37.  But perhaps you will say that these evils cannot be removed from the natures, and must therefore be considered natural.  The question at present is not what can be taken away, and what cannot; but it certainly helps to a clear perception that these natures, as far as they are natures, are good, when we see that the good things can be thought of without these evil things, while without these good things no nature can be conceived of.  I can conceive of waters without muddy commotion; but without settled continuity of parts no material form is an object of thought or of sensation in any way.  Therefore even these muddy waters could not exist without the good which was the condition of their material existence.  As to the reply that these evil things cannot be taken from such natures, I rejoin that neither can the good things be taken away.  Why, then, should you call these things natural evils, on account of the evil things which you suppose cannot be taken away, and yet refuse to call them natural good things, on account of the good things which, as has been proved, cannot be taken away?

38.  You may next ask, as you usually do for a last resource, whence come these evils which I have said that I too disapprove of.  I shall perhaps tell you, if you first tell me whence are those good things which you too are obliged to commend, if you would not be altogether unreasonable.  But why should I ask this, when we both acknowledge that all good things whatever, and how great soever, are from the one God, who is supremely good?  You must therefore yourselves oppose Manichæus who has placed all these important good things which we have mentioned and justly commended,—the continuity and agreement of parts in each nature, the health and vigor of the animated creatures, and the other things which it would be wearisome to repeat,—(in an imaginary region of darkness, so as to separate them altogether from that God whom he allows to be the author of all good things.)  He lost sight of those good things, while taking notice only of what was disagreeable; as if one, frightened by a lion’s roaring, and seeing him dragging away and tearing the bodies of cattle or human beings which he had seized, should from childish pusillanimity be so overpowered with fear as to see nothing but the cruelty and ferocity of the lion; and overlooking or disregarding all the other qualities, should exclaim against the nature of this animal as not only evil, but a great evil, his fear adding to his vehemence.  But were he to see a tame lion, with its ferocity subdued, especially if he had never been frightened by a lion, he would have leisure, in the absence of danger and terror, to observe and admire the beauty of the animal.  My only remark on this is one closely connected with our subject:  that any nature may be in some case disagreeable, so as to excite hatred towards the whole nature; though it is clear that the form of a real living beast, even when it excites terror in the woods, is far better than that of the artificial imitation which is commended in a painting on the wall.  We must not then be misled into this error by Manichæus, or be hindered from observing the forms of the natures, by his finding fault with some things in them in such a way as to make us disapprove of them entirely, when it is impossible to show that they deserve entire disapproval.  And when our minds are thus composed and prepared to form a just judgment, we may ask whence come those evils which I have said that I condemn.  It will be easier to see this if we class them all under one name.

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