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| Chapter XIV.—The Resurrection Does Not Rest Solely on the Fact of a Future Judgment.
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Chapter XIV.—The Resurrection Does Not Rest Solely on the Fact of a Future Judgment.
The proof839
| 839 [This
chapter of itself establishes the fact that Christians have a right to
demand the evidence for what they are required to believe. It refutes the
idea that what any single bishop or saint has said or thought is doctrine,
for that reason only; but it leaves the fact that concurrent testimony
is evidence, on certain conditions, in all its force.] | of
the several doctrines of which the truth consists, or of any matter
whatsoever proposed for examination, if it is to produce an unwavering
confidence in what is said, must begin, not from anything without, nor
from what certain persons think or have thought,840
| 840 [Not strong enough for the force of the original: ουδ᾽
ἐκ τῶν τισί
δοκοὐντων ῆ
δεδογμένων.] |
but from the common and natural notion841
| 841 [From the natural common sense of the thing.] |
of the matter, or from the connection of secondary truths with primary
ones. For the question relates either to primary beliefs, and then all
that is necessary is reminiscence, so as to stir up the natural notion;
or to things which naturally follow from the first and to their natural
sequence. And in these things we must observe order, showing what strictly
follows from the first truths, or from those which are placed first, so as
neither to be unmindful of the truth, or of our certainty respecting it,
nor to confound the things arranged by nature and distinguished from
each other, or break up the natural order. Hence I think it behoves
those who desire to handle the subject with fairness, and who wish to
form an intelligent judgment whether there is a resurrection or not,
first to consider attentively the force of the arguments contributing to
the proof of this, and what place each of them holds—which is first,
which second, which third, and which last. And in the arrangement of these
they should place first the cause of the creation of men,—namely,
the purpose of the Creator in making man; and then connect with this,
as is suitable, the nature of the men so created; not as being second
in order, but because we are unable to pass our judgment on both at the
same time, although they have the closest natural connection with each
other, and are of equal force in reference to the subject before us. But
while from these proofs as the primary ones, and as being derived from
the work of creation, the resurrection is clearly demonstrated, none the
less can we gain conviction respecting it from the arguments taken from
providence,—I mean from the reward or punishment due to each man in
accordance with just judgment, and from the end of human existence. For
many, in discussing the subject of the resurrection, have rested the
whole cause on the third argument alone, deeming that the cause of the
resurrection is the judgment. But the fallacy of this is very clearly
shown, from the fact that, although all human beings who die rise again,
yet not all who rise again are to be judged: for if only a just judgment
were the cause of the resurrection, it would of course follow that those
who had done neither evil nor good—namely, very young children842
—would not
rise again; but seeing that all are to rise again, those who have died
in infancy as well as others, they too justify our conclusion that
the resurrection takes place not for the sake of the judgment as the
primary reason, but in consequence of the purpose of God in forming men,
and the nature of the beings so formed.E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
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