether it is in the blessed? (3) Whether it is in the damned? (4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(1) Whether hope is in the will as its subject?

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above ( Q(17) , A(1) ; P(2a), Q(40) , A(1) ). Now the arduous is the object, not of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in the irascible.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological virtue having God for its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is in the will as its subject.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(1) —

I answer that, As shown above ( P(1) Q(87) , A(2) ), habits are known by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as stated in the P(1) Q(82) , A(5), those movements which occur in the lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite are without passion, as shown above ( P(1) Q(87) , A(2), ad 1; P(2a), Q(22) , A(3), ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the principal object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible, or rather superintelligible.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of hoping.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The movement of hope and the movement of charity are mutually related, as was shown above ( Q(17) , A(8) ). Hence there is no reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the P(1) Q(85) , A(4) .

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(2) Whether in the blessed there is hope?

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that in the blessed there is hope.

For Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of Psalm 30:2, “In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped,” are said in His person.

Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can hope to continue in its possession.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above ( Q(17) , A(3) ). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there can be hope in them.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10; Augustine, Genesis ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Romans 8:24): “What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?” Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore hope has no place in them.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(2) —

I answer that, If what gives a thing its species be removed, the species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object, even as the other virtues do, as was shown above ( Q(17) , AA(5),6 ; P(2a), Q(54) , A(2) ): and its principal object is eternal happiness as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above ( Q(17) , A(2) ).

Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except in so far as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of hope.

Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither of them can be in the blessed.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He was still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the body but the enjoyment of God.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The happiness of the saints is called eternal life, because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were, of God’s eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as regards this there is no future), but are in actual possession thereof.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(2)- RO(3) —

So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same hope that one hopes for one’s own happiness, and for that of others. But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor, without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Since hope is a theological virtue having God for its object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which consists in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Moreover, although the glory of the body is something arduous in comparison with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small thing as compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has the glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of the body.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(3) Whether hope is in the damned?

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Matthew 25:41: “Depart... you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels.”

But the devil has hope, according to Job 40:28, “Behold his hope shall fail him.” Therefore it seems that the damned have hope.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope. But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according to James 2:19: “The devils... believe and tremble.” Therefore it seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit that he had not before, according to Ecclesiastes 11:3, “If the tree fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be.”

Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and never despaired.

Therefore they will hope in the future life also.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Hope causes joy, according to Romans 12:12, “Rejoicing in hope.” Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and grief, according to Isaiah 65:14, “My servants shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit.”

Therefore no hope is in the damned.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(3) —

I answer that, Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that what is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that which is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will: wherefore Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could not be perfectly happy in their first state before their confirmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no foreknowledge of what would happen to them. For perfect and true happiness requires that one should be certain of being happy for ever, else the will would not rest.

In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly penal unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know that they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain happiness. Wherefore it is written ( Job 15:22): “He believeth not that he may return from darkness to light.” It is, therefore, evident that they cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither can the blessed apprehend it as a future good.

Consequently there is no hope either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand, hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, because in either case they apprehend happiness as a future possible thing.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(3)- RO(1) —

As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said of the devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just before ( Job 40:18): “He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth”: this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(3)- RO(2) —

As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), “faith is about things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one’s own or another’s; whereas hope is only about good things, future and concerning oneself.” Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them future possible things, but far removed from them.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Lack of hope in the damned does not change their demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their respective states.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of a wayfarer?

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not to the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in hope.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated above ( Q(17) , A(1) ). Now it is impossible in this life to know for certain that we are in a state of grace, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(112), A(5) ). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, there can be no certainty about that which may fail. Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness.

Therefore wayfarer’s hope has no certainty.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(4) —

On the contrary, “Hope is the certain expectation of future happiness,” as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be gathered from 2 Timothy 1:12, “I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed to Him.”

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(4) —

I answer that, Certainty is found in a thing in two ways, essentially and by participation. It is found essentially in the cognitive power; by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to its end by the cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works with certainty, since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything with certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral virtues are said to work with greater certainty than art, in as much as, like a second nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason: and thus too, hope tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing in the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive faculty.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received, but on God’s omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has faith is certain of God’s omnipotence and mercy.

P(2b)- Q(18)- A(4)- RO(3) —

That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but not to any deficiency in God’s power or mercy, in which hope places its trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.

QUESTION OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is to be feared? (2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly; (3) Whether worldly fear is always evil? (4) Whether servile fear is good? (5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear? (6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes? (7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom? (8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear? (9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost? (10) Whether it grows when charity grows? (11) Whether it remains in heaven? (12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(1) Whether God can be feared?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object of fear is a future evil, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(41) , AA(2),3 ).

