Chapter XVIII.
59. And inasmuch as when such things are either provided against the time to come, or reserved, if there is no cause wherefore you should expend them, it is uncertain with what intention it is done, since it may be done with a single heart, and also with a double one, He has seasonably added in this passage: “Judge not,426
| 426 Sine scientia, amore, necessitate (“without knowledge, love, necessity.”—Bengel). The discussion is one of the most thorough and satisfactory sections of Augustin’s commentary.
|
that ye be not judged.
427
| 427 Judicetur de vobis…judicabitur; Vulgate, judicemini…judicabimini.
|
For with what
judgment ye
judge, ye shall be judged,
428
| 428 Judicetur de vobis…judicabitur; Vulgate, judicemini…judicabimini.
|
and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.” In this passage, I am of opinion that we are taught nothing else, but that in the case of those actions respecting which it is doubtful with what intention they are done, we are to put the better construction on them. For when it is written, “By their fruits ye shall know them,” the statement has reference to things which manifestly cannot be done with a good intention; such as debaucheries, or
blasphemies, or
thefts, or
drunkenness, and all such things, of which we are permitted to
judge, according to the
apostle’s statement: “For what have I to do to
judge them also that are without? do not ye
judge them that are within?”
429
But concerning the
kind of
food, because every
kind of human
food can be taken indiscriminately with a good intention and a single
heart, without the vice of concupiscence, the same
apostle forbids that they who ate
flesh and drank
wine be judged by those who
abstained from such kinds of
sustenance: “Let not him that eateth,” says he, “
despise him that eateth not; and let not him which eateth not,
judge him that eateth.” There also he says: “Who art thou that
judges another man’s
servant? to his own master he standeth or falleth.”
430
For in reference to such matters as can be done with a good and single and
noble intention, although they may also be done with an intention the reverse of good, those parties wished, howbeit they were [mere] men, to pronounce
judgment upon the
secrets of the
heart, of which
God alone is
Judge.
60. To this category belongs also what he says in another passage: “Therefore judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the thoughts431
| 431 Cogitationes; Vulgate, consilia.
|
of the
hearts: and then shall every man have
praise of
God.”
432
There are therefore certain ambiguous actions, respecting which we are ignorant with what intention they are performed, because they may be done both with a good or with an
evil one, of which it is rash to
judge, especially for the purpose of
condemning. Now the time will come for these to be judged, when the
Lord “will bring to
light the hidden things of
darkness, and will make manifest the
counsels of the
hearts.” In another passage also the same
apostle says: “Some
men’s aims are manifest beforehand, going before to
judgment; and some men they follow after.” He calls those
sins manifest, with regard to which it is clear with what intention they are done; these go before to
judgment, because if a
judgment shall follow, it is not rash. But those which are concealed follow, because neither shall they remain hid in their own time. So we must understand with respect to good works also. For he adds to this effect: “Likewise also the good works of some are
manifest beforehand; and they that are otherwise cannot be hid.”
433
Let us
judge, therefore, with respect to those which are manifest; but respecting those which are concealed, let us leave the
judgment to
God: for they also cannot be hid, whether they be good or
evil, when the time shall come for them to be manifested.
61. There are two things, moreover, in which we ought to beware of rash judgment; when it is uncertain with what intention any thing is done; or when it is uncertain what sort of a person he is going to be, who at preset is manifestly either good or bad. If, therefore, any one, for example, complaining of his stomach, would not fast, and you, not believing this, were to attribute it to the vice of gluttony, you would judge rashly. Likewise, if you were to come to know
the gluttony and drunkenness as being manifest, and were so to administer reproof as if the man could never be amended and changed, you would nevertheless judge rashly. Let us not therefore reprove those things about which we do not know with what intention they are done; nor let us so reprove those things which are manifest, as that we should despair of a return to a right state of mind; and thus we shall avoid the judgment of which in the present instance it is said, “Judge not, that ye be
not judged.”
62. But what He says may cause perplexity: “For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.” Is it the case, then, that if we shall judge any thing with a rash judgment, God will also judge rashly with respect to us? or if we shall measure any thing with an unjust measure, is there with God also an unjust measure, according to which it shall be measured to us again? (for by the expression measure
also, I suppose the judgment itself is meant.) By no means does God either judge rashly, or recompense to any one with an unjust measure; but it is so expressed, inasmuch as that very same rashness wherewith you punish another must necessarily punish yourself. Unless, perchance, it is to be imagined that injustice does harm in some way to him against whom it goes forth, but in no way to him from whom it goes forth; but nay, it often does no harm to him who suffers the injury,
but it must necessarily do harm to him who inflicts it. For what harm did the injustice of the persecutors do to the martyrs? None; but very much to the persecutors themselves. For although some of them were turned from the error of their ways, yet at the time at which they were acting as persecutors, their wickedness was blinding them. So also a rash judgment frequently does no harm to him who is the object of the rash judgment; but to him who judges rashly, the rashness itself must
necessarily do harm. According to such a rule, I judge of that saying also: “Every one that strikes434
| 434 Omnis qui percusserit; Vulgate, omnes qui acceperint.
|
with the
sword shall
perish with the
sword.”
435
For how many take the
sword, and yet do not
perish with the
sword, Peter himself being an instance! But lest any should think that he
escaped such
punishment by the pardon of his
sins (although nothing could be more absurd than to think that the
punishment of the
sword, which did not
befall Peter, could have been greater than that of the
cross, which actually
befell him), yet what would they say of the malefactors who were crucified with our
Lord; for both he who got pardon,
got it after he was crucified, and the other did not get it at all?
436
Or had they perhaps crucified all whom they had slain; and did they therefore themselves too deserve to
suffer the same thing? It is ridiculous to think so. For what else is meant by the statement, “For all they that take the
sword shall
perish with the
sword,” but that the soul dies by that very sin, whatever it may be, which it has committed?
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