QUESTIONS 47-170 ON PRUDENCE QUESTIONS 47-56 QUESTION OF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)

After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding gift; fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning prudence.

Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason? (2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also in the speculative reason? (3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars? (4) Whether it is virtue? (5) Whether it is a special virtue? (6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues? (7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues? (8) Whether its proper act is command? (9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence? (10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many? (11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same in species as that which regards the common good? (12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers? (13) Whether prudence is in the wicked? (14) Whether prudence is in all good men? (15) Whether prudence is in us naturally? (16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness ?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(1) Whether prudence is in the cognitive or in the appetitive faculty?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib.

Eccl. xv): “Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and those that hinder.” Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs to prudence “to choose wisely.” But choice is an act of the appetitive faculty, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(13) , A(1) ). Therefore prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “in art it is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse.” Now the moral virtues, of which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas art is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather than in the rational faculty.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): “Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(1) —

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): “A prudent man is one who sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the event of uncertainties.” Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence belongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and offers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to the reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( P(1), Q(82) , A(4) ) the will moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty is love, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(25) , AA(1),2 ). Accordingly prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say that “prudence is love discerning aright that which helps from that which hinders us in tending to God.” Now love is said to discern because it moves the reason to discern.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end. Now of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) that a prudent man “takes good counsel.” But as choice presupposes counsel, since it is “the desire for what has been already counselled” (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs the choice by means of counsel.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely, but in its application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence, since, the end being of most import in everything, it follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst of all. Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is “something more than a merely rational habit,” such as art is, since, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(57) , A(4) ) it includes application to action, which application is an act of the will.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(2) Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the speculative reason?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written ( Proverbs 10:23): “Wisdom is prudence to a man.” Now wisdom consists chiefly in contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): “Prudence is concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of fuller knowledge.” Now this belongs to the speculative reason.

Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts.

Therefore prudence also is both practical and speculative.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(2) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) “a prudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel.” Now counsel is about things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the practical reason.

Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(2)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( Q(45) , AA(1),3 ), wisdom considers the absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest cause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus.

Now in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all human life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare, so he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is said to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good, and this is not the best thing of all. And so it is stated significantly that “prudence is wisdom for man,” but not wisdom absolutely.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether speculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently comes under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards its specification in relation to its object which is the “necessary true,” it comes under neither counsel nor prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Every application of right reason in the work of production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Since then, the speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process follows certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is possible to have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so we find such a thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(3) Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above ( AA(1),2 ). But “reason deals with universals,” according to Phys. i, 5.

Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence which is right reason, is not about singulars.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, particulars are known by the senses.

But prudence is not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of singulars.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that “prudence does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of singulars also.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1), ad 3), to prudence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are concerned.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals, and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases: hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to matter, as stated in De Anima iii.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(3)- RO(2) —

It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot be comprehended by human reason, that “our counsels are uncertain” (Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(3)- RO(3) —

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects, but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application it extends to this sense.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(4) Whether prudence is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that prudence is not a virtue.

For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that “prudence is the science of what to desire and what to avoid.” Now science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but “there is a virtue of art,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore art is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew “to grave all sort of graving, and to devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be need of in the work.”

Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is immoderate, else it would be useless to say ( Proverbs 23:4): “Set bounds to thy prudence.” Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(55) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(56) , A(1) ) when we were treating of virtues in general, “virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.” Now good may be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, without regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the aspect of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the rectitude of the appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in other words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of good.

Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above ( A(1), ad 3; A(3) ) to apply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it, among which virtues it is enumerated.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for any kind of right reason.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, because art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing to do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a particular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet, by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(4)- RO(3) —

This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on other things according to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(5) Whether prudence is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general, since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) “an elective habit that follows a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as a wise man decides.” Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that “the effect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that of prudence, right action as regards the means.” Now in every virtue certain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore prudence is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, a special virtue has a special object.

But prudence has not a special object, for it is right reason “applied to action” (Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It is distinct from and numbered among the other virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): “She teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(5) —

I answer that, Since acts and habits take their species from their objects, as shown above ( P(2a), Q(1) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(18) , A(2) ; P(2a), Q(54) , A(2) ), any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from other objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special, not merely according to the consideration of its matter, but rather according to its formal aspect, as explained above ( P(2a), Q(54) , A(2), ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the subject matter of the acts of different habits, and also of different powers, according to its different formal aspects.

Now a yet greater difference of object is requisite for a difference of powers than for a difference of habits, since several habits are found in the same power, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(54) , A(1) ). Consequently any difference in the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will “a fortiori” require a difference of habits.

Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as stated above ( A(2) ), it is differentiated from the other intellectual virtues by a material difference of objects. “Wisdom,” “knowledge” and “understanding” are about necessary things, whereas “art” and “prudence” are about contingent things, art being concerned with “things made,” that is, with things produced in external matter, such as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with “things done,” that is, with things that have their being in the doer himself, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(57) , A(4) ). On the other hand prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power, wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue, distinct from all other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(5)- RO(1) —

This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of moral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an intellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the aspect of virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(5)- RO(2) —

This argument proves that prudence helps all the virtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove that it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus from containing a species which is operative in every other species of that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true: but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are the object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(6) Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in the appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral virtue, as reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures, according to Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is “right reason applied to action,” as stated above ( A(2) ). Therefore all actions are directed to prudence as their end.

Therefore prudence appoints the end to all moral virtues.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(6) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that “moral virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while prudence ensures the rectitude of the means.” Therefore it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(6) —

I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good of the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity pre-exist in the reason.

Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things naturally known, about which is “understanding,” and certain things of which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which is “science,” so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues, since the end is in practical matters what principles are in speculative matters, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(7), ad 2; P(2a), Q(13) , A(3) ); while certain things are in the practical reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather from the ends themselves. About these is prudence, which applies universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Natural reason known by the name of “synderesis” appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above ( P(1), Q(79) , A(12) ): but prudence does not do this for the reason given above.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(6)- RO(3) —

The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is appointed by natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence, which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them: yet “synderesis” moves prudence, just as the understanding of principles moves science.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(7) Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral virtues, as shown above ( A(6) ). Therefore it does not find the mean in them.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to have being by reason of its cause. Now “to follow the mean” belongs to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as shown above ( A(5), O(1) ). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean in moral virtues.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), “virtue is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason.” Therefore prudence does not appoint the mean to moral virtues.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(7) —

On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral virtue ( A(5), O(1) ) it is stated that it “follows a mean appointed by reason... even as a wise man decides.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(7) —

I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man should not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right judgment of reason through fear or daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man according to natural reason, since natural reason dictates to each one that he should act according to reason.

But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are directed to the end.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Just as a natural agent makes form to be in matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to belong to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(8) Whether command is the chief act of prudence?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that command is not the chief act of prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence “to avoid ambushes.” Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “the prudent man takes good counsel.” Now “to take counsel” and “to command” seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been said above ( P(2a), Q(57) , A(6) ). Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the reason. Therefore command is not an act of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(8) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that “prudence commands.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(8) —

I answer that, Prudence is “right reason applied to action,” as stated above ( A(2) ). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are three such acts. The first is “to take counsel,” which belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(14) , A(1) ). The second act is “to judge of what one has discovered,” and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act is “to command,” which act consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged. And since this act approaches nearer to the end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence.

In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment, and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the reverse in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(8)- RO(1) —

The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes “the avoidance of ambushes” to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act of prudence that does not continue in heaven.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Good counsel is required in order that the good things discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to prudence which takes good counsel.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(8)- RO(3) —

Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of the reason, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(17) , A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(9) Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence. For solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a solicitous man is a restless man.” Now motion belongs chiefly to the appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does also. But prudence is not in the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated above ( A(1) ).