But God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore God cannot be feared.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God. Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), “we fear those things whence evil comes to us.” But evil comes to us, not from God, but from ourselves, according to Hosea 13:9: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is... in Me.” Therefore God is not to be feared.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Jeremiah 10:7): “Who shall not fear Thee, O King of nations?” and ( Malachi 1:6): “If I be a master, where is My fear?”

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(1) —

I answer that, Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is someone’s help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too, fear may have two objects, one of which is the very evil which a man shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil may come.

Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness itself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can be an object of fear in the second way, in so far as there may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation to Him.

From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good. Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.

In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be separated from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(1)- RO(1) —

This objection considers the object of fear as being the evil which a man shuns.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(1)- RO(2) —

In God, we may consider both His justice, in respect of which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that, accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under different aspects.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The evil of fault is not from God as its author but from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good, since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly; although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is written (Wis. 1:13,16): “God made not death... but the wicked with works and words have called it to them.”

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2) Whether fear is fittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. “laziness, shamefacedness,” etc. of which we have treated above ( P(2a), Q(41) , A(4) ), and which are not mentioned in the division in question. Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good, since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, “The devils... believe and tremble,” nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mark 14:33, Jesus “began to fear and be heavy.” Therefore the aforesaid division of fear is insufficient.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master.

Now filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be distinguished from all these other fears.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between them.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear about some evil. Now “concupiscence of the eyes,” which is the desire for things of this world, is distinct from “concupiscence of the flesh,” which is the desire for one’s own pleasure. Therefore “worldly fear,” whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct from “human fear,” whereby one fears harm to one’s own person.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2) —

On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2) —

I answer that, We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes us turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object of fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him. This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of fault.

Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear of committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child to fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both, it will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to whether it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has been treated above ( P(2a), Q(42) , A(3) ) when we were considering the passion of fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul: whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as explained above.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not numbered among these kinds of fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The relation of servant to master is based on the power which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her husband is based on the son’s affection towards his father to whom he submits himself, or on the wife’s affection towards her husband to whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste fear amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes our Father, according to Romans 8:15, “You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]”; and by this same charity He is called our spouse, according to Corinthians 11:2, “I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ”: whereas servile fear has no connection with these, since it does not include charity in its definition.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2)- RO(4) —

These three fears regard punishment but in different ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which turns man away from God, and which God’s enemies sometimes inflict or threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby men are drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God. Servile fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it secondarily.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(2)- RO(5) —

It amounts to the same whether man turns away from God through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of different goods.

This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins, all of which alike however lead man away from God.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil. Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge of whom we read ( Luke 18:2) that he “feared not God, nor regarded man.”

Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments incite us to good actions, according to Romans 13:3, “Wilt thou not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise from the same.”

Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not evil, since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby the present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Our Lord said ( Matthew 10:28): “Fear ye not them that kill the body,” thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(3) —

I answer that, As shown above ( P(2a), Q(1) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(18) , A(1) ; P(2a), Q(54) , A(2) ) moral acts and habits take their name and species from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite’s movement is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone were to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on account of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33).

Now worldly fear is that which arises from worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is always evil.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(3)- RO(1) —

One may have regard for men in two ways.

First in so far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one may have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): “In his days he feared not the prince.”

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(3)- RO(2) —

When the secular power inflicts punishment in order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God’s minister, according to Romans 13:4, “For he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil.”

To fear the secular power in this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(3)- RO(3) —

It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to suffer any punishment whatever.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(4) Whether servile fear is good?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Romans 8:15, “if a man do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well done.”

Therefore servile fear is not good.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, no good grows from a sinful root.

Now servile fear grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11, “Why did I not die in the womb?” Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): “When a man dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of pride, not of humility.” Therefore servile fear is evil.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear.

But mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Romans 8:15, “You have not received the spirit of bondage,” etc. says: “It is the one same spirit that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear.”

Therefore servile fear is not evil.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(4) —

I answer that, It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, “what is free is cause of itself” (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from love. Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so that if servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil simply, even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it contrary to charity belongs to its very species.

This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary, is loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid of charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end. Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is evil.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(4)- RO(1) —

This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride, but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to subject his affections to the yoke of justice.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity, so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be feared as the principal evil.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(5) Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is accompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and lifeless faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, habits are diversified by their objects.

Now the same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they both fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain favors from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be punished by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to receive other favors from Him, as stated above ( Q(17) , A(2), ad 2). Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan.

Tract. ix) says that there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(5) —

I answer that, The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts and habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above ( P(2a), Q(54) , A(2) ), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear correspond to different kinds of evil.

Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown above ( A(2) ). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear are not the same substantially but differ specifically.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards the object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but in respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand, servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the comparison fails.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God in the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz. God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural movements differ specifically according to their different relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This cannot be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(6) Whether servile fear remains with charity?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that servile fear does not remain with charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that “when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had prepared a place for it.”

