QUESTIONS 23-46 QUESTION OF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)

In proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself; (2) the corresponding gift of wisdom.

The first consideration will be fivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its acts; (4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating thereto.

The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity, considered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in its relation to its subject.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether charity is friendship? (2) Whether it is something created in the soul? (3) Whether it is a virtue? (4) Whether it is a special virtue? (5) Whether it is one virtue? (6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues? (7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it? (8) Whether it is the form of the virtues?

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(1) Whether charity is friendship?

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity is not friendship.

For nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one’s friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards God and the angels, “whose dwelling [Douay: ‘conversation’] is not with men” ( Daniel 2:11). Therefore charity is not friendship.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, there is no friendship without return of love (Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one’s enemies, according to Matthew 5:44: “Love your enemies.” Therefore charity is not friendship.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: “True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence, not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the study of the Divine Scriptures.” No more is it friendship for the virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii).

Therefore charity is not friendship.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( John 15:15): “I will not now call you servants... but My friends.” Now this was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(1) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2,3) not every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse.

Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication.

Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written ( 1 Corinthians 1:9): “God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son.” The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Man’s life is twofold. There is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God or the angels. The other is man’s spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of life, wherefore it is written ( Philippians 3:20): “Our conversation is in heaven.” But this “conversation” will be perfected in heaven, when “His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face” ( Revelation 22:3,4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one’s friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The friendship that is based on the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for God’s sake.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(2) Whether charity is something created in the soul?

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity is not something created in the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): “He that loveth his neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself.” Now God is love. Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he says (De Trin. xv, 17): “It was said: God is Charity, even as it was said: God is a Spirit.”

Therefore charity is not something created in the soul, but is God Himself.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the soul is the life of the body, according to Deuteronomy 30:20: “He is thy life.” Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity, according to 1 John 3:14: “We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren.”

Therefore God is charity itself.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(2) —

On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): “By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God for His own sake.” But a movement of the soul is something created in the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(2) —

I answer that, The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q[17] of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and this he said on account of the excellence of charity.

But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary, detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose principle needs to be in itself, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(6) , A(1) ): so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of the will.

Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated above ( P(2a), Q(114), A(4) ) that the love of charity is the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should be the efficient cause of that act.

Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be connatural to that power of reason of some form which is the principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He “ordereth all things sweetly” (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue, since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure. Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to some an occasion of error.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(2)- RO(2) —

God is effectively the life both of the soul by charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body. Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God, this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of charity.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(3) Whether charity is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a virtue, as may be gathered from Ethic. viii, 1; nor is it numbered among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, is charity a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, “virtue is the ultimate limit of power” (De Coelo et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject. Therefore charity is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): “Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to God, for by it we love Him.”

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(3) —

I answer that, Human acts are good according as they are regulated by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the principle of all man’s good acts consists in following the rule of human acts, which is twofold, as stated above ( Q(17) , A(1) ), viz. human reason and God.

Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being “in accord with right reason,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, so too, the nature of virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to faith, ( Q(4) , A(5) ) and hope ( Q(17) , A(1) ). Wherefore, it follows that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites us to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is “either a virtue or with a virtue.” For we might say that it is a moral virtue about works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13). Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit, as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous, as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(3)- RO(2) —

It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(25) , A(2) ) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love. And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation of the Holy Ghost.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(4) Whether charity is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For Jerome says: “Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby we love God” [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that “virtue is the order of love.” Now no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue, according to 1 Corinthians 13:4: “Charity is patient, is kind,” etc.; indeed it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Corinthians 16:14: “Let all your things be done in charity.” Therefore charity is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, “Thou shalt love” is “a general commandment,” and “Thou shalt not covet,” “a general prohibition.” Therefore charity is a general virtue.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Nothing general is enumerated together with what is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues, viz. hope and faith, according to 1 Corinthians 13:13: “And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three.” Therefore charity is a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(4) —

I answer that, Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as shown above ( P(2a), Q(18) , A(2) ; P(2a), Q(54) , A(2) ). Now the proper object of love is the good, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(27) , A(1) ), so that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love. Therefore charity is a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Charity is included in the definition of every virtue, not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on ( AA(7),8 ). In this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues, as explained in Ethic. ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on prudence.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The virtue or art which is concerned about the last end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of horseriding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows that it extends to the acts of a man’s whole life, by commanding them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The precept of love is said to be a general command, because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end, according to 1 Timothy 1:5: “The end of the commandment is charity.”

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(5) Whether charity is one virtue?

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity is not one virtue.

For habits are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of charity — God and our neighbor — which are infinitely distant from one another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit, even though that object be one in reality, as shown above ( Q(17) , A(6) ; P(2a), Q(54) , A(2), ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which God is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii, 3,11,12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into a number of various species.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine truth, according to Ephesians 4:5: “One faith.”

Therefore charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine goodness.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(5) —

I answer that, Charity, as stated above ( A(1) ) is a kind of friendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end, and in this way there are three species of friendship, namely friendship for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous; secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which friendships are based; thus there is one species of friendship between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow travellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter on civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).

Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not divided into several species.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(5)- RO(1) —

This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity for God’s sake.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(5)- RO(2) —

God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely God’s goodness, which is His substance, according to <19A501> Psalm 105:1: “Give glory to the Lord for He is good.” Other reasons that inspire us with love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary and result from the first.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(6) Whether charity is the most excellent of the virtues?

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as it has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will, since it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the intellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, the thing by which another works seems the less excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is beneath his master. Now “faith... worketh by charity,” according to Galatians 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent than charity.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Corinthians 13:13): “The greater of these is charity.”

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(6) —

I answer that, Since good, in human acts, depends on their being regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which is a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human acts. Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above ( A(3) ), namely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby, even human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological virtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since their object is God, are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual virtues, which consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that among the theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to that which attains God most.

Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by another.

But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues, just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent than the other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it appoints the mean in human operations or passions.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The operation of the intellect is completed by the thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the excellence of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the will and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of the appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of the appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is the object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the soul are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves, because a thing is contained according to the mode of the container (De Causis xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul, are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul.

Consequently it is better to know than to love the things that are beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7,8): whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowledge of such things. Therefore charity is more excellent than faith.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not prove.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(6)- RO(3) —

The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous, as hope does, since what is already united has not the character of arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(7) Whether any true virtue is possible without charity?

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that there can be true virtue without charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is possible without charity.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it comes of “an unfeigned faith,” as the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 1:5). Now, in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore true virtue is possible without charity.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, science and art are virtues, according to Ethic. 6:But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore true virtue can be without charity.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(7) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 13:3): “If I should distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.” And yet true virtue is very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: “She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life.” Therefore no true virtue is possible without charity.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(7) —

I answer that, Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(55) , A(4) ). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the end.

Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and universal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Psalm 72:28: “It is good for me to adhere to God,” and to this good man is ordered by charity. Man’s secondary and, as it were, particular good may be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it can be directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away from the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true virtue is that which is directed to man’s principal good; thus also the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that “virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best”: and in this way no true virtue is possible without charity.

If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end, then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good is not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), “the prudence of the miser, whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the miser’s justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through fear of severe punishment; nor the miser’s temperance, whereby he curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser’s fortitude, whereby as Horace, says, ‘he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty’“ (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, 45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible without charity.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(7)- RO(1) —

The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and directs it to his unbelief as end.

There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as stated above ( Q(10) , A(4) ; P(2a), Q(85) , A(2) ). In this way it is possible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not perfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Since the end is in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or chastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by charity, however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Science and art of their very nature imply a relation to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life, as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(56) , A(3) ). Hence the comparison fails.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(8) Whether charity is the form of the virtues?

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity is not the true form of the virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential.

Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it would follow that the other virtues are of the same species as charity: nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since then it would not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way the form of the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their root and foundation, according to Ephesians 3:17: “Rooted and founded in charity.” Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the matter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not coincide with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end and the mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that charity is the form of the virtues.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(8) —

I answer that, In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from the end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is the will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the form of an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently, in morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has been said ( A(7) ), that it is charity which directs the acts of all other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives the form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this sense that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are called virtues in relation to “informed” acts.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the aforesaid manner.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom, and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the character of a material cause.

P(2b)- Q(23)- A(8)- RO(3) —

Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end.

QUESTION OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject? (2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine infusion? (3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts? (4) Whether it increases in the person who has it? (5) Whether it increases by addition? (6) Whether it increases by every act? (7) Whether it increases indefinitely? (8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect? (9) Of the various degrees of charity; (10) Whether charity can diminish? (11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed? (12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(1) Whether the will is the subject of charity?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the will is not the subject of charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part. Therefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(6) ). But the reason is the subject of virtue.

Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1 Corinthians 16:14: “Let all your things be done in charity.” Now the principle of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that charity is chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the will.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The object of charity is the good, which is also the object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its subject.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(1) —

I answer that, Since, as stated in the P(1) Q(80) , A(2), the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective which is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in different ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good apprehended by sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite or will is good under the universal aspect of good, according as it can be apprehended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the intellective appetite, i.e. the will.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of the intellective appetite, as proved in the P(1) Q(81) , A(2) : wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good which is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(1)- RO(2) —

According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9), the will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God’s wisdom, and transcends the rule of human reason, according to Ephesians 3:19: “The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge.” Hence it is not in the reason, either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its rule, like justice and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship of the will to the reason.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As stated in the P(1) Q(83) , A(4), the freewill is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not in the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose. For choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2).

Hence charity, whose object is the last end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in the free-will.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(2) Whether charity is caused in us by infusion?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity is not caused in us by infusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man naturally.

Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the “Divine good”, which is the object of charity, “is for all an object of dilection and love.” Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by infusion.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to love it. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good.

Therefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no infused habit in order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do we need one in order to love God.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 1:5): “The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith.”

Now these three have reference to human acts. Therefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from infusion.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Romans 5:5): “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us.”

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(23) , A(1) ), charity is a friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of gratuitous gifts, for, according to Romans 6:23, “the grace of God is life everlasting”: wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural facilities.

Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect does not transcend its cause.

Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the participation of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(2) ).

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which is founded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all naturally. On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural fellowship, so the comparison fails.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet not to us, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on sensible things, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much as He is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable to us in this way, on account of the inclination of our appetite towards visible goods. Hence it is evident that for us to love God above all things in this way, it is necessary that charity be infused into our hearts.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(2)- RO(3) —

When it is said that in us charity proceeds from “a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith,” this must be referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these things. Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to receive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the saying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): “Fear leads to charity,” and of a gloss on Matthew 1:2: “Faith begets hope, and hope charity.”

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(3) Whether charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written ( Matthew 25:15) that “He gave to every one according to his own virtue [Douay: ‘proper ability’].” Now, in man, none but natural virtue precedes charity, since there is no virtue without charity, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(7) ). Therefore God infuses charity into man according to the measure of his natural virtue.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, among things ordained towards one another, the second is proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things that the form is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous gifts, that glory is proportionate to grace. Now, since charity is a perfection of nature, it is compared to the capacity of nature as second to first.

Therefore it seems that charity is infused according to the capacity of nature.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to the same measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to Matthew 22:30 and Luke 20:36. Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are bestowed on the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the Master teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently applies to man.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( John 3:8): “The Spirit breatheth where He will,” and ( 1 Corinthians 12:11): “All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will.”

Therefore charity is given, not according to our natural capacity, but according as the Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(3) —

I answer that, The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause of that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater effect. Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature, as stated above ( A(2) ) it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on the sole grace of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the quantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy Ghost Who “divides” His gifts “according as He will.” Hence the Apostle says ( Ephesians 4:7): “To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ.”

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The virtue in accordance with which God gives His gifts to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort of the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this disposition or effort, by moving man’s mind either more or less, according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says ( Colossians 1:12): “Who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light.”

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The form does not surpass the proportion of the matter. In like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus, for grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity and nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison fails.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The angel’s is an intellectual nature, and it is consistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly whithersoever he is borne, as stated in the P(1) Q(61) , A(6) . Hence there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good in those who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and consequently those of the higher angels who remained steadfast became better than the others, and those who fell became worse. But man’s is a rational nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act: so that it is not necessarily borne wholly whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater natural gifts there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the comparison fails.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(4) Whether charity can increase?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore charity does not increase.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, that which consists in something extreme receives no increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good.

Therefore charity cannot increase.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, increase is a kind of movement.

Therefore wherever there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase of essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or corrupted, which is unreasonable.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [*Cf. Ep. clxxxv.] that “charity merits increase that by increase it may merit perfection.”

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(4) —

I answer that, The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to God, Who is approached, “not by steps of the body but by the affections of the soul” [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and this approach is the result of charity, since it unites man’s mind to God.

Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that it can increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the way would cease.

Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he says ( 1 Corinthians 12:31): “I show unto you yet a more excellent way.”

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual quantity of charity increases.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the act.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Some have said that charity does not increase in its essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according to its fervor.

But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its subject. Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to act, so that an essential increase of charity implies ability to produce an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases essentially, not by beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject, as the objection imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in its subject.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(5) Whether charity increases by addition?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity increases by addition. For just as increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be according to virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity results from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that “increase is addition to pre-existing magnitude.” Therefore the increase of charity which is according to virtual quantity is by addition.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul, according to 1 John 2:10: “He that loveth his brother abideth in the light.” Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in a house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also increases in the soul by addition.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, the increase of charity is God’s work, even as the causing of it, according to 2 Corinthians 9:10: “He will increase the growth of the fruits of your justice.” Now when God first infuses charity, He puts something in the soul that was not there before.

Therefore also, when He increases charity, He puts something there which was not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater results from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved in Phys. iii, text. 59, and Metaph. ii, 4. Therefore charity does not increase by addition.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(5) —

I answer that, Every addition is of something to something else: so that in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things added together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if charity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as distinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a distinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which did not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which magnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless capable of being distinguished from the quantity to which it is added. Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose the distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other.

Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric. Specific distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while numeric distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a habit may receive increase through extending to objects to which it did not extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one who acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored hitherto. But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest charity extends to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the addition which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as though the added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically from that to which it is added.

It follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must presuppose a numerical distinction between them, which follows a distinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one white thing is added to another, although such an increase does not make a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in point, since the subject of charity is none other than the rational mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only take place by one rational mind being added to another; which is impossible. Moreover, even if it were possible, the result would be a greater lover, but not a more loving one. It follows, therefore, that charity can by no means increase by addition of charity to charity, as some have held to be the case.

Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of charity more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of increase in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a form consists wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently, since the magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a form is greater is the same as to say that it is more in its subject, and not that another form is added to it: for this would be the case if the form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with its subject. Therefore charity increases by being intensified in its subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not by charity being added to charity.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and something else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity, it is distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this way we have the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in animals. But in so far as it is an accidental form, it is distinguishable only in respect of its subject, and in this way it has its proper increase, like other accidental forms, by way of intensity in its subject, for instance in things subject to rarefaction, as is proved in Phys. iv, 9. In like manner science, as a habit, has its quantity from its objects, and accordingly it increases by addition, when a man knows more things; and again, as an accidental form, it has a certain quantity through being in its subject, and in this way it increase in a man who knows the same scientific truths with greater certainty now than before. In the same way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that which it has from its object, it does not increase, as stated above: hence it follows that it increases solely by being intensified.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The addition of light to light can be understood through the light being intensified in the air on account of there being several luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not apply to the case in point, since there is but one luminary shedding forth the light of charity.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(5)- RO(3) —

The infusion of charity denotes a change to the state of “having” charity from the state of “not having it,” so that something must needs come which was not there before. On the other hand, the increase of charity denotes a change to “more having” from “less having,” so that there is need, not for anything to be there that was not there before, but for something to be more there that previously was less there. This is what God does when He increases charity, that is He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and the likeness of the Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by the soul.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(6) Whether charity increases through every act of charity?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity increases through every act of charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less. But every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more than a simple addition of charity, since it includes the perfection of charity. Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase charity.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are engendered by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act of charity. Now each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of virtue.

Therefore also each virtuous act of charity conduces to the increase of charity.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, Gregory [*St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif.] says that “to stand still in the way to God is to go back.”

Now no man goes back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore whoever is moved by an act of charity goes forward in the way to God.

Therefore charity increases through every act of charity.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(6) —

On the contrary, The effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or slackness. Therefore it does not conduce to a more excellent charity, rather does it dispose one to a lower degree.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(6) —

I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like the increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is not a continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so much in so much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part of that time, as happens in local movement; but for a certain space of time nature works by disposing for the increase, without causing any actual increase, and afterwards brings into effect that to which it had disposed, by giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In like manner charity does not actually increase through every act of charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity, in so far as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again according to charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out into an act of more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity, and then his charity increases actually.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Every act of charity merits everlasting life, which, however, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper time. In like manner every act of charity merits an increase of charity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when we strive for that increase.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered, each act does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces towards that effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is the most perfect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it, reduces the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a stone.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Man advances in the way to God, not merely by actual increase of charity, but also by being disposed to that increase.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(7) Whether charity increases indefinitely?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity does not increase indefinitely. For every movement is towards some end and term, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8,9. But the increase of charity is a movement.

Therefore it tends to an end and term. Therefore charity does not increase indefinitely.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject. But the capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity is finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase, attain to the quantity of another finite thing however much greater, unless the amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an indefinite number of parts, and take these parts away and add them indefinitely to another line, we shall never arrive at any definite quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one from which we subtracted and the one to which we added what was subtracted. But this does not occur in the case in point: because there is no need for the second increase of charity to be less than the first, since rather is it probable that it would be equal or greater. As, therefore, the charity of the blessed is something finite, if the charity of the wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow that the charity of the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is absurd.

Therefore the wayfarer’s charity cannot increase indefinitely.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(7) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Philippians 3:12): “Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I may, by any means apprehend,” on which words a gloss says: “Even if he has made great progress, let none of the faithful say: ‘Enough.’ For whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his destination.” Therefore the wayfarer’s charity can ever increase more and more.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(7) —

I answer that, A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in three ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed measure, and when this has been reached it is no longer possible to go any further in that form, but if any further advance is made, another form is attained. And example of this is paleness, the bounds of which may, by continual alteration, be passed, either so that whiteness ensues, or so that blackness results. Secondly, on the part of the agent, whose power does not extend to a further increase of the form in its subject. Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which is not capable of ulterior perfection.

Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of man’s charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity itself considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In like manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is possessed of infinite power.

Furthermore, on the part of its subject, no limit to this increase can be determined, because whenever charity increases, there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a further increase. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to fix any limits to the increase of charity in this life.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(7)- RO(1) —

The increase of charity is directed to an end, which is not in this, but in a future life.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(7)- RO(2) —

The capacity of the rational creature is increased by charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according to 2 Corinthians 6:11: “Our heart is enlarged”; so that it still remains capable of receiving a further increase.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(7)- RO(3) —

This argument holds good in those things which have the same kind of quantity, but not in those which have different kinds: thus however much a line may increase it does not reach the quantity of a superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer’s charity which follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows open vision. Hence the argument does not prove.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(8) Whether charity can be perfect in this life?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this life. For this would have been the case with the apostles before all others. Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says ( Philippians 3:12): “Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect.” Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that “whatever kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is perfect, cupidity is done away altogether.” But this cannot be in this world, wherein it is impossible to live without sin, according to 1 John 1:8: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Now all sin arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any more. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above ( A(7) ). Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon.

Joan. Tract. v) “Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been brought to perfection, it exclaims, ‘I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.’“ Now this is possible in this life, as in the case of Paul.

Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(8) —

I answer that, The perfection of charity may be understood in two ways: first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to the person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is perfect, if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is as lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He is infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since all created power is finite. Consequently no creature’s charity can be perfect in this way; the charity of God alone can, whereby He loves Himself.

On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he loves as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a man’s whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the perfection of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this life, wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is impossible to think always actually of God, and to be moved by love towards Him. Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give his time to God and Divine things, while scorning other things except in so far as the needs of the present life demand. This is the perfection of charity that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not common to all who have charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his whole heart to God habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring anything contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common to all who have charity.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(8)- RO(1) —

The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that “he was a perfect wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which the way leads.”

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(8)- RO(2) —

This is said on account of venial sins, which are contrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are incompatible, not with the perfection of the way, but with that of heaven.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(8)- RO(3) —

The perfection of the way is not perfection simply, wherefore it can always increase.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(9) Whether charity is rightly distinguished into three degrees, beginning, progress, and perfection?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of charity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many degrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection.

Therefore it is not right to put only one.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins to be. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as progressing and as beginning.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, in this world, however perfect a man’s charity may be, it can increase, as stated above ( A(7) ). Now for charity to increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be distinguished from progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees are unsuitably assigned to charity.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(9) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon.

Joan. Tract. v) “As soon as charity is born it takes food,” which refers to beginners, “after taking food, it waxes strong,” which refers to those who are progressing, “and when it has become strong it is perfected,” which refers to the perfect. Therefore there are three degrees of charity.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(9) —

I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity may be considered in respect of a certain likeness to the growth of the human body. For although this latter growth may be divided into many parts, yet it has certain fixed divisions according to those particular actions or pursuits to which man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak of a man being an infant until he has the use of reason, after which we distinguish another state of man wherein he begins to speak and to use his reason, while there is again a third state, that of puberty when he begins to acquire the power of generation, and so on until he arrives at perfection.

In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distinguished according to the different pursuits to which man is brought by the increase of charity.

For at first it is incumbent on man to occupy himself chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting his concupiscences, which move him in opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in whom charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the second place man’s chief pursuit is to aim at progress in good, and this is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief aim is to strengthen their charity by adding to it: while man’s third pursuit is to aim chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God: this belongs to the perfect who “desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.”

In like manner we observe in local motion that at first there is withdrawal from one term, then approach to the other term, and thirdly, rest in this term.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(9)- RO(1) —

All these distinct degrees which can be discerned in the increase of charity, are comprised in the aforesaid three, even as every division of continuous things is included in these three — the beginning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, 1).

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(9)- RO(2) —

Although those who are beginners in charity may progress, yet the chief care that besets them is to resist the sins which disturb them by their onslaught. Afterwards, however, when they come to feel this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection with greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and with the other holding the sword as related in 2 Esdr 4:17 about those who built up Jerusalem.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(9)- RO(3) —

Even the perfect make progress in charity: yet this is not their chief care, but their aim is principally directed towards union with God. And though both the beginner and the proficient seek this, yet their solicitude is chiefly about other things, with the beginner, about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing in virtue.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(10) Whether charity can decrease?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(10) - O(1) —

It would seem that charity can decrease. For contraries by their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above ( A(4) ), it seems that it can also decrease.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) “He loves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee”: and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) he says that “what kindles charity quenches cupidity.” For this it seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity quenches charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides God, can increase in man. Therefore charity can decrease.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. viii, 12) “God makes the just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the man turns away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine operation.” From this we may gather that when God preserves charity in man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity into him. Now at the first infusion of charity God infuses less charity into him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in preserving charity, He preserves less charity in him that prepares himself less. Therefore charity can decrease.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(10) —

On the contrary, In Scripture, charity is compared to fire, according to Cant 8:6: “The lamps thereof,” i.e. of charity, “are fire and flames.” Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts. Therefore as long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot descend, i.e. decrease.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(10) —

I answer that, The quantity which charity has in comparison with its proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase, as stated above ( A(4), ad 2).

Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in comparison with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it can decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be either through an act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true that virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease altogether through cessation from act, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(53) , A(3) ). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to friendship (Ethic. viii, 5) “that want of intercourse,” i.e. the neglect to call upon or speak with one’s friends, “has destroyed many a friendship.” Now this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on its cause, and the cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when human acts cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last ceases altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, because it is not the result of human acts, but is caused by God alone, as stated above ( A(2) ). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it does not for this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the cessation involves a sin.

The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except either by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by God, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace in punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by way of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin.

It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But mortal sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but destroys it entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as we shall state further on ( A(12) ), and by way of merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against charity, he deserves that God should withdraw charity from him.

In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial sin is a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man’s love for the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act as regards the things directed to the end.

Thus sick people sometimes, though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to their diet: and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false opinions that are derived from the principles, do not diminish the certitude of the principles. So too, venial sin does not merit diminution of charity; for when a man offends in a small matter he does not deserve to be mulcted in a great matter. For God does not turn away from man, more than man turns away from Him: wherefore he that is out of order in respect of things directed to the end, does not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby he is ordered to the last end.

The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption may be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are venial sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of charity.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(10) - RO(1) —

Contraries affect the same subject when that subject stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in equal relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(10) - RO(2) —

Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his end in creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its poison, as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e. less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by diminishing charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we must understand the saying: “He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside Thee,” for he adds these words, “which he loveth not for Thee.” This does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that which we love in venial sin, is loved for God’s sake habitually though not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin, which is always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot diminish charity, for the reason given above.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(10) - RO(3) —

A movement of the free-will is requisite in the infusion of charity, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(113), A(3) ). Wherefore that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces dispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain inn us while we sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an obstacle on the part of the intensity of the free-will’s movement.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(11) Whether we can lose charity when once we have it?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(11) - O(1) —

It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who has charity cannot sin, for it is written ( 1 John 3:9): “Whosoever is born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.”

But none save the children of God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes “the children of God from the children of perdition,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(11) - O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that “if love be not true, it should not be called love.” Now, as he says again in a letter to Count Julian, “charity which can fail was never true.” [*The quotation is from De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam comitem, vii., among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly known as Paul the Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino.] Therefore it was no charity at all.

Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot lose it.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(11) - O(3) —

Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx) that “God’s love works great things where it is; if it ceases to work it is not charity.” Now no man loses charity by doing great things. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(11) - O(4) —

Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by some motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning, both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity cannot be lost.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(11) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Revelation 2:4): “I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity.”

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(11) —

I answer that, The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown above ( A(2) ; QQ(23),24 ). We can, accordingly, consider charity in three ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul to love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true at the same time — that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain man to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby “whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered,” as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De Dono Persev. xiv).

Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin at all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).

Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which is changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of form in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view of habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the forms of things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such things receives one form in such a way, that it retains the potentiality to another form, as though its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be lost by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter, so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form, is in its subject inseparably.

Accordingly the charity of the blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational mind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is possessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because the latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is not actually directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is lost.

It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste judges of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human mind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that “such as a man is, so does the end appear to him.” Accordingly charity is inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains to charity cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God is seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.

Therefore the charity of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity of the way can, because in this state God is not seen in His Essence, which is the essence of goodness.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(11) - RO(1) —

The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(11) - RO(2) —

The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the changeableness of the subject, and against the purpose of charity included in its act, this is not contrary to true charity.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(11) - RO(3) —

The love of God ever works great things in its purpose, which is essential to charity; but it does not always work great things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(11) - RO(4) —

Charity by reason of its act excludes every motive for sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(12) Whether charity is lost through one mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(12) - O(1) —

It would seem that charity is not lost through one mortal sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): “When a man who has mounted to the stage of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that he will become empty or fall away suddenly; but he must needs do so gradually and by little and little.” But man falls away by losing charity. Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(12) - O(2) —

Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (60) addresses Peter thus: “Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not an averted love, but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never failed, and the words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the fount of charity.” From this Bernard [*William of St. Thierry, De Nat. et Dig. Amoris. vi.] drew his assertion that “charity in Peter was not quenched, but cooled.” But Peter sinned mortally in denying Christ.

Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(12) - O(3) —

Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now a habit of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful act. Much less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(12) - O(4) —

Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor. Now, seemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love of God and one’s neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things directed to the end, does not remove the love for the end, as stated above ( A(10) ). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there be a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some temporal good.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(12) - O(5) —

Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last end. Now the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not done away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless.

Therefore charity can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin has been committed.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(12) —

On the contrary, By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal death, according to Romans 6:23: “The wages of sin is death.” On the other hand whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it is written ( John 14:21): “He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My Father: and I will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him,” in which manifestation everlasting life consists, according to John 17:3: “This is eternal life; that they may know Thee the... true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.”

Now no man can be worthy, at the same time, of eternal life and of eternal death. Therefore it is impossible for a man to have charity with a mortal sin. Therefore charity is destroyed by one mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(12) —

I answer that, That one contrary is removed by the other contrary supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very nature, which consists in man’s loving God above all things, and subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to God. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its very nature is capable of destroying charity.

If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of its subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin, for act is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the endurance of a habit in its subject does not require the endurance of its act, so that when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is not at once done away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends on the action of God Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the infusion and safekeeping of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion of light in the air, as stated above ( A(10), O(3) ).

Consequently, just as the light would cease at once in the air, were an obstacle placed to its being lit up by the sun, even so charity ceases at once to be in the soul through the placing of an obstacle to the outpouring of charity by God into the soul.

Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to God’s commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of charity, since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to God’s friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it follows that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. viii, 12) that “man is enlightened by God’s presence, but he is darkened at once by God’s absence, because distance from Him is effected not by change of place but by aversion of the will.”

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(12) - RO(1) —

This saying of Origen may be understood, in one way, that a man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go so far as to commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some previous negligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be dispositions to mortal sin, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(88) , A(3) ). Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one mortal sin if he commits it.

Since, however, he adds: “If some slight slip should occur, and he recover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether,” we may reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied and falling away altogether, he means one who falls so as to sin through malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(12) - RO(2) —

Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly, by actual contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity.

Secondly, indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity, through some passion of desire or fear; it was by sinning against charity in this way, that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered it.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(12) - RO(4) —

Not every inordinate affection for things directed to the end, i.e., for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin, but only such as is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the inordinate affection is contrary to charity, as stated.

P(2b)- Q(24)- A(12) - RO(5) —

Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and hope do not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as stated above (Genesis ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every moral sin is contrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain determinate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even as charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form regarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above ( Q(23), A(8) ).

QUESTION OF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will be twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The order in which they ought to be loved.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we love our neighbor also? (2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity? (3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity? (4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity? (5) Whether one’s own body? (6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity? (7) Whether sinners love themselves? (8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity? (9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship? (10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity? (11) Whether we ought to love the demons? (12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(1) Whether the love of charity stops at God, or extends to our neighbor?

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe Him fear, according Deuteronomy 10:12: “And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear... and love Him?”

Now the fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is distinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either servile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above ( Q(10) , A(2) ).

Therefore also the love with which we love God, is distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that “to be loved is to be honored.” Now the honor due to God, which is known as “latria,” is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as “dulia.” Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct from that with which we love our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Matthew 1:2. Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man, according to Jeremiah 17:5: “Cursed be the man that trusteth in man.” Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 John 4:21): “This commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother.”

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(17) , A(6) ; Q(19) , A(3) ; P(2a), Q(54) , A(3) ) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the same habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its object, considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity that it is specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is specifically the same visual act whereby we see the light, and whereby we see the color under the aspect of light.

Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God, and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(1)- RO(1) —

We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love him, in two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him, as when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love.

Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of God; as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising the ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for its justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God, as neither is such like love.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Love regards good in general, whereas honor regards the honored person’s own good, for it is given to a person in recognition of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated specifically on account of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas honor is distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals. Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity, in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which is God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according to each one’s own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular honor of latria on account of His singular virtue.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(1)- RO(3) —

It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us ministerially under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he loved him for God’s sake; and this is what charity does.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(2) Whether we should love charity out of charity?

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity need not be loved out of charity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in the two precepts of charity ( Matthew 22:37-39): and neither of them includes charity, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of happiness, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(1) ). But charity cannot participate in happiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(1) ). But no man can have friendship for charity or for an accident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is essential to friendship, as stated in Ethic. 8:Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): “He that loves his neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself.” But we love our neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also is loved out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(2) —

I answer that, Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature of the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the aspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to will is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands, because this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason of its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is a spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved, wherefore from the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love.

Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(1) ). Now by friendship a thing is loved in two ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom we wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend. It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved out of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all those whom we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and to the other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(2)- RO(1) —

God and our neighbor are those with whom we are friends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we love both God and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and our neighbor to love God, and this is to love charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual life, whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good which we desire for all whom we love out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(2)- RO(3) —

This argument considers friendship as referred to those with whom we are friends.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(3) Whether irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity?

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are conformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity, for He loves “all things that are” (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He loves, He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should love irrational creatures out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, charity is referred to God principally, and extends to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance of image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they bear the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. P(1) Q(45) , A(7) ]. Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes and birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that walk, and plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(3) —

On the contrary, The love of charity extends to none but God and our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational life. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(3) —

I answer that, According to what has been stated above ( Q(13) , A(1) ) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our friendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which we desire for our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational creature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of these reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which cannot have an irrational creature for its object: first because friendship is towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or evil befalling such like things, except metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship is based on some fellowship in life; since “nothing is so proper to friendship as to live together,” as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. viii, 5).

Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational creatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third reason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain. Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational creature.

Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far, to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God’s honor and man’s use; thus too does God love them out of charity.

Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The likeness by way of trace does not confer the capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does: and so the comparison fails.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Faith can extend to all that is in any way true, whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have a natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison fails.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(4) Whether a man ought to love himself out of charity?

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man is bound to love himself out of charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that there “can be no charity between less than two.” Therefore no man has charity towards himself.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which cannot be of one man towards himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(1) ). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards himself.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, anything relating to charity cannot be blameworthy, since charity “dealeth not perversely” (1 Corinthians 23:4).

Now a man deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written ( 2 Timothy 3:1,2): “In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be lovers of themselves.”

Therefore a man cannot love himself out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Leviticus 19:18): “Thou shalt love thy friend as thyself.” Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore we should love ourselves too out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(4) —

I answer that, Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(1) ), we may consider charity from two standpoints: first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we must hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “love is a unitive force,” whereas a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another. Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with which a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix, 4,8, that “the origin of friendly relations with others lies in our relations to ourselves.” Thus too with regard to principles we have something greater than science, namely understanding.

Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature, namely as denoting man’s friendship with God in the first place, and, consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man himself who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he loves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Gregory speaks there of charity under the general notion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the same sense.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so far as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which they humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one’s rational nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which pertain to the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is through charity that a man loves himself.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(5) Whether charity is one virtue?

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out of charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to associate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body, according to Romans 7:24: “Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” and Philippians 1:23: “Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship in the enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that enjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is towards those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot love us out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23,26) that there are four things that we should love out of charity, and among them he reckons our own body.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(5) —

I answer that, Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of sin and its punishment.

Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God’s service, according to Romans 6:13: “Present... your members as instruments of justice unto God.” Consequently, out of the love of charity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to long for the removal of such things.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(5)- RO(1) —

The Apostle did not shrink from the society of his body, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he was loth to be deprived thereof, according to 2 Corinthians 5:4: “We would not be unclothed, but clothed over.” He did, however, wish to escape from the taint of concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from the corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to hinder it from seeing God. Hence he says expressly: “From the body of this death.”

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by knowing and loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body, we are able to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the enjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into the body, viz., “the flush of health and incorruption,” as Augustine states (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a fashion, a share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Mutual love is found in the friendship which is for another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in respect of his soul, or in respect of his body.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6) Whether we ought to love sinners out of charity?

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of charity. For it is written ( <19B811> Psalm 118:113): “I have hated the unjust.” But David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated rather than loved, out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, “love is proved by deeds” as Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the unjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of hate, according to <19A)01> Psalm 100:8: “In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land”: and God commanded ( Exodus 22:18): “Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live.” Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire and wish good things for one’s friends. Now the saints, out of charity, desire evil things for the wicked, according to Psalm 9:18: “May the wicked be turned into hell [*Douay and A. V.: ‘The wicked shall be,’ etc. See Reply to this Objection.].” Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6)- O(4) —

Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will the same things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will, nor to rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary. Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6)- O(5) —

Further, it is proper to friends to associate together, according to Ethic. 8:But we ought not to associate with sinners, according to 2 Corinthians 6:17: “Go ye out from among them.”

Therefore we should not love sinners out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that “when it is said: ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor,’ it is evident that we ought to look upon every man as our neighbor.” Now sinners do not cease to be men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought to love sinners out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6) —

I answer that, Two things may be considered in the sinner: his nature and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity is based, as stated above ( A(3) ; Q(23) , AA(1),5 ), wherefore we ought to love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.

On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one’s father or mother or kindred, according to Luke 12:26. For it is our duty to hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity, for God’s sake.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the object of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such hatred is perfect, of which he himself says ( <19D802> Psalm 138:22): “I have hated them with a perfect hatred.” Now hatred of a person’s evil is equivalent to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs to charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6)- RO(2) —

As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than money to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great wickedness, and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them friendliness. It is for this reason that both Divine and human laws command such like sinners to be put to death, because there is greater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out of hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of which he prefers the public good to the life of the individual.

Moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not converted, it profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any more.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Such like imprecations which we come across in Holy Writ, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of prediction, not by way of wish, so that the sense is: “May the wicked be,” that is, “The wicked shall be, turned into hell.” Secondly, by way of wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the man’s punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to Psalm 57:11: “The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge,” since, according to Wis. 1:13, not even God “hath pleasure in the destruction of the wicked [Vulg.: ‘living’]” when He punishes them, but He rejoices in His justice, according to Psalm 10:8: “The Lord is just and hath loved justice.” Thirdly, so that this desire is referred to the removal of the sin, and not to the punishment itself, to the effect, namely, that the sin be destroyed, but that the man may live.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6)- RO(4) —

We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will what they will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make them will what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is written ( Jeremiah 15:19): “They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt not to be turned to them.”

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(6)- RO(5) —

The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them. But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them. For thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by Matthew 9:11-13.

Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written ( 2 Corinthians 6:17): “Go out from among them... and touch not the unclean thing,” i.e. by consenting to sin.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(7) Whether sinners love themselves?

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that sinners love themselves.

For that which is the principle of sin, is most of all in the sinner. Now love of self is the principle of sin, since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that it “builds up the city of Babylon.” Therefore sinners most of all love themselves.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, sin does not destroy nature. Now it is in keeping with nature that every man should love himself: wherefore even irrational creatures naturally desire their own good, for instance, the preservation of their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love themselves.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, good is beloved by all, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now many sinners reckon themselves to be good.

Therefore many sinners love themselves.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 10:6): “He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul.”

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(7) —

I answer that, Love of self is common to all, in one way; in another way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to the wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways: first, in respect of his substance and nature, and, this way all think themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and body. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love themselves, in so far as they love their own preservation.

Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In this way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. For the reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive and corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of which the Apostle calls the “inward man,” and the latter, the “outward man” ( 2 Corinthians 4:16). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the inward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way they think themselves to be what they are.

On the other hand, the wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward man, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what they think themselves to be. But the good know themselves truly, and therefore truly love themselves.

The Philosopher proves this from five things that are proper to friendship.

For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to be and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he does good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company; fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in almost the same things. In this way the good love themselves, as to the inward man, because they wish the preservation thereof in its integrity, they desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods, indeed they do their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in entering into their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts in the present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future good, all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no clashing of wills, since their whole soul tends to one thing.

On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be preserved in the integrity of the inward man, nor do they desire spiritual goods for him, nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in their own company by entering into their own hearts, because whatever they find there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor do they agree with themselves, on account of the gnawings of conscience, according to Psalm 49:21: “I will reprove thee and set before thy face.”

In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves, as regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas the good do not love themselves thus.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(7)- RO(1) —

The love of self which is the principle of sin is that which is proper to the wicked, and reaches “to the contempt of God,” as stated in the passage quoted, because the wicked so desire external goods as to despise spiritual goods.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Although natural love is not altogether forfeited by wicked men, yet it is perverted in them, as explained above.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(7)- RO(3) —

The wicked have some share of self-love, in so far as they think themselves good. Yet such love of self is not true but apparent: and even this is not possible in those who are very wicked.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(8) Whether charity requires that we should love our enemies?

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity does not require us to love our enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that “this great good,” namely, the love of our enemies, is “not so universal in its application, as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive us our trespasses.” Now no one is forgiven sin without he have charity, because, according to Proverbs 10:12, “charity covereth all sins.” Therefore charity does not require that we should love our enemies.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, charity does not do away with nature.

Now everything, even an irrational being, naturally hates its contrary, as a lamb hates a wolf, and water fire. Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, charity “doth nothing perversely” ( 1 Corinthians 13:4). Now it seems perverse to love one’s enemies, as it would be to hate one’s friends: hence Joab upbraided David by saying ( 2 Kings 19:6): “Thou lovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love thee.” Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Our Lord said ( Matthew 4:44): “Love your enemies.”

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(8) —

I answer that, Love of one’s enemies may be understood in three ways. First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is perverse, and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that which is evil in another.

Secondly love of one’s enemies may mean that we love them as to their nature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires that we should love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor, we should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbor in general.

Thirdly, love of one’s enemies may be considered as specially directed to them, namely, that we should have a special movement of love towards our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely, because it does not require that we should have a special movement of love to every individual man, since this would be impossible. Nevertheless charity does require this, in respect of our being prepared in mind, namely, that we should be ready to love our enemies individually, if the necessity were to occur. That man should actually do so, and love his enemy for God’s sake, without it being necessary for him to do so, belongs to the perfection of charity. For since man loves his neighbor, out of charity, for God’s sake, the more he loves God, the more does he put enmities aside and show love towards his neighbor: thus if we loved a certain man very much, we would love his children though they were unfriendly towards us. This is the sense in which Augustine speaks in the passage quoted in the First Objection, the Reply to which is therefore evident.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Everything naturally hates its contrary as such. Now our enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself should be hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They are not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness: and it is as such that we are bound to love them.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(8)- RO(3) —

It is wrong to love one’s enemies as such: charity does not do this, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(9) Whether it is necessary for salvation that we should show our enemies the signs and effects of love?

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his enemy the signs or effects of love. For it is written ( 1 John 3:18): “Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth.”

Now a man loves in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects of love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his enemies such signs and effects of love.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, Our Lord said in the same breath ( Matthew 5:44): “Love your enemies,” and, “Do good to them that hate you.” Now charity demands that we love our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we should “do good to them.”

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object of charity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx), that “love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great things, and if it ceases to work, it is no longer love.” Hence charity towards our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But charity requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though he be an enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the signs and effects of love towards our enemies.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(9) —

On the contrary, A gloss on Matthew 5:44, “Do good to them that hate you,” says: “To do good to one’s enemies is the height of perfection” [*Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii]. Now charity does not require us to do that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not require us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(9) —

I answer that, The effects and signs of charity are the result of inward love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely necessary, for the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly love our enemies in general, but not individually, except as regards the mind being prepared to do so, as explained above ( A(8) ).

We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and signs of love. For some of the signs and favors of love are shown to our neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or for a whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on a whole community: and the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should show such like favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For if we did not so, it would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to what is written ( Leviticus 19:18): “Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy citizens.” But there are other favors or signs of love, which one shows to certain persons in particular: and it is not necessary for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors and signs of love, except as regards being ready in our minds, for instance to come to their assistance in a case of urgency, according to Proverbs 25:21: “If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst, give him... drink.” Outside cases of urgency, to show such like favors to an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity, whereby we not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by evil, but also wish to overcome evil by good [* Romans 12:21], which belongs to perfection: for then we not only beware of being drawn into hatred on account of the hurt done to us, but purpose to induce our enemy to love us on account of our kindliness.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(10) - O(1) —

It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels out of charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity is a twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of the angels is not contained in the love of God, since they are created substances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of our neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common species. Therefore we are not bound to love them out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the angels have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as we do. But we have not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above ( A(3) ). Neither, therefore, have we towards the angels.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our companions; we cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give them the friendship of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(10) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): “If the name of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those who pity us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our neighbor includes also the holy angels from whom we receive many merciful favors.”

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(10) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(23) , A(1) ), the friendship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in which men share in common with the angels. For it is written ( Matthew 22:30) that “in the resurrection... men shall be as the angels of God in heaven.” It is therefore evident that the friendship of charity extends also to the angels.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(10) - RO(1) —

Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us in a common species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the blessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter fellowship that the friendship of charity is founded.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(10) - RO(2) —

Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate genus, by reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers of everlasting happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of our rational mind wherein we associate with the angels.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(10) - RO(3) —

The companionship of the angels does not consist in outward fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive nature; it consists in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in this life, but perfect in heaven, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(1), ad 1).

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(11) Whether we are bound to love the demons out of charity?

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(11) - O(1) —

It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of charity. For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their fellowship with us in a rational mind. But the demons also share in our fellowship thus, since natural gifts, such as life and understanding, remain in them unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(11) - O(2) —

Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the matter of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man loves the sinner out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(11) - O(3) —

Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our neighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the passage of Augustine quoted above ( A(9) ). Now the demons are useful to us in many things, for “by tempting us they work crowns for us,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(11) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Isaiah 28:18): “Your league with death shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not stand.”

Now the perfection of a peace and covenant is through charity. Therefore we ought not to have charity for the demons who live in hell and compass death.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(11) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(6) ), in the sinner, we are bound, out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the name of demon is given to designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore demons should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying stress on the word, the question as to whether the spirits called demons ought to be loved out of charity, must be answered in accordance with the statement made above ( AA(2),3 ), that a thing may be loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may be loved as the person who is the object of friendship, and thus we cannot have the friendship of charity towards the demons. For it is an essential part of friendship that one should be a wellwisher towards one’s friend; and it is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the good of everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those spirits whom God has condemned eternally, since this would be in opposition to our charity towards God whereby we approve of His justice.

Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be enduring as another’s good. In this way we love irrational creatures out of charity, in as much as we wish them to endure, to give glory to God and be useful to man, as stated above ( A(3) ): and in this way too we can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as much as we desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts, unto God’s glory.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(11) - RO(1) —

The possession of everlasting happiness is not impossible for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon; consequently the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of everlasting life, rather than on the fellowship of nature, is possible towards the angels, but not towards the demons.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(11) - RO(2) —

In this life, men who are in sin retain the possibility of obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are lost in hell, who, in this respect, are in the same case as the demons.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(11) - RO(3) —

That the demons are useful to us is due not to their intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this leads us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their perverse intention to our profit.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(12) Whether four things are rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, viz. God, our neighbor, our body and ourselves?

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(12) - O(1) —

It would seem that these four things are not rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan. lxxxiii), “he that loveth not God, loveth not himself.” Hence love of oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is not distinct from the love of God.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(12) - O(2) —

Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole. But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(12) - O(3) —

Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor. Since then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct from the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a man loves his neighbor’s body, ought to be distinct from the love with which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(12) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): “There are four things to be loved; one which is above us,” namely God, “another, which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us,” namely our neighbor, “and a fourth which is beneath us,” namely our own body.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(12) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(23) , AA(1),5 ), the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness. Now, in this fellowship, one thing is considered as the principle from which happiness flows, namely God; a second is that which directly partakes of happiness, namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which happiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human body.

Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness, can be an object of love for two reasons, either through being identified with ourselves, or through being associated with us in partaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to be loved out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(12) - RO(1) —

The different relations between a lover and the various things loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly, since the relation between the human lover and God is different from his relation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of love, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other, so that the former love being removed the latter is taken away.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(12) - RO(2) —

The subject of charity is the rational mind that can be capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable mind which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves himself in one way, and his own body in another.

P(2b)- Q(25)- A(12) - RO(3) —

Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and as to his body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness.

Wherefore, on the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him; and our neighbor’s body is not reckoned as a special object of love.

QUESTION OF THE ORDER OF CHARITY (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is an order in charity? (2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor? (3) Whether more than himself? (4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor? (5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body? (6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another? (7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one who is more closely united to him? (8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or one who is united to him by other ties? (9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his father ? (10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father? (11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother? (12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those whom we are kind to? (13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(1) Whether there is order in charity?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that there is no order in charity.

For charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues.

Neither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither, therefore, ought there to be any order in charity.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs, not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be ascribed to charity.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written (Cant 2:4): “He brought me into the cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me.”

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(1) —

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the terms “before” and “after” are used in reference to some principle. Now order implies that certain things are, in some way, before or after. Hence wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also order of some kind. But it has been said above ( Q(23) , A(1) ; Q(25) , A(12) ) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved out of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of that love, which is God.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Charity tends towards the last end considered as last end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(6) ). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of appetite and action, as was shown above ( Q(23) , A(7), ad 2; P(2a), A(1), ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the First Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we find an order in reference to the First Principle.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand, charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in the soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in things themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is more appropriate to charity than to faith.

And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly about God, and secondarily about things referred to God.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and to the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is in this way that order is stated to be in charity.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(2) Whether God ought to be loved more than our neighbor?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than our neighbor. For it is written ( 1 John 4:20): “He that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?” Whence it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to Ethic. ix, 5,12.

Now God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is less lovable, out of charity, than our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: “Every beast loveth its like.” Now man bears more likeness to his neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of charity, more than he loves God.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27). Now God is not greater in Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to love God more than our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(2) —

On the contrary, A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God’s sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Luke 14:26: “If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters... he cannot be My disciple.”

Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more than our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(2) —

I answer that, Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject in which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that friendship is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler of the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends; hence to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness, which consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it flows to all who are capable of happiness.

Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness from Him.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(2)- RO(1) —

A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle’s argument. For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first lovable object we meet with, because “the soul learns, from those things it knows, to love what it knows not,” as Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his neighbor is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our love: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The likeness we have to God precedes and causes the likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we share along with our neighbor in something received from God, we become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we ought to love God more than we love our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Considered in His substance, God is equally in all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in anything. And yet our neighbor does not possess God’s goodness equally with God, for God has it essentially, and our neighbor by participation.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(3) Whether out of charity, man is bound to love God more than himself?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8) that “a man’s friendly relations with others arise from his friendly relations with himself.” Now the cause is stronger than its effect.

Therefore man’s friendship towards himself is greater than his friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more than God.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one’s own good. Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not love God more than himself.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God. But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since this is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): “If thou oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of Him in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take offense if him also thou lovest for God’s sake.” Now “the cause of a thing being such is yet more so.” Therefore man ought to love God more than himself.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(3) —

I answer that, The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves God above all things and more than himself, but also every single creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the principal inclination of each part is towards common action conducive to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own property and persons for the sake of the common good.

Wherefore much more is this realized with regard to the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace.

Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as in the universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share of that happiness.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of friendship, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(3)- RO(3) —

That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love of friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying Him.

Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(4) Whether our of charity, man ought to love himself more than his neighbor?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to love himself more than his neighbor. For the principal object of charity is God, as stated above ( A(2) ; Q(25) , AA(1),12 ). Now sometimes our neighbor is more closely united to God than we are ourselves.

Therefore we ought to love such a one more than ourselves.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid injuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his neighbor’s sake, according to Proverbs 12:26: “He that neglecteth a loss for the sake of a friend, is just.” Therefore a man ought, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than himself.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( 1 Corinthians 13:5) “charity seeketh not its own.” Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most. Therefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than his neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Leviticus 19:18, Matthew 22:39): “Thou shalt love thy neighbor ( Leviticus 19:18: ‘friend’) as thyself.” Whence it seems to follow that man’s love for himself is the model of his love for another. But the model exceeds the copy.

Therefore, out of charity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(4) —

I answer that, There are two things in man, his spiritual nature and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason of his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated above ( Q(25) , A(7) ): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person.

This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated above ( Q(25) , AA(1),12 ), God is loved as the principle of good, on which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good. Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with him in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than his neighbor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The love of charity takes its quantity not only from its object which is God, but also from the lover, who is the man that has charity, even as the quantity of any action depends in some way on the subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to God, yet because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this man is to himself, it does not follow that a man is bound to love his neighbor more than himself.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(4)- RO(2) —

A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend’s sake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from sin, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(4)- RO(3) —

As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the saying, “‘charity seeks not her own,’ means that it prefers the common to the private good.” Now the common good is always more lovable to the individual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is more lovable to the part, than the latter’s own partial good, as stated above ( A(3) ).

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(5) Whether a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that a man is not bound to love his neighbor more than his own body. For his neighbor includes his neighbor’s body. If therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body, it follows that he ought to love his neighbor’s body more than his own.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his neighbor’s, as stated above ( A(4) ). Now a man’s own body is nearer to his soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our body more than our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the sake of what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil his own body for his neighbor’s safety: this belongs to the perfect, according to John 15:13: “Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” Therefore a man is not bound, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than his own body.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that “we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body.”

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(5) —

I answer that, Out of charity we ought to love more that which has more fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above ( A(2) ; Q(25) , A(12) ). Now fellowship in the full participation of happiness which is the reason for loving one’s neighbor, is a greater reason for loving, than the participation of happiness by way of overflow, which is the reason for loving one’s own body. Therefore, as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(5)- RO(1) —

According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing seems to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say that we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers to his soul, which is his predominant part.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Our body is nearer to our soul than our neighbor, as regards the constitution of our own nature: but as regards the participation of happiness, our neighbor’s soul is more closely associated with our own soul, than even our own body is.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Every man is immediately concerned with the care of his own body, but not with his neighbor’s welfare, except perhaps in cases of urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a man to imperil his own body for his neighbor’s welfare, except in a case where he is under obligation to do so and if a man of his own accord offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection of charity.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(6) Whether we ought to love one neighbor more than another?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor more than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): “One ought to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely united to us.”

Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than another.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and the same reason for loving all one’s neighbors, which reason is God, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(6) —

On the contrary, One’s obligation to love a person is proportionate to the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love. Now it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain neighbors, than against the love of others. Hence the commandment ( Leviticus 10:9), “He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him die,” which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above.

Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(6) —

I answer that, There have been two opinions on this question: for some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our neighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the outward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood as applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who are connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and not to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all including our enemies.

But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite, which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from Divine wisdom.

Now we observe in the physical order that the natural inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement that is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it is becoming to earth to be beneath water.

Consequently the inclination also of grace which is the effect of charity, must needs be proportionate to those actions which have to be performed outwardly, so that, to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense towards those to whom we ought to behave with greater kindness.

We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought to love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above ( A(1) ), wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to that principle.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of the good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all men equally out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good, namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not to love all equally.

Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because we cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not to be thus unequal.

The other inequality arises from our loving some more than others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter inequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of beneficence.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to Him.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(6)- RO(3) —

This argument considers the quantity of love on the part of the good which we wish our friends.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(7) Whether we ought to love those who are better more those who are more closely united us?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that we ought to love those who are better more than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is in no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for some reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black mixed with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for some reason, according to Luke 14:26: “If any man come to Me, and hate not his father,” etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful for any reason.

Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who are better more than those who are more closely connected with us.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But God loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought to love the better man more than one who is more closely united to him.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, in every friendship that ought to be loved most which has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by natural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by nature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has more to do with better men than with those who are more closely united to us.

Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men more than those who are more closely connected with us.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(7) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Timothy 5:8): “If any man have not care of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.”

Now the inward affection of charity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity regards those who are nearer to us before those who are better.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(7) —

I answer that, Every act should be proportionate both to its object and to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while, from the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus movement has its species from the term to which it tends, while the intensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved and the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species from its object, but its intensity is due to the lover.

Now the object of charity’s love is God, and man is the lover. Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his relation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater good to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity wishes to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it has various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it belongs to charity to wish God’s justice to be maintained, in accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness. And this regards the species of love; for there are different species of love according to the different goods that we wish for those whom we love.

On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to the man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater good he wishes for them.

Again a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors are connected with us by their natural origin, a connection which cannot be severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are. But the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come and go, increase and decrease, as was shown above ( Q(24) , AA(4),10,11 ). Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man who is more closely united to one, to be better than another, and so reach a higher degree of happiness.

Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we love more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love them in more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us we have no other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are connected with us, we have certain other friendships, according to the way in which they are connected. Now since the good on which every other friendship of the virtuous is based, is directed, as to its end, to the good on which charity is based, it follows that charity commands each act of another friendship, even as the art which is about the end commands the art which is about the means. Consequently this very act of loving someone because he is akin or connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or for any like reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be commanded by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we love in more ways those who are more nearly connected with us.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(7)- RO(1) —

We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us and God. In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according to Micah 7:6: “A men’s enemies are they of his own household.”

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Charity conforms man to God proportionately, by making man comport himself towards what is his, as God does towards what is His. For we may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to us which God does not will, because it becomes Him not to will them, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(19) , A(10) ), when we were treating of the goodness of the will.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(7)- RO(3) —

Charity elicits the act of love not only as regards the object, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The result is that the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(8) Whether we ought to love more those who are connected with us by ties of blood?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that we ought not to love more those who are more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written ( Proverbs 18:24): “A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than a brother.” Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv 7): “The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to the ties of blood.” Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that as to the latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract the former by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we ought not to love more than others those who are united to us by ties of blood.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): “I love not less you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace.”

Surely we ought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not love our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, “Love is proved by deeds,” as Gregory states (Hom. in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others than our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather than his father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of all.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(8) —

On the contrary, The commandments of the decalogue contain a special precept about the honor due to our parents ( Exodus 20:12). Therefore we ought to love more specially those who are united to us by ties of blood.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(8) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(7) ), we ought out of charity to love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different persons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is more loved in matters touching that particular union in respect of which he is loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should compare one union with another. Accordingly we must say that friendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by natural origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic fellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting side by side on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we should prefer our fellowcitizens, and on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 2) that “it is our duty to render to each class of people such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact the principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite our relations to a wedding... It would seem to be a special duty to afford our parents the means of living... and to honor them.”

The same applies to other kinds of friendship.

If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(8)- RO(1) —

In as much as the friendship of comrades originates through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose, for instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in matters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in the providing of necessaries.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(8)- RO(2) —

Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom he has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom he is bound to support in bodily sustenance.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(8)- RO(3) —

The fact that in the battle a man obeys his officer rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less, not simply relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on fellowship in battle.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(9) Whether a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his father?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(9)- O(1) —

It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to whom we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good to our children than to our parents, since the Apostle says ( Corinthians 12:14): “Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children.” Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his parents.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his parents.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, man’s affections are conformed to God by charity. But God loves His children more than they love Him.

Therefore we also ought to love our children more than our parents.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(9) —

On the contrary, Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: “We ought to love God first, then our parents, then our children, and lastly those of our household.”

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(9) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(4), ad 1; A(7) ), the degrees of love may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the object. In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to God, the more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love his father more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his father as his principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good and more like God.

Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more closely connected with him, in which way a man’s children are more lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of themselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the love of a father for his children, is more like a man’s love for himself. Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is their child than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to their parents, as being part of them, than their parents are to them to whom they stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because parents have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at once, whereas the child begins to love his father after a lapse of time; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to Ecclus. 9:14: “Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be like to him.”

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(9)- RO(1) —

The debt due to a principle is submission of respect and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence and care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in honor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of care.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(9)- RO(2) —

It is natural for a man as father to love his children more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but if we consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves his father more.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(9)- RO(3) —

As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God loves us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is related to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to the father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to be provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received to provide for his parents before all.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(10) Whether a man ought to love his mother more than his father?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(10) - O(1) —

It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener.

Animal. i, 20), “the female produces the body in generation.” Now man receives his soul, not from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in the P(1) Q(90) , A(2) ; Q(118). Therefore a man receives more from his mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to love her more than him.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due. Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that “mothers have greater love for their children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she knows more surely than the father who are her children.”

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, love should be more fond towards those who have labored for us more, according to Romans 16:6: “Salute Mary, who hath labored much among you.” Now the mother labors more than the father in giving birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 7:29): “Forget not the groanings of thy mother.” Therefore a man ought to love his mother more than his father.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(10) —

On the contrary, Jerome says on Ezekiel 44:25 that “man ought to love God the Father of all, and then his own father,” and mentions the mother afterwards.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(10) —

I answer that, In making such comparisons as this, we must take the answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether the father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as mother. The reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference in such like matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: “Good servants should be preferred to wicked children.”

Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural origin.

Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the father is to be loved more.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(10) - RO(1) —

In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through the formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though this power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the matter of the body to receive that form.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(10) - RO(2) —

This applies to another kind of love. For the friendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the friendship between child and parent: while the friendship we are speaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother through being begotten of them.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(11) Whether a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(11) - O(1) —

It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another unless he love the latter more. Now it is written ( Genesis 2:24) that “a man shell leave father and mother” on account of his wife.

Therefore a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(11) - O(2) —

Further, the Apostle says ( Ephesians 5:33) that a husband should “love his wife as himself.” Now a man ought to love himself more than his parents. Therefore he ought to love his wife also more than his parents.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(11) - O(2) —

Further, love should be greater where there are more reasons for loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the friendship of a man towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12) that “in this friendship there are the motives of utility, pleasure, and also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous.” Therefore a man’s love for his wife ought to be greater than his love for his parents.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(11) —

On the contrary, According to Ephesians 5:28, “men ought to love their wives as their own bodies.” Now a man ought to love his body less than his neighbor, as stated above ( A(5) ): and among his neighbors he should love his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents more than his wife.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(11) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(9) ), the degrees of love may be taken from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those who love. On the part of the good which is the object loved, a man should love his parents more than his wife, because he loves them as his principles and considered as a more exalted good.

But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more, because she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according to Matthew 19:6: “Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh.” Consequently a man loves his wife more intensely, but his parents with greater reverence.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(11) - RO(1) —

A man does not in all respects leave his father and mother for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought to succor his parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all his kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal connection and co-habitation.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(11) - RO(2) —

The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man ought to love his wife equally with himself, but that a man’s love for himself is the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with him.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(11) - RO(3) —

There are also several reasons for a man’s love for his father; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards good, are more weighty than those for which a man loves his wife; although the latter outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the union.

As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in the words quoted, the particle “as” denotes not equality of love but the motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife is her being united to him in the flesh.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(12) Whether a man ought to love more his benefactor than one he has benefited?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(12) - O(1) —

It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor more than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv): “Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love him first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses to love, but declines to return love already given.” Now a man’s benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors above all.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(12) - O(2) —

Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a man or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is a more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those to whom we are kind.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(12) - O(3) —

Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most, and then one’s father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25]. Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should be loved above all others.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(12) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that “benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather than vice versa.”

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(12) —

I answer that, As stated above ( AA(9),11 ), a thing is loved more in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent good, secondly by reason of a closer connection. In the first way we ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle of good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more excellent good, as stated above with regard to one’s father ( A(9) ).

In the second way, however, we love those more who have received benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by four arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the handiwork of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: “He was made by so and so.” Now it is natural to a man to love his own work (thus it is to be observed that poets love their own poems): and the reason is that we love “to be” and “to live,” and these are made manifest in our “action.”

Secondly, because we all naturally love that in which we see our own good.

Now it is true that the benefactor has some good of his in the recipient of his benefaction, and the recipient some good in the benefactor; but the benefactor sees his virtuous good in the recipient, while the recipient sees his useful good in the benefactor. Now it gives more pleasure to see one’s virtuous good than one’s useful good, both because it is more enduring for usefulness quickly flits by, and the pleasure of calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of having it present and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous goods than the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is it the lover’s part to act, since he wills and works the good of the beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more difficult to give than to receive favors: and we are most fond of things which have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what comes easy to us.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(12) - RO(1) —

It is some thing in the benefactor that incites the recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient, not through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do through another.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(12) - RO(2) —

The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is more of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(12) - RO(3) —

God also loves us more than we love Him, and parents love their children more than these love them. Yet it does not follow that we love all who have received good from us, more than any of our benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our parents, from whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on whom we have bestowed lesser benefits.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(13) - O(1) —

It would seem that the order of charity does not endure in heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): “Perfect charity consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods less.” Now charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will love those who are better more than either himself or those who are connected with him.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(13) - O(2) —

Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good. Now each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more good, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God’s will: and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in heaven each one loves more those who are better, and consequently he loves others more than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one who is.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(13) - O(3) —

Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God’s sake, for then will be fulfilled the words of 1 Corinthians 15:28: “That God may be all in all.” Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so that a man will love a better man more than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one who is.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(13) —

On the contrary, Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory. Now the order of charity given above ( AA(2),3 ,4) is derived from nature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others. Therefore this order of charity will endure in heaven.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(13) —

I answer that, The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order between man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be necessary, because, as we stated above ( AA(7),9 ), the degrees of love may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man desires for another, or according to the intensity of love itself. In the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those who are less good, less than himself: because, by reason of the perfect conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the blessed will desire everyone to have what is due to him according to Divine justice. Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of merit to a yet greater reward, as happens now while it is possible for a man to desire both the virtue and the reward of a better man, whereas then the will of each one will rest within the limits determined by God. But in the second way a man will love himself more than even his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of love arises on the part of the person who loves, as stated above ( AA(7),9 ).

Moreover it is for this that the gift of charity is bestowed by God on each one, namely, that he may first of all direct his mind to God, and this pertains to a man’s love for himself, and that, in the second place, he may wish other things to be directed to God, and even work for that end according to his capacity.

As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply love those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because the entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to God, wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with respect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be nearer to himself those who are nearer to God. For then one man will no longer succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein each man has to succor those who are closely connected with him rather than those who are not, no matter what be the nature of their distress: hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of charity, loves more those who are more closely united to him, for he is under a greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of charity. It will however be possible in heaven for a man to love in several ways one who is connected with him, since the causes of virtuous love will not be banished from the mind of the blessed. Yet all these reasons are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken from nighness to God.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(13) - RO(1) —

This argument should be granted as to those who are connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love himself so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect, since perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man’s charity directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(13) - RO(2) —

This argument considers the order of charity in respect of the degree of good one wills the person one loves.

P(2b)- Q(26)- A(13) - RO(3) —

God will be to each one the entire reason of his love, for God is man’s entire good. For if we make the impossible supposition that God were not man’s good, He would not be man’s reason for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should love himself more than all else after God.

QUESTION OF THE PRINCIPLE ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow from that act.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved? (2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill? (3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake? (4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life? (5) Whether God can be loved wholly? (6) Whether the love of God is according to measure? (7) Which is the better, to love one’s friend, or one’s enemy? (8) Which is the better, to love God, or one’s neighbor?

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(1) Whether to be loved is more proper to charity than to love?

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those who are themselves better. But those who are better should be more loved.

Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems to be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), “many would rather be loved than love, and lovers of flattery always abound.” Therefore it is better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in keeping with charity.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, “the cause of anything being such is yet more so.” Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv) that “nothing incites another more to love you than that you love him first.” Therefore charity consists in being loved rather than in loving.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity is a kind of friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than in being loved.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(1) —

I answer that, To love belongs to charity as charity.

For, since charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its proper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the person loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent to him as coming under the common notion of good, in so far as another tends towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is clear that to love is more proper to charity than to be loved: for that which befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more competent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason of something else. This can be exemplified in two ways. First, in the fact that friends are more commended for loving than for being loved, indeed, if they be loved and yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly, because a mother, whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love than to be loved: for “some women,” as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. viii, 8) “entrust their children to a nurse; they do love them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they happen not to be loved.”

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(1)- RO(1) —

A better man, through being better, is more lovable; but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves more, however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man does not love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved: whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much as he ought to be loved.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), “men wish to be loved in as much as they wish to be honored.” For just as honor is bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which is in him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since good alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be honored, for the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good which is in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity seek to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good of charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue’s good. Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be loved.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way leading a man to love.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that to love, considered as an act of charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “to love is to wish a person well”; and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit. Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above ( Q(24) , A(1) ). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the will.

But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should wish his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and to live; the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the fourth, that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth, that he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain to goodwill.

Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that “goodwill is neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship.” Now charity is friendship, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(1) ).

Therefore goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(2) —

I answer that, Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For the love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win. But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that “goodwill is a beginning of friendship.”

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The Philosopher, by thus defining “to love,” does not describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in which the act of love is chiefly manifested.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(2)- RO(2) —

To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is not denoted by goodwill.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(2)- RO(3) —

These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to friendship because they arise from a man’s love for himself, as he says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(3) Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself?

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi): “The soul learns from the things it knows, to love those it knows not,” where by things unknown he means the intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the objects of the senses.

Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of something else.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through something else, according to Romans 1:20: “The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”

Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for Himself.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, “hope begets charity” as a gloss says on Matthew 1:1, and “fear leads to charity,” according to Augustine in his commentary on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon.

Joan. Tract. ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it seems that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(3) —

On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Doctr.

Christ. i), to enjoy is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now “God is to be enjoyed” as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(3) —

I answer that, The preposition “for” denotes a relation of causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal, efficient, and material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According to these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for another. In respect of the final cause, we love medicine, for instance, for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable; in respect of the efficient cause, we love certain men because, for instance, they are the sons of such and such a father; and in respect of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of a material cause, we speak of loving something for that which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for the favors received from him, although after we have begun to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors, but for his virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love God, not for anything else, but for Himself. For He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor does He require to receive any form in order to be good, for His very substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. In the fourth way, however, He can be loved for something else, because we are disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(3)- RO(1) —

From the things it knows the soul learns to love what it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason for its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man to love the unknown.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, but through Himself, according to John 4:42: “We now believe, not for thy saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is indeed the Savior of the world.”

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain disposition, as was shown above ( Q(17) , A(8) ; Q(19) , AA(4),7,10 ).

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in this life. For the “unknown cannot be loved” as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since “we see now through a glass, in a dark manner” ( 1 Corinthians 13:12). Neither, therefore, do we love Him immediately.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since “he who is joined” to God by love, is “one spirit with Him” ( 1 Corinthians 6:17). But man cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him immediately.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Isaiah 59:2: “Your iniquities have divided between you and your God.” Now sin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said to be “enigmatic,” and “falls away” in heaven, as stated in 1 Corinthians 13:12. But charity “does not fall away” as stated in the same passage ( 1 Corinthians 13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immediately.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(1) Q(82) , A(3) ; Q(84) , A(7) ), the act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in respect of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows the mode of the knower.

Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.

Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves God immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand, with regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf. P(1) Q(12) , A(12) ).

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love, since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known through another thing.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Since to love God is something greater than to know Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not rest in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love begins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to God, and love begins with God as the last end, and passes on to creatures.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin, is removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of spiritual union.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(5) Whether God can be loved wholly?

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved by us.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God, because “God is greater than our heart” ( 1 John 3:20). Therefore God cannot be loved wholly.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be loved wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly loved by a creature.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(5) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Deuteronomy 6:5): “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.”

