QUESTIONS 118-122 QUESTION OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF COVETOUSNESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and (1) covetousness; (2) prodigality.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether covetousness is a sin? (2) Whether it is a special sin? (3) To which virtue it is opposed; (4) Whether it is a mortal sin? (5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins? (6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin? (7) Whether it is a capital vice? (8) Of its daughters.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(1) Whether covetousness is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that covetousness is not aa sin. For covetousness [avaritia] denotes a certain greed for gold [aeris aviditas*], because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money, under which all external goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for covetousness “avaritia” is derived from “aveo” to desire; but the Greek \philargyria\ signifies literally “love of money”: and it is to this that St. Thomas is alluding (cf.

A(2), O(2) ) Now it is not a sin to desire external goods: since man desires them naturally, both because they are naturally subject to man, and because by their means man’s life is sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his substance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, every sin is against either God, or one’s neighbor, or oneself, as stated above ( P(1), Q(72) , A(4) ). But covetousness is not, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is opposed neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which man is directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this pertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 6:18): “He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body.” In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one’s neighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own. Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Hebrews 13:5): “Let your manners be without covetousness, contented with such things as you have.”

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(1) —

I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a due measure, evil must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that measure. Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in a certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated above ( Q(117), A(3) ; P(1), Q(2) , A(1) ). Hence it must needs be that man’s good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other words, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have external riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined as “immoderate love of possessing.” It is therefore evident that covetousness is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(1)- RO(1) —

It is natural to man to desire external things as means to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as it is held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Covetousness may signify immoderation about external things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires or keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly against one’s neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches when, for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in them, immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against himself, because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in his body as do the sins of the flesh.

As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of temporal things.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Natural inclinations should be regulated according to reason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though old people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with regard to riches.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(2) Whether covetousness is a special sin?

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): “Covetousness, which in Greek is called \philargyria\, applies not only to silver or money, but also to anything that is desired immoderately.” Now in every sin there is immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as state above ( P(1), Q(71) , A(6), O(3) ). Therefore covetousness is a general sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), “the covetous [avarus] man” is so called because he is “greedy for brass [avidus aeris],” i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called \philargyria\, i.e. “love of silver.” Now silver, which stands for money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be measured by money, as stated above ( Q(117), A(2), ad 2). Therefore covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently seems to be a general sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a gloss on Romans 7:7, “For I had not known concupiscence,” says: “The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil.” Now the law seems to forbid especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written ( Exodus 20:17): “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods.” Therefore the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is a general sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together with other special sins ( Romans 1:29), where it is written: “Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness” [Douay: ‘avarice’], etc.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(2) —

I answer that, Sins take their species from their objects, as stated above ( P(1), Q(72) , A(1) ). Now the object of a sin is the good towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind of sin.

Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good. And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man. Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an immoderate love of having possessions, which are comprised under the name of money, whence covetousness [avaritia] is denominated.

Since, however, the verb “to have,” which seems to have been originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in De Praedicamentis), consequently the term “covetousness” has been amplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that “covetousness is a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after.” In this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(2)- RO(2) —

All those external things that are subject to the uses of human life are comprised under the term “money,” inasmuch as they have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it is a special vice.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(2)- RO(3) —

This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is forbidden to covet another’s possessions it is also forbidden to covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(3) Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality?

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality. For Chrysostom, commenting on Matthew 5:6, “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that there are two kinds of justice, one general, and the other special, to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. v, 2).

Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man’s exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to justice and not to liberality.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; iv, 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Ecclesiastes 5:9): “A covetous man shall not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no fruits from them.”

Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in the desire of riches.

Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(3) —

I answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition and keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his due, by stealing or retaining another’s property. This is opposed to justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned ( Ezekiel 22:27): “Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood... and to run after gains through covetousness.”

Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In this way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these affections, as stated above ( Q(117), A(2), ad 3, A(3), ad 3, A(6) ). In this sense covetousness is spoken of ( 2 Corinthians 9:5): “That they would... prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a blessing, not as covetousness,” where a gloss observes: “Lest they should regret what they had given, and give but little.”

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is called illiberality [*\aneleutheria\] by the Philosopher.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(3)- RO(2) —

It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another’s property.