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us” ( Romans 5:5).

Now “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty” ( 2 Corinthians 3:17). Since then freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away when charity comes.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as punishment diminishes one’s own good. Now love of God drives away self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine testifies (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that “the love of God unto the contempt of self builds up the city of God.” Therefore it seems that servile fear is driven out when charity comes.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated above ( A(4) ). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not forfeited through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost dwells in us. Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity comes.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(6) —

I answer that, Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is fear of punishment which is detrimental to one’s own good.

Hence the fear of punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as self-love is: because it comes to the same that a man love his own good and that he fear to be deprived of it.

Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In one way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the love of his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when a man loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way, it is indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as when a man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet not so as to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have another special love for one’s neighbor, besides the love of charity which is founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness, consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is referable to charity.

Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity, because separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it is contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that is opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in opposition to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear of punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of punishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when, to wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from God, but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not place his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil as being the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent with charity; but it is not called servile, except when punishment is dreaded as a principal evil, as explained above ( AA(2),4 ).

Hence fear considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the substance of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love can remain with charity.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Augustine is speaking of fear considered as servile: and such is the sense of the two other objections.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom. For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a part of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while wisdom is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. “Now fear of the Lord, that is wisdom,” according to Job 28:28.

Therefore it seems that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something is prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written in the <19B001> Psalm 110:10: “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.”

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(7) —

I answer that, A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to its essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art as to its essence consists in the principles from which that art proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is where the builder begins his work.

Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall state further on ( Q(45) , A(1) ), it is considered by us in one way, and in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is ordained to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according to a participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace, wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being cognizant of God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as directing human conduct; since this is directed not only by the human law, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists in the first principles of wisdom, i.e. the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet servile fear in one way, and filial fear, in another. For servile fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom, according to Ecclus. 1:27, “The fear of the Lord driveth out sin.” On the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of wisdom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the Divine law belongs to wisdom, in order to make a beginning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself to Him: for the result will be that in all things he will be ruled by God.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(7)- RO(1) —

This argument proves that fear is not the beginning of wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(7)- RO(2) —

The fear of God is compared to a man’s whole life that is ruled by God’s wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is written (Ecclus. 1:25): “The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for [Vulg.: ‘and’] the branches thereof are longlived.” Consequently, as the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said to be wisdom.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(7)- RO(3) —

As stated above, faith is the beginning of wisdom in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 25:16): “The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning of faith is to be fast joined to it.”

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(8) Whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that initial fear differs substantially from filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear is the beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, “The fear of God is the beginning of love.” Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the object of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to be the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial fear. Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the substance of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect of perfection and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ substantially from filial fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(8) —

I answer that, Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning [initium]. Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in some way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way, initial.

It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning of charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial fear, because they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity. Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to filial fear as imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and imperfect charity differ, not as to essence but as to state. Therefore we must conclude that initial fear, as we understand it here, does not differ essentially from filial fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(8)- RO(1) —

The fear which is a beginning of love is servile fear, which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces the thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Initial fear does not dread punishment as its proper object, but as having something of servile fear connected with it: for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment, though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which “casteth out fear,” according to 1 John 4:18.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(8)- RO(3) —

Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear, not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect is a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in Metaph. ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being, while it differs altogether from non-being.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God for its object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue, being connected with the same matter, as it were.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(9)- O(4) —

Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that “fear is bestowed as a remedy against pride.” But the virtue of humility is opposed to pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(9)- O(5) —

Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should not be said that fear is a gift.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(9) —

On the contrary, The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost ( Isaiah 11:3).

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(9) —

I answer that, Fear is of several kinds, as stated above ( A(2) ). Now it is not “human fear,” according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. xviii), “that is a gift of God” — for it was by this fear that Peter denied Christ — but that fear of which it was said ( Matthew 10:28): “Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell.”

Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas the gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as they are inseparable from charity, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(68) , A(5) ).

It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it was stated above ( P(2a), Q(68) , AA(1),3 ) that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul’s powers, whereby these are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as, by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to the motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of a certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a non-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the movable subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what filial or chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid separating ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it were, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and the last place, in the descending order.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(9)- RO(1) —

Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope: since thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain by God’s help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help.

Wherefore filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(9)- RO(2) —

The proper and principal object of fear is the evil shunned, and in this way, as stated above ( A(1) ), God cannot be an object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and the other theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust in God’s help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies to the other theological virtues.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(9)- RO(3) —

From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it does not follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from charity which is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of different emotions.

Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is, because love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed by reason of its own nature, as was shown above ( P(2a), Q(55) , AA(3),4 ); for which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes, wherefore it is something less than a theological virtue.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(9)- RO(4) —

According to Ecclus. 10:14, “the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God,” that is to refuse submission to God, and this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear cuts off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a remedy against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(68) , A(4) ), while the theological virtues are the origin of the gifts, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(69) , A(4), ad 3).

This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(10) Whether fear decreases when charity increases?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(10) - O(1) —

It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): “The more charity increases, the more fear decreases.”

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, fear decreases when hope increases.

But charity increases when hope increases, as stated above ( Q(17) , A(8) ).

Therefore fear decreases when charity increases.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies separation. Now separation decreases when union increases.

Therefore fear decreases when the love of charity increases.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(10) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that “the fear of God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love God above all things, and our neighbor as ourselves.”

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(10) —

I answer that, Fear is twofold, as stated above ( AA(2),4 ); one is filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be separated from him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears punishment.

Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as an effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one loves a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated from him.

On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains as to its substance, as stated above ( A(6) ). This fear decreases as charity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man loves God, the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks less of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly, because, the faster he clings, the more confident he is of the reward, and, consequently the less fearful of punishment.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(10) - RO(1) —

Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(10) - RO(2) —

It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases, because the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by another’s help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated from him.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(10) - RO(3) —

Filial fear does not imply separation from God, but submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission.

Yet, in a way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than himself and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of charity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(11) Whether fear remains in heaven?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(11) - O(1) —

It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For it is written ( Proverbs 1:33): “He... shall enjoy abundance, without fear of evils,” which is to be understood as referring to those who already enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is about some evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above ( AA(2),5 ; P(2a), Q(42) , A(1) ). Therefore there will be no fear in heaven.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(11) - O(2) —

Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according to 1 John 3:2, “When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him.” But God fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(11) - O(3) —

Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven.

Therefore neither will there be fear in heaven.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(11) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 18:10): “The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever.”

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(11) —

I answer that, Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no means be in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security which is essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(5) , A(4) ).

But regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of avoidance, fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for little evils inspire no fear. Now as a thing’s good consists in its staying in its own order, so a thing’s evil consists in forsaking its order. Again, the order of a rational creature is that it should be under God and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for a rational creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too is it an evil for it, if it submit not to God, by presumptuously revolt against Him or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a rational creature considered as to its nature on account of the natural flexibility of the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it becomes impossible, by reason of the perfection of glory.

Therefore the avoidance of this evil that consists in non-subjection to God, and is possible to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss, will be in heaven; while in this life there is avoidance of this evil as of something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, expounding the words of Job (26:11), “The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His beck,” says (Moral. xvii, 29): “The heavenly powers that gaze on Him without ceasing, tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it should be of a penal nature, is one not of fear but of wonder,” because, to wit, they wonder at God’s supereminence and incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) in this sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the question doubtful. “If,” he says, “this chaste fear that endureth for ever and ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that is afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which we have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because chaste fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we avoid sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and possess ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no kind of fear is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for ever and ever, because that which fear will lead us to, will be everlasting.”

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(11) - RO(1) —

The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the fear that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear which is accompanied by security.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(11) - RO(2) —

As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) “the same things are both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable imitation of the Inimitable” — that is, because, so far as they can, they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly — ”they are unlike because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short infinitely and immeasurably.” Hence, if there be no fear in God (since there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not follow that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in perfect subjection to God.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(11) - RO(3) —

Hope implies a certain defect, namely the futurity of happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas fear implies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is infinitely distant from God, and this defect will remain even in heaven. Hence fear will not be cast out altogether.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(12) Whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear?

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(12) - O(1) —

It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the beginning of the spiritual life, as explained above ( A(7) ): whereas poverty belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to Matthew 19:21, “If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor.” Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to the gift of fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(12) - O(2) —

Further, it is written ( <19B812> Psalm 118:120): “Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear,” whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear to restrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of mourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude of poverty.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(12) - O(3) —

Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above ( A(9), ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God,” seems above all to correspond to hope, because according to Romans 5:2, “we... glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God.”

Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than poverty of spirit.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(12) - O(4) —

Further, it was stated above ( P(2a), Q(70) , A(2) ) that the fruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the beatitudes.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(12) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): “The fear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed are the poor in spirit.”