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(5) —

I answer that, Since love may be considered as something between lover and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the question may be understood in three ways, first so that the qualification “wholly” be referred to the thing loved, and thus God is to be loved wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.

Secondly, it may be understood as though “wholly” qualified the lover: and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought to love God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love of God, according to Deuteronomy 6:5: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.”

Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to the thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the thing loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in proportion to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His goodness is infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely, because all power of creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is finite.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the last takes it in the second sense.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(6) Whether in loving God we ought to observe any mode?

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the best thing in man, according to Colossians 3:14: “Above all... things, have charity.” Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of God.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): “Prithee, tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought.” But it would be useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one.

Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. iv, 3), “the measure which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode.” Now the measure of the human will, as also of external action, is the reason.

Therefore just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the exterior effect of charity, according to Romans 12:1: “Your reasonable service,” so also the interior love of God requires a mode.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that “God is the cause of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure.”

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(6) —

I answer that, As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above ( O(3) ) mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination is to be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure essentially, because a measure is of itself the determining and modifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is found relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure. Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure, whether by deficiency or by excess.

Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end, because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be taken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means take their mode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), “in every art, the desire for the end is endless and unlimited,” whereas there is a limit to the means: thus the physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as perfect as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, for he does not give as much medicine as he can, but according as health demands so that if he give too much or too little, the medicine would be immoderate.

Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God, whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(6) ), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little, but as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we love God the better our love is.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(6)- RO(1) —

That which is so by its essence takes precedence of that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured .

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(6)- RO(2) —

As Augustine adds in the same passage, “the measure of our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart,” that is to love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode which is proper to the measure.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(6)- RO(3) —

An affection, whose object is subject to reason’s judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the Divine love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity between the interior act and external acts of charity. For the interior act of charity has the character of an end, since man’s ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God, according to Psalm 72:28: “It is good for me to adhere to my God”; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both according to charity and according to reason.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(7) Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend?

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend. For it is written ( Matthew 5:46): “If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have?” Therefore it is not deserving of reward to love one’s friend: whereas, as the same passage proves, to love one’s enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s enemy than to love one’s friend.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s enemy than to love one’s friend.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems to be more merit, since “every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor” ( 1 Corinthians 3:8). Now a man has to make a greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it is more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one’s enemy than to love one’s friend.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(7) —

On the contrary, The better an action is, the more meritorious it is. Now it is better to love one’s friend, since it is better to love a better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy who hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s friend than to love one’s enemy.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(7) —

I answer that, God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of charity, as stated above ( Q(25) , A(1) ). When therefore it is asked which is better or more meritorious, to love one’s friend or one’s enemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the reason for which we love him.

In the first way, love of one’s friend surpasses love of one’s enemy, because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so that he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of love that passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its opposite is worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.

In the second way, however, it is better to love one’s enemy than one’s friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible to love one’s friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the only reason for loving one’s enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose that both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the stronger through carrying a man’s affections to things which are furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the power of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it throws its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is proved to be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the things we accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so much the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable matter.

Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near than on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor those who are united to us than those who are far removed; and in this respect the love of friends, considered in itself, is more ardent and better than the love of one’s enemy.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(7)- RO(1) —

The words of Our Lord must be taken in their strict sense: because the love of one’s friends is not meritorious in God’s sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and this would seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way that we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends is meritorious, if we love them for God’s sake, and not merely because they are our friends.

The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said in the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the reason for loving, while the last considers the question on the part of those who are loved.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(8) Whether it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor than to love God?

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem to be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of our neighbor to the love of God, according to Romans 9:3: “I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren.” Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor than to love God.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious to love one’s friend, as stated above ( A(7) ). Now God is our chief friend, since “He hath first loved us” ( 1 John 4:10). Therefore it seems less meritorious to love God.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more virtuous and meritorious since “virtue is about that which is difficult and good” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one’s neighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one’s neighbor.

Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor than to love God.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(8) —

On the contrary, That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more so. Now the love of one’s neighbor is not meritorious, except by reason of his being loved for God’s sake. Therefore the love of God is more meritorious than the love of our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(8) —

I answer that, This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love of God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its own sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom the movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to him that loves God ( John 14:21): “He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, and I will... manifest Myself to him.”

Secondly, the comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the one side, and the love of one’s neighbor for God’s sake, on the other. In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be between perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor, and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for “this commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother” ( 1 John 4:21).

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(8)- RO(1) —

According to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he was in a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.

We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in Ep. ad Rom.] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For he wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which pertains to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in his neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(8)- RO(2) —

A man’s love for his friends is sometimes less meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God. Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit, but is the entire reason for merit.

P(2b)- Q(27)- A(8)- RO(3) —

The “good” has, more than the “difficult,” to do with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more difficult, and at the same time better.

QUESTION OF JOY (FOUR ARTICLES)

WE must now consider the effects which result from the principal act of charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the exterior effects.

As to the first, three things have to be considered: (1) Joy, (2) Peace, (3) Mercy.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether joy is an effect of charity? (2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow? (3) Whether this joy can be full? (4) Whether it is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(1) Whether joy is effected in us by charity?

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity. For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy.

But God, Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in this state of life, since “while we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord” ( 2 Corinthians 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us rather than joy.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among those things whereby we merit happiness, according to Matthew 5:5: “Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.” Therefore sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown above ( Q(17) , A(6) ). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to Romans 12:12: “Rejoicing in hope.” Therefore it is not the effect of charity.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Romans 5:5) “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us.”

But joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Romans 14:17: “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost.”

Therefore charity is a cause of joy.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(25) , AA(1),2 ,3), when we were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the presence of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of his friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from love, either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the loved object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with some evil.

Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable, since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that He is loved, He is in those who love Him by His most excellent effect, according to 1 John 4:16: “He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.” Therefore spiritual joy, which is about God, is caused by charity.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(1)- RO(1) —

So long as we are in the body, we are said to be “absent from the Lord,” in comparison with that presence whereby He is present to some by the vision of “sight”; wherefore the Apostle goes on to say ( 2 Corinthians 5:6): “For we walk by faith and not by sight.”

Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him, by the indwelling of His grace.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The mourning that merits happiness, is about those things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to the same that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy about God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to grieve for things that are contrary to it.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(1)- RO(3) —

There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways. First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself; secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. The former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward to enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether perfect or imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one’s charity.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(2) Whether the spiritual joy, which results from charity, is compatible with an admixture of sorrow?

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to charity to rejoice in our neighbor’s good, according to 1 Corinthians 13:4,6: “Charity... rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth.”

But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, according to Romans 12:15: “Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep.” Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv), “penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again those we have deplored.” But there is no true penance without charity. Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with Christ according to Philippians 1:23: “Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain sadness, according to <19B905> Psalm 119:5: “Woe is me that my sojourning is prolonged!” Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of sorrow.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. Now such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: “Her conversation hath no bitterness.” Therefore the joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1), ad 3), a twofold joy in God arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; and with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. This joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of evil: hence the Apostle says ( Philippians 4:4): “Rejoice in the Lord always.”

The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Our neighbor does not weep save on account of some evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the sovereign good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he is hindered from participating in the Divine good.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Our sins divide between us and God, according to Isaiah 59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins, or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from participating in the Divine good.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Although in this unhappy abode we participate, after a fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a participation of the Divine good.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(3) Whether the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity, can be filled?

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is infinite, surpasses the creature’s joy which is finite. Therefore joy in God can never be filled.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one’s joy is greater than another’s. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a creature.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature is finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature’s joy in God can be filled.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples ( John 15:11): “That My joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled.”

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(3) —

I answer that, Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much as it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God’s joy alone in Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is condignly due to the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be finite.

Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the part of the one who rejoices. Now joy is compared to desire, as rest to movement, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(25) , AA(1),2 ), when we were treating of the passions: and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when there remains nothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the movement of desire does not cease in us, because it still remains possible for us to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown above ( Q(24) , AA(4),7 ). When once, however, perfect happiness has been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because then there will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain whatever he had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to <19A205> Psalm 102:5: “Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.” Hence desire will be at rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so that the joy of the blessed is full to perfection — indeed over-full, since they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for “neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him” ( 1 Corinthians 2:9). This is what is meant by the words of Luke 6:38: “Good measure and pressed down, and shaken together, and running over shall they give into your bosom.”

Yet, since no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on the contrary, man enters into it, according to Matthew 25:21 “Enter into the joy of thy Lord.”

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(3)- RO(1) —

This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to the thing in which we rejoice.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(3)- RO(2) —

When each one attains to happiness he will reach the term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, some will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one’s joy will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at rest; yet one’s joy will be greater than another’s, on account of a fuller participation of the Divine happiness.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says ( Colossians 1:9): “That you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and spiritual understanding.”

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(4) Whether joy is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which is “good,” so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Philippians 4:4: “Rejoice in the Lord always.” Therefore joy is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident from what has been said above ( P(2a), QQ(57),60,62 ).

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(55) , AA(2),4 ), virtue is an operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same habit there proceed several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in reference to that preceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about the passions ( P(2a), Q(25) , AA(2),4 ) that love is the first affection of the appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it is numbered among the Fruits ( Galatians 5:22).

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of the vices, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(77) , A(4) ); so that it was necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices, because they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated above (here and A(2) ).

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz. “difficult,” and “possible to obtain”; for which reason it is accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love any special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(28)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of charity, albeit not its first act.

QUESTION OF PEACE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether peace is the same as concord? (2) Whether all things desire peace? (3) Whether peace is an effect of charity? (4) Whether peace is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): “Peace among men is well ordered concord.” Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the same as concord.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written ( 1 Corinthians 16:33): “God is not the God of dissension but of peace.” Therefore peace is the same as concord.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(1) —

On the contrary, There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But “there is no peace to the wicked” ( Isaiah 48:22). Therefore peace is not the same as concord.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(1) —

I answer that, Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.

For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the same thing.

Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Galatians 5:17: “The flesh lusteth against the spirit.” Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the appetite.

Now the union of such movements is essential to peace, because man’s heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even in one man.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord, not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both of them . For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises that “peace is tranquillity of order,” which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(1)- RO(2) —

If one man consent to the same thing together with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in agreement.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(1)- RO(3) —

A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(2) Whether all things desire peace?

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that not all things desire peace.

For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace “unites consent.” But there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of knowledge.

Therefore such things cannot desire peace.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do not desire peace.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, good alone is an object of appetite.

But a certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said ( Matthew 10:34): “I came not to send peace.” Therefore all things do not desire peace.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command ( Mark 9:49): “Have peace among you.” Therefore all things do not desire peace.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12,14) that “all things desire peace”: and Dionysius says the same (Div.

Nom. xi).

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(2) —

I answer that, From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining it.

Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance, to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) “the tranquillity of order.”

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius says that “peace is the cause of consent and of connaturalness,” where “consent” denotes the union of appetites proceeding from knowledge, and “connaturalness,” the union of natural appetites.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that which they had heretofore.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite.

Now just as the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed. Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is written (Wis. 14:22): “Whereas they lived in a great war of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace.”

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Since true peace is only about good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one’s desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature, according to <19E703> Psalm 147:3: “Who hath placed peace in thy borders.” The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the peace.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(3) Whether peace is the proper effect of charity?

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace.

But some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of their opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one another ( Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the effect of charity.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of different things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Isaiah 32:17: “And the work of justice shall be peace.” Therefore it is not the effect of charity.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( <19B816> Psalm 118:165): “Much peace have they that love Thy Law.”

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(3) —

I answer that, Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above ( A(1) ). The first is the result of one’s own appetites being directed to one object; while the other results from one’s own appetite being united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is effected by charity — the first, in so far as man loves God with his whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one object — the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor’s will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if people “make choice of the same things” (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends “like and dislike the same things” (Sallust, Catilin.)

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Without sin no one falls from a state of sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. Hence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(3)- RO(2) —

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends need not agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which precedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension, belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Peace is the “work of justice” indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace.

For love is “a unitive force” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): and peace is the union of the appetite’s inclinations.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(4) Whether peace is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are precepts about keeping peace, for example: “Have peace among you” ( Mark 9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is meritorious to keep peace, according to Matthew 5:9: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.”

Therefore peace is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices ( Galatians 5:20). Therefore peace is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto. But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(28) , A(4) ), when a number of acts all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other, they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For, though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction: and fire produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction.

Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God and of our neighbor, as shown above ( A(3) ), there is no other virtue except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in reference to joy ( Q(28) , A(4) ).

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(4)- RO(1) —

We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(69) , AA(1),3 ). It is also numbered among the fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(2b)- Q(29)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.

QUESTION OF MERCY (FOUR ARTICLES)

[*The one Latin word “misericordia” signifies either pity or mercy.

The distinction between these two is that pity may stand either for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for the virtue.] We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person pitied? (2) To whom does it belong to pity? (3) Whether mercy is a virtue? (4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(1) Whether evil is properly the motive of mercy?

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the motive of mercy. For, as shown above ( Q(19) , A(1) ; P(2a), Q(79) , A(1), ad 4; P(1) Q(48) , A(6) ), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not excite mercy.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that “harshness does not call for pity but drives it away.” Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive of mercy.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8).

Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow.

Therefore it is the motive of mercy.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(1) —

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is heartfelt sympathy for another’s distress, impelling us to succor him if we can. For mercy takes its name “misericordia” from denoting a man’s compassionate heart [miserum cor] for another’s unhappiness. Now unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to beatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), “happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss.” Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to unhappiness that a man should suffer what he wishes not.

Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural appetite; thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a man wishes a thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a thing, not in itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat what is bad for him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.

Accordingly the motive of “mercy,” being something pertaining to “misery,” is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will’s natural appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the contrary of which man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that “pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or distressing.” Secondly, such like evils are yet more provocative of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our pity “when it is the result of an accident, as when something turns out ill, whereas we hoped well of it.” Thirdly, they cause yet greater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as when evil befalls a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that “we pity most the distress of one who suffers undeservedly.”

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(1)- RO(1) —

It is essential to fault that it be voluntary; and in this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since, however, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having something connected with it that is against the sinner’s will, it may, in this respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and commiserate sinners.

Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that “true godliness is not disdainful but compassionate,” and again it is written ( Matthew 9:36) that Jesus “seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them: because they were distressed, and lying like sheep that have no shepherd.”

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Since pity is sympathy for another’s distress, it is directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself, except figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered to have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus. 30:24): “Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God” [*Cf. Q(106), A(3), ad 1].

Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself, but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in ourselves, so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to us, as to be part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents, we do not pity their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in which sense the Philosopher says that “harshness drives pity away.”

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the recollection of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are present to the senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so far as they represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(2) Whether the reason for taking pity is a defect in the person who pities?

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be merciful, wherefore it is written ( <19E409> Psalm 144:9): “His tender mercies are over all His works.” But there is no defect in God. Therefore a defect cannot be the reason for taking pity.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that “those who are in a desperate state are pitiless.” Therefore it seems that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that “those who are disposed to contumely are pitiless.” Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a defect in the person who pities.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to sorrow more easily, as we shall say further on ( Q(35) , A(1), ad 2).

Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(2) —

I answer that, Since pity is grief for another’s distress, as stated above ( A(1) ), from the very fact that a person takes pity on anyone, it follows that another’s distress grieves him. And since sorrow or grief is about one’s own ills, one grieves or sorrows for another’s distress, in so far as one looks upon another’s distress as one’s own.

Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections, which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks upon his friend as another self, he counts his friend’s hurt as his own, so that he grieves for his friend’s hurt as though he were hurt himself. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons “grieving with one’s friend” as being one of the signs of friendship, and the Apostle says ( Romans 12:15): “Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep.”

Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another’s evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to them, and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may happen to themselves.

This also explains why the old and the wise who consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem themselves happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no danger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.

Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either because one looks upon another’s defect as one’s own, through being united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering in the same way.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(2)- RO(1) —

God takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as He loves us as belonging to Him.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like manner this applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of others.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are incited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man think that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Proverbs 27:4: “Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth.” For the same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others, and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that “false godliness,” i.e. of the proud, “is not compassionate but disdainful.”

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).

Now choice is “the desire of what has been already counselled” (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called a virtue. But mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.): “All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from... anger... and mercy, because the mind does not easily see aright, when these things stand in the way.” Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9), and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they result from charity, as stated above ( Q(28) , A(4) ; Q(29) , A(4) ). Now mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we weep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice.

Therefore mercy is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is not an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its object, neither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral virtue, because neither is it about operations, for this belongs to justice; nor is it about passions, since it is not reduced to one of the twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): “Cicero in praising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at once more humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when he says: ‘Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful than thy mercy.’“ Therefore mercy is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(3) —

I answer that, Mercy signifies grief for another’s distress. Now this grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive appetite, in which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas, in another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective appetite, in as much as one person’s evil is displeasing to another. This movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that “this movement of the mind” (viz. mercy) “obeys the reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant.” And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above ( P(2a), Q(59) , AA(4),5 ), it follows that mercy is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The words of Sallust are to be understood as applying to the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for thus it impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis, considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one another on the part of their respective estimation of another’s evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well with the undeserving: “both of these are praiseworthy and come from the same disposition of character” (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking, however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state further on ( Q(36) , A(3) ).

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect, namely the misery of the person pitied.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue having relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called nemesis, because “they both proceed from the same character” (Rhet. ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but as passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in which case they assume the character of a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(4) Whether mercy is the greatest of the virtues?

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For the worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is preferred before the worship of God, according to Hosea 6:6 and Matthew 12:7: “I have desired mercy and not sacrifice.” Therefore mercy is the greatest virtue.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, on the words of 1 Timothy 4:8: “Godliness is profitable to all things,” a gloss says: “The sum total of a Christian’s rule of life consists in mercy and godliness.” Now the Christian rule of life embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is contained in mercy.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, “Virtue is that which makes its subject good,” according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man like God, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for being more like God. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since of God is it said ( <19E409> Psalm 144:9) that “His tender mercies are over all His works,” and ( Luke 6:36) Our Lord said: “Be ye... merciful, as your Father also is merciful.” Therefore mercy is the greatest of virtues.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The Apostle after saying ( Colossians 3:12): “Put ye on... as the elect of God... the bowels of mercy,” etc., adds ( Colossians 3:14): “Above all things have charity.”

Therefore mercy is not the greatest of virtues.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(4) —

I answer that, A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In itself, mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His omnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth Sunday after Pentecost].

On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others, surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to supply the defect of that which is beneath. [*”The quality of mercy is not strained. Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes The throned monarch better than his crown.”

Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene i.]. Hence, as regards man, who has God above him, charity which unites him to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(4)- RO(1) —

We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor.

For He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy, whereby we supply others’ defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor’s well-being, according to Hebrews 13:16: “Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is obtained.”

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(4)- RO(2) —

The sum total of the Christian religion consists in mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity, whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(30)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as regards similarity of works.

QUESTION OF BENEFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity, (1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence, (3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity ? (2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all? (3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us? (4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity?

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity. For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit God, according to Job 35:7: “What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He receive of thy hand?” Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of liberality and not of charity.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due, or as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is either an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an act of charity.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(1) ). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) “doing good,” i.e. being beneficent, “to one’s friends.” Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to others.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(1) —

I answer that, Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated above ( Q(23) , A(1) ; Q(27) , A(2) ). Now the will carries into effect if possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, the result of an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend. Therefore beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of friendship or charity.

But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special character and will belong to some special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(1)- RO(1) —

According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), “love moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the superior to watch over the inferior:” and in this respect beneficence is an effect of love.

Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to honor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to bestow good things on us.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Two things must be observed in the bestowal of gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward passion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence belongs in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract from a man’s friendship, if, through love, he give his friend something he would like to I keep for himself; rather does this prove the perfection of his friendship.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Just as friendship or charity sees, in the benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of distress or defect.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(2) Whether we ought to do good to all?

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we “are unable to do good to everyone.” Now virtue does not incline one to the impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) “Give to the good, and receive not a sinner.” But many men are sinners. Therefore we need not do good to all.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, “Charity dealeth not perversely” ( Corinthians 13:4). Now to do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were to do good to an enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding communion with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of charity, we ought not to do good to all.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Galatians 6:10): “Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men.”

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1), ad 1), beneficence is an effect of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the inferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels, because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is superior in one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should extend to all, but according as time and place require: because all acts of virtue must be modified with a view to their due circumstances.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to all in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as for the faithful.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(2)- RO(2) —

In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and his nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the maintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this would be to do evil rather than good.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The excommunicated and the enemies of the common weal are deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents them from doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they be in danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like distress, unless this be according to the order of justice.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(3) Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us?

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that we are nor bound to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written ( Luke 14:12): “When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen.”

Now these are the most closely united to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us, but preferably to strangers and to those who are in want: hence the text goes on: “But, when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed,” etc.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, to help another in the battle is an act of very great goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help a fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe.

Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the preference to those who are most closely united to us.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, we should pay what is due before conferring gratuitous favors. But it is a man’s duty to be good to those who have been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our benefactors rather than to those who are closely united to us.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his children, as stated above ( Q(26) , A(9) ). Yet a man ought to be more beneficent to his children, since “neither ought the children to lay up for the parents,” according to 2 Corinthians 12:14. Therefore we are not bound to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): “Since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely united to us.”

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(3) —

I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next to it.

In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.

Now one man’s connection with another may be measured in reference to the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, and so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various ways according to these various connections, because we ought in preference to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with us. And yet this may vary according to the various requirements of time, place, or matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one’s own father, if he is not in such urgent need.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite our friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they may invite us in return, since that would be an act not of charity but of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought rather to invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must be understood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor those rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two, one be more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not possible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to help rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want as well as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a prudent man.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The common good of many is more Godlike than the good of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage together in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as a private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country as a whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be preferred to one who is a blood relation.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(3)- RO(3) —

A thing may be due in two ways. There is one which should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather as belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may have another’s goods, whether in money or in kind, either because he has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or in deposit or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what he owes, rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless perchance the case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take another’s property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet, again, this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress: in which case, however, the claims on either side would have to be weighed with regard to such other conditions as a prudent man would take into consideration, because, on account of the different particular cases, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is impossible to lay down a general rule.

The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral equity, as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor confers a benefit equal to that which a man receives from his parents: wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should give the first place to our parents before all others, unless, on the other side, there be such weightier motives, as need or some other circumstance, for instance the common good of the Church or state. In other cases we must take to account the connection and the benefit received; and here again no general rule can laid down.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(3)- RO(4) —

Parents are like superiors, and so a parent’s love tends to conferring benefits, while the children’s love tends to honor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it would be lawful to abandon one’s children rather than one’s parents, to abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the obligation we lie under towards them for the benefits we have received from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14).

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue. For precepts are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make men virtuous (Ethic. i 9,13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are prescribed as distinct from one another, for it is written ( Matthew 4:44): “Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you.” Therefore beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there are opposed to beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on our neighbor, for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore beneficence is a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, charity is not divided into several species: whereas there would seem to be several kinds of beneficence, according to the various kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a distinct virtue from charity.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The internal and the external act do not require different virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as external and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of goodwill.

Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from charity, so neither is beneficence.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(4) —

I answer that, Virtues differ according to the different aspects of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of beneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect of good, as explained above ( A(1) ). Wherefore beneficence is not a distinct virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Precepts are given, not about habits but about acts of virtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes distinction, not of habits, but of acts.

P(2b)- Q(31)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Even as all benefits conferred on our neighbor, if we consider them under the common aspect of good, are to be traced to love, so all hurts considered under the common aspect of evil, are to be traced to hatred. But if we consider these same things under certain special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to certain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there are various kinds of benefits.

Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

QUESTION OF ALMSDEEDS (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity? (2) Of the different kinds of alms; (3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal? (4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect? (5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept? (6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need? (7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods? (8) Who can give alms? (9) To whom should we give alms? (10) How should alms be given ?

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity. For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible to give alms without having charity, according to 1 Corinthians 13:3: “If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor... nd have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.”

Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of satisfaction, according to Daniel 4:24: “Redeem thou thy sins with alms.” Now satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of justice and not of charity.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according to Hebrews 13:16: “Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is obtained.”

Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity, but of religion.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, l) that to give for a good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially true of almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written 2 John 3:17: “He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?”

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(1) —

I answer that, External acts belong to that virtue which regards the motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to relieve one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being “a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion and for God’s sake,” which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above ( Q(30) , AA(1),2 ). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly speaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its very name, for in Greek \eleemosyne\ it is derived from having mercy \eleein\ even as the Latin “miseratio” is.

And since mercy is an effect of charity, as shown above ( Q(30) , A(2), A(3), O(3) ), it follows that almsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of mercy.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(1)- RO(1) —

An act of virtue may be taken in two ways: first materially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and such an act of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having the habit of justice, do what is just, led by the natural light of reason, or through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak of a thing being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of justice is to do what is just, in the same way as a just man, i.e. with readiness and delight, and such an act of virtue cannot be without the virtue.

Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give alms formally, i.e. for God’s sake, with delight and readiness, and altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of one virtue being commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing it to this other virtue’s end. It is in this way that almsgiving is reckoned among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far as it is directed to placate God, it has the character of a sacrifice, and thus it is commanded by religion.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so far as liberality removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise from excessive love of riches, the result of which is that one clings to them more than one ought.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(2) Whether the different kinds of alms deeds are suitably enumerated?

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that the different kinds of almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds, namely, to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, to bury the dead; all of which are expressed in the following verse: “To visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe, harbor or bury.”

Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to instruct the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to reprove the sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear with those who trouble and annoy us, and to pray for all, which are all contained in the following verse: “To counsel, reprove, console, to pardon, forbear, and to pray,” yet so that counsel includes both advice and instruction.

And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated. For the purpose of almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor. But a dead man profits nothing by being buried, else Our Lord would not have spoken truly when He said ( Matthew 10:28): “Be not afraid of them who kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do.” [*The quotation is from Luke 12:4.] This explains why Our Lord, in enumerating the works of mercy, made no mention of the burial of the dead ( Matthew 25:35,36).

Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, as stated above ( A(1) ), the purpose of giving alms is to relieve our neighbor’s need. Now there are many needs of human life other than those mentioned above, for instance, a blind man needs a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man needs riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of mercy. Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a defect. But no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or other. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who is ignorant of what he knows himself.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): “Let him that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share his skill and profit with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned for retaining his talent, if when he has the chance he plead not with him the cause of the poor.”

Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are suitably enumerated in respect of those things whereof men have abundance or insufficiency.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(2) —

I answer that, The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably taken from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect the soul, and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others affect the body, and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal need occurs either during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during this life, it is either a common need in respect of things needed by all, or it is a special need occurring through some accident supervening. In the first case, the need is either internal or external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved by solid food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have “to feed the hungry”; while the other is relieved by liquid food, viz. thirst, and in respect of this we have “to give drink to the thirsty.” The common need with regard to external help is twofold; one in respect of clothing, and as to this we have “to clothe the naked”: while the other is in respect of a dwelling place, and as to this we have “to harbor the harborless.” Again if the need be special, it is either the result of an internal cause, like sickness, and then we have “to visit the sick,” or it results from an external cause, and then we have “to ransom the captive.” After this life we give “burial to the dead.”

In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this respect we have “prayer,” whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human assistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to relieve a deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in the speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by “instructing,” and if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by “counselling.” Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the appetitive power, especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by “comforting.” Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate act; and this may be the subject of a threefold consideration.

First, in respect of the sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his inordinate will, and thus the remedy takes the form of “reproof.”

Secondly, in respect of the person sinned against; and if the sin be committed against ourselves, we apply the remedy by “pardoning the injury,” while, if it be committed against God or our neighbor, it is not in our power to pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii, 15).

Thirdly, in respect of the result of the inordinate act, on account of which the sinner is an annoyance to those who live with him, even beside his intention; in which case the remedy is applied by “bearing with him,” especially with regard to those who sin out of weakness, according to Romans 15:1: “We that are stronger, ought to bear the infirmities of the weak,” and not only as regards their being infirm and consequently troublesome on account of their unruly actions, but also by bearing any other burdens of theirs with them, according to Galatians 6:2: “Bear ye one another’s burdens.”

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Burial does not profit a dead man as though his body could be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord said that those who kill the body “have no more that they can do”; and for this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with the other works of mercy, but those only which are more clearly necessary. Nevertheless it does concern the deceased what is done with his body: both that he may live in the memory of man whose respect he forfeits if he remain without burial, and as regards a man’s fondness for his own body while he was yet living, a fondness which kindly persons should imitate after his death. It is thus that some are praised for burying the dead, as Tobias, and those who buried Our Lord; as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii).

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(2)- RO(2) —

All other needs are reduced to these, for blindness and lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the blind, and to support the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick. In like manner to assist a man against any distress that is due to an extrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the wealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the purpose of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason for special mention of this particular need.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of the act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as to the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the evil of sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according to Proverbs 27:6: “Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful kisses of an enemy.”

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Nescience is not always a defect, but only when it is about what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to supply this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should observe the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in other virtuous acts.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(3) Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms?

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to one who is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised because it relieves one who is in need. Now the body which is relieved by corporal alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit which is relieved by spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of more account.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if the kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says ( Luke 14:12): “When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are rich, lest perhaps they also invite thee again. Now there is always compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another, profits thereby, according to Psalm 34:13: “My prayer shall be turned into my bosom: and he who teaches another, makes progress in knowledge, which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore corporal almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is comforted by it: wherefore it is written ( Job 31:20): “If his sides have not blessed me,” and the Apostle says to Philemon ( verse 7): “The bowels of the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother.” Now a corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a spiritual alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on the words, “Give to him that asketh of thee” ( Matthew 5:42): “You should give so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when you refuse what another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of justice, and send him away empty; at times indeed you will give what is better than what is asked for, if you reprove him that asks unjustly.”

Now reproof is a spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual almsdeeds are preferable to corporal almsdeeds.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(3) —

I answer that, There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds. First, simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the first place, for three reasons. First, because the offering is more excellent, since it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal gift, according to Proverbs 4:2: “I will give you a good gift, forsake not My Law.” Secondly, on account of the object succored, because the spirit is more excellent than the body, wherefore, even as a man in looking after himself, ought to look to his soul more than to his body, so ought he in looking after his neighbor, whom he ought to love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the acts themselves by which our neighbor is succored, because spiritual acts are more excellent than corporal acts, which are, in a fashion, servile.

Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case, when some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a man in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the Philosopher observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man “money is better than philosophy,” although the latter is better simply.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(3)- RO(1) —

It is better to give to one who is in greater want, other things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better, and is in want of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is thus in the case in point.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Compensation does not detract from merit and praise if it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended, does not detract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.), that “the less he sought fame, the more he became famous”: and thus it is with spiritual almsdeeds.

Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not detract from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(3)- RO(3) —

The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in which the will of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in which it rests when it is inordinate.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(4) Whether corporal almsdeeds have a spiritual effect?

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a spiritual effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual goods exceed corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the sin of simony [i.e., the buying and selling of positions in the Church] consists in giving the corporal for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one ought not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect. If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what we read ( Luke 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the treasury, and in Our Lord’s own words “cast in more than... all.”

Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): “The alms of a man... shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye.”

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(4) —

I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways. First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have merely a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor’s corporal needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their cause, in so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual fruit, according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: “Lose thy money for thy brother... place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most High, and it shall bring thee more profit than gold.”

Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have a spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the above text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): “Shut up alms in the heart of the poor, and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil.”

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(4)- RO(1) —

This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to their substance.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(4)- RO(2) —

He who gives an alms does rot intend to buy a spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual things infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a spiritual fruit through the love of charity.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(5) Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of precept. For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now almsgiving is a matter of counsel, according to Daniel 4:24: “Let my counsel be acceptable to the King; [Vulg.: ‘to thee, and’] redeem thou thy sins with alms.”

Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what is his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can always be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in some other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be needful to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it seems that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(5)- O(4) —

Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(5) —

On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for omitting to do what is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for omitting to give alms, as is clear from Matthew 25:41-43.

Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(5) —

I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, whatever is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a matter of precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not only should we be our neighbor’s well-wishers, but also his well-doers, according to 1 John 3:18: “Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth.” And in order to be a person’s well-wisher and welldoer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.

Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right reason. Now right reason demands that we should take into consideration something on the part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient. On the part of the giver, it must be noted that he should give of his surplus, according to Luke 11:41: “That which remaineth, give alms.” This surplus is to be taken in reference not only to himself, so as to denote what is unnecessary to the individual, but also in reference to those of whom he has charge (in which case we have the expression “necessary to the person” [*The official necessities of a person in position] taking the word “person” as expressive of dignity). Because each one must first of all look after himself and then after those over whom he has charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others. Thus nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for the upkeep of one’s own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the formation of another by the power of generation.

On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in need, else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it is not possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who could not be succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of Ambrose apply, “Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him” [*Cf.

Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken].

Accordingly we are bound to give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms to one whose need is extreme: otherwise almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a matter of counsel.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(5)- RO(1) —

Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to God’s Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he did not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(5)- RO(2) —

The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us alone but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we have over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii, 18]: “If you acknowledge them,” viz. your temporal goods, “as coming from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the hungry man’s bread that you withhold, the naked man’s cloak that you have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot, the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you injure as many as you might help.” Ambrose expresses himself in the same way.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(5)- RO(3) —

There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit to give alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored otherwise — on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods, which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge with probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly occur in the future, for this would be to think about the morrow, which Our Lord forbade us to do ( Matthew 6:34), but he should judge what is superfluous and what necessary, according as things probably and generally occur.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(5)- RO(4) —

All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to the precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle interpret it ( 1 Timothy 4:8) where he says: “Dutifulness* [Douay: ‘Godliness’] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come,” and he says this because the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, “that thou mayest be longlived upon the land” ( Exodus 20:12): and dutifulness comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*”Pietas,” whence our English word “Piety.” Cf. also inf. Q(101), A(2) .]

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(6) Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs?

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of what one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only as regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our interior affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of charity, because this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the order of charity requires that a man should love himself more than his neighbor, it seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of what he needed, in order to succor his neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself, squanders his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done. Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 5:8): “If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.” Now if a man gives of what he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from the care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Our Lord said ( Matthew 19:21): “If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor.”

Now he that gives all he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but also what he needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he needs.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(6) —

I answer that, A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because without it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to give alms out of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance, if a man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely sufficient to support himself and his children, or others under his charge, he would be throwing away his life and that of others if he were to give away in alms, what was then necessary to him. Yet I say this without prejudice to such a case as might happen, supposing that by depriving himself of necessaries a man might help a great personage, and a support of the Church or State, since it would be a praiseworthy act to endanger one’s life and the lives of those who are under our charge for the delivery of such a person, since the common good is to be preferred to one’s own.

Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or those of whom he has charge. The “necessary” considered thus is not an invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man’s property, and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might take much from him, and he would still have sufficient for the decencies of life in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is good to give alms of this kind of “necessary”; and it is a matter not of precept but of counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive oneself of one’s own, in order to give to others to such an extent that the residue would be insufficient for one to live in keeping with one’s station and the ordinary occurrences of life: for no man ought to live unbecomingly. There are, however, three exceptions to the above rule. The first is when a man changes his state of life, for instance, by entering religion, for then he gives away all his possessions for Christ’s sake, and does the deed of perfection by transferring himself to another state. Secondly, when that which he deprives himself of, though it be required for the decencies of life, can nevertheless easily be recovered, so that he does not suffer extreme inconvenience. Thirdly, when he is in presence of extreme indigence in an individual, or great need on the part of the common weal. For in such cases it would seem praiseworthy to forego the requirements of one’s station, in order to provide for a greater need.

The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(7) Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods?

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods. For it is written ( Luke 16:9): “Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity.” Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is lawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of illgotten riches.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten.

But the profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden ( Deuteronomy 23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God: “Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet... in the house of... thy God.”

In like manner gains from games of chance are ill-gotten, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), “we take such like gains from our friends to whom we ought rather to give.” And most of all are the profits from simony [i.e., the buying and selling of positions in the Church] ill-gotten, since thereby the Holy Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is lawful to give alms. Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another’s property than to commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who is in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf. Canon Pasce dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken): “Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him”. Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of ill-gotten goods.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): “Give alms from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not to hear you with the poor whom you rob... Give not alms from interest and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the Body of Christ.”

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(7) —

I answer that, A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the first place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from whom it is gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained possession of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of such things a man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.

Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it, and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it, because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly. This happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene the justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not to the giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar cases of illegal giving and receiving.

Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful, but because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case of a woman’s profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so called, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the Law of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in taking the money.

Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in alms what is thus acquired by an unlawful action.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(7)- RO(1) —

As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), “Some have misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another’s property and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are fulfilling the commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be amended. Yet all riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in De Quaest.

Ev. ii, 34, because “riches are not unjust save for those who are themselves unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or, according to Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 16:9, “Make unto yourselves friends,” etc., “He calls mammon unjust, because it draws our affections by the various allurements of wealth.” Or, because “among the many ancestors whose property you inherit, there is one who took the property of others unjustly, although you know nothing about it,” as Basil says in a homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all riches are styled riches “of iniquity,” i.e., of “inequality,” because they are not distributed equally among all, one being in need, and another in affluence.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(7)- RO(2) —

We have already explained how alms may be given out of the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not made therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and through reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out of the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid, indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary to the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play, and wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to restitution, and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms. Then again there would seem to be something unlawful as being against the positive civil law, which altogether forbids any such profits. Since, however, a civil law does not bind all, but only those who are subject to that law, and moreover may be abrogated through desuetude, it follows that all such as are bound by these laws are bound to make restitution of such gains, unless perchance the contrary custom prevail, or unless a man win from one who enticed him to play, in which case he is not bound to restitution, because the loser does not deserve to be paid back: and yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has won, so long as that positive law is in force, wherefore in this case he ought to give it away in alms.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(7)- RO(3) —

All things are common property in a case of extreme necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take another’s goods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who is willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take something if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in need. If however this be possible without danger, he must ask the owner’s consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme necessity.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(8) Whether one who is under another’s power can give alms?

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that one who is under another’s power can give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to whom they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to give alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as Ambrose [*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index to ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Timothy 4:8: “‘Dutifulness [Douay: ‘godliness’] is profitable to all things’: The sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one’s duty by all,” and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms. Therefore those who are in another’s power can give alms.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, a wife is under her husband’s power ( Genesis 3:16). But a wife can give alms since she is her husband’s partner; hence it is related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge of her betrothed [*”Sponsus” The matrimonial institutions of the Romans were so entirely different from ours that “sponsus” is no longer accurately rendered either “husband” or “betrothed.”] Therefore a person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under another’s power.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, the subjection of children to their parents is founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says ( Ephesians 6:1): “Children, obey your parents in the Lord.” But, apparently, children may give alms out of their parents’ property. For it is their own, since they are the heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily use, it seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so as to profit their souls. Therefore those who are under another’s power can give alms.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(8)- O(4) —

Further, servants are under their master’s power, according to Titus 2:9: “Exhort servants to be obedient to their masters.” Now they may lawfully do anything that will profit their masters: and this would be especially the case if they gave alms for them.

Therefore those who are under another’s power can give alms.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Alms should not be given out of another’s property; and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his own labor as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who are subject to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of another’s property. Therefore those who are under another’s power cannot give alms.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(8) —

I answer that, Anyone who is under another’s power must, as such, be ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the natural order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to its superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is subject to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the superior’s permission.

Accordingly he that is under another’s power must not give alms of anything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in so far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has something in respect of which he is not under the power of his superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being independent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms therefrom.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(8)- RO(1) —

If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned by his superior, he can give alms from the property of his monaster, in accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms without his abbot’s permission either express or presumed for some probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor does it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated in De Ecclesiastes Dogm. lxxi, “it is a good thing to give one’s property to the poor little by little, but it is better still to give all at once in order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to be needy with Christ.”

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(8)- RO(2) —

A wife, who has other property besides her dowry which is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that property be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means, can give alms, out of that property, without asking her husband’s permission: yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too much she impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms without the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases of necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply. For though the wife be her husband’s equal in the marriage act, yet in matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the Apostle says ( Corinthians 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her mother’s consent.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(8)- RO(3) —

What belongs to the children belongs also to the father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small quantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless, perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any particular property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(9) Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely united to us?

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(9)- O(1) —

It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus. 12:4,6): “Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner... Do good to the humble and give not to the ungodly.” Now it happens sometimes that those who are closely united to us are sinful and ungodly. Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to others.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(9)- O(2) —

Further, alms should be given that we may receive an eternal reward in return, according to Matthew 6:18: “And thy Father Who seeth in secret, will repay thee.” Now the eternal reward is gained chiefly by the alms which are given to the saints, according to Luke 16:9: “Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings, which passage Augustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): “Who shall have everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that shall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who succor them in their needs? Therefore alms should be given to the more holy persons rather than to those who are more closely united to us.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(9)- O(3) —

Further, man is more closely united to himself.

But a man cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to give alms to those who are most closely united to us.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(9) —

On the contrary, The Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 5:8): “If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.”

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(9) —

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), “it falls to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of those who are more closely united to us.” Nevertheless in this matter we must employ discretion, according to the various degrees of connection, holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one who is much holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful to the common weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to us, especially if the latter be not very closely united, and has no special claim on our care then and there, and who is not in very urgent need.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(9)- RO(1) —

We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(9)- RO(2) —

Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an eternal reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this respect an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order of charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we should, in preference, help those who are more closely connected with us. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): “It is with commendable liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be in need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own family, who would be ashamed to beg help from others.” Secondly, almsdeeds deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the recipient, who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(9)- RO(3) —

Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man does not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of comparison, as stated above ( Q(30) , AA(1),2 ), so too, properly speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another’s person; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when he gives to others.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(10) Whether alms should be given in abundance?

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(10) - O(1) —

It would seem that alms should not be given in abundance. For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most closely connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a way that they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to others.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(10) - O(2) —

Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): “We should not lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by degrees.” But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms should not be given in abundance.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(10) - O(3) —

Further, the Apostle says ( 2 Corinthians 8:13): “Not that others should be eased,” i.e. should live on you without working themselves, “and you burthened,” i.e. impoverished. But this would be the result if alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms abundantly.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(10) —

On the contrary, It is written (Tobias 4:93): “If thou have much, give abundantly.”

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(10) —

I answer that, Alms may be considered abundant in relation either to the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when that which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give thus is praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord ( Luke 21:3,4) commended the widow because “of her want, she cast in all the living that she had.”

Nevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid down when we spoke of giving alms out of one’s necessary goods ( A(9) ).

On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways; first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to give to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 13:3): “If I should distribute... to feed the poor,” on which words a gloss comments: “Thus we are warned to be careful in giving alms, and to give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit many.”

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(10) - RO(1) —

This argument considers abundance of alms as exceeding the needs of the recipient.

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(10) - RO(2) —

The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on the part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of life, wherefore he goes on to say: “Except we imitate Eliseus who slew his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household cares might keep him back” ( 1 Kings 19:21).

P(2b)- Q(32)- A(10) - RO(3) —

In the passage quoted the words, “not that others should be eased or refreshed,” refer to that abundance of alms which surpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief. Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on account of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more daintily nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): “When you give an alms to a man, you should take into consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the shame which proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has fallen from riches to indigence through no fault of his own.”

With regard to the words that follow, “and you burdened,” they refer to abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the same passage, “he says this, not because it would be better to give in abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes them so to give that they lack not for themselves.”

QUESTION OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity? (2) Whether it is a matter of precept? (3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors? (4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior? (5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone? (6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through being corrected? (7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement? (8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of charity. For a gloss on Matthew 18:15, “If thy brother shall offend against thee,” says that “a man should reprove his brother out of zeal for justice.” But justice is a distinct virtue from charity. Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of justice.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, fraternal correction is given by secret admonition. Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of prudence, for a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5).

Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of prudence.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue. Now it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Galatians 6:2: “Bear ye one another’s burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of Christ,” which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with him, is not an act of charity.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(1) —

On the contrary, To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed. But almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above ( Q(32) , A(1) ). Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(1) —

I answer that, The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which should be employed against a man’s sin. Now a man’s sin may be considered in two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing to the harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or by being detrimental to the common good, the justice of which is disturbed by that man’s sin.

Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone’s evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person’s good is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well. Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because thereby we drive out our brother’s evil, viz. sin, the removal of which pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external loss, or of a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of virtue is more akin to charity than the good of the body or of external things. Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity rather than the healing of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an external bodily need.

There is another correction which applies a remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered as hurtful to others, and especially to the common good. This correction is an act of justice, whose concern it is to safeguard the rectitude of justice between one man and another.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(1)- RO(1) —

This gloss speaks of the second correction which is an act of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it takes justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further on ( Q(58) , A(5) ), in which sense again all “sin is iniquity” ( 1 John 3:4), through being contrary to justice.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(1)- RO(2) —

According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), prudence regulates whatever is directed to the end, about which things counsel and choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by prudence, we perform some action aright which is directed to the end of some virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action belongs chiefly to the virtue to whose end it is directed. Since, then, the admonition which is given in fraternal correction is directed to the removal of a brother’s sin, which removal pertains to charity, it is evident that this admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which virtue commands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence, which executes and directs the action.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Fraternal correction is not opposed to forbearance with the weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a man bears with a sinner, in so far as he is not disturbed against him, and retains his goodwill towards him: the result being that he strives to make him do better.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(2) Whether fraternal correction is a matter of precept?

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter of precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according to the saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: “Accursed be he who says that God has commanded any. thing impossible.” Now it is written ( Ecclesiastes 7:14): “Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised.” Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to the precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not come under any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin, which has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are found to omit fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): “Not only those of low degree, but also those of high position, refrain from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity, not by the claims of charity.” Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due. If, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it is due to our brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man owes anyone a material due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he must not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek him out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we should have to go seeking for those who need correction, in order that we might correct them; which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the great number of sinners, for whose correction one man could not suffice, and because religious would have to leave the cloister in order to reprove men, which would be unbecoming. Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): “You become worse than the sinner if you fail to correct him.” But this would not be so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some precept. Therefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(2) —

I answer that, Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We must observe, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law forbid sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue.

Now sinful acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter how, or when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature they are connected with an evil end, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore negative precepts bind always and for all times. On the other hand, acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing the due circumstances, which are requisite in order that an act be virtuous; namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be done. And since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end depends on the formal aspect of the end, the chief of these circumstances of a virtuous act is this aspect of the end, which in this case is the good of virtue. If therefore such a circumstance be omitted from a virtuous act, as entirely takes away the good of virtue, such an act is contrary to a precept. If, however, the circumstance omitted from a virtuous act be such as not to destroy the virtue altogether, though it does not perfectly attain the good of virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 9) says that if we depart but little from the mean, it is not contrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much from the mean virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction is directed to a brother’s amendment: so that it is a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary for that end, but not so as we have to correct our erring brother at all places and times.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(2)- RO(1) —

In all good deeds man’s action is not efficacious without the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his power. Hence Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): “Since we ignore who is predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our feelings, that we wish all to be saved.” Consequently we ought to do our brethren the kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God’s help.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(2)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( Q(32) , A(5), ad 4), all the precepts about rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the precept about the honor due to parents.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Fraternal correction may be omitted in three ways.

