QUESTIONS 110-114 QUESTION OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice.

Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth? (2) Of the species of lying; (3) Whether lying is always a sin? (4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(1) Whether lying is always opposed to truth?

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible with truth, since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by this virtue one tells the truth both in one’s speech and in one’s life. But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii) that “a lie is a false signification by words.” Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the “liar’s sin is the desire to deceive.” But this is not opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): “Let no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive.

Wherefore a false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie.” But this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(1) —

I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in relation to the will’s act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated above ( P(1), Q(18) , AA(6),7 ).

Now it has been said above ( Q(109), A(1), ad 3) that the virtue of truth — and consequently the opposite vices — regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.

Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood — materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.

However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false; wherefore also the word “mendacium” [lie] is derived from its being in opposition to the “mind.” Consequently if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker’s intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters’ falsehood formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.

That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even though the form’s effect be lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of truth.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(1)- RO(1) —

We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally and essentially rather than according to what is in it materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the truth.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(1)- RO(2) —

As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that “a lie is a false signification by words,” the term “words” denotes every kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(1)- RO(3) —

The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to the species of its cause.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(2) Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and mischievous lies?

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into “officious,” “jocose” and “mischievous” lies. For a division should be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part. Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect: for a “jocose” lie is told in order to make fun, an “officious” lie for some useful purpose, and a “mischievous” lie in order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of lies. The first is “in religious doctrine”; the second is “a lie that profits no one and injures someone”; the third “profits one party so as to injure another”; the fourth is “told out of mere lust of lying and deceiving”; the fifth is “told out of the desire to please”; the sixth “injures no one, and profits /someone in saving his money”; the seventh “injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death”; the eighth “injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the body.”

Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is insufficient.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into “boasting,” which exceeds the truth in speech, and “irony,” which falls short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(2) —

On the contrary, A gloss on Psalm 5:7, “Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie,” says “that there are three kinds of lies; for some are told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is another kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of malice.” The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided into these three kinds.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(2) —

I answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways.

First, with respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential division of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and this belongs to “boasting,” and the lie which stops short of the truth, and this belongs to “irony.” This division is an essential division of lying itself, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition.

Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, and with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this is called a “mischievous” lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed to some good — either of pleasure and then it is a “jocose” lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the “officious” lie, whereby it is intended to help another person, or to save him from being injured. In this way lies are divided into the three kinds aforesaid.

Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are contained under “mischievous” lies, which are either against God, and then we have the lie “in religious doctrine,” or against man, and this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second kind of lie, which “profits no one, and injures someone”; or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting another, and this is the third kind of lie, “which profits one, and injures another.” Of these the first is the most grievous, because sins against God are always more grievous, as stated above ( P(1), Q(73) , A(3) ): and the second is more grievous than the third, since the latter’s gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting another.

After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a fourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition or diminution; and this is the lie which is told “out of mere lust of lying and deceiving.” This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in lying.”

The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying. For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told “with a desire to please”: and the remaining three are comprised under the officious lie, wherein something useful to another person is intended. This usefulness regards either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie, which “profits someone in saving his money”; or his body, and this is the seventh kind, which “saves a man from death”; or the morality of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which “saves him from unlawful defilement of his body.”

Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better than the pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue than the life of the body.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3) Whether every lie is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet they seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the words of Christ and of others often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly one of them must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin.

But the midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that “God built them houses” ( Exodus 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very holy men that they lied. Thus ( Genesis 12 and 20) we are told that Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing ( Genesis 27:27-29).

Again, Judith is commended (Judith 15:10,11) although she lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3)- O(4) —

Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person’s mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another from being killed.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3)- O(5) —

Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised. Yet one is not bound to keep all one’s promises: for Isidore says (Synonym. ii): “Break your faith when you have promised ill.”

Therefore not every lie is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3)- O(6) —

Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): “Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he deceives others.” Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the sake of giving pleasure.

Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3) —

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): “Be not willing to make any manner of lie.”

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3) —

I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise.” Therefore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3)- RO(1) —

It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ.

That the words of certain people are variously reported in the Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): “He that has the wit to understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what words that sense is expressed.” Hence it is evident, as he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that “we must not judge that someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way and in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or heard.”

