QUESTIONS 92-114 SUPERSTITION, I.E. BY WAY OF EXCESS QUESTIONS 92-96 QUESTION OF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to religion.

First we shall consider those which agree with religion in giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and afterwards irreligion and its parts.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion? (2) Whether it has several parts or species?

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(1) Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion?

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary to religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the other. But religion is included in the definition of superstition: for the latter is defined as being “immoderate observance of religion,” according to a gloss on Colossians 2:23, “Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in superstition.” Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): “Cicero [*De Natura Deorum ii, 28] states that the superstitious were so called because they spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children might survive [superstites] them.” But this may be done even in accordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is not a vice opposed to religion.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But religion admits of no excess, since, as stated above ( Q(81) , A(5), ad 3), there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord.

Serm. ix): “Thou strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of superstition hath fallen.” Now the worship of one God belongs to religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(81) , A(5) ), religion is a moral virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above ( P(1), Q(64) , A(1) ). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral virtue. One by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency.

Again, the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the circumstance called “how much,” but also with regard to other circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less, and yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to whom it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as regards other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,2,3).

Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a manner it ought not.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil things — thus we speak of a good thief — so too sometimes the names of the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense.

Thus prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Luke 16:8, “The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: ‘wiser’] in their generation than the children of light.”

It is in this way that superstition is described as religion.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it is applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ sometimes: for “lapis” [a stone] takes its name from hurting the foot [laedere pedem], but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow that “superstition” means that from which the word is derived.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of absolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of proportionate quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in divine worship that ought not to be done.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(2) Whether there are various species of superstition?

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that there are not various species of superstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), “if one contrary includes many kinds, so does the other.” Now religion, to which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has superstition various species.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, opposites relate to one same thing.

But religion, to which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are directed to God, as stated above ( Q(81) , A(1) ). Therefore superstition, which is opposed to religion, is not specified according to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances of certain human actions.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a gloss on Colossians 2:23, “Which things have... a show of wisdom in superstition,” adds: “that is to say in a hypocritical religion.” Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a species of superstition.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine assigns the various species of superstition (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above, sins against religion consist in going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances ( A(1) ). For as we have stated ( P(1), Q(72) , A(9) ), not every diversity of corrupt circumstances differentiates the species of a sin, but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends: since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified specifically, as stated above ( P(1), Q(1) , A(3) ; P(1), Q(18) , AA(2),6 ).

Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given, namely, to the true God, but “in an undue mode,” and this is the first species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of superstition, divided into many species in respect of the various ends of divine worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first place to give reverence to God, and in this respect the first species of this genus is “idolatry,” which unduly gives divine honor to a creature.

The second end of religion is that man may be taught by God Whom he worships; and to this must be referred “divinatory” superstition, which consults the demons through compacts made with them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship is a certain direction of human acts according to the precepts of God the object of that worship: and to this must be referred the superstition of certain “observances.”

Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he says that “anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols is superstitious,” and this refers to the first species. Then he goes on to say, “or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens,” which refers to the second species; and a little further on he adds: “To this kind belong all sorts of amulets and such like,” and this refers to the third species.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(2)- RO(1) —

As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “good results from a cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single defect.” Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated above ( A(1) ; Q(10) , A(5) ). The saying of the Philosopher is true of opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Divinations and certain observances come under the head of superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.

P(2b)- Q(92)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Hypocritical religion is taken here for “religion as applied to human observances,” as the gloss goes on to explain.

Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than worship given to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time of grace, to wish to worship God according to the rite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the gloss speaks literally.

QUESTION OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) Of the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true God; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory superstition; (4) of the superstition of observances.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God? (2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God?

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God. It is written ( Joel 2:32): “Everyone that shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved.” Now whoever worships God calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of God is conducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just in any age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just worshiped God in whatever manner they pleased, without committing mortal sin: wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special kind of worship, as related in Genesis 28. Therefore now also no worship of God is pernicious.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church. Yet the Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore Gregory, replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi, ep. 64), who stated that there existed in the churches various customs in the celebration of Mass, wrote: “I wish you to choose carefully whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God, whether in the Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in any part of the Church.”

Therefore no way of worshiping God is pernicious.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug.) See Opp. August. Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted in a gloss on Galatians 2:14) says that “after the Gospel truth had been preached the legal observances became deadly,” and yet these observances belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be something deadly in the divine worship.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(1) —

I answer that, As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), “a most pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to Christian religion.” Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that which is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by word, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that the outward worship of religion consists, as shown above ( Q(81) , A(7) ). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship, this worship will be pernicious.

Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the part of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law, the mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious to make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of Christ were foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be pernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In the second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of the worshiper, and especially in common worship which is offered by ministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of another person, proffer things that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the guilt of falsehood who, on the part of the Church, gives worship to God contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine authority, and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose [*Comment. in 1 ad Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard] says: “He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than Christ delivered it.” For this reason, too, a gloss on Colossians 2:23 says that superstition is “the use of human observances under the name of religion.”

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship Him in spirit and truth, according to John 4:23. Hence a worship that contains falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Before the time of the Law the just were instructed by an inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and others followed them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward precepts about this matter, and it is wicked to disobey them.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The various customs of the Church in the divine worship are in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe them, and to disregard them is unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(2) Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God?

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship of God. It is written (Ecclus. 43:32): “Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can, for He will yet far exceed.” Now the divine worship is directed to the glorification of God. Therefore there can be no excess in it.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, outward worship is a profession of inward worship, “whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope, and charity,” as Augustine says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in faith, hope, and charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the worship of God.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what we have received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God. Therefore if we do all that we possibly can for God’s honor, there will be no excess in the divine worship.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) “that the good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies, from Holy Writ.” But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there can be superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(2) —

I answer that, A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First, with regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be excess in the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than he owes God. Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity of proportion, through not being proportionate to its end. Now the end of divine worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit to Him in mind and body. Consequently, whatever a man may do conducing to God’s glory, and subjecting his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate curbing of the concupiscences, is not excessive in the divine worship, provided it be in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, and in keeping with the customs of those among whom he lives.