First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct someone.

For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): “If a man refrains from chiding and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable time for so doing, or because he fears lest, if he does so, they may become worse, or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others who are weak and need to be instructed in a life of goodness and virtue, this does not seem to result from covetousness, but to be counselled by charity.”

Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one commits a mortal sin, namely, “when” (as he says in the same passage) “one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous pain or death; provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by such things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity.” This would seem to be the case when a man reckons that he might probably withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so, through fear or covetousness.

Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother’s faults, and yet not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw him from sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through fear or covetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to these things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to correct wrongdoers.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(2)- RO(4) —

We are bound to pay that which is due to some fixed and certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good, without waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to find him. Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should seek him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he that has spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in order to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound to seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any certain person, but to all our neighbors in general, whether those favors be material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow them when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance. For this reason he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 1) that “Our Lord warns us not to be listless in regard of one another’s sins: not indeed by being on the lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting what we see”: else we should become spies on the lives of others, which is against the saying of Proverbs 24:19: “Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest.” It is evident from this that there is no need for religious to leave their cloister in order to rebuke evil-doers.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(3) Whether fraternal correction belongs only to prelates?

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.] says: “Let priests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: ‘If thy brother sin against thee,’“ etc. Now prelates having charge of others were usually designated under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms.

Now corporal almsgiving belongs to those who are placed above others in temporal matters, i.e. to the rich. Therefore fraternal correction belongs to those who are placed above others in spiritual matters, i.e. to prelates.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, when one man reproves another he moves him by his rebuke to something better. Now in the physical order the inferior is moved by the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which follows the order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone to correct inferiors.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, Can.

Tam Sacerdotes): “Both priests and all the rest of the faithful should be most solicitous for those who perish, so that their reproof may either correct their sinful ways. or, if they be incorrigible, cut them off from the Church.”

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), correction is twofold. One is an act of charity, which seeks in a special way the recovery of an erring brother by means of a simple warning: such like correction belongs to anyone who has charity, be he subject or prelate.

But there is another correction which is an act of justice purposing the common good, which is procured not only by warning one’s brother, but also, sometimes, by punishing him, that others may, through fear, desist from sin. Such a correction belongs only to prelates, whose business it is not only to admonish, but also to correct by means of punishments.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Even as regards that fraternal correction which is common to all, prelates have a grave responsibility, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): “for just as a man ought to bestow temporal favors on those especially of whom he has temporal care, so too ought he to confer spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and the like, on those who are entrusted to his spiritual care.” Therefore Jerome does not mean that the precept of fraternal correction concerns priests only, but that it concerns them chiefly.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Just as he who has the means wherewith to give corporal assistance is rich in this respect, so he whose reason is gifted with a sane judgment, so as to be able to correct another’s wrong-doing, is, in this respect, to be looked on as a superior.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Even in the physical order certain things act mutually on one another, through being in some respect higher than one another, in so far as each is somewhat in act, and somewhat in potentiality with regard to another. In like manner one man can correct another in so far as he has a sane judgment in a matter wherein the other sins, though he is not his superior simply.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(4) Whether a mann is bound to correct his prelate?

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that no man is bound to correct his prelate. For it is written ( Exodus 19:12): “The beast that shall touch the mount shall be stoned,” [*Vulg.: ‘Everyone that shall touch the mount, dying he shall die.’] and ( 2 Kings 6:7) it is related that the Lord struck Oza for touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark signify our prelates.

Therefore prelates should not be corrected by their subjects.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, a gloss on Galatians 2:11, “I withstood him to the face,” adds: “as an equal.” Therefore, since a subject is not equal to his prelate, he ought not to correct him.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) that “one ought not to presume to reprove the conduct of holy men, unless one thinks better of oneself.” But one ought not to think better of oneself than of one’s prelate. Therefore one ought not to correct one’s prelate.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Augustine says in his Rule: “Show mercy not only to yourselves, but also to him who, being in the higher position among you, is therefore in greater danger.” But fraternal correction is a work of mercy. Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(4) —

I answer that, A subject is not competent to administer to his prelate the correction which is an act of justice through the coercive nature of punishment: but the fraternal correction which is an act of charity is within the competency of everyone in respect of any person towards whom he is bound by charity, provided there be something in that person which requires correction.

Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power extends to whatever is contained under the object of that power or habit: thus vision extends to all things comprised in the object of sight. Since, however, a virtuous act needs to be moderated by due circumstances, it follows that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do so in a becoming manner, not with impudence and harshness, but with gentleness and respect. Hence the Apostle says ( 1 Timothy 5:1): “An ancient man rebuke not, but entreat him as a father.” Wherefore Dionysius finds fault with the monk Demophilus (Ep. viii), for rebuking a priest with insolence, by striking and turning him out of the church.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(4)- RO(1) —

It would seem that a subject touches his prelate inordinately when he upbraids him with insolence, as also when he speaks ill of him: and this is signified by God’s condemnation of those who touched the mount and the ark.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(4)- RO(2) —

To withstand anyone in public exceeds the mode of fraternal correction, and so Paul would not have withstood Peter then, unless he were in some way his equal as regards the defense of the faith. But one who is not an equal can reprove privately and respectfully.

Hence the Apostle in writing to the Colossians ( 4:17) tells them to admonish their prelate: “Say to Archippus: Fulfil thy ministry [*Vulg.: ‘Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.’ Cf. 2 Timothy 4:5].” It must be observed, however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought to rebuke his prelate even publicly.

Hence Paul, who was Peter’s subject, rebuked him in public, on account of the imminent danger of scandal concerning faith, and, as the gloss of Augustine says on Galatians 2:11, “Peter gave an example to superiors, that if at any time they should happen to stray from the straight path, they should not disdain to be reproved by their subjects.”

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(4)- RO(3) —

To presume oneself to be simply better than one’s prelate, would seem to savor of presumptuous pride; but there is no presumption in thinking oneself better in some respect, because, in this life, no man is without some fault. We must also remember that when a man reproves his prelate charitably, it does not follow that he thinks himself any better, but merely that he offers his help to one who, “being in the higher position among you, is therefore in greater danger,” as Augustine observes in his Rule quoted above.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(5) Whether a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer?

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer. For no man is excused from obeying a precept by having committed a sin. But fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as stated above ( A(2) ). Therefore it seems that a man ought not to forbear from such like correction for the reason that he has committed a sin.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account than corporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain from administering corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on account of a previous sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( 1 John 1:8): “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Therefore if, on account of a sin, a man is hindered from reproving his brother, there will be none to reprove the wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is unreasonable: therefore the former is also.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): “He that is subject to vice should not correct the vices of others.”

Again it is written ( Romans 2:1): “Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself. For thou dost the same things which thou judgest.”

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(5) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(3), ad 2), to correct a wrongdoer belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is gifted with right judgment. Now sin, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(85) , AA(1),2 ), does not destroy the good of nature so as to deprive the sinner’s reason of all right judgment, and in this respect he may be competent to find fault with others for committing sin. Nevertheless a previous sin proves somewhat of a hindrance to this correction, for three reasons. First because this previous sin renders a man unworthy to rebuke another; and especially is he unworthy to correct another for a lesser sin, if he himself has committed a greater. Hence Jerome says on the words, “Why seest thou the mote?” etc. ( Matthew 7:3): “He is speaking of those who, while they are themselves guilty of mortal sin, have no patience with the lesser sins of their brethren.”

Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on account of the scandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector’s sin be well known, because it would seem that he corrects, not out of charity, but more for the sake of ostentation. Hence the words of Matthew 7:4, “How sayest thou to thy brother?” etc. are expounded by Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] thus: “That is — ’With what object?’ Out of charity, think you, that you may save your neighbor?” No, “because you would look after your own salvation first. What you want is, not to save others, but to hide your evil deeds with good teaching, and to seek to be praised by men for your knowledge.”

Thirdly, on account of the rebuker’s pride; when, for instance, a man thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart, sets himself above his neighbor, judging the latter’s sins with harsh severity, as though he himself were just man. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): “To reprove the faults of others is the duty of good and kindly men: when a wicked man rebukes anyone, his rebuke is the latter’s acquittal.” And so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): “When we have to find fault with anyone, we should think whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then we must remember that we are men, and might have been guilty of it; or that we once had it on our conscience, but have it no longer: and then we should bethink ourselves that we are all weak, in order that our reproof may be the outcome, not of hatred, but of pity. But if we find that we are guilty of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but groan with him, and invite him to repent with us.” It follows from this that, if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, he does not sin, nor does he bring a further condemnation on himself, although thereby he proves himself deserving of condemnation, either in his brother’s or in his own conscience, on account of his previous sin.

Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(6) Whether one ought to forbear from correcting someone, through fear lest he become worse?

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(6)- O(1) —

It would seem that one ought not to forbear from correcting someone through fear lest he become worse. For sin is weakness of the soul, according to Psalm 6:3: “Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak.” Now he that has charge of a sick person, must not cease to take care of him, even if he be fractious or contemptuous, because then the danger is greater, as in the case of madmen. Much more, therefore should one correct a sinner, no matter how badly he takes it.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, according to Jerome vital truths are not to be foregone on account of scandal. Now God’s commandments are vital truths. Since, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as stated above ( A(2) ), it seems that it should not be foregone for fear of scandalizing the person to be corrected.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, according to the Apostle ( Romans 3:8) we should not do evil that good may come of it. Therefore, in like manner, good should not be omitted lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction is a good thing. Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the person corrected become worse.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(6) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Proverbs 9:8): “Rebuke not a scorner lest he hate thee,” where a gloss remarks: “You must not fear lest the scorner insult you when you rebuke him: rather should you bear in mind that by making him hate you, you may make him worse.” Therefore one ought to forego fraternal correction, when we fear lest we may make a man worse.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(6) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(3) ) the correction of the wrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, and is directed to the common good, has coercive force. Such correction should not be omitted lest the person corrected be disturbed, both because if he is unwilling to amend his ways of his own accord, he should be made to cease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be incorrigible, the common good is safeguarded in this way, since the order of justice is observed, and others are deterred by one being made an example of. Hence a judge does not desist from pronouncing sentence of condemnation against a sinner, for fear of disturbing him or his friends.

The other fraternal correction is directed to the amendment of the wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely admonishes.

Consequently when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take the warning, and will become worse, such fraternal correction should be foregone, because the means should be regulated according to the requirements of the end.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(6)- RO(1) —

The doctor uses force towards a madman, who is unwilling to submit to his treatment; and this may be compared with the correction administered by prelates, which has coercive power, but not with simple fraternal correction.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Fraternal correction is a matter of precept, in so far as it is an act of virtue, and it will be a virtuous act in so far as it is proportionate to the end. Consequently whenever it is a hindrance to the end, for instance when a man becomes worse through it, it is longer a vital truth, nor is it a matter precept.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Whatever is directed to end, becomes good through being directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal correction hinders the end, namely the amendment of our brother, it is no longer good, so that when such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted lest evil should befall.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7) Whether the precept of fraternal correction demands that a private admonition should precede denunciation?

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7)- O(1) —

It would seem that the precept of fraternal correction does not demand that a private admonition should precede denunciation. For, in works of charity, we should above all follow the example of God, according to Ephesians 5:1,2: “Be ye followers of God, as most dear children, and walk in love.” Now God sometimes punishes a man for a sin, without previously warning him in secret. Therefore it seems that there is no need for a private admonition to precede denunciation.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7)- O(2) —

Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn from the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the commandments of Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find that a hidden sin is publicly denounced, without any previous admonition in private. Thus we read ( Genesis 37:2) that “Joseph accused his brethren to his father of a most wicked crime”: and ( Acts 5:4,9) that Peter publicly denounced Ananias and Saphira who had secretly “by fraud kept back the price of the land,” without beforehand admonishing them in private: nor do we read that Our Lord admonished Judas in secret before denouncing him. Therefore the precept does not require that secret admonition should precede public denunciation.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7)- O(3) —

Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce. Now one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without previously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the Decretal (Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that “nothing else need precede accusation except inscription.” [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.] Therefore it seems that the precept does not require that a secret admonition should precede public denunciation.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7)- O(4) —

Further, it does not seem probable that the customs observed by religious in general are contrary to the precepts of Christ. Now it is customary among religious orders to proclaim this or that one for a fault, without any previous secret admonition. Therefore it seems that this admonition is not required by the precept.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7)- O(5) —

Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a prelate sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in particular, to tell him if they know of anything that requires correction. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to tell them this, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the precept does not require secret admonition before public denunciation.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the words, “Rebuke him between thee and him alone” ( Matthew 18:15): “Aiming at his amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from shame he might begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to make a better man, you make worse.” Now we are bound by the precept of charity to beware lest our brother become worse. Therefore the order of fraternal correction comes under the precept.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7) —

I answer that, With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is necessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public or secret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only for the sinner, that he may become better, but also for others, who know of his sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should be denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apostle ( 1 Timothy 5:20): “Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may have fear,” which is to be understood as referring to public sins, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).

On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord seem to apply ( Matthew 18:15): “If thy brother shall offend against thee,” etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others, he no longer sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he ‘disturbs. Since, however, a man’s neighbor may take offense even at his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further distinction. For certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor either in his body or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots secretly to betray his country to its enemies, or when a heretic secretly turns other men away from the faith. And since he that sins thus in secret, sins not only against you in particular, but also against others, it is necessary to take steps to denounce him at once, in order to prevent him doing such harm, unless by chance you were firmly persuaded that this evil result would be prevented by admonishing him secretly. On the other hand there are other sins which injure none but the sinner, and the person sinned against, either because he alone is hurt by the sinner, or at least because he alone knows about his sin, and then our one purpose should be to succor our sinning brother: and just as the physician of the body restores the sick man to health, if possible, without cutting off a limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a limb which is least indispensable, in order to preserve the life of the whole body, so too he who desires his brother’s amendment should, if possible, so amend him as regards his conscience, that he keep his good name.

For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not only in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses, if he lose his good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are restrained from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man finds his honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome says on Matthew 18:15: “If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke him in private, lest he persist in his sin if he should once become shameless or unabashed.”

Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning brother’s good name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the dishonor of others, according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii): “When a few of those who bear a name for holiness are reported falsely or proved in truth to have done anything wrong, people will seek by busily repeating it to make it believed of all”: and also because when one man’s sin is made public others are incited to sin likewise.

Since, however, one’s conscience should be preferred to a good name, Our Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother and so deliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his good name.

Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret admonition to precede public denunciation.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7)- RO(1) —

Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore hidden sins are to the judgment of God, just what public sins are to the judgment of man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by secretly admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration, either while they wake or while they sleep, according to Job 33:15-17: “By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men... then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn, that He may withdraw a man from the things he is doing.”

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7)- RO(2) —

Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though it were public, wherefore He could have made it known at once.

Yet He did not, but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure.

The sin of Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God’s executor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to Joseph it is probable that he warned his brethren, though Scripture does not say so. Or we may say that the sin was public with regard to his brethren, wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused “his brethren.”

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7)- RO(3) —

When there is danger to a great number of people, those words of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not sin against thee alone.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7)- RO(4) —

Proclamations made in the chapter of religious are about little faults which do not affect a man’s good name, wherefore they are reminders of forgotten faults rather than accusations or denunciations. If, however, they should be of such a nature as to injure our brother’s good name, it would be contrary to Our Lord’s precept, to denounce a brother’s fault in this manner.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(7)- RO(5) —

A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a Divine precept, according to Acts 5:29: “We ought to obey God rather then men.” Therefore when a prelate commands anyone to tell him anything that he knows to need correction, the command rightly understood supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal correction, whether the command be addressed to all in general, or to some particular individual. If, on the other hand, a prelate were to issue a command in express opposition to this order instituted by Our Lord, both would sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as disobeying Our Lord’s command. Consequently he ought not to be obeyed, because a prelate is not the judge of secret things, but God alone is, wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of hidden matters, except in so far as they are made known through certain signs, as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a prelate can command just as a judge, whether secular or ecclesiastical, can bind a man under oath to tell the truth.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(8) Whether before the public denunciation witnesses ought to be brought forward?

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(8)- O(1) —

It would seem that before the public denunciation witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not to be made known to others, because by so doing “a man would betray his brother’s sins instead of correcting them,” as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known a brother’s sin to others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one ought not to bring witnesses forward before the public denunciation.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(8)- O(2) —

Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no man brings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin.

Neither therefore ought one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our brother.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(8)- O(3) —

Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove something. But witnesses afford no proof in secret matters.

Therefore it is useless to bring witnesses forward in such cases.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(8)- O(4) —

Further, Augustine says in his Rule that “before bringing it to the notice of witnesses... it should be put before the superior.” Now to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is to tell the Church. Therefore witnesses should not be brought forward before the public denunciation.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(8) —

On the contrary, Our Lord said ( Matthew 18:16): “Take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two,” etc.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(8) —

I answer that, The right way to go from one extreme to another is to pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning of fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects another between this one and himself alone, while He wished the end to be public, when such a one would be denounced to the Church. Consequently it is befitting that a citation of witnesses should be placed between the two extremes, so that at first the brother’s sin be indicated to a few, who will be of use without being a hindrance, and thus his sin be amended without dishonoring him before the public.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(8)- RO(1) —

Some have understood the order of fraternal correction to demand that we should first of all rebuke our brother secretly, and that if he listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and his sin be altogether hidden, they say that we should go no further in the matter, whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of several by various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter, according to Our Lord’s command. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in his Rule that “we are bound to reveal” a brother’s sin, if it “will cause a worse corruption in the heart.” Wherefore we must say otherwise that when the secret admonition has been given once or several times, as long as there is probable hope of his amendment, we must continue to admonish him in private, but as soon as we are able to judge with any probability that the secret admonition is of no avail, we must take further steps, however secret the sin may be, and call witnesses, unless perhaps it were thought probable that this would not conduce to our brother’s amendment, and that he would become worse: because on that account one ought to abstain altogether from correcting him, as stated above ( A(6) ).

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(8)- RO(2) —

A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his own sin: yet they may be necessary that we may amend a brother’s sin. Hence the comparison fails.

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(8)- RO(3) —

There may be three reasons for citing witnesses. First, to show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says: secondly, to prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine says (in his Rule): thirdly, “to prove that the man who rebuked his brother, has done what he could,” as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth. lx).

P(2b)- Q(33)- A(8)- RO(4) —

Augustine means that the matter ought to be made known to the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as the prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than others, but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i.e. as holding the position of judge.

QUESTION OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)

We must how consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which is opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy of charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4) offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal correction.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is possible to hate God? (2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins? (3) Whether hatred of one’s neighbor is always a sin? (4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor? (5) Whether it is a capital sin? (6) From what capital sin does it arise?

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to hate God?

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the first good and beautiful is an object of love and dilection to all.” But God is goodness and beauty itself.

Therefore He is hated by none.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36,[39] it is written that “all things call upon truth... and (all men) do well like of her works.” Now God is the very truth according to John 14:6. Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself.

Therefore none can hate Him.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Psalm 73:23): “The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually,” and ( John 15:24): “But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father.”

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(1) —

I answer that, As shown above ( P(2a), Q(29) , A(1) ), hatred is a movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion save by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence; secondly, in His effects, when, to wit, “the invisible things” of God... “are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” ( Romans 1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which no man can hate — for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is impossible for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.

Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be contrary to the human will, since “to be, to live, to understand,” which are effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore again God cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the Author of such like effects.

Some of God’s effects, however, are contrary to an inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment, and the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law.

Such like effects are repugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration of them, God may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they look upon Him as forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(1)- RO(1) —

This argument is true of those who see God’s Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(1)- RO(2) —

This argument is true in so far as God is apprehended as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of all, among which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(1)- RO(3) —

God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to be like God, Who is Being itself.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost, since it cannot be forgiven, according to Matthew 12:32. Now hatred of God is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, as may be seen from what has been said above ( Q(14) , A(2) ).

Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now an unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further away from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than the sin of hatred against God.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of those of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which is punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin. Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The best is opposite to the worst, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to the love of God, wherein man’s best consists. Therefore hatred of God is man’s worst sin.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(2) —

I answer that, The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God, as stated above ( Q(10) , A(3) ): and this aversion would not have the character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt consists in a voluntary aversion from God.

Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the hatred of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly. For just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it directly shun what it hates.

Hence when a man hates God, his will is directly averted from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance, a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which aversion from God is connected. Now that which is so by itself, always takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore hatred of God is more grievous than other sins.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(2)- RO(1) —

According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), “it is one thing not to do good things, end another to hate the giver of good things, even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin deliberately.” This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found in every kind of that sin.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of God is a greater sin than unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God the author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other hand, to break out into hatred of God when He inflicts those punishments, is to hate God’s very justice, and that is a most grievous sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): “Even as sometimes it is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked to hate justice than, not to have done it.”

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(3) Whether hatred of one’s neighbor is always a sin?

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that hatred of one’s neighbor is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according to Proverbs 8:8: “All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them.” Now, it is written ( Luke 14:26): “If any man come to Me, and hate not his father and mother... he cannot be My disciple.”

Therefore hatred of one’s neighbor is not always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But it is in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is written ( Romans 1:30): “Detractors, hateful to God.” Therefore it is possible to hate certain people without committing a sin.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a “wandering away from what is according to nature,” according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing. Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one’s I enemy.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 1 John 2:9): “He that... hateth his brother, is in darkness.” Now spiritual darkness is sin.

Therefore there cannot be hatred of one’s neighbor without sin.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(3) —

I answer that, Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(29) , A(2) ); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of what he holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in respect of sin and lack of justice.

Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one’s brother, and whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate our brother’s nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in him, since desire for another’s good is equivalent to hatred of his evil. Consequently the hatred of one’s brother, if we consider it simply, is always sinful.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(3)- RO(1) —

By the commandment of God ( Exodus 20:12) we must honor our parents — as united to us in nature and kinship.

But we must hate them in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection of Divine justice.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(3)- RO(2) —

God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we should love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are hostile to us.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(4) Whether hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor?

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written ( 1 John 3:15): “Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer.” Now murder is the most grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we give our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to love. Therefore hatred is the worst.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(4) —

On the contrary, A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a man hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e.g. theft, murder and adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(4) —

Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Matthew 5:19, “He that shall break one of these least commandments,” says: “The commandments of Moses, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count for little in their reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed. On the other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou shalt not be angry, Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in their reward, but little in the transgression.” Now hatred is an internal movement like anger and desire. Therefore hatred of one’s brother is a less grievous sin than murder.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(4) —

I answer that, Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins, secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned against.

On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than external actions that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man’s will, which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of sin, so that if a man’s outward actions were to be inordinate, without any disorder in his will, they would not be sinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through ignorance or out of zeal for justice: and if there be anything sinful in a man’s outward sins against his neighbor, it is all to be traced to his inward hatred.

On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a man’s outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(5) Whether hatred is a capital sin?

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(5)- O(1) —

It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief of the capital sins, and the origin of all others.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(5)- O(2) —

Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations of our passions, according to Romans 7:5: “The passions of sins... did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.”