Therefore solicitude does not belong to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to solicitude, wherefore it is related ( 1 Kings 9:20) that Samuel said to Saul: “As for the asses which were lost three days ago, be not solicitous, because they are found.” Now the certainty of truth belongs to prudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is in opposition to prudence rather than belonging to it.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the “magnanimous man is slow and leisurely.” Now slowness is contrary to solicitude. Since then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for “good is not opposed to good,” as stated in the Predicaments (viii) it would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(9) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Peter 4:7): “Be prudent... and watch in prayers.” But watchfulness is the same as solicitude. Therefore solicitude belongs to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(9) —

I answer that, According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and alert [citus], in so far as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that “one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking counsel.” Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that “prudence keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived unawares by evil counsel.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(9)- RO(1) —

Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to the principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction and command of reason, wherein solicitude consists.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(9)- RO(2) —

According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), “equal certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter according to its proper mode.” And since the matter of prudence is the contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty of prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(9)- RO(3) —

The magnanimous man is said to be “slow and leisurely” not because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for over-much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since fear makes us take counsel, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(44) , A(2) ) when we were treating of the passion of fear.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(10) Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(10) - O(1) —

It would seem that prudence does not extend to the governing of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common good is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence is not directed to the common good.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their own. Therefore they are not prudent.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance and fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only to a man’s own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(10) —

On the contrary, Our Lord said ( Matthew 24:45): “Who, thinkest thou, is a faithful and prudent [Douay: ‘wise’] servant whom his lord hath appointed over his family?”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(10) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed to charity, which “seeketh not her own” ( 1 Corinthians 13:5): wherefore the Apostle says of himself ( 1 Corinthians 10:33): “Not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be saved.”

Moreover it is contrary to right reason, which judges the common good to be better than the good of the individual.

Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the common good of the multitude.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(10) - RO(1) —

The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now just as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is called “legal” justice, so the prudence that is directed to the common good is called “political” prudence, for the latter stands in the same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to moral virtue.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(10) - RO(2) —

He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the individual good is impossible without the common good of the family, state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv, 6] of the ancient Romans that “they would rather be poor in a rich empire than rich in a poor empire.” Secondly, because, since man is a part of the home and state, he must needs consider what is good for him by being prudent about the good of the many. For the good disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole; thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that “any part which does not harmonize with its whole, is offensive.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(10) - RO(3) —

Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as stated in Ethic. v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(11) Whether prudence about one’s own good is specifically the same as that which extends to the common good?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(11) - O(1) —

It seems that prudence about one’s own good is the same specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that “political prudence, and prudence are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(11) - O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that “virtue is the same in a good man and in a good ruler.” Now political prudence is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were.

Since then prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence and political prudence are the same habit.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(11) - O(3) —

Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular good, which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the common good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence and political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(11) —

On the contrary, “Political prudence,” which is directed to the common good of the state, “domestic economy” which is of such things as relate to the common good of the household or family, and “monastic economy” which is concerned with things affecting the good of one person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above differences of matter.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(11) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(5) ; Q(54) , A(2), ad 1), the species of habits differ according to the difference of object considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above ( P(2a), Prolog.; P(2a), Q(102), A(1) ), wherefore the species of habits differ by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is “prudence” simply so called, which is directed to one’s own good; another, “domestic prudence” which is directed to the common good of the home; and a third, “political prudence,” which is directed to the common good of the state or kingdom.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(11) - RO(1) —

The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is the same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This is called “prudence” in respect of the common notion of prudence, i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is called “political,” as being directed to the common good.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(11) - RO(2) —

As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), “it belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well,” wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good ruler. Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs specifically, even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2).

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(11) - RO(3) —

Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically although their ends are subordinate to one another. In like manner, though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the many, that does not prevent this difference from making the habits differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed to the last end is above the other habits and commands them.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(12) - O(1) —

It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only in their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that “prudence alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues are common to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is not a virtue but a true opinion.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(12) - O(2) —

Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that “a slave is not competent to take counsel.” But prudence makes a man take good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(12) - O(3) —

Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above ( A(8) ). But command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only of rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(12) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are two kinds of political prudence, one of which is “legislative” and belongs to rulers, while the other “retains the common name political,” and is about “individual actions.” Now it belongs also to subjects to perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is not only in rulers but also in subjects.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(12) —

I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the slave as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject.

Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in the ruler “after the manner of a mastercraft” (Ethic. vi, 8), but in the subjects, “after the manner of a handicraft.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(12) - RO(1) —

The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood strictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as such.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(12) - RO(2) —

A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as he is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he does take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(12) - RO(3) —

By prudence a man commands not only others, but also himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(13) Whether prudence can be in sinners?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(13) - O(1) —

It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For our Lord said ( Luke 16:8): “The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: ‘wiser’] in their generation than the children of light.”

Now the children of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in sinners.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(13) - O(2) —

Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence also.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(13) - O(3) —

Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, “we say that to be of good counsel is the work of prudent man especially.” Now many sinners can take good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(13) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that “it is impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good.” Now no inner is a good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(13) —

I answer that, Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called “a good robber,” and in this way may speak of “a prudent robber,” by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This is the prudence of which the Apostle says ( Romans 8:6): “The prudence [Douay: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh is death,” because, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of the flesh.

The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship, he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man takes counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning life as a whole, but fails to make an effective command.

The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel, judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man’s whole life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that which is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is only in the wicked.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(13) - RO(1) —

This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the first prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent absolutely, but that they are prudent in “their generation.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(13) - RO(2) —

The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the other hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite.

First because its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue, which rectify the appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there is no prudence, as shown above ( P(2a), Q(58) , A(5) ); secondly because prudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless the appetite be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object is more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is more opposed to sin, which arises from a disorder of the appetite.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(13) - RO(3) —

Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for some particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel into effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12) there is “cleverness,” [*\deinotike\] i.e. natural diligence which may be directed to both good and evil; or “cunning,” [*\panourgia\] which is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be “false prudence” or “prudence of the flesh.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(14) Whether prudence is in all who have grace?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(14) - O(1) —

It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace. Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to be done. But many who have grace have not this diligence.

Therefore not all who have grace have prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(14) - O(2) —

Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as stated above ( A(8), O(2), A(13), O(3) ). Yet many have grace who do not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others. Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence P(2b)- Q(47)- A(14) - O(3) — Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that “young people are not obviously prudent.” Yet many young people have grace. Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(14) —

On the contrary, No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that “the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what they desire to accomplish.” Therefore all who have grace have prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(14) —

I answer that, The virtues must needs be connected together, so that whoever has one has all, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(65) , A(1) ). Now whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above ( A(4) ), he must, of necessity, have prudence also.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(14) - RO(1) —

Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient with regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is given to all who have grace, whom “His unction teacheth of all things” ( 1 John 2:27). There is also another diligence which is more than sufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself and for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also in all things relating to human life; and such diligence as this is not in all who have grace.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(14) - RO(2) —

Those who require to be guided by the counsel of others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves in this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and can discern good from evil counsel.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(14) - RO(3) —

Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of acts, wherefore “its acquisition demands experience and time” (Ethic. ii, 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act. On the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion. Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the use of reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even as in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it is also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This by practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the other virtues. Hence the Apostle says ( Hebrews 5:14) that “strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(15) Whether prudence is in us by nature?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(15) - O(1) —

It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The Philosopher says that things connected with prudence “seem to be natural,” namely “synesis, gnome” [*\synesis\ and \gnome\, Cf.

P(2a), Q(57) , A(6) ] and the like, but not those which are connected with speculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(15) - O(2) —

Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now prudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: “In the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days prudence.” Therefore prudence is natural.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(15) - O(3) —

Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(15) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that “intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore demands experience and time.” Now prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above ( A(4) ). Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(15) —

I answer that, As shown above ( A(3) ), prudence includes knowledge both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of speculative science, because the primary universal principles of either are known naturally, as shown above ( A(6) ): except that the common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) “the life which is according to the speculative reason is better than that which is according to man”: whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the speculative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through teaching.

On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because this matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above ( P(2a), Q(51) , A(1) ; P(2a), Q(63) , A(1) ) that some, from a natural inclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment about such like ends.

But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man has a greater aptitude than another in discerning them, just as it happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since then prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated above ( A(6) ; P(2a), Q(57) , A(5) ), it follows that prudence is not from nature.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(15) - RO(1) —

The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had said before (Ethic. vi, 5,11) that “they are the principles of the \ou heneka\” [*Literally, ‘for the sake of which’ (are the means)], namely, the end; and so he does not mention \euboulia\ among them, because it takes counsel about the means.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(15) - RO(2) —

Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but also because of their long experience.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(15) - RO(3) —

Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently extends to an infinity of singulars.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(16) Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness?

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(16) - O(1) —

It would seem that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is more certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of action.

But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(16) - O(2) —

Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) “the same things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue.”

Now the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up “of many memories,” as he states at the beginning of his Metaphysics (i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(16) - O(3) —

Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(16) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence.”

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(16) —

I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above ( A(8) ), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence”: wherefore it is written (Daniel 13:56): “Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath subverted thy heart,” and ( Exodus 23:8): “Neither shalt thou take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: ‘wise’].”

Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the latter’s command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(16) - RO(1) —

Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison fails, as stated above [*Cf. P(2a), Q(53) , A(1) ].

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(16) - RO(2) —

The experience required by prudence results not from memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.

P(2b)- Q(47)- A(16) - RO(3) —

Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above ( A(3) ). Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.

QUESTION OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (ONE ARTICLE)

We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Which are the parts of prudence? (2) Of its integral parts; (3) Of its subjective parts; (4) Of its potential parts.

P(2b)- Q(48)- A(1) Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned?

P(2b)- Q(48)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of prudence, namely, “memory,” “understanding” and “foresight.” Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus ascribes to prudence six parts, namely, “reasoning,” “understanding,” “circumspection,” “foresight,” “docility” and “caution.” Aristotle says (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11) that “good counsel,” “synesis” and “gnome” belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he mentions “conjecture,” “shrewdness,” “sense” and “understanding.” And another Greek philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q(80) , O(4) ] says that ten things are connected with prudence, namely, “good counsel,” “shrewdness,” “foresight,” “regnative [*Regnativa],” “military,” “political” and “domestic prudence,” “dialectics,” “rhetoric” and “physics.” Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is either excessive or deficient.

P(2b)- Q(48)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences.

Therefore they are not parts of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(48)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the parts do not exceed the whole.

Now the intellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility, belong not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits. Therefore they should not be set down as parts of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(48)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts of the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(16) , A(1) ). Therefore, just as “eubulia” which refers to counsel, is connected with prudence, and “synesis” and “gnome” which refer to judgment, so also ought something to have been assigned corresponding to use.

P(2b)- Q(48)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(9) ). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among the parts of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(48)- A(1) —

I answer that, Parts are of three kinds, namely, “integral,” as wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; “subjective,” as ox and lion are parts of animal; and “potential,” as the nutritive and sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be assigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral parts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of a virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of all the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of prudence, namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with the addition of a seventh, viz. “memory” mentioned by Tully; and \eustochia\ or “shrewdness” mentioned by Aristotle. For the “sense” of prudence is also called “understanding”: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): “Of such things one needs to have the sense, and this is understanding.” Of these eight, five belong to prudence as a cognitive virtue, namely, “memory,” “reasoning,” “understanding,” “docility” and “shrewdness”: while the three others belong thereto, as commanding and applying knowledge to action, namely, “foresight,” “circumspection” and “caution.” The reason of their difference is seen from the fact that three things may be observed in reference to knowledge.

In the first place, knowledge itself, which, if it be of the past, is called “memory,” if of the present, whether contingent or necessary, is called “understanding” or “intelligence.” Secondly, the acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to which pertains “docility,” or by “discovery,” and to this belongs to \eustochia\, i.e. “a happy conjecture,” of which “shrewdness” is a part, which is a “quick conjecture of the middle term,” as stated in Poster. i, 9. Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed from things known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this belongs to “reasoning.” And the reason, in order to command aright, requires to have three conditions. First, to order that which is befitting the end, and this belongs to “foresight”; secondly, to attend to the circumstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs to “circumspection”; thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to “caution.”

The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a multitude, which differ specifically as stated above ( Q(47) , A(11) ). Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into various species according to the various kinds of multitude. There is the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that governs this is called “military.”

There is also the multitude that is united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a home or family, and this is ruled by “domestic prudence”: and such again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is “regnative prudence” in the ruler, and “political prudence,” simply so called, in the subjects.

If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also speculative knowledge, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(2), ad 2) then its parts include “dialectics,” “rhetoric” and “physics,” according to three methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to “physics” (if physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The second method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises, and this belongs to “dialectics.” The third method is to employ conjectures in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and this belongs to “rhetoric.” It may be said, however, that these three belong also to prudence properly so called, since it argues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes from probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.

The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it, which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the parts of prudence are “good counsel,” which concerns counsel, “synesis,” which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence, and “gnome,” which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the law: while “prudence” is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.

P(2b)- Q(48)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The various enumerations differ, either because different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another enumeration. Thus Tully includes “caution” and “circumspection” under “foresight,” and “reasoning,” “docility” and “shrewdness” under “understanding.”

P(2b)- Q(48)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply may be gathered from what has been said.

P(2b)- Q(48)- A(1)- RO(3) —

All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with things pertaining to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(48)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Right command and right use always go together, because the reason’s command is followed by obedience on the part of the lower powers, which pertain to use.

P(2b)- Q(48)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Solicitude is included under foresight.

QUESTION OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Memory; (2) Understanding or Intelligence; (3) Docility; (4) Shrewdness; (5) Reason; (6) Foresight; (7) Circumspection; (8) Caution.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(1) Whether memory is a part of prudence?

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience, whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2,7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among the parts of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(1) —

I answer that, Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(5) ). Now in such like matters a man can be directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must be proportionate to their conclusions, and “like must be concluded from like” (Ethic. vi [*Anal. Post. 1:32]). But we need experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that “intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time.” Now experience is the result of many memories as stated in Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( Q(47) , AA(3),6 ), prudence applies universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for prudence, and memory is one of them.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24], memory not only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.

There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii): “Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other.” Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that “anxiety preserves the figures of images entire.” Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that “reflection preserves memories,” because as he remarks (De Memoria ii) “custom is a second nature”: wherefore when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one thing to another by a kind of natural order.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(1)- RO(3) —

It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to take good counsel for the future.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(2) Whether understanding* is a part of prudence? (*Otherwise intuition; Aristotle’s word is \nous\)

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that understanding is not a part of prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part of the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding and prudence, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above ( Q(8) , AA(1),8 ). But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has been said above ( Q(4) , A(8) ; P(2a), Q(62) , A(2) ). Therefore understanding does not pertain to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic. vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts “intelligence” a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn.

Scip. i, 8] mentions “understanding,” which comes to the same.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(2) —

I answer that, Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated above ( Q(47) , AA(3),6 ), it applies the knowledge of some universal principle.

Now a singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative principles, but also practical universal principles, such as “One should do evil to no man,” as shown above ( Q(47) , A(6) ). The other understanding, as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, is cognizant of an extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent practical matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the syllogism of prudence, as stated above ( Q(47) , AA(3),6 ). Now this primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place.

Wherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right estimate of some particular end.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is a quick insight into divine things, as shown above ( Q(8) , AA(1),2 ). It is in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The right estimate about a particular end is called both “understanding,” in so far as its object is a principle, and “sense,” in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): “Of such things we need to have the sense, and this is understanding.” But this is to be understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a particular.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(3) Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence?

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that docility should not be accounted a part of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it should not be accounted a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are praised or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this is befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it is not a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are also called “preceptors.” Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the opinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2), ad 1; Q(47) , A(3) ) prudence is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time.

Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): “It is right to pay no less attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into principles.” Thus it is written ( Proverbs 3:5): “Lean not on thy own prudence,” and (Ecclus. 6:35): “Stand in the multitude of the ancients” (i.e. the old men), “that are wise, and join thyself from thy heart to their wisdom.” Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence P(2b)- Q(49)- A(3)- RO(1) — Although docility is useful for every intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given above.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them through pride.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(3)- RO(3) —

By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but also for himself, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(12), ad 3).

Hence as stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned should be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(4) Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence. For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for demonstrations, as stated in Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning of prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies. Therefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to Ethic. vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place in good counsel for shrewdness [*Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of \eustochia\, i.e. “a happy conjecture”: for the latter is “unreasoning and rapid,” whereas counsel needs to be slow, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be accounted a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, shrewdness as stated above ( Q(48) ) is a “happy conjecture.” Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): “A solicitous man is one who is shrewd and alert [solers citus].” But solicitude belongs to prudence, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(9) ). Therefore shrewdness does also.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(4) —

I answer that, Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for \eustochia\, of which it is a part. For \eustochia\ is a happy conjecture about any matter, while shrewdness is “an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term” (Poster. i, 34).

Nevertheless the philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q(48) , O(1) ] who calls shrewdness a part of prudence, takes it for \eustochia\, in general, hence he says: “Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered rapidly.”

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends they are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9) to prove that \euboulia\, i.e. good counsel, is not \eustochia\, which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a man may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for instance, something has to be done without warning. It is for this reason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters, wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric and prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(5) Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence?

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof. But prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5).

Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence P(2b)- Q(49)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from the intelligence, as stated above ( P(1), Q(79) , A(8) ). If therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add reason.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(5) —

I answer that, The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite or quasiintegral parts of prudence, it follows that reason should be numbered among these parts.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its good use.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of things intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are nevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there is no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Hence, although in certain other intellectual virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and uncertain.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Although intelligence and reason are not different powers, yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth [*Cf. P(2b), Q(8) , A(1) ], while reason is so called from being inquisitive and discursive.

Hence each is accounted a part of reason as explained above ( A(2) ; Q(47) , A(2), 3).

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(6) Whether foresight* should be accounted a part of prudence? (*”Providentia,” which may be translated either “providence” or “foresight.”) P(2b)- Q(49)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems to be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), “a prudent man is one who sees from afar [porro videns]”: and this is also the derivation of “providentia [foresight],” according to Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be also speculative, because “seeing,” whence we have the word “to foresee,” has more to do with speculation than operation.

Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(6) —

On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above ( Q(48) ).

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(6) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(47) , A(1), ad 2, AA(6),13 ), prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be undone. In like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.

Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of them must needs be the principal to which all the others are subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the principal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very name of prudence is taken from foresight [providentia] as from its principal part.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Speculation is about universal and necessary things, which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but only to practical matters.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Right order to an end which is included in the notion of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command, without which no right order to the end is possible.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(7) Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence?

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one’s surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part of prudence in addition to foresight.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(7) —

On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above ( Q(48) ).

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(7) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(6) ), it belongs to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.

Since, however, prudence, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(3) ) is about singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the circumstances.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Though the number of possible circumstances be infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few in number

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(7)- RO(2) — Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing of circumstances.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of the circumstances.

Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(8) Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence?

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which directs the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures illhealth.

Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of prudence, distinct from foresight.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no man can take precautions against all possible evils.

Therefore caution does not belong to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(8) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Ephesians 5:15): “See how you walk cautiously [Douay: ‘circumspectly’].”

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(8) —

I answer that, The things with which prudence is concerned, are contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of acts of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(8)- RO(2) —

It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both belong to the one virtue of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(49)- A(8)- RO(3) —

Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether, or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them, although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.

QUESTION OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence. And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules himself ( Q(47) , seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species of prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative? (2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence? (4) Whether military prudence is?

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the preservation of justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to justice rather than to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are “aristocracy,” “polity,” also called “timocracy” [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 10], “tyranny,” “oligarchy” and “democracy.” Therefore neither should a regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part of prudence to be “legislative.” Therefore it is not becoming to substitute regnative prudence in its place.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that “prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince.” Therefore a special kind of prudence is regnative.

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(47) , AA(8),10 ), it belongs to prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of governance in one who has to govern not only himself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because a government is the more perfect according as it is more universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence is reckoned to be regnative.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(1) —

All matters connected with moral virtue belong to prudence as their guide, wherefore “right reason in accord with prudence” is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(5), ad 1; P(2a), Q(58) , A(2), ad 4). For this reason also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of prudence. Hence these two virtues — prudence and justice — belong most properly to a king, according to Jeremiah 23:5: “A king shall reign and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth.”

Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence which is directive, rather than to justice which is executive.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(2) —

A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not pertain to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as they have a share of kingly government.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(2) Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence?

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political prudence, as stated above ( A(1) ). But a part should not be reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from regnative prudence.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, each subject is an individual person.

Now each individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence called political.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that “of the prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the common name political, and deals with individuals.”

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(2) —

I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not in their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is called political.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(2)- RO(1) —

As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence of a thing retains the name of “proper.”

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(2)- RO(2) —

A different aspect of the object diversifies the species of a habit, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(5) ). Now the same actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various departments.

Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(3) Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic?

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) “prudence is directed to a good life in general”: whereas domestic prudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(13) ) prudence is only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people, since many sinners are provident in governing their household. Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject, so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, “one of which is domestic, another legislative, and another political.”

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(3) —

I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in respect of universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality, diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom, since just as the individual is part of the household, so is the household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct from political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from both.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the other hand, the end of political prudence is “a good life in general” as regards the conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way of example and in accordance with the opinion of many.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Some sinners may be provident in certain matters of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in regard to “a good life in general” as regards the conduct of the household, for which above all a virtuous life is required.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The father has in his household an authority like that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(4) Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence?

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that military prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, just as military business is contained under political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore should any be assigned to military business.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the soldiers’ bravery counts for a great deal in warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Proverbs 24:6): “War is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels.”

Now it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need in warfare for that species of prudence which is called “military.”

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(4) —

I answer that, Whatever things are done according to art or reason, should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature, and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason, there should be not only “political” prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a “military” prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it belongs rather to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Other matters in the state are directed to the profit of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of the entire common good.

P(2b)- Q(50)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.

QUESTION OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether \euboulia\, is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence? (3) Whether \synesis\ is a special virtue? (4) Whether \gnome\ is a special virtue? [*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of deliberating well \euboulia\, of judging well according to common law \synesis\, and of judging well according to general law \gnome\, respectively.]

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(1) Whether \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is not a virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) “no man makes evil use of virtue.” Now some make evil use of \euboulia\ (deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising crafty counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may give alms.

Therefore \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. 7:But \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection.

Therefore \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(65) ). Now \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is not connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(1) —

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) \euboulia\ (deliberating well) “is a right counselling.” Now the perfection of virtue consists in right reason. Therefore \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(47) , A(4) ) the nature of a human virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in Ethic. 10:But \euboulia\ (deliberating well) signifies goodness of counsel, for it is derived from the \eu\, good, and \boule\, counsel, being “a good counsel” or rather “a disposition to take good counsel.” Hence it is evident that \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is a human virtue.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(1)- RO(1) —

There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence both the aforesaid processes are contrary to \euboulia\ (deliberating well), as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies perfection.

For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which counsel is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive appetite, which are still more imperfect.

It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which are contingent.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(1)- RO(3) —

In no sinner as such is \euboulia\ (deliberating well) to be found: since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good counsel requires not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due circumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things which are directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not take good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(2) Whether \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the “prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel.” Now this belongs to \euboulia\ (deliberating well) as stated above. Therefore \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is not distinct from prudence.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are specified chiefly by their end, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(1) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(18) , AA(4),6 ). Now \euboulia\ (deliberating well) and prudence are directed to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not indeed to some particular end, but to the common end of all life. Therefore \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to \euboulia\ (deliberating well), while decision belongs to prudence. There \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Prudence is preceptive, according to Ethic. vi, 10. But this does not apply to \euboulia\ (deliberating well).

Therefore \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), virtue is properly directed to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ according to different acts, especially when there is a different kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all these belong to the same virtue of charity.

Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another. Consequently \euboulia\ (deliberating well) which makes man take good counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. And since counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal, so \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is directed to prudence as to a principal virtue, without which it would be no virtue at all, even as neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(1) —

It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by commanding it, to \euboulia\ (deliberating well) by eliciting it.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Different acts are directed in different degrees to the one end which is “a good life in general” [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The last named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the other two acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty. Hence this proves not that \euboulia\ (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a principal virtue.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Even in speculative matters the rational science of dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct from demonstrative science, which decides the truth.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(3) Whether \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that \synesis\ is not a virtue.

Virtues are not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, as stated in the same book (10), \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) is nothing but “a faculty of judging.” But judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it seems that \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) be reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable. Therefore \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But \euboulia\, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) a virtue, as being good judgment.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(3) —

I answer that, \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) are said to be \synetoi\, i.e. “persons of sense,” or \eusynetoi\, i.e. “men of good sense,” just as on the other hand, those who lack this virtue are called \asynetoi\, i.e. “senseless.”

Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause, for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need, besides \euboulia\ (deliberating well), for another virtue, which judges well, and this is called \synesis\ (judging well according to common law).

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Right judgment consists in the cognitive power apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are, whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the cognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true and correct ideas: this belongs to \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly, through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but this judgment is about the ends, whereas \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) is rather about the means.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(3)- RO(2) —

In wicked men there may be right judgment of a universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the particular matter of action, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(13) ).

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(4) Whether \gnome\ (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that \gnome\ (judging well according to general law) is not a special virtue distinct from \synesis\ (judging well according to common law). For a man is said, in respect of \synesis\ (judging well according to common law), to have good judgment.

Now no man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge aright in all things. Therefore \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) extends to all matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of good judgment called \gnome\ (judging well according to general law).

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. \euboulia\ (deliberating well) and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence.

Therefore there is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. \synesis\ (judging well according to common law).

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is no intellectual virtue about such matters.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that \gnome\ (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue.

I answer that cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they come under the order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one could not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we consider Divine Providence.

Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the enemy of one’s country, when it would be wrong to give him back his deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common laws, according to which \synesis\ (judging according to common law) judges: and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of judgment, which is called \gnome\ (judging according to general law), and which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(4)- RO(1) —

\Synesis\ (judging well according to common law) judges rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules: but certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which aims at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles.

Hence \euboulia\ (deliberating well) to which the research of counsel belongs is one for all, but not so \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one.

P(2b)- Q(51)- A(4)- RO(3) —

It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand, among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such things by his reason: this belongs to \gnome\ (judging well according to general law), which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.

QUESTION OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to prudence.

Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost? (2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence? (3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven? (4) Whether the fifth beatitude, “Blessed are the merciful,” etc. corresponds to the gift of counsel?

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as a help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49).

Now for the purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the virtue of prudence, or even of \euboulia\ (deliberating well), as is evident from what has been said ( Q(47) , A(1), ad 2; Q(51) , AA(1),2 ).

Therefore counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are not given to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But counsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy Ghost specially to certain persons, according to 1 Macc. 2:65: “Behold... your brother Simon is a man of counsel.” Therefore counsel should be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( Romans 8:14): “Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.” But counselling is not consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the Holy Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who “have received the spirit of adoption of sons,” it would seem that counsel should not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Isaiah 11:2): “(The Spirit of the Lord) shall rest upon him... the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude.”

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(68) , A(1) ), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according to the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature through time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but not through place, as Augustine declares (Genesis ad lit. viii, 20,22).

Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the research of reason to perform any particular action, and this research is called counsel. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the rational creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Prudence or \euboulia\ (deliberating well), whether acquired or infused, directs man in the research of counsel according to principles that the reason can grasp; hence prudence or \euboulia\ (deliberating well) makes man take good counsel either for himself or for another. Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp the singular and contingent things which may occur, the result is that “the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain” (Wis. 9:14). Hence in the research of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who comprehends all things: and this is done through the gift of counsel, whereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to take counsel for themselves, seek counsel from those who are wiser.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(1)- RO(2) —

That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel others, may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be counselled by God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for salvation is common to all holy persons.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost according to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which is the “faculty of will and reason” [*Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly the gift of counsel is befitting the children of God in so far as the reason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the gift of counsel does not fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence. For “the highest point of that which is underneath touches that which is above,” as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to the gifts, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(68) , A(8) ). Since, then, counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, while command is its highest act, and judgment comes between, it seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of judgment or command.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in De Causis. Now prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only speculative but also practical, as shown above ( Q(9) , A(3) ). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(8) ). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that man should be directed by God, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. Therefore they correspond to one another.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(2) —

I answer that, A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and is perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, as a body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a lower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the supreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of counsel, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(2)- RO(1) —

To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved, but to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost, the position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a mover, as stated above ( A(1) ; P(2a), Q(68) , A(1) ), it follows that it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence by the name of command or judgment rather than of counsel whereby it is possible to signify that the counselled mind is moved by another counselling it.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by a kind of extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the same things.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The mover that is moved, moves through being moved. Hence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by the Holy Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain in heaven. For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of an end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an end, since there man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of counsel is not in heaven.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take counsel in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there is no counsel in heaven.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God, according to 1 John 3:2, “When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him.” But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Romans 11:34, “Who hath been His counsellor?” Therefore neither to the saints in heaven is the gift of counsel becoming.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): “When either the guilt or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate of the heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have won in the conflict, or not to have won.”

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ; P(2a), Q(68) , A(1) ), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational creature by God. Now we must observe two points concerning the motion of the human mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which is moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition when it is in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover is the principle of the movement alone, when the movement ceases, the action of the mover ceases as regards the thing moved, since it has already reached the term of movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases being built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover is cause not only of the movement, but also of the form to which the movement tends, then the action of the mover does not cease even after the form has been attained: thus the sun lightens the air even after it is lightened. In this way, then, God causes in us virtue and knowledge, not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as we persevere in them: and it is thus that God causes in the blessed a knowledge of what is to be done, not as though they were ignorant, but by continuing that knowledge in them.

Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or men, do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but concern the government of things according to Divine Providence. As regards these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God moves the mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the wayfarer, in another. For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in matters of action, by soothing the preexisting anxiety of doubt; whereas there is simple nescience in the mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not know. From this nescience the angel’s mind is cleansed, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does there precede in them any research of doubt, for they simply turn to God; and this is to take counsel of God, for as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. v, 19) “the angels take counsel of God about things beneath them”: wherefore the instruction which they receive from God in such matters is called “counsel.”

Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them in their nescience of what has to be done.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an end, or resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such as the acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which they themselves have attained, for example the ministrations of the angels, and the prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of counsel finds a place in them.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state of life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven.

Even so neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as on the way thither.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving it: and the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the source whence they receive.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(4) Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the gift of counsel?

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(69) , A(1) ). Now we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the fifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other to counsel.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not necessary for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation, according to James 2:13, “Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy.” On the other hand poverty is not necessary for salvation, but belongs to the life of perfection, according to Matthew 19:21. Therefore the beatitude of poverty corresponds to the gift of counsel, rather than to the beatitude of mercy.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they denote a certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of virtue. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as appears from Galatians 5:22,23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of mercy correspond to the gift of counsel.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): “Counsel is befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered from evils so great, to pardon, and to give.”

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(4) —

I answer that, Counsel is properly about things useful for an end. Hence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all correspond to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1 Timothy 4:8, “Godliness [*’Pietas,’ which our English word ‘pity,’ which is the same as mercy; see note on P(2b), Q(30) , A(1) ] is profitable to all things.” Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Although counsel directs in all the acts of virtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason given above.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life whether they be necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work of mercy is necessary for salvation.

P(2b)- Q(52)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the ultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an action which is the end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical knowledge is numbered among the fruits, but only such things as pertain to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among these we find “goodness” and “benignity” which correspond to mercy.

QUESTION OF IMPRUDENCE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3): “There are vices opposed to every virtue, not only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of kinship and not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in opposition to prudence we have craftiness.”

Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a defect either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for prudence, and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to prudence, those namely which are due to abuse of the things required for prudence. And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of negligence which is opposed to solicitude.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin? (2) Whether it is a special sin? (3) Of precipitation or temerity; (4) Of thoughtlessness; (5) Of inconstancy; (6) Concerning the origin of these vices.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(1) Whether imprudence is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine [*De Vera Relig. xiv]; whereas imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be imprudent. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, none but original sin comes to man with his birth. But imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young are imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to original justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But imprudence is not taken away by repentance. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away save by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence, according to Proverbs 21:20, “There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just, and the imprudent [Douay: ‘foolish’] man shall spend it.”

Therefore imprudence is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(1) —

I answer that, Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first, as a privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly speaking it is not taken as a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for this can be without any sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man’s negligence in striving to have prudence.

Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act of reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, whereas the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions which require consideration in the act of prudence. In this way imprudence is a sin in respect of prudence considered under its proper aspect, since it is not possible for a man to act against prudence, except by infringing the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends. Wherefore, if this should happen through aversion from the Divine Law, it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately through contempt and rejection of the Divine teaching: whereas if he act beside the Law and without contempt, and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it will be a venial sin.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(1)- RO(1) —

No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but the rash man wills the act of imprudence, because he wishes to act precipitately. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “he who sins willingly against prudence is less to be commended.”

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(1)- RO(2) —

This argument takes imprudence in the negative sense. It must be observed however that lack of prudence or of any other virtue is included in the lack of original justice which perfected the entire soul. Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed to original sin.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus the lack of this prudence ceases; but acquired prudence is not restored as to the habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly speaking the sin of imprudence consists.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(2) Whether imprudence is a special sin?

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For whoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above ( A(1) ).

Therefore imprudence is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge is. But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be reckoned among those causes.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “evil results from each single defect.” Now many things are requisite for prudence; for instance, reason, intelligence docility, and so on, as stated above (QQ(48) , 49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence, so that it is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now prudence is a special virtue.

Therefore imprudence too is one special vice.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(2) —

I answer that, A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways; first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all sins; secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices, which are its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be general on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated of all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with special acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by participation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no sin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason, which defect belongs to imprudence.

If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in some particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin, then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in three ways.

First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of prudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the individual, from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above ( Q(48) ; Q(50) , A(7) ), so also we distinguish various kinds of imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasipotential parts of prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the several acts of reason. Thus, by defect of “counsel” to which \euboulia\ (deliberating well) corresponds, “precipitation” or “temerity” is a species of imprudence; by defect of “judgment,” to which \synesis\ (judging well according to common law) and \gnome\ (judging well according to general law) refer, there is “thoughtlessness”; while “inconstancy” and “negligence” correspond to the “command” which is the proper act of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things which are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts of prudence. Since however all these things are intended for the direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above. Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in “thoughtlessness”; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable to “precipitation”; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of shrewdness, belong to “negligence” and “inconstancy.”

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This argument considers generality by participation.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Since knowledge is further removed from morality than prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(2)- RO(3) —

When various circumstances are corrupted for the same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same species of sin to take what is not one’s own, where one ought not, and when one ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are various species: for instance, if one man were to take another’s property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this would constitute the species called sacrilege, while if another were to take another’s property when he ought not, merely through the lust of possession, this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack of those things which are requisite for prudence, does not constitute a diversity of species, except in so far as they are directed to different acts of reason, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(3) Whether precipitation is a sin included in imprudence?

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included in imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence; whereas precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to Gregory, who says (Moral. ii, 49) that the gift of “counsel is given as a remedy to precipitation.” Therefore precipitation is not a sin contained under imprudence.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now rashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride.

Therefore precipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste. Now sin happens in counselling not only through being over hasty but also through being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes by, and through corruption of other circumstances, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore there is no reason for reckoning precipitation as a sin contained under imprudence, rather than slowness, or something else of the kind pertaining to inordinate counsel.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Proverbs 4:19): “The way of the wicked is darksome, they know not where they fall.”

Now the darksome ways of ungodliness belong to imprudence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to fall or to be precipitate.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(3) —

I answer that, Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of the soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is said to be precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is brought down from above by the impulse either of its own movement or of another’s, and not in orderly fashion by degrees.

Now the summit of the soul is the reason, and the base is reached in the action performed by the body; while the steps that intervene by which one ought to descend in orderly fashion are “memory” of the past, “intelligence” of the present, “shrewdness” in considering the future outcome, “reasoning” which compares one thing with another, “docility” in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes counsel descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed into action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking these steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then inordinate counsel pertains to imprudence, it is evident that the vice of precipitation is contained under imprudence.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel and to the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as stated above ( Q(52) , A(2) ), and consequently precipitation is opposed to both.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Things are said to be done rashly when they are not directed by reason: and this may happen in two ways; first through the impulse of the will or of a passion, secondly through contempt of the directing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly speaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride, which refuses to submit to another’s ruling. But precipitation refers to both, so that rashness is contained under precipitation, although precipitation refers rather to the first.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Many things have to be considered in the research of reason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that “one should be slow in taking counsel.” Hence precipitation is more directly opposed to rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for the latter bears a certain likeness to right counsel.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(4) Whether thoughtlessness is a special sin included in prudence?

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin included in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to any sin, according to Psalm 18:8, “The law of the Lord is unspotted”; and yet it incites us to be thoughtless, according to Matthew 10:19, “Take no thought how or what to speak.” Therefore thoughtlessness is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to many things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and therefore to a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is contained under thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason, viz. “counsel,” “judgment” about what has been counselled, and “command” [*Cf. Q(47) , A(8) ]. Now thought precedes all these acts, since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore thoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Proverbs 4:25): “Let thy eyes look straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps.”

Now this pertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness. Therefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(4) —

I answer that, Thought signifies the act of the intellect in considering the truth about. something. Now just as research belongs to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles. Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore evident that thoughtlessness is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the words quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of God alone, because “as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to God,” according to 2 Paral 20:12: else if man, instead of doing what he can, were to be content with awaiting God’s assistance, he would seem to tempt God.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(4)- RO(2) —

All thought about those things of which counsel takes cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment, wherefore this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently thoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in speculative matters, because actions are about singulars.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(5) Whether inconstancy is a vice contained under prudence?

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained under imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult matters belongs to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to fortitude rather than to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( James 3:16): “Where jealousy [Douay: ‘envy’] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil work.”

But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains not to imprudence but to envy.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to persevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of “incontinency” in pleasurable matters, and of “effeminacy” or “squeamishness” in unpleasant matters, according to Ethic. vii, 1.

Therefore inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to imprudence. Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to imprudence.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(5) —

I answer that, Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, for a man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account of something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this withdrawal completed except through a defect of reason, which is deceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since it can resist the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it is due to its own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has conceived; hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a defect in the reason. Now just as all rectitude of the practical reason belongs in some degree to prudence, so all lack of that rectitude belongs to imprudence.

Consequently inconstancy, as to its completion, belongs to imprudence.

And just as precipitation is due to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises from a defect in the act of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant because his reason fails in commanding what has been counselled and judged.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The good of prudence is shared by all the moral virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Envy and anger, which are the source of contention, cause inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which power the origin of inconstancy is due, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers evil concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows (which points to a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands firm, in the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the persevering man, against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance seem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason; and to this power inconstancy pertains also.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(6) Whether the aforesaid vices arise from lust?

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above ( A(5), ad 2). But envy is a distinct vice from lust.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( James 1:8): “A double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways.” Now duplicity does not seem to pertain to lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of covetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect of reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than carnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices rather than from carnal vices.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the aforesaid vices arise from lust.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(6) —

I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) “pleasure above all corrupts the estimate of prudence,” and chiefly sexual pleasure which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight.

Now the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the aforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical reason, as stated above ( AA(2),5 ), it follows that they arise chiefly from lust.

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the reason to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by destroying the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “the man who is incontinent through anger listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent through lust does not listen to it at all.”

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Duplicity also is something resulting from lust, just as inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the mind from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1, sc. 1) that “love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce.”

P(2b)- Q(53)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the more as they lead us away from reason.

QUESTION OF NEGLIGENCE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether negligence is a special sin? (2) To which virtue is it opposed? (3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(1) Whether negligence is a special sin?

