QUESTIONS 115-117 QUESTION OF FLATTERY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: (1) Flattery, and (2) Quarreling.

Concerning flattery there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether flattery is a sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(1) Whether flattery is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, according to Proverbs 31:28, “Her children rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her.”

Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to Corinthians 10:33, “I... in all things please all men.” Therefore flattery is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise. But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, detraction is contrary to flattery.

Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against flattery. “It must be observed,” says he, “that by the wonderful moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by detractions but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may humble.” But detraction is an evil, as stated above ( Q(73) , AA(2),3 ). Therefore flattery is a good.

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(1) —

On the contrary, A gloss on Ezekiel 13:18, “Woe to them that sew cushions under every elbow,” says, “that is to say, sweet flattery.” Therefore flattery is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(114), A(1), ad 3), although the friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing, and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere intention of pleasing he is said to be “complaisant,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of making some gain out of it, he is called a “flatterer” or “adulator.” As a rule, however, the term “flattery” is wont to be applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their fellows.

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(1)- RO(1) —

One may praise a person both well and ill, according as one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while observing other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person by praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since perhaps they are evil, according to Psalm 9:24, “The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul”; or they may be uncertain, according to Ecclus. 27:8, “Praise not a man before he speaketh,” and again (Ecclus. 11:2), “Praise not a man for his beauty”; or because there may be fear lest human praise should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written, (Ecclus. 11:30), “Praise not any man before death.” Again, in like manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster charity, so that he may make spiritual progress therein.

But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil, according to Psalm 52:6, “God hath scattered the bones of them that please men,” and according to the words of the Apostle ( Galatians 1:10), “If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ.”

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good.

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which is contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as regards the end.

Because flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(2) Whether flattery is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), “a thing is evil because it is harmful.” But flattery is most harmful, according to Psalm 9:24, “For the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the Lord.”

Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant): “Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery”: and a gloss on Psalm 69:4, “Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that say to me: ‘Tis well, ‘Tis well,” says: “The tongue of the flatterer harms more than the sword of the persecutor.” Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin.

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less than others: wherefore it is written ( Psalm 36:15): “Let their sword enter into their own hearts.” Now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally: hence a gloss on <19E005> Psalm 140:5, “Let not the oil of the sinner fatten my head,” says: “The false praise of the flatterer softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders it susceptive of vice.” Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in himself.

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it is written in the Decretals (D.

XLVI, Cap. 3): “The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and treachery shall be degraded from his office.” Now such a punishment as this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, “if one desire to flatter any person of higher standing, whether of one’s own choice, or out of necessity.”

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(112), A(2) ), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another’s sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Isaiah 5:20. “Woe to you that call evil good.” Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one man flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written ( Proverbs 27:6): “Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy.” Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In this case it is necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall, as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal ( Q(43) , AA(3),4 ). If, however, one man flatters another from the mere craving to please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial sin.

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises another’s sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than the sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of greater consequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively, being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be a sufficient cause of another’s sinning, as was shown above ( Q(43) , A(1), ad 3; P(1), Q(73) , A(8), ad 3; P(1), Q(80) , A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(2)- RO(2) —

This argument applies to one that flatters with the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.

P(2b)- Q(115)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters another treacherously, in order to deceive him.

QUESTION OF QUARRELING (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship? (2) Of its comparison with flattery?

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(1) Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability?

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord, just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated above ( Q(37) , A(1) ). Therefore quarreling is also.

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Proverbs 26:21): “An angry man stirreth up strife.” Now anger is opposed to meekness.

Therefore strife or quarreling is also.

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( James 4:1): “From whence are wars and quarrels [Douay: ‘contentions’] among you? Are they not hence, from your concupiscences which war in your members?”

Now it would seem contrary to temperance to follow one’s concupiscences. Therefore it seems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship (Ethic. iv, 6).

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(1) —

I answer that, Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely, one person contradicts another’s words. Now two things may be observed in this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity. Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being a person to whom someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarreling, which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or affability, to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that “those who are opposed to everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody, are said to be peevish and quarrelsome.”

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Contention pertains rather to the contradiction of discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the intention of displeasing.

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The direct opposition of virtues to vices depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from many causes, but on the species of their acts. And although quarreling arises at times from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence it does not follow that it is directly opposed to meekness.

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(1)- RO(3) —

James speaks there of concupiscence considered as a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Romans 7:7 says: “The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil.”

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(2) Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery?

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin does the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than quarreling, for it is written ( Isaiah 3:12): “O My people, they that call thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps.”

Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another: whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts openly.

Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a flatterer than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous sin than flattery.

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written ( Timothy 3:2,3) that it “behooveth a bishop to be... not quarrelsome”; and ( 2 Timothy 3:24): “The servant of the Lord must not wrangle.”

Therefore quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(2) —

I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In one way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as regards certain external motives, and thus flattery sometimes more grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up the speaker to contempt.

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly. Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a more grievous sin than theft, as stated above ( Q(66) , A(9) ).

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(2)- RO(2) —

In human acts, the more grievous is not always the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason: wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem to arise from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason, although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding from greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.

P(2b)- Q(116)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As stated in the objection, shame regards the vileness of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more grievous.

QUESTION OF LIBERALITY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely, covetousness and prodigality.

Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether liberality is a virtue? (2) What is its matter? (3) Of its act; (4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take? (5) Whether liberality is a part of justice? (6) Of its comparison with other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(1) Whether liberality is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination for one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), “it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things.” Therefore liberality is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in Ethic. i, 8.

Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic. iv, 1) that “he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but to give it away.”

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues: since many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing to give; and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise. Therefore liberality is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “the Gospel contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated.” Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. Therefore liberality is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(1) —

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), “it belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill.” Now we may use both well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as the powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are without, such as the things of this world that are granted us for our livelihood.

Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(1)- RO(1) —

According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp.) and Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to some, in order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship.

But it suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal man commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): “It is a commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them to be in want.”

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(1)- RO(2) —

It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “the liberal man does not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people”; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “Our Lord does not wish a man to pour out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he do as Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by any household cares.” For this belongs to the state of perfection, of which we shall speak farther on ( Q(184), Q(186), A(3) ).

It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one’s possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is directed to happiness.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), “those who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal”; and likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i): “If you assist to rob others of their possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than of pity.” Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend much on certain evil works, are not liberal.

Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good uses, without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform works of other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not in the same way as virtuous people, as stated above ( P(1), Q(65) , A(1) ). In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal, although he be poor.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): “Liberality is proportionate to a man’s substance,” i.e. his means, “for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the giver”: and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “it is the heart that makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value.”

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(2) Whether liberality is about money?

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that liberality is not about money.

For every moral virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to justice to be about operations, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is about passions and not about money.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any kind of wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial riches, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5,6). Therefore liberality is not chiefly about money.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, different virtues have different matter, since habits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are the matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they are not the matter of liberality.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money.”

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(2) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it belongs to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is also called open-handedness [largitas], because that which is open does not withhold things but parts of them. The term “liberality” seems also to allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees it [liberat], so to speak, from his keeping and ownership, and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things which are the subject of a man’s free-handedness towards others are the goods he possesses, which are denoted by the term “money.” Therefore the proper matter of liberality is money.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(2)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( A(1), ad 3), liberality depends not on the quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart of the giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire, and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things given.

Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of liberality, while exterior money is the object of those same passions.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(2)- RO(2) —

As Augustine says in his book De Disciplina Christi (Tract. de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth, and whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of “‘pecunia’ [money], because in olden times men’s possessions consisted entirely of ‘pecora’ [flocks].” And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): “We give the name of money to anything that can be valued in currency.”

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Justice establishes equality in external things, but has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of internal passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of liberality, and in another way of justice.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(3) Whether using money is the act of liberality?

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that using money is not the act of liberality. For different virtues have different acts. But using money is becoming to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence. Therefore it is not the proper act of liberality.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it but also in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the spender, and consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says (De Benef. v): “A man is not liberal by giving to himself.” Therefore not every use of money belongs to liberality.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): “In whatever matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter: Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the best use of riches.” Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good use of money is the act of liberality.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(3) —

I answer that, The species of an act is taken from its object, as stated above ( P(1), Q(18) , A(2) ). Now the object or matter of liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the foregoing Article (ad 2). And since every virtue is consistent with its object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful goods, since all external goods are directed to man’s use. Hence the proper act of liberality is making use of money or riches.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(3)- RO(1) —

It belongs to liberality to make good use of riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On the other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under another aspect, namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing is due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for the fulfilment of some great deed.

Hence magnificence stands in relation to liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall explain farther on ( Q(134) ).

