QUESTIONS 97-102 QUESTION OF THE TEMPTATION OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which pertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things. Accordingly we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to irreverence for God; (2) Vices pertaining to irreverence for holy things.

With regard to the first we shall consider the temptation whereby God is tempted, and perjury, whereby God’s name is taken with irreverence.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) In what the temptation of God consists; (2) Whether it is a sin? (3) To what virtue it is opposed; (4) Of its comparison with other vices.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(1) Whether the temptation of God consists in certain deeds, wherein the expected result is ascribed to the power of God alone?

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the temptation of God does not consist in certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the power of God alone. Just as God is tempted by man so is man tempted by God, man, and demons. But when man is tempted the result is not always expected from his power. Therefore neither is God tempted when the result is expected from His power alone.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, all those who work miracles by invoking the divine name look for an effect due to God’s power alone.

Therefore, if the temptation of God consisted in such like deeds, all who work miracles would tempt God.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, it seems to belong to man’s perfection that he should put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence Ambrose, commenting on Luke 9:3, “Take nothing for your journey,” etc. says: “The Gospel precept points out what is required of him that announces the kingdom of God, namely, that he should not depend on worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance from his faith, he should hold himself to be the more able to provide for himself, the less he seeks these things.” And the Blessed Agatha said: “I have never treated my body with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus Christ, Who restores all things by His mere word.” [*Office of St. Agatha, eighth Responsory (Dominican Breviary).] But the temptation of God does not consist in anything pertaining to perfection. Therefore the temptation of God does not consist in such like deeds, wherein the help of God alone is expected.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 36): “Christ who gave proof of God’s power by teaching and reproving openly, yet not allowing the rage of His enemies to prevail against Him, nevertheless by fleeing and hiding, instructed human weakness, lest it should dare to tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that which it needs to avoid.” From this it would seem that the temptation of God consists in omitting to do what one can in order to escape from danger, and relying on the assistance of God alone.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(1) —

I answer that, Properly speaking, to tempt is to test the person tempted. Now we put a person to the test by words or by deeds. By words, that we may find out whether he knows what we ask, or whether he can and will grant it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe another’s prudence, will or power. Either of these may happen in two ways. First, openly, as when one declares oneself a tempter: thus Samson ( Judges 14:12) proposed a riddle to the Philistines in order to tempt them. In the second place it may be done with cunning and by stealth, as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Matthew 22:15, sqq. Again this is sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends, by word or deed, to put some person to the test; and sometimes implicitly, when, to wit, though he does not intend to test a person, yet that which he does or says can seemingly have no other purpose than putting him to a test.

Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds.

Now we speak with God in words when we pray. Hence a man tempts God explicitly in his prayers when he asks something of God with the intention of probing God’s knowledge, power or will. He tempts God explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to experiment on God’s power, good will or wisdom. But He will tempt God implicitly, if, though he does not intend to make an experiment on God, yet he asks for or does something which has no other use than to prove God’s power, goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man wishes his horse to gallop in order to escape from the enemy, this is not giving the horse a trial: but if he make the horse gallop with out any useful purpose, it seems to be nothing else than a trial of the horse’s speed; and the same applies to all other things. Accordingly when a man in his prayers or deeds entrusts himself to the divine assistance for some urgent or useful motive, this is not to tempt God: for it is written (2 Paralip 20:12): “As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee.” But if this be done without any useful or urgent motive, this is to tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a gloss on Deuteronomy 6:16, “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God,” says: “A man tempts God, if having the means at hand, without reason he chooses a dangerous course, trying whether he can be delivered by God.”

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds, to test his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same deeds.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(1)- RO(2) —

When saints work miracles by their prayers, they are moved by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which is an effect of the divine power.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The preachers of God’s kingdom dispense with temporal aids, so as to be freer to give their time to the word of God: wherefore if they depend on God alone, it does not follow that they tempt God. But if they were to neglect human assistance without any useful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 36) says that “Paul fled, not through ceasing to believe in God, but lest he should tempt God, were he not to flee when he had the means of flight.” The Blessed Agatha had experience of God’s kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such sickness as required bodily medicine, or else she felt herself suddenly cured by God.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(2) Whether it is a sin to tempt God?

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God.

For God has not commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is the same as to tempt, Him: for it is written ( Malachi 3:10): “Bring all the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house; and try Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the flood-gates of heaven.”

Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt God.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, a man is tempted not only in order to test his knowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will.

Now it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is written ( Psalm 33:9): “O taste and see that the Lord is sweet,” and ( Romans 12:2): “That you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and the perfect will of God.”

Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from sin, but rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because when the Lord said: “Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God,” he replied: “I will not ask, and I will not tempt the Lord,” and then it was said to him: “Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are grievous to my God also?” ( Isaiah 7:11-13).

And we read of Abraham ( Genesis 15:8) that he said to the Lord: “Whereby may I know that I shall possess it?” namely, the land which God had promised him. Again Gedeon asked God for a sign of the victory promised to him ( Judges 6:36, sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is forbidden in God’s Law, for it is written ( Deuteronomy 6:10): “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.”