On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive to God’s glory, nor raise man’s mind to God, nor curb inordinate concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the general custom — which, according to Augustine [*Ad Casulan. Ep. xxxvi], “has the force of law” — all this must be reckoned excessive and superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals, it has no connection with the internal worship of God. Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of Luke 17:21, “The kingdom of God is within you,” against the “superstitious,” those, to wit, who pay more attention to externals.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The glorification of God implies that what is done is done for God’s glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by superstition.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God, so that there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with external acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues.

P(2b)- Q(93)- A(2)- RO(3) —

This argument considers excess by way of absolute quantity.

QUESTION OF IDOLATRY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition? (2) Whether it is a sin? (3) Whether it is the gravest sin? (4) Of the cause of this sin.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(1) Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition?

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a species of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are idolaters. But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above ( Q(11) , A(1) ). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief and not of superstition.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to which superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally applied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion. For just as we speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and of the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry, and of the worship of the true God, which is the latria of true religion. Therefore idolatry is not a species of superstition.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of any genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 8:4): “We know that an idol is nothing in the world,” and further on ( 1 Corinthians 10:19): “What then? Do I say that what is offered in sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?” implying an answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols belongs properly to idolatry. Therefore since idolatry is like to nothing, it cannot be a species of superstition.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor to whom that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are reproached ( Romans 1:25) for that they “worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator.” Therefore this species of superstition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be named “worship of creatures.”

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is related ( Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited Silas and Timothy at Athens, “his spirit was stirred within him seeing the whole city given to idolatry,” and further on ( Acts 17:22) he says: “Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too superstitious.” Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(92) , A(2) ), it belongs to superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be given. Now it should be given to the most high uncreated God alone, as stated above ( Q(81) , A(1) ) when we were treating of religion. Therefore it is superstition to give worship to any creature whatsoever.

Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by means of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so too was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or shape, which is called an “idol.” Yet divine worship was given to idols in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art, constructed images which produced certain effects by the power of the demons: wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained something God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to them. This was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep], as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine worship not to the images, but to the creatures represented thereby. The Apostle alludes to both of these ( Romans 1:23,25). For, as regards the former, he says: “They changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things,” and of the latter he says: “Who worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator.”

These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain men to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those men: for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the whole world to be one god, not by reason of its material substance, but by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God, for they held God to be nothing else than a soul governing the world by movement and reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect not of his body but of his soul. Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given to the whole world and to all its parts, heaven, air, water, and to all such things: and to these they referred the names of their gods, as Varro asserted, and Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others, namely, the Platonists, said that there is one supreme god, the cause of all things. After him they placed certain spiritual substances created by the supreme god. These they called “gods,” on account of their having a share of the godhead; but we call them “angels.” After these they placed the souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these the demons which they stated to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these again they placed human souls, which they believed to be taken up into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason of the merit of their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as Augustine relates (De Civ . . Dei xviii, 14).

The last two opinions were held to belong to “natural theology” which the philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in the schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was said to belong to “mythical theology” which was wont to be represented on the stage according to the fancies of poets. The remaining opinion relating to images was held to belong to “civil theology,” which was celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples [*De Civ. Dei vi, 5].

Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry.

Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): “Anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving Divine worship to a creature or any part of a creature, is superstitious.”

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Just as religion is not faith, but a confession of faith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief by external worship. Such a confession is signified by the term idolatry, but not by the term heresy, which only means a false opinion. Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a species of superstition.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The term latria may be taken in two senses.

In one sense it may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God: and then its signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown, because, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not included in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, whether to true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax is univocally the same, whether it is paid to the true or to a false king. In another sense latria denotes the same as religion, and then, since it is a virtue, it is essential thereto that divine worship be given to whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied equivocally to the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as prudence is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and to that which is carnal.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The saying of the Apostle that “an idol is nothing in the world” means that those images which were called idols, were not animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as though they were composed of spirit and body. In the same sense we must understand the saying that “what is offered in sacrifice to idols is not anything,” because by being thus sacrificed the sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(1)- RO(4) —

It was owing to the general custom among the Gentiles of worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images that the term “idolatry” was used to signify any worship of a creature, even without the use of images.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(2) Whether idolatry is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that idolatry is not a sin.

Nothing is a sin that the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true faith employs images for the divine worship: since both in the Tabernacle were there images of the cherubim, as related in Exodus 25, and in the Church are images set up which the faithful worship. Therefore idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But the angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors.

Therefore it will be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the like.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the most high God should be honored with an inward worship, according to John 4:24, “God... they must adore... in spirit and in truth”: and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that “God is worshipped by faith, hope and charity.” Now a man may happen to worship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly without prejudice to the divine worship.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Exodus 20:5): “Thou shalt not adore them,” i.e. outwardly, “nor serve them,” i.e. inwardly, as a gloss explains it: and it is a question of graven things and images. Therefore it is a sin to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(2) —

I answer that, There has been a twofold error in this matter. For some [*The School of Plato] have thought that to offer sacrifices and other things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the others aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that divine honor should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer to God. But this is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all superiors, yet the same reverence is not due to them all: and something special is due to the most high God Who excels all in a singular manner: and this is the worship of latria.

Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that “these visible sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the most high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices, namely, the service of a pure mind, should be offered” [*Augustine, as quoted below]. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), “external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible words are signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we utter significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the things they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize that we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him Whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts.”

Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to idols, not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but as being in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) quotes Seneca as saying: “We shall adore,” says he, “in such a way as to remember that our worship ss in accordance with custom rather than with the reality”: and (De Vera Relig. v) Augustine says that “we must not seek religion from the philosophers, who accepted the same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the schools to various and contrary opinions about the nature of their gods, and the sovereign good.” This error was embraced also by certain heretics [*The Helcesaitae], who affirmed that it is not wrong for one who is seized in time of persecution to worship idols outwardly so long as he keeps the faith in his heart.

But this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of the inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary of what one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked falsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the sentiments of one’s heart.

Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) in that “his worship of idols was so much the more infamous forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by him that the people believed him to act honestly.”

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old Law, nor again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of latria may be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order that belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be impressed and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the image of Christ, to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as we shall state in the P(3), Q(25) , A(3) .

The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what has been said above.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3) Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins?

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins. The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior worship, which consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than external worship. Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God, which are opposed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry, which is opposed to external worship.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous it is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by blaspheming, or denying the faith, than by giving God’s worship to another, which pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial of the faith are more grievous sins than idolatry.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with greater evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin against nature, as stated in Romans 1:26. Therefore the sin against nature is a graver sin than idolatry.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): “Neither do we say that you,” viz. the Manichees, “are pagans, or a sect of pagans, but that you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many gods: and yet you are much worse than they are, for they worship things that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you worship things that exist not at all.” Therefore the vice of heretical depravity is more grievous than idolatry.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, a gloss of Jerome on Galatians 4:9, “How turn you again to the weak and needy elements?” says: “The observance of the Law, to which they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship of idols, to which they had been given before their conversion.” Therefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3) —

On the contrary, A gloss on the saying of Leviticus 15:25, about the uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: “Every sin is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry.”

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3) —

I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most grievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to another than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs the whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are committed against God, which indeed are the greater sins, the greatest of all seems to be for a man to give God’s honor to a creature, since, so far as he is concerned, he sets up another God in the world, and lessens the divine sovereignty.

Secondly, the gravity of a sin may be considered on the part of the sinner.

Thus the sin of one that sins knowingly is said to be graver than the sin of one that sins through ignorance: and in this way nothing hinders heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the faith which they have received, from sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin through ignorance. Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on account of greater contempt on the part of the sinner.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to this it adds undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without internal unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated above ( A(2) ).

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch as it deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the faith by deeds.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Since it is essential to punishment that it be against the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more manifest, in order that it may make the man more hateful to himself and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man abuses the order of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of his own nature.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy is more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies about God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their belief in one God and worship Him alone.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(3)- RO(5) —

The observance of the Law during the time of grace is not quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but almost equal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(4) Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man?

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the part of man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or guilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man’s nature, since rather does man’s natural reason dictate that there is one God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to inanimate beings.

Likewise, neither could idolatry have its cause in man on the part of virtue, since “a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit,” according to Matthew 7:18: nor again could it be on the part of guilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27, “the worship of abominable idols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil.” Therefore idolatry has no cause on the part of man.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, those things which have a cause in man are found among men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated [*Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire, or by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped. Among the Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus was the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael was the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): “It was not possible to learn, for the first time, except from their” (i.e. the demons’) “teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by what name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic arts and their professors”: and the same observation seems to apply to idolatry.

Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:14): “By the vanity of men they,” i.e. idols, “came into the world.”

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(4) —

I answer that, Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on account of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men divine honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This cause is assigned (Wis. 14:15): “A father being afflicted with bitter grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken away: and him who then had died as a man he began to worship as a god.” The same passage goes on to say (Wis. 14:21) that “men serving either their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name [Vulg.: ‘names’],” i.e. of the Godhead, “to stones and wood.” Secondly, because man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as the Philosopher observes (Poet. iv), wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human images skillfully fashioned by the diligence of the craftsman, he gave them divine worship; hence it is written (Wis. 13:11-17): “If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree, proper for his use, in the wood... and by the skill of his art fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man... and then maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his children, or his marriage.” Thirdly, on account of their ignorance of the true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence men gave divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their beauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:1,2): “All men... neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman, but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and the moon, to be the gods that rule the world.”

The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part of the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by giving answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed marvelous.

Hence it is written ( Psalm 95:5): “All the gods of the Gentiles are devils.”

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of man, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect, or disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to guilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end of all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not produce at some time, either through leading expressly to that sin by causing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a beginning or as an end, in so far as certain sins were employed in the worship of idols; such as homicides, mutilations, and so forth. Nevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man thereto.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(4)- RO(2) —

There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still retained in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age idolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who triumphed over the devil.

P(2b)- Q(94)- A(4)- RO(3) —

This argument considers the consummative cause of idolatry.

QUESTION OF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether divination is a sin? (2) Whether it is a species of superstition? (3) Of the species of divination; (4) Of divination by means of demons; (5) Of divination by the stars; (6) Of divination by dreams; (7) Of divination by auguries and like observances; (8) Of divination by lots.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(1) Whether divination is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that divination is not a sin.

Divination is derived from something “divine”: and things that are divine pertain to holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): “Who dares to say that learning is an evil?” and again: “I could nowise admit that intelligence can be an evil.” But some arts are divinatory, as the Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek to foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore divination is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 18:10,11): “Neither let there be found among you... any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune tellers”: and it is stated in the Decretals (26, qu. v, can. Qui divinationes): “Those who seek for divinations shall be liable to a penance of five years’ duration, according to the fixed grades of penance.”