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(3)- RO(2) —

It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make good use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide opportunities for that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier’s fortitude not only to wield his sword against the foe, but also to sharpen his sword and keep it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to use money, but also to keep it in preparation and safety in order to make fitting use of it.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(3)- RO(3) —

As stated ( A(2), ad 1), the internal passions whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man should not be prevented from making any due use of money through an inordinate affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one consists in applying it to one’s own use, and would seem to come under the designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts. Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an immoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from making suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with giving and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). The saying of Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving: for a man is not said to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to himself.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(4) Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give?

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that it does not belong to a liberal man chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral virtues, is regulated by prudence. Now it seems to belong very much to prudence that a man should keep his riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “those who have not earned money, but have received the money earned by others, spend it more liberally, because they have not experienced the want of it.” Therefore it seems that giving does not chiefly belong to the liberal man.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, no man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to do, nor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal man is sometimes sorry for what he has given, nor does he give to all, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, in order to accomplish what he intends chiefly, a man employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal man is not a beggar, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he might provide himself with the means of giving to others. Therefore it seems that he does not chiefly aim at giving.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, man is bound to look after himself rather than others. But by spending he looks after himself, whereas by giving he looks after others. Therefore it belongs to a liberal man to spend rather than to give.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “it belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving.”

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(4) —

I answer that, It is proper to a liberal man to use money. Now the use of money consists in parting with it. For the acquisition of money is like generation rather than use: while the keeping of money, in so far as it is directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a habit. Now in parting with a thing — for instance, when we throw something — the farther we put it away the greater the force [virtus] employed. Hence parting with money by giving it to others proceeds from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves. But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more perfect, since “virtue is a kind of perfection” (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(4)- RO(1) —

It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest it be stolen or spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is not less but more prudent than to keep it usefully: since more things have to be considered in money’s use, which is likened to movement, than in its keeping, which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received money that others have earned, spend it more liberally, through not having experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the sole cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue of liberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely removes the impediment to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to act liberally, because, not unfrequently, the fear of want that results from the experience of want hinders those who have acquired money from using it up by acting with liberality; as does likewise the love they have for it as being their own effect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1).

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(4)- RO(2) —

As stated in this and the preceding Article, it belongs to liberality to make fitting use of money, and consequently to give it in a fitting manner, since this is a use of money. Again, every virtue is grieved by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids whatever hinders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable giving; namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given, and giving something unsuitably.

Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at both: but especially at the former, since it is more opposed to his proper act. For this reason, too, he does not give to all: since his act would be hindered were he to give to everyone: for he would not have the means of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him to give.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Giving and receiving are related to one another as action and passion. Now the same thing is not the principle of both action and passion. Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving, it does not belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and still less to beg. Hence the verse: ‘In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many Should give often, take seldom, ask never.’ But he makes provision in order to give certain things according as liberality requires; such are the fruits of his own possessions, for he is careful about realizing them that he may make a liberal use thereof.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(4)- RO(4) —

To spend on oneself is an inclination of nature; hence to spend money on others belongs properly to a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(5) Whether liberality is a part of justice?

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(5)- O(1) —

It seems that liberality is not a part of justice.

For justice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing is due the less liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is not a part of justice, but is incompatible with it.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, justice is about operation as stated above ( Q(58) , A(9) ; P(1), Q(60) , AA(2),3 ): whereas liberality is chiefly about the love and desire of money, which are passions. Therefore liberality seems to belong to temperance rather than to justice.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to give becomingly, as stated ( A(4) ). But giving becomingly belongs to beneficence and mercy, which pertain to charity, as state above ( QQ(30),31 ).

Therefore liberality is a part of charity rather than of justice.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): “Justice has to do with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is divided into two parts, justice and beneficence, also called liberality or kind-heartedness.” Therefore liberality pertains to justice.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(5) —

I answer that, Liberality is not a species of justice, since justice pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another what is one’s own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees with justice: first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as justice is; secondly, that it is concerned with external things, and so is justice, albeit under a different aspect, a stated in this Article and above ( A(2), ad 3). Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to a principal virtue.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Although liberality does no consider the legal due that justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due is based on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it answers to the idea of due in the lowest degree.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the body. But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to the body but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly pertain to temperance.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(5)- RO(3) —

The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the fact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom he gives: wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But the giving of liberality arises from a person being affected in a certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his friends but also to those whom he knows not. Hence it belong not to charity, but to justice, which is about external things.

P(2b)- Q(117)- A(6) Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues?