QUESTIONS 64-81 QUESTION OF MURDER (EIGHT ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in relation to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed with regard to voluntary commutations.

Sins are committed in relation to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one’s neighbor against his will: and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or by word. By deed when one’s neighbor is injured either in his own person, or in a person connected with him, or in his possessions.

We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the first place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the greatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants? (2) Whether it is lawful to kill a sinner? (3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public person only? (4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric? (5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself? (6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man? (7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense? (8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(1) Whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing?

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing.

For the Apostle says ( Romans 13:2): “They that resist the ordinance of God purchase to themselves damnation [*Vulg.: ‘He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase themselves damnation.’].”

Now Divine providence has ordained that all living things should be preserved, according to <19E608> Psalm 146:8,9, “Who maketh grass to grow on the mountains... ho giveth to beasts their food.”

Therefore it seems unlawful to take the life of any living thing.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life. Now life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same reason it is apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not appointed save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be inflicted, according to the Divine law, on one who killed another man’s ox or sheep ( Exodus 22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): “When we hear it said, ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ we do not take it as referring to trees, for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because they have no fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words, ‘Thou shalt not kill’ refer to the killing of a man.”

I answer that, There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds from imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the generation of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, and lastly a man, so too things, like the plants, which merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man.

Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).

Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that animals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and this cannot be done unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for the use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of God Himself: for it is written ( Genesis 1:29,30): “Behold I have given you every herb... and all trees... to be your meat, and to all beasts of the earth”: and again ( Genesis 9:3): “Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat to you.”

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(1)- RO(1) —

According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals and plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), “by a most just ordinance of the Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use.”

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of reason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it were by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(1)- RO(3) —

He that kills another’s ox, sins, not through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(2) Whether it is lawful to kill sinners?

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For our Lord in the parable ( Matthew 13) forbade the uprooting of the cockle which denotes wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is forbidden by God is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now according to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance, according to Ezekiel 33:11, “I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live.” Therefore it seems altogether unjust to kill sinners.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to do that which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in itself, since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and “we wish our friends to live and to exist,” according to Ethic. ix, 4. Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Exodus 22:18): “Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live”; and ( <19A001> Psalm 100:8): “In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land.”

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), it is lawful to kill dumb animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man’s use, as the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since “a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump” ( Corinthians 5:6).

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(2)- RO(2) —

According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas sometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what is expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate according to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(2)- RO(3) —

By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to others. This is expressed in Psalm 48:21: “Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them,” and Proverbs 11:29: “The fool shall serve the wise.”

Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1 and Ethic. vii, 6).

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(3) Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned?

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine law. Yet, on account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded ( Exodus 32:27): “Let every man kill his brother, and friend, and neighbor.” Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a sinner.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, as stated above ( A(2), ad 3), man, on account of sin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful for any private individual to kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful. Therefore for the same reason, it is lawful for any private individual to kill a man who has sinned.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves praise for doing what is useful for the common good. Now the slaying of evildoers is useful for the common good, as stated above ( A(2) ).

Therefore it is deserving of praise if even private individuals kill evil-doers.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [*Can. Quicumque percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8]: “A man who, without exercising public authority, kills an evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and all the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not given him.”

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ), it is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community’s welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The person by whose authority a thing is done really does the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), “He slays not who owes his service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the instrument to him that wields it.” Wherefore those who, at the Lord’s command, slew their neighbors and friends, would seem not to have done this themselves, but rather He by whose authority they acted thus: just as a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his sovereign, and the executioner slays the robber by the authority of the judge.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(3)- RO(2) —

A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in the case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill it; whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is required, not for their sake, but on account of the owner’s loss. On the other hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn him to death for the common good.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(3)- RO(3) —

It is lawful for any private individual to do anything for the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful to some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(4) Whether it is lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers?

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem lawful for clerics to kill evildoers.

For clerics especially should fulfil the precept of the Apostle ( Corinthians 4:16): “Be ye followers of me as I also am of Christ,” whereby we are called upon to imitate God and His saints. Now the very God whom we worship puts evildoers to death, according to <19D510> Psalm 135:10, “Who smote Egypt with their firstborn.” Again Moses made the Levites slay twenty-three thousand men on account of the worship of the calf ( Exodus 32), the priest Phinees slew the Israelite who went in to the woman of Madian ( Numbers 25), Samuel killed Agag king of Amalec ( 1 Samuel 15), Elias slew the priests of Baal ( <111801> 1 Kings. 18), Mathathias killed the man who went up to the altar to sacrifice (1 Mach. 2); and, in the New Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira ( Acts 5). Therefore it seems that even clerics may kill evil-doers.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and is more united to God. Now the secular power as “God’s minister” lawfully puts evil-doers to death, according to Romans 13:4.

Much more therefore may clerics, who are God’s ministers and have spiritual power, put evil-doers to death.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office, may lawfully exercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the princely office to slay evildoers, as stated above ( A(3) ). Therefore those clerics who are earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Timothy 3:2,3): “It behooveth... a bishop to be without crime [*Vulg.: ‘blameless.’ ‘Without crime’ is the reading in Titus 1:7]... not given to wine, no striker.”

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(4) —

I answer that, It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons. First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon is represented the Passion of Christ slain “Who, when He was struck did not strike [Vulg.: ‘When He suffered, He threatened not’]” ( Peter 2:23). Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: for ministers should imitate their master, according to Ecclus. 10:2, “As the judge of the people is himself, so also are his ministers.” The other reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed: wherefore they should abstain from such things in order that they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(4)- RO(1) —

God works in all things without exception whatever is right, yet in each one according to its mode. Wherefore everyone should imitate God in that which is specially becoming to him.

Hence, though God slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that all should imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put Ananias and Saphira to death by his own authority or with his own hand, but published their death sentence pronounced by God. The Priests or Levites of the Old Testament were the ministers of the Old Law, which appointed corporal penalties, so that it was fitting for them to slay with their own hands.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The ministry of clerics is concerned with better things than corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual welfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with minor matters.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of earthly princes, not that they may inflict capital punishment themselves, but that this may be carried into effect by others in virtue of their authority.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself.

For murder is a sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man can do an injustice to himself, as is proved in Ethic. v, 11. Therefore no man sins by killing himself.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public authority, to kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority is sometimes an evil-doer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a lesser danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a man to cut off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his whole body. Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater evil, for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a man may kill himself.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, Samson killed himself, as related in Judges 16, and yet he is numbered among the saints ( Hebrews 11).

Therefore it is lawful for a man to kill himself.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5)- O(5) —

Further, it is related (2 Mach. 14:42) that a certain Razias killed himself, “choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the hands of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble birth.”

Now nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful. Therefore suicide is not unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): “Hence it follows that the words ‘Thou shalt not kill’ refer to the killing of a man — not another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills himself, kills nothing else than a man.”

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5) —

I answer that, It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as such, belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community, and so, as such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing himself he injures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Thirdly, because life is God’s gift to man, and is subject to His power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own life, sins against God, even as he who kills another’s slave, sins against that slave’s master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce sentence of death and life, according to Deuteronomy 32:39, “I will kill and I will make to live.”

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to justice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a man should have towards himself: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to oneself. In relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by reason also of its opposition to justice.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5)- RO(2) —

One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to death an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man is judge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises public authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever: although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Man is made master of himself through his free-will: wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters which pertain to this life which is ruled by man’s free-will. But the passage from this life to another and happier one is subject not to man’s free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for man to take his own life that he may pass to a happier life, nor that he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, because the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 6).

Therefore to bring death upon oneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is unlawful to take one’s own life on account of one’s having committed a sin, both because by so doing one does oneself a very great injury, by depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance, and because it is not lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself lest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on herself the very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sir; of another. For she commits no sin in being violated by force, provided she does not consent, since “without consent of the mind there is no stain on the body,” as the Blessed Lucy declared.

Now it is evident that fornication and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man’s, especially one’s own, life: since the latter is most grievous, because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love.

Moreover it is most dangerous since no time is left wherein to expiate it by repentance. Again it is not lawful for anyone to take his own life for fear he should consent to sin, because “evil must not be done that good may come” ( Romans 3:8) or that evil may be avoided especially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain event, for it is uncertain whether one will at some future time consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man from sin under any temptation whatever.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5)- RO(4) —

As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), “not even Samson is to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies under the ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him to do this.” He assigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the time of persecution took their own lives, and who are commemorated by the Church.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(5)- RO(5) —

It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from being slain by another, for the sake of the good of virtue, and that he may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to avoid penal evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason some, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to act from fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a weakness of soul unable to bear penal evils, as the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7) and Augustine (De Civ. Dei 22,23) declare.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(6) Whether it is lawful to kill the innocent?

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill the innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on the contrary “the fear of the Lord driveth out sin” (Ecclus. 1:27). Now Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was willing to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin, kill an innocent person.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, among those sins that are committed against one’s neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is a greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life to the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a righteous person.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is not a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of justice, to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who is bound to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man whom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses; and again the executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to death the man who has been unjustly sentenced.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Exodus 23:7): “The innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death.”

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(6) —

I answer that, An individual man may be considered in two ways: first, in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated above ( A(2) ) the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. On the other hand the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common good, since they are the chief part of the community. Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(6)- RO(1) —

God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both the sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God’s command kills an innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he executes: indeed his obedience to God’s commands is a proof that he fears Him.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(6)- RO(2) —

In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just man, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in opposition to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to justice: thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater good: fourthly, because he despises God more, according to Luke 10:16, “He that despiseth you despiseth Me.” On the other hand it is accidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be received by God into glory.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(6)- RO(3) —

If the judge knows that man who has been convicted by false witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest injustice, he does not has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): “I do not agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him; unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one does it not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, provided it be in keeping with one’s person.” Now he who kills a man in self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this would seem to be unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): “How are they free from sin in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man’s life for the sake of these contemptible things?” Now among contemptible things he reckons “those which men may forfeit unwillingly,” as appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and the chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to take another’s life for the sake of the life of his own body.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can.

De his clericis] says in the Decretals: “Concerning the clerics about whom you have consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in selfdefense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they may return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree; know that in no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any circumstances whatever.” Now clerics and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral precepts.

Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in self-defense.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(7)- O(4) —

Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or adultery or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since the spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore no man may lawfully take another’s life in self-defense in order to save his own life.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(7)- O(5) —

Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to Matthew 7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according to Romans 12:19: “Not defending [Douay: ‘revenging’] yourselves, my dearly beloved.” Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Exodus 22:2): “If a thief be found breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die; he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood.”

Now it is much more lawful to defend one’s life than one’s house.

Therefore neither is a man guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(7) —

I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above ( Q(43) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(12) , A(1) ). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in “being,” as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], “it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense.” Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one’s own life than of another’s. But as it is unlawful to take a man’s life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, as stated above ( A(3) ), it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(7)- RO(1) —

The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when one man intends to kill another to save himself from death.

The passage quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the same sense. Hence he says pointedly, “for the sake of these things,” whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Irregularity results from the act though sinless of taking a man’s life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly condemns a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but to defend himself.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(7)- RO(4) —

The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of one’s own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking of a man’s life.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(7)- RO(5) —

The defense forbidden in this passage is that which comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: “Not defending yourselves — that is, not striking your enemy back.”

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(8) Whether one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance?

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance. For we read ( Genesis 4:23,24) that Lamech slew a man in mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Genesis 4:23], and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Exodus 21:22): “If... one strike a woman with child, and she miscarry indeed... if her death ensue thereupon, he shall render life for life.”

Yet this may happen without any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs the guilt of murder.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): “When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us.” Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted guilty.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(8) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) “chance is a cause that acts beside one’s intention.” Hence chance happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary. And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.

Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally, according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes another’s death through occupying himself with unlawful things which he ought to avoid: secondly, when he does not take sufficient care. Hence, according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is not guilty of that person’s death: whereas if he be occupied with something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his action results in someone’s death.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a man’s life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(8)- RO(2) —

He that strikes a woman with child does something unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.

P(2b)- Q(64)- A(8)- RO(3) —

According to the canons a penalty, is inflicted on those who cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, or failing to take sufficient care.

QUESTION OF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person.

Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The mutilation of members; (2) Blows; (3) Imprisonment; (4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries are aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with others?

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(1) Whether in some cases it may be lawful to maim anyone?

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that “sin consists in departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is contrary to nature.” Now according to nature it is appointed by God that a man’s body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary to nature that it should be deprived of a member. Therefore it seems that it is always a sin to maim a person.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the parts of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). But it is unlawful to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by public authority. Therefore neither is it lawful to maim anyone, except perhaps by public authority.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself for the sake of the soul’s welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P. I, sect. 4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves that they might preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other reason to maim a person.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Exodus 21:24): “Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.”

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(1) —

I answer that, Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to the whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and retains its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury to the whole body. But as the whole of man is directed as to his end to the whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above ( Q(61) , A(1) ; Q(64) , AA(2),5 ), it may happen that although the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so far as it is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of restraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is lawfully deprived of life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so is he deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins. But this is not lawful for a private individual, even with the consent of the owner of the member, because this would involve an injury to the community, to whom the man and all his parts belong. If, however, the member be decayed and therefore a source of corruption to the whole body, then it is lawful with the consent of the owner of the member, to cut away the member for the welfare of the whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent of the person whose business it is to care for the welfare of the person who has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether unlawful to maim anyone.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a particular nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus death and corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the particular nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping with universal nature.

In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common good.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The life of the entire man is not directed to something belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is directed to his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to take anyone’s life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be directed to the good of one man, and consequently in certain cases can pertain to him.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(1)- RO(3) —

A member should not be removed for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to further the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further one’s spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, because sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no case is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever. Hence Chrysostom, in his exposition on Matthew 19:12 (Hom. lxii in Matth.), “There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven,” says: “Not by maiming themselves, but by destroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself, since they are murderers who do such things.” And further on he says: “Nor is lust tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more importunate, for the seed springs in us from other sources, and chiefly from an incontinent purpose and a careless mind: and temptation is curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by curbing one’s thoughts.”

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(2) Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves?

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says ( Ephesians 6:4): “You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger”; and further on (Ephesians 9:6): “And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves [Vulg.: ‘to them’] forbearing threatenings.”

Now some are provoked to anger by blows, and become more troublesome when threatened. Therefore neither should parents strike their children, nor masters their slaves.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that “a father’s words are admonitory and not coercive.” Now blows are a kind of coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their children.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above ( Q(32) , A(2) ). If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Proverbs 13:24): “He that spareth the rod hateth his son,” and further on ( Proverbs 23:13): “Withhold not correction from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul from hell.”

Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): “Torture and fetters are for a malicious slave.”

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(2) —

I answer that, Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as when it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body’s integrity, while a blow merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much less harm than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a person a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice.

Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear from threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The greater power should exercise the greater coercion. Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the father and the master who preside over the family household, which is an imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is exercised by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows, which do not inflict irreparable harm.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(2)- RO(3) —

It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(3) Whether it is lawful to imprison a man?

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(18) , A(2) ). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter for imprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is unlawful to imprison a man.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice. Now according to Ecclus. 15:14, “God left man in the hand of his own counsel.” Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by chains or prisons.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from doing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from doing this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order to restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put a man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(3) —

On the contrary, We read in Leviticus 24 that a man was imprisoned for the sin of blasphemy.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(3) —

I answer that, In the goods three things may be considered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of the body, and this is injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or rest of the senses, and to this striking or anything causing a sense of pain is opposed.

Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and this is hindered by binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention.

Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, unless it be done according to the order of justice, either in punishment, or as a measure of precaution against some evil.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(3)- RO(1) —

A man who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use of his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(3)- RO(2) —

According to the order of His wisdom God sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to Job 5:12: “Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so that their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes He allows them to do what they will.” In like manner, according to human justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain ones.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(3)- RO(3) —

It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him from doing not only evil but also good deeds.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(4) Whether the sin is aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with others?

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character from inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil inflicted on a man’s own person is more against his will than that which is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an injury inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do injuries to orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17): “He will not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when she poureth out her complaint.” Now the widow and the orphan are not connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated through an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own just as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary for him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the case of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now these injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary commutation.

Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 28:32) as though indicating an aggravating circumstance: “Thy sons and thy daughters shall be given to another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg.: ‘May thy sons and thy daughters be given,’ etc.].”

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(4) —

I answer that, Other things being equal, an injury is a more grievous sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is that it is a more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in authority than a private individual, because it conduces to the injury of the whole community, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(73) , A(9) ). Now when an injury is inflicted on one who is connected in any way with another, that injury affects two persons, so that, other things being equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen, however, that in view of certain circumstances, a sin committed against one who is not connected with any other person, is more grievous, on account of either the dignity of the person, or the greatness of the injury.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(4)- RO(1) —

An injury inflicted on a person connected with others is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than if it were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view it is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man is guilty through injuring the other one in himself.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the same injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they have no one to turn to for relief.

P(2b)- Q(65)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is concerned, for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed her by violence.

But this does not remove the injury as affecting her husband, since “the wife hath not power of her own body; but the husband” ( 1 Corinthians 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. of adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to chastity, we shall speak in the treatise on Temperance ( Q(154), A(8) ).

QUESTION OF THEFT AND ROBBERY (NINE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man injures his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery.

Under this head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things? (2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own? (3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another’s property? (4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft? (5) Whether every theft is a sin? (6) Whether theft is a mortal sin? (7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity? (8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin? (9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(1) Whether it is natural for man to possess external things?

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is God’s. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God, according to Psalm 23:1, “The earth is the Lord’s,” etc. Therefore it is not natural for man to possess external things.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man ( Luke 12:18), “I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my goods,” says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: “Tell me: which are thine? where did you take them from and bring them into being?” Now whatever man possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does not naturally possess external things.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad Gratianum, i, 1]) “dominion denotes power.” But man has no power over external things, since he can work no change in their nature.

Therefore the possession of external things is not natural to man.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 8:8): “Thou hast subjected all things under his feet.”

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(1) —

I answer that, External things can be considered in two ways. First, as regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, but only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated above ( Q(64) , A(1) ). It is by this argument that the Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural dominion of man over other creatures, which is competent to man in respect of his reason wherein God’s image resides, is shown forth in man’s creation ( Genesis 1:26) by the words: “Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea,” etc.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(1)- RO(1) —

God has sovereign dominion over all things: and He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the sustenance of man’s body. For this reason man has a natural dominion over things, as regards the power to make use of them.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The rich man is reproved for deeming external things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received them from another, namely from God.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(1)- RO(3) —

This argument considers the dominion over external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to God alone, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own?

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as his own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful.

Now according to the natural law all things are common property: and the possession of property is contrary to this community of goods. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external thing to himself.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted above ( A(1), O(2) ), says: “The rich who deem as their own property the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use.” Now it would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of common goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what belongs to the community.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp.], and his words are quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.]: “Let no man call his own that which is common property”: and by “common” he means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): “The ‘Apostolici’ are those who with extreme arrogance have given themselves that name, because they do not admit into their communion persons who are married or possess anything of their own, such as both monks and clerics who in considerable number are to be found in the Catholic Church.” Now the reason why these people are heretics was because severing themselves from the Church, they think that those who enjoy the use of the above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess property.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(2) —

I answer that, Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is necessary to human life for three reasons. First because every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his own.

Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed.

The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 6:17,18): “Charge the rich of this world... to give easily, to communicate to others,” etc.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one’s own: but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as stated above ( Q(57) , AA(2),3 ). Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human reason.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(2)- RO(2) —

A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts unlawfully if by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking possession of something which at first was common property, and gives others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately from using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): “Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?”

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(2)- RO(3) —

When Ambrose says: “Let no man call his own that which is common,” he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore he adds: “He who spends too much is a robber.”

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(3) Whether the essence of theft consists in taking another’s thing secretly?

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take another’s thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not, apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends to diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as indicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some ( Isaiah 3:9): “They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it.”

Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another’s thing secretly.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp., A(2), O(3), Can. Sicut hi.]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii]: “It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than to refuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off.” Therefore just as theft consists in taking another’s thing, so does it consist in keeping it back.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly.

Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another’s thing secretly.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): “‘Fur’ [thief] is derived from ‘furvus’ and so from ‘fuscus’ [dark], because he takes advantage of the night.”

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(3) —

I answer that, Three things combine together to constitute theft. The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take possession of what is another’s. The second thing belongs to theft as distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another’s not as a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. The third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it belongs properly to theft that it consists in “taking another’s thing secretly.”

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a man employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and guile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a species of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is merely a circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both because it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(3)- RO(2) —

To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the same kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust detention is included in an unjust taking.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit belongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is the depositary’s, and the thing stolen is the thief’s, not simply, but as regards its custody.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(4) Whether theft and robbery are sins of different species?

