QUESTIONS 144-154 QUESTION OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue? (2) What is its object? (3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed? (4) What kind of people are ashamed?

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper to a virtue “to observe the mean as fixed by reason”: this is clear from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii, 7).

Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy. But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of justice. since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that “shamefacedness is the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful.” Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue.

Now certain vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, “like acts beget like habits,” according to Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12).

Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that shamefacedness is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1) —

I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in Phys. vii, 17,18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that “shamefacedness is fear of a base action.”

Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above ( P(1), Q(40) , A(1) ; P(1), Q(41) , A(2) ; P(1), Q(42) , A(3) ), when we were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.

Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way /shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue’s definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be “an elective habit,” that is to say, operating from choice. Now shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it falls short of the notion of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated ( Q(142), A(4) ) that the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of honesty.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2) Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “shamefacedness is fear of disgrace.” Now sometimes those who do nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Psalm 67:8, “For thy sake I have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face.” Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Luke 9:26, “He that shall be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed,” etc.

Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most grievous, according to Psalm 51:3, “Why dost thou glory in malice?” Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that “shamefacedness is fear of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(1), Q(41) , A(2) ; P(1), Q(42) , A(3) ), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone does not appear to be arduous and above man’s ability: wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear.

The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “a man is less ashamed of those defects which are not the result of any fault of his own.”

Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person “blushing,” in the latter we say that he is “ashamed.” Hence he says that “the man who is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause.” Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it said of the apostles ( Acts 5:41) that “they (the apostles) went from the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus.” It is owing to imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is written ( Isaiah 51:7): “Fear ye not the reproach of men.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( Q(63) , A(3) ), though honor is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence: and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly due to sin alone, yet, at least in man’s opinion, it regards any kind of defect.

Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and the like.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical for doing virtuous deeds.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3) Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him?

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that “men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire approbation.” Now men desire this especially from people of the better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet. ii, 6, “a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does himself.” Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely connected with him.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “men take more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as jokers and fable-tellers.” But those who are more closely connected with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame chiefly from them.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “men are most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time; by those whose friends they wish to become.” Now these are less closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who are more closely united to him.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that “man is made most ashamed by those who are to be continually with him.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3) —

I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor denotes attestation to someone’s excellence, especially the excellence which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person’s defect, especially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person’s attestation is considered to be, the more does he make another person ashamed. Now a person’s attestation may be considered as being more weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person’s attestations for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge of the matter attested, because “everyone judges well of what is known to him” [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we are more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us with no shame at all.

An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more desirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with us make us more ashamed, since we are to be continually in their society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the harm that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- RO(1) —

People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom we live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in detail.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- RO(2) —

We fear not the attestation of those who are connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they look upon our defect as disgraceful.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm they do by making many think ill of us.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more disgraceful.

The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our request, or by failing to become their friends.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4) Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness are not ashamed, according to Jeremiah 3:3, “Thou hadst a harlot’s forehead, thou wouldst not blush.” Therefore those who are virtuous are more inclined to be ashamed.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “men are ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil”: and this happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, shamefacedness is “fear of disgrace” [*Ethic. iv, 9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly.

Therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated above ( Q(143) ). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is also.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a “virtuous man is not shamefaced.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(1),2 ) shamefacedness is fear of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to avoid.

Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First, because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of them.

Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous are not shamefaced.

Yet they are so disposed, that if there were anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “shame is in the virtuous hypothetically.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet are not altogether free from evil.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- RO(2) —

It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to Thessalonians 5:22, “From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves.” The Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should avoid “not only what is really evil, but also those things that are regarded as evil.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- RO(3) —

As stated above ( A(1), ad 1) the virtuous man despises ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- RO(4) —

Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that “shamefacedness lays the first foundation of temperance,” by inspiring man with the horror of whatever is disgraceful.

QUESTION OF HONESTY* (FOUR ARTICLES)

[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum.] We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous; (2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty]; (3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant; (4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1) Whether honesty is the same as virtue?

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that “the honest is what is desired for its own sake.” Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that “happiness is the reward and the end of virtue.” Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) “honesty means an honorable state.” Now honor is due to many things besides virtue, since “it is praise that is the proper due of virtue” (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the “principal part of virtue is the interior choice,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Corinthians 14:40, “Let all things be done decently [honeste] and according to order” among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth. According to Ecclus. 11:14, “good things and evil, life and death [poverty and riches] are from God” [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has ‘honestas’]. But virtue does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1) —

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) “honesty means an honorable state,” wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy of honor. Now honor, as stated above ( Q(144), A(2), ad 2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii, 17. Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- RO(1) —

According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that “some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge.” And this suffices to give a thing the character of honest.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in so far as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank, power, and riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that these things “are honored by some people, but in truth it is only the good man who is worthy of honor.” Now a man is good in respect of virtue.

Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the character of honesty.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is due. Now honor is an attestation to someone’s excellence, as stated above ( Q(103), AA(1),2 ). But one attests only to what one knows; and the internal choice is not made known save by external actions.

Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the external conduct.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- RO(4) —

It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes the name of honesty is given to external prosperity.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2) Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the honest is not the same as the beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, since the honest is “what is desirable for its own sake” [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the honest.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then honor and glory differ, as stated above ( Q(103), A(1), ad 3), it seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above ( A(1) ). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it is written (Ezech. 16:15): “Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the harlot because of thy renown.” Therefore the honest is not the same as the beautiful.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Corinthians 12:23,24): “Those that are our uncomely [inhonesta] parts, have more abundant comeliness [honestatem], but our comely [honesta] parts have no need.” Now by uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the beautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are apparently the same.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2) —

I answer that, As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be beautiful, as being “the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe.” Hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well proportioned, together with a certain clarity of color. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man’s conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which we have stated ( A(1) ) to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore “honesty is the same as spiritual beauty.”

Hence Augustine says ( QQ(83) , qu. 30): “By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, which we properly designate as spiritual,” and further on he adds that “many things are beautiful to the eye, which it would be hardly proper to call honest.”

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the beautiful and the good are beloved by all.” Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully says (De Offic. i, 5): “Thou perceivest the form and the features, so to speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom.”

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( Q(103), A(1), ad 3), glory is the effect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a person acquires clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the same thing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest and beautiful.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2)- RO(3) —

This argument applies to the beauty of the body: although it might be replied that to be proud of one’s honesty is to play the harlot because of one’s spiritual beauty, according to Ezekiel 28:17, “Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy beauty.”

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3) Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the honest does not differ from the useful and the pleasant. For the honest is “what is desirable for its own sake” [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired for its own sake, for “it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes to be pleased,” as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the honest does not differ from the pleasant.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): “There is a thing that attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility”: and “that is money.” Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written (Ecclus. 11:14): “Poverty and riches [honestas] are from God,” and (Ecclus. 13:2): “He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship with one more honorable,” i.e. richer, “than himself.” Therefore the honest differs not from the useful.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says ( Q(83) , qu. 30): “The honest is that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies reference to something else.”

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3) —

I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect.

For, as stated above ( A(2) ), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man. Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is becoming to it.

Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue (Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason. A pleasing thing of this kind is beside man’s reason which perfects his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred to something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.

Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant, however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3)- RO(1) —

A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite. which tends to that which is in accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be the instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2).

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it is contrary to man’s last end, which is a good in accordance with reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4) Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and whole in respect of one same thing. Now “temperance is a part of honesty,” according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that “wine... makes all thoughts honest.” But the use of wine, especially in excess, in which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now “it is the just and the brave who receive most honor,” according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: “I suffer an honorable [honesta] death, for the most venerable and most holy laws.”

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a part of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as pertaining especially to temperance.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ), honesty is a kind of spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts.

Hence by its very name temperance is most significative of the good of reason to which it belongs to moderate and temper evil desires.

Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4)- RO(2) —

When a man is intoxicated, “the wine makes his thoughts honest” according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great and deserving of honor [*Cf. Q(148), A(6) ].

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule given by the Apostle ( 1 Corinthians 12:23) when he says that “our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness,” which, namely, destroys whatever is uncomely.

QUESTION OF ABSTINENCE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence, which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically about drink.

With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite vice which is gluttony.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether abstinence is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 4:20): “The kingdom of God is not in speech but in power [virtute].” Now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence, for the Apostle says ( Romans 14:17): “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink,” where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11] observes that “justice consists neither in abstaining nor in eating.” Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself to God: “This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take food as physic.” Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one’s food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, every virtue “observes the mean,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 6,7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean but to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, no virtue excludes another virtue.

But abstinence excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “impatience not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer’s mind from its peaceful seclusion.” Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “sometimes the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer,” so that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 2 Peter 1:5,6): “Join with your faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence”; where abstinence is numbered among other virtues. Therefore abstinence is a virtue.

I answer that, Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of food.

Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent. Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of Peter’s words quoted above, where he says that we ought “to join abstinence with knowledge,” namely that in abstaining from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of health.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The use of and abstinence from food, considered in themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 8:8): “Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we eat not [*Vulg.: ‘Neither if we eat... nor if we eat not’], shall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more,” i.e. spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, in so far as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The regulation of food, in the point of quantity and quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11): “It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how much food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for the people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity to abstain.”

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- RO(3) —

It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of reason.

Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a certain excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their name, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part of temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the mean, in so far as it is in accord with right reason.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain as one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e. for God’s glory and not one’s own.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2) Whether abstinence is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue. For every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “the virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other virtues.” Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii) that “the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body.” Now this belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue distinct from chastity.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Timothy 6:8, “Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should be [Vulg.: ‘are’] content.”

Now there is no special virtue in being content with moderate clothes.

Neither, therefore, is there in abstinence which moderates food.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons abstinence as a special part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(136), A(1) ; Q(141), A(3) ) moral virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the passions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion departs from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue.

Now pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated above ( P(1), Q(65) , A(1) ). Wherefore one virtue receives help and commendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of the other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only against the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony: since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to them.

Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps another.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.

QUESTION OF FASTING (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue? (2) Of what virtue is it the act? (3) Whether it is a matter of precept? (4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept? (5) The time of fasting; (6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once? (7) The hour of eating for those who fast; (8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always acceptable to God, according to Isaiah 58:3, “Why have we fasted and Thou hast not regarded?” Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of abstinence takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of nature, whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else those who do not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, that which is competent to all, both good and evil, is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one is fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts ( 2 Corinthians 6:5,6) where the Apostle says: “In fasting, in knowledge, in chastity, etc. [Vulg.: ‘in chastity, in knowledge’].”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1) —

I answer that, An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to some virtuous [honestum] [*Cf. Q(145), A(1) ] good.

Now this is consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold purpose. First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle says ( 2 Corinthians 6:5,6): “In fasting, in chastity,” since fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome [*Contra Jov. ii.] “Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there,” that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Secondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence it is related ( Daniel 10) of Daniel that he received a revelation from God after fasting for three weeks.

Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is written ( Joel 2:12): “Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning.”

The same is declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [*Serm. lxxii (ccxxx, de Tempore)]): “Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the mind, subjects one’s flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite and humble, scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire of lust, kindles the true light of chastity.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1)- RO(1) —

An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered vicious by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence the text goes on to say: “Behold in the day of your fast your own will is founded,” and a little further on ( Isaiah 58:4): “You fast for debates and strife and strike with the fist wickedly.” These words are expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii, 19) as follows: “The will indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the flesh restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be wrecked by vice.” And Augustine says (in the same sermon) that “fasting loves not many words, deems wealth superfluous, scorns pride, commends humility, helps man to perceive what is frail and paltry.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The mean of virtue is measured not according to quantity but according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6.

Now reason judges it expedient, on account of some special motive, for a man to take less food than would be becoming to him under ordinary circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or in order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and much more does reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and the pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much from one’s food as to refuse nature its necessary support: thus Jerome says:* “It matters not whether thou art a long or a short time in destroying thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately, whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen goods.” [*The quotation is from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there ascribes the quotation to St. Jerome, but it is not to be found in the saint’s works.] In like manner right reason does not retrench so much from a man’s food as to render him incapable of fulfilling his duty. Hence Jerome says (in the same reference) “Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets fasting before chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of his senses.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is said to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure negation, wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for a reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting [jejunium jejunii] [*Literally the ‘fast of fasting’]: while the latter is called the faster’s fast, because he fasts for a purpose.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2) Whether fasting is an act of abstinence?

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence. For Jerome [*The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the reference is lacking] commenting on Matthew 17:20, “This kind of devil” says: “To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all manner of lusts.” Now this belongs to every virtue. Therefore fasting is not exclusively an act of abstinence.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang.) that “the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year.” Now paying tithes is an act of religion, as stated above ( Q(87) , A(1) ). Therefore fasting is an act of religion and not of abstinence.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated above ( QQ(143),146 , A(1), ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with fortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems very applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of abstinence.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that “fasting is frugality of fare and abstinence from food.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2) —

I answer that, Habit and act have the same matter.

Wherefore every virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food, wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident that fasting is an act of abstinence.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining from food, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from anything harmful, and such especially is sin.

We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence from all manner of lust, since, as stated above ( A(1), ad 1), an act ceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging to another virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that virtue, as explained above ( Q(32) , A(1), ad 2; Q(85) , A(3) ). Accordingly there is no reason why fasting should not be an act of religion, or of chastity, or of any other virtue.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2)- RO(3) —

It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to endure, not any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the danger of death. To endure hardships resulting from privation of pleasure of touch, belongs to temperance and its parts: and such are the hardships of fasting.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3) Whether fasting is a matter of precept?

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept. For precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are a matter of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it would have to be equally observed at all places and times. Therefore fasting is not a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin. Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not fast would sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that “the Wisdom of God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of freedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the community of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude, should be bound together in subjection to one God.” Now the liberty of the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number of observances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For Augustine says (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv) that “whereas God in His mercy wished our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the evidence and small number of its solemn sacraments, some people render it oppressive with slavish burdens.” Therefore it seems that the Church should not have made fasting a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting says: “Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles.” Therefore fasting is a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3) —

I answer that, Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make legal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal in temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to prescribe by statute those things that concern the common weal of the faithful in spiritual goods.

Now it has been stated above ( A(1) ) that fasting is useful as atoning for and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual things. And everyone is bound by the natural dictate of reason to practice fasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore fasting in general is a matter of precept of the natural law, while the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept of positive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is the Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed by nature.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Fasting considered in itself denotes something not eligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is useful to some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding under precept, but it is binding under precept to each one that stands in need of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this remedy, both because “in many things we all offend” ( James 3:2), and because “the flesh lusteth against the spirit” ( Galatians 5:17), it was fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by all in common. In doing this the Church does not make a precept of a matter of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is of general obligation.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Those commandments which are given under the form of a general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but subject to the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver.

It will be a mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt of the lawgiver’s authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate the end intended by him: but it is not a mortal sin if one fails to keep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and especially if the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were present. Hence it is that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the Church, sin mortally.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Augustine is speaking there of those things “that are neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found among the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church.” On the other hand, the fasts that are of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. Nor are they opposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in hindering the slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom, of which it is written ( Galatians 5:13): “You, brethren, have been called unto liberty; only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4) Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church?

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as the commandments of God, according to Luke 10:16, “He that heareth you heareth Me.” Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God. Therefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts appointed by the Church.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, children especially are seemingly not exempt from fasting, on account of their age: for it is written ( Joel 2:15): “Sanctify a fast,” and further on ( Joel 2:16): “Gather together the little ones, and them that suck the breasts.” Much more therefore are all others bound to keen the fasts.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal, and necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily works are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed to spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since fasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary thing by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts of the Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or bodily works.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than through necessity, as stated in 2 Corinthians 9:7. Now the poor are wont to fast through necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought they to fast willingly.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast. For the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to Christ’s teaching. But our Lord said ( Luke 5:34) that “the children of the bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them [*Vulg.: ‘Can you make the children of the bridegroom fast, whilst the bridegroom is with them?’].” Now He is with all the righteous by dwelling in them in a special manner [*Cf. P(1), Q(8) , A(3) ], wherefore our Lord said ( Matthew 28:20): “Behold I am with you... even to the consummation of the world.” Therefore the righteous are not bound by the commandment of the Church to fast.

I answer that, As stated above ( P(1), Q(90) , A(2) ; P(1), Q(98) , AA(2),6 ), general precepts are framed according to the requirements of the many.

Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver considers what happens generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the precept to be binding on a person in whom for some special reason there is something incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet discretion must be brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be evident, it is lawful for a man to use his own judgment in omitting to fulfil the precept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it be difficult for him to have recourse to superior authority. on the other hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to the superior who has power to grant a dispensation in such cases. And this must be done in the fasts appointed by the Church, to which all are bound in general, unless there be some special obstacle to this observance.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The commandments of God are precepts of the natural law, which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the commandments of the Church are about matters which are necessary for salvation, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of the Church.

Hence there may be certain obstacles on account of which certain persons are not bound to keep the fasts in question.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- RO(2) —

In children there is a most evident reason for not fasting, both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which they need to take food frequently, and not much at a time, and because they need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth, which results from the residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as the stage of growth lasts, which as a rule lasts until they have completed the third period of seven years, they are not bound to keep the Church fasts: and yet it is fitting that even during that time they should exercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in accordance with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of more severe penance, according to Jonas 3:7, “Let neither men nor beasts... taste anything... nor drink water.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Apparently a distinction should be made with regard to pilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work can be conveniently deferred or lessened without detriment to the bodily health and such external conditions as are necessary for the upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no reason for omitting the fasts of the Church. But if one be under the necessity of starting on the pilgrimage at once, and of making long stages, or of doing much work, either for one’s bodily livelihood, or for some need of the spiritual life, and it be impossible at the same time to keep the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because in ordering fasts the Church would not seem to have intended to prevent other pious and more necessary undertakings.

Nevertheless, in such cases one ought seemingly, to seek the superior’s dispensation; except perhaps when the above course is recognized by custom, since when superiors are silent they would seem to consent.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- RO(4) —

Those poor who can provide themselves with sufficient for one meal are not excused, on account of poverty, from keeping the fasts of the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to be exempt who beg their food piecemeal, since they are unable at any one time to have a sufficiency of food.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- RO(5) —

This saying of our Lord may be expounded in three ways. First, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says that “the disciples, who are called children of the bridegroom, were as yet of a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared to an old garment.” Hence while Christ was with them in body they were to be fostered with kindness rather than drilled with the harshness of fasting.

According to this interpretation, it is fitting that dispensations should be granted to the imperfect and to beginners, rather than to the elders and the perfect, according to a gloss on <19D002> Psalm 130:2, “As a child that is weaned is towards his mother.” Secondly, we may say with Jerome [*Bede, Comment. in Luc. v] that our Lord is speaking here of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law. Wherefore our Lord means to say that the apostles were not to be held back by the old observances, since they were to be filled with the newness of grace. Thirdly, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), who states that fasting is of two kinds. one pertains to those who are humbled by disquietude, and this is not befitting perfect men, for they are called “children of the bridegroom”; hence when we read in Luke: “The children of the bridegroom cannot fast [*Hom. xiii, in Matth.],” we read in Matthew 9:15: “The children of the bridegroom cannot mourn [*Vulg.: ‘Can the children of the bridegroom mourn?’].” The other pertains to the mind that rejoices in adhering to spiritual things: and this fasting is befitting the perfect.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(5) Whether the times for the Church fast are fittingly ascribed?

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that the times for the Church fast are unfittingly appointed. For we read (Matthew 4) that Christ began to fast immediately after being baptized. Now we ought to imitate Christ, according to 1 Corinthians 4:16, “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ.” Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the Epiphany when Christ’s baptism is celebrated.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to observe the ceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to the solemnities of the Old Law to fast in certain particular months: for it is written (Zach. 8:19): “The fast of the fourth month and the fast of the fifth, and the fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall be to the house of Judah, joy and gladness and great solemnities.” Therefore the fast of certain months, which are called Ember days, are unfittingly kept in the Church.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), just as there is a fast “of sorrow,” so is there a fast “of joy.” Now it is most becoming that the faithful should rejoice spiritually in Christ’s Resurrection. Therefore during the five weeks which the Church solemnizes on account of Christ’s Resurrection, and on Sundays which commemorate the Resurrection, fasts ought to be appointed.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(5) —

On the contrary, stands the general custom of the Church.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(5) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(1),3 ), fasting is directed to two things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of the mind to heavenly things. Wherefore fasting ought to be appointed specially for those times, when it behooves man to be cleansed from sin, and the minds of the faithful to be raised to God by devotion: and these things are particularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when sins are loosed by baptism, which is solemnly conferred on Easter-eve, on which day our Lord’s burial is commemorated, because “we are buried together with Christ by baptism unto death” ( Romans 6:4). Moreover at the Easter festival the mind of man ought to be devoutly raised to the glory of eternity, which Christ restored by rising from the dead, and so the Church ordered a fast to be observed immediately before the Paschal feast; and for the same reason, on the eve of the chief festivals, because it is then that one ought to make ready to keep the coming feast devoutly. Again it is the custom in the Church for Holy orders to be conferred every quarter of the year (in sign whereof our Lord fed four thousand men with seven loaves, which signify the New Testament year as Jerome says [*Comment. in Marc. viii]): and then both the ordainer, and the candidates for ordination, and even the whole people, for whose good they are ordained, need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the ordination. Hence it is related ( Luke 6:12) that before choosing His disciples our Lord “went out into a mountain to pray”: and Ambrose [*Exposit. in Luc.] commenting on these words says: “What shouldst thou do, when thou desirest to undertake some pious work, since Christ prayed before sending His apostles?”

With regard to the forty day’s fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi in Evang.) there are three reasons for the number. First, “because the power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the Holy Gospels: since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four.” Or “because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body through whose lusts we transgress the Lord’s commandments which are delivered to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should punish that same body forty times. or, because, just as under the Law it was commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive to pay God a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three hundred and sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves for thirty-six days” (namely, the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) “we pay God a tithe of our year.” According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 16) a fourth reason may be added. For the Creator is the “Trinity,” Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: while the number “three” refers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded to love God, with our whole heart, with our whole soul, and with our whole mind: and the number “four” refers to the visible creature, by reason of heat, cold, wet and dry. Thus the number “ten” [*Ten is the sum of three, three, and four] signifies all things, and if this be multiplied by four which refers to the body whereby we make use of things, we have the number forty.

Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of the number of months in each season: or on account of the number of Holy orders which are conferred at these times.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but in order to commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him to fast, not before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to fast before our baptism.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the very same time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted in July, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the first), because it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai broke the tables of the Law ( Exodus 32), and that, according to Jeremiah 39:2, “the walls of the city were first broken through.” In the fifth month, which we call August, they fasted because they were commanded not to go up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on account of the spies ( Numbers 14): also in this month the temple of Jerusalem was burnt down by Nabuchodonosor ( Jeremiah 52) and afterwards by Titus. In the seventh month which we call October, Godolias was slain, and the remnants of the people were dispersed ( Jeremiah 51). In the tenth month, which we call January, the people who were with Ezechiel in captivity heard of the destruction of the temple ( Ezekiel 4).

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(5)- RO(3) —

The “fasting of joy” proceeds from the instigation of the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore this fasting should not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by the commandment of the Church are rather “fasts of sorrow” which are inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not ordered by the Church during the whole of the Paschal season, nor on Sundays: and if anyone were to fast at these times in contradiction to the custom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi) “is to be considered as law,” or even through some erroneous opinion (thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of obligation) — he would not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting considered in itself is commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi): “Would that we might fast always.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(6) Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once?

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that one eat but once. For, as stated above ( A(2) ), fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not less than the number of meals. Now the quantity of food is not limited for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of meals be limited.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by drink: wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot receive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to drink at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should not be forbidden to eat several times.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take them on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential to fasting to take only one meal.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(6) —

On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Christian people.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(6) —

I answer that, Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to bridle concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one meal is seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is able to satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from concupiscence by minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is appointed by the Church, in her moderation, that those who fast should take one meal in the day.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(6)- RO(1) —

It was not possible to fix the same quantity of food for all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result being that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for the most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Fasting is of two kinds [*Cf. A(1), ad 3].

One is the natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This is broken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not lawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church is another kind and is called the “fasting of the faster,” and this is not broken save by such things as the Church intended to forbid in instituting the fast. Now the Church does not intend to command abstinence from drink, for this is taken more for bodily refreshment, and digestion of the food consumed, although it nourishes somewhat. It is, however, possible to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by partaking of too much drink: as also by eating immoderately at one meal.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not taken chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not break one’s fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were to take digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity and by way of food.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(7) Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster’s meal?

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed for the faster’s meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect than the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted until evening, for it is written ( Leviticus 23:32): “It is a sabbath... you shall afflict your souls,” and then the text continues: “From evening until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths.” Much more therefore under the New Testament should the fast be ordered until the evening.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all. But all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour.

Therefore it seems that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the commandment to fast.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as stated above ( A(2) ). Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply in the same way to all, since what is much for one is little for another, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should not be fixed for those who fast.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(7) —

On the contrary, The Council of Chalons [*The quotation is from the Capitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and is said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De Consecratione] says: “During Lent those are by no means to be credited with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of Vespers,” which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth hour.

Therefore we ought to fast until the ninth hour.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(7) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(1),3 ,5), fasting is directed to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add something to the common custom, yet so as not to be a heavy burden to nature. Now the right and common custom is for men to eat about the sixth hour: both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natural heat being withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the surrounding cold of the night), and the humor spread about through the limbs (to which result the heat of the day conduces until the sun has reached its zenith), and again because it is then chiefly that the nature of the human body needs assistance against the external heat that is in the air, lest the humors be parched within. Hence, in order that those who fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for their sins, the ninth hour is suitably fixed for their meal.

Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ’s Passion, which was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when “bowing His head, He gave up the ghost” ( John 19:30): because those who fast by punishing their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ, according to Galatians 5:24, “They that are Christ’s, have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(7)- RO(1) —

The state of the Old Testament is compared to the night, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day, according to Romans 13:12, “The night is passed and the day is at hand.” Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but not in the New Testament.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a strict calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be about the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(7)- RO(3) —

A little more or a little less cannot do much harm. Now it is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which men for the most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is fixed for those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do much harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however this were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of sickness, age, or some similar reason, he should be dispensed from fasting, or be allowed to forestall the hour by a little.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(8) Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods?

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has been stated above ( A(6) ) that fasting was instituted as a curb on the concupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking wine more than by eating flesh; according to Proverbs 20:1, “Wine is a luxurious thing,” and Ephesians 5:18, “Be not drunk with wine, wherein is luxury.” Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine, it seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh meat.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh of certain animals. Now “concupiscence is desire of the delectable,” as stated above ( P(1), Q(30) , A(1) ). Therefore since fasting which was instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the eating of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs and cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the Lenten fast.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(8) —

On the contrary, stands the common custom of the faithful.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(8) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(6) ), fasting was instituted by the Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which regard pleasures of touch in connection with food and sex.

Wherefore the Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which both afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest on the earth, and of those that breathe the air and their products, such as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds. For, since such like animals are more like man in body, they afford greater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body, so that from their consumption there results a greater surplus available for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great incentive to lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to abstain especially from these foods.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Three things concur in the act of procreation, namely, heat, spirit [*Cf. P. I., Q. 118, A(1), ad 3], and humor. Wine and other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat: flatulent foods seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital spirit: but it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most productive of nourishment, that conduces to the production of humor. Now the alteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital spirits are of short duration, whereas the substance of the humor remains a long time. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of flesh meat rather than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(8)- RO(2) —

In the institution of fasting, the Church takes account of the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating flesh meat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not always the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh meat, rather than to eat fish.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(8)- RO(3) —

Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who fast, for as much as they originate from animals that provide us with flesh: wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of the prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the most solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of Christ, and because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the mysteries of our redemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is forbidden in every fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on eggs and milk foods. As to the use of the latter things in other fasts the custom varies among different people, and each person is bound to conform to that custom which is in vogue with those among whom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says [*Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii, 18; cf. De Nat. et Grat. lxvii]: “Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they were the laws of the apostles.”

QUESTION OF GLUTTONY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether gluttony is a sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? (4) Its species; (5) Whether it is a capital sin? (6) Its daughters.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(1) Whether gluttony is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord said ( Matthew 15:11): “Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man.” Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man.

Therefore, since every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, “No man sins in what he cannot avoid” [*Ep. lxxi, ad Lucin.]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): “Since in eating pleasure and necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of necessity and the seduction of pleasure,” and Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): “Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more than necessary?”

Therefore gluttony is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin. But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that “unless we first tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat.” But man’s inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(1) —

I answer that, Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be inordinate through leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue consists: and a thing is said to be a sin through being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(1)- RO(1) —

That which goes into man by way of food, by reason of its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually.

But the Jews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their signification, but by reason of their nature [*Cf. P(1), Q(102), A(6), ad 1].

It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man spiritually.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not regard the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being regulated by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The appetite is twofold. There is the natural appetite, which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these powers virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to reason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from the powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the sensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite that the vice of gluttony consists.

Hence the first movement of gluttony denotes inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and this is not without sin.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(2) Whether gluttony is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this, apparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above ( Q(132), A(3) ). But gluttony is not opposed to charity, neither as regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of one’s neighbor. Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Cf. Append. to St. Augustine’s works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)]: “Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins.” But this pertains to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that is to say venial, sins.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(2)- O(4) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): “As long as the vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done valiantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is unrestrained, all virtue comes to naught.” But virtue is not done away save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), the vice of gluttony properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of reason in regulating the concupiscence may be considered from two points of view. First, with regard to things directed to the end, inasmuch as they may be incommensurate and consequently improportionate to the end; secondly, with regard to the end itself, inasmuch as concupiscence turns man away from his due end. Accordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in gluttony be found to turn man away from the last end, gluttony will be a mortal sin. This is the case when he adheres to the pleasure of gluttony as his end, for the sake of which he contemns God, being ready to disobey God’s commandments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other hand, if the inordinate concupiscence in the vice of gluttony be found to affect only such things as are directed to the end, for instance when a man has too great a desire for the pleasures of the palate, yet would not for their sake do anything contrary to God’s law, it is a venial sin.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by turning man away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of reduction, it is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands us to rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not all directly opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which contain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain specially to justice and its parts, as stated above ( Q(122), A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(2)- RO(2) —

In so far as it turns man away from his last end, gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our last end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(2)- RO(3) —

This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as denoting inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed to the end.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not so much on its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from it. For Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): “When the belly is distended by gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust.”

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(3) Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins?

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in Matth.]: “Gluttony turned Adam out of Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of Noah.”

According to Ezekiel 16:49, “This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy sister... fulness of bread,” etc. Therefore the sin of gluttony is the greatest of all.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful. Now gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on <19D510> Psalm 135:10, “Who smote Egypt with their first-born,” says: “Lust, concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony.” Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, man should love himself in the first place after God, as stated above ( Q(25) , A(4) ). Now man, by the vice of gluttony, inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (Ecclus. 37:34): “By surfeiting many have perished.” Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins, at least excepting those that are against God.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii).

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(3) —

I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways. First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is committed: and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment of the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person who sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and moderation in such matters.

Thirdly, from the point of view of the result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity, inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(3)- RO(1) —

These punishments are to be referred to the vices that resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang, rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to an act of gluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(3)- RO(2) —

This objection argues from the standpoint of the sins that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more powerful, unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other vices.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The glutton intends, not the harm to his body, but the pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is accidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur some bodily injury through taking too much food.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(4) Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished?

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): “The vice of gluttony tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of refreshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of an immoderate appetite” — which are contained in the following verse: “Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.”

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(4)- O(1) For the above are distinguished according to diversity of circumstance.

Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do not differentiate its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are not distinguished according to the aforesaid.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place.

If then gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that there should likewise be others in respect of place and other circumstances.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so do the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony distinguished thus.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(4) —

On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), gluttony denotes inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof.

Accordingly, the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or species of food a man seeks “sumptuous” — i.e. costly food; as regards its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely — i.e. “daintily”; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating “too much.”

Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time for eating, which is to eat “hastily,” or one fails to observe the due manner of eating, by eating “greedily.”

Isidore [*De Summo Bon. ii, 42] comprises the first and second under one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in “what” he eats, or in “how much,” “how” or “when he eats.”

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The corruption of various circumstances causes the various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by reason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For in him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Place and other circumstances include no special motive connected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(4)- RO(3) —

In all other vices, whenever different circumstances correspond to different motives, the difference of circumstances argues a specific difference of vice: but this does not apply to all circumstances, as stated above ( P(1), Q(72) , A(9) ).

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(5) Whether gluttony is a capital vice?

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause, other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but for the body’s nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, which, in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins, seeing that it is most akin to what is in respect of its genus, is apparently the least gluttony is not a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, sin results from a man forsaking the food of virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or pleasing to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of utility, there is but one capital vice, namely covetousness. Therefore, seemingly, there would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and this is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony, and is about greater pleasures.

Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among the capital vices.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(5) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(1), Q(84) , A(3) ), a capital vice denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e. as having a most desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered most desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to happiness, according to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3,7,8. Therefore the vice of gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost among other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(5)- RO(1) —

It is true that food itself is directed to something as its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil of man’s life is directed thereto, according to Ecclesiastes 6:7, “All the labor of man is for his mouth.” Yet gluttony seems to be about pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), “with such food as is good for the worthless body, men desire to be fed,” wherein namely the pleasure consists, “rather than to be filled: since the whole end of that desire is this — not to thirst and not to hunger.”

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(5)- RO(2) —

In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(5)- RO(3) —

That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital vices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something else: wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such things.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(6) Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony?

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to gluttony, to wit, “unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness, loquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding.” For unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Proverbs 2:14, “Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things.”

Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin, according to Proverbs 14:22, “They err that work evil.” Therefore they are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Isaiah 28:8, “All tables were full of vomit and filth.” But this seems to be not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter of counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, “If thou hast been forced to eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee.” Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deuteronomy 16) reckons scurrility as a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to gluttony.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(6) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(1),2 ,3), gluttony consists properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are the results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for either on the part of the soul or on the part of the body. on the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, “dullness of sense in the understanding,” on account of the fumes of food disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the penetrating power of wisdom, according to Ecclesiastes 2:3, “I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind in wisdom.

Secondly, as regards the. appetite, which is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating and drinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm, and in this respect “unseemly joy” is reckoned, because all the other inordinate passions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we must refer the saying of 3 Esdra 3:20, that “wine... gives every one a confident and joyful mind.” Thirdly, as regards inordinate words, and thus we have “loquaciousness,” because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), “unless gluttons were carried away by immoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted sumptuously every day would not have been so tortured in his tongue.” Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we have “scurrility,” i.e. a kind of levity resulting from lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Ephesians 5:4, “Or foolish talking or scurrility,” says that “fools call this geniality — i.e. jocularity, because it is wont to raise a laugh.” Both of these, however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason of excess which belongs to “loquaciousness,” or by reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to “scurrility.”

On the part of the body, mention is made of “uncleanness,” which may refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities, or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Ephesians 5:3, “But fornication and all uncleanness,” says: “That is, any kind of incontinence that has reference to lust.”

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin, especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous joy which is described as “unseemly” arises chiefly from immoderate partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that dullness of sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from gluttony, for the reason given above.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Although it does one good to vomit after eating too much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.

P(2b)- Q(148)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be referred to either vice.

QUESTION OF SOBRIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is the matter of sobriety? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) Whether the use of wine is lawful? (4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(1) Whether drink is the matter of sobriety?

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to sobriety. For it is written ( Romans 12:3): “Not to be more wise than it behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety.”

Therefore sobriety is also about wisdom, and not only about drink.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wis. 8:7) that “she teacheth sobriety [Douay: ‘temperance’], and prudence, and justice, and fortitude,” where sobriety stands for temperance. Now temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from “measure” [*’Bria,’ a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini’s Lexicon]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things appertaining to us: for it is written ( Titus 2:12): “We should live soberly and justly and godly,” where a gloss remarks: “Soberly, in ourselves”; and ( 1 Timothy 2:9): “Women... in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety.” Consequently it would seem that sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things appertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter proper to sobriety.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): “Wine taken with sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt be sober.”

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(1) —

I answer that, When a virtue is denominated from some condition common to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that in which it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that condition of virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from “measure,” for a man is said to be sober because he observes the “bria,” i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to that matter wherein the observance of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such matter is the drinking of intoxicants, because the measured use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of reason even more than excessive eating. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 31:37,38): “Sober drinking is health to soul and body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins.” For this reason sobriety is especially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but that which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the brain, such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may be employed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter, as stated above ( Q(123), A(2) ; Q(141), A(2) ) with regard to fortitude and temperance.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its delight, according to Psalm 22:5, “My chalice which inebriateth me, how goodly is it!” Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in speaking of the contemplation of wisdom.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(1)- RO(2) —

All the things that belong properly to temperance are necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful.

Wherefore it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with drink.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety is not properly employed in connection with all things, but only in those wherein there is most need for a measure.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(2) Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which is about drink, a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment. Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats and of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue, seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons sobriety to be a special part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(146), A(2) ), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason, there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove this hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is sobriety, is requisite.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and in this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike.

But intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above, wherefore it requires a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink, considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does not follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds of food.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(2)- RO(3) —

In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks bears an accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does not call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the difference of meats.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(3) Whether the use of wine is altogether unlawful?

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the use of wine is altogether unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of salvation: since it is written (Wis. 7:28): “God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom,” and further on (Wis. 9:19): “By wisdom they were healed, whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the beginning.”

Now the use of wine is a hindrance to wisdom, for it is written ( Ecclesiastes 2:3): “I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom.”

Therefore wine-drinking is altogether unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the Apostle says ( Romans 14:21): “It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized, or made weak.”

Now it is sinful to forsake the good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one’s brethren. Therefore it is unlawful to make use of wine.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i] that “after the deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last of the ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning.”

Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian law.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 5:23): “Do not still drink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach’s sake, and thy frequent infirmities”; and it is written (Ecclus. 31:36): “Wine drunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart.”

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(3) —

I answer that, No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful, according to Matthew 15:11, “Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man.” Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such. Yet it may become unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a circumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily the worse for taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to drink wine: sometimes it results from the mode of drinking, because to wit he exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on account of others who would be scandalized thereby.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(3)- RO(1) —

A man may have wisdom in two ways.

First, in a general way, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way it is required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain altogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use.

Secondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in this way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly, it is requisite for certain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this depends on circumstances of certain persons and places.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would give scandal to certain people.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Christ withdraws us from some things as being altogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to perfection.

It is in the latter way that he withdraws some from the use of wine, that they may aim at perfection, even as from riches and the like.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(4) Whether sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing?

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing; wherefore honor and reverence are due to the old, according to Leviticus 19:32, “Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man.” Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should be exhorted to sobriety, according to Titus 2:2, “That the aged man be sober.” Therefore sobriety is most requisite in persons of standing.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and the Apostle commands him to be sober, according to Timothy 3:2, “It behooveth... a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent,” etc.

Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in persons of high standing.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs: while it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction, according to Proverbs 31:4, “Give not wine to kings,” and further on ( Proverbs 31:6), “Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to them that are grieved in mind.”

Therefore sobriety is more requisite in persons of standing.

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 3:11): “The women in like manner, chaste... sober,” etc., and ( Titus 2:6) “Young men in like manner exhort that they be sober.”

P(2b)- Q(149)- A(4) —

I answer that, Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads. Accordingly a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons for two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the concupiscences which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the vices which are removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most requisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence of pleasure thrives in the young on account of the heat of youth, while in women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist concupiscence. Hence, according to Valerius Maximus [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1] among the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Secondly, sobriety is more requisite in certain persons, as being more necessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of wine is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should be vigorous in instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church, who should fulfil their spiritual duties with a devout mind; and to kings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

QUESTION OF DRUNKENNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether drunkenness is a sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? (3) Whether it is the most grievous sin? (4) Whether it excuses from sin?

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(1) Whether drunkenness is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that drunkenness is not a sin.

For every sin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to daring, and presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, every sin is voluntary [*Augustine, De Vera Relig. xiv]. But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be deprived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, whoever causes another to sin, sins himself. Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a sin to ask a man to drink that which makes him drunk, which would seem very hard.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, every sin calls for correction. But correction is not applied to drunkards: for Gregory [*Cf. Canon Denique, dist. 4 where Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of Canterbury] says that “we must forbear with their ways, lest they become worse if they be compelled to give up the habit.” Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Romans 13:13): “Not in rioting and drunkenness.”

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(1) —

I answer that, Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it may signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking much wine, the consequence being that he loses the use of reason.

In this sense drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect resulting from a fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by which a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunkenness in two ways. In one way, through the wine being too strong, without the drinker being cognizant of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin, especially if it is not through his negligence, and thus we believe that Noah was made drunk as related in Genesis 9. In another way drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and use of wine: in this way it is accounted a sin, and is comprised under gluttony as a species under its genus. For gluttony is divided into “surfeiting [Douay:,’rioting’] and drunkenness,” which are forbidden by the Apostle ( Romans 13:13).

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11), insensibility which is opposed to temperance “is not very common,” so that like its species which are opposed to the species of intemperance it has no name. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and yet if a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting nature grievously, he would not be free from sin.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(1)- RO(2) —

This objection regards the resulting defect which is involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is in this that the sin consists.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows not the strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to drink excused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind of person to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be lacking neither is excused from sin.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be foregone, as stated above ( Q(33) , A(6) ). Hence Augustine says in a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), “Meseems, such things are cured not by bitterness, severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than commanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be followed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should be treated with severity.”

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(2) Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St. Augustine’s works] that “drunkenness if indulged in assiduously, is a mortal sin.” Now assiduity denotes a circumstance which does not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as shown above ( P(1), Q(88) , A(5) ). Therefore if drunkenness /is not a mortal sin for some other reason, neither is it for this.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St. Augustine’s works]: “Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins.” Now the lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is caused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician, that they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(2) —

On the contrary, We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli, xlii): “A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or gambling, or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either give them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity.”

Now such punishments are not inflicted save for mortal sins. Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(2) —

I answer that, The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine. Now this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows not the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness may be without sin, as stated above ( A(1) ). Secondly, so that he perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be intoxicating, and then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Thirdly, it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate and intoxicating, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from drink.

Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals take their species not from things that occur accidentally and beside the intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way drunkenness is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i.]): “We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For the things we avoid when sober, we unknowingly commit through drunkenness.” Therefore drunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is impossible for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many times experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to drunkenness.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(2)- RO(2) —

To take more meat or drink than is necessary belongs to the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but knowingly to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): “Drunkenness is far from me: Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full feeding sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant.”

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As stated above ( Q(141), A(6) ), meat and drink should be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body’s health. Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink which are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so too it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man is moderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or drinks much at the physician’s advice in order to provoke vomiting, he is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There is, however, no need for intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting, since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore this is no sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(3) Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins. For Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that “nothing gains the devil’s favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices.” And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante omnia): “Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the vices.”

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good of reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely; for Ambrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that “there would be no slavery, were there no drunkards.” Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(3) —

On the contrary, According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one of the carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(3) —

I answer that, A thing is said to be evil because it removes a good. Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver the evil. Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a human good. Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are graver than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of human reason.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because such like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not for being graver than other sins, but because they occur more frequently among men.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more the character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue, which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason, are always good.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery, in so far as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants, for having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(4) Whether drunkenness excuses from sin?

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that “the drunkard deserves double punishment.” Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of excusing from it.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases it. Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as man’s reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence.

But concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is drunkenness.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(4) —

On the contrary, According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43), Lot was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(4) —

I answer that, Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as stated above ( A(1) ), namely the resulting defect and the preceding act. on the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is fettered, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it causes an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of the preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if the drunkenness that results from that act be without sin, the subsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case of Lot. If, however, the preceding act was sinful, the person is not altogether excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into the subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished, even as the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that “Lot’s guilt is to be measured, not by the incest, but by his drunkenness.”

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard deserves more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment for his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered “those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished than if they had been sober, because they do wrong in more ways than one.” In this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), “he seems to have considered the advantage,” namely of the prevention of wrong, “rather than the leniency which one should have for drunkards,” seeing that they are not in possession of their faculties.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the point of its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that results from it, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(150)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the reason, as drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to make a man insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it is less grievous to sin through weakness than through malice.

QUESTION OF CHASTITY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity: (2) virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the contrary vice.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether chastity is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a general virtue? (3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence? (4) Of its relation to purity.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(1) Whether chastity is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that chastity is not a virtue.

For here we are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in a certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, virtue is “a voluntary habit,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can be taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done.

Therefore it seems that chastity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But chastity is reckoned among the fruits ( Galatians 5:23).

Therefore chastity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de Tempore]): “Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust, while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious.”

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(1) —

I answer that, Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason “chastises” concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above ( P(1), Q(64) , A(1) ). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject, though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), “so long as her mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even in body, not even the violence of another’s lust can deprive her body of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering continency.” He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that “in the mind there is a virtue which is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved to suffer any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil.”

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), “it is impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is it possible to be just unless one live by faith.” Whence he argues that in unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue, because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) “virtues are distinguished from vices not by their functions,” i.e. their acts, “but by their ends.”

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it is reckoned among the fruits.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(2) Whether chastity is a general virtue?

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that chastity is a general virtue.

For Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that “chastity of the mind is the well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to the greater things.” But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore chastity is a general virtue.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, “Chastity” takes its name from “chastisement” [*Cf. A(1) ]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be chastised by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, chastity is opposed to fornication.

But fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written ( Psalm 72:27): “Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.: ‘hast destroyed’] all them that go awhoring from [Douay: ‘are disloyal to’] Thee.”

Therefore chastity is a general virtue.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(2) —

I answer that, The word “chastity” is employed in two ways. First, properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter, namely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures.

Secondly, the word “chastity” is employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the spiritual union of the mind with certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the matter of a spiritual chastity metaphorically speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication likewise metaphorically so called. For if the human mind delight in the spiritual union with that to which it behooves it to be united, namely God, and refrains from delighting in union with other things against the requirements of the order established by God, this may be called a spiritual chastity, according to 2 Corinthians 11:2, “I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ.”

If, on the other hand, the mind be united to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to Jeremiah 3:1, “But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers.” Taking chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists principally in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the human mind is united to God.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical sense.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(2)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( A(1) ; Q(142), A(2) ), the concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child, because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature. Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a child left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and consequently chastity is applied antonomastically to such like concupiscences, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need of strength of mind.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(2)- RO(3) —

This argument considers spiritual fornication metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity, as stated.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(3) Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same, one virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now “chastity” takes its name from “chastisement” of the contrary vices. Since then certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is chastity.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. Cf.

Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on Titus 1:7, “Not given to wine, no striker,” etc.: “The belly and the organs of generation are neighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in vice.”

Therefore abstinence and chastity are not distinct virtues.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The Apostle ( 2 Corinthians 6:5,6) reckons “chastity” together with “fastings” which pertain to abstinence.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(141), A(4) ), temperance is properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate to the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the nature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which is about pleasures of the palate.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as regards the sense’s judgment concerning the objects of touch. which judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in character. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though they regard the one sense.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): “I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which belong to the married state.”

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the maintenance of man’s nature, except in so far as they are directed to pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are essentially directed to the preservation of man’s life: wherefore by their very nature they have a special virtue, although this virtue which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(4) Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that purity does not belong especially to chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that “purity is a virtue of the soul.” Therefore it is not something belonging to chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, “pudicitia” [purity] is derived from “pudor,” which is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to the other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that “every kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach.” Now it would seem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach.

Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not especially to chastity.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): “We must give praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none but a lawful use the organs intended for procreation.” Now the use of these organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity belongs properly to chastity.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( O(2) ), “pudicitia” [purity] takes its name from “pudor,” which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs be properly about the things of which man is most ashamed.

Now men are most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the honesty [*Cf. Q(145) ] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and this because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject to the command of reason, as are the movements of the other external members.

Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6). Consequently purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially the signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather these external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity.

Nevertheless the one is sometimes used to designate the other.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Augustine is here speaking of purity as designating chastity.

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the vices of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above ( Q(142), A(4) ).

P(2b)- Q(151)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins are most deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination of the genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason is absorbed.

QUESTION OF VIRGINITY (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) In what does virginity consist? (2) Whether it is lawful? (3) Whether it is a virtue? (4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage; (5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(1) Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh?

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that virginity does not consist in integrity of the flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.) [*The quotation is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii] that “virginity is the continual meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh.” But meditation does not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not situated in the flesh.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity.

Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that “purity dwells in the soul.”

Therefore virginity is not incorruption of the flesh.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken without loss of virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that “those organs may be injured through being wounded by mischance.

Physicians, too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder to see: and a midwife has been known to destroy by touch the proof of virginity that she sought.” And he adds: “Nobody, I think, would be so foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily sanctity, though she lost the integrity of that organ.” Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation, whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost without copulation: for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that “virginal integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse is the portion of angels.” Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that “virginity is continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh.”

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(1) —

I answer that, Virginity takes its name apparently from “viror” [freshness], and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining its freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so too, virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared by the heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the greatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 5) that “virginal chastity is integrity free of pollution.”

Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The first is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of virginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the soul and that which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of the semen, causing sensible pleasure.

The third is entirely on the part of the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of these three the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such must be considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the relation of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions are the matters of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of form and complement, because the essence of morality is perfected in that which concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists in freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity of the bodily organ is accidental to virginity; while freedom from pleasure in resolution of the semen is related thereto materially; and the purpose of perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the formal and completive element in virginity.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(1)- RO(1) —

This definition of Augustine’s expresses directly that which is formal in virginity. For “meditation” denotes reason’s purpose; and the addition “perpetual” does not imply that a virgin must always retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear in mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material element is expressed indirectly by the words “on incorruption in a corruptible body.”

This is added to show the difficulty of virginity: for if the flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to maintain a perpetual meditation on incorruption.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(1)- RO(2) —

It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in the soul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same with virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that “although virginity resides in the flesh,” and for this reason is a bodily quality, “yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency fosters and preserves.”

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ is accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily organ.

Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other way, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of a hand or foot.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise in two ways. If this be the result of the mind’s purpose, it destroys virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine, however, mentions copulation, because such like resolution is the ordinary and natural result thereof. In another way this may happen beside the purpose of the mind, either during sleep, or through violence and without the mind’s consent, although the flesh derives pleasure from it, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case of those who are subject to a flow of semen. In such cases virginity is not forfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity which excludes virginity.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(2) Whether virginity is unlawful?

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as the words of Genesis 2:16, “Of every tree” that is in “paradise, thou shalt eat,” indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation of the individual, so also the words of Genesis 1:28, “Increase and multiply, and fill the earth,” express a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species. Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this would be to act counter to the good of the individual, so too it is a sin to abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to act against the good of the species.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue, since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2), that “he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from all is loutish and insensible.” Therefore virginity is something sinful.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius Maximus asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato “is said to have sacrificed to nature, in order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as though it were a sin.” Therefore virginity is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(2) —

On the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written ( Corinthians 7:25): “Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel.” Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(2) —

I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which are against right reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man’s good is threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in external things, for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the third, consisting in the goods of the soul among which the goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the active life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord declared ( Luke 10:42), “Mary hath chosen the better part.” Of these goods those that are external are directed to those which belong to the body, and those which belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to the active life are directed to those which belong to the life of contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use external goods in a measure proportionate to the body, and in like manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from possessing certain things (which otherwise it were good for him to possess), for the sake of his body’s good, or of the contemplation of truth, this is not sinful, but in accord /with right reason. In like manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely to give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 7:34): “The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband.”

Therefore it follows that virginity instead of being sinful is worthy of praise.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(2)- RO(1) —

A precept implies a duty, as stated above ( Q(122), A(1) ). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one person doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually. Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while others abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and others fight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the multitude, although they cannot be done by one person.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The person who, beside the dictate of right reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal: and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that “in point of quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows the mean.”

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Laws are framed according to what occurs more frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained from all venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth: as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence it was not through thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but “because he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen,” as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii).

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3) Whether virginity is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that virginity is not a virtue.

For “no virtue is in us by nature,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1).

Now virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(65) , A(1) ). Yet some have other virtues without having virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, every virtue is recovered by penance.

But virginity is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii ad Eustoch.]: “Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin after her downfall.” Therefore seemingly virginity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): “Love of virginity moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree.”

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), the formal and completive element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far, to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things: while the material element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a good action has a special matter through having a special excellence, there is a special kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is about great expenditure is for this reason a special virtue distinct from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself free from inordinate venereal pleasure.

Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related to chastity as magnificence to liberality.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Men have from their birth that which is material in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God’s sake, which purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. xi): “Nor do we praise virgins for being virgins, but, because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy continency.”

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Virtues are connected together by reason of that which is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as stated above ( Q(129), A(3), ad 2), but not by reason of that which is material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity, his mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material therein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity.

As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, which we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who has experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For God cannot make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in the P(1), Q(25) , A(4) .

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that “by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh.”

Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(3)- RO(5) —

Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds something to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity alone is accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is reckoned above liberality.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(4) Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): “Continence was equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who begot children.” Now a greater virtue has greater merit.

Therefore virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence, it would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than any married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not preferable to marriage.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the common good takes precedence of the private good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is directed to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): “What food is to a man’s wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human race.” On the other hand, virginity is ordered to the individual good, namely in order to avoid what the Apostle calls the “tribulation of the flesh,” to which married people are subject ( Corinthians 7:28). Therefore virginity is not greater than conjugal continence.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): “Both solid reason and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful, nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or even to that of widowhood.”

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(4) —

I answer that, According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to marriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and by the teaching of the Apostle who ( 1 Corinthians 7) counsels virginity as the greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good takes precedence of a human good, and because the good of the soul is preferable to the good of the body, and again because the good of the contemplative life is better than that of the active life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in respect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking “on the things of God” [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’], whereas marriage is directed to the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the human race, and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace the married life have to think “on the things of the world,” as the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to conjugal continence.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so disposed, that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards the accidental reward.

Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that both “the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought Christ’s battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but John was continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in habit.”

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons.

First, on the part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married person is more prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be expedient, than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: “I am no better than Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage.” Further on he gives the reason for this: “For what I do now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him to do it then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved me now to do it.” Secondly, because perhaps the person who is not a virgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. xliv): “Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account of some mental fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink the chalice of the Lord?”

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The common good takes precedence of the private good, if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. ix): “It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those women who in these times seek naught else from marriage but children in order to make them servants of Christ, cannot compensate for lost virginity.”

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(5) Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues?

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues. For Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg.]): “We address ourselves now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less exalted is their vocation. They are a flower of the Church’s sowing, the pride and ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion of Christ’s flock.”

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue. Now the greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold fruit, according to a gloss on Matthew 13:23. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the greater it is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is declared in the Revelation 14:4 that virgins “follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,” and ( Revelation 14:3) that they sing “a new canticle,” which “no” other “man” could say. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): “No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom,” and (De Virgin. xlv): “The authority of the Church informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so that they know in what place the martyrs and the holy virgins who have departed this life are commemorated in the Sacrament of the Altar.” By this we are given to understand that martyrdom, and also the monastic state, are preferable to virginity.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(5) —

I answer that, A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in some particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely in the genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to chastity antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is ascribed to chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 7): “Can anyone esteem any beauty greater than a virgin’s, since she is beloved of her King, approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God?”

Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply, and in this way virginity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the end always excels that which is directed to the end; and the more effectively a thing is directed to the end, the better it is. Now the end which renders virginity praiseworthy is that one may have leisure for Divine things, as stated above ( A(4) ).

Wherefore the theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion, the acts of which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in order to cleave to God — since for this end they hold their own life in contempt; and those who dwell in monasteries — since for this end they give up their own will and all that they may possess — than virgins who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose. Therefore virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Virgins are “the more honored portion of Christ’s flock,” and “their glory more sublime” in comparison with widows and married women.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity, according to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.], on account of its superiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, and to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But according to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), “the hundredfold fruit is given to martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to married persons.” Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is simply the greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other degrees of chastity.

P(2b)- Q(152)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Virgins “follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,” because they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but also of the flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they follow more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more closely by imitation of the mind. The “new hymn” which virgins alone sing, is their joy at having preserved integrity of the flesh.

QUESTION OF LUST (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity: (1) Lust in general; (2) its species.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) What is the matter of lust? (2) Whether all copulation is unlawful? (3) Whether lust is a mortal sin? (4) Whether lust is a capital vice? (5) Concerning its daughters.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(1) Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures?

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that “lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance.” But surfeit regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Proverbs 20:1): “Wine is a lustful [Douay: ‘luxurious’] thing.” Now wine is connected with pleasure of meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, lust is defined “as the desire of wanton pleasure” [*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure regards not only venereal matters but also many others.

Therefore lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(1) —

On the contrary, To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii [*Written by St. Augustine]): “He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall reap corruption.” Now the sowing of the flesh refers to venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(1) —

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), “a lustful man is one who is debauched with pleasures.” Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a man’s mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like pleasures.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a man’s mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Galatians 5:19 says “lust is any kind of surfeit.”

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the name of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to which also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 15,16).

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(2) Whether no venereal act can be without sin?

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): “I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts.” Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by “excess” and “deficiency” as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that “it is incompatible with the act of understanding,” as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.; Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of the prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): “This is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a commandment”: and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal act is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(2) —

I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): “What food is to a man’s well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human race.”

Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of human procreation.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(2)- RO(1) —

A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. viii): “Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna’s conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more that of the Virgin Mary.”

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(2)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( Q(152), A(2), ad 2; P(2a), Q(64) , A(2) ), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), “the child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin.”

Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(3) Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener.

Anim. i, 18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own, except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle ( Ephesians 5:18), “Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay: ‘luxury’].” Therefore lust is forbidden.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(3) —

Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Galatians 5:19 [Douay: ‘luxury’].

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(3) —

I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken.

Now the use of venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the dictate of reason’s ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(3)- RO(1) —

As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener. Anim. i, 18), “the semen is a surplus that is needed.” For it is said to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not to be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the emission of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end for which it is needed.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(3)- RO(2) —

As the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 6:20) in speaking against lust, “You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body.” Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body.