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3)- RO(2) —

The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated ( Exodus 2:21): “And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses.” But the subsequent lie was not meritorious.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3)- RO(3) —

In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib.

De Mend. v), the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If, however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): “We must believe that whatever is related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned as being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically.” As to Abraham “when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was the daughter of his father,” Augustine says (QQ. Super. Genesis xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself said ( Genesis 20:12): “She is truly my sister, the daughter of my father, and not the daughter of my mother,” being related to him on his father’s side. Jacob’s assertion that he was Esau, Isaac’s first-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter’s birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of this mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.

Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that her words contain truth in some mystical sense.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3)- RO(4) —

A lie is sinful not only because it injures one’s neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3)- RO(5) —

A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two reasons.

First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful, because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind. Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising — since he promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for granted — nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go ( 2 Corinthians 1), did not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(3)- RO(6) —

An action may be considered in two ways.

First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v), “it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify.”

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4) Whether every lie is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is written ( Psalm 6:7): “Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie,” and (Wis. 1:11): “The mouth that belieth killeth the soul.” Now mortal sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: “Thou shalt not bear false witness.” Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): “Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of iniquity.” Now no one is said to break his faith or “to be guilty of iniquity,” for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4)- O(4) —

Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for a temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that “we learn from the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the reward which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might have received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on account of the lie of which they were guilty.” Therefore even an officious lie, such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies, is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4)- O(5) —

Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that “it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie.” Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept. Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off than others.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Augustine says on Psalm 5:7, “Thou wilt destroy,” etc.: “There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake of our neighbor’s good.” But every mortal sin is grievous.

Therefore jocose and officious lies are not mortal sins.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4) —

I answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as stated above ( Q(24) , A(12) ; Q(35) , A(3) ). Now a lie may be contrary to charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of the evil intended; thirdly, accidentally.

A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; so that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of charity, but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a man’s good, for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on one’s neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion, wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the false opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge of which is of no consequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one’s neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some contingent particulars that do not concern him.

Wherefore a lie of this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.

As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one’s neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and this also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one’s neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little pleasure is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of one’s neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred through scandal from lying publicly.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4)- RO(1) —

The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a gloss explains the words of Psalm 5:7, “Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.”

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4)- RO(2) —

Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above ( Q(44) , A(1), ad 3; P(1), Q(100), A(5), ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our neighbor.

Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness against our neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4)- RO(3) —

Even a venial sin can be called “iniquity” in a broad sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore it is written ( 1 John 3:4): “Every sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: ‘And sin is iniquity.’].” It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4)- RO(4) —

The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews, and their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in his exposition of Isaiah 65:21, ‘And they shall build houses’) explains that God “built them spiritual houses.” Secondly, it may be considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words of Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean.

P(2b)- Q(110)- A(4)- RO(5) —

Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another species.

Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in this sense the saying of Augustine that “it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie”: although Augustine says this not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: “Unless perhaps it is a precept,” etc. Nor does it matter that they are placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in other matters.

QUESTION OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY (FOUR ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin? (2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation? (3) Whether it is opposed to truth? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is written ( Luke 24:28) that our Lord “pretended [Douay: ‘made as though’] he would go farther”; and Ambrose in his book on the Patriarchs (De Abraham i) says of Abraham that he “spoke craftily to his servants, when he said” ( Genesis 22:5): “I and the boy will go with speed as far as yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return to you.”

Now to pretend and to speak craftily savor of dissimulation: and yet it is not to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abraham. Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, no sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in his commentary on Galatians 2:11, “When Peter [Vulg.: ‘Cephas’] was come to Antioch: — The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest of Baal, pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach us that dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed”; and David “changed his countenance before” Achis, king of Geth ( Kings 21:13). Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil to simulate good, it is good to simulate evil.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(1)- O(4) —

Further, it is written in condemnation of certain people ( Isaiah 3:9): “They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it.”

Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one’s sin. Therefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is never reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(1) —

On the contrary, A gloss on Isaiah 16:14, “In three years,” etc., says: “Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness.” But to sin openly is always a sin. Therefore dissimulation is always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(109), A(3) ; Q(110), A(1) ), it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by outward signs to be such as one is. Now outward signs are not only words, but also deeds. Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by words something different from that which is in one’s mind, so also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is properly denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is properly a lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not whether one lie in word or in any other way, as stated above ( Q(110), A(1), O(2) ). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as stated above ( Q(110), A(3) ), it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(1)- RO(1) —

As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), “To pretend is not always a lie: but only when the pretense has no signification, then it is a lie. When, however, our pretense refers to some signification, there is no lie, but a representation of the truth.” And he cites figures of speech as an example, where a thing is “pretended,” for we do not mean it to be taken literally but as a figure of something else that we wish to say. In this way our Lord “pretended He would go farther,” because He acted as if wishing to go farther; in order to signify something figuratively either because He was far from their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev.); or, as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, “as He was about to go farther away from them by ascending into heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on earth by their hospitality.”

Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (De Abraham i) says that Abraham “foretold what he knew not”: for he intended to return alone after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord expressed what He was about to do. It is evident therefore that neither dissembled.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Jerome employs the term “simulation” in a broad sense for any kind of pretense. David’s change of countenance was a figurative pretense, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title of Psalm 33, “I will bless the Lord at all times.” There is no need to excuse Jehu’s dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked man, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam ( 2 Kings 10:29,31). And yet he is praised withal and received an earthly reward from God, not for his dissimulation, but for his zeal in destroying the worship of Baal.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked, because no one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do evil deeds, he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man might pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but has some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil, both because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although he is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the wickedness he simulates.

And because dissimulation is evil in itself, its sinfulness is not derived from the thing simulated, whether this be good or evil.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(1)- RO(4) —

Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that which he is not, yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is, for this is sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by outward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not, yet he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one may hide one’s sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus that we must understand the saying of Jerome on the words of Isaiah 3:9, that the “second remedy after shipwreck is to hide one’s sin,” lest, to wit, others be scandalized thereby.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(2) Whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation?

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly, according to Matthew 6:2, “When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do.”

Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): “Some there are who wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of perfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks of the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and another to sin from malice.” Now those who wear the habit of holiness, without attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers, since the outward habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore dissimulation is not the same as hypocrisy.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our Lord says of hypocrites ( Matthew 23:5) that “all their works they do for to be seen of men”: and Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that “they never consider what it is that they do, but how by their every action they may please men.” But dissimulation consists, not in the mere intention, but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job 36:13, “Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God,” says that “the dissembler simulates one thing and does another: he pretends chastity, and delights in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse.” Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): “‘Hypocrite’ is a Greek word corresponding to the Latin ‘simulator,’ for whereas he is evil within,” he “shows himself outwardly as being good; \hypo\ denoting falsehood, and \krisis\, judgment.”

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(2) —

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), “the word hypocrite is derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a disguised face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to imitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under the guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to deceive the people in their acting.” Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. ii) that “just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the parts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and in every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is not is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just without being so in reality.”

We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not, however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person simulates another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(2)- RO(1) —

The outward deed is a natural sign of the intention. Accordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their genus to the service of God, and seeks by their means to please, not God but man, he simulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.) that “hypocrites make God’s interests subservient to worldly purposes, since by making a show of saintly conduct they seek, not to turn men to God, but to draw to themselves the applause of their approval:” and so they make a lying pretense of having a good intention, which they have not, although they do not pretend to do a good deed without doing it.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(2)- RO(2) —

The habit of holiness, for instance the religious or the clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one is bound to perform works of perfection. And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness, with the intention of entering the state of perfection, if he fail through weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of holiness. If, however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in order to make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a dissembler.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(2)- RO(3) —

In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two things: one by way of sign, the other by way of thing signified.

Accordingly the evil intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified, which does not tally with the sign: and the outward words, or deeds, or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie as a sign.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(3) Whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of truth?