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of different species. For theft and robbery differ as “secret” and “manifest”: because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery is to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of sins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically. Therefore theft and robbery are not different species of sin.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(1) , A(3) ; Q(18) , A(6) ). Now theft and robbery are directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another’s property. Therefore they do not differ specifically.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that “he who commits a rape is called a corrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted.” Now it is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or secretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken by force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and robbery do not differ.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft from robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that robbery is done openly.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(4) —

I answer that, Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in as much as one man does another an injustice. Now “no man suffers an injustice willingly,” as stated in Ethic. v, 9. Wherefore theft and robbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking being involuntary on the part of the person from whom something is taken. Now the involuntary is twofold, namely, through violence and through ignorance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect of robbery differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ specifically.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(4)- RO(1) —

In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is not derived from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to justice: and so where there is a different kind of involuntary, there is a different species of sin.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The remote end of robbery and theft is the same. But this is not enough for identity of species, because there is a difference of proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing by his own power, but the thief, by cunning.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the part of the woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as regards the others from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the part of the woman to whom violence is done.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(5) Whether theft is always a sin?

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that theft is not always a sin.

For no sin is commanded by God, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): “He hath commanded no man to do wickedly.” Yet we find that God commanded theft, for it is written ( Exodus 12:35,36): “And the children of Israel did as the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg.: ‘as Moses had commanded’]. . . and they stripped the Egyptians.”

Therefore theft is not always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes it, he seems to commit a theft, for he takes another’s property.

Yet this seems lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold. [*See loc. cit. in Reply.] Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to sin, because he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy its equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his own property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another.

Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Exodus 20:15): “Thou shalt not steal.”

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(5) —

I answer that, If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will find that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its opposition to justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that for this reason theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking of what belongs to another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the thief, by laying hands on another’s property secretly and cunningly. Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(5)- RO(1) —

It is no theft for a man to take another’s property either secretly or openly by order of a judge who has commanded him to do so, because it becomes his due by the very fact that it is adjudicated to him by the sentence of the court. Hence still less was it a theft for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the Egyptians at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done on account of the illtreatment accorded to them by the Egyptians without any cause: wherefore it is written significantly (Wis. 10:19): “The just took the spoils of the wicked.”

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(5)- RO(2) —

With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must be made. For some there are that were never in anyone’s possession, for instance precious stones and jewels, found on the seashore, and such the finder is allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst. II, i, De rerum divis.]. The same applies to treasure hidden underground long since and belonging to no man, except that according to civil law the finder is bound to give half to the owner of the land, if the treasure trove be in the land of another person [*Inst. II, i, 39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris]. Hence in the parable of the Gospel ( Matthew 13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden in a field that he bought the field, as though he purposed thus to acquire the right of possessing the whole treasure. On the other Land the treasure-trove may be nearly in someone’s possession: and then if anyone take it with the intention, not of keeping it but of returning it to the owner who does not look upon such things as unappropriated, he is not guilty of theft. In like manner if the thing found appears to be unappropriated, and if the finder believes it to be so, although he keep it, he does not commit a theft [*Inst. II, i, 47]. In any other case the sin of theft is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De acquirend, rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II, i, 48]: wherefore Augustine says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb. Apost.): “If thou hast found a thing and not returned it, thou hast stolen it” (Dig. xiv, 5, can. Si quid invenisti).

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(5)- RO(3) —

He who by stealth takes his own property which is deposited with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound either to restitution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is clearly guilty of sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his burden. On the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own property, if this be unjustly detained by another, he sins indeed; yet not because he burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to restitution or compensation: but he sins against general justice by disregarding the order of justice and usurping judgment concerning his own property. Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor to allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbor by acting this way.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin.

For it is written ( Proverbs 6:30): “The fault is not so great when a man hath stolen.” But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death. But in the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity, according to Exodus 22:1, “If any man steal an ox or a sheep... he shall restore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep.”

Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great things. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with eternal death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a quill.

Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(6) —

On the contrary, No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save for a mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to Zechariah 5:3, “This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the earth; for every thief shall be judged as is there written.”

Therefore theft is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(6) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(59) , A(4) ; P(2a), Q(72) , A(5) ), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life of the soul. Now charity consists principally in the love of God, and secondarily in the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our wishing and doing him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our neighbor in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another habitually, human society would be undone. Therefore theft, as being opposed to charity, is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The statement that theft is not a great fault is in view of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through necessity. This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we shall show further on ( A(7) ). Hence the text continues: “For he stealeth to fill his hungry soul.” Secondly, theft is stated not to be a great fault in comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is punished with death.

Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that “if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold... but he that is an adulterer... shall destroy his own soul.”

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(6)- RO(2) —

The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment which is pronounced against sinners “according to truth” ( Romans 2:2).

Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some horrible deformity. Hence according to the present judgment the pain of death is not inflicted for theft which does not inflict an irreparable harm, except when it is aggravated by some grave circumstance, as in the case of sacrilege which is the theft of a sacred thing, of peculation, which is theft of common property, as Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.), and of kidnaping which is stealing a man, for which the pain of death is inflicted ( Exodus 21:16).

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Reason accounts as nothing that which is little: so that a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters: and the person who takes such things can presume that this is not against the will of the owner. And if a person take such like very little things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet if his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be through consent in a mere thought.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(7) Whether it is lawful to steal through stress of need?

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need. For penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): “If anyone, through stress of hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do penance for three weeks.” Therefore it is not lawful to steal through stress of need.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “there are some actions whose very name implies wickedness,” and among these he reckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done for a good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to remedy a need.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal in order to succor one’s neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore neither is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one’s own needs.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(7) —

On the contrary, In cases of need all things are common property, so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another’s property, for need has made it common.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(7) —

I answer that, Things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order established by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for the purpose of succoring man’s needs by their means. Wherefore the division and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do not preclude the fact that man’s needs have to be remedied by means of these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. For this reason Ambrose [*Loc. cit., A(2), O(3) ] says, and his words are embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut ii): “It is the hungry man’s bread that you withhold, the naked man’s cloak that you store away, the money that you bury in the earth is the price of the poor man’s ransom and freedom.”

Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or robbery.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(7)- RO(1) —

This decretal considers cases where there is no urgent need.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(7)- RO(2) —

It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly and use another’s property in a case of extreme need: because that which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own property by reason of that need.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(7)- RO(3) —

In a case of a like need a man may also take secretly another’s property in order to succor his neighbor in need.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(8) Whether robbery may be committed without sin?

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin. For spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the essence of robbery, according to what has been said ( A(4) ). Now it is lawful to take spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 3]): “When the conqueror has taken possession of the spoils, military discipline demands that all should be reserved for the sovereign,” in order, to wit, that he may distribute them. Therefore in certain cases robbery is lawful.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his. Now the things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine says (Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. xciii.): “You falsely call things your own, for you do not possess them justly, and according to the laws of earthly kings you are commanded to forfeit them.” Therefore it seems that one may lawfully rob unbelievers.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from their subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would seem a grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that case nearly every prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases robbery is lawful.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to God in sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds of robbery, according to Isaiah 61:8, “I am the Lord that love judgment, and hate robbery in a holocaust.” Therefore it is not lawful to take anything by robbery.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(8) —

I answer that, Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion employed in taking unjustly from a man that which is his. Now in human society no man can exercise coercion except through public authority: and, consequently, if a private individual not having public authority takes another’s property by violence, he acts unlawfully and commits a robbery, as burglars do. As regards princes, the public power is entrusted to them that they may be the guardians of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use violence or coercion, save within the bounds of justice — either by fighting against the enemy, or against the citizens, by punishing evil-doers: and whatever is taken by violence of this kind is not the spoils of robbery, since it is not contrary to justice. On the other hand to take other people’s property violently and against justice, in the exercise of public authority, is to act unlawfully and to be guilty of robbery; and whoever does so is bound to restitution.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(8)- RO(1) —

A distinction must be made in the matter of spoils. For if they who take spoils from the enemy, are waging a just war, such things as they seize in the war become their own property. This is no robbery, so that they are not bound to restitution. Nevertheless even they who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils through cupidity arising from an evil intention, if, to wit, they fight chiefly not for justice but for spoil. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xix; Serm. lxxxii) that “it is a sin to fight for booty.” If, however, those who take the spoil, are waging an unjust war, they are guilty of robbery, and are bound to restitution.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Unbelievers possess their goods unjustly in so far as they are ordered by the laws of earthly princes to forfeit those goods. Hence these may be taken violently from them, not by private but by public authority.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(8)- RO(3) —

It is no robbery if princes exact from their subjects that which is due to them for the safe-guarding of the common good, even if they use violence in so doing: but if they extort something unduly by means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary is. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): “If justice be disregarded, what is a king but a mighty robber? since what is a robber but a little king?” And it is written ( Ezekiel 22:27): “Her princes in the midst of her, are like wolves ravening the prey.” Wherefore they are bound to restitution, just as robbers are, and by so much do they sin more grievously than robbers, as their actions are fraught with greater and more universal danger to public justice whose wardens they are.

P(2b)- Q(66)- A(9) Whether theft is a more grievous sin than robbery?