But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally in the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking and keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as these proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which latter depends on the rule of reason.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite vice: since it consists in having more than one ought according to justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(4) Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For no one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy of death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying ( Romans 1:29): “Being filled with all iniquity... fornication, covetousness [Douay: ‘avarice’],” etc. adds ( Romans 1:32): “They who do such things are worthy of death.” Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to one’s own inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil says (Serm. super. Luc. xii, 18): “It is the hungry man’s bread that thou keepest back, the naked man’s cloak that thou hoardest, the needy man’s money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as thou mightest succor.”

Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore is all covetousness a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace. But, according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom], “Lust for money brings darkness on the soul.” Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(4) —

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Corinthians 3:12, “If any man build upon this foundation,” says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that “he builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world, how he may please the world,” which pertains to the sin of covetousness. Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but venially, for it is said of him that “he shall be saved, yet so as by fire.”

Therefore covetousness is some times a venial sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(3) ) covetousness is twofold. In one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the unjust taking or retaining of another’s property, and this belongs to theft or robbery, which are mortal sins, as stated above ( Q(66) , AA(6),8 ). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above ( Q(66) , A(6), ad 3), when we were treating of theft.

In another way covetousness may be take as opposed to liberality: in which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly if the love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in such wise that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a mortal sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love stops short of this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he does not prefer the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling for the sake of riches to do anything in opposition to God or his neighbor, then covetousness is a venial sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Covetousness is numbered together with mortal sins, by reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is bound by a legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through fear of their want or on account of his having too much.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by preferring the love of riches to the love of God.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(5) Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins?

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For it is written (Ecclus. 10:9): “Nothing is more wicked than a covetous man,” and the text continues: “There is not a more wicked thing than to love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale.”

Tully also says (De Offic. i, under the heading, ‘True magnanimity is based chiefly on two things’): “Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to love money.” But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for Augustine says ( QQ(83), qu. 36) that “greed is the bane of charity.”

Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be most grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an incurable sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “old age and helplessness of any kind make men illiberal.” Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, the Apostle says ( Ephesians 5:5) that covetousness is “a serving of idols.” Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous sins. Therefore covetousness is also.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, according to Proverbs 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not the most grievous of sins.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(5) —

I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil, consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so far as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good. Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is committed against a man’s person, and after this comes a sin against external things, which are deputed to man’s use, and this seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be considered on the part of the good to which the human appetite is inordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods: since it is less than the good of the body, and this is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine good. From this point of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the human appetite is subjected even to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since, however, corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from that of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous of sins.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(5)- RO(1) —

These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Ecclus. 10:10) it is given as a reason that the covetous man “setteth his own soul to sale”; because, to wit, he exposes his soul — that is, his life — to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues: “Because while he liveth he hath cast away” — that is, despised — ”his bowels,” in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of a “narrow mind,” namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness: because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal good.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(5)- RO(3) —

The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns God’s mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby man’s sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one gives way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indication not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more dangerous.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(5)- RO(4) —

Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man, like the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use, not for worship.

Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as grievous a sin as idolatry.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(6) Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin?

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(6)- O(1) —

It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man’s body is disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle ( Corinthians 6:18), “He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body.” Now covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom. xxix in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil ( Mark 5) and was troubled in body.

Therefore covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among spiritual vices.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(6) —

I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure and sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are consummated in the carnal senses — for instance, the pleasures of the table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches. Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a bodily object.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Movement takes its species from the term “whereto” and not from the term “wherefrom.” Hence a vice of the flesh is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its originating in some defect of the flesh.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while the possessed man, of whom we read in Mark 5, stripped himself, the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(7) Whether covetousness is a capital vice?

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(7)- O(1) —

It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be reckoned a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, as stated above ( P(1), Q(84) , AA(3),4 ), those vices are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness: since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed to an end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that “covetousness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who, when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who, wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other people’s property.” Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among the capital vices.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(7) —

I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human life, as stated above ( P(1), Q(1) , AA(4),7,8 ): wherefore the more a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficing, else it would not set man’s appetite at rest, as the last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we “use money in token of taking possession of something,” and again it is written ( Ecclesiastes 10:19): “All things obey money.” Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money, is a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, because it regards money, which occupies a principal place among sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article.

