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| That to Work is Not a Matter of Pain and Weariness to God. PREVIOUS SECTION - NEXT SECTION - HELP
V. That to Work is Not a
Matter of Pain and Weariness to God.
Now to work, and administer, and do good, and exercise
care, and such like actions, may perhaps be hard tasks for the idle,
and silly, and weak, and wicked; in whose number truly Epicurus reckons
himself, when he propounds such notions about the gods. But to
the earnest, and powerful, and intelligent, and prudent, such as
philosophers ought to be—and how much more so, therefore, the
gods!—these things are not only not disagreeable and irksome, but
ever the most delightful, and by far the most welcome of all. To
persons of this character, negligence and procrastination in the doing
of what is good are a reproach, as the poet admonishes them in these
words of counsel:—
“Delay not aught till the
morrow.”685
685
Hesiod’s Works and Days, v. 408. |
And then he adds this further sentence of threatening:—
“The lazy procrastinator is ever wrestling
with miseries.”686
And the prophet teaches us
the same lesson in a more solemn fashion, and declares that deeds done
according to the standard of virtue are truly worthy of God,687 and that the man who gives no heed to
these is accursed: “For cursed be he that doeth the works
of the Lord carelessly.”688 Moreover, those who are unversed
in any art, and unable to prosecute it perfectly, feel it to be
wearisome when they make their first attempts in it, just by reason of
the novelty689
689 The
text gives, διὰ
τὸ τῆς πείρας
ἀληθές. We adopt
Viger’s emendation, ἄηθες. | of their
experience, and their want of practice in the works. But those,
on the other hand, who have made some advance, and much more those who
are perfectly trained in the art, accomplish easily and successfully
the objects of their labours, and have great pleasure in the work, and
would choose rather thus, in the discharge of the pursuits to which
they are accustomed, to finish and carry perfectly out what their
efforts aim at, than to be made masters of all those things which are
reckoned advantageous among men. Yea, Democritus himself, as it
is reported, averred that he would prefer the discovery of one true
cause to being put in possession of the kingdom of Persia. And
that was the declaration of a man who had only a vain and groundless
conception of the causes of things,690
690
[“Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.”
But see Hippolytus (vol. v.), and compare Clement, vol. ii. pp.
565–567, this series.] |
inasmuch as he started with an unfounded principle, and an erroneous
hypothesis, and did not discern the real root and the common law
of necessity in the constitution of natural things, and held as the
greatest wisdom the apprehension of things that come about simply in an
unintelligent and random way, and set up chance691 as the mistress and queen of things
universal, and even things divine, and endeavoured to demonstrate that
all things happen by the determination of the same, although at the
same time he kept it outside the sphere of the life of men, and
convicted those of senselessness who worshipped it. At any rate,
at the very beginning of his Precepts692 he speaks thus: “Men have made
an image693 of chance, as a
cover694 for their own lack
of knowledge. For intellect and chance are in their very nature
antagonistic to each other.695
695
φύσει
γὰρ γνώμη
τυχῇ
μάχεται. Viger
refers to the parallel in Tullius, pro Marcello, sec. 7:
“Nunquam temeritas cum sapientia commiscetur, nec ad
consilium casus admittitur.” | And men have maintained that this
greatest adversary to intelligence is its sovereign. Yea, rather,
they completely subvert and do away with the one, while they establish
the other in its place. For they do not celebrate intelligence as
the fortunate,696 but they laud
chance697 as the most
intelligent.”698
Moreover, those who attend to things conducing to the good of life,
take special pleasure in what serves the interests of those of the same
race with themselves, and seek the recompense of praise and glory in
return for labours undertaken in behalf of the general good; while some
exert themselves as purveyors of ways and means,699 others as magistrates, others as
physicians, others as statesmen; and even philosophers pride themselves
greatly in their efforts after the education of men. Will, then,
Epicurus or Democritus be bold enough to assert that in the exertion of
philosophizing they only cause distress to themselves? Nay,
rather they will reckon this a pleasure of mind second to none.
For even though they maintain the opinion that the good is pleasure,
they will be ashamed to deny that philosophizing is the greater
pleasure to them.700
700 The text
gives, ἡδυ ὄν αὐτοῖς
εἶναι τὸ
φιλοσοφεῖν.
Viger suggests ἡδιον for ἡδυ
ὄν. | But as to
the gods, of whom the poets among them sing that they are the
“bestowers of good gifts,”701
701
δωτῆρας
ἐάων. See Homer,
Odyssey, viii. 325 and 335. | these philosophers scoffingly celebrate them
in strains like these: “The gods are neither the bestowers
nor the sharers in any good thing.” And in what manner,
forsooth, can they demonstrate that there are gods at all, when they
neither perceive their presence, nor discern them as the doers of
aught, wherein, indeed, they resemble those who, in their admiration
and wonder at the sun and the moon and the stars, have held these to
have been named gods,702
from their running703
such courses: when, further, they do not attribute to them any
function or power of operation,704
704
δημιουργίαν
αὐτοῖς ἢ
κατασκευήν. | so
as to hold them gods705 from
their constituting,706
that is, from their making objects,707 for thereby in all truth the one maker and
operator of all things must be God: and when, in fine, they do
not set forth any administration, or judgment, or beneficence of theirs
in relation to men, so that we might be bound either by fear or by
reverence to worship them? Has Epicurus then been able, forsooth,
to see beyond this world, and to overpass the precincts of heaven? or
has he gone forth by some secret gates known to himself alone, and thus
obtained sight of the gods in the void?708
708 The
text gives, οὓς
ἐν τῷ κενῷ
κατεῖδε
θεούς. Viger proposes
τούς for
οὕς. | and, deeming them blessed in their full
felicity, and then becoming himself a passionate aspirant after such
pleasure, and an ardent scholar in that life which they pursue in the
void, does he now call
upon all to participate in this felicity, and urge them thus to make
themselves like the gods, preparing709 as their true symposium of
blessedness neither heaven nor Olympus, as the poets feign, but the
sheer void, and setting before them the ambrosia of atoms,710
710 For
ἀτόμων Viger suggests ἀτμῶν, “of vapours.” | and pledging them in711
711 Or,
giving them to drink. | nectar made of the same? However, in
matters which have no relation to us, he introduces into his books a
myriad oaths and solemn asseverations, swearing constantly both
negatively and affirmatively by Jove, and making those whom he meets,
and with whom he discusses his doctrines, swear also by the gods, not
certainly that he fears them himself, or has any dread of perjury, but
that he pronounces all this to be vain, and false, and idle, and
unintelligible, and uses it simply as a kind of accompaniment to his
words, just as he might also clear his throat, or spit, or twist his
face, or move his hand. So completely senseless and empty a
pretence was this whole matter of the naming of the gods, in his
estimation. But this is also a very patent fact, that, being in
fear of the Athenians after (the warning of) the death of Socrates, and
being desirous of preventing his being taken for what he really
was—an atheist—the subtle charlatan invented for them
certain empty shadows of unsubstantial gods. But never surely did
he look up to heaven with eyes of true intelligence, so as to hear the
clear voice from above, which another attentive spectator did hear, and
of which he testified when he said, “The heavens declare the
glory of God, and the firmament showeth His handiwork.”712 And never surely did he look down
upon the world’s surface with due reflection; for then would he
have learned that “the earth is full of the goodness of the
Lord”713 and that
“the earth is the Lord’s, and the fulness
thereof;”714 and that, as we
also read, “After this the Lord looked upon the earth, and filled
it with His blessings. With all manner of living things hath He
covered the face thereof.”715 And if these men are not hopelessly
blinded, let them but survey the vast wealth and variety of living
creatures, land animals, and winged creatures, and aquatic; and let
them understand then that the declaration made by the Lord on the
occasion of His judgment of all things716
716 The text
is, ἐπὶ τῇ πάντων
κρίσει. Viger suggests
κτίσει, “at the
creation of all things.” | is true: “And all things, in
accordance with His command, appeared good.”717
717 The
quotation runs thus: καὶ πάντα
κατὰ τὴν
αὐτοῦ
πρόσταξιν
πέφηνε
καλά. Eusebius adds the remark
here: “These passages have been culled by me out of a very
large number composed against Epicurus by Dionysius, a bishop of our
own time.” [Among the many excellent works which have
appeared against the “hopelessly blinded” Epicureans of
this age, let me note Darwinism tested by Language, by E.
Bateman, M.D. London, Rivingtons, 1877.] | E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
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