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(12) —

I answer that, Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. Because, since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and submission to God, whatever results from this submission belongs to the gift of fear. Now from the very fact that a man submits to God, it follows that he ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks it only in God. For that would be inconsistent with perfect subjection to God, wherefore it is written ( Psalm 19:8): “Some trust in chariots and some in horses; but we will call upon the name of... our God.” It follows that if a man fear God perfectly, he does not, by pride, seek greatness either in himself or in external goods, viz. honors and riches. In either case, this proceeds from poverty of spirit, in so far as the latter denotes either the voiding of a puffed up and proud spirit, according to Augustine’s interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the renunciation of worldly goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one’s own will, through the instigation of the Holy Spirit, according to the expounding of Ambrose on Luke 6:20 and Jerome on Matthew 5:3.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(12) - RO(1) —

Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue, all the beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a perfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts. Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent with the perfection of wisdom, as stated above ( AA(7),10 ).

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(12) - RO(2) —

The undue exaltation of man either in himself or in another is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is the result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject to Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless, pleasure is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous character of a thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of poverty corresponds to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning, consequently.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(12) - RO(3) —

Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation of withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal from external things which hinder submission to God, fittingly corresponds to fear.

P(2b)- Q(19)- A(12) - RO(4) —

As regards the fruits, it seems that those things correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty, continency and chastity.

QUESTION OF DESPAIR (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether despair is a sin? (2) Whether it can be without unbelief? (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? (4) Whether it arises from sloth?

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(1) Whether despair is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from the immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But despair includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no sin, because “a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit” ( Matthew 7:18). Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God, or from horror at the greatness of one’s own sins. Therefore despair is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(1) —

On the contrary, That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be a sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the Apostle says of certain men ( Ephesians 4:19): “Who, despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness and [Vulg.: ‘unto’] covetousness.”

Therefore despair is not only a sin but also the origin of other sins.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(1) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2) affirmation and negation in the intellect correspond to search and avoidance in the appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect correspond to good and evil in the appetite. Consequently every appetitive movement which is conformed to a true intellect, is good in itself, while every appetitive movement which is conformed to a false intellect is evil in itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of the intellect about God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners, according to Ezekiel 18:23, “I desire not the death of the sinner, but that he should be converted, and live” [*Vulg.: ‘Is it My will that a sinner should die... and not that he should be converted and live?’ Cf. Ezekiel 33:11]: while it is a false opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the contrary movement of despair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is vicious and sinful.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(1)- RO(1) —

In every mortal sin there is, in some way, aversion from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but not always in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to a mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God, must necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist principally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which is that he departs from God.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(1)- RO(2) —

A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two ways: first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an act proceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that “no man makes evil use of virtue.” Secondly, a thing proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and in this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus sometimes men pride themselves of their virtues, according to Augustine (Ep. ccxi): “Pride lies in wait for good works that they may die.” In this way fear of God or horror of one’s own sins may lead to despair, in so far as man makes evil use of those good things, by allowing them to be an occasion of despair.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The damned are outside the pale of hope on account of the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not imputed to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their damnation.

Even so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of obtaining that which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which was not due to be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to despair of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever becoming rich.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(2) Whether there can be despair without unbelief?

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that there can be no despair without unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so long as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a man cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his faith be removed.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, to prefer one’s own guilt to God’s mercy and goodness, is to deny the infinity of God’s goodness and mercy, and so savors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to the Divine mercy and goodness, according to Genesis 4:13: “My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon.” Therefore whoever despairs, is an unbeliever.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned heresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon for sins after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is an unbeliever.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(2) —

On the contrary, If we remove that which follows, that which precedes remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above ( Q(17) , A(7) ). Therefore when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not everyone who despairs, is an unbeliever.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(2) —

I answer that, Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to the appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the appetite is moved in connection with particulars, since the appetitive movement is from the soul towards things, which, in themselves, are particular. Now it may happen that a man, while having a right opinion in the universal, is not rightly disposed as to his appetitive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a particular matter, because, in order to pass from the universal opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is necessary to have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just as it is impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal proposition, except through the holding of a particular proposition. Hence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal, fails in an appetitive movement, in regard to some particular, his particular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as the fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular matter, although he retains the true universal estimate according to faith, viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In the same way, a man while retaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, viz. that there is in the Church the power of forgiving sins, may suffer a movement of despair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state, there is no hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a particular matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there can be other mortal sins, without belief.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The effect is done away, not only when the first cause is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed.

Hence the movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(2)- RO(2) —

If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God’s mercy is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.

The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(3) Whether despair is the greatest of sins?

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins. For there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above ( A(2) ).

But unbelief is the greatest of sins because it overthrows the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair is not the greatest of sins.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than hope, according to 1 Corinthians 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater sin than despair.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but inordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only inordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion. Therefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than other sins.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(3) —

On the contrary, An incurable sin seems to be most grievous, according to Jeremiah 30:12: “Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very grievous.” Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jeremiah 15:18: “My wound is desperate so as to refuse to be healed.” [*Vulg.: ‘Why is my wound,’ etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(3) —

I answer that, Those sins which are contrary to the theological virtues are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are opposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now every mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact of its turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a mutable good, even inordinately, without turning away from God, it would not be a mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its very nature, includes aversion from God, is most grievous among mortal sins.

Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the theological virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God and unbelief to despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in respect of their proper species, they are more grievous. For unbelief is due to a man not believing God’s own truth; while the hatred of God arises from man’s will being opposed to God’s goodness itself; whereas despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share of God’s goodness. Hence it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself, while despair is against Him, according as His good is partaken of by us.

Wherefore strictly speaking it is more grievous sin to disbelieve God’s truth, or to hate God, than not to hope to receive glory from Him.

If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point of view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope withdraws us from evils and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is given up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good works. Wherefore a gloss on Proverbs 24:10, “If thou lose hope being weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished,” says: “Nothing is more hateful than despair, for the man that has it loses his constancy both in the every day toils of this life, and, what is worse, in the battle of faith.” And Isidore says (De Sum. Bono ii, 14): “To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair is to fall into hell.”

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(4) Whether despair arises from sloth?

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that despair does not arise from sloth. Because different causes do not give rise to one same effect. Now despair of the future life arises from lust, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it does not arise from sloth.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, just as despair is contrary to hope, so is sloth contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy arises from hope, according to Romans 12:12, “rejoicing in hope.” Therefore sloth arises from despair, and not vice versa.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, contrary effects have contrary causes.

Now hope, the contrary of which is despair, seems to proceed from the consideration of Divine favors, especially the Incarnation, for Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10): “Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope, than that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now what greater proof could we have of this than that God’s Son should deign to unite Himself to our nature?” Therefore despair arises rather from the neglect of the above consideration than from sloth.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons despair among the effects of sloth.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(17) , A(1) ; P(2a), Q(40) , A(1) ), the object of hope is a good, difficult but possible to obtain by oneself or by another. Consequently the hope of obtaining happiness may be lacking in a person in two ways: first, through his not deeming it an arduous good; secondly, through his deeming it impossible to obtain either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact that spiritual goods taste good to us no more, or seem to be goods of no great account, is chiefly due to our affections being infected with the love of bodily pleasures, among which, sexual pleasures hold the first place: for the love of those pleasures leads man to have a distaste for spiritual things, and not to hope for them as arduous goods. In this way despair is caused by lust.

On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good impossible to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due to his being over downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his affections, it seems to him that he will never be able to rise to any good. And since sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in this way despair is born of sloth.

Now this is the proper object of hope — that the thing is possible, because the good and the arduous regard other passions also. Hence despair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise from lust, for the reason given above.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(4)- RO(2) —

According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11), just as hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater hope: and, accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily into despair, according to 2 Corinthians 2:7: “Lest... such an one be swallowed up by overmuch sorrow.” Yet, since the object of hope is good, to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, not naturally but only on account of some supervening obstacle, it follows that, more directly, hope gives birth to joy, while on the contrary despair is born of sorrow.

P(2b)- Q(20)- A(4)- RO(3) —

This very neglect to consider the Divine favors arises from sloth. For when a man is influenced by a certain passion he considers chiefly the things which pertain to that passion: so that a man who is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful things, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he turn his thoughts away from sadness.

QUESTION OF PRESUMPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is the object in which presumption trusts? (2) Whether presumption is a sin? (3) To what is it opposed? (4) From what vice does it arise?

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(1) Whether presumption trusts in God or in our own power?

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that presumption, which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but in our own power. For the lesser the power, the more grievously does he sin who trusts in it too much. But man’s power is less than God’s. Therefore it is a more grievous sin to presume on human power than to presume on the power of God.

Now the sin against the Holy Ghost is most grievous. Therefore presumption, which is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts to human rather than to Divine power.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, other sins arise from the sin against the Holy Ghost, for this sin is called malice which is a source from which sins arise. Now other sins seem to arise from the presumption whereby man presumes on himself rather than from the presumption whereby he presumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it seems that presumption which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, relies chiefly on human power.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, sin arises from the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. Now presumption is a sin. Therefore it arises from turning to human power, which is a mutable good, rather than from turning to the power of God, which is an immutable good.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Just as, through despair, a man despises the Divine mercy, on which hope relies, so, through presumption, he despises the Divine justice, which punishes the sinner. Now justice is in God even as mercy is. Therefore, just as despair consists in aversion from God, so presumption consists in inordinate conversion to Him.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(1) —

I answer that, Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. Now the object of hope is an arduous possible good: and a thing is possible to a man in two ways: first by his own power; secondly, by the power of God alone. With regard to either hope there may be presumption owing to lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man relies on his own power, there is presumption if he tends to a good as though it were possible to him, whereas it surpasses his powers, according to Judith 6:15: “Thou humblest them that presume of themselves.” This presumption is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to the mean in this kind of hope.

But as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there may be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that a man tends to some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of God, whereas it is not possible, for instance, if a man hope to obtain pardon without repenting, or glory without merits. This presumption is, properly, the sin against the Holy Ghost, because, to wit, by presuming thus a man removes or despises the assistance of the Holy Spirit, whereby he is withdrawn from sin.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( Q(20) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(73) , A(3) ) a sin which is against God is, in its genus, graver than other sins.

Hence presumption whereby a man relies on God inordinately, is a more grievous sin than the presumption of trusting in one’s own power, since to rely on the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to God, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident that it is a graver sin to detract from the Divine power than to exaggerate one’s own.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The presumption whereby a man presumes inordinately on God, includes self-love, whereby he loves his own good inordinately. For when we desire a thing very much, we think we can easily procure it through others, even though we cannot.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Presumption on God’s mercy implies both conversion to a mutable good, in so far as it arises from an inordinate desire of one’s own good, and aversion from the immutable good, in as much as it ascribes to the Divine power that which is unbecoming to it, for thus man turns away from God’s power.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(2) Whether presumption is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that presumption is not a sin.

For no sin is a reason why man should be heard by God. Yet, through presumption some are heard by God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): “Hear me a poor wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy.” Therefore presumption on God’s mercy is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, presumption denotes excessive hope.

But there cannot be excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and mercy are infinite. Therefore it seems that presumption is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, that which is a sin does not excuse from sin: for the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) that “Adam sinned less, because he sinned in the hope of pardon,” which seems to indicate presumption. Therefore presumption is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(20) , A(1) ) with regard to despair, every appetitive movement that is conformed to a false intellect, is evil in itself and sinful. Now presumption is an appetitive movement, since it denotes an inordinate hope. Moreover it is conformed to a false intellect, just as despair is: for just as it is false that God does not pardon the repentant, or that He does not turn sinners to repentance, so is it false that He grants forgiveness to those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory to those who cease from good works: and it is to this estimate that the movement of presumption is conformed.

Consequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than despair, since, on account of His infinite goodness, it is more proper to God to have mercy and to spare, than to punish: for the former becomes God in Himself, the latter becomes Him by reason of our sins.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Presumption sometimes stands for hope, because even the right hope which we have in God seems to be presumption, if it be measured according to man’s estate: yet it is not, if we look at the immensity of the goodness of God.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as though man hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from God something unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too little in Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power; as stated above ( A(1), ad 1).

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(2)- RO(3) —

To sin with the intention of persevering in sin and through the hope of being pardoned, is presumptuous, and this does not diminish, but increases sin. To sin, however, with the hope of obtaining pardon some time, and with the intention of refraining from sin and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes sin, because this seems to indicate a will less hardened in sin.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(3) Whether presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope?

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now presumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written (Wis. 17:10): “A troubled conscience always presumes [Douay: ‘forecasteth’] grievous things,” and (Wis. 17:11) that “fear is a help to presumption [*Vulg.: ‘Fear is nothing else but a yielding up of the succours from thought.’].” Therefore presumption is opposed to fear rather than to hope.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because presumption implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas fear denotes movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it does not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope. Since therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(3) —

On the contrary, When two vices are opposed to one another they are contrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of despair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that presumption also is more directly opposed to hope.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(3) —

I answer that, As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), “every virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice, alike, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning is opposed to prudence.” This agrees with the Philosopher who says (Ethic. ii, 8) that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of the contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with insensibility, and fortitude with audacity.

Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear, especially servile fear, which looks at the punishment arising from God’s justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a kind of false likeness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes an inordinate hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed when they belong to the same genus, than when they belong to different genera, it follows that presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear.

For they both regard and rely on the same object, hope inordinately, presumption inordinately.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and properly applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in this way that inordinate fear is called presumption.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Contraries are things that are most distant from one another within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a movement of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or inordinate. Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear, since it is opposed to hope in respect of its specific difference, as an inordinate thing to an ordinate one, whereas it is opposed to fear, in respect of its generic difference, which is the movement of hope.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety. Hence presumption excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas it does not exclude hope except by reason of its difference, by excluding its ordinateness.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(4) Whether presumption arises from vainglory?

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that presumption does not arise from vainglory. For presumption seems to rely most of all on the Divine mercy. Now mercy [misericordia] regards unhappiness [miseriam] which is contrary to glory. Therefore presumption does not arise from vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, presumption is opposed to despair.