Hence Augustine says (De Decem. Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): “God Who thus governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which thou hast begun to be.”

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The opposite of lust is not found in many, since men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(4) Whether lust is a capital vice?

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is apparently the same as “uncleanness,” according to a gloss on Ephesians 5:3 (Cf. 2 Corinthians 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that “as pride of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind safeguard the chastity of the flesh.” Now it is seemingly contrary to the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust is not a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Ephesians 4:19, “Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness.” But despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of sloth, as stated above ( Q(35) , A(4), ad 2). Much less, therefore, is lust a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the capital vices.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(148), A(5) ; P(2a), Q(84) , AA(3),4 ), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all of which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and because such like concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(4)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( Q(148), A(6) ), according to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point.

If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it is caused by gluttony materially — in so far as gluttony provides the bodily matter of lust — and not under the aspect of final cause, in which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the cause of others.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(4)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( Q(132), A(4), ad 1), when we were treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair, so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary for a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(5) Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly reckoned to be “blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of a future world.” For mental blindness, thoughtlessness and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be reckoned especially as daughters of lust.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated above ( Q(128), ad 6; Q(137), A(3) ). But lust is contrary, not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter of lust.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, “Self-love extending to the contempt of God” is the origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).

Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four, namely, “obscene,” “scurrilous,” “wanton” and “foolish talking.” There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(5) —

On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(5) —

I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.

Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act is hindered by lust, according to Daniel 13:56, “Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart.” In this respect we have “blindness of mind.” The second act is counsel about what is to be done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1), speaking of lecherous love: “This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not control it by counseling.” In this respect there is “rashness,” which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above ( Q(53) , A(3) ). The third act is judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful old men (Daniel 13:9): “They perverted their own mind... that they might not... remember just judgments.”

In this respect there is “thoughtlessness.” The fourth act is the reason’s command about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this “inconstancy” must be referred.] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who declared that he would leave his mistress: “One little false tear will undo those words.”

On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is the desire for the end, to which we refer “self-love,” which regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand there is “hatred of God,” by reason of His forbidding the desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the end. With regard to this there is “love of this world,” whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is “despair of a future world,” because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(5)- RO(1) —

According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of intemperance.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as stated above ( Q(143) ). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles a man’s heart and renders it effeminate, according to Hosea 4:11, “Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay: ‘understanding’].” Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that “the less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death.” Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf.

Q(35) , A(4), ad 2; Q(118), A(8), ad 1; Q(148), A(6) ).

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of lust.

P(2b)- Q(153)- A(5)- RO(4) —

The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer “obscene words”: for since “out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh” ( Matthew 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly, on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a thought to his words. which are described as “scurrilous.” Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to “wanton words.” Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man’s sentiments, and so he gives way “to foolish talking,” for instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.

QUESTION OF THE PARTS OF LUST (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Into what parts is lust divided? (2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin? (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? (4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like seduction? (5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin? (6) Of seduction; (7) Of rape; (8) Of adultery; (9) Of incest; (10) Of sacrilege; (11) Of the sin against nature; (12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1) Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to lust, namely, “simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape, and the unnatural vice.” For diversity of matter does not diversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is married or a virgin, or of some other condition. Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified in this way.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man having intercourse with one who is another’s, so that he commits an injustice.

Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow. Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as adultery is.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter sin is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the species thereof.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 2 Corinthians 12:21): “Lest again, when I come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them that sinned before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed.”

Therefore it seems that also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of lust, as well as fornication.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1)- O(6) —

Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is written ( Galatians 5:19): “The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: ‘luxury’].”

Therefore it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36, qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].

I answer that As stated above ( Q(153), A(3) ), the sin of lust consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.

Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways.

First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. In this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the “vice against nature,” which attaches to every venereal act from which generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing and advancement of the child when born, there is “simple fornication,” which is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman. Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other persons; and this in two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with whom a man has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to her; and thus there is “incest,” which consists in the misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed: and if she be under the authority of a husband, it is “adultery,” if under the authority of her father, it is “seduction,” in the absence of violence, and “rape” if violence be employed.

These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than of the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is by way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been stated above ( O(1) ) that the aforesaid species are assigned with regard to a difference of matter.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a formal difference of object, which difference results from different modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( P(2a), Q(18) , A(7) ), nothing hinders the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in this way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby shown to be more grievous.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the violation of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner, the other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced to other species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1)- RO(4) —

The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not constitute the species of a moral act, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(18) , A(2) ).

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1)- RO(5) —

As a gloss says on this passage, “uncleanness” stands for lust against nature, while “lasciviousness” is a man’s abuse of boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction.

We may also reply that “lasciviousness” relates to certain acts circumstantial to the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(1)- RO(6) —

According to a gloss on this passage “lust” there signifies any kind of excess.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal sin. For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a par with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that are not mortal sins: for it is written ( Acts 15:29): “That you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication.”

But there is not mortal sin in these observances, according to 1 Timothy 4:4, “Nothing is rejected that is received with thanksgiving.” Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But the Lord commanded ( Hosea 1:2): “Go take thee a wife of fornications, and have of her children of fornications.” Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without disapprobation by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus we read ( Genesis 16:4) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and further on ( Genesis 30:5,9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the handmaids of his wives; and again ( Genesis 38:18) that Juda was with Thamar whom he thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love of God, since it is not a sin directly against. God, nor as regards the love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But simple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose [*The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to St. Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on 1 Timothy 4:8, “Godliness is profitable to all things,” says: “The whole of Christian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man conforms to this, even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish.”

Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2)- O(6) —

Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that “what food is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human race.” But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse; and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid species.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:13): “Take heed to keep thyself... from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a crime.” Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all intercourse with other than one’s wife is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2) —

Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God’s kingdom. But fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle ( Galatians 5:21), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, adds: “They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2) —

Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can. Praedicandum): “They should know that the same penance is to be enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder and other criminal offenses.” Therefore simple fornication is a criminal or mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2) —

I answer that, Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in Deut., qu. 37] on Deuteronomy 23:17, says: “This is a prohibition against going with whores, whose vileness is venial.” For instead of “venial” it should be “venal,” since such is the wanton’s trade.

In order to make this evident, we must take note that every sin committed directly against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union. For we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female, that these come together not indeterminately, but the male with a certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where the female alone suffices for the offspring’s upbringing, the union is indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother’s care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate.

This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole human race, and common goods depend on the law for their determination, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(90) , A(2) ), it follows that this union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, is determined by some law. What this determination is for us will be stated in the Third Part of this work (XP, Q(50) , seqq.), where we shall treat of the sacrament of matrimony.

Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child’s upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin.

Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according to what happens in general, and not according to what may happen in a particular case.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing unanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason: whereas the Jews, taught by the Divine law, considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the Jews, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(103), A(4), ad 3).

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary to right reason. Now man’s reason is right, in so far as it is ruled by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does by God’s will and in obedience to His command, is not contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously by the Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the usual course of nature.

Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his innocent son, because he obeyed God, although considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by God’s command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called fornication, though it be so called in reference to the general course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): “When God commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be done”; and afterwards he adds: “For as among the powers of human society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God in preference to all.”

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of matrimony (XP, Q(65) , A(5), ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, as we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvantageous to the future child.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2)- RO(5) —

A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy; but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal inconstancy impenitent until death.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(2)- RO(6) —

One copulation may result in the begetting of a man, wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one meal does not hinder the good of a man’s whole life, wherefore the act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would, however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a food which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the case with Adam.

Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised under lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous pleasure is a lesser sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(3) Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins?

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in fornication, for a gloss on 1 Corinthians 7:9 says that the “flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust.” Therefore it seems that fornication is the gravest of sins.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger.

Now according to 1 Corinthians 6:18, “He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body,” which is most intimately connected with a man. Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was said in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according to 1 Corinthians 6:15, “Shall I... take the members of Christ, and make them the members of a harlot?” Therefore fornication is the most grievous of sins.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of the flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(3) —

I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, first with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some accident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin itself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to the good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to its species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods, such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those which are directly against God, and sins that are injurious to the life of one already born, such as murder.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure that is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano [*Serm. ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine’s works]) that of all a Christian’s conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and Isidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that “mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal lust more than by anything else,” because, to wit, the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts against the good of his own body by an undue resolution and defilement thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin, because in man reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if there be a sin more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the human race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual begetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of the species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind of lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human species. Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and therefore those sins also that are against God are more grievous. Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though the fornicator intended to offend God, but consequently, in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are Christ’s members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, according to 1 Corinthians 6:17, “He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.” Wherefore also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(4) Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses?

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and kisses. For the Apostle says ( Ephesians 5:3): “Fornication and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh saints,” then he adds: “Or obscenity” (which a gloss refers to “kissing and fondling”), “or foolish talking” (as “soft speeches”), “or scurrility” (which “fools call geniality — i.e. jocularity”), and afterwards he continues ( Ephesians 5:5): “For know ye this and understand that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person (which is the serving of idols), hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God,” thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being prejudicial to the good of the future child’s begetting and upbringing. But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in themselves.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(4) —

On the contrary, A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a kiss. But according to Matthew 5:28, “Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart.”

Much more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things mortal sins.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(4) —

Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), “By their very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their embraces, those who are associated in a sleep that knows neither honor nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime.” Therefore by doing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(4) —

I answer that, A thing is said to be a mortal works. /sin in two ways. First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is possible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of one’s country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt intention. Now it has been stated above ( P(2a), Q(74) , A(8) ), that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a mortal sin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in such like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lustful. Therefore in so far as they are lustful, they are mortal sins.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The Apostle makes no further mention of these three because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had mentioned before.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally sinful.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(4)- RO(3) —

This argument proves that such things are not mortal sins in their species.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord ( 1 Kings 3:2, Par. 1).

Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution would seem to be a sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is instructed and reproved by God, according to Job 33:15,16, “By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of men [*Vulg.: ‘When deep sleep falleth upon men.’ St. Thomas is apparently quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly above, Q(95) , A(6), O(1) ]... Then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn.” Therefore a man, while asleep, can act according to or against his reason, and this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that nocturnal pollution is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii, 15): “When the same image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the mind of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about such things while one is awake.”

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(5) —

I answer that, Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways. First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first movement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far as it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason’s judgment, there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard some of the images formed by his imagination as though they were real, as stated above in the P(1), Q(84) , A(8), ad 2. Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason’s judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile.

Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there is excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated either through overheating of the body or some other disturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing happens when nature is cumbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a sinful cause (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the character of sin from its cause: whereas if the excess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.

A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to arise from thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul, so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that “in so far as certain movements in some degree pass” from the waking state to the state of sleep, “the dreams of good men are better than those of any other people”: and Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xii, 15) that “even during sleep, the soul may have conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition.”

Thus it is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its cause. on the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution ensues after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.

The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the work of a devil the sleeper’s phantasms are disturbed so as to induce the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous sin, namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil. Hence the words of the hymn at even: “Our enemy repress, that so our bodies no uncleanness know” [*Translation W. K. Blount].

On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man’s part, and through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It is for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to God ( 1 Kings 3:10), as Augustine observes (Genesis ad lit. xii, 15).

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep, according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations.

Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the P(1), Q(84) , A(8), ad 2. Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as a sin.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Reason’s apprehension is not hindered during sleep to the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human thought. Hence nothing hinders man’s reason during sleep from apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or again through Divine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(6) Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust?

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, according to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]. But this may occur between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust, distinct from fornication.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 4]): “Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery.” Now a species is not contained under another that is differentiated in opposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species of lust, it seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury to another, namely the violated maiden’s father, who “can take the injury as personal to himself” [*Gratian, ad can. Lex illa], and sue the seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Seduction consists properly in the venereal act whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about venereal actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(6) —

I answer that, When the matter of a vice has a special deformity, we must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust is a sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above ( Q(153), A(1) ). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is under her father’s care: both on the part of the maid, who through being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both hindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity: and on the part of the father, who is her guardian, according to Ecclus. 42:11, “Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a laughing-stock to thy enemies.” Therefore it is evident that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, while still under the guardianship of her parents, is a determinate species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage, she is not free from her father’s power. Moreover, the seal of virginity is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots, women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2 Corinthians 12:, “And have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication,” etc.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, in the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man and any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding: “Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not.” In this sense, too, we are to understand the words of Numbers 5:13: “If [Vulg.: ‘But’] the adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by witnesses, because she was not found in adultery [stupro].”

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an injustice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, is nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is bound to compensation. Hence it is written ( Exodus 22:16,17): “If a man seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to wife. If the maid’s father will not give her to him, he shall give money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive.”

The other injury is done to the maid’s father: wherefore the seducer is bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written ( Deuteronomy 22:28,29): “If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to judgment: he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he hath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of his life”: and this, lest he should prove to have married her in mockery, as Augustine observes. [*QQ. in Dt., qu. xxxiv.]

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(7) Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction?

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that rape is not a species of lust, distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that “seduction [stuprum], or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption: wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer.” Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a species of lust distinct from seduction.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, rape, apparently, implies violence.

For it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can.

Lex illa]) that “rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her father’s house that after being violated she may be taken to wife.” But the employment of force is accidental to lust, for this essentially regards the pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is written ( 1 Corinthians 7:2): “For fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife.” Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was enacted in the council of Meaux: “We decree that those who are guilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not have those women in marriage, although they should have subsequently married them with the consent of their parents.” Therefore rape is not a determinate species of lust distinct from seduction.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(7)- O(4) —

Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he take her away by force from her parents’ house, and have carnal knowledge of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore rape is a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(7) —

I answer that, Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.

They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from her father’s house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by force from her parents’ house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says [*Ep. v ad Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2], “We abhor abductors whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of their crime.”

There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force, violates a virgin unlawfully.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one is sometimes used to signify the other.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(7)- RO(2) —

The employment of force would seem to arise from the greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear to endanger himself by offering violence.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(7)- RO(3) —

The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her father’s care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her parents’ consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever steals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, although it is an impediment to its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, it was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abrogated. Wherefore Jerome [*The quotation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2] declares the contrary: “Three kinds of lawful marriage,” says he, “are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal knowledge of her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her according to the father’s estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity [*Cf. Deuteronomy 22:23-29]. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from such a man, and is given to another at the father’s will.”

We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words in the present tense.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(7)- RO(4) —

The man who is just married has, in virtue of the betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by using violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius says [*Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: “This law of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken away by force.”

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(8) Whether adultery is determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species?

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its name from a man having intercourse “with a woman who is not his own [ad alteram],” according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de Divers. lxiii] on Exodus 20:14. Now a woman who is not one’s own may be of various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father’s care, or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems that adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: “It matters not for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an adulterer,” and in like manner one who is over enamored of any woman.

Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be reckoned a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is the same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case a woman is violated who is under another person’s authority. Therefore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the others.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that “adultery is sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one’s own lust, or with the consent of the other party.” Now this implies a special deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(8) —

I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, “is access to another’s marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]” [*Cf. Append.

Gratian, ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense against chastity and the good of human procreation. First, by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his own children. Secondly, by accession to a woman who is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders the good of another’s children. The same applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery. Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:32,33): “Every woman... that leaveth her husband... shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath been unfaithful to the law of the Most High” (since there it is commanded: “Thou shalt not commit adultery”); “and secondly, she hath offended against her husband,” by making it uncertain that the children are his: “thirdly, she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of another man,” which is contrary to the good of her offspring.

The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins, while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery. Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust, through having a special deformity in venereal acts.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(8)- RO(1) —

If a married man has intercourse with another woman, his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse; and thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has intercourse with another’s wife; and sometimes it has the character of seduction, or of some other sin, according to various conditions affecting the woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been stated above ( A(1) ) that the species of lust correspond to the various conditions of women.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human offspring, as stated above ( A(2) ). But adultery is specially opposed to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is due between husband and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her indecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be called an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a lover of another woman.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(8)- RO(3) —

The wife is under her husband’s authority, as united to him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father’s authority, as one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in the Third Part [*XP, Q(59) , A(3) ; XP, QQ(60),62 ], when we treat of matrimony.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(9) Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem that incest is not a determinate species of lust. For incest [*’Incestus’ is equivalent to ‘in-castus = ‘unchaste’] takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that incest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself in general.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that “incest is intercourse between a man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity.” Now affinity differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity, does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not, of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have been lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(9) —

On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished according to the various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse. Now incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman, because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by consanguinity or affinity as stated ( O(2) ). Therefore incest is a determinate species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(9) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(1),6 ) wherever we find something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there must needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was not deemed right for a son to bathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now from what has been said ( Q(142), A(4) : Q(151), A(4) ), it is evident that in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent with respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse.

This reason seems to be indicated ( Leviticus 18:7) where we read: “She is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness,” and the same is expressed further on with regard to others.

The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and thus men’s minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in the Old Law [*Leviticus 18] the prohibition was apparently directed specially to those persons who must needs live together.

The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his wife’s relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): “The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one, but each should have one.”

Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive to lust: and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a determinate species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(9)- RO(1) —

Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love, as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between such persons is called “incest” antonomastically.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(9)- RO(2) —

Persons are related by affinity through one who is related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the other, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(9)- RO(3) —

There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and immediately related to one another, since children naturally owe their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and threw itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done, because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have begotten them.

There is not the same essential unbecomingness attaching to other persons who are related to one another not directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or unbecomingness varies according to custom, and human or Divine law: because, as stated above ( A(2) ), sexual intercourse, being directed to the common good, is subject to law.

Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation when religion forbade it.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(10) Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(10) - O(1) —

It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust. For the same species is not contained under different genera that are not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species of irreligion, as stated above ( Q(99) , A(2) ). Therefore sacrilege cannot be reckoned a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is not reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice.

Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(10) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that “if it is wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one’s earthly bounds, how much more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds of morals!” Now to go beyond one’s earthly bounds in sacred matters is a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred matters.

But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(10) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(18) , AA(6),7 ), the act of a virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice, assumes the latter’s species: thus, theft committed for the sake of adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is evident that as Augustine states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, as in the case of those who vow and keep chastity. Wherefore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the species of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(10) - RO(1) —

Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end, becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(10) - RO(2) —

The enumeration referred to, includes those sins which are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a species of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its end, and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse with a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of Christ, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her father’s authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and if force be employed it will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian says [*Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: “If any man dare, I will not say to rape, but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment.”

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(10) - RO(3) —

Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may also come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an injury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless, sacrilege is ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the observance of which certain persons are specially consecrated.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(11) Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(11) - O(1) —

It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species of lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the enumeration given above ( A(1), O(1) ). Therefore it is not a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(11) - O(2) —

Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice, but under bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5).

Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(11) - O(3) —

Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation, as stated above ( Q(153), A(2) ): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(11) —

On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the other species of lust ( 2 Corinthians 12:21) where we read: “And have not done penance for the uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness,” where a gloss says: “Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust.”

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(11) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(6),9 ) wherever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is common to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the human race: and this is called “the unnatural vice.” This may happen in several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the sin of “uncleanness” which some call “effeminacy.” Secondly, by copulation with a thing of undue species, and this is called “bestiality.” Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female with female, as the Apostle states ( Romans 1:27): and this is called the “vice of sodomy.” Fourthly, by not observing the natural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(11) - RO(1) —

There we enumerated the species of lust that are not contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(11) - RO(2) —

Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue, and therefore is reducible to the same genus.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(11) - RO(3) —

The lustful man intends not human generation but venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the unnatural vice.

P(2b)- Q(154)- A(12) Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?