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), to tempt a person is to put him to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain. Wherefore all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt, either in the tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its qualities), or in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove it to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it is a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which pertains to God’s perfection.

Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in order that the tempter himself may know God’s power.

On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the divine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it to others: this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of urgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite conditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might be wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in order, to wit, that Christ’s power might be made manifest to unbelievers.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law, as stated above ( Q(87) , A(1) ). Hence there was a motive of urgency to pay it, through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive of usefulness, as stated in the text quoted — ”that there may be meat in God’s house”: wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The words that follow, “and try Me,” are not to be understood causally, as though they had to pay tithes in order to try if “God would open the flood-gates of heaven,” but consecutively, because, to wit, if they paid tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which God would shower upon them.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(2)- RO(2) —

There is a twofold knowledge of God’s goodness or will. One is speculative and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to prove whether God’s will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other knowledge of God’s will or goodness is effective or experimental and thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God’s sweetness, and complacency in God’s will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (Div. Nom. ii) that “he learnt divine thing through experience of them.” It is in this way that we are told to prove God’s will, and to taste His sweetness.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(2)- RO(3) —

God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him alone, but for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was reproved because, by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both because he would have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it was a matter relating to the common good. Abraham asked for a sign through the divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to be excused from sin, as a gloss observes: just as Zachary sinned in saying to the angel ( Luke 1:18): “Whereby shall I know this?” so that he was punished for his unbelief.

It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God for a sign: first in order to test God’s power or the truth of His word, and this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God. Secondly, in order to be instructed as to what is God’s pleasure in some particular matter; and this nowise comes under the head of temptation of God.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(3) Whether temptation of God is opposed to the virtue of religion?

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed to the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a man doubts God, as stated above ( A(2) ). Now doubt about God comes under the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore temptation of God is opposed to faith rather than to religion.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is written (Ecclus. 18:23): “Before prayer prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man,” that is, who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, “prays for what God taught him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him to do.” Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to hope.

Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, a gloss on Psalm 77:18, “And they tempted God in their hearts,” says that “to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully, with simplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts.”

Now deceit is opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is opposed, not to religion, but to truth.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(3) —

On the contrary, According to the gloss quoted above “to tempt God is to pray to Him inordinately.” Now to pray to God becomingly is an act of religion as stated above ( Q(83) , A(15) ).

Therefore to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(3) —

I answer that, As clearly shown above ( Q(81) , A(5) ), the end of religion is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains directly to irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is evident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since no one presumes to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it is manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(3)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( Q(81) , A(7) ), it belongs to religion to declare one’s faith by certain signs indicative of reverence towards God. Consequently it belongs to irreligion that, through doubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence towards God. To tempt God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of irreligion.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(3)- RO(2) —

He that prepares not his soul before prayer by forgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way disposing himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by God, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence towards Him. For it is written ( 1 Peter 5:6): “Be you humbled... under the mighty hand of God,” and ( 2 Timothy 2:15): “Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God.” Therefore also this kind of temptation is a species of irreligion.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(3)- RO(3) —

A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in relation to God, Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to man. Wherefore deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and consequently it does not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed to the truth.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(4) Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition?

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment. Now the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews than was the sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of superstition: since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of their number were slain, as related in Exodus 32:28 [*Septuagint version. The Vulgate has “twenty-three thousand.”], whereas for the sin of temptation they all without exception perished in the desert, and entered not into the land of promise, according to Psalm 94:9, “Your fathers tempted Me,” and further on, “so I swore in My wrath that they should not enter into My rest.” Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin than superstition.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it would seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God is a species, is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition which bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin than superstition.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, it seems to be a greater sin to behave disrespectfully to one’s parents, than to pay others the respect we owe to our parents. Now God should be honored by us as the Father of all ( Malachi 1:6). Therefore. temptation of God whereby we behave irreverently to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby we give to a creature the honor we owe to God.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(4) —

On the contrary, A gloss on Deuteronomy 17:2, “When there shall be found among you,” etc. says: “The Law detests error and idolatry above all: for it is a very great sin to give to a creature the honor that belongs to the Creator.”

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(4) —

I answer that, Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is that which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is less opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine excellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For just as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his error, than if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts more against the reverence due to God, if by his deeds he professes an error contrary to the divine excellence, than if he expresses a doubt. Now the superstitious man professes an error, as shown above ( Q(94) , A(1), ad 1), whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds expresses a doubt of the divine excellence, as stated above ( A(2) ). Therefore the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting God.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above manner, as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more severe punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is written ( Exodus 32:34): “And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin also of theirs.”

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as regards the material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as regards the end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of God, since it implies greater irreverence for God, as stated.

P(2b)- Q(97)- A(4)- RO(3) —

It belongs essentially to the divine excellence that it is singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine reverence to another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine excellence. There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents, which can without sin be given to others.

QUESTION OF PERJURY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury? (2) Whether perjury is always a sin? (3) Whether it is always a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(1) Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false?

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above ( Q(89) , A(3) ), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears to something unjust.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the thing confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man’s statement is confirmed by calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human statement which is confirmed on oath.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost.

Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): “Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are deceived themselves”; and he gives three examples. The first is: “Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true, whereas it is false”; the second is: “Take the instance of another who knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it were true”; and the third is: “Take another, who thinks his statement false, and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true,” of whom he says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not necessary for perjury.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Perjury is defined “a falsehood confirmed by oath” [*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5].

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(92) , A(2) ), moral acts take their species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed: since an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing, which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood.

Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As Jerome says on Jeremiah 4:2, “whichever of these three be lacking, there is perjury,” but in different order. For first and chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to do the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking, since by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of lapsing into falsehood.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(1)- RO(2) —

In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since they are in the position of active principle, as stated in Phys. ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from that kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its end, by swearing what is false.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. If something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false, it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each of these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in some way, on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which is formal in anything is of greater importance than that which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it false. For Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): “It depends how the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty except the mind be guilty.”

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(2) Whether all perjury is sinful?

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that not all perjury is sinful.

Whoever does not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a perjurer. Yet sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful (adultery, for instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a sin. If therefore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would follow that he is perplexed.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, no man sins by doing what is best.

Yet sometimes by committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed.

Therefore not all perjury is sinful.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, he that swears to do another’s will would seem to be guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that he sins not, if he do not the man’s will: for instance, if the latter order him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly not all perjury is sinful.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the obligation of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus a state may swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does not sin.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost.

Jacobi; Serm. cxxx), in speaking of perjury: “See how you should detest this horrible beast and exterminate it from all human business.”

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(89) , A(1) ), to swear is to call God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to witness to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that God ignores the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a falsehood.

Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it belongs to show reverence to God.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(2)- RO(1) —

He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep his oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(2)- RO(2) —

A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is doing could not be a matter of an oath.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(2)- RO(3) —

When one man swears or promises to do another’s will, there is to be understood this requisite condition — that the thing commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(2)- RO(4) —

An oath is a personal act, and so when a man becomes a citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the nature of which obligation is that he should take his share of the state’s burdens if he takes a share of its goods.

The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some particular “college” is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all, past and future.

Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of the statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as stated above ( P(1), Q(96) , A(4) ).

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(3) Whether all perjury is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It is laid down (Extra, De Jurejur, cap. Verum): “Referring to the question whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in order to safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind than that which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations of their oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to avoid occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to keep their oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for this reason to be punished as for a mortal sin.” Therefore not all perjury is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, “it is a greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels.” Now it is not always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance, if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue in the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on the Gospels.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem that infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury [*Cap.

Cum dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.]. Therefore, seemingly, not all perjury is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is written ( Leviticus 19:12): “Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name.” Therefore it is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(3) —

I answer that, According to the teaching of the Philosopher (Poster. i, 2), “that which causes a thing to be such is yet more so.” Now we know that an action which is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of God. Wherefore any action that of its nature, implies contempt of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very nature implies contempt of God, since, as stated above ( A(2) ), the reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence towards God. Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of its very nature, is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(3)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( Q(89) , A(7), ad 3), coercion does not deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as regards that which can be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfil an oath which he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally. Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a man from an obligation even of an oath, especially if the latter should have been coerced into taking the oath through such fear as may overcome a high-principled man.

When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of mortal sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(3)- RO(2) —

He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless irreverent to God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue, if he adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that he is swearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as neither is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and consequently is excused from the sin of perjury.

It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels, than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we consider them equally in comparison with one another, it is more grievous to commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the Gospels.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he still has it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his oath, which is not the case in a declaratory oath.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(4) Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer?

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for him to demand an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for his own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should one enjoin an oath on another person.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful to impose an oath on one who swears falsely.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( Leviticus 5:1): “If anyone sin, and hear the voice of one swearing falsely [*’Falsely’ is not in the Vulgate’], and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity.”

Hence it would seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an oath of such a man.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(4)- O(4) —

On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so is it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public.

Ep. xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one who swears falsely.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(4) —

I answer that, As regards a person who demands an oath from another, a distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he demands the oath on his own account and of his own accord, or he demands it on account of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If a man demands an oath on his own account as a private individual, we must make a distinction, as does Augustine (de Perjuriis. serm. clxxx): “For if he knows not that the man will swear falsely, and says to him accordingly: ‘Swear to me’ in order that he may be credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human temptation” (because, to wit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the man will speak the truth). “This is the evil whereof Our Lord says ( Matthew 5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But if he knows the man to have done so,” i.e. the contrary of what he swears to, “and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the other destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand of the slayer.”

If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath of a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at whose instance he demands it.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(4)- RO(1) —

This argument avails in the case of one who demands an oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an oath in order that he may be more certain.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(4)- RO(2) —

As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), “though we are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others.” Hence he that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely.

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(4)- RO(3) —

As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce another’s perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter had to be denounced “to those who would do the perjurer good rather than harm.” Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden, especially when it does not tend to another person’s injury: because if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated above ( Q(33) , A(7) ; Q(68) , A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(98)- A(4)- RO(4) —

It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil.

Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Hence when a man swears falsely by the true God his oath seems to lack any good that one may use lawfully.

QUESTION OF SACRILEGE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony [i.e., the buying and selling of positions in the Church].

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is sacrilege? (2) Whether it is a special sin? (3) Of the species of sacrilege; (4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(1) Whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing?

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can. Si quis suadente]): “They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the sovereign’s decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the sovereign be worthy of honor.” Now this seems to have no connection with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the violation of something sacred.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is stated further on [*Append.

Gratian, on can. Constituit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public offices, “he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege.”

Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, God’s power is greater than man’s.

Now sacred things receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot be violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of a sacred thing.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a man is said to be sacrilegious because he selects,” i.e. steals, “sacred things.”

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(81) , A(5) ; P(1), Q(101), A(4) ), a thing is called “sacred” through being deputed to the divine worship. Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through being deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is due to it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever pertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and comes under the head of sacrilege.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(1)- RO(1) —

According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers of divine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, “Being ministers of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly.” Hence by an extension of the term, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments of Christ, according to 1 Corinthians 6:11, “But you are washed, but you are sanctified.” Wherefore it is written ( 1 Peter 2:9): “You are a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people.”

Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Violation here means any kind of irreverence or dishonor. Now as “honor is in the person who honors and not in the one who is honored” (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the person who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the object of his irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(2) Whether sacrilege is a special sin?

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that sacrilege not a special sin. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv) “They are guilty of sacrilege who through ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it by their negligence.”

But this is done in every sin, because sin is “a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God,” according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general sin.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of sin. Now sacrilege comprised under different kinds of sin, for instance under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the violation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. v, 11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(2) —

On the contrary, That which is opposed to a special virtue is a special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely religion, to which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. Therefore sacrilege is a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(2) —

I answer that, Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, there must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is derived chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or subject. Now in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it is a special sin.

Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 3), “When the purple has been made into a royal robe, we pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to death,” as acting against the king: and in the same way if a man violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the divine law who assail God’s law, as heretics and blasphemers do.

These are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of sacrilege, through perverting the words of the divine law.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin materially.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins, through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a sacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(3) Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things?

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished thereby.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to the same species should at the same time differ specifically.

Now murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin.

Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, and not according to the various sacred things.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If, therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the sinner.

Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according to the sacred things.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished by their objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), the sin of sacrilege consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege.

Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is written (2 Macc. 5:19): “God did not choose the people for the place’s sake, but the place for the people’s sake.” Hence sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that which is committed against a sacred place.

Yet in either species there are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of sacred persons and places.

In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs to the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the sacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the vessels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also sacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons of the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these come things connected with the apparel of the Church and its ministers; and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(3)- RO(1) —

There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a material, but also a formal difference.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one species in one respect, and to different species in another respect.

Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, “animal,” but differ in the species “colored thing,” if one be white and the other black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the same species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance, the violation of a nun by blows or by copulation.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The quotation is from St. Bernard, De Consideration, ii, 13] says that “a trifle on a priest’s lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy.” But formally and properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is to be said of other instances.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(4) Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary?

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted for a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is punished by capital sentence according to civil law [*Dig. xlviii, 13; Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.]. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment, according to Nahum 1:9, “There shall not rise a double affliction.” But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major excommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges.

Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 1 Thessalonians 2:5): “Neither have we taken an occasion of covetousness.” But it seems to involve an occasion of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be exacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a fitting punishment of sacrilege.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written [*XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis contumax]: “If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred soldi”: and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis inventus, can. 21): “Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay thirty pounds of tried purest silver.”

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(4) —

I answer that, In the award of punishments two points must be considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just, and that “by what things a man sinneth by the same... he may be tormented” (Wis. 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of one guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is excommunication [*Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis contumax, quoted above] whereby sacred things are withheld from him. The second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but excommunication in its stead.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(4)- RO(2) —

When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who despise spiritual things.

P(2b)- Q(99)- A(4)- RO(3) —

If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is exacted for the purpose of man’s correction, it has a manifest utility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice.

QUESTION ON SIMONY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) What is simony? (2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments? (3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions? (4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals? (5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or also oral remuneration or remuneration by service? (6) Of the punishment of simony.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1) Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing?

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that simony is not “an express will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing.”

Simony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Eos qui per pecunias.]): “The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who are guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained that the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own slave. For every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether it be his slave or any other of his possessions.” But unbelief, like faith, is an act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above ( Q(10) , A(2) ). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of the will.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is an intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin against the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory says in a homily (v, in Ev.): “The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you possess.” Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy something spiritual.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of whom we read ( Acts 8:18,19) that “he offered the apostles money” that he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, “that on whomsoever he imposed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost.” But we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony is not the will to sell a spiritual thing.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, there are many other voluntary commutations besides buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction [*A kind of legal compromise — Oxford Dictionary]. Therefore it would seem that simony is defined insufficiently.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- O(6) —

Further, anything connected with spiritual things is itself spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add “or connected with spiritual things.”

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- O(7) —

Further, according to some, the Pope cannot commit simony: yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not the will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Regist. [*Caus.

I, qu. i, can. Presbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare]): “None of the faithful is ignorant that buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the heresy of simony.”

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(1), Q(18) , A(2) ) an act is evil generically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is undue matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because a spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as it is said concerning wisdom ( Proverbs 3:15), “she is more precious than all riches, and all things that are desired, are not to be compared with her”: and for this reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of Simon in its very source, said ( Acts 8:20): “Keep thy money to thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money.”

Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor is not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted ( O(1)) Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of spiritual things, according to 1 Corinthians 4:1, “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers of God.”

Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things, since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore Our Lord said ( Matthew 10:8): “Freely have you received, freely give.”

Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God and divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of irreligion.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of faith, without, sometimes, faith being in one’s heart, so too the vices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief without, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is said to be a “heresy,” as regards the outward protestation, since by selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares, in a way, that he is the owner of a spiritual gift; and this is heretical. It must, however, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles to sell him a grace of the Holy Ghost for money, said that the world was not created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore states (Etym. viii, 5): and so for this reason simoniacs are reckoned with other heretics, as appears from Augustine’s book on heretics.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( Q(58) , A(4) ), justice, with all its parts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its subject. Hence simony is fittingly defined from its relation to the will. This act is furthermore described as “express,” in order to signify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part in virtue and vice.

Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Ghost that sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin through contempt of those things whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from sin, as stated above ( Q(14) , A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man gives what he has for God’s sake. But this is to employ the term “buying” in a wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it reach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither “the sufferings of this time,” nor any gift or deed of ours, “are worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us” ( Romans 8:18), and because merit consists chiefly, not in an outward gift, action or passion, but in an inward affection.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in order that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I, qu. iii [*Can. Salvator]), that “Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of the Holy Ghost, in order that he might make money by selling the signs to be wrought by him.” Hence those who sell spiritual things are likened in intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate, in act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read ( 2 Kings 5:20-24) that he received money from the leper who was healed: wherefore the sellers of spiritual things may be called not only “simoniacs” but also “giezites.”

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- RO(5) —

The terms “buying” and “selling” cover all kinds of non-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the exchange or agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by authority of the parties concerned without danger of committing simony, as laid down by law [*Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.; cap. Super, de Transact.]. Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of his office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or necessary reasons.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- RO(6) —

Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives through being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are spiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while others are called spiritual, through adhering to those others. Hence (I, qu. iii, cap.

Siquis objecerit) it is stated that “spiritual things do not progress without corporal things, even as the soul has no bodily life without the body.”

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(1)- RO(7) —

The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony, like any other man, since the higher a man’s position the more grievous is his sin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore, were he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for a spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of simony. In like manner he might commit simony by accepting from a layman moneys not belonging to the goods of the Church.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2) Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments?

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give money for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as we shall state in the P(3), Q(68) , A(6) ; P(3), Q(73) , A(3) . But seemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for Baptism, for instance if a priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child without being paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell the sacraments.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist, which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend or money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or sell the other sacraments.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be not sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that “it was no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom.”

Now it is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration of bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that it is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a like ecclesiastical dignity.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2)- O(6) —

Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]): “Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from the priesthood.”

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2) —

I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on which no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with a non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support, according to the words of the Apostle ( 1 Corinthians 9:13), “Know you not, that they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the holy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar?”

Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be excused by any custom whatever, since “custom does not prevail over natural or divine law” [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; cf. P(1), Q(97) , A(3) ]. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a pecuniary value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the other hand, to receive anything for the support of those who administer the sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it is received not as a price of goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence a gloss of Augustine on 1 Timothy 5:17, “Let the priests that rule well,” says: “They should look to the people for a supply to their need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry.”

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In a case of necessity anyone may baptize.

And since nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize without being paid, one must act as though there were no priest available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water from the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it were an adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the priest were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if possible, to be baptized by someone else.

And if he is unable to have recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The priest receives money, not as the price for consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would be simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The money exacted of the person absolved is not the price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2)- RO(4) —

As stated above, “custom does not prevail over natural or divine law” whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend recognized by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no intention of buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary, and especially if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all these cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of simony or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle ( 1 Thessalonians 5:22), “From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves.”

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2)- RO(5) —

It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition of one’s rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any dignity or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing. But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust opposition, after one has already acquired that right.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(2)- RO(6) —

Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia] say that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no grace is conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state in the Third Part of the work [*XP, Q(42) , A(3) ]. Wherefore we must reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, but also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give money for Matrimony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if it be considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the law [*Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand anything for the Nuptial Blessing.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(3) Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions?

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears from 1 Samuel 9:7,8, and 1 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that it is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain the assistance of their prayers, according to Luke 16:9, “Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity.” To preachers also, who sow spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle ( Corinthians 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the divine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions: and sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful to receive something for spiritual actions.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a master the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it would seem lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiritual power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and so forth.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for spiritual things.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can.

Quidquid invisibilis]): “It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever.” Now all these spiritual things are acquired through an invisible grace. Therefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return for them.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(3) —

I answer that, Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are called spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose thereto. And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of men, according to 1 Corinthians 9:7, “Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?” Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is spiritual in such like actions; but to receive or give something for the support of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that there be no intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by withholding spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then there would be an appearance of simony [i.e., the buying and selling of positions in the Church]. But after the spiritual things have been freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary offerings and other dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay, if the superior authorize this to be done.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(3)- RO(1) —

As Jerome says in his commentary on Micheas 3:9, certain gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their livelihood, but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of prophecy.

Wicked prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent of buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity. Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1 Timothy 5:11, “Let the priests that rule well,” says: “Their need allows them to receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this should be given to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they sell a great thing for a contemptible price.” In like manner temporal things are given to those who praise God by celebrating the divine office whether for the living or for the dead, not as a price but as a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled when alms are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal to do such things by contract, or with the intention of buying or selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were decreed in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral unless a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance would preclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms, because this would not preclude its being granted to others. Moreover, the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(3)- RO(3) —

A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood. Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor (which he is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has accepted), but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this reason it is unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing whatever, or for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the other hand it is lawful for him to receive “procurations,” when he visits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them, but as a means of livelihood.

He that is possessed of science, without having taken upon himself the obligation of using it for the benefit of others can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since this is not a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would sin grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches are appointed to instruct the clerics of that church and other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical benefice for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything in return, either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting any feasts.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(3)- RO(4) —

It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries, that are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance to the monastery is free, to accept something for the support of those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier in admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for that monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other hand, it is lawful to incite a person’s regard for a monastery by means of temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter the monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or receive something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio).

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(4) Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things?

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the sake of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything temporal, and this is clearly false.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a chalice for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28). Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right of burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised the priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place ( Genesis 23:8, sqq.), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born ( Genesis 25:31, sqq.).

Again the right of patronage is transferred with the property sold, and is granted “in fee.” Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for themselves the revenues of prebends of which they have the presentation, although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii, cap. Si quis objecerit): “Whoever sells one of two such things, that the one is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold.

Wherefore let no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical.”

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(4) —

I answer that, A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two ways. First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have to spiritual things, because it is not competent save to those who hold a clerical office. Hence such things can by no means exist apart from spiritual things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such things, because the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual. Other things are annexed to spiritual things through being directed thereto, for instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore such things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not as annexed to spiritual things.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(4)- RO(1) —

All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things, as to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful sale.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual things as to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the poor provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over them, since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sacred vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to be made out of the same material they would have to be consecrated again.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(4)- RO(3) —

We have no authority for supposing that the double cave which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used for burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even a church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places are looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price as payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary plot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell or buy land on which there has previously been a church, as we have also said with regard to sacred vessels ( RO(2) ). Or again, Abraham is to be excused because he thus freed himself of a grievance. For although Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing, Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without prejudice to himself.

The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God’s choice, according to Malachi 1:2,3, “I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.”

Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not in buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of his grievance.

The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can it be granted “in fee,” but is transferred with the property sold or granted.

The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk, but merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of tithe, as stated above ( Q(87) , A(3) ).

With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be observed, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a person to a benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of the revenues of the benefice in question, and to spend it on some pious object. But, on the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it would be the same as though he demanded payment from him, and he would not escape the guilt of simony.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(5) Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or for an oral remuneration?

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral remuneration. Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): “It is right that those who serve the interests of the Church should be rewarded.” Now an equivalent of service denotes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for services received.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so on account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former simoniacal.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, that which is done only at another’s request would seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person’s request. Therefore this is not simoniacal.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral remuneration: and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony.

Therefore oral remuneration does not entail simony.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says: “Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in consideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service rendered or money received, is guilty of simony.”

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(5) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ), the term “money” denotes “anything that can have a pecuniary value.” Now it is evident that a man’s service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage.

Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or promised, at which that service could be valued. If likewise, to grant a person’s request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any eternal thing which comes under the head of “real remuneration,” so too does he contract it, by receiving “oral remuneration” or an “equivalent in service rendered.”

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(5)- RO(1) —

If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service, directed to spiritual things (e.g. to the good of the Church, or benefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the service, as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has in mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things (e.g. a service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a case of remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal, but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which simony is based.

But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice with the understanding or intention that he provide for one’s kindred from the revenue is manifest simony.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Oral remuneration denotes either praise that pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby man’s favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend this chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one’s chief intention wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made for a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is based on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is granted to the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there may be simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of the person, but to human favor. If, however, a person asks for himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption renders him unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy person. But, if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical benefice without the cure of souls.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(5)- RO(4) —

A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false pretenses stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6) Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony?

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are not fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in return for a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by a consecration.

Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person to be deprived of what he has acquired simoniacally.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained the episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders from him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, if he has acquired it by simony.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, no one should be punished for what was done without his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which is voluntary, as was shown above ( P(1), Q(74) , AA(1),2 ; P(1), Q(77) , A(7) ). Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual, which others have procured for him without his knowledge and consent. Therefore he should not be punished by being deprived of what has been bestowed on him.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- O(4) —

Further, no one should profit by his own sin.

Yet, if a person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- O(5) —

Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But no one should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the monastic state which he has acquired by simony.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- O(6) —

Further, in this world external punishment is not inflicted for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is the judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will, wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2).

Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what he has acquired by simony.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- O(7) —

Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less than to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they have received.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus): “He that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money.”

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6) —

I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired against the owner’s will. For instance, if a steward were to give some of his lord’s property to a person, against his lord’s will and orders, the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of churches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis, according to Matthew 10:8, “Freely have you received, freely give.” Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual things in return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them.

Moreover, those who are guilty of simony, by either selling or buying spiritual things, as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced to other punishments, namely, infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas].

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- RO(1) —

He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally, receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were, and against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should not busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others, namely, that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his Order, whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it.

Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself alone, and not as regards others.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- RO(2) —

One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one knows to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his command or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they are ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive Orders in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order without a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, because no one should obey a man to the extent of communicating with him in an unlawful action.

Now he that is, by virtue of the law, suspended as regards both himself and others, confers Orders unlawfully: wherefore no one should communicate with him, by receiving Orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to another’s sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to receive Orders from him. And if the bishop has been guilty of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive Orders from him because he is not suspended as regards others, but only as regards himself, as stated above (ad 1).

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- RO(3) —

To be deprived of what one has received is not only the punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of acquiring unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it. Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Orders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his order, and resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom, but also in addition to this he is punished by being marked with infamy. Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits, allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits), excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the Church.

On the other hand, if a man’s promotion be procured simoniacally by others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise of his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together with fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be made in the case when his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes the transaction, for then he is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the transaction, by paying what was promised.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- RO(4) —

Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received, must be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their transfer, notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- RO(5) —

If there are any persons who have been simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the simony was committed with their knowledge since the holding of the General Council [*Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent III], they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some house of the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however, this took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses of the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they wander about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former rank, and must be assigned a lower place.

On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- RO(6) —

In God’s sight the mere will makes a man guilty of simony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is not punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to repent of his evil intention.

P(2b)- Q(100)- A(6)- RO(7) —

The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one who has knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases the bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater dispensation, allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor orders; or a full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.

QUESTION OF PIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)

After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of inquiry arise with regard to piety: (1) To whom does piety extend? (2) What does piety make one offer a person? (3) Whether piety is a special virtue? (4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion?

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(1) Whether piety extends to particular human individuals?

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that piety does not extend to particular human individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes, properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by the term \eusebeia\. But the worship of God does not denote relation to man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain human individuals.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): “Piety, on her day, provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy.” Now the works of mercy are to be done to all, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain special persons.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), and on each of them is founded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a gloss on 2 Timothy 3:5, “Having an appearance indeed of piety [Douay: ‘godliness’].” Therefore piety extends not only to one’s kindred and fellow-citizens.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “it is by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and wellwishers of our country and render them faithful service.”

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(1) —

I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the various benefits received from them. on both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government. In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one’s parents and one’s country.

The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to these.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the worship due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a particular. Hence it is written ( Malachi 1:6): “If I be a father, where is My honor?” Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine worship.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), “the term piety is often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language of the common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact that God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word ‘pious’ to God Himself.”

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The relations of a man with his kindred and fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being than other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to them.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(2) Whether piety provides support for our parents?

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that piety does not provide support for our parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, “Honor thy father and mother,” belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide support for one’s parents.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound to support. Now according to the Apostle ( Corinthians 12:14), “neither ought the children to lay up for the parents.”

Therefore piety does not oblige them to support their parents.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, piety extends not only to one’s parents, but also to other kinsmen and to one’s fellow-citizens, as stated above ( A(1) ). But one is not bound to support all one’s kindred and fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one’s parents.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(2) —

On the contrary, our Lord ( Matthew 15:3-6) reproved the Pharisees for hindering children from supporting their parents.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(2) —

I answer that, We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially that which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son’s superior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “piety gives both duty and homage”: “duty” referring to service, and “homage” to reverence or honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), “we are said to give homage to those whose memory or presence we honor.”

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(2)- RO(1) —

According to our Lord’s interpretation ( Matthew 15:3-6) the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them; and the reason for this is that support is given to one’s father because it is due to him as to one greater.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on his father is accidental, arising from some momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the successors of their children, but children of their parents.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), “we offer homage and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country”; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to others according to our means and their personal claims.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(3) Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue from charity.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God. But piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and duty, seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common good. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as a part of justice.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(3) —

I answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an object under a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect of something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing is indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural principle of being and government. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and to those who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety is a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and country.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(3)- RO(2) —

God is the principle of our being and government in a far more excellent manner than one’s father or country.

Hence religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety, which pays homage to our parents and country. But things relating to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of excellence and causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore, by way of excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God, by way of excellence, is called “Our Father.”

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Piety extends to our country in so far as the latter is for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the good of our country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal justice has more of the character of a general virtue than piety has.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(4) Whether the duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of religion?

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that the duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said ( Luke 14:26): “If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple.”

Hence it is said in praise of James and John ( Matthew 4:22) that they left “their nets and father, and followed” Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites ( Deuteronomy 33:9): “Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do not know you; and to his brethren: I know you not; and their own children they have not known. These have kept Thy word.”

Now a man who knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even hates them, must needs omit the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Luke 9:59,60) that in answer to him who said: “Suffer me first to go and bury my father,” Our Lord replied: “Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the kingdom of God.” Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety to bury one’s father. Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, God is called “Our Father” by excellence. Now just as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety so do we worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of the worship of religion.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not break to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents, both on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on the score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister without the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of religion.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees ( Matthew 15:3-6) who taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying one’s parents the honor we owe them.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(4) —

I answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues.

Now no virtue is opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his book on the Categories (Cap. De oppos.), “good is not opposed to good.” Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually hinder one another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of the other. Now, as stated above ( P(1), Q(7) , A(2) ; P(1), Q(18) , A(3) ), the act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and if it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of vice. Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one’s parents according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that man should tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on Luke 12:52, “the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of kindred.”

Accordingly, if the worship of one’s parents take one away from the worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to one’s parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad Heliod.): “Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter.” Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God. If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we are not withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says (Hom. xxxvii in Ev.) that “when we find our parents to be a hindrance in our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them.”

For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their kindred, because they obeyed the Lord’s command, and spared not the idolaters ( Exodus 32). James and John are praised for leaving their parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another means of livelihood, if they followed Christ.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth.), “Our Lord by so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries and other things that one anticipates under these circumstances.

For after the burial the will had to be read, the estate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly, because there were others who could see to the funeral.” Or, according to Cyril’s commentary on Luke 9, “this disciple’s request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that he might support a yet living father in the latter’s old age, until at length he should bury him. This is what Our Lord did not grant, because there were others, bound by the duties of kindred, to take care of him.”

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Whatever we give our parents out of piety is referred by us to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform with regard to any of our neighbors are offered to God, according to Matthew 25:40: “As long as you did it to one of... My least... you did it to Me.” Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of our assistance, so that they have no other means of support, provided they incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for the sake of religion.

But if we cannot devote ourselves to their service without sin, or if they can be supported without our assistance, it is lawful to forego their service, so as to give more time to religion.

P(2b)- Q(101)- A(4)- RO(4) —

We must speak differently of one who is yet in the world, and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he that is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support without him, he must not leave them and enter religion, because he would be breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of parents. Some say, however, that even then he might abandon them, and leave them in God’s care. But this, considered aright, would be to tempt God: since, while having human means at hand, he would be exposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God’s assistance. on the other hand, if the parents can find means of livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter religion, because children are not bound to support their parents except in cases of necessity, as stated above. He that has already made his profession in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world: wherefore he ought not, under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once more with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound, saving his obedience to his superiors, and his religious state withal, to make points efforts for his parents’ support.

QUESTION OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of which will manifest the contrary vices.

Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues? (2) What does observance offer? (3) Of its comparison with piety.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that observance is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their objects. But the object of observance is not distinct from the object of piety: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity.”

But worship and honor are paid also by piety to our parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct virtue from piety.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that are in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law, according to Romans 13:7, “Render... to all men their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due,” etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements of the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice. Therefore observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance along with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(1) —

I answer that, As explained above ( Q(101), AA(1),3 ; Q(80) ), according to the various excellences of those persons to whom something is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of virtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are designated as “fathers,” on account of their being charged with like cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him ( 2 Kings 5:13): “Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing,” etc.

Therefore, just as, in a manner, religion, whereby worship is given to find piety, whereby we worship our so under piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( Q(101), A(3), ad 2), religion goes by the name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety properly so called is distinct from religion; and in the same way piety can be called observance by way of excellence, although observance properly speaking is distinct from piety.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(1)- RO(2) —

By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself. Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(1)- RO(3) —

It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and not to special justice, which is a principal virtue.

Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above ( Q(58) , A(6) ).

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(2) Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are in positions of dignity?

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons whom we hold in honor, so that worship and honor would seem to be the same. Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe: wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of justice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us. Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and honor to all.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity who are placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of remuneration, according to Romans 13:7, “Render... to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor.”

Moreover, we owe them reverence and subjection, according to Hebrews 13:17, “Obey your prelates, and be subject to them.” Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as paying worship and honor.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity.”

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(2) —

I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: thus a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every mover has a certain excellence and power over that which is moved.

Wherefore, a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there is due to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by repaying him, according to one’s faculty, for the benefits we received from him.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Worship includes not only honor, but also whatever other suitable actions are connected with the relations between man and man.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(2)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( Q(80) ), debt is twofold.

One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honor and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise of their government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repayment of their labor.

P(2b)- Q(102)- A(3) Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?