QUESTIONS 155-170 QUESTION OF CONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty.

Under the first head we must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether continence is a virtue? (2) What is its matter? (3) What is its subject? (4) Of its comparison with temperance.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1) Whether continence is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that continence is not a virtue.

For species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division.

But continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1,9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19), “a virtue is a thing that no one makes ill use of.” Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful, but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Galatians 5:23, “Faith, modesty,” etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that “continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure.”

Therefore continence is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1) —

I answer that, The word “continence” is taken by various people in two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity ( Galatians 5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above ( Q(152), A(3) ) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii, 10,11). In this way continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, lest it be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “continence is not a virtue but a mixture,” inasmuch as it has something of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.

If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The Philosopher includes continence in the same division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Properly speaking, man is that which is according to reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds [tenet se] to that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself.

Now whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason.

Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right reason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2) Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): “General decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous is restrained* in its every action.” [*”Continentem” according to St. Thomas’ reading; St. Ambrose wrote “concinentem = harmonious”].

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for the good of right reason, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2). Now other passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence than the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore continence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of touch.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): “It is continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel.”

Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Timothy 6:10, “Cupidity [Douay: ‘The desire of money’] (\philargyria\), is the root of all evils.” Therefore continence is not properly about the desires for pleasures of touch

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- O(4) — Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of touch is not its proper matter.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but bestial, both as regards food — for instance, the pleasure of eating human flesh; and as regards venereal matters — for instance the abuse of animals or boys. But continence is not about such like things, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of continence.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that “continence and incontinence are about the same things as temperance and intemperance.” Now temperance and intemperance are about the desires for pleasures of touch, as stated above ( Q(141), A(4) ).

Therefore continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2) —

I answer that, Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from following his passions. Hence continence is properly said in reference to those passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein it is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is not properly about those passions, such as fear and the like, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates, as stated above ( Q(123), AA(3),4 ). Now it is to be observed that natural inclinations are the principles of all supervening inclinations, as stated above ( P(1), Q(60) , A(2) ). Wherefore the more they follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the maintenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain to the touch.

Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to desires for pleasures of touch.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and in this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the soul — in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured him — rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be said to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- RO(3) —

External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak of a person as being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding that they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth, or honor and so forth. Hence Tully either understood continence in a general sense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are applicable to both.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- RO(5) —

Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that “if a man were to lay hold of a child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent [*See A(4) ], not absolutely, but relatively.”

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3) Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power?

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the subject of continence is the concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be proportionate to the virtue’s matter. Now the matter of continence, as stated ( A(2) ), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the concupiscible power.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, “Opposites are referred to one same thing” [*Categ. viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions overcome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that “incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to reason.” Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the reason, or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason, for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will, since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the passions of the irascible, as stated above ( A(2), ad 2). Therefore it follows that it is in the concupiscible.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Every virtue residing in a certain power removes the evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil act of the concupiscible: since “the continent man has evil desires,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is not in the concupiscible power.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3) —

I answer that, Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that subject have a different disposition from that which it has while subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent, since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires. Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible as its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both, since both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and each of them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow his unlawful desires. Now the primary difference between them is to be found in their choice: since the continent man, though subject to vehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason; whereas the incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his reason forbids. Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(13) , A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which is in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them.

For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of one thing against another.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The will stands between reason and the concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible. Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover, and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong immediately to the will as their proper subject.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Although the passions are not in the will as their subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it is that the will of the continent man resists desires.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4) Whether continence is better than temperance?

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that continence is better than temperance. For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): “No price is worthy of a continent soul.” Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward; for it is written ( 2 Timothy 2:5): “He... is not crowned, except he strive lawfully,” and the continent man, since he is subject to vehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the will is a more excellent power than the concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is in the concupiscible, as stated above ( A(3) ). Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a principal virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), continence has a twofold signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater than temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what we said above ( Q(152), A(5) ) concerning the preeminence of virginity over chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when they are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far greater than continence, because the good of a virtue derives its praise from that which is in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes more in the temperate man than in the continent man, because in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient to reason, being tamed by reason so to speak, whereas in the continent man the sensitive appetite strongly resists reason by its evil desires. Hence continence is compared to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The passage quoted may be understood in two ways. First in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence from all things venereal: and thus it means that “no price is worthy of a continent soul,” in the genus of chastity the fruitfulness of the flesh is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated above ( Q(152), AA(4),5 ). Secondly it may be understood in reference to the general sense in which continence denotes any abstinence from things unlawful: and thus it means that “no price is worthy of a continent soul,” because its value is not measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable according to weight.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause: because some people by their natural temperament are more prone to concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure which inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for others. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas strength of concupiscence increases it. on the other hand, weakness or strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual cause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or the strength of reason, as in the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of concupiscence, by reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence diminishes it.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The will is more akin to the reason than the concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason — on account of which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the temperate man — is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the will, as in the case of one who is continent.

QUESTION OF INCONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body? (2) Whether incontinence is a sin? (3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance; (4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in desire?

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire.” Therefore incontinence regards the body.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because “the flesh lusteth against the spirit,” and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly on the part of the soul.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1) —

I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions. If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of reason altogether — as in the case of those who become insane through the vehemence of their passions — the essential conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes.

From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason. This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is called “unbridled incontinence” or “impetuosity”: secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding weakly to reason’s judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is called “weakness.” Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds to it weakly; although in /rare cases the opposite occurs, according to Proverbs 31:10, “Who shall find a valiant woman?” And since small and weak things “are accounted as though they were not” [*Aristotle, Phys. ii, 5] the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that “we do not describe women as being continent, because they are vacillating” through being unstable of reason, and “are easily led” so that they follow their passions readily.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1)- RO(2) —

It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious persons [*Cf. P(2a), Q(46) , A(5) ], or from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with regard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1)- RO(3) —

In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain negligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2) Whether incontinence is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that incontinence is not a sin.

For as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): “No man sins in what he cannot avoid.” Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis. 8:21, “I know [Vulg.: ‘knew’] that I could not... be continent, except God gave it.” Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man.

Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “Paul, through incontinence of divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I” ( Galatians 2:20). Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is numbered together with other sins ( 2 Timothy 3:3) where it is written: “Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful,” etc. Therefore incontinence is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2) —

I answer that, Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence ( Q(155), A(2) ). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that “incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong” — that is, by straying from reason — ”but also because it is wicked” — that is, by following evil desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is considered, properly — inasmuch as it is a straying from reason — but not simply; for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence ( Q(155), A(2), ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of themselves desirable.

Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but metaphorically. for instance about the desires for things of which one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God’s help, according to John 15:5: “Without Me you can do nothing.” Wherefore the fact that man needs God’s help in order to be continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, “what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves.”

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2)- RO(3) —

This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not properly.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3) Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate?

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Luke 12:47, “That servant who knew the will of his lord... and did not... shall be beaten with many stripes.”

Now the incontinent man would seem to act against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to Ethic. vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a person’s sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong, and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12,13) that “impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost.” Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) “the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance.” Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3) —

I answer that, According to Augustine [*De Duab.

Anim. x, xi] sin is chiefly an act of the will, because “by the will we sin and live aright” [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion. And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is “a disposition difficult to remove,” the result is that the incontinent man repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit.

Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written ( Proverbs 2:14) that “they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things.” Hence it follows that “the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent,” as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 7).

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something, either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man’s ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7,8) that “the incontinent man is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best principle [*\To beltiston, e arche\, ‘the best thing, i.e. the principle’],” to wit, the right estimate of the end.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above ( Q(142), A(2) ). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily suppressed.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate man, “because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm,” i.e. slight desire. “For what would he have done if he had desired it with passion?”

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4) Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire?

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): “It is not wonderful, indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains.” Now, “as Heraclitus says, it is more difficult to resist desire than anger” [*Ethic. 2:3]. Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of anger.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one who is incontinent in desire: since “anger listens to reason somewhat, but desire does not” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is. Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads.

Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire.”

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4) —

I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more inordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher indicates them, Ethic. vii, 6: First, because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. on the other hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as though forced by a certain previous displeasure.

Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because it leads to things that are harmful to one’s neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4)- RO(1) —

It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is more disgraceful.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4)- RO(3) —

This argument considers incontinence with regard to its result.

QUESTION OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices.

Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical? (2) Whether each of them is a virtue? (3) Whether each is a part of temperance? (4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1) Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same?

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is “desire of vengeance” [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency “is leniency of a superior in inflicting punishment on an inferior,” as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem that clemency and meekness are the same.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that “clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person,” so that apparently clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi], hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and clemency.

Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely the same.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues. But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are absolutely the same.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1) —

On the contrary, According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca ( O(1) ) “clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior”: whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the same.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated in Ethic. ii, 3, a moral virtue is “about passions and actions.” Now internal passions are principles of external actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore virtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from theft. This applies to the case in point; because through the passion of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment, while it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be prevented by excessive anger.

Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment, while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Meekness regards properly the desire itself of vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is applied externally for the purpose of vengeance.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Man’s affections incline to the moderation of things that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter’s punishment in itself, but only as directed to something else, for instance justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes one quick to mitigate punishment — and this pertains to clemency — while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this reason Tully says that “the mind provoked to hatred” that is to punish too severely, “is restrained by clemency,” from inflicting too severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred but punishment.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that “those are called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in punishing.” Those who delight in a man’s punishment for its own sake may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling that leads one man to love another.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2) Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues?

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, “Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect” [*Ethic. ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease; for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, meekness or mildness is included ( Matthew 5:4) among the beatitudes, and ( Galatians 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised under virtue.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): “Every good man is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness.” Now it is virtue properly that belongs to a good man, since “virtue it is that makes its possessor good, and renders his works good also” (Ethic. ii, 6).

Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2) —

I answer that, The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For clemency, in mitigating punishment, “is guided by reason,” according to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external punishing, as stated above ( A(1) ). Yet they are not really opposed to one another, since they are both according to right reason. For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also according to right reason, when and where this is requisite. Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about the same thing.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2)- RO(2) —

According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), “the habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the name of meekness.” For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to excess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since “scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself,” as Sallust observes [*Cf. Q(120) ]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not in respect of that which is according to right reason, but as regards that which is according to common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on account of some particular consideration, it mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1): “Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets free are declared immune from all further punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to a pardon.” Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related to severity as equity [the Greek ‘epieikeia’ [*Cf. Q(120) ]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as regards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on ( A(3), ad 1).

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3) Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance?

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above ( A(2) ). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which pertains to justice, as stated above ( Q(120), A(2) ). Therefore seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): “A man may be said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty.” Now this is opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of prudence rather than of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that “clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge.” Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3) —

I answer that, Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and name of justice consist in a certain “equality,” those of fortitude in a certain “strength of mind,” those of temperance in a certain “restraint,” inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above ( AA(1),2 ). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Two points must be considered in the mitigation of punishment. one is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance with the lawgiver’s intention, although not according to the letter of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other point is a certain moderation of a man’s inward disposition, so that he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that “it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge.” This moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another.

Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that “clemency is a certain smoothness of the soul”; for, on the other hand, there would seem to be a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to pain others.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The annexation of secondary to principal virtues depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form of the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not in matter.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3)- RO(3) —

“Unsoundness” is corruption of “soundness.” Now just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason, and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses that humane feeling whereby “every man is naturally friendly towards all other men” (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind, is because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to clemency.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4) Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues?

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is written ( James 1:21): “With meekness receive the ingrafted word,” and (Ecclus. 5:13): “Be meek to hear the word” of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) that “Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on account of his great meekness.” Therefore meekness is the greatest of virtues.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to be most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34,35): “That which is agreeable” to God is “faith and meekness”; wherefore Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself ( Matthew 11:29), where He says: “Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart”; and Hilary declares [*Comment. in Matthew 4:3] that “Christ dwells in us by our meekness of soul.” Again, it is most acceptable to men; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): “My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men”: for which reason it is also declared ( Proverbs 20:28) that the King’s “throne is strengthened by clemency.” Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest of virtues.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that “the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but overcome evil by good.” Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of Ambrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 1 Timothy 4:8, “Piety [Douay: ‘Godliness’] is profitable to all things,” observes that “piety is the sum total of the Christian religion.” Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest virtues.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4) —

On the contrary, They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4) —

I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus. It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and meekness.

Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil inclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man’s free judgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 10:31): “My son, keep thy soul in meekness.” Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as stated above ( Q(141), A(7), ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger.

Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): “To be meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and have a clearer insight of the truth.”

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor’s evils.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor’s evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive.

For piety relieves a neighbor’s evil through reverence for a superior, for instance God or one’s parents: mercy relieves a neighbor’s evil, because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon it as affecting oneself, as stated above ( Q(30) , A(2) ): and this results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.

QUESTION OF ANGER (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency.

Concerning anger there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful to be angry? (2) Whether anger is a sin? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins? (5) Of its species; (6) Whether anger is a capital vice? (7) Of its daughters; (8) Whether it has a contrary vice?

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For Jerome in his exposition on Matthew 5:22, “Whosoever is angry with his brother,” etc. says: “Some codices add ‘without cause.’

However, in the genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden altogether.” Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) “The soul’s evil is to be without reason.” Now anger is always without reason: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “anger does not listen perfectly to reason”; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “when anger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by its riot”; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): “From whatever cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the mind.”

Therefore it is always evil to be angry.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, anger is “desire for vengeance” [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2] according to a gloss on Leviticus 19:17, “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart.” Now it would seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Deuteronomy 32:35, “Revenge is Mine.” Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since God judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18.

Therefore to be angry is always an evil.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: “He that is angry without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments unstable, crimes unchecked.” Therefore to be angry is not always an evil.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1) —

I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(46) , A(1) ) when we were treating of the passions.

Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion’s very species, which is derived from the passion’s object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at another’s good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), “the very mention of envy denotes something evil.” Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the passion’s quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one’s anger is deserving of praise.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(24) , A(2) ) when we were treating of the passions. It is in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger whereby one is angry with one’s neighbor, with the intent of doing him a wrong. — But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not always evil.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called “zealous anger.” Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): “We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of following in reason’s train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey.” This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it.” Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while having to act.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- RO(3) —

It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order of judgment, it is God’s work, since he who has power to punish “is God’s minister,” as stated in Romans 13:4.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- RO(4) —

We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows to the command of reason.”

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2) Whether anger is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by sinning. But “we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do we incur blame thereby,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above ( P(2a), Q(46) , A(1) ) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a person’s evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, “No man sins in what he cannot avoid,” as Augustine asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger, for a gloss on Psalm 4:5, “Be ye angry and sin not,” says: “The movement of anger is not in our power.” Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. vii, 6) that “the angry man acts with displeasure.” Now displeasure is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30]. But it is not contrary to man’s nature to be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible; wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach.] that “to be angry is the property of man.” Therefore it is not a sin to be angry.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Ephesians 4:31): “Let all indignation and anger [*Vulg.: ‘Anger and indignation’]... be put away from you.”

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2) —

I answer that, Anger, as stated above ( A(1) ), is properly the name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called “zealous anger” [*Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.

Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally; and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, even though just vengeance be desired.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that “it is he who is angry in a certain way, that is praised or blamed.”

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite turns as to a mutable good.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Man is master of his actions through the judgment of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that judgment, it is not in man’s power to prevent them as a whole, i.e. so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each one, if it arise.

Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not in man’s power, to the extent namely that no such movement arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the Philosopher that “the angry man acts with displeasure,” means that he is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to seek vengeance.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- RO(4) —

The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is contrary to man’s nature.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(3) Whether all anger is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin.

For it is written ( Job 5:2): “Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg.: ‘Anger indeed killeth the foolish’],” and he speaks of the spiritual killing, whence mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord said ( Matthew 5:22): “Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment”: and a gloss on this passage says that “the three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and hell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state of eternal damnation corresponding to various sins.” Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal sin. Now anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares in his commentary on Matthew 5:22, “Whosoever is angry with his brother,” etc. where he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor. Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(3) —

On the contrary, A gloss on Psalm 4:5, “Be ye angry and sin not,” says: “Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action.”

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(3) —

I answer that, The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful in two ways, as stated above ( A(2) ). First, on the part of the appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger is a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a venial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfection is considered either in relation to the subject desirous of vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of his reason; or in relation to the desired object, as when one desires to be avenged in a trifling matter, which should be deemed of no account, so that even if one proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for instance by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some other like action. Secondly, the movement of anger may be inordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if one be too fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal sin in the point of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin, for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a man fall away from the love of God and his neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(3)- RO(1) —

It does not follow from the passage quoted that all anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually by anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God or by doing injury to their neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition to the words of the Law: “Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment” ( Matthew 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(3)- RO(3) —

In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we have said.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(4) Whether anger is the most grievous sin?

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that “nothing is more repulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a ruthless* face, and most of all than a cruel soul.” [*’Severo’. The correct text is ‘Si vero.’ The translation would then run thus... ‘and nothing uglier.’ And if his ‘face is ugly, how much uglier is his soul!’]. Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), “a thing is said to be evil because it hurts.” Now anger is most hurtful, because it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that “anger differs in no way from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome than one harassed by a demon.” Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, inward movements are judged according to their outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): “Lest anger grow into hatred and a mote become a beam.” Therefore anger is not the most grievous sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(1),2 ), the inordinateness of anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the least of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some person, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the part of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred; but while hatred desires absolutely another’s evil as such, and the envious man desires another’s evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man desires another’s evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such as honor or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man desires an evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this respect again, absolutely speaking. the sin of anger is apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the good of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that “the incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent in anger.”

On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on account of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to Proverbs 27:4, “Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: and who can bear the violence of one provoked?”

Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): “The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no sense in its utterance.”

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(4)- RO(2) —

This argument considers the inordinate movement of anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the aspect of justice, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(5) Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger?

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some angry persons are “choleric,” some “sullen,” and some “ill-tempered” or “stern.” According to him, a person is said to be “sullen” whose anger “is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time.” But this apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the other circumstances.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that “illtempered” or “stern” persons “are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge, or punishment.” Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He says ( Matthew 5:22): “Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say” to his brother, “Thou fool.” But these degrees are not referable to the aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger is not fitting.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi] says “there are three species of irascibility,” namely, “the anger which is called wrath [*’Fellea,’ i.e. like gall. But in P(2a), Q(46) , A(8), St. Thomas quoting the same authority has \Cholos\ which we render ‘wrath’],” and “ill-will” which is a disease of the mind, and “rancour.” Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid. For “wrath” he describes as “having beginning and movement,” and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to “choleric” persons: “ill-will” he describes as “an anger that endures and grows old,” and this the Philosopher ascribes to “sullenness”; while he describes “rancour” as “reckoning the time for vengeance,” which tallies with the Philosopher’s description of the “ill-tempered.” The same division is given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(5) —

I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when treating of the passions ( P(2a), Q(46) , A(8) ) how it is to be applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.

For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards “choleric” persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too long in a man’s memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting displeasure, wherefore he is “grievous” and “sullen” to himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to “ill-tempered” or “stern” people, who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted punishment.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(5)- RO(1) —

It is not time, but a man’s propensity to anger, or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the aforesaid species.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Both “sullen” and “ill-tempered” people have a long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a “sullen” person has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger of “ill-tempered” persons is long-lasting on account of their intense desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be quelled only by revenge.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(5)- RO(3) —

The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of the human act [*Cf. P(2a), Q(46) , A(8), O(3) ]. For the first degree is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: “Whosoever is angry with his brother.” The second degree is when the anger is manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect; and in reference to this He says: “Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca!” which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is another’s hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to this He says: “Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou fool!” Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first, and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above ( A(3), ad 2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is assigned as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case “judgment” is assigned, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], “where judgment is to be delivered, there is an opportunity for defense”: in the second case “council” is assigned, “whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be inflicted”: to the third case is assigned “hell-fire,” i.e. “decisive condemnation.”

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(6) Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices?

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger.

Therefore it should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, a gloss on Proverbs 29:22, “An angry [Douay: ‘passionate’] man provoketh quarrels,” says: “Anger is the door to all vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the virtues; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime.” Now no capital vice is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the capital vices.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(6) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(84) , A(3), 4), a capital vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*, which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above ( A(4) ). [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q(145), A(1) ]. The second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident that anger is a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results from an injury inflicted.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(6)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( Q(118), A(7) ; Q(148), A(5) ; Q(153), A(4) ; P(2a), Q(84) , A(4) ), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to have a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a capital vice than hatred is.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Anger is stated to be the door to the vices accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however, directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called its daughters.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(7) Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger?

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to anger, namely “quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor, indignation and blasphemy.” For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride.

Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of anger.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, “a swollen mind” would seem to be the same as pride. Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but “the mother of all vices,” as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to anger.

I answer that, Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. one is on the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy [indignum] of acting thus towards him, and this is called “indignation.” The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, “Will a wise man... fill his stomach with burning heat?” And thus we have “swelling of the mind.”

Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his anger in his manner of speech, as stated above ( A(5), ad 3) of the man who says to his brother, “Raca”: and this refers to “clamor,” which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against God, it is “blasphemy,” if against one’s neighbor, it is “contumely.”

Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger gives rise to “quarrels,” by which we are to understand all manner of injuries inflicted on one’s neighbor through anger.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(7)- RO(1) —

The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God: since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, “the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God,” i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is the first part of pride [*Cf. Q(162), A(7), ad 2]; and this gives rise to blasphemy.

But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from sloth rather than from anger.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(8) Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger?

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that there. is not a vice opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges “with tranquillity” (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice to be altogether without anger.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless. But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it seems that lack of anger is not a vice.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), “man’s evil is to be without reason.” Now the judgment of reason remains unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of anger amounts to a vice.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: “He who is not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong.”

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(8) —

I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom): “Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion”: and when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with passion resulting from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak.

Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(8)- RO(1) —

He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God’s punishing by judgment.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(8)- RO(2) —

The passion of anger, like all other movements of the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt execution [*Cf. P(2a), Q(24) , A(3) ] of reason’s dictate: else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas “nature does nothing without purpose” [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(8)- RO(3) —

When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.

QUESTION OF CRUELTY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency? (2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that “those are said to be cruel who exceed in punishing,” which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Jeremiah 6:23): “They are cruel, and will have no mercy”; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above ( Q(157), A(4), ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of punishment, as stated above ( Q(157), A(1) ): whereas cruelty applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Proverbs 11:17, “But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred.” Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that “the opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in exacting punishment.”

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(1) —

I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from “cruditas” [rawness]. Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and bitter taste. Now it has been stated above ( Q(157), A(3), ad 1; A(4), ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment, belongs to cruelty.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun and recoil from another’s unhappiness, but in different ways.

For it belongs to mercy [*Cf. Q(30) , A(1) ] to relieve another’s unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to mitigate another’s unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for mercilessness.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of beneficence is in itself a punishment.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(2) Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue. Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “severity is as it were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending to piety”: so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty ( A(1), ad 1). Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency, which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): “Let there be love, but not that which enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency.”

Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that “a man who is angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage.”

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(2) —

I answer that, “Savagery” and “brutality” take their names from a likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage.

For animals of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man’s torture.

Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial, and resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature, as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls “heroic” or “god-like,” which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift of piety.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(2)- RO(2) —

A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because this implies a vice; but he is said to be “savage as regards the truth,” on account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined to mitigate punishment.

P(2b)- Q(159)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.

QUESTION OF MODESTY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of its species.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance? (2) What is the matter of modesty?

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance. For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and “good,” according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), “consists in mode, species, and order.” Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be reckoned a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our neighbor, according to 2 Timothy 2:24,25, “The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men... with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth.”

Now admonishing wrong-doers is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above ( Q(33) , A(1) ). Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(141), A(4) ; Q(157), A(3) ), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by the virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above ( Q(134), A(3), ad 1), that while magnificence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its principal.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(1)- RO(1) —

When a name is common to many it is sometimes appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Some things need tempering on account of their strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong passions, and modesty about weaker passions.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation which is necessary in all virtues.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(2) Whether modesty is only about outward actions?

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins ( Philippians 4:5): “Let your modesty be known to all men.” Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the virtues that are about the passions are distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will not be concerned with inward passions.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining to the appetite — which is proper to the moral virtues — and about things pertaining to knowledge — which is proper to the intellectual virtues — and again about things pertaining to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it cannot be about all these things.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(2) —

On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary to observe the “mode” whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of them.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), modesty differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty.

In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by “humility.” The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by “studiousness” which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done becomingly and honestly [*Cf. Q(145), A(1) ], whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like.

To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions “meekness, simplicity, humility,” and other kindred virtues, of which we have spoken above ( Q(143) ); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned \eutrapelia\ to pleasures in games, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(60) , A(5) ). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also inward actions.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain outward signs.

P(2b)- Q(160)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Various virtues assigned by various authorities are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is about passions, because in actions and passions that present no great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.

QUESTION OF HUMILITY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite, Curiosity; (3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting outward attire.

Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether humility is a virtue? (2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason? (3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men? (4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance? (5) Of its comparison with the other virtues; (6) Of the degrees of humility.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1) Whether humility is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that humility is not a virtue.

For virtue conveys the notion of a penal evil, according to <19A418> Psalm 104:18, “They humbled his feet in fetters.” Therefore humility is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23): “There is one that humbleth himself wickedly.” Therefore humility is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem that humility is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, virtue is “the disposition of that which is perfect” (Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions, according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would seem not to be a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Origen commenting on Luke 1:48, “He hath regarded the humility of His handmaid,” says (Hom. viii in Luc.): “One of the virtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our Saviour said: ‘Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.’“

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1) — I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(23) , A(2) ) when we were treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it.

In respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above ( P(2a), Q(61) , A(2) ) that for those appetitive movements which are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a moderating and restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a kind of recoil, there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on.

Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As Isidore observes (Etym. x), “a humble man is so called because he is, as it were, ‘humo acclinis’“ [*Literally, ‘bent to the ground’], i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance when one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment. Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abraham said to the Lord ( Genesis 18:27), “I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes.” In this way humility is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for instance when man, “not understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to them” ( Psalm 48:13).

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and pretense: wherefore this is “false humility,” of which Augustine says in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is “grievous pride,” since to wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way, properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not consist externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this, that each is according to right reason.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1)- RO(4) —

A thing is said to be perfect in two ways.

First absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature nor in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To Him humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only as regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in comparison with God his perfection is found wanting, according to the word of Isaiah 40:17, “All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all.” In this way humility may be competent to every man.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(1)- RO(5) —

The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(2) Whether humility has to do with the appetite?

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite but the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride.

Now pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 22) that “pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is first of all shown in the eyes”: wherefore it is written ( <19D001> Psalm 130:1), “Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty.” Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that “almost the whole of Christian teaching is humility.” Consequently nothing contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility.

Now Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according to 1 Corinthians 12:31, “Be zealous for the better gifts.” Therefore it belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things but the estimate thereof.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire but with the estimate of great things.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to outward show; for he says that humility is “the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and parade.” Therefore it is not concerned with the movement of the appetite.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that “the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of the Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners.” But choice concerns the appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite rather than with the estimative power.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), it belongs properly to humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion to that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one’s own deficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite. Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking, moderates the movement of the appetite.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves with others. But it does not follow from this that humility is essentially concerned with knowledge.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(2)- RO(2) —

It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things through confiding in one’s own powers: but to aim at greater things through confidence in God’s help, is not contrary to humility; especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is one exalted in God’s sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): “It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to raise oneself up against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He raiseth up; he that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth down.”

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(2)- RO(3) —

In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason in both cases is that man should set the good of reason before dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one’s proper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him according to the position in which God has placed him.

Wherefore humility would seem to denote in the first place man’s subjection to God; and for this reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows that the relation of fortitude to daring differs from that of humility to hope.

Because fortitude uses daring more than it suppresses it: so that excess of daring is more like fortitude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self more than it uses it; wherefore excessive self-confidence is more opposed to humility than lack of confidence is.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility.

Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as signs of the inward movement of the appetite.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(3) Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men?

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above ( A(2), ad 3), humility consists chiefly in man’s subjection to God. Now one ought not to offer to a man that which is due to God, as is the case with all acts of religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject oneself to man.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv): “Humility should take the part of truth, not of falsehood.” Now some men are of the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the detriment of another’s spiritual welfare. But if a man subject himself to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to whom he subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other. Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): “Lest through excessive humility the superior lose his authority.” Therefore a man ought not, by humility, to subject himself to all.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Philippians 2:3): “In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves.”

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(3) —

I answer that, We may consider two things in man, namely that which is God’s, and that which is man’s. Whatever pertains to defect is man’s: but whatever pertains to man’s welfare and perfection is God’s, according to the saying of Hosea 13:9, “Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.” Now humility, as stated above ( A(1), ad 5; A(2), ad 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is subject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that which the latter has of God’s: but humility does not require a man to subject what he has of God’s to that which may seem to be God’s in another. For those who have a share of God’s gifts know that they have them, according to Corinthians 2:12: “That we may know the things that are given us from God.” Wherefore without prejudice to humility they may set the gifts they have received from God above those that others appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says ( Ephesians 3:5): “(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed to His holy apostles.”

In like manner. humility does not require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that which his neighbor has of man’s: otherwise each one would have to esteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle says without prejudice to humility ( Galatians 2:15): “We by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners.” Nevertheless a man may esteem his neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself, or himself to have some evil which another has not: by reason of which, he may subject himself to him with humility.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(3)- RO(1) —

We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with humility to all our neighbors for God’s sake, according to 1 Peter 2:13, “Be ye subject... to every human creature for God’s sake”; but to God alone do we owe the worship of latria.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(3)- RO(2) —

If we set what our neighbor has of God’s above that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood.

Wherefore a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on Philippians 2:3, “Esteem others better than themselves,” says: “We must not esteem by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, although our own good whereby we are apparently better than he, be not hidden.”

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may subject himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): “With fear, the superior should prostrate himself at your feet in the sight of God.” On the other hand, due moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as of other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If, however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since he does not give scandal, although others take it.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(4) Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance?

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is subject to God, as stated above ( A(3) ). Now it belongs to a theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of temperance or modesty.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object, as stated above ( A(1), ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above ( Q(129), A(5) ).

Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): “If thou wilt hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as what they called \metriotes\, i.e. measure or moderation.” Now this evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or temperance.

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(137), A(2), ad 1; Q(157), A(3), ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not magnanimous but “temperate,” and such a man we may call humble.

Moreover, for the reason given above ( Q(160), A(2) ), among the various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it is written ( 1 Peter 3:4): “In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit.”

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The theological virtues, whose object is our last end, which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or temperance.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated above ( Q(137), A(2), ad 1; Q(157), A(3), ad 2). Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(5) Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues?

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that humility is the greatest of the virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the publican ( Luke 18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.] that “if humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the angels by the judgment seat of God.” Hence it is clear that humility is set above justice.

Now justice is either the most exalted of all the virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. [*S. 10, C[1]]): “Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality? Attend first of all to the foundation of humility.” Now this would seem to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue.

Therefore apparently it is greater than the other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now the greatest reward is due to humility, since “he that humbleth himself shall be exalted” ( Luke 14:11). Therefore humility is the greatest of virtues.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16), “Christ’s whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through the human nature which He assumed.” Now He especially proposed His humility for our example, saying ( Matthew 11:29): “Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.” Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 1) that the “lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility of God.” Therefore humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Charity is set above all the virtues, according to Colossians 3:14, “Above all... things have charity.”

Therefore humility is not the greatest of virtues.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(5) —

I answer that, The good of human virtue pertains to the order of reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end: wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance, as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but by participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. Now humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and in all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially legal justice, humility stands before all others.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Humility is not set before justice, but before that justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue; even so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is said of the publican ( Luke 18:14) that through the merit of his humility “he went down into his house justified.” Hence Chrysostom says [*De incompr.

Nat. Dei, Hom. v]: “Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin with humility: and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength, but by that of humility: while you will see the other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but by the weight and size of pride.”

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by reason of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that which is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place, inasmuch as it expels pride, which “God resisteth,” and makes man submissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence it is written ( James 4:6): “God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble.” In this sense humility is said to be the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first step towards God is by faith, according to Hebrews 11:6, “He that cometh to God must believe.” In this sense faith is the foundation in a more excellent way than humility.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(5)- RO(3) —

To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who despise earthly riches, according to Matthew 6:19,20, “Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth... but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven.”

Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to those who despise worldly joys, according to Matthew 4:5, “Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.” In the same way spiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone merits it, but because it is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]): “Think not that he who humbles himself remains for ever abased, for it is written: ‘He shall be exalted.’ And do not imagine that his exaltation in men’s eyes is effected by bodily uplifting.”

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(5)- RO(4) —

The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us, was because it especially removes the obstacle to man’s spiritual welfare consisting in man’s aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were, a disposition to man’s untrammeled access to spiritual and divine goods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition, so charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are greater than humility.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(6) Whether twelve degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict?

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that are set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict [*St. Thomas gives these degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict] are unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be “humble not only in heart, but also to show it in one’s very person, one’s eyes fixed on the ground”; the second is “to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice”; the third is “not to be easily moved, and disposed to laughter”; the fourth is “to maintain silence until one is asked”; the fifth is “to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery”; the sixth is “to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all”; the seventh is “to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes”; the eighth is “to confess one’s sin”; the ninth is “to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances”; the tenth is “to subject oneself to a superior”; the eleventh is “not to delight in fulfilling one’s own desires”; the twelfth is “to fear God and to be always mindful of everything that God has commanded.” For among these there are some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience and patience. Again there are some that seem to involve a false opinion — and this is inconsistent with any virtue — namely to declare oneself more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe oneself to be in all ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these are unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do other virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which concern outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which pertain to inward actions.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) gives seven degrees of humility, the first of which is “to acknowledge oneself contemptible”; the second, “to grieve for this”; the third, “to confess it”; the fourth, “to convince others of this, that is to wish them to believe it”; the fifth, “to bear patiently that this be said of us”; the sixth, “to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt”; the seventh, “to love being thus treated.” Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(6)- O(4) —

Further, a gloss on Matthew 3:15 says: “Perfect humility has three degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are above us, and not to set ourselves above our equals: this is sufficient. The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our inferiors; this is called abundant humility. The third degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righteousness.”

Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(6)- O(5) —

Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): “The measure of humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank.

It is imperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to be entrapped.” Now the measure of a man’s greatness cannot be fixed according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem that it is not possible to assign the aforesaid degrees to humility.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(6) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ) humility has essentially to do with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of his soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is in the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of humility leads to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as happens also with the other virtues. For “a man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, by his countenance” (Ecclus. 19:26). Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility include something regarding the root of humility, namely the twelfth degree, “that a man fear God and bear all His commandments in mind.”

Again, they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest one aim inordinately at one’s own excellence. This is done in three ways. First, by not following one’s own will, and this pertains to the eleventh degree; secondly, by regulating it according to one’s superior judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by not being deterred from this on account of the difficulties and hardships that come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree.

Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man forms in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three ways. First by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs to the eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great things, and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in this respect one should put others before oneself, and this belongs to the sixth degree.

Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of these regards deeds, namely that in one’s work one should not depart from the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others have reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to speak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not immoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The others have to do with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks, which regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other signs of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(6)- RO(1) —

It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults which we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which others have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): “Bethink you that some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although outwardly you are better than they.” Again, without falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of one’s own capability, so as to refer all one’s sufficiency to God, according to Corinthians 3:5, “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God.”

And there is nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those things that pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises from another, so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act of another.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and chiefly by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the outward man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of all restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking out the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees of humility are here enumerated.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(6)- RO(3) —

All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to knowledge, avowal, and desire of one’s own abasement. For the first degree belongs to the knowledge of one’s own deficiency; but since it would be wrong for one to love one’s own failings, this is excluded by the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal of one’s own deficiency; namely that not merely one simply assert one’s failing, but that one convince another of it. The other three degrees have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward excellence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity, whether it consist of words or deeds. For as Gregory says (Regist. ii, 10, Ep. 36), “there is nothing great in being humble towards those who treat us with regard, for even worldly people do this: but we should especially be humble towards those who make us suffer,” and this belongs to the fifth and sixth degrees: or the appetite may even go so far as lovingly to embrace external abasement, and this pertains to the seventh degree; so that all these degrees are comprised under the sixth and seventh mentioned above.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(6)- RO(4) —

These degrees refer, not to the thing itself, namely the nature of humility, but to the degrees among men, who are either of higher or lower or of equal degree.

P(2b)- Q(161)- A(6)- RO(5) —

This argument also considers the degrees of humility not according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which the aforesaid degrees are assigned, but according to the various conditions of men.

QUESTION OF PRIDE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first man’s sin, which we hold to have been pride.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether pride is a sin? (2) Whether it is a special vice? (3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject? (4) Of its species; (5) Whether it is a mortal sin? (6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins? (7) Of its relation to other sins; (8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(1) Whether pride is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the object of God’s promise. For God’s promises refer to what He will do; and He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the Divine promises: for it is written ( Isaiah 60:15): “I will make thee to be an everlasting pride [Douay: ‘glory’], a joy unto generation and generation.”

Therefore pride is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for every creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does this become the rational creature which is made to God’s image and likeness. Now it is said in Prosper’s Lib. Sent. 294, that “pride is love of one’s own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is supremely excellent.” Hence Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): “Pride imitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all.” Therefore pride is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to a contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice is found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written (Tobias 4:14): “Never suffer pride to reign in thy mind or in thy words.”

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(1) —

I answer that, Pride [superbia] is so called because a man thereby aims higher [supra] than he is; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x): “A man is said to be proud, because he wishes to appear above (super) what he really is”; for he who wishes to overstep beyond what he is, is proud. Now right reason requires that every man’s will should tend to that which is proportionate to him. Therefore it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to right reason, and this shows it to have the character of sin, because according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), “the soul’s evil is to be opposed to reason.” Therefore it is evident that pride is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Pride [superbia] may be understood in two ways. First, as overpassing [supergreditur] the rule of reason, and in this sense we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply denominate “superabundance”; in which sense any super-abundant thing may be called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as significant of super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on the same passage ( Isaiah 61:6) says that “there is a good and an evil pride”; or “a sinful pride which God resists, and a pride that denotes the glory which He bestows.”

It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those things in which men may take pride.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Reason has the direction of those things for which man has a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from the rule of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is the case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that pride is the “desire for inordinate exaltation”: and hence it is that, as he asserts (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), “pride imitates God inordinately: for it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and wishes to usurp Hi. dominion over our fellow-creatures.”

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility, which, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as magnanimity, as stated above ( Q(161), A(1), ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride by default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge the mind to great things against despair, so it belongs to humility to withdraw the mind from the inordinate desire of great things against presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for a deficiency in pursuing great things, is properly opposed to magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind’s attachment to things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to humility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In the same way, on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity and humility, from different points of view: to humility, inasmuch as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch as it tends to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride implies a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility, even as pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul in tending towards great things, is more directly opposed to magnanimity.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(2) Whether pride is a special sin?

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that pride is not a special sin.

For Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that “you will find no sin that is not labelled pride”; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii, 2) that “without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible.” Therefore pride is a general sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, “That He may withdraw man from wickedness [*Vulg.: ‘From the things that he is doing, and may deliver him from pride’],” says that “a man prides himself when he transgresses His commandments by sin.” Now according to Ambrose [*De Parad. viii], “every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments.” Therefore every sin is pride.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23): “Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body”; and Isidore says (Etym. [*De Summo Bono ii, 38]) that it is “the downfall of all virtues.” Therefore pride is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that “one man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by mean and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues.” Therefore pride is not a special but a general sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): “If he look into the question carefully, he will find that, according to God’s law, pride is a very different sin from other vices.” Now the genus is not different from its species. Therefore pride is not a general but a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(2) —

I answer that, The sin of pride may be considered in two ways. First with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect of its proper object. In this way pride is a special sin, because it has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one’s own excellence, as stated ( A(1), ad 2). Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In this way it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins being directed to the end of pride which is one’s own excellence, to which may be directed anything that is inordinately desired.

Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, that is by removing an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which hinders him from sinning, according to Jeremiah 2:20, “Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve.”

It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes, but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin, through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always break the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance. and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that “many things are done amiss which are not done through pride.”

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(2)- RO(1) —

These words are introduced by Augustine into his book De Nat. et Grat., not as being his own, but as those of someone with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride. We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as referring to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act of pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, sometimes through weakness, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(2)- RO(2) —

A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a parricide effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend it.

Accordingly he who breaks God’s commandment is said to pride himself against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(2)- RO(3) —

A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another way a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an occasion of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which aspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love of one’s excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(3) Whether the subject of pride is the irascible faculty?

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the subject of pride is not the irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): “A swollen mind is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light.” Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the rational faculty.

Therefore pride is not in the irascible.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that “the proud observe other people’s conduct not so as to set themselves beneath them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with pride”: wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue observation.

Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the rational faculty.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further. pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus. 10:14, “The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God.” Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in the irascible.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, as stated in Prosper’s Liber Sententiarum, sent. 294, “Pride is love of one’s own excellence.” But love is not in the irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the irascible.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(3) —

I answer that, The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both.

Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for pride is the desire of one’s own excellence, as stated above ( AA(1),2 ). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite. Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to the intellective appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in the P(1), Q(59) , A(4) ; P(2a), Q(82) , A(5), ad 1 and 2.

Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause.

For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Matthew 11:25, “Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent,” i.e. from the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, “and hast revealed them to little ones,” i.e. to the humble.

Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written (Ecclus. 6:34): “If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction.”

The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that “the proud, although certain hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them.” Hence it is written ( Proverbs 11:2): “Where humility is there also is wisdom.”

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(3)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( Q(161), AA(2), 6 ), humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true selfesteem.

Now pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appetite is borne towards things higher than what become him. Consequently whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and one of those is the observing of other people’s failings, just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), “holy men, by a like observation of other people’s virtues, set others above themselves.” Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(3)- RO(4) —

According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), “love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause,” wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is in this sense that pride is said to be “love of one’s own excellence,” inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(4) Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory?

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): “There are four marks by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they believe it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits; or when they boast of having what they have not, or despise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they have.” For pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not received his good from God, or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore this should not be reckoned a species of pride.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as stated above ( Q(110), A(2) ; Q(112) ). Therefore it should not be accounted a species of pride.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride, which are not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says that “nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful”: and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that “it belongs to pride to excuse oneself of a sin one has committed.” Again, presumption whereby one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not sufficiently account for the different species of pride.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm [*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq.] divides the uplifting of pride, saying that there is “pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of deed.”

Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.] also reckons twelve degrees of pride, namely “curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense of one’s sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful habit.” Now these apparently are not comprised under the species mentioned by Gregory.

Therefore the latter would seem to be assigned unfittingly.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The authority of Gregory suffices.

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(1),2,3 ), pride denotes immoderate desire of one’s own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency: and thus we have the third species of pride, namely “boasting of having what one has not.”

Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of one’s own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus we have the first two species of pride, namely “when a man thinks he has from himself that which he has from God,” or “when he believes that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits.”

Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it, in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus we have the fourth species of pride, which is “when a man despises others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous.”

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(4)- RO(1) —

A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First, universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice, and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication, judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one’s own excellence, to boast of one’s goods as though one had them of oneself, or of one’s own merits.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which consists in wishing to be preferred to others.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(4)- RO(4) —

The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.

The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken above ( Q(161), A(6) ). For the first degree of humility is to “be humble in heart, and to show it in one’s very person, one’s eyes fixed on the ground”: and to this is opposed “curiosity,” which consists in looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second degree of humility is “to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice”: to this is opposed “frivolity of mind,” by which a man is proud of speech.

The third degree of humility is “not to be easily moved and disposed to laughter,” to which is opposed “senseless mirth.” The fourth degree of humility is “to maintain silence until one is asked,” to which is opposed “boasting”. The fifth degree of humility is “to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery,” to which is opposed “singularity,” whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is “to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all,” to which is opposed “arrogance,” whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of humility is “to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes,” to which is opposed “presumption,” whereby a man thinks himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility is “to confess one’s sins,” to which is opposed “defense of one’s sins.” The ninth degree is “to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances,” to which is opposed “deceitful confession,” whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is “obedience,” to which is opposed “rebelliousness.” The eleventh degree of humility is “not to delight in fulfilling one’s own desires”; to this is opposed “license,” whereby a man delights in doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is “fear of God”: to this is opposed “the habit of sinning,” which implies contempt of God.

In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated, but also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have stated above with regard to humility ( Q(161), A(6) ).

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(5) Whether pride is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin.

For a gloss on Psalm 7:4, “O Lord my God, if I have done this thing,” says: “Namely, the universal sin which is pride.” Therefore if pride were a mortal sin, so would every sin be.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of God, nor as to the love of one’s neighbor, because the excellence which, by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to God’s honor, or our neighbor’s good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), “sometimes a man is elated by sublime and heavenly virtues.” Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that “pride is a most evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the elect.” But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins. Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(5) —

I answer that, Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above ( Q(161), A(1), ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the Apostle ( 2 Corinthians 10:13), “But we will not glory beyond our measure; but according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to us.”

Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): “The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God” because, to wit, the root of pride is found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to God and His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is of its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin. Nevertheless just as in other sins which are mortal by their genus (for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason of their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so too in the matter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial sins, when reason does not consent to them.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(5)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( A(2) ) pride is a general sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all sins may have their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all sins are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have stated to be a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Pride is always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor; when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has established order among men, so that one ought to be subject to another.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from being the accidental cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii, 1. Hence some are even proud of their humility.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(6) Whether pride is the most grievous of sins?

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it would seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), “Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy them.”

Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, “The greater evil is opposed to the greater good,” as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above ( Q(61) , A(5) ). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are more grievous sins than pride.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Romans 1:28, where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men of science were delivered “to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient.” Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(6) —

On the contrary, A gloss on <19B805> Psalm 118:51, “The proud did iniquitously,” says: “The greatest sin in man is pride.”

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(6) —

I answer that, Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the good of virtue.

But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity, because in other sins man turns away from God, either through ignorance or through weakness, or through desire for any other good whatever; whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence Boethius [*Cf. Cassian, de Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says that “while all vices flee from God, pride alone withstands God”; for which reason it is specially stated ( James 4:6) that “God resisteth the proud.” Wherefore aversion from God and His commandments, which is a consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than that which belongs to it through something else, it follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds in aversion which is the formal complement of sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(6)- RO(1) —

A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways.

First, on account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and “still more difficult is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its connaturality,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 3,9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins the more grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12,15).

Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes occasion even from good deeds, as stated ( A(5), ad 3). Hence Augustine says pointedly that it “lies in wait for good deeds”; and it is written ( <19E104> Psalm 141:4): “In the way wherein I walked, the proud [*Cf. <19D906> Psalm 139:6, ‘The proud have hidden a net for me.’] [Vulg.: ‘they’] have hidden a snare for me.” Hence no very great gravity attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the judgment of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, both by considering one’s own infirmity, according to Ecclus. 10:9, “Why is earth and ashes proud?” and by considering God’s greatness, according to Job 15:13, “Why doth thy spirit swell against God?” as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which man prides himself, according to Isaiah 40:6, “All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the flower of the field”; and farther on ( Isaiah 64:6), “all our justices” are become “like the rag of a menstruous woman.”

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from the object, which is considered on the part of conversion. In this way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud contempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair and the like.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh, which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that “pride is the worst of all vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. on the other hand, carnal lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful nature: and yet, under God’s dispensation, it is less grievous than pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he may rise from his abasement.”

From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient to contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to fall into other sins.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7) Whether pride is the first sin of all?

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done “amiss which are not done with pride.” Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that the “beginning of... pride is to fall off from God.” Therefore falling away from God precedes pride.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7)- O(4) —

Further, it is written ( 2 Timothy 3:13): “Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse”; so that apparently man’s beginning of wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the first sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7)- O(5) —

Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that “pride apes fortitude and daring.” Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride is the beginning of all sin.”

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7) —

I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that which is essential. Now it has been stated above ( A(6) ) that aversion from God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is “the beginning of all sins,” as stated above ( P(2a), Q(84) , A(2) ), when we were treating of the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part of sin.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Pride is said to be “the beginning of all sin,” not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin is naturally liable to arise from pride.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7)- RO(2) —

To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being the first part of pride. For it has been said above ( A(5) ) that pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for God’s sake.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7)- RO(3) —

There is no need for the order of virtues to be the same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on <19D607> Psalm 136:7, “Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof,” says that “by heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief,” and the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 1:19) that “some rejecting a good conscience have made shipwreck concerning the faith.”

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7)- RO(4) —

Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed through ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous. And as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Psalm 18:13, “I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin,” says: “Namely from the sin of pride, which is the last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw from God.”

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(7)- RO(5) —

The Philosopher associates pride with feigned fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be daring or brave.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(8) Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice?

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital vice, since Isidore [*Comment. in Deuteronomy xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst. Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice. Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that “pride begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion.” Now envy is reckoned a capital vice, as stated above ( Q(36) , A(4) ). Much more therefore is pride a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride among the capital vices.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(8) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(2),5 , ad 1) pride may be considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin; secondly, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many kinds of sin arise.

Wherefore some, considering pride in the light of a special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all vices, as explained above ( A(2), O(3) ), did not place it among the capital vices, but held it to be the “queen and mother of all the vices.” Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): “Pride, the queen of vices, when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds.”

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory covets the outward show of excellence.

P(2b)- Q(162)- A(8)- RO(3) —

The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.

QUESTION OF THE FIRST MAN’S SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the first man’s sin which was pride: and (1) his sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether pride was the first man’s first sin? (2) What the first man coveted by sinning? (3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins? (4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(1) Whether pride was the first man’s first sin?

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that pride was not the first man’s first sin. For the Apostle says ( Romans 5:19) that “by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners.” Now the first man’s first sin is the one by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin. Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man’s first sin.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Luke 4:3, “And the devil said to Him,” that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to gluttony, as appears from Matthew 4:3, where it was said to Him: “If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread.” Therefore the first man’s first sin was not pride but gluttony.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, man sinned at the devil’s suggestion.

Now the devil in tempting man promised him knowledge ( Genesis 3:5).

Therefore inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the first sin.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Genesis ad lit. xi] on 1 Timothy 2:14, “The woman being seduced was in the transgression,” says: “The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they would be like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead...” Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a thing.

Therefore man’s first sin was unbelief and not pride.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride is the beginning of all sin.” Now man’s first sin is the beginning of all sin, according to Romans 5:12, “By one man sin entered into this world.” Therefore man’s first sin was pride.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(1) —

I answer that, Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the body; since, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also, among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and consequently man’s first sin was where it was possible for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit.

Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason. It remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it inordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man’s first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man’s first sin was pride.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Man’s disobedience to the Divine command was not willed by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4]) that “man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent’s prompting, and scorned God’s commands.”

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first parents. For it is written ( Genesis 3:6): “The woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat.”

Yet the very goodness and beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the persuasive words of the serpent, who said ( Genesis 3:5): “Your eyes shall be opened and you shall be as Gods”: and it was by coveting this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the sin of pride.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began by saying: “You shall be as Gods,” and added: “Knowing good and evil.”

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(1)- RO(4) —

According to Augustine (Genesis ad lit. xi, 30), “the woman had not believed the serpent’s statement that they were debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud selfpresumption.”

This does not mean that pride preceded the promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being that she believed the demon to have spoken truly.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(2) Whether the first man’s pride consisted in his coveting God’s likeness?

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the first man’s pride did not consist in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God’s likeness is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written ( Genesis 1:26): “Let us make man to our image and likeness.” Therefore he did not sin by coveting God’s likeness.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, it would seem that man coveted God’s likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the serpent’s suggestion: “You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil.” Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: “All men naturally desire knowledge.” Therefore he did not sin by coveting God’s likeness.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, no wise man chooses the impossible.

Now the first man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, “He filled them with the knowledge of understanding.” Since then every sin consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Exodus 15:11, “Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?”

Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God’s likeness.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Psalm 68:5 [*Enarr. in Psalm 68], “Then did I restore [Douay: ‘pay’] that which I took not away,” says: “Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness.”

I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute equality [*Cf. P(1), Q(93) , A(1) ]: and such a likeness to God our first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.

The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates somewhat of God’s likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): “The same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause.” Now every good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good.

Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he coveted God’s likeness inordinately.

It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on man — of whom it is written ( Genesis 1:26) that God made man “to His image and likeness” — and on the angel, of whom it is written ( Ezekiel 28:12): “Thou wast the seal of resemblance.” Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just quoted, “Thou wast the seal of resemblance,” we read: “Full of wisdom.” But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness.

Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted God’s likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God’s likeness as regards “knowledge of good and evil,” according to the serpent’s instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God’s likeness as regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xi, 30) that “the woman’s mind was filled with love of her own power.” On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God’s likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that “he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God’s.” Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(2)- RO(2) —

It is not a sin to covet God’s likeness as to knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that is, above one’s measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on Psalm 70:18, “O God, who is like Thee?” says: “He who desires to be of himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command.”

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(2)- RO(3) —

This argument considers the likeness of equality.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(3) Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins?

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15): “Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid sin.” Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt.

Now the sin of our first parents was most severely punished, since by it “death entered into this world,” as the Apostle says ( Romans 5:12).

Therefore that sin was more grievous than other sins.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest (Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first parents was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: “I think that a man who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little.” Now our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade.

Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(3) —

I answer that, There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. one results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery is a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first man’s sin was not graver than all other sins of men, as regards the species of the sin. For though pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the pride whereby one covets God’s likeness inordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as stated ( A(2) ).

But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We must accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not simply.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(3)- RO(1) —

This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting from the person of the sinner.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The severity of the punishment awarded to that first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence brought disorder upon the whole human nature.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Where things are directly subordinate, the first must needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the first sin is the greatest.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(4) Whether Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s?

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s. For it is written ( 1 Timothy 2:14): “Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression”: and so it would seem that the woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to Luke 12:47,48, “That servant who knew the will of his lord... and did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.”

Therefore Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3 [*Serm. ix; xcvi de Temp.]): “If the man is the head, he should live better, and give an example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him.”

Now he who ought to do better, sins more grievously, if he commit a sin.

Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be the most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy Ghost, because while sinning he relied on God’s mercy [*Cf. Q(21) , A(2), O(3) St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter Lombard quoted there], and this pertains to the sin of presumption.

Therefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Punishment corresponds to guilt.

Now the woman was more grievously punished than the man, as appears from Genesis 3. Therefore she sinned more grievously than the man.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated ( A(3) ), the gravity of a sin depends on the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin.

Accordingly we must assert that, if we consider the condition attaching to these persons, the man’s sin is the more grievous, because he was more perfect than the woman.

As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xi, 35): “Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex, though parity of pride.”

But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up than the man. For the woman believed in the serpent’s persuasive words, namely that God had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest they should become like to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God’s likeness by eating of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain something against God’s will. On the other hand, the man did not believe this to be true; wherefore he did not wish to attain to God’s likeness against God’s will: but his pride consisted in wishing to attain thereto by his own power. Secondly, the woman not only herself sinned, but suggested sin to the man; wherefore she sinned against both God and her neighbor. Thirdly, the man’s sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xi, 42), “he consented to the sin out of a certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man sometimes will offend God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to have done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine sentence.”

It is therefore evident that the woman’s sin was more grievous than the man’s.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The woman was deceived because she was first of all puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but aggravated her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed up with still greater pride.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(4)- RO(2) —

This argument considers the circumstance of personal condition, on account of which the man’s sin was more grievous than the woman’s.

P(2b)- Q(163)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The man’s reliance on God’s mercy did not reach to contempt of God’s justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy Ghost, but as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xi [*De Civ. Dei xiv, 11]), it was due to the fact that, “having had no experience of God’s severity, he thought the sin to be venial,” i.e. easily forgiven [*Cf. P(2a), Q(89) , A(3), ad 1].

QUESTION OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN’S SIN (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1) Whether death is the punishment of our first parents’ sin?

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that death is not the punishment of our first parents’ sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called a punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates it. Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the fact that his body is composed of contraries, and because “mortal” is included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a punishment of our first parents’ sin.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly found in man as well as in other animals, according to Ecclesiastes 3:19, “The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both equal.”

But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin. Therefore neither is it so in men.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human nature.

Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our first parents’ sin.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, all are equally descended from our first parents. Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents’ sin, it would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But this is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more painfully, than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated above ( P(1), Q(48) , A(6) ; P(1), Q(49) , A(2) ). But death, apparently, is not from God: for it is written (Wis. 1:13): “God made not death.” Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- O(6) —

Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now death is sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr’s death. Therefore it would seem that death is not a punishment.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- O(7) —

Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he is dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is not a punishment of sin.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- O(8) —

Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents lived a long time after their sin ( Genesis 5:5). Therefore, seemingly, death is not a punishment of sin.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Romans 5:12): “By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.”

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1) —

I answer that, If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of a favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment of that fault. Now as we stated in the P(1), Q(95) , A(1) ; P(1), Q(97) , A(1), God bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state, that as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his soul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul. But inasmuch as through sin man’s mind withdrew from subjection to God, the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject to his reason, whence there followed so great a rebellion of the carnal appetite against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject to the soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life and soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul, as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the other hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the body are due to the lack of the body’s subjection to the soul.

It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents’ sin, so also are death and all defects of the body.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- RO(1) —

A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part of his form.

The matter of man is a body such as is composed of contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and in this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached to the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity, since it was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch, and consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was impossible, were it not composed of contraries, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not attached to the adaptability of matter to form because, if it were possible, since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather be incorruptible. In the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this being suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make it fit for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary result of such a matter and is not according to the agent’s choice; for, if the craftsman were able, of the iron he would make a saw that would not rust. Now God Who is the author of man is all-powerful, wherefore when He first made man, He conferred on him the favor of being exempt from the necessity resulting from such a matter: which favor, however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents. Accordingly death is both natural on account of a condition attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the Divine favor preserving man from death [*Cf. P(2a), Q(85) , A(6) ].

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- RO(2) —

This likeness of man to other animals regards a condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of contraries. But it does not regard the form, for man’s soul is immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Our first parents were made by God not only as particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human nature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with the Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their sin the entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their posterity, incurred death.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- RO(4) —

A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal in those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed, should fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to the sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot foresee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was the withdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of human nature was maintained.

But the defects resulting from this withdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life. Wherefore these punishments need not be equal in those to whom the first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all future events, Divine providence has so disposed that these penalties are apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on account of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen held [*Peri Archon ii, 9]: for this is contrary to the words of Romans 9:11, “When they... had not done any good or evil”; and also contrary to statements made in the P(1), Q(90) , A(4) ; P(1), Q(118), A(3), namely that the soul is not created before the body: but either in punishment of their parents’ sins, inasmuch as the child is something belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often punished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended for the spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these penalties, to wit that he may thus be turned away from his sins, or lest he take pride in his virtues, and that he may be crowned for his patience.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- RO(5) —

Death may be considered in two ways.

First, as an evil of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect befalling man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore Augustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death, except in so far as it is a punishment.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- RO(6) —

As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), “just as the wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is good, while good men die well, although death is an evil.” Wherefore inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them meritorious.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- RO(7) —

Death may be considered in two ways.

First, as the privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of sense but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has no pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken as including the previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in motion towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered, while in motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death may be painful.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(1)- RO(8) —

According to Augustine (Genesis ad lit. [*De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. i, 16. Cf. Genesis ad lit. 2:32]), “although our first parents lived thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when they heard the death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age.”

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2) Whether the particular punishments of our first parents are suitably appointed in Scripture?

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the particular punishments of our first parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture.

For that which would have occurred even without sin should not be described as a punishment for sin. Now seemingly there would have been “pain in child-bearing,” even had there been no sin: for the disposition of the female sex is such that offspring cannot be born without pain to the bearer. Likewise the “subjection of woman to man” results from the perfection of the male, and the imperfection of the female sex. Again it belongs to the nature of the earth “to bring forth thorns and thistles,” and this would have occurred even had there been no sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of the first sin.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, that which pertains to a person’s dignity does not, seemingly, pertain to his punishment. But the “multiplying of conceptions” pertains to a woman’s dignity. Therefore it should not be described as the woman’s punishment.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the punishment of our first parents’ sin is transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard to death ( A(1) ). But all “women’s conceptions” are not “multiplied,” nor does “every man eat bread in the sweat of his face.” Therefore these are not suitable punishments of the first sin.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, the place of paradise was made for man. Now nothing in the order of things should be without purpose.

Therefore it would seem that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable punishment of man.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, this place of the earthly paradise is said to be naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other obstacles in the way lest man should return thither, to wit the cherubim, and the “flaming sword turning every way.”

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- O(6) —

Further, immediately after his sin man was subject to the necessity of dying, so that he could not be restored to immortality by the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid him to eat of the tree of life, as instanced by the words of Genesis 3:22: “See, lest perhaps he... take... of the tree of life . . . and live for ever.”

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- O(7) —

Further, to mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy and clemency, which are most of all ascribed to God in Scripture, according to <19E409> Psalm 144:9, “His tender mercies are over all His works.” Therefore God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents, already reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of Genesis 3:22, “Behold Adam is become as one of Us, knowing good and evil.”

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- O(8) —

Further, clothes are necessary to man, like food, according to 1 Timothy 6:8, “Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content.”

Therefore just as food was appointed to our first parents before their sin, so also should clothing have been ascribed to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable to say that God made for them garments of skin.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- O(9) —

Further, the punishment inflicted for a sin should outweigh in evil the gain realized through the sin: else the punishment would not deter one from sinning. Now through sin our first parents gained in this, that their eyes were opened, according to Genesis 3:7. But this outweighs in good all the penal evils which are stated to have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting from our first parents’ sin are unsuitably described.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2) —

On the contrary, These punishments were appointed by God, Who does all things, “in number, weight, and measure [*Vulg.: ‘Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.’]” (Wis. 11:21).

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated in the foregoing Article, on account of their sin, our first parents were deprived of the Divine favor, whereby the integrity of human nature was maintained in them, and by the withdrawal of this favor human nature incurred penal defects. Hence they were punished in two ways. In the first place by being deprived of that which was befitting the state of integrity, namely the place of the earthly paradise: and this is indicated ( Genesis 3:23) where it is stated that “God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure.” And since he was unable, of himself, to return to that state of original innocence, it was fitting that obstacles should be placed against his recovering those things that were befitting his original state, namely food (lest he should take of the tree of life) and place; for “God placed before... paradise... Cherubim, and a flaming sword.” Secondly, they were punished by having appointed to them things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid favor: and this as regards both the body and the soul. With regard to the body, to which pertains the distinction of sex, one punishment was appointed to the woman and another to the man. To the woman punishment was appointed in respect of two things on account of which she is united to the man; and these are the begetting of children, and community of works pertaining to family life. As regards the begetting of children, she was punished in two ways: first in the weariness to which she is subject while carrying the child after conception, and this is indicated in the words ( Genesis 3:16), “I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions”; secondly, in the pain which she suffers in giving birth, and this is indicated by the words ( Genesis 3:16), “In sorrow shalt thou bring forth.” As regards family life she was punished by being subjected to her husband’s authority, and this is conveyed in the words ( Genesis 3:16), “Thou shalt be under thy husband’s power.”

Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in matters relating to the family life, so it belongs to the husband to provide the necessaries of that life. In this respect he was punished in three ways.

First, by the barrenness of the earth, in the words ( Genesis 3:17), “Cursed is the earth in thy work.” Secondly, by the cares of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the earth; hence the words ( Genesis 3:17), “With labor and toil shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life.” Thirdly, by the obstacles encountered by the tillers of the soil, wherefore it is written ( Genesis 3:18), “Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee.”

Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the soul.

First, by reason of the confusion they experienced at the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit; hence it is written ( Genesis 3:7): “The eyes of them both were opened; and... they perceived themselves to be naked.”

Secondly, by the reproach for their sin, indicated by the words ( Genesis 3:22), “Behold Adam is become as one of Us.” Thirdly, by the reminder of their coming death, when it was said to him ( Genesis 3:19): “Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return.” To this also pertains that God made them garments of skin, as a sign of their mortality.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In the state of innocence child-bearing would have been painless: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): “Just as, in giving birth, the mother would then be relieved not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity, so in bearing and conceiving the union of both sexes would be one not of lustful desire but of deliberate action” [*Cf. P(1), Q(98) , A(2) ].

The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship (since even before sin the man was the “head” and governor “of the woman”), but as to her having now to obey her husband’s will even against her own.

If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and thistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish man, because their growth would bring no labor or punishment for the tiller of the soil, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. iii, 18). Alcuin [*Interrog. et Resp. in Genesis lxxix], however, holds that, before sin, the earth brought forth no thorns and thistles, whatever: but the former opinion is the better.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed as a punishment to the woman, not on account of the begetting of children, for this would have been the same even before sin, but on account of the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject, through carrying her offspring after conception. Hence it is expressly stated: “I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions.”

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- RO(3) —

These punishments affect all somewhat. For any woman who conceives must needs suffer sorrows and bring forth her child with pain: except the Blessed Virgin, who “conceived without corruption, and bore without pain” [*St. Bernard, Serm. in Dom. inf. oct.

Assum. B. V. M.], because her conceiving was not according to the law of nature, transmitted from our first parents. And if a woman neither conceives nor bears, she suffers from the defect of barrenness, which outweighs the aforesaid punishments. Likewise whoever tills the soil must needs eat his bread in the sweat of his brow: while those who do not themselves work on the land, are busied with other labors, for “man is born to labor” ( Job 5:7): and thus they eat the bread for which others have labored in the sweat of their brow.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Although the place of the earthly paradise avails not man for his use, it avails him for a lesson; because he knows himself deprived of that place on account of sin, and because by the things that have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed in things pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to which is prepared for man by Christ.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- RO(5) —

Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual interpretation, this place would seem to be inaccessible, chiefly on account of the extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the nighness of the sun. This is denoted by the “flaming sword,” which is described as “turning every way,” as being appropriate to the circular movement that causes this heat. And since the movements of corporal creatures are set in order through the ministry of the angels, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4), it was fitting that, besides the sword turning every way, there should be cherubim “to keep the way of the tree of life.” Hence Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xi, 40): “It is to be believed that even in the visible paradise this was done by heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery guard set there by the ministry of angels.”

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- RO(6) —

After sin, if man had ate of the tree of life, he would not thereby have recovered immortality, but by means of that beneficial food he might have prolonged his life. Hence in the words “And live for ever,” “for ever” signifies “for a long time.” For it was not expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of this life.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- RO(7) —

According to Augustine (Genesis ad lit. xi, 39), “these words of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a deterrent to others, for whose benefit these things are written, lest they be proud likewise, because Adam not only failed to become that which he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he was made.”

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- RO(8) —

Clothing is necessary to man in his present state of unhappiness for two reasons. First, to supply a deficiency in respect of external harm caused by, for instance, extreme heat or cold.

Secondly, to hide his ignominy and to cover the shame of those members wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most manifest. Now these two motives do not apply to the primitive state. because then man’s body could not be hurt by any outward thing, as stated in the P(1), Q(97) , A(2), nor was there in man’s body anything shameful that would bring confusion on him. Hence it is written ( Genesis 2:23): “And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his wife, and were not ashamed.” The same cannot be said of food, which is necessary to entertain the natural heat, and to sustain the body.

P(2b)- Q(164)- A(2)- RO(9) —

As Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xi, 31), “We must not imagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed, especially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was fair, and good to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were opened so that they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their minds before, this was a mutual concupiscence such as they had not hitherto.”

QUESTION OF OUR FIRST PARENTS’ TEMPTATION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider our first parents’ temptation, concerning which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil? (2) Of the manner and order of that temptation.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that it was not fitting for man to be tempted by the devil. For the same final punishment is appointed to the angels’ sin and to man’s, according to Matthew 25:41, “Go [Vulg.: ‘Depart from Me’] you cursed into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels.”

Now the angels’ first sin did not follow a temptation from without.

Therefore neither should man’s first sin have resulted from an outward temptation.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, God, Who foreknows the future, knew that through the demon’s temptation man would fall into sin, and thus He knew full well that it was not expedient for man to be tempted.

Therefore it would seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, it seems to savor of punishment that anyone should have an assailant, just as on the other hand the cessation of an assault is akin to a reward. Now punishment should not precede fault.

Therefore it was unfitting for man to be tempted before he sinned.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 34:11): “He that hath not been tempted [Douay: ‘tried’], what manner of things doth he know?”

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(1) —

I answer that, God’s wisdom “orders all things sweetly” (Wis. 8:1), inasmuch as His providence appoints to each one that which is befitting it according to its nature. For as Dionysius says (Div.

Nom. iv), “it belongs to providence not to destroy, but to maintain, nature.” Now it is a condition attaching to human nature that one creature can be helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it was fitting that God should both allow man in the state of innocence to be tempted by evil angels, and should cause him to be helped by good angels. And by a special favor of grace, it was granted him that no creature outside himself could harm him against his own will, whereby he was able even to resist the temptation of the demon.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Above the human nature there is another that admits of the possibility of the evil of fault: but there is not above the angelic nature. Now only one that is already become evil through sin can tempt by leading another into evil. Hence it was fitting that by an evil angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according to the order of nature he is moved forward to perfection by means of a good angel. An angel could be perfected in good by something above him, namely by God, but he could not thus be led into sin, because according to James 1:13, “God is not a tempter of evils.”

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Just as God knew that man, through being tempted, would fall into sin, so too He knew that man was able, by his free will, to resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to man’s nature required that he should be left to his own will, according to Ecclus. 15:14, “God left” man “in the hand of his own counsel.” Hence Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. xi, 4): “It seems to me that man would have had no prospect of any special praise, if he were able to lead a good life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an evil life; since both by nature he had the power, and in his power he had the will, not to consent to the persuader.”

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(1)- RO(3) —

An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist it: but, in the state of innocence, man was able, without any difficulty, to resist temptation. Consequently the tempter’s assault was not a punishment to man.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(2) Whether the manner and order of the first temptation was fitting?

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the manner and order of the first temptation was not fitting. For just as in the order of nature the angel was above man, so was the man above the woman. Now sin came upon man through an angel: therefore in like manner it should have come upon the woman through the man; in other words the woman should have been tempted by the man, and not the other way about.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the temptation of our first parents was by suggestion. Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without making use of an outward sensible creature. Since then our first parents were endowed with a spiritual mind, and adhered less to sensible than to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting for man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead of an outward, temptation.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an evil except through some apparent good. But many other animals have a greater appearance of good than the serpent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted by the devil through a serpent.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, the serpent is an irrational animal.

Now wisdom, speech, and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal. Therefore the serpent is unfittingly described ( Genesis 3:1) as “more subtle than any of the beasts of the earth,” or as “the most prudent of all beasts” according to another version [*The Septuagint]: and likewise is unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman, and to have been punished by God.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(2) —

On the contrary, That which is first in any genus should be proportionate to all that follow it in that genus. Now in every kind of sin we find the same order as in the first temptation. For, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12), it begins with the concupiscence of sin in the sensuality, signified by the serpent; extends to the lower reason, by pleasure, signified by the woman; and reaches to the higher reason by consent in the sin, signified by the man. Therefore the order of the first temptation was fitting.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(2) —

I answer that, Man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective and sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempting man, made use of a twofold incentive to sin: one on the part of the intellect, by promising the Divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge which man naturally desires to have; the other on the part of sense. This he did by having recourse to those sensible things, which are most akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the woman who was akin to him in the same species; partly by tempting the woman through the serpent, who was akin to them in the same genus; partly by suggesting to them to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin to them in the proximate genus.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In the act of tempting the devil was by way of principal agent; whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of temptation in bringing about the downfall of the man, both because the woman was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable to be deceived, and because, on account of her union with man, the devil was able to deceive the man especially through her. Now there is no parity between principal agent and instrument, because the principal agent must exceed in power, which is not requisite in the instrumental agent.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(2)- RO(2) —

A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to man spiritually, shows the devil to have more power against man than outward suggestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least, man’s imagination is changed by the devil [*Cf. P(1), Q(91) , A(3) ]; whereas by an outward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on an outward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power against man before sin, wherefore he was unable to tempt him by inward suggestion, but only by outward suggestion.

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(2)- RO(3) —

According to Augustine (Genesis ad lit. xi, 3), “we are not to suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of temptation; but as he was possessed of the lust of deceit, he could only do so by the animal he was allowed to use for that purpose.”

P(2b)- Q(165)- A(2)- RO(4) —

According to Augustine (Genesis ad lit. xi, 29), “the serpent is described as most prudent or subtle, on account of the cunning of the devil, who wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of a prudent or cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of a prudent or cunning man in advising something prudently or cunningly. Nor indeed (Genesis ad lit. xi, 28) did the serpent understand the sounds which were conveyed through it to the woman; nor again are we to believe that its soul was changed into a rational nature, since not even men, who are rational by nature, know what they say when a demon speaks in them. Accordingly (Genesis ad lit. xi, 29) the serpent spoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat spoke to him, except that the former was the work of a devil, whereas the latter was the work of an angel. Hence (Genesis ad lit. xi, 36) the serpent was not asked why it had done this, because it had not done this in its own nature, but the devil in it, who was already condemned to everlasting fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed to the serpent were directed to him who wrought through the serpent.”

Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Genesis contra Manich. ii, 17,18), “his, that is, the devil’s, punishment mentioned here is that for which we must be on our guard against him, not that which is reserved till the last judgment. For when it was said to him: ‘Thou art cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth,’ the cattle are set above him, not in power, but in the preservation of their nature, since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had it, but they continue to live in the nature which they received.” It is also said to him: “‘Upon thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,’“ according to another version [*The Septuagint] “Here the breast signifies pride, because it is there that the impulse of the soul dominates, while the belly denotes carnal desire, because this part of the body is softest to the touch: and on these he creeps to those whom he wishes to deceive.” The words, “‘Earth shalt thou eat all the days of thy life’ may be understood in two ways. Either ‘Those shall belong to thee, whom thou shalt deceive by earthly lust,’ namely sinners who are signified under the name of earth, or a third kind of temptation, namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat earth is to look into things deep and dark.” The putting of enmities between him and the woman “means that we cannot be tempted by the devil, except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects the likeness of a woman. The seed of the devil is the temptation to evil, the seed of the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the temptation to evil is resisted. Wherefore the serpent lies in wait for the woman’s heel, that if at any time she fall away towards what is unlawful, pleasure may seize hold of her: and she watches his head that she may shut him out at the very outset of the evil temptation.”

QUESTION OF STUDIOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity.

Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry: (1) What is the matter of studiousness? (2) Whether it is a part of temperance?

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(1) Whether the proper matter of studiousness is knowledge?

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of studiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies study to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every matter, in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore seemingly knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness.

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now curiosity, which is derived from “cura” [care], may also refer to elegance of apparel and other such things, which regard the body; wherefore the Apostle says ( Romans 13:14): “Make not provision [curam] for the flesh in its concupiscences.”

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further it is written ( Jeremiah 6:13): “From the least of them even to the greatest, all study [Douay: ‘are given to’] covetousness.”

Now covetousness is not properly about knowledge, but rather about the possession of wealth, as stated above ( Q(118), A(2) ). Therefore studiousness, which is derived from “study,” is not properly about knowledge.

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Proverbs 27:11): “Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him that reproacheth.” Now study, which is commended as a virtue, is the same as that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is properly about “knowledge.”

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(1) —

I answer that, Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of the mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except by knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind’s application to knowledge precedes its application to those things to which man is directed by his knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and as a result it regards any other things the working of which requires to be directed by knowledge. Now the virtues lay claim to that matter about which they are first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch.

Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge.

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Nothing can be done aright as regards other matters, except in so far as is previously directed by the knowing reason.

Hence studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior regard for knowledge.

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Man’s mind is drawn, on account of his affections, towards the things for which he has an affection, according to Matthew 6:21, “Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also.” And since man has special affection for those things which foster the flesh, it follows that man’s thoughts are concerned about things that foster his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best sustain his body.

Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be about things pertaining to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge.

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and for this it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things. Accordingly studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to covetousness.

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(2) Whether studiousness is a part of temperance?

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that studiousness is not a part of temperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his studiousness. Now all virtuous persons without exception are called studious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the term “studious” (\spoudaios\) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4,8,9). [*In the same sense Aristotle says in Ethic. iii, 2, that “every vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do.”] Therefore studiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, studiousness, as stated ( A(1) ), pertains to knowledge. But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues which are in the appetitive part of the soul, and pertains rather to the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore solicitude is an act of prudence as stated above ( Q(47) , A(9) ). Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a principal virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not resemble temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name from being a kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the vice that is in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from being the application of the mind to something, so that it would seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of study, rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity. wherefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a studious man is one who is curious to study.” Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): “We are forbidden to be curious: and this is a great gift that temperance bestows.” Now curiosity is prevented by moderate studiousness. Therefore studiousness is a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(141), AA(3),4,5 ), it belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it tend excessively to that which is desired naturally. Now just as in respect of his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures of food and sex, so, in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to know something; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: “All men have a natural desire for knowledge.”

The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness; wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue. Moreover, it is comprised under modesty for the reason given above ( Q(160), A(2) ).

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Consequently, in so far as the knowledge of prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term “studiousness,” which properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the appetitive power, which moves all the powers, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(9) , A(1) ). Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is connected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate about each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the appetitive power, and consists in man’s appetite being directed aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or that thing. And this belongs to the virtue of seriousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among the moral virtues.

P(2b)- Q(166)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in order to be virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us. chiefly to fear dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things; and so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The former is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle.

QUESTION OF CURIOSITY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge? (2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(1) Whether curiosity can be about intellective knowledge?

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are essentially good.

Now intellective knowledge is essentially good: because man’s perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge of truth. For Dionysius says (Div.

Nom. iv) that “the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with reason,” whose perfection consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge.

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge is from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, “All wisdom is from the Lord God,” and Wis. 7:17, “He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the elements,” etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to God, since “all things are naked and open to His eyes” ( Hebrews 4:13), and “the Lord is a God of all knowledge” ( 1 Kings 2:3). Therefore however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good. Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth.

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: for Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): “Those who refused to partake of the king’s meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful, would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful”: and Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that “if the philosophers made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from unjust possessors.” Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge cannot be sinful.

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says: “Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?” Now vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful.

Therefore curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful.

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(166), A(2), ad 2) studiousness is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth, according to 1 Corinthians 8:1, “Knowledge puffeth up,” or because one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin.

On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride in their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): “Some there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they are doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue.” In like manner, those who study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful study, according to the saying of Jeremiah 9:5, “They have taught their tongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity.”

Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this in four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence Jerome says [*Epist. xxi ad Damas]: “We see priests forsaking the gospels and the prophets, reading stageplays, and singing the love songs of pastoral idylls.” Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious curiosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): “Maybe, the philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity in seeking knowledge from the demons.”

Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge of God.

Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that “in studying creatures, we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity; but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things.”

Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error: wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:22): “Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability... and in many of His works be not curious,” and further on (Ecclus. 3:26), “For... the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in vanity.”

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Man’s good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet man’s sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7,8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth, wherein supreme happiness consists.

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Although this argument shows that the knowledge of truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good should be regulated in due manner.

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired through God revealing it to them, as stated in Romans 1:19. Since, however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the faith, the Apostle says ( Colossians 2:8): “Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men... and not according to Christ”: and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp.) of certain philosophers that “they make an unholy use of divine things against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to destroy the worship of God.”

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(2) Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge?

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense of sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and taste.

Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the vice of curiosity about things known by the sight.

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games; wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when “a fall occurred in the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly, and overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes.” But it does not seem to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on account of the representation, wherein man takes a natural delight, as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity is not about the knowledge of sensible objects.

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire into our neighbor’s actions, as Bede observes [*Comment. in 1 John 2:16]. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of others, because according to Ecclus. 17:12, God “gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor.” Therefore the vice of curiosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular sensible objects.

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that “concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious.” Now according to Bede (Comment. in 1 John 2:16) “concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and dispraise of our neighbor’s faults,” and all these are particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the eves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are members of the same division ( 1 John 2:16), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things.

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(2) —

I answer that, The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it is directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this kind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek those things that are necessary for the body’s sustenance. In the second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful consideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), “I go no more to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open country, if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract me from some weighty thought, and draw me after it... and unless Thou, having made me see my weakness, didst speedily admonish me, I become foolishly dull.” Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people’s actions is directed to detraction. on the other hand, if one be ordinately intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is virtuous.

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising from the knowledge acquired through all the senses.

According to Augustine (Confess. x, 35) “it is called concupiscence of the eyes” because “the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge, so that all sensible things are said to be seen,” and as he says further on: “By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory, soft; but curiosity, for trial’s sake, seeketh even the contraries of these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust of experiment and knowledge.”

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees represented. Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.] that such sights make men adulterers and shameless.

P(2b)- Q(167)- A(2)- RO(3) —

One may watch other people’s actions or inquire into them, with a good intent, either for one’s own good — that is in order to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor — or for our neighbor’s good — that is in order to correct him, if he do anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of one’s position. This is praiseworthy, according to Hebrews 10:24, “Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works.” But to observe our neighbor’s faults with the intention of looking down upon them, or of detracting them, or even with no further purpose than that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written ( Proverbs 24:15), “Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest.”

QUESTION OF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of the body that are done seriously? (2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions? (3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play; (4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(1) Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body?

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that no virtue regards the outward movements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual beauty of the soul, according to Psalm 44:14, “All the glory of the king’s daughter is within,” and a gloss adds, “namely, in the conscience.”

Now the movements of the body are not within, but without. Therefore there can be no virtue about them.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, “Virtues are not in us by nature,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are in man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some slow of movement, and the same applies to other differences of outward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of this kind.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, every moral virtue is either about actions directed to another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance and fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is connected with them.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue, as stated above ( Q(166), A(1), O(1); A(2), ad 1). Now it is censurable to apply study to the ordering of one’s outward movements: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “A becoming gait is one that reflects the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the foot-print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor affectation, but natural and artless movement.” Therefore seemingly there is no virtue about the style of outward movements.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The beauty of honesty [*Cf.

Q(145), A(1) ] pertains to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “The sound of the voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether they be unduly soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be our model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of honesty.” Therefore there is a virtue about the style of outward movement.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(1) —

I answer that, Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members are set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements.

Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly, in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or place.

Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “Beauty of conduct consists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex and person,” and this regards the first. As to the second, he adds: “This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish becoming to every action.”

Hence Andronicus [*De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these outward movements: namely “taste” [ornatus] which regards what is becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of what is becoming in movement and behavior; and “methodicalness” [bona ordinatio] which regards what is becoming to the business in hand, and to one’s surroundings, wherefore he calls it “the practical knowledge of separation,” i.e. of the distinction of “acts.”

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition, according to Ecclus. 19:27, “The attire of the body, and the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is”; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that “the habit of mind is seen in the gesture of the body,” and that “the body’s movement is an index of the soul.”

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Although it is from natural disposition that a man is inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “Let nature guide the movement: and if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect.”

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As stated (ad 1) outward movements are indications of the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that “from these things,” i.e. the outward movements, “the man that lies hidden in our hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from blemish.” It is moreover from our outward movements that other men form their judgment about us, according to Ecclus. 19:26, “A man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his countenance.” Hence moderation of outward movements is directed somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), “In all your movements, let nothing be done to offend the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the holiness of your state.” Wherefore the moderation of outward movements may be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher mentions in Ethic. iv, 6,7. For, in so far as by outward movements we are directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward movements belongs to “friendliness or affability” [*Cf. Q(114), A(1) ]. This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference to others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so far as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition, their moderation belongs to the virtue of truthfulness [*Cf. Q(9) ], whereby a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(1)- RO(4) —

It is censurable to study the style of one’s outward movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they do not agree with one’s inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may be corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “Let them be without artifice, but not without correction.”

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(2) Whether there can be a virtue about games?

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): “Our Lord said: ‘Woe to you who laugh, for you shall weep.’ Wherefore I consider that all, and not only excessive, games should be avoided.” Now that which can be done virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be a virtue about games.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, “Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us,” as stated above ( P(2a), Q(55) , A(4) ). Now Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.]: “It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun. Listen to what happened to those who played: ‘The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.’“ Therefore there can be no virtue about games.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that “playful actions are not directed to something else.” But it is a requisite of virtue that the agent in choosing should “direct his action to something else,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore there can be no virtue about games.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): “I pray thee, spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax the high pressure of his attention to work.” Now this relaxation of the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times.

Moreover the Philosopher [*Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8] assigns to games the virtue of \eutrapelia\, which we may call “pleasantness.”

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(2) —

I answer that, Just as man needs bodily rest for the body’s refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of work.

Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when the soul works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the intellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs. Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the soul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations of reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of soul, whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the practical or of the speculative reason.

Yet this weariness is greater if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby it is raised higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. In either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than another, according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now just as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the soul’s rest is pleasure, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(25) , A(2) ; P(2a), Q(31) , A(1), ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by slackening the tension of the reason’s study. Thus in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21, it is related of Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized on finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that in like manner man’s mind would break if its tension were never relaxed.

Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul’s delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul.

This is in agreement with the statement of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that “in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of rest that is associated with games”: and consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things.

Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that “one kind of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene.” Another thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one’s mind altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): “We should beware lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony which is the concord of good works”: and Tully says (De Offic. i, 29), that, “just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in their games, but only that which is consistent with good behavior, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright mind.” Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other human actions, to conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take due account of other circumstances, so that our fun “befit the hour and the man,” as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).

Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness (\eutrapelia\), and a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. [*\Eutrapelia\ is derived from \trepein\ = ‘to turn’].

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(2)- RO(1) —

As stated above, fun should fit with business and persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that “when the audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the gravity of the subject.” Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with things of the greatest moment, according to Proverbs 8:6, “Hear, for I will speak of great things.” Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he begins by saying: “Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in Holy Writ?”

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(2)- RO(2) —

This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end; of whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): “They have accounted our life a pastime.” Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): “We are so begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and moment.”

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Playful actions themselves considered in their species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): “It is indeed lawful to make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty by grave and serious matters.”

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(3) Whether there can be sin in the excess of play?

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that there cannot be sin in the excess of play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful.

Now play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be grave sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they be done in fun, are either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there is no sin in excessive play.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven capital vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play does not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would seem not to be a sin.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in play, since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if excess of play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover all those who employ them, as well as those who make them any payment, would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue; for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; 8:63) that is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain jester would be with him in the life to come.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(3) —

On the contrary, A gloss on Proverbs 14:13, “Laughter shall be mingled with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy,” remarks: “A mourning that will last for ever.” Now there is inordinate laughter and inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin therein, since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(3) —

I answer that, In all things dirigible according to reason, the excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which falls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated ( A(2) ) that playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason.

Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be “discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene,” when to wit a man, for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such as are injurious to his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins. And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.

Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue times or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or persons. This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love of God, so as to be willing to disobey a commandment of God or of the Church rather than forego, such like amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for instance where a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its sake to do anything in disobedience to God.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Certain things are sinful on account of the intention alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such an intention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from sin, or diminishes it.

Other things, however, are sins according to their species, such as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is no excuse for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and obscene.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it is written ( Exodus 32:6): “The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.”

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(3)- RO(3) —

As stated ( A(2) ), play is necessary for the intercourse of human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse may have a lawful employment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is not unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words or deeds in order to amuse, and that they do not introduce play into undue matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have no other occupation in reference to other men, nevertheless in reference to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both serious and virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation of their own passions and operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor. Wherefore those who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act justly, by rewarding them for their services. on the other hand, if a man spends too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians who practice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging them in their sin. Hence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that “to give one’s property to comedians is a great sin, not a virtue”; unless by chance some play-actor were in extreme need, in which case one would have to assist him, for Ambrose says (De Offic. [*Quoted in Canon Pasce, dist. 86]): “Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst save a man by feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him.”

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(4) Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth?

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [*Spurious]: “Let him refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to obtain the grace of a full pardon.” Therefore there is no sin in lack of mirth.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy men. But some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth; for it is written ( Jeremiah 15:17): “I sat not in the assembly of jesters,” and (Tobias 3:17): “Never have I joined myself with them that play; neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness.”

Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives nor receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the lack of mirth to be a vice.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(4) —

I answer that, In human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment. Wherefore Seneca [*Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De Continentia] says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): “Let your conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude, or despise you as a cad.” Now a man who is without mirth, not only is lacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are vicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 8).

Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are not in quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 6, it follows that “lack of mirth is less sinful than excess thereof.” Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 10): “We should make few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt suffices for our meat.”

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in default, because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with reason.

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the times, the state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he adds: “I sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats.” The words of Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his adding: “Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness.”

P(2b)- Q(168)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures, but only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore it would seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6) calls “friendliness,” or \eutrapelia\, otherwise wittiness. Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement with temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.

QUESTION OF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel, and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel? (2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment?

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not belong to us by nature, wherefore it varies according to different times and places. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12) that “among the ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a cloak with sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is scandalous for anyone hailing from a reputable place to be without them.” Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1) there is in us a natural aptitude for the virtues.

Therefore there is no virtue or vice about such things.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, if there were virtue and vice in connection with outward attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess in outward attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of the altar use most precious vestments in the sacred ministry. Likewise it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it is said in praise of certain people ( Hebrews 11:37): “They wandered about in sheepskins and in goatskins.” Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in this matter.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, every virtue is either theological, or moral, or intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is not conversant with matter of this kind, since it is a perfection regarding the knowledge of truth. Nor is there a theological virtue connected therewith, since that has God for its object; nor are any of the moral virtues enumerated by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), connected with it. Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection with this kind of attire.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Honesty [*Cf. Q(145) ] pertains to virtue. Now a certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 19): “The body should be bedecked naturally and without affectation, with simplicity, with negligence rather than nicety, not with costly and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity, yet nothing be added to increase its beauty.” Therefore there can be virtue and vice in the outward attire.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(1) —

I answer that, It is not in the outward things themselves which man uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them immoderately. This lack of moderation occurs in two ways.

First, in comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): “Those offenses which are contrary to the customs of men, are to be avoided according to the customs generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by custom or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner. For any part, which harmonizeth not with its whole, is offensive.” Secondly, the lack of moderation in the use of these things may arise from the inordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a man sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, either in accordance with the custom of those among whom he dwells or contrary to such custom. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): “We must avoid excessive pleasure in the use of things, for it leads not only wickedly to abuse the customs of those among whom we dwell, but frequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay hidden, while under the restraint of established morality, it displays its deformity in a most lawless outbreak.”

In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways. First when a man seeks glory from excessive attention to dress; in so far as dress and such like things are a kind of ornament. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xl in Ev.): “There are some who think that attention to finery and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were no fault, the word of God would not say so expressly that the rich man who was tortured in hell had been clothed in purple and fine linen. No one, forsooth, seeks costly apparel” (such, namely, as exceeds his estate) “save for vainglory.” Secondly, when a man seeks sensuous pleasure from excessive attention to dress, in so far as dress is directed to the body’s comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too solicitous [*Cf. Q(55) , A(6) ] in his attention to outward apparel.

Accordingly Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons three virtues in connection with outward attire; namely “humility,” which excludes the seeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is “the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and parade”; “contentment” [*Cf. Q(143), O(4) ], which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure, wherefore he says that “contentedness is the habit that makes a man satisfied with what is suitable, and enables him to determine what is becoming in his manner of life” (according to the saying of the Apostle, 1 Timothy 6:8): “Having food and wherewith to be covered, with these let us be content;” — and “simplicity,” which excludes excessive solicitude about such things, wherefore he says that “simplicity is a habit that makes a man contented with what he has.”

In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate attachment in two ways.

First, through a man’s neglect to give the requisite study or trouble to the use of outward apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is a mark of effeminacy to let one’s cloak trail on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up.” Secondly, by seeking glory from the very lack of attention to outward attire. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that “not only the glare and pomp of outward things, but even dirt and the weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under the guise of God’s service”; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “both excess and inordinate defect are a subject of ostentation.”

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Although outward attire does not come from nature, it belongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are naturally inclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates outward raiment.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Those who are placed in a position of dignity, or again the ministers of the altar, are attired in more costly apparel than others, not for the sake of their own glory, but to indicate the excellence of their office or of the Divine worship: wherefore this is not sinful in them. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): “Whoever uses outward things in such a way as to exceed the bounds observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either signifies something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he uses these things for sensual pleasure or ostentation.”

Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: although it is not always a sin to wear coarser clothes than other people. For, if this be done through ostentation or pride, in order to set oneself above others, it is a sin of superstition; whereas, if this be done to tame the flesh, or to humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue of temperance. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): “Whoever uses transitory things with greater restraint than is customary with those among whom he dwells, is either temperate or superstitious.” Especially, however, is the use of coarse raiment befitting to those who by word and example urge others to repentance, as did the prophets of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted. Wherefore a gloss on Matthew 3:4, says: “He who preaches penance, wears the garb of penance.”

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(1)- RO(3) —

This outward apparel is an indication of man’s estate; wherefore excess, deficiency, and mean therein, are referable to the virtue of truthfulness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) assigns to deeds and words, which are indications of something connected with man’s estate.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(2) Whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine law is a mortal sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a precept of the Divine law; for it is written ( 1 Peter 3:3): “Whose,” namely women’s, “adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of the hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel.” Wherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: “Those who are clothed in silk and purple cannot sincerely put on Christ: those who are bedecked with gold and pearls and trinkets have forfeited the adornments of mind and body.” Now this is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women cannot be devoid of mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.): “I hold that not only virgins and widows, but also wives and all women without exception, should be admonished that nowise should they deface God’s work and fabric, the clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of yellow pigments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye that alters the natural features.” And afterwards he adds: “They lay hands on God, when they strive to reform what He has formed. This is an assault on the Divine handiwork, a distortion of the truth. Thou shalt not be able to see God, having no longer the eyes that God made, but those the devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on whose account thou art bedecked.”

But this is not due except to mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, just as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear man’s clothes, so is it unbecoming for her to adorn herself inordinately. Now the former is a sin, for it is written ( Deuteronomy 22:5): “A woman shall not be clothed with man’s apparel, neither shall a man use woman’s apparel.”

Therefore it seems that also the excessive adornment of women is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(2)- O(4) —

On the contrary, If this were true it would seem that the makers of these means of adornment sin mortally.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(2) —

I answer that, As regards the adornment of women, we must bear in mind the general statements made above ( A(1) ) concerning outward apparel, and also something special, namely that a woman’s apparel may incite men to lust, according to Proverbs 7:10, “Behold a woman meeteth him in harlot’s attire, prepared to deceive souls.”

Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her husband, lest through despising her he fall into adultery. Hence it is written ( 1 Corinthians 7:34) that the woman “that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband.” Wherefore if a married woman adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do this without sin.

But those women who have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are in a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot without sin desire to give lustful pleasure to those men who see them, because this is to incite them to sin. And if indeed they adorn themselves with this intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally; whereas if they do so from frivolity, or from vanity for the sake of ostentation, it is not always mortal, but sometimes venial. And the same applies to men in this respect.

Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): “I do not wish you to be hasty in forbidding the wearing of gold or costly attire except in the case of those who being neither married nor wishful to marry, should think how they may please God: whereas the others think on the things of the world, either husbands how they may please their wives, or wives how they may please their husbands, except that it is unbecoming for women though married to uncover their hair, since the Apostle commands them to cover the head.” Yet in this case some might be excused from sin, when they do this not through vanity but on account of some contrary custom: although such a custom is not to be commended.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(2)- RO(1) —

As a gloss says on this passage, “The wives of those who were in distress despised their husbands, and decked themselves that they might please other men”: and the Apostle forbids this. Cyprian is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid married women to adorn themselves in order to please their husbands, lest the latter be afforded an occasion of sin with other women. Hence the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 2:9): “Women... in ornate [Douay: ‘decent’] apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with plaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire”: whence we are given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn themselves soberly and moderately but to do so excessively, shamelessly, and immodestly.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Cyprian is speaking of women painting themselves: this is a kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin.

Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): “To dye oneself with paints in order to have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying counterfeit.

I doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be deceived by it, by whom alone” (i.e. the husbands) “are they to be permitted, but not ordered, to adorn themselves.” However, such painting does not always involve a mortal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of sensuous pleasure or in contempt of God, and it is to like cases that Cyprian refers.

It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to counterfeit a beauty one has not, and another to hide a disfigurement arising from some cause such as sickness or the like. For this is lawful, since according to the Apostle ( 1 Corinthians 12:23), “such as we think to be the less honorable members of the body, about these we put more abundant honor.”

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As stated in the foregoing Article, outward apparel should be consistent with the estate of the person, according to the general custom. Hence it is in itself sinful for a woman to wear man’s clothes, or vice versa; especially since this may be a cause of sensuous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law ( Deuteronomy 22) because the Gentiles used to practice this change of attire for the purpose of idolatrous superstition. Nevertheless this may be done sometimes without sin on account of some necessity, either in order to hide oneself from enemies, or through lack of other clothes, or for some similar motive.

P(2b)- Q(169)- A(2)- RO(4) —

In the case of an art directed to the production of goods which men cannot use without sin, it follows that the workmen sin in making such things, as directly affording others an occasion of sin; for instance, if a man were to make idols or anything pertaining to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the products of which may be employed by man either for a good or for an evil use, such as swords, arrows, and the like, the practice of such an art is not sinful.

These alone should be called arts; wherefore Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlix super Matth.]: “The name of art should be applied to those only which contribute towards and produce necessaries and mainstays of life.” In the case of an art that produces things which for the most part some people put to an evil use, although such arts are not unlawful in themselves, nevertheless, according to the teaching of Plato, they should be extirpated from the State by the governing authority. Accordingly, since women may lawfully adorn themselves, whether to maintain the fitness of their estate, or even by adding something thereto, in order to please their husbands, it follows that those who make such means of adornment do not sin in the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing means that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysostom says (Super Matth.) that “even the shoemakers’ and clothiers’ arts stand in need of restraint, for they have lent their art to lust, by abusing its needs, and debasing art by art.”

QUESTION OF THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider the precepts of temperance: (1) The precepts of temperance itself; (2) The precepts of its parts.

P(2b)- Q(170)- A(1) Whether the precepts of temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?

P(2b)- Q(170)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the precepts of temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater virtue than temperance, as stated above ( Q(123), A(12) ; Q(141), A(8) ; P(2a), Q(66) , A(4) ). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the most important among the precepts of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include among the precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of adultery, which is contrary to temperance, as stated above ( Q(154), AA(1),8 ).

P(2b)- Q(170)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, temperance is not only about venereal matters, but also about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the decalogue include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of meat and drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore, should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to venereal pleasure.

P(2b)- Q(170)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, in the lawgiver’s intention inducement to virtue precedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in order that obstacles to virtue may be removed. Now the precepts of the decalogue are the most important in the Divine law.

Therefore the precepts of the decalogue should have included an affirmative precept directly prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather than a negative precept forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto.

P(2b)- Q(170)- A(1) —

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue ( Exodus 20:14,17).

P(2b)- Q(170)- A(1) —

I answer that, As the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 1:5), “the end of the commandment is charity,” which is enjoined upon us in the two precepts concerning the love of God and of our neighbor.

Wherefore the decalogue contains those precepts which tend more directly to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to the love of our neighbor, since thereby a man lays hold of another’s property for his own use, by abusing his neighbor’s wife. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue include a special prohibition of adultery, not only as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought.

P(2b)- Q(170)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude there is not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our neighbor as adultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to temperance. And yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude, is wont to be sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one of the precepts of the decalogue: for it is written (Ecclus. 8:18): “Go not on the way with a bold man lest he burden thee with his evils.”

P(2b)- Q(170)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our neighbor, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust, for a father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over whom he has no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of his wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her body [* 1 Corinthians 7:4].

P(2b)- Q(170)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As stated above ( Q(122), AA(1),4 ) the precepts of the decalogue are universal principles of the Divine law; hence they need to be common precepts. Now it was not possible to give any common affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of temperance varies according to different times, as Augustine remarks (De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according to different human laws and customs.

P(2b)- Q(170)- A(2) Whether the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?