On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “a prodigal man is a fool rather than a knave.”

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(7)- RO(2) —

It is true that money is directed to something else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising sometimes out of other vices, as stated above ( Q(36) , A(4), ad 1; P(1), Q(84) , A(4) ), provided that itself be frequently the source of others.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8) Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness?

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8)- O(1) —

It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as commonly stated, namely, “treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy.” For covetousness is opposed to liberality, as stated above ( A(3) ). Now treachery, fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion, restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved object, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have no connection with covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one’s neighbor.

Therefore they should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine daughters of covetousness; which are “lying, fraud, theft, perjury, greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity, rapacity.” Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8)- O(4) —

Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality, for he speaks of those who are “sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints [*\kyminopristes\], misers [*\kimbikes\], who do illiberal deeds,” and of those who “batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers of the dead, and robbers.” Therefore it seems that the aforesaid enumeration is insufficient.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8)- O(5) —

Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “tyrants who destroy cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal,” i.e. covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the daughters mentioned above.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8) —

I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now since covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this respect covetousness gives rise to “insensibility to mercy,” because, to wit, a man’s heart is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with his riches [*See Q(30) , A(1) ]. In the second place it belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought [affectu]. In this way it gives rise to “restlessness,” by hindering man with excessive anxiety and care, for “a covetous man shall not be satisfied with money” ( Ecclesiastes 5:9).

Secondly, it may be considered in the execution [effectu]. In this way the covetous man, in acquiring other people’s goods, sometimes employs force, which pertains to “violence,” sometimes deceit, and then if he has recourse to words, it is “falsehood,” if it be mere words, “perjury” if he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we have “fraud”; if persons, then we have “treachery,” as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8)- RO(1) —

There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to have species.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8)- RO(2) —

These three are distinguished as stated in the Article.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8)- RO(3) —

These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as insensibility to mercy.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8)- RO(4) —

The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives but little he is said to be “sparing”; if nothing, he is “tightfisted”: if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be \kyminopristes\ [skinflint], a cumin-seller, as it were, because he makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to make little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means, whether by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the dead, or by preying on one’s friends, as gamblers do.

P(2b)- Q(118)- A(8)- RO(5) —

Just as liberality is about moderate sums of money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.

QUESTION OF PRODIGALITY (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness? (2) Whether prodigality is a sin? (3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, opposites relate to one same thing.

But covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as stated above ( P(1), Q(62) , A(3) ). Now prodigality seems always to be directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated ( Luke 15:13) of the prodigal son that he “wasted his substance living riotously.” Therefore it seems that prodigality is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness and liberality.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we give here the name of covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(1) —

I answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and prodigality differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful of them than he ought: and as regards external action, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in retaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be “prodigal,” while he who is deficient in giving is said to be “covetous.” Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of necessity, since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Prodigality regards passions in respect of money, not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) “that many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate.”

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 6:10): “Covetousness [Douay: ‘desire of money’] is the root of all evils.” But it is not the root of prodigality, since this is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 6:17,18): “Charge the rich of this world... to give easily, to communicate to others.” Now this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming to the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord ( Matthew 6:34), “Be not... solicitous for tomorrow,” and ( Matthew 19:21), “Sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast, and give to the poor.” Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), the opposition between prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either of which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and sinful through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that prodigality is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Some expound this saying of the Apostle as referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual covetousness, which is the concupiscence of the “fomes” [*Cf. P(1), Q(81) , A(3), ad 2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of riches, for he had said previously ( Timothy 6:9): “They that will become rich,” etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be “the root of all evils,” not that all evils always arise from covetousness, but because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in order to curry favor with certain persons from whom he may receive riches.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does not do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), “his giving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought to be.

For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor, namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give nothing.”

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not in the total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought to be given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those who give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ, and banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are not prodigal but perfectly liberal.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(3) Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness?

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “the wasting of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an undoing of his very being.” Now he that injures himself sins more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5, “He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?”

Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1).

Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated above ( Q(56) , A(1), ad 1; P(1), Q(61) , A(2), ad 1). Now prodigality is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written ( Proverbs 21:20): “There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it”: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that “it is the mark of a fool to give too much and receive nothing.” Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that “the prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man.”

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(3) —

I answer that, Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving, wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 6.

Thirdly, because prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is opposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want, since much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is not easily cured, for the reason given above ( Q(118), A(5), ad 3).

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The difference between the prodigal and the covetous man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending that which is his, and his means of support, and against others by spending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church’s goods, that belong to the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like manner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency in spending: wherefore it is written ( Ecclesiastes 6:2): “A man to whom God hath given riches... yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof.”

Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he injures both himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his own goods for his own profit.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(3)- RO(2) —

In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend too much for the sake of intemperance points already to several additional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others.

P(2b)- Q(119)- A(3)- RO(3) —

All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.

QUESTION OF “EPIKEIA” OR EQUITY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider “epikeia,” under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether “epikeia” is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a part of justice?

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(1) Whether “epikeia” (*\epieikeia\) is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that “epikeia” is not a virtue. For no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet “epikeia” does away with another virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore “epikeia” is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): “With regard to these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when they make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge must pronounce judgment not on them but according to them.” But seemingly “epikeia” pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems that the law should not be observed in some particular case. Therefore “epikeia” is a vice rather than a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, apparently it belongs to “epikeia” to consider the intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions, under Law i: “It is fitting and lawful that We alone should interpret between equity and law.” Therefore the act of “epikeia” is unlawful: and consequently “epikeia” is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(1), Q(96) , A(6) ), when we were treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned, are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to the common good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires deposits to be restored, because in the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes to be injurious — for instance, if a madman were to put his sword in deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to fight against his country. In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good.

This is the object of “epikeia” which we call equity. Therefore it is evident that “epikeia” is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(1)- RO(1) —

“Epikeia” does not set aside that which is just in itself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it ought to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought not to be followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions under Law v: “Without doubt he transgresses the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of the lawgiver.”

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(1)- RO(2) —

It would be passing judgment on a law to say that it was not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to be observed in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law, but on some particular contingency.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases where it is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the interpretation of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there is need, not of interpretation, but of execution.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(2) Whether “epikeia” is a part of justice?

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that “epikeia” is not a part of justice.

For, as stated above ( Q(58) , A(7) ), justice is twofold, particular and legal.

Now “epikeia” is not a part of particular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside that which is established by law.

Therefore it seems that “epikeia” is not a part of justice.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now “epikeia” seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as implied by its name: for it is derived from \epi\, i.e. “above,” and \dikaion\, i.e. “just.”

Therefore “epikeia” is not a part of justice.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it seems that “epikeia” is the same as modesty. For where the Apostle says ( Philippians 4:5), “Let your modesty be known to all men,” the Greek has \epieikeia\ [*\to epieikes\]. Now, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore “epikeia” is not a part of justice.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that “epikeia is a kind of justice.”

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(48) ), a virtue has three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and posteriority, as “being” of substance and accident.

Accordingly, “epikeia” is a part of justice taken in a general sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). Wherefore it is evident that “epikeia” is a subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of “epikeia.” Hence “epikeia” is by way of being a higher rule of human actions.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Epikeia corresponds properly to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it.

For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the lawgiver, which is of more account, then “epikeia” is the more important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then “epikeia” is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(2)- RO(2) —

As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), “epikeia is better than a certain,” namely, legal, “justice,” which observes the letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all justice.

P(2b)- Q(120)- A(2)- RO(3) —

It belongs to “epikeia” to moderate something, namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man’s outward life — for instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term \epieikeia\ is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation.

QUESTION OF PIETY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely, piety.

Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost? (2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(1) Whether piety is a gift?

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ from the virtues, as stated above ( P(1), Q(68) , A(1) ). But piety is a virtue, as stated above ( Q(101), A(3) ). Therefore piety is not a gift.

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above all the moral virtues, as above ( P(1), Q(68) , A(8) ). Now among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a gift rather than piety.

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated above ( P(1), Q(68) , A(6) ). But the act of piety cannot remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that “piety fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy”: and so there will be no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q(30) , A(1) ]. Therefore piety is not a gift.

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: ‘godliness’] [*”Pietas,” whence our English word “pity,” which is the same as mercy.]

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(1) — I answer that, As stated above ( P(1), Q(68) , A(1) ; P(1), Q(69) , AA(1),3 ), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial affection towards God, according to Romans 8:15, “You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father).”

And since it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one’s father, it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost’s instigation, we pay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as Father.

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(1)- RO(2) —

To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one’s father in the flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the gift of piety is greater than religion.

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on account of their being related to his father so by the gift of piety he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii). Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness. And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the Day of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, “Behold how they are numbered among the children of God.” The saints will also mutually honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day, the saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state.

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(2) Whether the second beatitude, “Blessed are the meek,” corresponds to the gift of piety?

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that the second beatitude, “Blessed are the meek,” does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude, “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” or the fifth beatitude, “Blessed are the merciful,” since as stated above ( A(1), O(3) ), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety.

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts (Isaiah 11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since, then, the third beatitude, “Blessed are they that mourn,” corresponds to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude corresponds to piety.

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and gifts, as stated above ( P(1), Q(70) , A(2) ). Now among the fruits, goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not correspond to the gift of piety.

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): “Piety is becoming to the meek.”

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(2) —

I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore he assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the second beatitude, “Blessed are the meek,” to piety, and so on. Another congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to the gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the second. Yet the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to knowledge and piety: but taking them according to their order, different beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity may be observed, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(121)- A(2)- RO(3) —

In the fruits goodness and benignity may be directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.

QUESTION OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice? (2) Of the first precept of the decalogue; (3) Of the second; (4) Of the third; (5) Of the fourth; (6) Of the other six.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is “to make the citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 1.

Wherefore, according to Ethic. v, 1, “the law prescribes about all acts of all virtues.” Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first. principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially the judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as stated above ( P(1), Q(99) , A(4) ). But the precepts of the decalogue are moral precepts, as stated above ( P(1), Q(100), A(3) ).

Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do not properly belong to justice.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them.

Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(1) —

I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at once, as to principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, appears in justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters that refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another that which is his due.

Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice.

Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining are about justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one’s neighbor, just as the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Things that concern the common good must needs be administered in different ways according to the difference of men.

Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the decalogue, but among the judicial precepts.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(1)- RO(4) —

The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as their end, according to 1 Timothy 1:5, “The end of the commandment is charity”: but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer immediately to acts of justice.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(2) Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his father in the flesh, according to Hebrews 12:9, “How much more shall we [Vulg.: ‘shall we not much more’] obey the Father of spirits and live?”

Now the precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed affirmatively in these words: “Honor thy father and thy mother.” Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, whereby all honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is naturally prior to negation.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to religion, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now religion, since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are forbidden: since we read first: “Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me”; secondly, “Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing”; and thirdly, “Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them.” Therefore the first precept is unfittingly expressed.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that “the first precept forbids the sin of superstition.” But there are many wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above ( Q(92) , A(2) ).

Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(2) —

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(2) —

I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the order of generation, the order, to wit, of man’s becoming good. Now two things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and in building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes good use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end. Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is the last end of man’s will.

The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, according to Jeremiah 4:3, “Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon thorns.” Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, according to Matthew 6:24, “You cannot serve God and mammon.” Therefore in the first precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In point of fact there is one affirmative precept about religion, namely: “Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day.” Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(2)- RO(2) —

People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For some served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images. Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped gods without using images: and this worship is first forbidden by the words, “Thou shalt not have strange gods.” Among others the worship of false gods was observed by using certain images: and so the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, “Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing,” as also the worship of those same images, by the words, “Thou shalt not adore them,” etc.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(2)- RO(3) —

All other kinds of superstition proceed from some compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood to be forbidden by the words, “Thou shalt not have strange gods.”

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3) Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For this precept, “Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain” is thus explained by a gloss on Exodus 20:7: “Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature,” so that it forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Deuteronomy 5:11, “Thou shalt not take the name of... thy God in vain,” adds, i.e. “by giving the name of God to wood or stone,” as though they forbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief. Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion.

Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, whereby superstition is forbidden.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes — for instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Colossians 3:17, “All whatsoever you do in word or in work... do ye in the name of the Lord.” Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of God’s name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded it.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, a gloss on Exodus 20:7 expounds the precept, “Thou shalt not take the name of... thy God in vain,” namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden them.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult to God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and other like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, God’s names are many. Therefore it should not have been said indefinitely: “Thou shalt not take the name of... thy God in vain.”

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3) —

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3) —

I answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue it is necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition.

Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated above ( Q(97) , in the preamble, and in the Article that follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing man from acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and when a man’s mind is engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, according to Isaiah 28:20, “The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out,” i.e. either the true God or a false god must fall out from man’s heart, “and a short covering cannot cover both.” On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from honoring God after he has acknowledged Him.

Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him we have acknowledged.

For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3)- RO(1) —

These expositions are mystical. The literal explanation is that which is given Deuteronomy 5:11: “Thou shalt not take the name of... thy God in vain,” namely, “by swearing on that which is not [*Vulg.: ‘for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon a vain thing’].”

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3)- RO(2) —

This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of God, but properly the taking of God’s name in confirmation of a man’s word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God’s name more frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the explanation quoted in the First Objection.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3)- RO(3) —

To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called perjury, as stated above ( Q(98) , A(1), ad 3). For when a man swears to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is not supported by the truth. on the other hand, when a man swears without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the swearer.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law, which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the latter sin.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(3)- RO(5) —

Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: “Thou shalt not take the name of... thy God in vain”: since it matters not in which of God’s names perjury is committed.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(4) Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is fittingly expressed?

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed. For this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in commenting on Luke 13:14, “The ruler of the synagogue being angry that He had healed on the Sabbath,” says (Comment. iv): “The Law forbids, not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works,” i.e. “to burden oneself with sin.” Taken literally it is a ceremonial precept, for it is written ( Exodus 31:13): “See that you keep My Sabbath: because it is a sign between Me and you in your generations.” Now the precepts of the decalogue are both spiritual and moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain “sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances,” as stated above ( P(1), Q(101), A(4) ). Now sacred things comprised not only sacred days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover, there were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention only that of the Sabbath.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins. But in the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did not sin — for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth day, and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also Elias ( 1 Kings 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of God, Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who carried the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Joshua 7, must be understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is written ( Luke 13:15): “Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or his ass... and lead them to water?”

Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be observed also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord’s day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many like things.

Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is unfittingly expressed.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(4) —

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(4) —

I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being removed by the first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above ( AA(2),3 ), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby man is established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give worship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is external worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And since for the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, consisting in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law as necessary respecting the exterior worship that consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the decalogue are, so to speak, first and common principles of the Law, and consequently the third precept of the decalogue describes the exterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns all.

This universal boon was the work of the Creation of the world, from which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh day: and sign of this we are commanded to keep holy seventh day — that is, to set it aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath the reason for it is given: “For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth... and rested on the seventh day.”

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, understood literally, is partly oral and partly ceremonial. It is a moral precept in the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to be given to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as refreshment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the dictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual refreshment, by which man’s mind is refreshed in God. And thus to have a certain time set aside for occupying oneself with Divine things is the matter of a moral precept. But, in so far as this precept specializes the time as a sign representing the Creation of the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its allegorical signification, as representative of Christ’s rest in the tomb on the seventh day: also in its moral signification, as representing cessation from all sinful acts, and the mind’s rest in God, in which sense, too, it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its analogical signification, as foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath is placed among the precepts of the decalogue, as a moral, but not as a ceremonial precept.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of certain particular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is representative of a general boon, namely, the production of all creatures.

Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the general precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial precept of the Law.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of the Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy himself with Divine things, and is signified in the words: “Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day.” For in the Law those things are said to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other thing is cessation from work, and is signified in the words ( Exodus 20:11), “On the seventh day... thou shalt do no work.” The kind of work meant appears from Leviticus 23:3, “You shall do no servile work on that day [*Vulg.: ‘You shall do no work on that day’].” Now servile work is so called from servitude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby man is the servant of sin, according to John 8:34, “Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin,” and in this sense all sinful acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves another. Now one man serves another not with his mind but with his body, as stated above ( Q(104), AA(5),6 , ad 1). Wherefore in this respect those works are called servile whereby one man serves another. The third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work of worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work. In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath day, because that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath observance: since man abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in order that he may occupy himself with works connected with God’s service. For this reason, according to John 7:23, “a man [*Vulg.: ‘If a man,’ etc.] receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not be broken”: and for this reason too we read ( Matthew 12:5), that “on the Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath,” i.e. do corporal works on the Sabbath, “and are without blame.” Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner it is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing.

Wherefore a gloss on Numbers 28 says that “smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does not cease from his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, and are without blame.” On the other hand, those works that are called servile in the first or second way are contrary to the observance of the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder man from applying himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered from applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast day is more against this precept than to do some other but lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says (De decem chord. iii): “It would be better if the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent his time seditiously in the theatre: and their womenfolk would do better to be making linen on the Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the new moon.” It is not, however, against this precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy holiness.

Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of God, are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly to servants; while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they are common to those who serve and those who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries both for himself and for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the well-being of the body, according to Proverbs 24:11, “Deliver them that are led to death”: secondarily as regards avoiding damage to one’s property, according to Deuteronomy 22:1, “Thou shalt not pass by if thou seest thy brother’s ox or his sheep go astray, but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother.”

Hence a corporal work pertaining to the preservation of one’s own bodily well-being does not profane the Sabbath: for it is not against the observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such things as preserve the health of the body. For this reason the Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they fought in self-defense on the Sabbath day (1 Macc. 2), nor Elias when he fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For this same reason our Lord ( Matthew 12:3) excused His disciples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need which they suffered. In like manner a bodily work that is directed to the bodily well-being of another is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is written ( John 7:23): “Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath day?”

And again, a bodily work that is done to avoid an imminent damage to some external thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says ( Matthew 12:11): “What man shall there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up?”

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(4)- RO(4) —

In the New Law the observance of the Lord’s day took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the precept but by the institution of the Church and the custom of Christian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the observance of the Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work on the Lord’ day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and certain works are permitted on the Lord’s day which were forbidden on the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again in the New Law, dispensation is more easily granted than in the Old, in the matter of certain forbidden works, on account of their necessity, because the figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is unlawful to omit even in small things; while works, considered in themselves, are changeable in point of place and time.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(5) Whether the fourth precept, about honoring one’s parents, is fittingly expressed?

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one’s parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining to piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance, gratitude, and others of which we have spoken ( QQ(101),102, seq.). Therefore it seems that there should not have been given a special precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, piety pays worship not only to one’s parents, but also to one’s country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the well-wishers of our country, as stated above ( Q(101), AA(1),2 ).

Therefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the honoring of one’s father and mother.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also support. Therefore the mere honoring of one’s parents is unfittingly prescribed.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die young, and on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time. Therefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the promise, “That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth.”

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(5) —

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(5) —

I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our neighbors, we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately after the precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the precept directing us to our parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle: so that this precept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the First Table.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(5)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( Q(101), A(2) ), piety directs us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common to all. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are general precepts, they ought to contain some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of justice, which regard some special debt.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The debt to one’s parents precedes the debt to one’s kindred and country since it is because we are born of our parents that our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct man to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred. Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is understood to command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as secondary matter included in the principal matter.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Reverential honor is due to one’s parents as such, whereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for instance, because they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as stated above ( Q(101), A(2) ). And since that which belongs to a thing by nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among the first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of the decalogue, there is a special precept of honoring our parents: and this honor, as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and whatever else is due to our parents.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(5)- RO(4) —

A long life is promised to those who honor their parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present life, according to the saying of the Apostle ( 1 Timothy 4:8): “Piety [Douay: ‘godliness’] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come.”

And with reason. Because the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain congruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and he who is ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of bodily life to our parents after God: wherefore he that honors his parents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful for that favor: while he that honors not his parents deserves to be deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. However, present goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above ( P(1), Q(114), A(12) ). Wherefore sometimes in accordance with the hidden design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the future reward, some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner deprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their parents, live longer.

P(2b)- Q(122)- A(6) Whether the other six precepts of the decalogue are fittingly expressed?