Now despair arises from sorrow, as stated above ( Q(20) , A(4), ad 2). Since therefore opposites have opposite causes, presumption would seem to arise from pleasure, and consequently from sins of the flesh, which give the most absorbing pleasure.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the vice of presumption consists in tending to some impossible good, as though it were possible. Now it is owing to ignorance that one deems an impossible thing to be possible.

Therefore presumption arises from ignorance rather than from vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that “presumption of novelties is a daughter of vainglory.”

P(2b)- Q(21)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), presumption is twofold; one whereby a man relies on his own power, when he attempts something beyond his power, as though it were possible to him. Such like presumption clearly arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great desire for glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power, and especially novelties which call for greater admiration. Hence Gregory states explicitly that presumption of novelties is a daughter of vainglory.

The other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Divine mercy or power, consisting in the hope of obtaining glory without merits, or pardon without repentance. Such like presumption seems to arise directly from pride, as though man thought so much of himself as to esteem that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory, however much he might be a sinner.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

QUESTION OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) The precepts relating to hope; (2) The precepts relating to fear.

P(2b)- Q(22)- A(1) Whether there should be a precept of hope?

P(2b)- Q(22)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that no precept should be given relating to the virtue of hope. For when an effect is sufficiently procured by one cause, there is no need to induce it by another. Now man is sufficiently induced by his natural inclination to hope for good. Therefore there is no need of a precept of the Law to induce him to do this.

P(2b)- Q(22)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, since precepts are given about acts of virtue, the chief precepts are about the acts of the chief virtues. Now the chief of all the virtues are the three theological virtues, viz. hope, faith and charity. Consequently, as the chief precepts of the Law are those of the decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(100), A(3) ), it seems that if any precept of hope were given, it should be found among the precepts of the decalogue. But it is not to be found there. Therefore it seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.

P(2b)- Q(22)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is equivalent to a prohibition of the act of the opposite vice. Now no precept is to be found forbidding despair which is contrary to hope. Therefore it seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.

P(2b)- Q(22)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says on John 15:12, “This is My commandment, that you love one another” (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.): “How many things are commanded us about faith! How many relating to hope!” Therefore it is fitting that some precepts should be given about hope.

P(2b)- Q(22)- A(1) —

I answer that, Among the precepts contained in Holy Writ, some belong to the substance of the Law, others are preambles to the Law. The preambles to the Law are those without which no law is possible: such are the precepts relating to the act of faith and the act of hope, because the act of faith inclines man’s mind so that he believes the Author of the Law to be One to Whom he owes submission, while, by the hope of a reward, he is induced to observe the precepts. The precepts that belong to the substance of the Law are those which relate to right conduct and are imposed on man already subject and ready to obey: wherefore when the Law was given these precepts were set forth from the very outset under form of a command.

Yet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given under the form of a command, since, unless man already believed and hoped, it would be useless to give him the Law: but, just as the precept of faith had to be given under the form of an announcement or reminder, as stated above ( Q(16) , A(1) ), so too, the precept of hope, in the first promulgation of the Law, had to be given under the form of a promise. For he who promises rewards to them that obey him, by that very fact, urges them to hope: hence all the promises contained in the Law are incitements to hope.

Since, however, when once the Law has been given, it is for a wise man to induce men not only to observe the precepts, but also, and much more, to safeguard the foundation of the Law, therefore, after the first promulgation of the Law, Holy Writ holds out to man many inducements to hope, even by way of warning or command, and not merely by way of promise, as in the Law; for instance, in the Psalm 61:9: “Hope [Douay: ‘Trust’] in Him all ye congregation of the people,” and in many other passages of the Scriptures.

P(2b)- Q(22)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Nature inclines us to hope for the good which is proportionate to human nature; but for man to hope for a supernatural good he had to be induced by the authority of the Divine law, partly by promises, partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless there was need for precepts of the Divine law to be given even for those things to which natural reason inclines us, such as the acts of the moral virtues, for sake of insuring a greater stability, especially since the natural reason of man was clouded by the lusts of sin.

P(2b)- Q(22)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The precepts of the law of the decalogue belong to the first promulgation of the Law: hence there was no need for a precept of hope among the precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough to induce men to hope by the inclusion of certain promises, as in the case of the first and fourth commandments.

P(2b)- Q(22)- A(1)- RO(3) —

In those observances to which man is bound as under a duty, it is enough that he receive an affirmative precept as to what he has to do, wherein is implied the prohibition of what he must avoid doing: thus he is given a precept concerning the honor due to parents, but not a prohibition against dishonoring them, except by the law inflicting punishment on those who dishonor their parents. And since in order to be saved it is man’s duty to hope in God, he had to be induced to do so by one of the above ways, affirmatively, so to speak, wherein is implied the prohibition of the opposite.

P(2b)- Q(22)- A(2) Whether there should have been given a precept of fear?