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| Concerning Man.
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Chapter
XII.—Concerning Man.
In this way, then, God
brought into existence mental essence1794
| 1794 τὴν νοητὴν
οὐσίαν;
rational being. | , by which I mean, angels and all the
heavenly orders. For these clearly have a mental and incorporeal
nature: “incorporeal” I mean in comparison with the
denseness of matter. For the Deity alone in reality is immaterial
and incorporeal. But further He created in the same way sensible
essence1795
| 1795 την
αἰσθητήν;
material being, being perceptible by sense. | , that is heaven
and earth and the intermediate region; and so He created both the kind
of being that is of His own nature (for the nature that has to do with
reason is related to God, and apprehensible by mind alone), and the
kind which, inasmuch as it clearly falls under the province of the
senses, is separated from Him by the greatest interval. And it
was also fit that there should be a mixture of both kinds of being, as
a token of still greater wisdom and of the opulence of the Divine
expenditure as regards natures, as Gregorius, the expounder of
God’s being and ways, puts it, and to be a sort of connecting
link between the visible and invisible natures1796
| 1796 Greg. Naz.,
Orat. 38 and 42. | . And by the word “fit”
I mean, simply that it was an evidence of the Creator’s will, for
that will is the law and ordinance most meet, and no one will say to
his Maker, “Why hast Thou so fashioned me?” For the
potter is able at his will to make vessels of various patterns out of
his clay1797
, as a proof of
his own wisdom.
Now this being the case, He creates with His own hands
man of a visible nature and an invisible, after His own image and
likeness: on the one hand man’s body He formed of earth,
and on the other his reasoning and thinking soul1798
He bestowed upon him by His own
inbreathing, and this is what we mean by “after His
image.” For the phrase “after His image”
clearly refers1799
| 1799 Cf.
Chrysostom, Hom. in Gen. 9; Anastasius, Hom. in Hex. 7;
Clem. Alex., Strom. II.; Basil, Hom. de hom. Struct. 1;
Greg. Nyss., De opif. hom., ch. 16; Iren., Hær. v.
8, &c. | to the side of
his nature which consists of mind and free will, whereas “after
His likeness” means likeness in virtue so far as that is
possible.
Further, body and soul were formed at one and the
same time1800
| 1800 Cf. Greg.
Naz., Orat. 31; Jerome, Epist. 82; August., De
Genesi, x. 28, &c. | , not first the one
and then the other, as Origen so senselessly supposes.
God then made man without evil, upright, virtuous,
free from pain and care, glorified with every virtue, adorned with all
that is good, like a sort of second microcosm within the great
world1801
| 1801 ἐν
μικρῷ
μέγαν, is read in Nazianz.
Hom. 38 and 42: so also in Nicetas, who says that ‘the
world is small in comparison with man, for whose sake all was
made.’ But Combefis emended it. | , another angel capable of
worship, compound, surveying the visible creation and initiated into
the mysteries of the realm of thought, king over the things of earth,
but subject to a higher king, of the earth and of the heaven, temporal
and eternal, belonging to the realm of sight and to the realm of
thought, midway between greatness and lowliness, spirit and
flesh: for he is spirit by grace, but flesh by overweening
pride: spirit that he may abide and glorify his Benefactor, and
flesh that he may suffer, and suffering may be admonished and
disciplined when he prides himself in his greatness1802
| 1802 The text read,
τῷ
μεγέθει
φιλοτιμούμενος·
τὸ δὲ ἵνα
πάσχων
ὑπομιμνήσκηται,
καὶ
παιδεύηται
ζῶον. On the basis of various
manuscripts and the works of Gregory of Nazianzum, it is corrected
so—ἵνα πάσχῃ,
καὶ πάσχων,
ὑπομιμνήσκηται,
καὶ
παιδεύηται
τῷ μεγέθει
φιλοτιμούμενον. | : here, that is, in the present
life, his life is ordered as an animal’s, but elsewhere, that is,
in the age to come, he is changed and—to complete the
mystery—becomes deified by merely inclining himself towards God;
becoming deified, in the way of participating in the divine glory and
not in that of a change into the divine being1803
| 1803 Greg. Naz.,
Orat. 38 and 42. | .
But God made him by nature sinless, and endowed
him with free will. By sinless, I mean not that sin could find no
place in him (for that is the case with Deity alone), but that sin is
the result of the free volition he enjoys rather than an integral part
of his nature1804
| 1804 Reading,
οὐχ ὡς
ἐν τῆ φύσει, for
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν
τῃ φύσει. | ; that is to say,
he has the power to continue and go forward in the path of goodness, by
co-operating with the divine grace, and likewise to turn from good and
take to wickedness, for God has conceded this by conferring freedom of
will upon him. For there is no virtue in what is the result of
mere force1805
| 1805 Athan. lib. de
inob. contr. Apoll. | .
The soul, accordingly1806
| 1806 The Fathers
objected to Aristotle’s definition of the soul as the ἐντελέχεια
πρώτη
σώματος
φυσικοῦ
ὀργανικοῦ
taking it to imply that the soul had no independent existence but
was dissolved with the body. Cicero explains it otherwise,
Tusc. Quæst., bk. 1. | , is a living essence, simple,
incorporeal, invisible in its proper nature to bodily eyes, immortal,
reasoning and intelligent, formless, making use of an organised body,
and being the source of its powers of life, and growth, and sensation,
and generation1807
| 1807 Maxim., opus de
Anima. | , mind being but
its purest part and not in any wise alien to it; (for as the eye to the
body, so is the mind to the soul); further it enjoys freedom and
volition and energy, and is mutable, that is, it is given to change,
because it is created. All these qualities according to nature it
has received of the grace of the Creator, of which grace it has
received both its being and this particular kind of nature.