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(3)- O(1) —

It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing signified. Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be opposed to any special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates any virtue, and by means of any virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms deeds, as stated in Matthew 6:1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not specially opposed to the virtue of truth.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(3)- O(2) —

Further, all dissimulation seems to proceed from guile, wherefore it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to prudence as above stated ( Q(55) , A(4) ). Therefore, hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or simplicity.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(3)- O(3) —

Further, the species of moral acts is taken from their end. Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vainglory: wherefore a gloss on Job 27:8, “What is the hope of the hypocrite, if through covetousness he take by violence,” says: “A hypocrite or, as the Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: for through desire of being honored for holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he steals praise for a life which is not his.” [*The quotation is from St. Gregory’s Moralia, Bk XVIII.] Therefore since covetousness or vainglory is not directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is hypocrisy or dissimulation.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(3) —

On the contrary, All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore dissimulation or hypocrisy is also.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(3) —

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. text. 13, 24, x), “contrariety is opposition as regards form,” i.e. the specific form. Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may be opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another way indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be considered with regard to the very species of the act, and this species depends on that act’s proper object. Wherefore since hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a character which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it follows that it is directly opposed to truth whereby a man shows himself in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in Ethic. iv, 7.

The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered in relation to any accident, for instance a remote end, or an instrument of action, or anything else of that kind.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(3)- RO(1) —

The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it as his end, not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to have it, but in respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it. Hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth, inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And he performs acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own sake, but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his hypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to that virtue.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(3)- RO(2) —

As stated above ( Q(55) , AA(3),4,5 ), the vice directly opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it belongs to discover ways of achieving a purpose, that are apparent and not real: while it accomplishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds: and it stands in relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to simplicity. Now guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception, and sometimes secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly to simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this way the virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated above ( Q(109), A(2), ad 4). There is, however, a mere logical difference between them, because by truth we mean the concordance between sign and thing signified, while simplicity indicates that one does not tend to different things, by intending one thing inwardly, and pretending another outwardly.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(3)- RO(3) —

Gain or glory is the remote end of the dissembler as also of the liar. Hence it does not take its species from this end, but from the proximate end, which is to show oneself other than one is. Wherefore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things of himself, for no further purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and as also we have said above with regard to lying ( Q(110), A(2) ).

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(4) Whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(4)- O(1) —

It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. For Jerome says on Isaiah 16:14: “Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness”: and a gloss on Job 1:21 [*St. Augustine on Psalm 63:7], “As it hath pleased the Lord,” etc., says that “pretended justice is no justice, but a twofold sin”: and again a gloss on Lamentations 4:6, “The iniquity... of my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom,” says: “He deplores the sins of the soul that falls into hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of Sodom.” Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(4)- O(2) —

Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 8) that hypocrites sin out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(4)- O(3) —

Further, no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion from seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is deserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, “Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God”: and the hypocrite is excluded from seeing God, according to Job 13:16, “No hypocrite shall come before His presence.” Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(4) —

On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed. Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(4) —

Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But this is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(4) —

Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is hypocrisy.

P(2b)- Q(111)- A(4) —

I answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness, and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a person whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely, who cares not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This will depend on the end in view; for if this be contrary to the love of God or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal sin: for instance if he were to simulate holiness in order to disseminate false doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment, though unworthy, or that he may obtain any temporal good in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be not contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance when a man takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of such a man it is said in Ethic. iv, 7 that “he would seem to be vain rather than evil”; for the same applies to simulation as to a lie.

It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of this kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated with mortal sin.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

QUESTION OF BOASTING (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the first head, namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry: (1) To which virtue is it opposed? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(1) Whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth?

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast even without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence.

Thus it is written ( Esther 1:3,4) that Assuerus “made a great feast... that he might show the riches of the glory” and “of his kingdom, and the greatness and boasting of his power.” Therefore boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4) to be one of the four species of pride, “when,” to wit, “a man boasts of having what he has not.” Hence it is written ( Jeremiah 48:29,30): “We have heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness, and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart.

I know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is not according to it.” Moreover, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that boasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed to the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to truth, but to humility.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches; wherefore it is written (Wis. 5:8): “What hath pride profited us? or what advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us?” Now excess of riches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed to justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 7), that boasting is opposed to truth.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(1) —

I answer that, “Jactantia” [boasting] seems properly to denote the uplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw [jactare] a thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift oneself, properly speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself [*Or ‘tall-talking’ as we should say in English]. This happens in two ways. For sometimes a man speaks of himself, not above what he is in himself, but above that which he is esteemed by men to be: and this the Apostle declines to do when he says ( 2 Corinthians 12:6): “I forbear lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth of me.”

In another way a man uplifts himself in words, by speaking of himself above that which he is in reality. And since we should judge of things as they are in themselves, rather than as others deem them to be, it follows that boasting denotes more properly the uplifting of self above what one is in oneself, than the uplifting of self above what others think of one: although in either case it may be called boasting. Hence boasting properly so called is opposed to truth by way of excess.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(1)- RO(1) —

This argument takes boasting as exceeding men’s opinion.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(1)- RO(2) —

The sin of boasting may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is opposed to truth; as stated (in the body of the article and Q(110), A(2) ).

Secondly, with regard to its cause, from which more frequently though not always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride as its inwardly moving and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly by arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of great things about himself; though sometimes a man takes to boasting, not from arrogance, but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein, because he is a boaster by habit.

Hence arrogance, which is an uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it is not the same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For this reason Gregory reckons boasting among the species of pride.

Moreover, the boaster frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, and so, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its end.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(1)- RO(3) —

Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways.

First, as an occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches. Hence ( Proverbs 8:18) “riches” are significantly described as “proud” [Douay: ‘glorious’]. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since according to Ethic. iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake of glory, but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent stories about themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for instance, they pretend to be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(2) Whether boasting is a mortal sin?

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is written ( Proverbs 28:25): “He that boasteth, and puffeth himself, stirreth up quarrels.” Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels, since God hates those that sow discord, according to Proverbs 6:19. Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, whatever is forbidden in God’s law is a mortal sin. Now a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, “Extol not thyself in the thoughts of thy soul,” says: “This is a prohibition of boasting and pride.”

Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying; for according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), “the boaster pretends to something greater than he is, sometimes for no further purpose, sometimes for the sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the sake of money.” Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious nor a jocose lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie. Therefore seemingly it is always a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(2) —

On the contrary, Boasting arises from vainglory, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid.

For Gregory says (Moral. viii, 30) that “it belongs to the very perfect, by outward deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are not inwardly uplifted by the praise awarded them.” Therefore boasting is not always a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(110), A(4) ), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a mortal, and sometimes a venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man boasts of that which is contrary to God’s glory — thus it is said in the person of the king of Tyre ( Ezekiel 28:2): “Thy heart is lifted up, and thou hast said: I am God” — or contrary to the love of our neighbor, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out into invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee who said ( Luke 18:11): “I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, as also is this publican.”

Sometimes it is a venial sin, when, to wit, a man boasts of things that are against neither God nor his neighbor. Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and then if it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin, then the boasting will also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a venial sin.

Sometimes, however, a man breaks out into boasting through desire of gain, and for this very reason he would seem to be aiming at the deception and injury of his neighbor: wherefore boasting of this kind is more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “a man who boasts for the sake of gain, is viler than one who boasts for the sake of glory or honor.” Yet it is not always a mortal sin because the gain may be such as not to injure another man.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(2)- RO(1) —

To boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels, not intentionally but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not be a mortal sin on that account.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(2)- RO(2) —

This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from pride that is a mortal sin.

P(2b)- Q(112)- A(2)- RO(3) —

Boasting does not always involve a mischievous lie, but only where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbor, either in itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere pleasure in boasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn God’s commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it would be against the charity of God, in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its last end.

To boast for the sake of glory or gain seen to involve an officious lie: provided it be do without injury to others, for then it would once become a mischievous lie.

QUESTION IRONY* (TWO ARTICLES)

[*Irony here must be given the signification of the Greek \eironia\, whence it is derived: dissimulation of one’s own good points.] We must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether irony is a sin? (2) Of its comparison with boasting.

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(1) Whether irony is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that irony, which consists in belittling oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one’s being strengthened by God: and yet this leads one to belittle oneself, according to Proverbs 30:1,2: “The vision which the man spoke, with whom is God, and who being strengthened by God, abiding with him, said, I am the most foolish of men.”

Also it is written ( Amos 7:14): “Amos answered... I am not a prophet.”

Therefore irony, whereby a man belittles himself in words, is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xii): “It is the mark of a welldisposed mind to acknowledge one’s fault when one is not guilty.” But all sin is inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But “some belittle themselves in words, so as to avoid pride,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(1) —

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm. xxix): “If thou liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before lying, thou hast become one by lying.”

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(1) —

I answer that, To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the greater things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of himself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle oneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in respect of its genus, except through corruption of one of its circumstances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself to possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(1)- RO(1) —

There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly. For there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly folly annexed to it, according to 1 Corinthians 3:18, “If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise.”

But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text goes on to say, “is foolishness with God.” Accordingly, he that is strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which human wisdom seeks.

Hence the text quoted continues, “and the wisdom of men is not with me,” and farther on, “and I have known the science of the saints” [*Vulg.: ‘and I have not known the science of the saints’].

It may also be replied that “the wisdom of men” is that which is acquired by human reason, while the “wisdom of the saints” is that which is received by divine inspiration.

Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, “nor am I the son of a prophet.”

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(1)- RO(2) —

It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty, not only if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which sometimes is not a sin.

But he does not call sinful that which he does not acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(1)- RO(3) —

A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): “Shun not arrogance so as to forsake truth”: and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3) that “it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies.”

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(2) Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting?

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(2)- O(1) —

It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is a kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(2)- O(2) —

Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(2)- O(3) —

Further, it is written ( Proverbs 26:25): “When he shall speak low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart.” Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold wickedness.

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(2) —

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): “Those who speak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, seemingly, in their manners.”

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(2) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(110), AA(2),4 ), one lie is more grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is about — thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most grievous — and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person: so that in this respect they are equal.

But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely, the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man’s averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “boasting is a more grievous sin than irony.”

Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then irony is more grievous.

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(2)- RO(1) —

This argument applies to irony and boasting, according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(2)- RO(2) —

Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the kind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men ( Matthew 6:16) that “they disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast.”

Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason they sin more grievously.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that it is “the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little of themselves”: and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men seek glory.

P(2b)- Q(113)- A(2)- RO(3) —

According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, “There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit,” and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through deceitful humility, “speaks low” wickedly.

QUESTION OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a special virtue? (2) Whether it is a part of justice?

P(2b)- Q(114)- A(1) Whether friendliness is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(114)- A(1)- O(1) —

It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that “the perfect friendship is that which is on account of virtue.” Now any virtue is the cause of friendship: “since the good is lovable to all,” as Dionysius states (Div.

Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a consequence of every virtue.

P(2b)- Q(114)- A(1)- O(2) —

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind of friend that he “takes everything in a right manner both from those he loves and from those who are not his friends.” Now it seems to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue. Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(114)- A(1)- O(3) —

Further, virtue “observes the mean according as a wise man decides” (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written ( Ecclesiastes 7:5): “The heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth”: wherefore “it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of pleasure” (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), “is essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, but fears to give pain.” Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(114)- A(1) —

On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): “Make thyself affable to the congregation of the poor.” Therefore affability, which is what we mean by friendship, is a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(114)- A(1) —

I answer that, As stated above ( Q(109), A(2) ; P(1), Q(55) , A(3) ), since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists in order, as stated above ( Q(109), A(2) ). And it behooves man to be maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is called friendliness.

P(2b)- Q(114)- A(1)- RO(1) —

The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in treating of charity ( Q(23) , A(1), A(3), ad 1;QQ(25) , 26), what things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those with whom he is in contact.

P(2b)- Q(114)- A(1)- RO(2) —

Every man is naturally every man’s friend by a certain general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that “every beast loveth its like.” This love is signified by signs of friendship, which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this: because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to us by special friendship.

P(2b)- Q(114)- A(1)- RO(3) —

When it is said that “the heart of the wise is where there is mourning” it is not that he may bring sorrow to his neighbor, for the Apostle says ( Romans 14:15): “If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity”: but that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus. 7:38, “Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them that mourn.” Again, “the heart of fools is where there is mirth,” not that they may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others’ gladness.

Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, according to <19D201> Psalm 132:1, “Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.”

Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those among whom he lives.

Hence the Apostle says ( 2 Corinthians 7:8): “Although I made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent,” and further on ( 2 Corinthians 7:9), “I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto repentance.”

For this reason we should not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, and in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:26): “Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and show not thy countenance gay towards them.”

P(2b)- Q(114)- A(2) Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice?