QUESTIONS 57-62 QUESTION OF RIGHT (FOUR ARTICLES)

After considering prudence we must in due sequence consider justice, the consideration of which will be fourfold: (1) Of justice; (2) Of its parts; (3) Of the corresponding gift; (4) Of the precepts relating to justice.

Four points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2) Justice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether right is the object of justice? (2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive right? (3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right? (4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species?

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(1) Whether right is the object of justice?

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that right is not the object of justice. For the jurist Celsus says [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1] that “right is the art of goodness and equality.” Now art is not the object of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore right is not the object of justice.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, “Law,” according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), “is a kind of right.” Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence, wherefore the Philosopher [*Ethic. vi, 8] reckons “legislative” as one of the parts of prudence. Therefore right is not the object of justice.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that “justice is love serving God alone, and consequently governing aright all things subject to man.” Now right [jus] does not pertain to Divine things, but only to human affairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that “‘fas’ is the Divine law, and ‘jus,’ the human law.” Therefore right is not the object of justice.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that “‘jus’ [right] is so called because it is just.” Now the “just” is the object of justice, for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that “all are agreed in giving the name of justice to the habit which makes men capable of doing just actions.”

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(1) —

I answer that, It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other hand the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit him in relation to himself.

Accordingly that which is right in the works of the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue tends as to its proper object, depends on its relation to the agent only, whereas the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to the agent, is set up by its relation to others. Because a man’s work is said to be just when it is related to some other by way of some kind of equality, for instance the payment of the wage due for a service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as having the rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act of justice, without taking into account the way in which it is done by the agent: whereas in the other virtues nothing is declared to be right unless it is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason justice has its own special proper object over and above the other virtues, and this object is called the just, which is the same as “right.” Hence it is evident that right is the object of justice.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(1)- RO(1) —

It is usual for words to be distorted from their original signification so as to mean something else: thus the word “medicine” was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a sick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this is done. In like manner the word “jus” [right] was first of all used to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to designate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further to denote the place where justice is administered, thus a man is said to appear “in jure” [*In English we speak of a court of law, a barrister at law, etc.], and yet further, we say even that a man, who has the office of exercising justice, administers the jus even if his sentence be unjust.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsman an expression of the things to be made externally by his craft, which expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists in the mind an expression of the particular just work which the reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this rule be expressed in writing it is called a “law,” which according to Isidore (Etym. v, 1) is “a written decree”: and so law is not the same as right, but an expression of right.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot offer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a perfectly just repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not properly called “jus” but “fas,” because, to wit, God is satisfied if we accomplish what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man repay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him entirely.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural right and positive right?

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that right is not fittingly divided into natural right and positive right. For that which is natural is unchangeable, and is the same for all. Now nothing of the kind is to be found in human affairs, since all the rules of human right fail in certain cases, nor do they obtain force everywhere. Therefore there is no such thing as natural right.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, a thing is called “positive” when it proceeds from the human will. But a thing is not just, simply because it proceeds from the human will, else a man’s will could not be unjust. Since then the “just” and the “right” are the same, it seems that there is no positive right.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, Divine right is not natural right, since it transcends human nature. In like manner, neither is it positive right, since it is based not on human, but on Divine authority. Therefore right is unfittingly divided into natural and positive.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “political justice is partly natural and partly legal,” i.e. established by law.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ) the “right” or the “just” is a work that is adjusted to another person according to some kind of equality. Now a thing can be adjusted to a man in two ways: first by its very nature, as when a man gives so much that he may receive equal value in return, and this is called “natural right.” In another way a thing is adjusted or commensurated to another person, by agreement, or by common consent, when, to wit, a man deems himself satisfied, if he receive so much. This can be done in two ways: first by private agreement, as that which is confirmed by an agreement between private individuals; secondly, by public agreement, as when the whole community agrees that something should be deemed as though it were adjusted and commensurated to another person, or when this is decreed by the prince who is placed over the people, and acts in its stead, and this is called “positive right.”

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(2)- RO(1) —

That which is natural to one whose nature is unchangeable, must needs be such always and everywhere. But man’s nature is changeable, wherefore that which is natural to man may sometimes fail. Thus the restitution of a deposit to the depositor is in accordance with natural equality, and if human nature were always right, this would always have to be observed; but since it happens sometimes that man’s will is unrighteous there are cases in which a deposit should not be restored, lest a man of unrighteous will make evil use of the thing deposited: as when a madman or an enemy of the common weal demands the return of his weapons.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The human will can, by common agreement, make a thing to be just provided it be not, of itself, contrary to natural justice, and it is in such matters that positive right has its place. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “in the case of the legal just, it does not matter in the first instance whether it takes one form or another, it only matters when once it is laid down.” If, however, a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the human will cannot make it just, for instance by decreeing that it is lawful to steal or to commit adultery. Hence it is written ( Isaiah 10:1): “Woe to them that make wicked laws.”

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The Divine right is that which is promulgated by God. Such things are partly those that are naturally just, yet their justice is hidden to man, and partly are made just by God’s decree. Hence also Divine right may be divided in respect of these two things, even as human right is. For the Divine law commands certain things because they are good, and forbids others, because they are evil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others evil because they are forbidden.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(3) Whether the right of nations is the same as the natural right?

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the right of nations is the same as the natural right. For all men do not agree save in that which is natural to them. Now all men agree in the right of nations; since the jurist [*Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] “the right of nations is that which is in use among all nations.” Therefore the right of nations is the natural right.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, slavery among men is natural, for some are naturally slaves according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2). Now “slavery belongs to the right of nations,” as Isidore states (Etym. v, 4).

Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, right as stated above ( A(2) ) is divided into natural and positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive right, since all nations never agreed to decree anything by common agreement.

Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that “right is either natural, or civil, or right of nations,” and consequently the right of nations is distinct from natural right.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ), the natural right or just is that which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with another person. Now this may happen in two ways; first, according as it is considered absolutely: thus a male by its very nature is commensurate with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent is commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a thing is naturally commensurate with another person, not according as it is considered absolutely, but according to something resultant from it, for instance the possession of property. For if a particular piece of land be considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should belong to one man more than to another, but if it be considered in respect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one and not of another man, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. ii, 2).

Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend a thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural, is common to us and other animals according to the first kind of commensuration. But the right of nations falls short of natural right in this sense, as the jurist [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] says because “the latter is common to all animals, while the former is common to men only.” On the other hand to consider a thing by comparing it with what results from it, is proper to reason, wherefore this same is natural to man in respect of natural reason which dictates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i, 9): “whatever natural reason decrees among all men, is observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations.” This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular man should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful to this man to be ruled by a wiser man, and to the latter to be helped by the former, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). Wherefore slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in the second way, but not in the first.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Since natural reason dictates matters which are according to the right of nations, as implying a proximate equality, it follows that they need no special institution, for they are instituted by natural reason itself, as stated by the authority quoted above

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(4) Whether paternal right and right of dominion should be distinguished as special species?

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that “paternal right” and “right of dominion” should not be distinguished as special species. For it belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, as Ambrose states (De Offic. i, 24). Now right is the object of justice, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore right belongs to each one equally; and we ought not to distinguish the rights of fathers and masters as distinct species.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the law is an expression of what is just, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2). Now a law looks to the common good of a city or kingdom, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(90) , A(2) ), but not to the private good of an individual or even of one household. Therefore there is no need for a special right of dominion or paternal right, since the master and the father pertain to a household, as stated in Polit. i, 2.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, there are many other differences of degrees among men, for instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to them.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) distinguishes right of dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct from civil right.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(4) —

I answer that, Right or just depends on commensuration with another person. Now “another” has a twofold signification. First, it may denote something that is other simply, as that which is altogether distinct; as, for example, two men neither of whom is subject to the other, and both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and between these according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is the “just” simply. Secondly a thing is said to be other from something else, not simply, but as belonging in some way to that something else: and in this way, as regards human affairs, a son belongs to his father, since he is part of him somewhat, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12, and a slave belongs to his master, because he is his instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 2 [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 11]. Hence a father is not compared to his son as to another simply, and so between them there is not the just simply, but a kind of just, called “paternal.” In like manner neither is there the just simply, between master and servant, but that which is called “dominative.” A wife, though she is something belonging to the husband, since she stands related to him as to her own body, as the Apostle declares ( Ephesians 5:28), is nevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his father, or a slave from his master: for she is received into a kind of social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for justice between husband and wife than between father and son, or master and slave, because, as husband and wife have an immediate relation to the community of the household, as stated in Polit. i, 2,5, it follows that between them there is “domestic justice” rather than “civic.”

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(4)- RO(1) —

It belongs to justice to render to each one his right, the distinction between individuals being presupposed: for if a man gives himself his due, this is not strictly called “just.” And since what belongs to the son is his father’s, and what belongs to the slave is his master’s, it follows that properly speaking there is not justice of father to son, or of master to slave.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(4)- RO(2) —

A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as such, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man, is something having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence in so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards them in a way: and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the relations of father to his son, and of a master to his slave; but in so far as each is something belonging to another, the perfect idea of “right” or “just” is wanting to them.

P(2b)- Q(57)- A(4)- RO(3) —

All other differences between one person and another in a state, have an immediate relation to the community of the state and to its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the perfect sense of justice. This “just” however is distinguished according to various offices, hence when we speak of “military,” or “magisterial,” or “priestly” right, it is not as though such rights fell short of the simply right, as when we speak of “paternal” right, or right of “dominion,” but for the reason that something proper is due to each class of person in respect of his particular office.

QUESTION OF JUSTICE (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) What is justice? (2) Whether justice is always towards another? (3) Whether it is a virtue? (4) Whether it is in the will as its subject? (5) Whether it is a general virtue? (6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every virtue? (7) Whether there is a particular justice? (8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own? (9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only? (10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean? (11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own? (12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1) Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined justice as being “the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right” [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10]. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a man “capable of doing what is just, and of being just in action and in intention.” Now “will” denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore justice is unfittingly defined as being a will.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the will were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is rectitude.

Therefore justice is not the will.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, no will is perpetual save God’s. If therefore justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say that it is both “perpetual” and “constant.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his right. Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows that it is in none but the sovereign: which is absurd.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(6) —

Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that “justice is love serving God alone.” Therefore it does not render to each one his right.

I answer that, The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on ( A(2) ). Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is indicated in the words, “Rendering to each one his right,” since, as Isidore says (Etym. x), “a man is said to be just because he respects the rights [jus] of others.”

Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be virtuous it needs first of all to be done “knowingly,” secondly to be done “by choice,” and “for a due end,” thirdly to be done “immovably.” Now the first of these is included in the second, since “what is done through ignorance is involuntary” (Ethic. iii, 1). Hence the definition of justice mentions first the “will,” in order to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is made afterwards of its “constancy” and “perpetuity” in order to indicate the firmness of the act.

Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that “justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will”: and this is about the same definition as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that “justice is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions in accordance with his choice.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that “faith is to believe what one sees not.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on the part of the will’s act which endures for ever, and thus God’s will alone is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject, because, to wit, a man wills to do a certain thing always. and this is a necessary condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in some particular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite that one should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all cases.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Since “perpetual” does not imply perpetuity of the act of the will, it is not superfluous to add “constant”: for while the “perpetual will” denotes the purpose of observing justice always, “constant” signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(5) —

A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of command and direction, because a judge is the “personification of justice,” and “the sovereign is its guardian” (Ethic. v, 4). On the other hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by way of execution.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(6) —

Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as stated above ( Q(25) , A(1) ), so too the service of God includes rendering to each one his due.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(2) Whether justice is always towards one another?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that justice is not always towards another. For the Apostle says ( Romans 3:22) that “the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ.” Now faith does not concern the dealings of one man with another. Neither therefore does justice.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), “it belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his authority over the things that are subject to him.” Now the sensitive appetite is subject to man, according to Genesis 4:7, where it is written: “The lust thereof,” viz. of sin, “shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it.” Therefore it belongs to justice to have dominion over one’s own appetite: so that justice is towards oneself.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else is co-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards another.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, man’s dealings with himself need to be rectified no less than his dealings with another. Now man’s dealings are rectified by justice, according to Proverbs 11:5, “The justice of the upright shall make his way prosperous.” Therefore justice is about our dealings not only with others, but also with ourselves.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that “the object of justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse.” Now this implies relationship of one man to another.

Therefore justice is concerned only about our dealings with others.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(57) , A(1) ) since justice by its name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above ( Q(57) , A(1) ; P(2a), Q(113), A(1) ) this otherness which justice demands must needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to supposits [*Cf.

P(1), Q(29) , A(2) ] and wholes and, properly speaking, not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed metaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this “metaphorical justice.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby the ungodly is justified it consists in the due coordination of the parts of the soul, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(113), A(1) ) where we were treating of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all by himself.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(2)- RO(3) —

God’s justice is from eternity in respect of the eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice consists); although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since nothing is co-eternal with God.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Man’s dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified by the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues.

But his dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special virtue, and this is justice.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(3) Whether justice is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is written ( Luke 17:10): “When you shall have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do.” Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): “We look to a profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of godliness.” Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice.

Therefore justice is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious. But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix) [*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a moral virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that “the entire structure of good works is built on four virtues,” viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice P(2b)- Q(58)- A(3) — I answer that, A human virtue is one “which renders a human act and man himself good” [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice. For a man’s act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man’s operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he says again (De Officiis i, 7) “the luster of virtue appears above all in justice.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(3)- RO(1) —

When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously.

Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom “teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in life.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Necessity is twofold. One arises from “constraint,” and this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other arises from the obligation of a “command,” or from the necessity of obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary in this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation, according to Corinthians 9:16, “If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Justice is concerned about external things, not by making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings with other men.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(4) Whether justice is in the will as its subject?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that justice is not in the will as its subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in the will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is “rational by participation,” viz. the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and concupiscible.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that “justice is rectitude of the will observed for its own sake.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(4) —

I answer that, The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in some appetitive power as its subject.

Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension, and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in the P(1), Q(81) , A(2) . Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above ( A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Since the will is the rational appetite, when the rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of truth.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The will is borne towards its object consequently on the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation to another, and this belongs to justice.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are “rational by participation,” but the entire “appetitive” faculty, as stated in Ethic. i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason. Now the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can be the subject of moral virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(5) Whether justice is a general virtue?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7, “She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude.” Now the “general” is not specified or reckoned together with the species contained under the same “general.” Therefore justice is not a general virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in any way be reckoned a general virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above ( A(2) ). But a sin committed against one’s neighbor cannot be a general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against oneself.

Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(5) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “justice is every virtue.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(5) —

I answer that, Justice, as stated above ( A(2) ) directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community.

Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the common good, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(90) , A(2) ), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called “legal justice,” because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Justice is specified or enumerated with the other virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state further on ( AA(7),12 ).

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite, viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are appetitive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the intellective appetite as its subject, which can have the universal good as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Things referable to oneself are referable to another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal justice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general sin; hence it is written ( 1 John 3:4) that all “sin is iniquity.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(6) Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but differ in their mode of being.” Now things that differ merely in their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore justice is essentially the same as every virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. 5:1) “is not a part but the whole of virtue.”

Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as all virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be directed to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the common good of the multitude, which transcends the good of one single individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(6)- O(4) —

Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that does not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good; and so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(6) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to be virtuous in matters relating to others,” and (Polit. iii, 2) that “the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good citizen.” Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby a man Is directed to the common good. Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and it is possible to have one without the other.

I answer that, A thing is said to be “general” in two ways. First, by “predication”: thus “animal” is general in relation to man and horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said to be general “virtually”; thus a universal cause is general in relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in this sense there is no need for that which is “general” to be essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said ( A(5) ), legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects.

However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks.

Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(6)- RO(3) —

This argument again takes legal justice for the virtue commanded by legal justice.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(6)- RO(4) —

Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act to that virtue’s proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a further end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to that end.

Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good; and this virtue is legal justice.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(7) Whether there is a particular besides a general justice?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that there is not a particular besides a general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is no need for a particular justice.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to “one” and “many.” But legal justice directs one man to another in matters relating to the multitude, as shown above ( AA(5),6 ).

Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man to another in matters relating to the individual.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, between the individual and the general public stands the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a legal justice.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Chrysostom in his commentary on Matthew 5:6, “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” says (Hom. xv in Matth.): “By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(7) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(6) ), legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a man immediately to the good of another individual.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(7)- RO(2) —

The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the “many” and the “few,” but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the “common” good differs from the aspect of the “individual” good, even as the aspect of “whole” differs from that of “part.” Wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that “they are wrong who maintain that the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and not specifically.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(7)- RO(3) —

The household community, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely “of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave,” in each of which one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice, viz. “domestic” justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 6.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(8) Whether particular justice has a special matter?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that particular justice has no special matter. Because a gloss on Genesis 2:14, “The fourth river is Euphrates,” says: “Euphrates signifies ‘fruitful’; nor is it stated through what country it flows, because justice pertains to all the parts of the soul.”

Now this would not be the case, if justice had a special matter, since every special matter belongs to a special power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that “the soul has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;” and he says that “the fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues.” Therefore particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no special matter.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and not special.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(8) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(8) —

I answer that, Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external actions, and also those external things of which man can make use. And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by means of which men can communicate with one another, that the relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we consider man’s rectitude in himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through them.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(8)- RO(1) —

It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not directly but by a kind of diffusion.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(8)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( P(2a), Q(61) , AA(3),4 ), the cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of virtue.

In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted: for he says that “prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures, fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with passing trials, justice is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between one man and another.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(8)- RO(3) —

A man’s internal passions which are a part of moral matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external actions, are capable of being directed to another man. Consequently it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(9) Whether justice is about the passions?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem that justice is about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that “moral virtue is about pleasure and pain.” Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions, as stated above [* P(2a), Q(23) , A(4) ; P(2a), Q(31) , A(1) ; P(2a), Q(35) , A(1) ] when we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral virtue, is about the passions.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man’s operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs be about the passions.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, even as particular justice is towards another person so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently about the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(9) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is about operations.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(9) —

I answer that, The true answer to this question may be gathered from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from the will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(22) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(59) , A(4) ), for it is only the sensitive appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the matter, because justice is about man’s relations with another, and we are not directed immediately to another by the internal passions. Therefore justice is not about the passions.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(9)- RO(1) —

Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), “pleasure and pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a good”: and in this way too they belong to justice, since “a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions” (Ethic. i, 8).

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(9)- RO(2) —

External operations are as it were between external things, which are their matter, and internal passions, which are their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may steal another’s property, not through the desire to have the thing, but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet another’s property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external things, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the passions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the passions. Hence justice hinders theft of another’s property, in so far as stealing is contrary to the, equality that should be maintained in external things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from an immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations take their species, not from the internal passions but from external things as being their objects, it follows that, external operations are essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral virtues.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(9)- RO(3) —

The common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to the common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions whereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than particular justice which is directed to the good of another individual: although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of their external operations, in so far, to wit, as “the law commands us to perform the actions of a courageous person... the actions of a temperate person... and the actions of a gentle person” (Ethic. v, 5).

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(10) - O(1) —

It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be “an elective habit which observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason.” Therefore justice observes the rational and not the real mean.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is clearly the case with the virtues, according to Ethic. ii, 6. Now justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in Ethic. 5:Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(10) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the mean of justice is to be taken according to “arithmetical” proportion, so that it is the real mean.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(10) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(9) ; P(2a), Q(59) , A(4) ), the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our regard.

On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person.

Now equality is the real mean between greater and less, as stated in Metaph. x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4]: wherefore justice observes the real mean.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(10) - RO(1) —

This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(10) - RO(2) —

We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways. First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good; and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is about things that are good simply.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(10) - RO(3) —

The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(11) Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(11) - O(1) —

It would seem that the act of justice is not to render to each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to justice the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we give them what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(11) - O(2) —

Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that “beneficence which we may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice.”

Now it pertains to liberality to give to another of one’s own, not of what is his. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(11) - O(3) —

Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute things duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder, adultery and so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his seems to belong solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act of justice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in rendering to each one his own.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(11) —

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): “It is justice that renders to each one what is his, and claims not another’s property; it disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(11) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(8),10 ), the matter of justice is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use by it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by justice. Now each man’s own is that which is due to him according to equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is nothing else than to render to each one his own.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(11) - RO(1) —

Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected with it, as we shall state further on ( Q(80) , A(1) ). Wherefore to succor the needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally beneficent, which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction ascribed to justice as to their principal virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(11) - RO(1) This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(11) - RO(3) —

As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of justice, the name of “profit” is extended to whatever is excessive, and whatever is deficient is called “loss.” The reason for this is that justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein those expressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred to all other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to each one of what is his own.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(12) Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(12) - O(1) —

It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of one’s own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a greater virtue than justice.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(12) - O(2) —

Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all the virtues, according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more excellent than justice.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(12) - O(3) —

Further, virtue is about that which is “difficult” and “good,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But fortitude is about more difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death, according to Ethic. iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent than justice.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(12) —

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): “Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(12) —

I answer that, If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person. In this sense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that “the most excellent of the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the evening or the morning star.” But, even if we speak of particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto appertain the passions which are the matter of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from the object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect of the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9): “The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace.”

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(12) - RO(1) —

Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which gives of a man’s own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each man what is his.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(12) - RO(2) —

When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the latter’s goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(58)- A(12) - RO(3) —

Although fortitude is about the most difficult things, it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.

QUESTION OF INJUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether injustice is a special vice? (2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds? (3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly? (4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(1) Whether injustice is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For it is written ( 1 John 3:4): “All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: ‘Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity’].” Now iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it is opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness, and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the will. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(1) —

I answer that, Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially a special vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the common good which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as regards the intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of sin.

Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the common good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose from injustice, in accord with what has been said above about justice ( Q(58) , AA(5),6 ). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a particular vice opposed to particular justice.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Even as legal justice is referred to human common good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to which all sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be iniquity.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both to justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways as stated above ( Q(58) , A(9), ad 2).

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The will, like the reason, extends to all moral matters, i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to another person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and the same applies to injustice.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(2) Whether a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing?

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(54) , A(2) ). Now the proper object of justice is the just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through doing an unjust thing.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man’s power to do suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not be false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he does an unjust thing.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that “a man may do an unjust thing without being unjust.”

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(2) —

I answer that, Even as the object of justice is something equal in external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal, through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him. To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of its proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the operation and its proper object. For the operation takes its species and name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in things directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is beside the intention.

Hence if a man do that which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is unjust: hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of a lack of proportion between the operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one’s complacency. In the latter case properly speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without having the habit of injustice.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(2)- RO(1) —

A habit is specified by its object in its direct and formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(2)- RO(2) —

It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The object of temperance is not something established externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance, i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like manner neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there is dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is similarity in all respects.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(3) Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For injustice is inequality, as stated above ( A(2) ). Now a man by injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another.

Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another. But whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. Therefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by himself.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a man suffers injustice voluntarily.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(3) —

On the contrary, To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will.

Therefore on the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(3) —

I answer that, Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent, whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys. iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he suffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a principle in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to be done involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally), or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to another more than he owes him).

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(3)- RO(1) —

When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality.

For a man’s ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by another’s action.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(3)- RO(2) —

An individual person may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin, intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person.

Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and image; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of the fornicator ( 1 Corinthians 3:17): “If any man violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy.”

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Suffering is the effect of external action. Now in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above ( A(2) ), and the formal and essential element is on the part of the will of agent and patient, as stated above ( A(2) ). Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(4) Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally?

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: “Whatever they do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter.” Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, charity is the “mother of all the virtues” [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary thereto that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to do an injustice.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on ( Q(64) , seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(12) , A(5) ), when we were treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(4)- RO(1) —

This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls “ignorance of particular circumstances” [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he who does an injustice through ignorance, does no injustice except accidentally, as stated above ( A(2) )

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(4)- RO(2) — He who does an injustice in small matters falls short of the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he does may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is not hurt or displeased.

P(2b)- Q(59)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The sins which are contrary to the other virtues are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.

QUESTION OF JUDGMENT (SIX ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether judgment is an act of justice? (2) Whether it is lawful to judge? (3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions? (4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably? (5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written law? (6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice. The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that “everyone judges well of what he knows,” so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty. Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. Therefore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which is in the will, as stated above ( Q(58) , A(4) ).

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 2:15): “The spiritual man judgeth all things.” Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue of charity, which “is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us” ( Romans 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity rather than to justice.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its proper matter, because “the virtuous man is the rule and measure in everything,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4).

Therefore judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral virtues.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then judges are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the proper act of justice.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 93:15): “Until justice be turned into judgment.”

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(1) —

I answer that, Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such. Now a judge [judex] is so called because he asserts the right [jus dicens] and right is the object of justice, as stated above ( Q(57) , A(1) ). Consequently the original meaning of the word “judgment” is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about matters relating to chastity.

Therefore judgment, which denotes a right decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that “men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice.”

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The word “judgment,” from its original meaning of a right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is an act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or define. The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which depends his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice, judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of fortitude, it proceeds from fortitude.

Accordingly judgment is an act of justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of prudence in so far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) which belongs to prudence is said to “judge rightly,” as stated above ( Q(51) , A(3) ).

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity, has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to the Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of the law.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The other virtues regulate man in himself, whereas justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown above ( Q(58) , A(2) ). Now man is master in things concerning himself, but not in matters relating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are in question, there is no need for judgment other than that of a virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as explained above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further need for the judgment of a superior, who is “able to reprove both, and to put his hand between both” [* Job 9:33].

Hence judgment belongs more specifically to justice than to any other virtue.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue [*Cf. Q(58) , A(6) ], commanding and prescribing what is just; while it is in the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue. Hence judgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Matthew 7:1, “Judge not, and ye shall not be judged.” Therefore it is unlawful to judge.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Romans 14:4): “Who art thou that judgest another man’s servant. To his own lord he standeth or falleth.”

Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, no man is sinless, according to John 1:8, “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Now it is unlawful for a sinner to judge, according to Romans 2:1, “Thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou judgest.” Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 16:18): “Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates... that they may judge the people with just judgment.”

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(2) —

I answer that, Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice. Now it follows from what has been stated above ( A(1), ad 1,3) that three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice: first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice; secondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is called “perverted” or “unjust”: secondly, when a man judges about matters wherein he has no authority, and this is called judgment “by usurpation”: thirdly, when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it is called judgment by “suspicion” or “rash” judgment.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply believe, since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on Matthew 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross], He forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from bitterness of heart.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(2)- RO(2) —

A judge is appointed as God’s servant; wherefore it is written ( Deuteronomy 1:16): “Judge that which is just,” and further on ( Deuteronomy 1:17), “because it is the judgment of God.”

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Matthew 7:1, “Judge not.” Above all does this hold when such sins are public, because there would be an occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): “If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to strive against it together with us.” And yet it is not through acting thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned once again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be equally deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(3) Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion about an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible to have any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. Since then human judgment is about human acts, which are about singular and contingent matters, it seems that no judgment would be lawful, if it were not lawful to judge from suspicions.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a man’s opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the injury of another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus, as stated above ( Q(59) , A(4) ). Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this is false, because “we cannot avoid suspicions,” according to a gloss of Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on 1 Corinthians 4:5, “Judge not before the time.” Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to be unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross] in comment on the words of Matthew 7:1, “Judge not,” etc., says: “By this commandment our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part on mere suspicion.”

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(3) —

I answer that, As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to three causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to think evil of others, according to Ecclesiastes 10:3, “The fool when he walketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools.”

Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards another: for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this is due to long experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that “old people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults of others.” The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote perversity of the affections, while the third diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it is.

Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man begins to doubt of another’s goodness from slight indications. This is a venial and a light sin; for “it belongs to human temptation without which no man can go through this life,” according to a gloss on 1 Corinthians 4:5, “Judge not before the time.” The second degree is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another man’s wickedness as certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without contempt of one’s neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes on to say: “If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are human, we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from forming a definite and fixed opinion.” The third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains directly to injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Some kind of certainty is found in human acts, not indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting the matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable witnesses.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(3)- RO(2) —

From the very fact that a man thinks evil of another without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore does him an injury.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Since justice and injustice are about external operations, as stated above ( Q(58) , AA(8),10,11; Q(59) , A(1), ad 3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it is betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as it is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or anger to murder.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most part. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since “the number of fools is infinite” ( Ecclesiastes 1:15), “for the imagination and thought of man’s heart are prone to evil from his youth” ( Genesis 8:21). Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that “he leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, and turns neither to this side nor to that.” Now he who interprets a doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should not be done.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the worst, according to Job 9:28, “I feared all my works.”

Therefore it seems that doubtful matters affecting one’s neighbor should be interpreted for the worst.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(4) —

On the contrary, A gloss on Romans 14:3, “He that eateth not, let him not judge him that eateth,” says: “Doubts should be interpreted in the best sense.”

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(3), ad 2), things from the very fact that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have evident indications of a person’s wickedness, we ought to deem him good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(4)- RO(1) —

He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(4)- RO(2) —

It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because “the true is the good of the intellect, and the false is its evil,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the intellect’s perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in themselves.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(4)- RO(3) —

One may interpret something for the worst or for the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another’s, in order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure, it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of things we should try to interpret each thing according as it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(5) Whether we should always judge according to the written law?

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that we ought not always to judge according to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging unjustly. But written laws sometimes contain injustice, according to Isaiah 10:1, “Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice.”

Therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, judgment has to be formed about individual happenings. But no written law can cover each and every individual happening, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it seems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written law.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver’s intention may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if the lawgiver himself were present he would judge otherwise.

Therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): “In these earthly laws, though men judge about them when they are making them, when once they are established and passed, the judges may judge no longer of them, but according to them.”

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(5) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), judgment is nothing else but a decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes just in two ways: first by the very nature of the case, and this is called “natural right,” secondly by some agreement between men, and this is called “positive right,” as stated above ( Q(57) , A(2) ). Now laws are written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but in different ways. For the written law does indeed contain natural right, but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its force, not from the law but from nature: whereas the written law both contains positive right, and establishes it by giving it force of authority.

Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive right.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Just as the written law does not give force to the natural right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force, because neither can man’s will change nature. Hence if the written law contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has no binding force.

For positive right has no place except where “it matters not,” according to the natural right, “whether a thing be done in one way or in another”; as stated above ( Q(57) , A(2), ad 2). Wherefore such documents are to be called, not laws, but rather corruptions of law, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(95) , A(2) ): and consequently judgment should not be delivered according to them.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Even as unjust laws by their very nature are, either always or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so too laws that are rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they were observed they would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore in such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to the letter of the law, but according to equity which the lawgiver has in view. Hence the jurist says [*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque consult. 25]: “By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man.” In such cases even the lawgiver himself would decide otherwise; and if he had foreseen the case, he might have provided for it by law.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(6) Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by being usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action.

Now truth is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from the person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses nothing, no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is meant by judgment.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins.

Now it is related to the praise of some that they punished sins without having authority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the Egyptian ( Exodus 2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri the son of Salu ( Numbers 25:7-14), and “it was reputed to him unto justice” ( <19A531> Psalm 105:31). Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not to injustice.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters concerning the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(6)- O(4) —

Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to judge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown above ( A(1), ad 1,3; A(2) ). But a judgment is not described as unjust, if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge of the law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by usurpation, i.e. without authority.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Romans 14:4): “Who art thou that judgest another man’s servant?”

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(6) —

I answer that, Since judgment should be pronounced according to the written law, as stated above ( A(5) ), he that pronounces judgment, interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to interpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by public authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by public authority, which extends over those who are subject to the community. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority, so too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment that is pronounced by other than the public authority.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(6)- RO(1) —

When the truth is declared there is no obligation to accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes. On the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by authority received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to follow from Acts 7:24,25, where it is said that “striking the Egyptian... he thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand would save Israel [Vulg.: ‘them’].” Or it may be replied that Moses slew the Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked, without himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that “whoever does not ward off a blow from a fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the striker”; and he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with Augustine (QQ. Exodus qu. 2) [*Cf.

Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just as “the soil gives proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs before the useful seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful although it gave a sign of great fertility,” in so far, to wit, as it was a sign of the power whereby he was to deliver his people.

With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for God by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest, he was nevertheless the high-priest’s son, and this judgment was his concern as of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [* Exodus 22:20; Leviticus 20; Deuteronomy 13,17].

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(6)- RO(3) —

The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have been committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority.

P(2b)- Q(60)- A(6)- RO(4) —

The habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of the individual, and consequently their absence does not make a judgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority which gives a judgment its coercive force.

QUESTION OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts, which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts, i.e. the virtues connected with justice.

The first consideration will be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices.

And since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and distributive justice; (2) restitution.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and commutative? (2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way? (3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold? (4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as counterpassion?

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1) Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative and distributive?

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the two species of justice are unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many, both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and because the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii, 15): “He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to expect that he will receive again.” Therefore distribution does not belong to any species of justice.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is his own, as stated above ( Q(58) , A(2) ). But when things are distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes possessed of something which belonged to the community. Therefore this does not pertain to justice.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in the subject, as stated above ( Q(58) , A(6) ). But it belongs exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution does not always belong to justice.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, “Distributive justice regards common goods” (Ethic. v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice. Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of legal justice.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to one person, while distributive justice consists in giving something to many. Therefore they are not different species of justice.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and says (Ethic. v, 2) that “one directs distributions, the other, commutations.”

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(58) , AA(7),8 ), particular justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be considered in relation to a part. In the first place there is the order of one part to another, to which corresponds the order of one private individual to another. This order is directed by commutative justice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two persons. In the second place there is the order of the whole towards the parts, to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to the community in relation to each single person. This order is directed by distributive justice, which distributes common goods proportionately. Hence there are two species of justice, distributive and commutative.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Just as a private individual is praised for moderation in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein distributive justice directs.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his own.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The act of distributing the goods of the community, belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods; and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just distribution.

Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made not to the state but to the members of a family, and such distribution can be made by authority of a private individual.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Movement takes its species from the term “whereunto.” Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common good those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to particular individuals by way of distribution.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Distributive and commutative justice differ not only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of different kinds of due: because common property is due to an individual in one way, and his personal property in another way.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(2) Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in commutative justice?

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is to be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way in both distributive and commutative justice.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then, one virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the same.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive justice we have to consider the various deserts of persons.

Now a person’s deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for instance, in punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished more than one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is observed in the same way in both kinds of justice.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in distributive justice is observed according to “geometrical proportion,” whereas in commutative justice it follows “arithmetical proportion.”

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), in distributive justice something is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect of the whole.

Consequently in distributive justice a person receives all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a more prominent position in the community. This prominence in an aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of community. Hence in distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and persons: in such a way that even as one person surpasses another, so that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in the latter case follows “geometrical proportion,” wherein equality depends not on quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6 is to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion equals 1- 1/2; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half: whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6 exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.

On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found primarily.

Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The result of this will be equality according to the “arithmetical mean” which is gauged according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the mean between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by the former, by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5, and one of them receives 1 out of the other’s belongings, the one that is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be left with 4: and so there will be justice if both be brought back to the mean, 1 being taken from him that has 6, and given to him that has 4, for then both will have 5 which is the mean.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In the other moral virtues the rational, not the real mean, is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean; wherefore the mean, in justice, depends on the diversity of things.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Equality is the general form of justice, wherein distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find equality of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find equality of arithmetical proportion.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(2)- RO(3) —

In actions and passions a person’s station affects the quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a prince than a private person. Hence in distributive justice a person’s station is considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is considered in so far as it causes a diversity of things.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(3) Whether there is a different matter for both kinds of justice?

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that there is not a different matter for both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of virtue, as in the case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if distributive and commutative justice have different matters, it would seem that they are not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the distribution that has to do with distributive justice is one of “wealth or of honors, or of whatever can be distributed among the members of the community” (Ethic. v, 2), which very things are the subject matter of commutations between one person and another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Therefore the matters of distributive and commutative justice are not distinct.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs from that of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ specifically, where there is no specific difference, there ought to be no diversity of matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons commutative justice as one species, and yet this has many kinds of matter.

Therefore the matter of these species of justice is, seemingly, not of many kinds.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. v, 2 that “one kind of justice directs distributions, and another commutations.”

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(51) , AA(8),10 ), justice is about certain external operations, namely distribution and commutation. These consist in the use of certain externals, whether things, persons or even works: of things, as when one man takes from or restores to another that which is his; of persons, as when a man does an injury to the very person of another, for instance by striking or insulting him, or even by showing respect for him; and of works, as when a man justly exacts a work of another, or does a work for him. Accordingly, if we take for the matter of each kind of justice the things themselves of which the operations are the use, the matter of distributive and commutative justice is the same, since things can be distributed out of the common property to individuals, and be the subject of commutation between one person and another; and again there is a certain distribution and payment of laborious works.

If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things, and works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice directs commutations that can take place between two persons. of these some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when anyone uses another man’s chattel, person, or work against his will, and this may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In either case the offence may be committed against the other man’s chattel or person, or against a person connected with him.

If the offence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, it is called “theft,” if openly, it is called “robbery.” If it be against another man’s person, it may affect either the very substance of his person, or his dignity. If it be against the substance of his person, a man is injured secretly if he is treacherously slain, struck or poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or maimed. If it be against his personal dignity, a man is injured secretly by false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is deprived of his good name, and openly, by being accused in a court of law, or by public insult. If it be against a personal connection, a man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly (for the most part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the latter be induced to leave his master: which things can also be done openly. The same applies to other personal connections, and whatever injury may be committed against the principal, may be committed against them also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to leave his master are properly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a slave is his master’s chattel, is referred to theft. Voluntary commutations are when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person. And if he transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no debt, as in the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but of liberality. A voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far as it includes the notion of debt, and this may occur in many ways. First when one man simply transfers his thing to another in exchange for another thing, as happens in selling and buying. Secondly when a man transfers his thing to another, that the latter may have the use of it with the obligation of returning it to its owner. If he grant the use of a thing gratuitously, it is called “usufruct” in things that bear fruit; and simply “borrowing” on “loan” in things that bear no fruit, such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even the use is granted gratis, it is called “letting” or “hiring.” Thirdly, a man transfers his thing with the intention of recovering it, not for the purpose of its use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a “deposit,” or under some obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when one man stands security for another. In all these actions, whether voluntary or involuntary, the mean is taken in the same way according to the equality of repayment. Hence all these actions belong to the one same species of justice, namely commutative justice. And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(4) Whether the just is absolutely the same as retaliation?

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the judgment of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with his deeds, according to Matthew 7:2: “With what measure you judge, you shall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again.”

Therefore the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, in either kind of justice something is given to someone according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice this equality regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly on what a person has done for the good of the community; while in commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has suffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there is retaliation in respect of the deed committed. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based on the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for he who does an injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary and involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify the mean of justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on us.

Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just is not always the same as retaliation.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(4) —

I answer that, Retaliation [contrapassum] denotes equal passion repaid for previous action; and the expression applies most properly to injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of his neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back.

This kind of just is laid down in the Law ( Exodus 21:23,24): “He shall render life for life, eye for eye,” etc. And since also to take away what belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows that secondly retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes loss to another, should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss is also found in the Law ( Exodus 22:1): “If any man steal an ox or a sheep, and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and four sheep for one sheep.”

Thirdly retaliation is transferred to voluntary commutations, where action and passion are on both sides, although voluntariness detracts from the nature of passion, as stated above ( Q(59) , A(3) ).

In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action. Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one who is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species that he might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not only struck back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner when a man despoils another of his property against the latter’s will, the action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of that thing, because the man who caused another’s loss, himself would lose nothing, and so he is punished by making restitution several times over, because not only did he injure a private individual, but also the common weal, the security of whose protection he has infringed.

Nor again would there be equality of passion in voluntary commutations, were one always to exchange one’s chattel for another man’s, because it might happen that the other man’s chattel is much greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to equalize passion and action in commutations according to a certain proportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented. Hence retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but there is no place for it in distributive justice, because in distributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing and thing or between passion and action (whence the expression ‘contrapassum’), but according to proportion between things and persons, as stated above ( A(2) ).

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(4)- RO(1) —

This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with the conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are apportioned to merits, and punishments to sins.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(4)- RO(2) —

When a man who has served the community is paid for his services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive, justice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not between the thing received and the thing done, but between the thing received by one person and the thing received by another according to the respective conditions of those persons.

P(2b)- Q(61)- A(4)- RO(3) —

When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing.

Hence it requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a difference, not on part, but on the part of the thing.

QUESTION OF RESTITUTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) of what is it an act? (2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what one has taken away? (3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away? (4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away? (5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from whom something has been taken? (6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to restore it? (7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution? (8) Whether one is bound to restore at once?

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(1) Whether restitution is an act of commutative justice?

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that restitution is not an act of commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due. Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due. Therefore restitution is not the act of any part of justice.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away. Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation, but also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man less than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of commutative than of distributive justice.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another. Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs commutations.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(1) —

I answer that, To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Hence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or theft.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(1)- RO(1) —

That which is not due to another is not his properly speaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is a mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution, since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which considers that thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is not restitution properly so called.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(1)- RO(2) —

In so far as the word restitution denotes something done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem originally to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass from one person to another, since they remain the same both substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as the term “commutation” has passed from such like things to those actions and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit on another person, so too the term “restitution” is applied, to things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in their effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or dishonored by injurious words.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing, when the latter receives so much the more according as he received less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative justice.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(2) Whether restitution of what has been taken away is necessary for salvation?

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what has been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary for salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has been taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does not seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is impossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one has taken away another’s good name by telling the truth.

Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted.

Therefore that which has been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since “to lack little is almost the same as to lack nothing at all,” as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a benefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the benefice, since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): “Unless a man restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven.”

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(2) —

I answer that, Restitution as stated above ( A(1) ) is an act of commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality.

Wherefore restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; since it is by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it be taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no need for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(1) —

When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God and our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Wherefore when that which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent, compensation should be made as far as possible: for instance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make compensation either in money or in honor, the condition of either party being duly considered according to the judgment of a good man.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(2) —

There are three ways in which one may take away another’s good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly, as when a man reveals another’s sin, while observing the right order of so doing, and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by saying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore that man’s good name, by confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly, by saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals another’s sin contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound to restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an untruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name, he must compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases, as stated above (ad 1).

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its effect, viz. the lowering of the other man’s personal dignity in the opinion of other men.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(4) —

There are several ways of preventing a man from obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view the honor of God or the good of the Church, one procures its being conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation whatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, through hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefice has been definitely assigned to anyone, one prevents its being conferred on a worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred on him, one is bound to make some compensation, after taking account of the circumstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a prudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man had not obtained the benefice and might have been prevented in many ways from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had already been assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some undue cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had deprived a man of what he already possessed, and consequently he would be bound to compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to his means.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(3) Whether it suffices to restore the exact amount taken?

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the exact amount taken. For it is written ( Exodus 22:1): “If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep.”

Now everyone is bound to keep the commandments of the Divine law.

Therefore a thief is bound to restore four- or fivefold.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, “What things soever were written, were written for our learning” ( Romans 15:4). Now Zachaeus said ( Luke 19:8) to our Lord: “If I have wronged any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold.” Therefore a man is bound to restore several times over the amount he has taken unjustly.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, no one can be unjustly deprived of what he is not bound to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than the amount of his theft, under the head of damages. Therefore a man is bound to pay it, and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the exact amount.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Restitution re-establishes equality where an unjust taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by repaying the exact amount taken. Therefore there is no obligation to restore more than the exact amount taken.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(3) —

I answer that, When a man takes another’s thing unjustly, two things must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the thing, which inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the case in loans. The other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent with equality on the part of the thing, as when a person intends to use violence but fails.

As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitution, since thereby equality is re-established; and for this it is enough that a man restore just so much as he has belonging to another. But as regards the sin, the remedy is applied by punishment, the infliction of which belongs to the judge: and so, until a man is condemned by the judge, he is not bound to restore more than he took, but when once he is condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty.

Hence it is clear how to answer the First Objection: because this law fixes the punishment to be inflicted by the judge. Nor is this commandment to be kept now, because since the coming of Christ no man is bound to keep the judicial precepts, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(104), A(3) ). Nevertheless the same might be determined by human law, and then the same answer would apply.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Zachaeus said this being willing to do more than he was bound to do; hence he had said already: “Behold... the half of my goods I give to the poor.”

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(3)- RO(3) —

By condemning the man justly, the judge can exact more by way of damages; and yet this was not due before the sentence.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(4) Whether a man is bound to restore what he has not taken?

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man is bound to restore what he has not taken. For he that has inflicted a loss on a man is bound to remove that loss. Now it happens sometimes that the loss sustained is greater than the thing taken: for instance, if you dig up a man’s seeds, you inflict on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest, and thus you would seem to be bound to make restitution accordingly. Therefore a man is bound to restore what he has not taken.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, he who retains his creditor’s money beyond the stated time, would seem to occasion his loss of all his possible profits from that money, and yet he does not really take them. Therefore it seems that a man is bound to restore what he did not take.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now a man is bound to restore to God more than he has received from Him, according to Matthew 25:26, “Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not, and gather where I have not strewed.”

Therefore it is just that one should restore to a man also, something that one has not taken.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Restitution belongs to justice, because it re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore what one did not take, there would not be equality. Therefore it is not just to make such a restitution.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(4) —

I answer that, Whoever brings a loss upon another person, seemingly, takes from him the amount of the loss, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so called from a man having “less”* than his due. [*The derivation is more apparent in English than in Latin, where ‘damnum’ stands for ‘loss,’ and ‘minus’ for ‘less.’ Aristotle merely says that to have more than your own is called ‘gain,’ and to have less than you started with is called ‘loss.’] Therefore a man is bound to make restitution according to the loss he has brought upon another.

Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by being deprived of what he actually has; and a loss of this kind is always to be made good by repayment in equivalent: for instance if a man damnifies another by destroying his house he is bound to pay him the value of the house.

Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him from obtaining what he was on the way to obtain. A loss of this kind need not be made good in equivalent; because to have a thing virtually is less than to have it actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing is to have it merely virtually or potentially, and so were he to be indemnified by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not the exact value taken from him, but more, and this is not necessary for salvation, as stated above. However he is bound to make some compensation, according to the condition of persons and things.

From this we see how to answer the First and Second Objections: because the sower of the seed in the field, has the harvest, not actually but only virtually. In like manner he that has money has the profit not yet actually but only virtually: and both may be hindered in many ways.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(4)- RO(3) —

God requires nothing from us but what He Himself has sown in us. Hence this saying is to be understood as expressing either the shameful thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he had received nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects from us the fruit of His gifts, which fruit is from Him and from us, although the gifts themselves are from God without us.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5) Whether restitution must always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken?

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful to injure anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man himself, or to others, were one to restore to him what has been taken from him; if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword. Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does not deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully that which another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and receiver who are guilty of simony [i.e., the buying and selling of positions in the Church]. Therefore it is not always necessary to make restitution to the person from whom one has taken something.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it is sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from whom a thing has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he is too far away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we have received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors from others (our parents for instance) than from a lender or depositor. Therefore sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather than make restitution to one from whom we have taken something.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5)- O(5) —

Further, it is useless to restore a thing which reverts to the restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly taken something from the Church and makes restitution to the Church, it reverts into his hands, since he is the guardian of the Church’s property.

Therefore he ought not to restore to the Church from whom he has taken: and so restitution should not always be made to the person from whom something has been taken away

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5) — On the contrary, It is written ( Romans 13:7): “Render... to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom.”

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5) —

I answer that, Restitution re-establishes the equality of commutative justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of thing to thing, as stated above ( A(2) ; Q(58) , A(10) ). Now this equalizing of things is impossible, unless he that has less than his due receive what is lacking to him: and for this to be done, restitution must be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5)- RO(1) —

When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some other, it should not be restored to him there and then, because restitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made, since all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who retains another’s property must not appropriate it, but must either reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over to another to keep it more securely.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5)- RO(2) —

A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways. First through the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as is the case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves to lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to him: and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he must not retain the price, but must use it for some pious object. Secondly a man gives unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful purpose, albeit the giving itself is not unlawful, as when a woman receives payment for fornication: wherefore she may keep what she has received. If, however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit, she would be bound to restitution.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5)- RO(3) —

If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or living): but not without previously making a careful inquiry about his person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead, restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon as one with him. If he be very far away, what is due to him should be sent to him, especially if it be of great value and can easily be sent: else it should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for him, and the owner should be advised of the fact.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5)- RO(4) —

A man is bound, out of his own property, to succor his parents, or those from whom he has received greater benefits; but he ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to others; and he would be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is due to another. Exception must be made in cases of extreme need, for then he could and should even take what belongs to another in order to succor a parent.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(5)- RO(5) —

There are three ways in which a prelate can rob the Church of her property. First by laying hands on Church property which is committed, not to him but to another; for instance, if a bishop appropriates the property of the chapter. In such a case it is clear that he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those who are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another person (for instance a relative or a friend) Church property committed to himself: in which case he must make restitution to the Church, and have it under his own care, so as to hand it over to his successor. Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands on Church property, merely in intention, when, to wit, he begins to have a mind to hold it as his own and not in the name of the Church: in which case he must make restitution by renouncing his intention.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(6) Whether he that has taken a thing is always bound to restitution?

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not always bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality of justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him that has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that which belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed into another’s hands.

Therefore it should be restored, not by the person that took it, but by the one that has it.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always bound to restitution.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, the same thing should not be restored several times. Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing is not always bound to restitution.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(6) —

On the contrary, He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a thing is bound to restore it.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(6) —

I answer that, With regard to a man who has taken another’s property, two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the taking. By reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as long as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in addition to what is his, should be taken away from him, and given to him who lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On the other hand, the taking of the thing that is another’s property, may be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will of the owner, as in theft and robbery: in which case the thief is bound to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the injurious action, even though the thing is no longer in his possession. For just as a man who strikes another, though he gain nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured person, so too he that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make compensation for the loss incurred, although he be no better off; and in addition he must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes another’s property for his own profit but without committing an injury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a loan: and then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost the thing: for he is bound to compensate the person who has done him a favor, and he would not be doing so if the latter were to lose thereby. Thirdly, a man takes another’s property without injury to the latter or profit to himself, as in the case of a deposit; wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on account of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; but he is bound to restitution on account of the thing taken. Consequently if this thing be taken from him without any fault on his part, he is not bound to restitution, although he would be, if he were to lose the thing through a grievous fault on his part.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The chief end of restitution is, not that he who has more than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than his due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for restitution in those things which one man may receive from another without loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from another’s candle. Consequently although he that has taken something from another, may have ceased to have what he took, through having transferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what is his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the thing, on account of the injurious taking, and he that has it, on account of the thing.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to other men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so he may make restitution of another’s property through the priest to whom he confesses.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Since restitution is chiefly directed to the compensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing has been taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has received sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound to any further restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund the person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse them from so doing.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(7) Whether restitution is binding on those who have not taken?

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that restitution is not binding on those who have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker.

Now none should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are bound to restitution save the one who has taken.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, justice does not bind one to increase another’s property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who takes a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the gainer, both because he would receive restitution many times over, and because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken away from someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore the others are not bound to restitution.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in order to safeguard another’s property. Now sometimes a man would expose himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or withstand him. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not betraying or withstanding a thief.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Romans 1:32): “They who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also they that consent to them that do them.”

Therefore in like manner they that consent are bound to restitution.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(7) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(6) ), a person is bound to restitution not only on account of someone else’s property which he has taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever is cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the taking, by moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel, or consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving. Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving him shelter or any other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by taking part in the theft or robbery, as a fellow evil-doer. Indirectly, when a man does not prevent another from evil-doing (provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by omitting the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows: “By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing.”

It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent; namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place. Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver of thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of participation; when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do so; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to safeguard justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their neglect thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of their preserving justice here below.

In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is bound to restitution, only when it may be judged with probability that the unjust taking resulted from such causes.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by counselling, or by commanding, or in any other way whatever.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(7)- RO(2) —

He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the principal in the deed; first of all, the “commander”; secondly, the “executor,” and in due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of them make restitution, another is not bound to make restitution to the same person. Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who took possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those who have already made restitution. When a man commands an unjust taking that does not follow, no restitution has to be made, since its end is chiefly to restore the property of the person who has been unjustly injured.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(7)- RO(3) —

He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand or reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when he is obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of earthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they are invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain justice.

P(2b)- Q(62)- A(8) Whether a man is bound to immediate restitution, or may he put it off?