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(1) —

I answer that, Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, secondly in itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce their effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians, concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the case in the rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to the Philosopher [*Metaph. viii, 2,5,8]. Such like effects, as also those which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority of instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their causes, because these causes have no determinate inclination to produce these effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now man cannot consider these effects in themselves except when they are present, as when he sees Socrates running or walking: the consideration of such things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in His eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in the P(1), Q(14) , A(13) ; P(1), Q(57) , A(3) ; P(1), Q(86) , A(4) . Hence it is written ( Isaiah 41:23): “Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.”

Therefore if anyone presume to foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever, except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to God. It is for this reason that certain men are called divines: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): “They are called divines, as though they were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men.”

Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things that happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the like can be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows other contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then he does not divine, i.e. cause something divine, but rather receives something divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps to himself, in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and this is manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin; and for this reason Jerome says in his commentary on Mich. 3:9, seqq. that “divination is always taken in an evil sense.”

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered share of something divine, but from an undue usurpation thereof, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(1)- RO(2) —

There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not pertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the knowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of the devil’s deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Man has a natural inclination to know the future by human means, but not by the undue means of divination.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(2) Whether divination is a species of superstition?

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that divination is not a species of superstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera. Now divination is apparently a species of curiosity, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxviii) [*Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23,24; De Divin. Daem. 3].

Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species of superstition.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, just as religion is due worship, so is superstition undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to undue worship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, superstition is opposed to religion.

But in true religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Origen says in his Peri Archon [*The quotation is from his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers]: “There is an operation of the demons in the administering of foreknowledge, comprised, seemingly, under the head of certain arts exercised by those who have enslaved themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the observance of shadows. I doubt not that all these things are done by the operation of the demons.” Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20,23), “whatever results from fellowship between demons and men is superstitious.” Therefore divination is a species of superstition.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ; QQ(92),94 ), superstition denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of God in two ways: in one way, it is something offered to God; as a sacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it is something divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to an oath ( Q(89) , A(4), ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the help of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But all divination results from the demons’ operation, either because the demons are expressly invoked that the future may be made known, or because the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings of the future, in order to entangle men’s minds with vain conceits. Of this kind of vanity it is written ( Psalm 39:5): “Who hath not regard to vanities and lying follies.” Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the future, when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of superstition.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to the end in view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind of superstition as regards the mode of operation.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(2)- RO(2) —

This kind of divination pertains to the worship of the demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express with the demons.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(2)- RO(3) —

In the New Law man’s mind is restrained from solicitude about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no institution for the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters. On the other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises, there were consultations about the future in connection with religious matters.

Hence where it is written ( Isaiah 8:19): “And when they shall say to you: Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their enchantments,” it is added by way of answer: “Should not the people seek of their God, a vision for the living and the dead? [*Vulg.: ‘seek of their God, for the living of the dead?’]” In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.

In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(3) Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination?

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that we should not distinguish several species of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there are not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality of sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering into compact with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore there are not several species of divination.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, a human act takes it species from its end, as stated above ( P(1), Q(1) , A(3) ; P(1), Q(18) , A(6) ). But all divination is directed to one end, namely, the foretelling of the future.

Therefore all divinations are of one species.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for whether one detracts by word writing or gestures, it is the same species of sin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the various signs whence the foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore there are not several species of divination.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Isidore enumerates various species of divination (Etym. viii, 9).

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ), all divinations seek to acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and help of a demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his help, or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell certain future things unknown to men, but known to him in such manners as have been explained in the P(1), Q(57) , A(3) . When demons are expressly invoked, they are wont to foretell the future in many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to human sight and hearing by mock apparitions in order to foretell the future: and this species is called “prestigiation” because man’s eyes are blindfolded [praestringuntur]. Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is called “divination by dreams”: sometimes they employ apparitions or utterances of the dead, and this species is called “necromancy,” for as Isidore observes (Etym. viii) in Greek, \nekron\ “means dead and \manteia\ divination, because after certain incantations and the sprinkling of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine and to answer questions.” Sometimes they foretell the future through living men, as in the case of those who are possessed: this is divination by “pythons,” of whom Isidore says that “pythons are so called from Pythius Apollo, who was said to be the inventor of divination.” Sometimes they foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which appear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear in some earthly body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is called “geomancy,” if in water “hydromancy,” if in the air “aeromancy,” if in fire “pyromancy,” if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the altars of demons, “aruspicy.”

The divination which is practiced without express invocation of the demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of certain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the position and movements of the stars, this belongs to “astrologers,” who are also called “genethliacs,” because they take note of the days on which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of birds or of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of limbs, this belongs in general to “augury,” which is so called from the chattering of birds [avium garritu], just as “auspice” is derived from watching birds [avium inspectione]. These are chiefly wont to be observed in birds, the former by the ear, the latter by the eye. If, however, these observations have for their object men’s words uttered unintentionally, which someone twist so as to apply to the future that he wishes to foreknow, then it is called an “omen”: and as Valerius Maximus [*De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5] remarks, “the observing of omens has a touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be founded not on a chance movement, but on divine providence. It was thus that when the Romans were deliberating whether they would change their position, a centurion happened to exclaim at the time: ‘Standard-bearer, fix the banner, we had best stand here’: and on hearing these words they took them as an omen, and abandoned their intention of advancing further.” If, however, the observation regards the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of divination: for the divination that is taken from observing the lines of the hand is called “chiromancy,” i.e. divination of the hand (because \cheir\ is the Greek for hand): while the divination which is taken from signs appearing in the shoulder-blades of an animal is called “spatulamancy.”

To this second species of divination, which is without express invocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced by observing certain things done seriously by men in the research of the occult, whether by drawing lots, which is called “geomancy”; or by observing the shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or by observing which of several sheets of paper, with or without writing upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by holding out several unequal sticks and noting who takes the greater or the lesser. or by throwing dice, and observing who throws the highest score; or by observing what catches the eye when one opens a book, all of which are named “sortilege.”

Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The first is when the demons are invoked openly, this comes under the head of “necromancy”; the second is merely an observation of the disposition or movement of some other being, and this belongs to “augury”; while the third consists in doing something in order to discover the occult; and this belongs to “sortilege.” Under each of these many others are contained, as explained above.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(3)- RO(1) —

In all the aforesaid there is the same general, but not the same special, character of sin: for it is much more grievous to invoke the demons than to do things that deserve the demons’ interference.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Knowledge of the future or of the occult is the ultimate end whence divination takes its general formality. But the various species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters, according as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The things observed by diviners are considered by them, not as signs expressing what they already know, as happens in detraction, but as principles of knowledge. Now it is evident that diversity of principles diversifies the species, even in demonstrative sciences.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(4) Whether divination practiced by invoking the demons is unlawful?

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that divination practiced by invoking the demons is not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to 1 Peter 2:22, “Who did no sin.” Yet our Lord asked the demon: “What is thy name?” and the latter replied: “My name is Legion, for we are many” ( Mark 5:9). Therefore it seems lawful to question the demons about the occult.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the souls of the saints do not encourage those who ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter inquired of the woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue of the coming war ( 1 Samuel 28:8, sqq.). Therefore the divination that consists in questioning demons is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth from one who knows, if it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know what is hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in the discovery of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 18:10,11): “Neither let there be found among you... anyone that consulteth soothsayers... nor... that consulteth pythonic spirits.”

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(4) —

I answer that, All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for two reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination, which is a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking him. This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written against certain persons ( Isaiah 28:15): “You have said: We have entered into a league with death, and we have made a covenant with hell.”

And still more grievous would it be if sacrifice were offered or reverence paid to the demon invoked. The second reason is gathered from the result.

For the demon who intends man’s perdition endeavors, by his answers, even though he sometimes tells the truth, to accustom men to believe him, and so to lead him on to something prejudicial to the salvation of mankind.

Hence Athanasius, commenting on the words of Luke 4:35, “He rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace,” says: “Although the demon confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his speech, lest together with the truth he should publish his wickedness and accustom us to care little for such things, however much he may seem to speak the truth. For it is wicked, while we have the divine Scriptures, to seek knowledge from the demons.”

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(4)- RO(1) —

According to Bede’s commentary on Luke 8:30, “Our Lord inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease, which he tolerated, being made public, the power of the Healer might shine forth more graciously.” Now it is one thing to question a demon who comes to us of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times for the good of others, especially when he can be compelled, by the power of God, to tell the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to gain from him knowledge of things hidden from us.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(4)- RO(2) —

According to Augustine (Ad Simplic. ii, 3), “there is nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man, being about to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted to appear to him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some occult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or else the spirit of Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest, but some phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the devil, and styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the images of things are wont to be called by the names of those things.”

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(4)- RO(3) —

No temporal utility can compare with the harm to spiritual health that results from the research of the unknown by invoking the demon.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(5) Whether divination by the stars is unlawful?

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that divination by the stars is not unlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes: thus a physician foretells death from the disposition of the disease. Now the heavenly bodies are the cause of what takes place in the world, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by the stars is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, human science originates from experiments, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Now it has been discovered through many experiments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby some future events may be known beforehand. Therefore it would seem not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, divination is declared to be unlawful in so far as it is based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the stars contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of God’s creatures. Therefore it would seem that this species of divination is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): “Those astrologers whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without scruple; because they seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any spirit for their divinations which art, however, Christian and true piety rejects and condemns.”

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(5) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(1),2 ), the operation of the demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false and vain opinions, in order that man’s mind may become entangled in vanity and falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion if, by observing the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that cannot be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider what things can be foreknown by observing the stars: and it is evident that those things which happen of necessity can be foreknown by this mean,: even so astrologers forecast a future eclipse.

However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired by observing the stars there have been various opinions. For some have stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things foretold by means of their observation. But this is an unreasonable statement: since every corporeal sign is either the effect of that for which it stands (thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused), or it proceeds from the same cause, so that by signifying the cause, in consequence it signifies the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair weather, in so far as its cause is the cause of fair weather). Now it cannot be said that the dispositions and movements of the heavenly bodies are the effect of future events; nor again can they be ascribed to some common higher cause of a corporeal nature, although they are referable to a common higher cause, which is divine providence. on the contrary the appointment of the movements and positions of the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on a different principle from the appointment of the occurrence of future contingencies, because the former are appointed on a principle of necessity, so that they always occur in the same way, whereas the latter are appointed on a principle of contingency, so that the manner of their occurrence is variable.

Consequently it is impossible to acquire foreknowledge of the future from an observation of the stars, except in so far as effects can be foreknown from their causes.

Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In the first place all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human affairs or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in Metaph. vi [*Ed. Did. v, 3], an accidental being has no cause, least of all a natural cause, such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what occurs accidentally, neither is a “being” properly speaking, nor is “one” — for instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or that a treasure be discovered when a man digs a grave — for these and like occurrences are not one thing, but are simply several things. Whereas the operation of nature has always some one thing for its term, just as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form of a natural thing.

In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of will and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the intellect or reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and consequently neither is the will, since it is in the reason, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 4,9).

Now no body can make an impression on an incorporeal body. Wherefore it is impossible for heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the intellect and will: for this would be to deny the difference between intellect and sense, with which position Aristotle reproaches (De Anima iii, 3) those who held that “such is the will of man, as is the day which the father of men and of gods,” i.e. the sun or the heavens, “brings on” [*Odyssey xviii, 135].

Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the free-will’s operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive cause of an inclination to those operations, in so far as they make an impression on the human body, and consequently on the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs having an inclination for human acts. Since, however, the sensitive powers obey reason, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 11; Ethic. i, 13), this does not impose any necessity on the free-will, and man is able, by his reason, to act counter to the inclination of the heavenly bodies.

Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to foreknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with certitude future human actions, his conduct is based on a false and vain opinion; and so the operation of the demon introduces itself therein, wherefore it will be a superstitious and unlawful divination. On the other hand if one were to apply the observation of the stars in order to foreknow those future things that are caused by heavenly bodies, for instance, drought or rain and so forth, it will be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination.

Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(5)- RO(2) —

That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the truth by observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because a great number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the inclination of the heavenly bodies: while there are few, namely, the wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The result is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth, especially in public occurrences which depend on the multitude. Secondly, because of the interference of the demons. Hence Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. ii, 17): “When astrologers tell the truth, it must be allowed that this is due to an instinct that, unknown to man, lies hidden in his mind. And since this happens through the action of unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man for they are permitted to know certain things about temporal affairs.” Wherefore he concludes: “Thus a good Christian should beware of astrologers, and of all impious diviners, especially of those who tell the truth, lest his soul become the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of partnership with them enmesh itself in their fellowship.”

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(6) Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful. It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are instructed by God in dreams, for it is written ( Job 33:15,16): “By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are sleeping in their beds, then He,” God to wit, “openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn.” Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of divination by dreams.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh’s butler and of his chief baker ( Genesis 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the king of Babylon ( Daniel 2,4). Therefore divination by dreams is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 18:10): “Neither let there be found among you any one that . . . observeth dreams.”

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(6) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(2),6 ), divination is superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion.

Wherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences; for instance, when a person’s mind becomes anxious through what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do something or avoid something: while sometimes dreams are signs of future happenings, in so far as they are referable to some common cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this way the future is frequently known from dreams.

We must, then, consider what is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future occurrences, or be cognizant of them.

Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams is twofold: one regards the soul, in so far as those things which have occupied a man’s thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagination while asleep.

A such like cause of dreams is not a cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any time they concur it will be by chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body: because the inward disposition of the body leads to the formation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that disposition; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold humors dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to discover internal dispositions.

In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper’s imagination is affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a heavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper, in keeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Numbers 12:6, “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.”

Sometimes, however, it is due to the action of the demons that certain images appear to persons in their sleep, and by this means they, at times, reveal certain future things to those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them.

Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as those dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause inward or outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by a revelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been made, whether explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose, or implicit, through the divination extending beyond its possible limits.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(7) Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is unlawful?

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were unlawful holy men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph that he paid attention to auguries, for it is related ( Genesis 44:5) that Joseph’s steward said: “The cup which you have stolen is that in which my lord drinketh and in which he is wont to divine [augurari]”: and he himself afterwards said to his brethren ( Genesis 44:15): “Know you not that there is no one like me in the science of divining?” Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, birds naturally know certain things regarding future occurrences of the seasons, according to Jeremiah 8:7, “The kite in the air hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have observed the time of their coming.” Now natural knowledge is infallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to make use of the birds’ knowledge in order to know the future, and this is divination by augury.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints ( Hebrews 11:32). Yet Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and interpreting of a dream ( Judges 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham’s servant, acted in like manner ( Genesis 24). Therefore it seems that this kind of divination is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 18:10): “Neither let there be found among you anyone . . . that observeth omens.”

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(7) —

I answer that, The movements or cries of birds, and whatever dispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the cause of future events: wherefore the future cannot be known therefrom as from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything future can be known from them, it will be because the causes from which they proceed are also the causes of future occurrences or are cognizant of them.

Now the cause of dumb animals’ actions is a certain instinct whereby they are inclined by a natural movement, for they are not masters of their actions. This instinct may proceed from a twofold cause. In the first place it may be due to a bodily cause. For since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive soul, every power of which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is subject to the disposition of surrounding bodies, and primarily to that of the heavenly bodies. Hence nothing prevents some of their actions from being signs of the future, in so far as they are conformed to the dispositions of the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to which certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must observe two things: first, that such observations must not be applied to the foreknowledge of future things other than those which can be foreknown from the movements of heavenly bodies, as stated above ( AA(5),6 ): secondly, that they be not applied to other matters than those which in some way may have reference to these animals (since they acquire through the heavenly bodies a certain natural knowledge and instinct about things necessary for their life — such as changes resulting from rain and wind and so forth).

In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause, namely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and vomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use of these actions of dumb animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems to be true of all such like things; except omens, because human words which are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the stars, yet are they ordered according to divine providence and sometimes according to the action of the demons.

Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations are superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set according to the order of nature or of divine providence.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(7)- RO(1) —

According to Augustine [*QQ. in Genes., qu. cxlv], when Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science of divining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to the common opinion about him: in this sense also spoke his steward.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(7)- RO(2) —

The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that birds have about things concerning them; and in order to know these things it is not unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus from the frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will rain soon.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation of a dream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for his instruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel’s words, having previously prayed to God.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(8) Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful?

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on Psalm 30:16, “My lots are in Thy hands,” says: “It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of ascertaining the divine will when a man is in doubt.”

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(8)- O(2) —

There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances which the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men.

Now both in the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the casting of lots. For it is related ( Joshua 7:14, sqq.) that Josue, at the Lord’s command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had stolen of the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing lots, found that his son Jonathan had eaten honey ( 1 Kings 14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when fleeing from the face of the Lord, was discovered and thrown into the sea (Jonas 1:7, sqq.): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense ( Luke 1:9): and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the apostleship ( Acts 1:26). Therefore it would seem that divination by lots is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, fighting with the fists, or “monomachy,” i.e. single combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which are called “popular” trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege, because something unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices seem to be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single combat with the Philistine ( 1 Kings 17:32, sqq.). Therefore it would seem that divination by lot is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(8) —

On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, can. Sortes): “We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make up your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have condemned, is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason we wish them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under pain of anathema.”

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(8) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(3) ), sortilege consists, properly speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one may come to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one seeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a possession, an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or other, it is called “sortilege of allotment”; if one seeks to know what ought to be done, it is called “sortilege of consultation”; if one seeks to know what is going to happen, it is called “sortilege of divination.” Now the actions of man that are required for sortilege and their results are not subject to the dispositions of the stars. Wherefore if anyone practicing sortilege is so minded as though the human acts requisite for sortilege depended for their result on the dispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and false, and consequently is not free from the interference of the demons, so that a divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful.

Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual cause. If we ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in “sortilege of allotment,” it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, as in the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the division of something or other, are willing to draw lots for its division, thus leaving to chance what portion each is to receive.

If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read ( Ezekiel 21:21) that “the king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of two ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired of the idols, and consulted entrails”: sortilege of this kind is unlawful, and forbidden by the canons.

Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Proverbs 16:33, “Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord”: sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine declares [*Enarr. ii in Psalm xxx, serm. 2; cf. O(1).

Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount to tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Luke 1:8, says: “He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men.” Secondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to have recourse to lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Bede says (Super Act.

Apost. i): “But if anyone, compelled by necessity, thinks that he ought, after the apostles’ example, to consult God by casting lots, let him take note that the apostles themselves did not do so, except after calling together the assembly of the brethren and pouring forth prayer to God.”

Thirdly, if the Divine oracles be misapplied to earthly business. Hence Augustine says (ad inquisit. Januar. ii; Ep. lv): “Those who tell fortunes from the Gospel pages, though it is to be hoped that they do so rather than have recourse to consulting the demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that anyone should wish to apply the Divine oracles to worldly matters and to the vain things of this life.” Fourthly, if anyone resort to the drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried out by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says (Super Act. Apost. i): “Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias was decided by lot,” because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost was not yet poured forth into the Church: “whereas the same deacons were ordained not by lot but by the choice of the disciples.” It is different with earthly honors, which are directed to the disposal of earthly things: in elections of this kind men frequently have recourse to lots, even as in the distribution of earthly possessions.

If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the divine judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), “If, at a time of persecution, the ministers of God do not agree as to which of them is to remain at his post lest all should flee, and which of them is to flee, lest all die and the Church be forsaken, should there be no other means of coming to an agreement, so far as I can see, they must be chosen by lot.” Again he says (De Doctr.

Christ. xxviii): “If thou aboundest in that which it behooves thee to give to him who hath not, and which cannot be given to two; should two come to you, neither of whom surpasses the other either in need or in some claim on thee, thou couldst not act more justly than in choosing by lot to whom thou shalt give that which thou canst not give to both.”

This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Objections.

P(2b)- Q(95)- A(8)- RO(3) —

The trial by hot iron or boiling water is directed to the investigation of someone’s hidden sin, by means of something done by a man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of lots.

But in so far as a miraculous result is expected from God, it surpasses the common generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of the occult, which is reserved to the divine judgment, and because such like trials are not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a decree of Pope Stephen V [*II, qu. v., can. Consuluist i]: “The sacred canons do not approve of extorting a confession from anyone by means of the trial by hot iron or boiling water, and no one must presume, by a superstitious innovation, to practice what is not sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers. For it is allowable that public crimes should be judged by our authority, after the culprit has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have been approved, with due regard to the fear of God; but hidden and unknown crimes must be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children of men.” The same would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, save that it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since no miraculous effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be very unequal in strength or skill.

QUESTION OF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by the magic art; (2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies; (3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling; (4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(1) Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art?

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two ways. First, by reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft: secondly, through being directed to an evil end, as when a person gives an alms for the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the magic art are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist in certain fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are directed to a good end, namely, the acquisition of science. Therefore it is not unlawful to practice these observances.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Daniel 1:17) that “to the children” who abstained, “God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book, and wisdom.” Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain fasts and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its results through God: and consequently it is not unlawful to practice it.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, seemingly, as stated above ( A(1) ), the reason why it is wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future is because they have no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet the demons know scientific truths: because sciences are about things necessary and invariable, and such things are subject to human knowledge, and much more to the knowledge of demons, who are of keener intellect, as Augustine says [*Genesis ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin. Daemon. 3,4]. Therefore it seems to be no sin to practice the magic art, even though it achieve its result through the demons.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 18:10,11): “Neither let there be found among you... anyone... that seeketh the truth from the dead”: which search relies on the demons’ help. Now through the observances of the magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought “by means of certain signs agreed upon by compact with the demons” [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above Q(92) , A(2) ]. Therefore it is unlawful to practice the notary art.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(1) —

I answer that, The magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is unlawful, because the means it employs for acquiring knowledge have not in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do in gazing certain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, and so forth. Wherefore this art does not make use of these things as causes, but as signs; not however as signs instituted by God, as are the sacramental signs. It follows, therefore, that they are empty signs, and consequently a kind of “agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens” [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above Q(92) , A(2) ]. Wherefore the magic art is to be absolutely repudiated and avoided by Christian, even as other arts of vain and noxious superstition, as Augustine declares (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23). This art is also useless for the acquisition of science. For since it is not intended by means of this art to acquire science in a manner connatural to man, namely, by discovery and instruction, the consequence is that this effect is expected either from God or from the demons. Now it is certain that some have received wisdom and science infused into them by God, as related of Solomon (3 Kings 3 and 2 Paralip 1). Moreover, our Lord said to His disciples ( Luke 21:15): “I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist and gainsay.”

However, this gift is not granted to all, or in connection with any particular observance, but according to the will of the Holy Ghost, as stated in Corinthians 12:8, “To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit,” and afterwards it is said ( 1 Corinthians 12:11): “All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as He will.”

On the other hand it does not belong to the demons to enlighten the intellect, as stated in the P(1), Q(109), A(3) . Now the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom is effected by the enlightening of the intellect, wherefore never did anyone acquire knowledge by means of the demons.

Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 9): “Porphyry confesses that the intellectual soul is in no way cleansed by theurgic inventions,” i.e. the operations “of the demons, so as to be fitted to see its God, and discern what is true,” such as are all scientific conclusions. The demons may, however, be able by speaking to men to express in words certain teachings of the sciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(1)- RO(1) —

It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it is not good to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that the magic art tends.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The abstinence of these children was not in accordance with a vain observance of the notary art, but according to the authority of the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the meat of Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience they received knowledge from God, according to <19B810> Psalm 118:100, “I have had understanding above the ancients, because I have sought Thy commandments.”

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(1)- RO(3) —

To seek knowledge of the future from the demons is a sin not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also on account of the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies to the case in point.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(2) Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health or the like, are unlawful?

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the like, are lawful. It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of bodies in order to produce their proper effects. Now in the physical order things have certain occult forces, the reason of which man is unable to assign; for instance that the magnet attracts iron, and many like instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Dei xxi, 5,7). Therefore it would seem lawful to employ such like forces for the alteration of bodies.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire certain occult forces resulting from their species through the influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g. images, also acquire from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force for the production of certain effects. Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of them and of such like things.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the demons too are able to alter bodies in many ways, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 8,9). But their power is from God. Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the purpose of producing these alterations.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that “to superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and nostrums condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of incantations or of certain cyphers which they call characters, or of any kind of thing worn or fastened on.”

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(2) —

I answer that, In things done for the purpose of producing some bodily effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that effect naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since it is lawful to employ natural causes in order to produce their proper effects. But, if they seem unable to produce those effects naturally, it follows that they are employed for the purpose of producing those effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that they come under the head of “compact by tokens entered into with the demons” [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ.; see above Q(92) , A(2) ]. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): “The demons are allured by means of creatures, which were made, not by them, but by God. They are enticed by various objects differing according to the various things in which they delight, not as animals by meat, but as spirits by signs, such as are to each one’s liking, by means of various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites.”

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(2)- RO(1) —

There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in employing natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain effects such as they are thought to have the natural power of producing. But if in addition there be employed certain characters, words, or any other vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, it will be superstitious and unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The natural forces of natural bodies result from their substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of heavenly bodies; wherefore through this same influence they acquire certain active forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial bodies result from the conception of the craftsman; and since they are nothing else but composition, order and shape, as stated in Phys. i, 5, they cannot have a natural active force. Consequently, no force accrues to them from the influence of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are artificial, but only in respect of their natural matter. Hence it is false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11), that “by herbs, stones, animals, certain particular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again by certain movements of the stars observed in the course of the heavens it is possible for men to fashion on earth forces capable of carrying into effect the various dispositions of the stars,” as though the results of the magic arts were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly bodies. In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ. Dei x, 11), “all these things are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the souls that are subject to them.”

Wherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy from the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that it is requisite to inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce to any effect naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural action. Yet astronomical images differ from necromantic images in this, that the latter include certain explicit invocations and trickery, wherefore they come under the head of explicit agreements made with the demons: whereas in the other images there are tacit agreements by means of tokens in certain shapes or characters.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(2)- RO(3) —

It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty, to Whom the demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever purpose He will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the demons, to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the contrary, it is appointed that he should wage war against the demons.

Hence in no way is it lawful for man to make use of the demons’ help by compacts either tacit or express.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(3) Whether observances directed to the purpose of fortunetelling are unlawful?

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the misfortunes that occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by certain symptoms, which the physician observes. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe such like signs.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is unreasonable to deny that which nearly everybody experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain times, or places, hearing of certain words meetings of men or animals, uncanny or ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to come.

Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, human actions and occurrences are disposed by divine providence in a certain order: and this order seems to require that precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences: wherefore, according to the Apostle ( 1 Corinthians 10:6), the things that happened to the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in our time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to observe these presages.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that “a thousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts entered into with the demons: for instance, the twitching of a limb; a stone, a dog, or a boy coming between friends walking together; kicking the door-post when anyone passes in front of one’s house; to go back to bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on your shoes; to return home if you trip when going forth; when the rats have gnawed a hole in your clothes, to fear superstitiously a future evil rather than to regret the actual damage.”

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(3) —

I answer that, Men attend to all these observances, not as causes but as signs of future events, good or evil. Nor do they observe them as signs given by God, since these signs are brought forward, not on divine authority, but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of the malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men’s minds with such like trifles. Accordingly it is evident that all these observances are superstitious and unlawful: they are apparently remains of idolatry, which authorized the observance of auguries, of lucky and unlucky days which is allied to divination by the stars, in respect of which one day differentiated from another: except that these observances are devoid of reason and art, wherefore they are yet more vain and superstitious.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The causes of sickness are seated in us, and they produce certain signs of sickness to come, which physicians lawfully observe. Wherefore it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future events as proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a flogging when he sees his master’s anger. Possibly the same might be said if one were to fear for child lest it take harm from the evil eye, of which we have spoken in the P(1), Q(117), A(3), ad 2. But this does not apply to this kind of observances.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(3)- RO(2) —

That men have at first experienced a certain degree of truth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards when a man begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind, many things occur in connection with them through the trickery of the demons, “so that men, through being entangled in these observances, become yet more curious, and more and more embroiled in the manifold snares of a pernicious error,” as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23).

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be born, not only words but also deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply those deeds to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all things, however, that occur through divine providence are ordered so as to be signs of the future. Hence the argument does not prove.

P(2b)- Q(96)- A(4) Whether it is unlawful to wear divine words at the neck?