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in every virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special sin. Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins neglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in sin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, every special sin had a determinate matter. But negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither about evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence if he omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done negligently, they are no longer good. Therefore it seems that negligence is not a special vice.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Sins committed through negligence, are distinguished from those which are committed through contempt.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(1) —

I answer that, Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence is a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin according as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain sins are special through being about a special matter, as lust is about sexual matters, while some vices are special on account of their having a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of matter, and such are all vices affecting an act of reason, since every act of reason extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then solicitude is a special act of reason, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(9) ), it follows that negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because the more we love [diligimus] a thing the more solicitous are we about it. Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for every virtue, in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every virtue.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(1)- RO(2) —

In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an act of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence just as precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of reason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is found more or less in all sins.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good that one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done negligently, but because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of goodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through lack of solicitude, or some due circumstance be omitted.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(2) Whether negligence is opposed to prudence?

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that negligence is not opposed to prudence. For negligence seems to be the same as idleness or laziness, which belongs to sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Now sloth is not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated above ( Q(35) , A(3) ).

Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence. But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the executive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But negligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is “precipitation,” nor a defect of judgment, since that is “thoughtlessness,” nor a defect of command, because that is “inconstancy.” Therefore negligence does not pertain to imprudence.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, it is written ( Ecclesiastes 7:19): “He that feareth God, neglecteth nothing.” But every sin is excluded by the opposite virtue. Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): “A babbler and a fool [imprudens] will regard no time.” Now this is due to negligence. Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(2) —

I answer that, Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to imprudence. This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore observes (Etym. x) “a negligent man is one who fails to choose [nec eligens]”: and the right choice of the means belongs to prudence. Therefore negligence pertains to imprudence.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to which choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote slowness of execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in setting about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the execution itself. Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from sloth, which is “an oppressive sorrow,” i.e. hindering, the mind from action [*Cf. Q(35) , A(1) ; P(2a), Q(35) , A(8) ].

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Omission regards the external act, for it consists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is opposed to justice, and is an effect of negligence, even as the execution of a just deed is the effect of right reason.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Negligence regards the act of command, which solicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this act otherwise than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(2)- RO(4) —

The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because according to Proverbs 15:27, “by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth from evil.” Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites man to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above ( P(2a), Q(44) , A(2) ) when we were treating of the passions, that “fear makes us take counsel.”

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(3) Whether negligence can be a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin. For a gloss of Gregory [*Moral. 9:34] on Job 9:28, “I feared all my works,” etc. says that “too little love of God aggravates the former,” viz. negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the love of God is done away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, a gloss on Ecclus. 7:34, “For thy negligences purify thyself with a few,” says: “Though the offering be small it cleanses the negligences of many sins.” Now this would not be, if negligence were a mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed for mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice was prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Proverbs 19:16): “He that neglecteth his own life [Vulg.: ‘way’] shall die.”

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2), ad 3), negligence arises out of a certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of solicitude on the part of the reason in commanding what it should command, or as it should command. Accordingly negligence may happen to be a mortal sin in two ways. First on the part of that which is omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin. Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will be so remiss about Divine things, as to fall away altogether from the charity of God, such negligence is a mortal sin, and this is the case chiefly when negligence is due to contempt.

But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial sin, provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some lack of fervor, to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First through lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence that is a venial sin: secondly through lack of charity itself, in which sense we say that a man loves God less when he loves Him with a merely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(3)- RO(2) —

According to the same authority (gloss), a small offering made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man not only from venial but also from mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(54)- A(3)- RO(3) —

When negligence consists in the omission of that which is necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest genus of sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions, are more hidden, wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not be confessed in public.

QUESTION OF VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a resemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? (3) Whether craftiness is a special sin? (4) Of guile; (5) Of fraud; (6) Of solicitude about temporal things; (7) Of solicitude about the future; (8) Of the origin of these vices.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin. For prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it governs them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither therefore is any prudence a sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it is lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, “for no man ever hated his own flesh” ( Ephesians 5:29). Therefore prudence of the flesh is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or of the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any prudence of the flesh be accounted among sins.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(1) —

On the contrary, No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness according to Wis. 14:9, “To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike.” Now it is written ( Romans 8:7): “The prudence [Vulg.: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh is an enemy to God.” Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(47) , A(13) ), prudence regards things which are directed to the end of life as a whole.

Hence prudence of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a sin, because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods of the body, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(2) , A(5) ). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Justice and temperance include in their very nature that which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the curbing of concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense. On the other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing [providendo], as stated above ( Q(47) , A(1) ; Q(49) , A(6) ), which can extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken simply in a good sense, yet, if something be added, it may be taken in a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to be a sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on account of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the good of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in a good of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it is thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the flesh.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The devil tempts us, not through the good of the appetible object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence implies direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of “prudence of the devil,” as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is the aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as worldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence we speak of “carnal” and again of “worldly” prudence, according to Luke 16:8, “The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: ‘wiser’] in their generation,” etc.

The Apostle includes all in the “prudence of the flesh,” because we covet the external things of the world on account of the flesh.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(1)- RO(3) We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called “wisdom,” as stated above ( Q(47) , A(2), ad 1), we may distinguish a threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation. Hence it is written ( James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is “earthly, sensual and devilish,” as explained above ( Q(45) , A(1), ad 1), when we were treating of wisdom.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(2) Whether prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since this implies contempt of God. Now “the prudence [Douay: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh... is not subject to the law of God” ( Romans 8:7). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin. Now prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, for “it cannot be subject to the law of God” ( Romans 8:7), and so it seems to be an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed to that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues.

Therefore prudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is itself a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(2) —

On the contrary, That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining to the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence, diminishes sin [*Cf. Proverbs 6:30]. Therefore prudence of the flesh has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(47) , A(2), ad 1; A(13) ), a man is said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to the end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to some particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or something else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so doing, since he cannot have several last ends, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(1) , A(5) ).

If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affection for some pleasure of the flesh, without turning away from God by a mortal sin; in which case he does not place the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about one’s food in order to sustain one’s body, this is no longer prudence of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh as a means to an end.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby a man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and this is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the Holy Ghost. For when it is stated that “it cannot be subject to the law of God,” this does not mean that he who has prudence of the flesh, cannot be converted and submit to the law of God, but that carnal prudence itself cannot be subject to God’s law, even as neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that which is hot may become cold.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed to prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in some very grave matter.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(3) Whether craftiness is a special sin?

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they induce us to be crafty, according to Proverbs 1:4, “To give craftiness [Douay: ‘subtlety’] to little ones.” Therefore craftiness is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Proverbs 13:16): “The crafty [Douay: ‘prudent’] man doth all things with counsel.” Therefore, he does so either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no sin seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to carnal or worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin distinct from prudence of the flesh.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, “The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn,” says (Moral. x, 29): “The wisdom of this world is to hide one’s thoughts by artifice, to conceal one’s meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make out the truth to be false,” and further on he adds: “This prudence is acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by children.” Now the above things seem to belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not distinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently it seems not to be a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( 2 Corinthians 4:2): “We renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the word of God.”

Therefore craftiness is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(3) —

I answer that, Prudence is “right reason applied to action,” just as science is “right reason applied to knowledge.” In speculative matters one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false premises, that appear to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion. Even so a sin may be against prudence, through having some resemblance thereto, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end which is good not in truth but in appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the flesh; secondly, when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(3)- RO(1) —

As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is craftiness sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of their mutual resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is taken in a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. vi, 12.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for an evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false and counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if it be directed to a good end.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Under “worldly prudence” Gregory included everything that can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness also.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(4) Whether guile is a sin pertaining to craftiness?

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men. Yet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Corinthians 12:16, “Being crafty I caught you by guile.” Therefore guile is not always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue, according to Psalm 5:11, “They dealt deceitfully with their tongues.” Now craftiness like prudence is in the very act of reason.

Therefore guile does not pertain to craftiness.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( Proverbs 12:20): “Guile [Douay: ‘Deceit’] is in the heart of them that think evil things.” But the thought of evil things does not always pertain to craftiness. Therefore guile does not seem to belong to craftiness.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to Ephesians 4:14, “By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive”: and guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to craftiness.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(3) ), it belongs to craftiness to adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in order to attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of such ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as regards the process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly to craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end belongs to prudence. Secondly the adopting of such like ways may be considered with regard to their actual execution, and in this way it belongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a certain execution of craftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense, and improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the execution of craftiness.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The execution of craftiness with the purpose of deceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the chief place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to another man, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence guile is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in deeds, according to <19A425> Psalm 104:25, “And to deal deceitfully with his servants.” Guile is also in the heart, according to Ecclus. 19:23, “His interior is full of deceit,” but this is to devise deceits, according to Psalm 37:13: “They studied deceits all the day long.”

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs devise certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part he devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end.

Nevertheless it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by violence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult, it is of less frequent occurrence.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(5) Whether fraud pertains to craftiness?

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness. For a man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be deceived, which is the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves praise for allowing himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Corinthians 6:1, “Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?” Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or receiving external things, for it is written ( Acts 5:1) that “a certain man named Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept back part of the price of the land.”

Now it pertains to injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain external things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness which is opposed to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written ( Proverbs 1:18) concerning some “that they practice frauds [Douay: ‘deceits’] against their own souls.” Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(5) —

On the contrary, The object of fraud is to deceive, according to Job 13:9, “Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent [Douay: ‘deceitful’] dealings?”

Now craftiness is directed to the same object. Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(5) —

I answer that, Just as “guile” consists in the execution of craftiness, so also does “fraud.” But they seem to differ in the fact that “guile” belongs in general to the execution of craftiness, whether this be effected by words, or by deeds, whereas “fraud” belongs more properly to the execution of craftiness by deeds.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be deceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of being deceived, and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The execution of craftiness may be carried out by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against themselves or their own souls; it is through God’s just judgment that what they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to Psalm 7:16, “He is fallen into the hole he made.”

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(6) Whether it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters?

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters. Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects, according to Romans 12:8, “He that ruleth, with solicitude.” Now according to the Divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things, according to Psalm 8:8, “Thou hast subjected all things under his feet,” etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he works. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things whereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says ( Thessalonians 3:10): “If any man will not work, neither let him eat.”

Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal things.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy, according to 2 Timothy 1:17, “When he was come to Rome, he carefully sought me.” Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes connected with works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous to watch over the interests of orphans and poor persons.

Therefore solicitude about temporal things is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Our Lord said ( Matthew 6:31): “Be not solicitous... saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?”

And yet such things are very necessary.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(6) —

I answer that, Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when there is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when success is assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in three ways. First on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): “When Our Lord said: ‘Be not solicitous,’ etc.... He intended to forbid them either to make such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the Gospel.” Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written ( Matthew 13:22) that “the care of this world... chokes up the word.” Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack necessary things if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives three motives for laying aside this fear. First, on account of the yet greater favors bestowed by God on man, independently of his solicitude, viz. his body and soul ( Matthew 6:26); secondly, on account of the care with which God watches over animals and plants without the assistance of man, according to the requirements of their nature; thirdly, because of Divine providence, through ignorance of which the gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all others. Consequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be granted us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them and be over solicitous about them.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily labor is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on Matthew 6:31, “Be not solicitous,” that “labor is necessary, but solicitude must be banished,” namely superfluous solicitude which unsettles the mind.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(6)- RO(3) —

In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, unless it be superfluous.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(7) Whether we should be solicitous about the future?

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that we should be solicitous about the future. For it is written ( Proverbs 6:6-8): “Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no guide, nor master... provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest.”

Now this is to be solicitous about the future. Therefore solicitude about the future is praiseworthy.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is chiefly about the future, since its principal part is “foresight of future things,” as stated above ( Q(49) , A(6), ad 1). Therefore it is virtuous to be solicitous about the future.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for the morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read ( John 12:6) that Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and ( Acts 4:34-37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which had been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about the future.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Our Lord said ( Matthew 6:34): “Be not... solicitous for tomorrow”; where “tomorrow” stands for the future, as Jerome says in his commentary on this passage.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(7) —

I answer that, No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with its due circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to Ecclesiastes 8:6, “There is a time and opportunity for every business”; which applies not only to external deeds but also to internal solicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude; thus solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and solicitude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly if a man were solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging to a future time. Hence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude, saying: “Be... not solicitous for tomorrow,” wherefore He adds, “for the morrow will be solicitous for itself,” that is to say, the morrow will have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the soul. This is what He means by adding: “Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof,” namely, the burden of solicitude.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(7)- RO(1) —

The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is this that is proposed for our example.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, if a man were to seek temporal things, to which the terms “past” and “future” apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for solicitude.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(7)- RO(3) —

As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17), “when we see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these needful things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the morrow, since even Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse, and we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on account of a threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not condemn those who according to human custom, provide themselves with such things, but those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these things.”

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(8) Whether these vices arise from covetousness?

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that these vices do not arise from covetousness. As stated above ( Q(43) , A(6) ) lust is the chief cause of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to right reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from lust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “Venus is full of guile and her girdle is many colored” and that “he who is incontinent in desire acts with cunning.”

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(13) ). Now, since prudence is in the reason, the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride and vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride rather than from covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold of other people’s goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a daughter of covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(8) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(3) ; Q(47) , A(13) ), carnal prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise chiefly from covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(8)- RO(1) —

On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising its act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust. When the Philosopher says that “Venus is full of guile,” he is referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means of craftiness but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure; wherefore he adds that “Venus doth cozen the wits of the wisest man” [*Cf. Iliad xiv, 214-217].

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(8)- RO(2) —

To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or apes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use of fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by excellence.

P(2b)- Q(55)- A(8)- RO(3) —

Anger’s movement is sudden, hence it acts with precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2,3) [*Cf. Ethic. vii, 6].

QUESTION OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) The precepts of prudence; (2) The precepts relating to the opposite vices.

P(2b)- Q(56)- A(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence?

P(2b)- Q(56)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. For the chief precepts should include a precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts are those of the decalogue. Since then prudence is the chief of the moral virtues, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(56)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the teaching of the Gospel contains the Law especially with regard to the precepts of the decalogue. Now the teaching of the Gospel contains a precept of prudence ( Matthew 10:16): “Be ye... prudent [Douay: ‘wise’] as serpents.” Therefore the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(56)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the other lessons of the Old Testament are directed to the precepts of the decalogue: wherefore it is written ( Malachi 4:4): “Remember the law of Moses My servant, which I commanded him in Horeb.”

Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include precepts of prudence; for instance ( Proverbs 3:5): “Lean not upon thy own prudence”; and further on ( Proverbs 4:25): “Let thine eyelids go before thy steps.”

Therefore the Law also should have contained a precept of prudence, especially among the precepts of the decalogue.

The contrary however appears to anyone who goes through the precepts of the decalogue.

P(2b)- Q(56)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(100), A(3) ; A(5), ad 1) when we were treating of precepts, the commandments of the decalogue being given to the whole people, are a matter of common knowledge to all, as coming under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost among the things dictated by natural reason are the ends of human life, which are to the practical order what naturally known principles are to the speculative order, as shown above ( Q(47) , A(6) ).

Now prudence is not about the end, but about the means, as stated above ( Q(47) , A(6) ). Hence it was not fitting that the precepts of the decalogue should include a precept relating directly to prudence. And yet all the precepts of the decalogue are related to prudence, in so far as it directs all virtuous acts.

P(2b)- Q(56)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although prudence is simply foremost among all the moral virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its object under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a precept, as stated above ( Q(44) , A(1) ; P(2a), Q(99) , AA(1),5 ). Hence it behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which are those of the decalogue, to refer to justice rather than to prudence.

P(2b)- Q(56)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of perfection. Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all matters relating to right conduct, whether ends or means: wherefore it behooved the Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(56)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Just as the rest of the teaching of the Old Testament is directed to the precepts of the decalogue as its end, so it behooved man to be instructed by the subsequent lessons of the Old Testament about the act of prudence which is directed to the means.

P(2b)- Q(56)- A(2) Whether the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are fittingly propounded in the Old Law?