Now all other passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown above ( P(2a), Q(25) , AA(1),2 ). Therefore hatred should be reckoned one of the capital sins.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(5)- O(3) —

Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should be reckoned a capital sin.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(5) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among the seven capital sins.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(5) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(84) , AA(3),4 ), a capital vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is contrary to man’s nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all in that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is first in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first and foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good, and especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor’s good. Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and therefore it is not a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(5)- RO(1) —

As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18, “the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its nature.”

Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first among the vices, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(5)- RO(2) —

Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one’s natural good, is the first of the soul’s passions, even as love of one’s natural good is. But hatred of one’s connatural good cannot be first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of an already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(5)- RO(3) —

Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason that it is incompatible with one’s natural good, and the hatred of such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is, however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which, namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(6) Whether hatred arises from envy?

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(6)- O(1) —

It seems that hatred does not arise from envy.

For envy is sorrow for another’s good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, for, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate.

Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(6)- O(2) —

Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above ( Q(25) , A(1) ; Q(26) , A(2) ). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(6)- O(3) —

Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that “anger grows into hatred.” Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(6) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that “out of envy cometh hatred.”

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(6) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(5) ), hatred of his neighbor is a man’s last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, x).

Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor’s good, it follows that our neighbor’s good becomes hateful to us, so that “out of envy cometh hatred.”

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(6)- RO(1) —

Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement, love gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(6)- RO(2) —

Love and hatred are essentially different, for the object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures, wherefore love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place in God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been stated above ( A(1) ), that God is not an object of hatred, except in so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred towards God.

P(2b)- Q(34)- A(6)- RO(3) —

Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at first, through anger, we desire our neighbor’s evil according to a certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor’s evil, which desire is part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by anger.

QUESTION OF SLOTH (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or about our neighbor’s good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether sloth is a sin? (2) Whether it is a special vice? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is a capital sin?

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(1) Whether sloth is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a kind of sorrow, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as we stated above ( P(2a), Q(35) , A(8) ). Therefore sloth is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x, [*De Institutione Caeobiorum]): “The monk is troubled with sloth chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at regular and fixed intervals.”

Therefore sloth is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, that which proceeds from a good root is, seemingly, no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x) that “sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other monasteries and those which are a long way off are much better than the one we dwell in”: all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore sloth is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus. 21:2: “Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent.” Now Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x): “Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth is not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance.” Therefore sloth is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now such is sloth [acedia]: for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): “Bow down thy shoulder, and bear her,” namely spiritual wisdom, “and be not grieved [acedieris] with her bands.” Therefore sloth is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(1) —

I answer that, Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) is an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man’s mind, that he wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold.

Hence sloth implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on <19A618> Psalm 106:18, “Their soul abhorred all manner of meat,” and from the definition of some who say that sloth is a “sluggishness of the mind which neglects to begin good.”

Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand, pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, in truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth, sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the Apostle ( 2 Corinthians 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be “swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.”

Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow for spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in point of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an evil movement of the appetite, as appears from what has been said above ( Q(10) , A(2) ; P(2a), Q(74) , A(4) ).

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they are blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just as they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good.

Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame: whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The passions of the sensitive appetite may either be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal sin. And since the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows that on account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to commit some particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may become more insistent, through certain bodily transmutations occurring at certain fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose one to sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by sloth towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and to be parched by the sun’s heat.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(1)- RO(3) —

It is a sign of humility if a man does not think too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man contemns the good things he has received from God, this, far from being a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such like contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we reckon evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the goods of others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have received ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of sin should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance; by flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin, as in lust; for which reason it is written ( 1 Corinthians 6:18): “Fly fornication”; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us, and forthwith sloth dies away.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(2) Whether sloth is a special vice?

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that sloth is not a special vice.

For that which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite spiritual good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of continence, and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above ( A(1) ), it seems that sloth is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed to joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth should not be reckoned a special vice.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object, which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now nothing, seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this be a special vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual goods, is that they are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of weariness: while dislike of toil, and love of bodily repose seem to be due to the same cause, viz. idleness.

Hence sloth would be nothing but laziness, which seems untrue, for idleness is opposed to carefulness, whereas sloth is opposed to joy.

Therefore sloth is not a special vice.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from the other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(2) —

I answer that, Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice, because, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(71) , A(1) ), every vice shuns the spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body’s pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices, whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.

Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good, about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is proper to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists in its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to have that spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good.

In like manner the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual good which is in each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special vice, but to every vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which charity rejoices, belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(3) Whether sloth is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin.

For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth seems contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less grievous than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain in deed from some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man. But sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit. Caenob. x, l) that “sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a most vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit.” Therefore sloth is not always a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( 2 Corinthians 7:20): “The sorrow of the world worketh death.” But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow “according to God,” which is contrasted with sorrow of the world.

Therefore it is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(3) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(88) , AA(1),2 ), mortal sin is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the effect of charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which by its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason of its genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity is joy in God, as stated above ( Q(28) , A(1) ), while sloth is sorrow about spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore sloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be observed with regard to all sins that are mortal in respect of their genus, that they are not mortal, save when they attain to their perfection. Because the consummation of sin is in the consent of reason: for we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human acts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, without attaining to the consent of reason, it is a venial sin on account of the imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus of adultery, the concupiscence that goes no further than the sensuality is a venial sin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a mortal sin. So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality alone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and then it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason, which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of the Divine good, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the spirit. In this case it is evident that sloth is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(3)- RO(1) —

Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing the Sabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept, implicitly commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind about the Divine good is contrary thereto.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(3)- RO(2) —

Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any spiritual good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged to adhere. Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do acts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of sloth; but when he is sorry to have to do something for God’s sake.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in holy men, but they do not reach to the consent of reason.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(4) Whether sloth should be accounted a capital vice?

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a capital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful acts, as stated above ( Q(34) , A(5) ). Now sloth does not move one to action, but on the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it should not be accounted a capital sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to sloth, viz. “malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness in regard to the commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful things.” Now these do not seem in reality to arise from sloth. For “spite” is, seemingly the same as hatred, which arises from envy, as stated above ( Q(34) , A(6) ); “malice” is a genus which contains all vices, and, in like manner, a “wandering” of the mind after unlawful things is to be found in every vice; “sluggishness” about the commandments seems to be the same as sloth, while “faint-heartedness” and “despair” may arise from any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly accounted a capital sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as a man shirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is sorrow, and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth: and of sorrow he says that it gives rise to “spite, faint-heartedness, bitterness, despair,” whereas he states that from sloth seven things arise, viz. “idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of the mind, restlessness of the body, instability, loquacity, curiosity.” Therefore it seems that either Gregory or Isidore has wrongly assigned sloth as a capital sin together with its daughters.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(4) —

On the contrary, The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that sloth is a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(4) —

I answer that, As stated above ( P(2a), Q(84) , AA(3),4 ), a capital vice is one which easily gives rise to others as being their final cause. Now just as we do many things on account of pleasure, both in order to obtain it, and through being moved to do something under the impulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account of sorrow, either that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing something under pressure thereof. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of sorrow, as stated above ( A(2) ; P(2a), Q(85) , A(8) ), it is fittingly reckoned a capital sin.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(4)- RO(1) —

Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from doing things that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do certain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such as weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth. For since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5,6) “no man can be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant,” it follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that man shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other things that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and secondly he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of “despair,” while avoidance of those goods which are the means to the end, in matters of difficulty which come under the counsels, is the effect of “faint-heartedness,” and in matters of common righteousness, is the effect of “sluggishness about the commandments.” The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow is sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is called “spite”; and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods themselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is properly called “malice.” In so far as a man has recourse to eternal objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called “wandering after unlawful things.” From this it is clear how to reply to the objections against each of the daughters: for “malice” does not denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be understood as explained. Nor is “spite” taken as synonymous with hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same applies to the others.

P(2b)- Q(35)- A(4)- RO(3) —

This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also given by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly (Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated above ( A(2) ), sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of any other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is sorry on account of the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in so far as it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for “bitterness” which Isidore states to be the result of sorrow, is an effect of “spite.” “Idleness” and “drowsiness” are reduced to “sluggishness about the precepts”: for some are idle and omit them altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil them with negligence. All the other five which he reckons as effects of sloth, belong to the “wandering of the mind after unlawful things.” This tendency to wander, if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing after various things without rhyme or reason, is called “uneasiness of the mind,” but if it pertains to the imaginative power, it is called “curiosity”; if it affect the speech it is called “loquacity”; and in so far as it affects a body that changes place, it is called “restlessness of the body,” when, to wit, a man shows the unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of his body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to another, it is called “instability”; or “instability” may denote changeableness of purpose.

QUESTION OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is envy? (2) Whether it is a sin? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(1) Whether envy is a kind of sorrow?

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the envious man that “self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which is racked by the prosperity of another.” Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10): “Men are envious of such as are like them in genus, in knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation.” Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(47) , A(3) ) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection of goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(32) , A(3) ) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that “we envy those who have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or which we possessed at some time.” Therefore sloth is not a kind of sorrow.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a species of sorrow, and says that “envy is sorrow for another’s good.”

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(1) —

I answer that, The object of a man’s sorrow is his own evil. Now it may happen that another’s good is apprehended as one’s own evil, and in this way sorrow can be about another’s good. But this happens in two ways: first, when a man is sorry about another’s good, in so far as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man grieves for his enemy’s prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some harm: such like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9).

Secondly, another’s good may be reckoned as being one’s own evil, in so far as it conduces to the lessening of one’s own good name or excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another’s good: and consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10).

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Nothing hinders what is good for one from being reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for sorrow to be about good, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Since envy is about another’s good name in so far as it diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a man is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed from one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors to rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner whom he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who are near him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is against our will that these should be in better repute than we are, and that gives rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes pleasure in so far as it is in agreement with the will.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(1)- RO(3) —

A man does not strive for mastery in matters where he is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses him in such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort; wherefore, if his effort fails through the other’s reputation surpassing his, he grieves.

Hence it is that those who love to be honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are envious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in something great. Hence it is written ( Job 5:2): “Envy slayeth the little one,” and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that “we can envy those only whom we think better in some respect than ourselves.”

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Recollection of past goods in so far as we have had them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes sorrow; and in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that, above all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much in order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that others have acquired goods.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(2) Whether envy is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): “Let her have companions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and be nettled when they are praised.” But no one should be advised to commit a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin P(2b)- Q(36)- A(2)- O(1) — Further, “Envy is sorrow for another’s good,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes praiseworthy: for it is written ( Proverbs 29:2): “When the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn.” Therefore envy is not always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good zeal, according to Psalm 68:10: “The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up.” Therefore envy is not always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, punishment is condivided with fault.

But envy is a kind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): “When the foul sore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed, while the limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is gnashing with the teeth.” Therefore envy is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Galatians 5:26): “Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another.”

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), envy is sorrow for another’s good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First, when a man grieves for another’s good, through fear that it may cause harm either to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy, as stated above ( A(1) ), and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 11): “It very often happens that without charity being lost, both the destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and again his glory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he falls, we believe that some are deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we dread lest many suffer unjustly.”

Secondly, we may grieve over another’s good, not because he has it, but because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Corinthians 14:1: “Be zealous for spiritual gifts”: while, if it be about temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may grieve over another’s good, because he who happens to have that good is unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by virtuous goods, which make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher states, is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow \nemesis\ [*The nearest equivalent is “indignation.” The use of the word “nemesis” to signify “revenge” does not represent the original Greek.], saying that it belongs to good morals. But he says this because he considered temporal goods in themselves, in so far as they may seem great to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to the teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are unworthy, are so disposed according to God’s just ordinance, either for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such goods are as nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are prepared for good men.

Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in Holy Writ, according to Psalm 36:1: “Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy them that work iniquity,” and elsewhere ( Psalm 72:2,3): “My steps had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners [*Douay: ‘because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners’].”

Fourthly, we grieve over a man’s good, in so far as his good surpasses ours; this is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor’s good.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought to strive to progress with those who are better than we are.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(2)- RO(2) —

This argument considers sorrow for another’s good in the first sense given above.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Envy differs from zeal, as stated above.

Hence a certain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Nothing hinders a sin from being penal accidentally, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(87) , A(2) ) when we were treating of sins.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(3) Whether envy is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin.

For since envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite.

Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. P(2a), Q(74) , A(4) ]. Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants.

But envy can be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): “I myself have seen and known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and looked bitterly on its foster-brother.” Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to \nemesis\, which is a passion, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Job 5:2): “Envy slayeth the little one.” Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin.

Therefore envy is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(3) —

I answer that, Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For the genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to the aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul derives its spiritual life, according to 1 John 3:14: “We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren.”

Now the object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor’s good, but by contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor’s good, while envy grieves over it, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore it is evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.

Nevertheless, as stated above ( Q(35) , A(4) ; P(2a), Q(72) , A(5), ad 1), in every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in the sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of anger, in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are venial sins.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion of the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts, the principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not a mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is manifest.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(3)- RO(3) —

According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is contrary both to \nemesis\ and to pity, but for different reasons.

For it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his neighbor’s good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor’s evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is contrary to \nemesis\ on the part of the man whose good grieves the envious man, for \nemesis\ is sorrow for the good of the undeserving according to Psalm 72:3: “I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners” [*Douay: ‘because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners’], whereas the envious grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it.

Hence it is clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter.

Now pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is contrary to pity and charity.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(4) Whether envy is a capital vice?

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that envy is not a capital vice.

For the capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that “those who love honor and glory are more envious.” Therefore envy is not a capital vice.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than the other vices which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45): “The leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived mind under some kind of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the soul to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their wild outcry.” Now envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): “Though in every evil thing that is done, the venom of our old enemy is infused into the heart of man, yet in this wickedness the serpent stirs his whole bowels and discharges the bane of spite fitted to enter deep into the mind.” Therefore envy is not a capital sin.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly assigned by Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who says that from envy arise “hatred, tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor’s misfortunes, and grief for his prosperity.” For joy at our neighbor’s misfortunes and grief for his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears from what has been said above ( A(3) ). Therefore these should not be assigned as daughters of envy.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(4) —

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) who states that envy is a capital sin and assigns the aforesaid daughters thereto.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(4) —

I answer that, Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual good, so envy is grief for our neighbor’s good. Now it has been stated above ( Q(35) , A(4) ) that sloth is a capital vice for the reason that it incites man to do certain things, with the purpose either of avoiding sorrow or of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy is accounted a capital vice for the same reason.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(4)- RO(1) —

As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), “the capital vices are so closely akin to one another that one springs from the other. For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by corrupting the mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves for the power of an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should acquire that power.”

Consequently the notion of a capital vice does not exclude its originating from another vice, but it demands that it should have some principal reason for being itself the origin of several kinds of sin. However it is perhaps because envy manifestly arises from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. v, 1).

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(4)- RO(2) —

It does not follow from the passage quoted that envy is the greatest of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to envy, he is enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart, for as quoted further on in the same passage, “by the envy of the devil, death came into the world” (Wis. 2:24).

There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most grievous sins, viz. envy of another’s spiritual good, which envy is a sorrow for the increase of God’s grace, and not merely for our neighbor’s good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, because thereby a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who is glorified in His works.

P(2b)- Q(36)- A(4)- RO(3) —

The number of envy’s daughters may be understood for the reason that in the struggle aroused by envy there is something by way of beginning, something by way of middle, and something by way of term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower another’s reputation, and this either secretly, and then we have “talebearing,” or openly, and then we have “detraction.” The middle consists in the fact that when a man aims at defaming another, he is either able to do so, and then we have “joy at another’s misfortune,” or he is unable, and then we have “grief at another’s prosperity.” The term is hatred itself, because just as good which delights causes love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above ( Q(34) , A(6) ). Grief at another’s prosperity is in one way the very same as envy, when, to Wit, a man grieves over another’s prosperity, in so far as it gives the latter a good name, but in another way it is a daughter of envy, in so far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper notwithstanding his efforts to prevent it. On the other hand, “joy at another’s misfortune” is not directly the same as envy, but is a result thereof, because grief over our neighbor’s good which is envy, gives rise to joy in his evil.

QUESTION OF DISCORD, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO PEACE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall consider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention, which is on the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz. schism, quarrelling, war, and sedition. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether discord is a sin? (2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(1) Whether discord is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that discord is not a sin. For to disaccord with man is to sever oneself from another’s will. But this does not seem to be a sin, because God’s will alone, and not our neighbor’s, is the rule of our own will. Therefore discord is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, whoever induces another to sin, sins also himself. But it appears not to be a sin to incite others to discord, for it is written ( Acts 23:6) that Paul, knowing that the one part were Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, cried out in the council: “Men brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when he had so said, there arose a dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees.”

Therefore discord is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not to be found in a holy man. But discord is to be found even among holy men, for it is written ( Acts 15:39): “There arose a dissension” between Paul and Barnabas, “so that they departed one from another.” Therefore discord is not a sin. and least of all a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(1) —

On the contrary, “Dissensions,” that is, discords, are reckoned among the works of the flesh ( Galatians 5:20), of which it is said afterwards ( Galatians 5:21) that “they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” Now nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from the kingdom of God. Therefore discord is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(1) —

I answer that, Discord is opposed to concord. Now, as stated above ( Q(29) , AA(1),3 ) concord results from charity, in as much as charity directs many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the Divine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord.

But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in two ways: first, directly; secondly, accidentally. Now, human acts and movements are said to be direct when they are according to one’s intention. Wherefore a man directly disaccords with his neighbor, when he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and his neighbor’s good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal sin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity, although the first movements of such discord are venial sins by reason of their being imperfect acts.

The accidental in human acts is that which occurs beside the intention.

Hence when several intend a good pertaining to God’s honor, or our neighbor’s profit, while one deems a certain thing good, and another thinks contrariwise, the discord is in this case accidentally contrary to the Divine good or that of our neighbor. Such like discord is neither sinful nor against charity, unless it be accompanied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by undue obstinacy, since it has also been stated above ( Q(29) , AA(1),3 , ad 2) that the concord which is an effect of charity, is union of wills not of opinions. It follows from this that discord is sometimes the sin of one party only, for instance, when one wills a good which the other knowingly resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both parties, as when each dissents from the other’s good, and loves his own.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(1)- RO(1) —

One man’s will considered in itself is not the rule of another man’s will; but in so far as our neighbor’s will adheres to God’s will, it becomes in consequence, a rule regulated according to its proper measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord with such a will, because by that very fact one disaccords with the Divine rule.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Just as a man’s will that adheres to God is a right rule, to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man’s will that is opposed to God is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good. Hence to cause a discord, whereby a good concord resulting from charity is destroyed, is a grave sin: wherefore it is written ( Proverbs 6:16): “Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth,” which seventh is stated ( Proverbs 6:19) to be “him that soweth discord among brethren.” On the other hand, to arouse a discord whereby an evil concord (i.e. concord in an evil will) is destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to be commended for sowing discord among those who concorded together in evil, because Our Lord also said of Himself ( Matthew 10:34): “I came not to send peace, but the sword.”

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental and not direct: because each intended some good, yet the one thought one thing good, while the other thought something else, which was owing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not about things necessary to salvation. Moreover all this was ordained by Divine providence, on account of the good which would ensue.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(2) Whether discord is a daughter of vainglory?

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that discord is not a daughter of vainglory. For anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. Now discord is apparently the daughter of anger, according to Proverbs 15:18: “A passionate man stirreth up strifes.” Therefore it is not a daughter of vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine expounding the words of John 7:39, “As yet the Spirit was not given,” says (Tract. xxxii) “Malice severs, charity unites.” Now discord is merely a separation of wills.

Therefore discord arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, whatever gives rise to many evils, would seem to be a capital vice. Now such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on Matthew 12:25, “Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate,” says: “Just as concord makes small things thrive, so discord brings the greatest things to ruin.” Therefore discord should itself be reckoned a capital vice, rather than a daughter of vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(2) —

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(2) —

I answer that, Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so far, to wit, as one man’s will holds fast to one thing, while the other man’s will holds fast to something else. Now if a man’s will holds fast to its own ground, this is due to the act that he prefers what is his own to that which belongs to others, and if he do this inordinately, it is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord, whereby a man holds to his own way of thinking, and departs from that of others, is reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Strife is not the same as discord, for strife consists in external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should arise from anger, which incites the mind to hurt one’s neighbor; whereas discord consists in a divergence in the movements of wills, which arises from pride or vainglory, for the reason given above.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(2)- RO(2) —

In discord we may consider that which is the term “wherefrom,” i.e. another’s will from which we recede, and in this respect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is the term “whither,” i.e. something of our own to which we cling, and in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment the term “whither” is more important than the term “wherefrom” (because the end is of more account than the beginning), discord is accounted a daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may arise from both for different reasons, as stated.

P(2b)- Q(37)- A(2)- RO(3) —

The reason why concord makes small things thrive, while discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because “the more united a force is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the weaker it becomes” (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills, and in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as though it were a capital vice.

QUESTION OF CONTENTION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether contention is a mortal sin? (2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(1) Whether contention is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be found in them, according to Luke 22:24: “And there was also a strife amongst” the disciples of Jesus, “which of them should... be the greatest.”

Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says ( Philippians 1:17): “Some out of contention preach Christ,” and afterwards he says ( Philippians 1:18): “In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.” Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, it happens that people contend either in the courts or in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a good intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with heretics. Hence a gloss on 1 Kings 14:1, “It came to pass one day,” etc. says: “Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless they are first challenged to dispute.” Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to Job 39:32: “Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily silenced?” And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said of him ( Job 42:7): “You have not spoken the thing that is right before me, as my servant Job hath.” Therefore contention is not always a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(1) —

On the contrary, It is against the precept of the Apostle who says ( 2 Timothy 2:14): “Contend not in words.”

Moreover ( Galatians 5:20) contention is included among the works of the flesh, and as stated there ( Galatians 5:21) “they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” Now whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God and is against a precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(1) —

I answer that, To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention signifies contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts various contrary things in a speech, this is called “contentio,” which Tully calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren. iv), where he says that “it consists in developing a speech from contrary things,” for instance: “Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most bitter end.”

Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with regard to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must consider whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be blamed, or against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the manner, we must consider whether his manner of contending is in keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that “contention is a sharp speech suitable for proof and refutation” — or whether it exceeds the demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which case it is blameworthy.

Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose [*Cf. Gloss. Ord. in Romans 1:29] defines contention: “Contention is a disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence.” If, however, contention denote a disavowal of what is false, with the proper measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin, unless the contention be conducted so inordinately, as to give scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying ( 2 Timothy 2:14): “Contend not in words,” adds, “for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers.”

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The disciples of Christ contended together, not with the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought not to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and for this reason Our Lord checked them.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Those who preached Christ “out of contention,” were to be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith, but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that they thought they would “raise affliction” to the Apostle who was preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their contention, but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that Christ would be made known — since evil is sometimes the occasion of good results.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or in a disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when, whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e. in respect of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute.

For Job had said ( 13:3): “I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to reason with God”: yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be inordinate in mind or in speech.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(2) Whether contention is a daughter of vainglory?

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that contention is not a daughter of vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written ( Corinthians 3:3): “Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: ‘envying’] and contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men?” Now zeal pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the voice. But the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the matter of pride and vainglory, according to 1 Corinthians 8:1: “Knowledge puffeth up.” Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by knowledge we do not impugn the truth, we know it.

Therefore contention is not a daughter of vainglory.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(2) —

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(37) , A(2) ), discord is a daughter of vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings to his own opinion, rather than acquiesce with the other. Now it is proper to pride and vainglory to seek one’s own glory. And just as people are discordant when they hold to their own opinion in their hearts, so are they contentious when each defends his own opinion by words.

Consequently contention is reckoned a daughter of vainglory for the same reason as discord.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so far as a man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or with whom he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he clings to his own opinion, as stated above ( Q(37) , A(2), ad 1).

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The contention of which we are speaking puts on a loud voice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not the chief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention arises from the same source as the raising of the voice.

P(2b)- Q(38)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by goods even those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is proud of his humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does so not directly but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why the “per se” and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not result from the contraries of those things which are the occasion of pride.

QUESTION OF SCHISM (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to deeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first place, then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether schism is a special sin? (2) Whether it is graver than unbelief? (3) Of the power exercised by schismatics; (4) Of the punishment inflicted on them.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(1) Whether schism is a special sin?

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that schism is not a special sin.

For “schism,” as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad Victor. et Pancrat.), “denotes a division.” But every sin causes a division, according to Isaiah 59:: “Your sins have divided between you and your God.” Therefore schism is not a special sin.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys the Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) “is disobedience against the heavenly commandments.”

Therefore every sin is a schism.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, heresy also divides a man from the unity of faith. If, therefore, the word schism denotes a division, it would seem not to differ, as a special sin, from the sin of unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; Contra Crescon. ii, 4) distinguishes between schism and heresy, for he says that a “schismatic is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same worship, as others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the community, whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that of the Catholic Church.” Therefore schism is not a generic sin.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(1) —

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its name “from being a scission of minds,” and scission is opposed to unity. Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and essentially opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical order, the species is not constituted by that which is accidental. Now, in the moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and that which results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental. Hence the sin of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the reason that the schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity which is the effect of charity: because charity unites not only one person to another with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole Church in unity of spirit.

Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church; for this is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several individuals among themselves is subordinate to the unity of the Church, even as the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural body is subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the unity of the Church consists in two things; namely, in the mutual connection or communion of the members of the Church, and again in the subordination of all the members of the Church to the one head, according to Colossians 2:18,19: “Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands, being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God.”

Now this Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent in the Church is the Sovereign Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are those who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion with those members of the Church who acknowledge his supremacy.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The division between man and God that results from sin is not intended by the sinner: it happens beside his intention as a result of his turning inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is not schism properly so called.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The essence of schism consists in rebelliously disobeying the commandments: and I say “rebelliously,” since a schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church, and refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do this, wherefore not every sin is a schism.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those things to which each is opposed essentially and directly.

For heresy is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith and charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This is what Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians [*In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10]: “I consider the difference between schism and heresy to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs a man from the Church.” Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is the road to the loss of faith, according to Timothy 1:6: “From which things,” i.e. charity and the like, “some going astray, are turned aside into vain babbling,” so too, schism is the road to heresy. Wherefore Jerome adds (In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that “at the outset it is possible, in a certain respect, to find a difference between schism and heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for separating from the Church.”

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(2) Whether schism is a graver sin than unbelief?

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief. For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Deuteronomy 25:2: “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.” Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read ( Exodus 32:28) that some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of idolatry: whereas of the sin of schism we read ( Numbers 16:30): “If the Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them down, and all things that belong to them, and they go down alive into hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God.”

Moreover the ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from the rule of David were most severely punished ( 2 Kings 17). Therefore the sin of schism is graver than the sin of unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, “The good of the multitude is greater and more godlike than the good of the individual,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude, namely, ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the particular good of one man, namely the faith of an individual. Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed to charity, which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is opposed, as shown above ( Q(10) , A(2) ; Q(23) , A(6) ). Therefore schism is a graver sin than unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(2) —

On the contrary, That which results from an addition to something else surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy results from something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt doctrine, as Jerome declares in the passage quoted above ( A(1), ad 3). Therefore schism is a less grievous sin than unbelief.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(2) —

I answer that, The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways: first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to its circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in number, so too they can be varied in an infinite number of ways: wherefore if one were to ask in general which of two sins is the graver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity derived from the sin’s genus.

Now the genus or species of a sin is taken from its object, as shown above ( P(2a), Q(72) , A(1) ; P(2a), Q(73) , A(3) ). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to the greater good is, in respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance a sin committed against God is graver than a sin committed against one’s neighbor.

Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God Himself, according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith is founded; whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which is a participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore it is manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous than the sin of schism, although it may happen that a particular schismatic sins more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either because his contempt is greater, or because his sin is a source of greater danger, or for some similar reason.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(2)- RO(1) —

It had already been declared to that people by the law which they had received that there was one God, and that no other God was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for those who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be punished in an unwonted manner: it was enough that they should be punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well known among them that Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it behooved those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in a miraculous and unwonted manner.

We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to seditions and schisms. For it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): “This city since days gone by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and wars were raised therein [*Vulg.: ‘This city is a rebellious city, and hurtful to the kings and provinces, and... wars were raised therein of old’].” Now sometimes a more severe punishment is inflicted for an habitual sin (as stated above, P(2a), Q(105), A(2), ad 9), because punishments are medicines intended to keep man away from sin: so that where there is greater proneness to sin, a more severe punishment ought to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes, they were punished not only for the sin of schism, but also for that of idolatry as stated in the passage quoted.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic good to which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank in the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed, is less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Charity has two objects; one is its principal object and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object and is our neighbor’s good. Now schism and other sins against our neighbor, are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good, which is less than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred of God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object, is not less grievous than unbelief.

Nevertheless of all sins committed by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem to be the greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(3) Whether schismatics have any power?

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that schismatics have some power. For Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): “Just as those who come back to the Church after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who return after being ordained, are not ordained again.” Now Order is a kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power since they retain their Orders.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt. [*De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 5]): “One who is separated can confer a sacrament even as he can have it.” But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very great power. Therefore schismatics who are separated from the Church, have a spiritual power.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, Pope Urban II [*Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf. Can. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1] says: “We command that persons consecrated by bishops who were themselves consecrated according to the Catholic rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the Roman Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders should be acknowledged, when they return to the unity of the Church, provided they be of commendable life and knowledge.” But this would not be so, unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics. Therefore schismatics have spiritual power.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu. 1, can. Novatianus): “He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church, and from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power or honor.”

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(3) —

I answer that, Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of the Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: as appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated, is not consecrated again unless it has been broken up.

Consequently such a power as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who has received it by consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall into schism or heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he come back to the Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, however, the lower power ought not to exercise its act, except in so far as it is moved by the higher power, as may be seen also in the physical order, it follows that such persons lose the use of their power, so that it is not lawful for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this power has its effect in sacramental acts, because therein man acts only as God’s instrument, so that sacramental effects are not precluded on account of any fault whatever in the person who confers the sacrament.

On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is conferred by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not adhere to the recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in heretics and schismatics; and consequently they neither absolve nor excommunicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and if they do, it is invalid.

Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second power, or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to the essence of the power, but to its lawful use.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(4) Whether it is right that schismatics should be punished with excommunication?

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished with excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a share in the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5) that “Baptism can be received from a schismatic.” Therefore it seems that excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, it is the duty of Christ’s faithful to lead back those who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain persons ( Ezekiel 34:4): “That which was driven away you have not brought again, neither have you sought that which was lost.” Now schismatics are more easily brought back by such as may hold communion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be excommunicated.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and the same sin, according to Nahum 1:9: “God will not judge the same twice” [*Septuagint version]. Now some receive a temporal punishment for the sin of schism, according to Q(23) , A(5), where it is stated: “Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who are severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must be punished by the secular power.” Therefore they ought not to be punished with excommunication.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written ( Numbers 16:26): “Depart from the tents of these wicked men,” those, to wit, who had caused the schism, “and touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins.”

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(4) —

I answer that, According to Wis. 11:11, “By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he should be punished” [Vulg.: ‘he is tormented’]. Now a schismatic, as shown above ( A(1) ), commits a twofold sin: first by separating himself from communion with the members of the Church, and in this respect the fitting punishment for schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse submission to the head of the Church, wherefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by the Church’s spiritual power, it is just that they should be compelled by the secular power.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(4)- RO(1) —

It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a schismatic, save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man to quit this life, marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom he may receive it, whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that mark, which is bestowed in Baptism.

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse whereby a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the Church those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their separation, they are sometimes led to do penance

P(2b)- Q(39)- A(4)- RO(3) — The punishments of the present life are medicinal, and therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel a man, another is added: just as physicians employ several body medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment suffices, another should not be employed.

QUESTION OF WAR (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether some kind of war is lawful? (2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight? (3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes? (4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(1) Whether it is always sinful to wage war?

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war. Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Matthew 26:52: “All that take the sword shall perish with the sword.”

Therefore all wars are unlawful.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written ( Matthew 5:39): “But I say to you not to resist evil”; and ( Romans 12:19): “Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath.” Therefore war is always sinful.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore it seems that war is a sin in itself.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the centurion [*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: “If the Christian Religion forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their arms, and to give up soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: ‘Do violence to no man... and be content with your pay’ [* Luke 3:14]. If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering.”

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(1) —

I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle ( Romans 13:4): “He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil”; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority ( Psalm 81:4): “Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner”; and for this reason Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): “The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority.”

Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.

Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super Jos.): “A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly.”

Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine’s works, but Can. Apud. Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]): “True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.” For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): “The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war.”

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): “To take the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone, without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority.” On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak, of God, is not to “take the sword,” but to use it as commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Marcellin. cxxxviii): “Those whom we have to punish with a kindly severity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will. For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like an internal enemy.”

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord “came not to send upon earth” ( Matthew 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix): “We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace.”

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no such danger, and hence they were called “exercises of arms” or “bloodless wars,” as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference incorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i].

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight?

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight. For, as stated above ( A(1) ), wars are lawful and just in so far as they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): “The wolf comes upon the sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and was not, leaveth the sheep, end flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice.” Therefore it is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can.

Igitur): “As untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and covertly; for which reason we commanded our people to gather together, and ordered them to go down to the seashore.” Therefore it is lawful for bishops to fight.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man does a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another, according to Romans 1:32: “They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them.”

Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of Adrian, bishop of Rome.

Therefore they also are allowed to fight.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and meritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni timore) that if “a man die for the true faith, or to save his country, or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward.” Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(2) —

On the contrary, It was said to Peter as representing bishops and clerics ( Matthew 16:52): “Put up again thy sword into the scabbard [Vulg.: ‘its place’] [*”Scabbard” is the reading in John 18:11].”

Therefore it is not lawful for them to fight.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(2) —

I answer that, Several things are requisite for the good of a human society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a number of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 1), while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another, that they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore those who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy themselves with things of small importance. Thus according to human laws, soldiers who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage in commerce [*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.].

Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine things, the praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong to the duties of a cleric.

Wherefore just as commercial enterprises are forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so too are warlike pursuits, according to 2 Timothy 2:4: “No man being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business.” The second reason is a special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are directed to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ is represented sacramentally, according to Corinthians 11:26: “As often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord, until He come.”

Wherefore it is unbecoming for them to slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed what they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been decreed that those who shed blood, even without sin, become irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully do that which renders him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(2)- RO(1) —

Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons, according to the saying of the Apostle ( 2 Corinthians 10:4): “The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God.” Such are salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, the sentence of excommunication.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps. Thus in the Old Testament ( Joshua 6:4) the priests were commanded to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the front: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(2)- RO(3) —

As stated above ( Q(23) , A(4), ad 2) every power, art or virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is unbecoming their personality.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Although it is meritorious to wage a just war, nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(3) Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(3)- O(1) —

It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war. For it is written ( Deuteronomy 16:20): “Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just.” But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a just war.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one’s enemy, as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one’s enemies.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( Matthew 7:12): “Whatsoever you would that men should do to you,| do you also to them”: and we ought to observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by laying ambushes.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(3) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos): “Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be carried on openly or by ambushes”: and he proves this by the authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai ( Joshua 8:2).

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(3) —

I answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another’s word or deed in two ways. First, through being told something false, or through the breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain “rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies,” as Ambrose states (De Officiis i).

Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according to Matthew 7:6: “Give not that which is holy, to dogs.” Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy. For this reason among other things that a soldier has to learn is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy’s knowledge, as stated in the Book on Strategy [*Stratagematum i, 1] by Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war.

Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything from him This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(4)- O(1) —

It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days.

For holy days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God. Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Exodus 20:8: for “sabbath” is interpreted “rest.” But wars are full of unrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, certain persons are reproached ( Isaiah 58:3) because on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it unlawful to fight on holy days.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal harm. But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed.

Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of avoiding temporal harm.

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(4) —

On the contrary, It is written (1 Machab 2:41): The Jews rightly determined... saying: “Whosoever shall come up against us to fight on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him.”

P(2b)- Q(40)- A(4) —

I answer that, The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those things which are ordained to man’s safety, even that of his body. Hence Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying ( John 7:23): “Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?”

Hence physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days.

Now there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal (whereby many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual.

Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common weal of the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days, provided there be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain from fighting.

However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

QUESTION OF STRIFE (TWO ARTICLES)

[*Strife here denotes fighting between individuals] We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether strife is a sin? (2) Whether it is a daughter of anger?

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(1) Whether strife is always a sin?

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that strife is not always a sin.

For strife seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x) that the word “rixosus [quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling [rictu] of a dog, because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he delights in brawling, and provokes contention.” Now contention is not always a sin.

Neither, therefore, is strife.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, it is related ( Genesis 26:21) that the servants of Isaac “digged” another well, “and for that they quarrelled likewise.” Now it is not credible that the household of Isaac quarrelled publicly, without being reproved by him, supposing it were a sin.

Therefore strife is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, strife seems to be a war between individuals. But war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Strifes [*The Douay version has ‘quarrels’] are reckoned among the works of the flesh ( Galatians 5:20), and “they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.”

Therefore strifes are not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(1) —

I answer that, While contention implies a contradiction of words, strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds.

Wherefore a gloss on Galatians 5:20 says that “strifes are when persons strike one another through anger.” Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it takes place between private persons, being declared not by public authority, but rather by an inordinate will. Therefore strife is always sinful. In fact it is a mortal sin in the man who attacks another unjustly, for it is not without mortal sin that one inflicts harm on another even if the deed be done by the hands. But in him who defends himself, it may be without sin, or it may sometimes involve a venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends on his intention and on his manner of defending himself. For if his sole intention be to withstand the injury done to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say properly that there is strife on his part. But if, on the other hand, his self-defense be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a sin. It is a venial sin, if a slight movement of hatred or vengeance obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed moderation in defending himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes for his assailant with the fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting grievous harm on him.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(1)- RO(1) —

Strife is not just the same as contention: and there are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which express the inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is always ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, “ever ready to contradict,” that is to say, whether the other man says or does well or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the passage proceeds, “and delights in brawling.” Thirdly, “he” provokes others to quarrel, wherefore it goes on, “and provokes contention.”

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The sense of the text is not that the servants of Isaac quarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country quarrelled with them: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore the calumny [*Cf. Genesis 26:20].

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(1)- RO(3) —

In order for a war to be just it must be declared by authority of the governing power, as stated above ( Q(40) , A(1) ); whereas strife proceeds from a private feeling of anger or hatred. For if the servants of a sovereign or judge, in virtue of their public authority, attack certain men and these defend themselves, it is not the former who are said to be guilty of strife, but those who resist the public authority.

Hence it is not the assailants in this case who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those who defend themselves inordinately.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2) Whether strife is a daughter of anger?

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger. For it is written ( James 4:1): “Whence are wars and contentions? Are they not... from your concupiscences, which war in your members?”

But anger is not in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a daughter, not of anger, but of concupiscence.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, it is written ( Proverbs 28:25): “He that boasteth and puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels.” Now strife is apparently the same as quarrel. Therefore it seems that strife is a daughter of pride or vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( Proverbs 18:6): “The lips of a fool intermeddle with strife.” Now folly differs from anger, for it is opposed, not to meekness, but to wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2)- O(4) —

Further, it is written ( Proverbs 10:12): “Hatred stirreth up strifes.” But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger, but of envy.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2)- O(5) —

Further, it is written ( Proverbs 17:19): “He that studieth discords, soweth [Vulg.: ‘loveth’] quarrels.” But discord is a daughter of vainglory, as stated above ( Q(37) , A(2) ). Therefore strife is also.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that “anger gives rise to strife”; and it is written ( Proverbs 15:18; 29:22): “A passionate man stirreth up strifes.”

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), strife denotes an antagonism extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another.

Now there are two ways in which one man may intend to harm another. In one way it is as though he intended absolutely the other’s hurt, which in this case is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is directed to the hurt of one’s enemy either openly or secretly. In another way a man intends to hurt another who knows and withstands his intention. This is what we mean by strife, and belongs properly to anger which is the desire of vengeance: for the angry man is not content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him to feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what he has done, as may be seen from what has been said above about the passion of anger ( P(2a), Q(46) , A(6), ad 2).

Therefore, properly speaking, strife arises from anger.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2)- RO(1) —

As stated above ( P(2a), Q(25) , AA(1),2 ), all the irascible passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty, so that whatever is the immediate outcome of anger, arises also from concupiscence as from its first root.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Boasting and puffing up of self which are the result of anger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional cause of quarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being preferred to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results in quarrel and strife.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Anger, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(48) , A(3) ) hinders the judgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to folly.

Hence they have a common effect, since it is due to a defect in the reason that a man designs to hurt another inordinately.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2)- RO(4) —

Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is not the proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it is beside his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner, since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel. But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the proper effect of anger, for the reason given above.

P(2b)- Q(41)- A(2)- RO(5) —

Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the hearts of those who are guilty of strife, and so he that “studies,” i.e., intends to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that strife is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly.

QUESTION OF SEDITION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a special sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(1) Whether sedition is a special sin distinct from other sins?

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that sedition is not a special sin distinct from other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), “a seditious man is one who sows dissent among minds, and begets discord.” Now, by provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no other kind of sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems that sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord.

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, sedition denotes a kind of division.

Now schism takes its name from scission, as stated above ( Q(39) , A(1) ).

Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that of schism.

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, every special sin that is distinct from other sins, is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now sedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a special sin, distinct from other sins.

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other sins ( 2 Corinthians 12:20).

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(1) —

I answer that, Sedition is a special sin, having something in common with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has something in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and it differs from them in two points. First, because war and strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, or the preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on 2 Corinthians 12:20 says that “seditions are tumults tending to fight,” when, to wit, a number of people make preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly, they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being as it were between one people and another, whereas strife is between one individual and another, or between few people on one side and few on the other side, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part. Wherefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, namely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin.

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(1)- RO(1) —

A seditious man is one who incites others to sedition, and since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that a seditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only in him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one another inordinately.

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Sedition differs from schism in two respects.

First, because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the multitude, viz. ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to the temporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city or kingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dissent.

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord, since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between the parts of a multitude.

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(2) Whether sedition is always a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(2)- O(1) —

It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin. For sedition denotes “a tumult tending to fight,” according to the gloss quoted above ( A(1) ). But fighting is not always a mortal sin, indeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above ( Q(40) , A(1) ).

Much more, therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above ( A(1), ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some dissension in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to retain the tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore there can be sedition without mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Apostle forbids seditions together with other things that are mortal sins ( 2 Corinthians 12:20).

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( A(1), ad 2), sedition is contrary to the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom. Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that “wise men understand the word people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the common good.” Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which sedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it assails surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife.

Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors, who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the common good, and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves seditious, even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because he defends himself, as stated above ( Q(41) , A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(2)- RO(1) —

It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common good, as stated above ( Q(40) , A(1) ). But sedition runs counter to the common good of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Discord from what is not evidently good, may be without sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without sin: and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity of the multitude, which is a manifest good.

P(2b)- Q(42)- A(2)- RO(3) —

A tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; Ethic. viii, 10). Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless indeed the tyrant’s rule be disturbed so inordinately, that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant’s government.

Indeed it is the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler, and to the injury of the multitude.

QUESTION OF SCANDAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice, those, to wit, whereby one harms one’s neighbor unjustly. But scandal seems to be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here consider scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) What is scandal? (2) Whether scandal is a sin? (3) Whether it is a special sin? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin? (5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized? (6) Whether they can give scandal? (7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal? (8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal?

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1) Whether scandal is fittingly defined as being something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual downfall?

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1)- O(1) —

It would seem that scandal is unfittingly defined as “something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual downfall.” For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on ( A(2) ). Now, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), a sin is a “word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God.” Therefore the definition given above is insufficient, since it omits “thought” or “desire.”

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, since among virtuous or right acts one is more virtuous or more right than another, that one alone which has perfect rectitude would not seem to be a “less” right one. If, therefore, scandal is something “less” rightly said or done, it follows that every virtuous act except the best of all, is a scandal.

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, an occasion is an accidental cause. But nothing accidental should enter a definition, because it does not specify the thing defined. Therefore it is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say that it is an “occasion.”

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, whatever a man does may be the occasion of another’s spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are indeterminate. Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions another’s spiritual downfall, any deed or word can be a scandal: and this seems unreasonable.

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1)- O(5) —

Further, a man occasions his neighbor’s spiritual downfall when he offends or weakens him. Now scandal is condivided with offense and weakness, for the Apostle says ( Romans 14:21): “It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized, or weakened.”

Therefore the aforesaid definition of scandal is unfitting.

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Jerome in expounding Matthew 15:12, “Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word,” etc. says: “When we read ‘Whosoever shall scandalize,’ the sense is ‘Whosoever shall, by deed or word, occasion another’s spiritual downfall.’“

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1) — I answer that, As Jerome observes the Greek \skandalon\ may be rendered offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For when a body, while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it may happen to stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such an obstacle is a \skandalon\.

In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be disposed to a spiritual downfall by another’s word or deed, in so far, to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called.

Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall, except that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his downfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as “something less rightly done or said, that occasions another’s spiritual downfall.”

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the heart, wherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an obstacle conducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come under the head of scandal.

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1)- RO(2) —

A thing is said to be less right, not because something else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack of rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man were to “sit at meat in the idol’s temple” ( 1 Corinthians 8:10), though this is not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention, yet, since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man’s spiritual downfall. Hence the Apostle says ( Thessalonians 5:22): “From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves.”

Scandal is therefore fittingly described as something done “less rightly,” so as to comprise both whatever is sinful in itself, and all that has an appearance of evil.

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1)- RO(3) —

As stated above ( P(2a), Q(75) , AA(2),3 ; P(2a), Q(80) , A(1) ), nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man’s spiritual downfall, which is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another man’s words or deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a cause, but an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an accidental cause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions should not make mention of things that are accidental, since what is accidental to one, may be proper to something else: thus the accidental cause is mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5).

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Another’s words or deed may be the cause of another’s sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature as to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly commits a sin or does something that has an appearance of sin. In this case he that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an occasion of another’s spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called “active scandal.” One man’s word or deed is the accidental cause of another’s sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one, through being ill-disposed, is led into sin, for instance, into envy of another’s good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not, so far as he is concerned, afford an occasion of the other’s downfall, but it is this other one who takes the occasion according to Romans 7:8: “Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence.” Wherefore this is “passive,” without “active scandal,” since he that acts rightly does not, for his own part, afford the occasion of the other’s downfall. Sometimes therefore it happens that there is active scandal in the one together with passive scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin being induced thereto by another; sometimes there is active without passive scandal, for instance when one, by word or deed, provokes another to sin, and the latter does not consent; and sometimes there is passive without active scandal, as we have already said.

P(2b)- Q(43)- A(1)- RO(5) —

“Weakness” denotes proneness to scandal; while “offense” signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin, which resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and “scandal” is the stumbling that results in downfall.