Marg. The different applications of
“incorporeal.” We understand two kinds of what is
incorporeal and invisible and formless: the one is such in
essence, the other by free gift: and likewise the one is such in
nature, and the other only in comparison with the denseness of
matter. God then is incorporeal by nature, but the angels and
demons and souls are said to be so by free gift, and in comparison with
the denseness of matter.
Further, body is that which has three dimensions, that
is to say, it has length and breadth and depth, or thickness. And
every body is composed of the four elements; the bodies of living
creatures, moreover, are composed of the four humours.
Now there are, it should be known, four
elements: earth which is dry and cold: water which is cold
and wet: air which is wet and warm: fire which is warm and
dry. In like manner there are also four humours, analogous to the
four elements: black bile, which bears an analogy to earth, for
it is dry and cold: phlegm, analogous to water, for it is cold
and wet: blood, analogous to air1808
| 1808 Supplying the
words, τῷ
ὕδατι, ψυχρὸν
γὰρ καὶ
ὑγρόν· αἷμα,
ἀναλογοῦν. | , for it is wet and warm: yellow
bile, the analogue to fire, for it is warm and dry. Now, fruits
are composed of the elements, and the humours are composed of the
fruits, and the bodies of living creatures consist of the humours and
dissolve back into them. For every thing that is compound
dissolves back into its elements.
Marg. That man has community alike with
inanimate things and animate creatures, whether they are devoid of or possess the
faculty of reason.
Man, it is to be noted, has community with things
inanimate, and participates in the life of unreasoning creatures, and
shares in the mental processes of those endowed with reason. For
the bond of union between man and inanimate things is the body and its
composition out of the four elements: and the bond between man
and plants consists, in addition to these things, of their powers of
nourishment and growth and seeding, that is, generation: and
finally, over and above these links man is connected with unreasoning
animals by appetite, that is anger and desire, and sense and impulsive
movement.
There are then five senses, sight, hearing, smell,
taste, touch. Further, impulsive movement consists in change from
place to place, and in the movements of the body as a whole and in the
emission of voice and the drawing of breath. For we have it in
our power to perform or refrain from performing these actions.
Lastly, man’s reason unites him to incorporeal and
intelligent natures, for he applies his reason and mind and judgment to
everything, and pursues after virtues, and eagerly follows after piety,
which is the crown of the virtues. And so man is a microcosm.
Moreover, it should be known that division and
flux and change1809
| 1809 τομὴ, καὶ
ρεῦσις, καὶ
μεταβολή. | are peculiar to
the body alone. By change, I mean change in quality, that is in
heat and cold and so forth: by flux, I mean change in the way of
depletion1810
| 1810 Nemes., de Nat.
Hom., ch. 1. | , for dry things
and wet things and spirit1811
suffer
depletion, and require repletion: so that hunger and thirst are
natural affections. Again, division is the separation of the
humours, one from another, and the partition into form and
matter1812
| 1812 Nemes., de Nat.
Hom., ch. 1. | .
But piety and thought are the peculiar properties of the
soul. And the virtues are common to soul and body, although they
are referred to the soul as if the soul were making use of the
body.
The reasoning part, it should be understood,
naturally bears rule over that which is void of reason. For the
faculties of the soul are divided into that which has reason, and that
which is without reason. Again, of that which is without reason
there are two divisions: that which does not listen to reason,
that is to say, is disobedient to reason, and that which listens and
obeys reason. That which does not listen or obey reason is the
vital or pulsating faculty, and the spermatic or generative faculty,
and the vegetative or nutritive faculty: to this belong also the
faculties of growth and bodily formation. For these are not under
the dominion of reason but under that of nature. That which
listens to and obeys reason, on the other hand is divided into anger
and desire. And the unreasoning part of the soul is called in
common the pathetic and the appetitive1813
| 1813 παθητικὸν
καὶ
ὀρεκτικόν. | . Further, it is to be understood,
that impulsive movement1814
| 1814 ἡ καθ᾽ ὁρμὴν
κίνησις. | likewise
belongs to the part that is obedient to reason.
The part1815
| 1815 The following three
paragraphs, as found in manuscripts and the old translation, are placed
at the end of ch. 32, “Concerning Anger,” but do not suit
the context there. | which does not
pay heed to reason includes the nutritive and generative and pulsating
faculties: and the name “vegetative1816
| 1816 Supplying the word
φυτικόν from
Nemesius. | ” is applied to the faculties of
increase and nutriment and generation, and the name “vital”
to the faculty of pulsation.
Of the faculty of nutrition, then, there are four
forces: an attractive force which attracts nourishment: a
retentive force by which nourishment is retained and not suffered to be
immediately excreted: an alternative force by which the food is
resolved into the humours: and an excretive force, by which the
excess of food is excreted into the draught and cast forth.
The forces again1817
, inherent in a living creature are, it
should be noted, partly psychical, partly vegetative, partly
vital. The psychical forces are concerned with free volition,
that is to say, impulsive movement and sensation. Impulsive
movement includes change of place and movement of the body as a whole,
and phonation and respiration. For it is in our power to perform
or refrain from performing these acts. The vegetative and vital
forces, however, are quite outside the province of will. The
vegetative, moreover, include the faculties of nourishment and growth,
and generation, and the vital power is the faculty of pulsation.
For these go on energising whether we will it or not.
Lastly, we must observe that of actual things, some are
good, and some are bad. A good thing in anticipation constitutes
desire: while a good thing in realisation constitutes
pleasure. Similarly an evil thing in anticipation begets fear,
and in realisation it begets pain. And when we speak of good in
this connection we are to be understood to mean both real and apparent
good: and, similarly, we mean real and apparent evil. E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
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