King James Bible Adam Clarke Bible Commentary Martin Luther's Writings Wesley's Sermons and Commentary Neurosemantics Audio / Video Bible Evolution Cruncher Creation Science Vincent New Testament Word Studies KJV Audio Bible Family videogames Christian author Godrules.NET Main Page Add to Favorites Godrules.NET Main Page




Bad Advertisement?

Are you a Christian?

Online Store:
  • Visit Our Store

  • THE TRIAL OF CHRIST
    PREVIOUS CHAPTER - NEXT CHAPTER - HELP - GR VIDEOS - GR YOUTUBE - TWITTER - SD1 YOUTUBE    


    BY ALEXANDER TAYLOR INNES THE TRIAL OF JESUS CHRIST MEN have too much forgotten that the central event in history assumed the form of a judicial trial.

    The prodigious influence of the life and personality of Jesus of Nazareth is admitted by all. But His tragical death, early and passionately accepted by Christianity as the significant fact of His career, has become more than any other incident the starting-point of modern history — His tomb, as Lamartine put it, was the grave of the old world and the cradle of the new.

    Yet that memorable transaction was the execution of a capital sentence, proceeding upon a twofold criminal trial — upon one process conducted under Hebrew and one under Roman law.

    In its forensic aspect, as in some others, it is peculiar — perhaps unique.

    There have been many judicial tragedies recorded in history. Capital trials, like those of Socrates, of Charles of England, and of Mary of Scotland, have always had a fascination for men. And this trial has impressed and attracted the world more than ally or all of these. But these pages recall to general readers — what scholars have long known — that it has in addition a purely legal interest which no one of them possesses. By common consent of lawyers, the most august of all jurisprudences is that of ancient Rome. But perhaps the most peculiar of all jurisprudences, and in the eyes of Christendom the most venerable as well as peculiar, is that of the Jewish Commonwealth. And whenever these two famous and diverse systems happen for a moment to intersect each other, the investigation, from a legal point of view, of the transaction in which they meet is necessarily interesting. But when the two systems meet in the most striking and influential event that has ever happened, its investigation at once becomes not only interesting, but important. It becomes, undoubtedly, the most interesting isolated problem which historical jurisprudence can present.

    And the problem is not only interesting, but difficult. For questions such as the following are at once raised: — Were there two trials, or only one?

    Was the second a mere review of the first, or was the first a mere preliminary to the second?

    Farther, were the forms, in the one case of Hebrew, in the other of Roman, law observed, or attempted to be observed? And was there in either case an attempt, with or without form, to attain substantial justice?

    Again, were the charges preferred before the Hebrew and Roman tribunals the same, or nearly so? What was the crime for which the accused died.

    Lastly, as to the decision. Was it in either case right in form, and attained by steps in conformity with the process which was binding (or was observed) at the time? And was it right in substance, i .e . was it, if not just, at least legal — in conformity with the Hebrew law, or the Roman law, as those laws then stood?

    These questions of law proceed of course upon an assumed or ascertained history of fact. The history is abundantly familiar; and, fortunately, there is no special necessity that we should commence this inquiry by an examination of the sources. Men are not agreed how far back they can exactly trace the three Gospels on the one hand, or the Fourth Gospel of John on the other. But the detail, verisimilitude, and authoritative calm of all these documents, impress the reader with a sense of close proximity to the life narrated — proximity, at least, on the part of the original oral narrators. And they have no competitors. A few words in Tacitus, a disputed sentence or two in Josephus, occasional execrations scattered throughout the Talmud, — these and such as these are the outside references to a career which burned itself in detail into the hearts of a generation of surviving disciples, and thence into the imagination of the world. To some readers it will appear a singular advantage that, so far as the documents bear on this special legal question, there is no reference to miracle. In none of the four records of the trial is there (after the first arrest) any touch of the supernatural in that sense of the word. The whole narrative of external fact might have been told of any morning’s work of the Sanhedrin, of any forenoon condemnation by the Procurator. We may not indeed stretch this too far. The judicial narrative, unbroken by actual portent or marvel, maintains in each Gospel the same tone of supernatural consciousness which in previous pages, apparently without surprise or break or sense of effort, passes into actual external miracle. Yet it remains true that in the fragment of fourfold history with which we at present deal, there is nothing which the most determined enemy of the supernatural needs to question. In truth, the incidents of the trial are most natural and probable, and, in so far as the traditions agree, there seems no excuse for doubting the history.

    Of course the four do not agree in all details, here or elsewhere. The variations in the utterances reported by different Gospels warn readers to expect a similar independence in narration of facts. And sometimes this cuts deep into the history, as in the matter of chronology. A doubt exists even as to the number of years during which the prophetic ministry lasted which this trial was now to close. A similar question has been raised as to the hours occupied by the tragic execution which followed on this very day. Neither of these points, however, directly concerns the legal side of the trial. We do not need to solve even the still more famous and ancient problem, whether the death took place on the 14th or the 15th day of Nisan — the day before, or the day after, the Passover. For, whatever day it was, no one doubts that such a death, proceeding upon a Roman sentence, actually took place on the Friday of that week. Nor is it doubted by anyone; or that the Roman sentence and execution followed upon an arrest which happened on the immediately preceding night — so that the Hebrew judicial proceedings, whatever these were, must have been interposed between the previous sunset and that morning session in the Praetorium. The chronological difficulties, even when they are outside of the actual trial, will no doubt ultimately affect the relative value of our sources. Yet it must be remembered that even if one of the Gospels were shown to be irreconcilable with the others, and with history — say, in a chronological matter contemporaneous with that of which we here treat — it does not by any means at once follow that its narrative of the trial itself may not have high historic value. Each tradition or narration, and each part of it, must be looked at upon its own merits; and when criticism has settled the weight of apostolic or contemporary authority which belongs to each, the resulting stereoscope (at present somewhat blurred in the superimposition) will finally take solid shape. Meantime a lawyer, who is not himself also a critic, may remark that the mere independence of two or more narratives by no means tends to suggest doubt as to the story they convey. And while their variations, in so far as these affect the legal question before us, will call for careful consideration, we shall find that the basis of fact is on the whole satisfactory.

    I give on a following page the fourfold narrative of the Hebrew, as subsequently of the Roman, trial. And to allow readers closer access to the original, I take the English from the Revised Version.

    THE HEBREW TRIAL “Thou, if Thou wast He, who at midnight came By the star-light, naming a dubious name!

    And if, too heavy with sleep, too rash With fear — O Thou, if that martyr-gash Fell on Thee coming to take Thine own, And we gave the Cross, when we owed the Throne.”

    Robert Browning’s “Holy-Cross Day.” THE FOUR NARRATIVES.

    MATTHEW MARK LUKE JOHN And while he yet spake, lo, Judas, one of the twelve, came, and with him a great multitude with swords and staves, from the chief priests and elders of the people. . . Then they came and laid hands on Jesus, and took him. . .In that hour said Jesus to the multitudes, Are ye come out as against a robber with swords and staves to seize me? I sat daily And straightway, while he yet spake, cometh Judas, one of the twelve, and with him a multitude with swords and staves, from the chief priests and the scribes and the elders. . .

    And they laid hands on him, and took him. . .

    And Jesus answered and said unto them, Are ye come out, as against a robber, with swords and staves to seize me? I was daily with you in the While he yet spake, behold, a multitude, and he that was called Judas, one of the twelve, went before them, and he drew near unto Jesus to kiss him. . .And Jesus said unto the chief priests, and captains of the temple, and elders, which were come against him, Are ye come out, as against a robber, with swords and staves? When I was daily with Judas then, having received the band of soldiers, and officers from the chief priests and the Pharisees, cometh thither with lanterns and torches and weapons. . .So the band and the chief captain and the officers of the Jews, seized Jesus and bound him, and led him to Annas first; for he was father in-law to Caiaphas, which was high priest that year. Now teaching in the temple, and ye took me not. . .

    And they that had taken Jesus led him away to the house of Caiaphas the high priest, where the scribes and the elders were gathered together. . . Now the chief priests and the whole council sought false witness against Jesus, that they might put him to death; and they found it not, though many false witnesses came. But afterward came two, and said, This man said, I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to build it ill three days. And the high priest stood up, and said unto him, temple teaching, and ye took me not: but this is done that the scriptures might be fulfilled. . .

    And they led Jesus away to the high priest: and there come together with him all the chief priests and the elders and the scribes. ·. Now the chief priests and the whole council sought witness against Jesus to put him to death; and found it not. For many bare false witness against him, and their witness agreed not together.

    And there stood up certain, and bare false witness against him, saying, We heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and within three days I will build you in the temple, ye stretched not forth your hands against me: but this is your hour, and the power of darkness. And they seized him, and led him away, and brought him into the high priest’s house. . . And the men that held Jesus mocked him, and beat him. And they blindfolded him, and asked him, saying, Prophesy: who is it that struck thee? And many other things spake they against him, reviling him.

    And as soon as it was day, the assembly of the elders of the people was gathered together, both chief priests and Caiaphas was he which gave counsel to the Jews, that it was expedient that one man should die for the people. And Simon Peter followed Jesus, and so did another disciple.

    Now that disciple was known unto the high priest, and entered in with Jesus into the court of the high priest. . .The high priest therefore asked Jesus of his disciples, and of his teaching.

    Jesus answered him, I have spoken openly to the world; I ever taught in synagogues, and in the temple, where all the Jews come together; and in secret spake I nothing. Why Answerest thou nothing? what is it which the these witness against thee? But Jesus held his peace. And the high priest said unto him, I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God.

    Jesus saith unto him, Thou hast said: nevertheless I say unto you, Henceforth ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power, and coming on the clouds of heaven. Then the high priest rent his garments, saying, He hath spoken blasphemy; what further need have we of witnesses? behold, now ye another made without hands.

    And not even so did their witness agree together.

    And the high priest stood up in the midst, asked Jesus, saying, Answerest thou nothing? what is it which these witness against thee? But he held his peace, and answered nothing. Again the high priest asked him, and saith unto him, Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?

    And Jesus said, I am: and ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power, and coming with the clouds of heaven. And the high priest rent his clothes, and saith, What further need have we of witnesses? Ye scribes; and they led him away into their council, saying, If thou art the Christ, tell us.

    But he said unto them, If I tell ye, ye will not believe: and if I ask you , ye will not answer. But from henceforth shall the Son of man be seated at the right hand of the power of God. And they all said, Art thou then the Son of God? And he said unto them, Ye say that I am.

    And they said, What further need have we of witness? for we ourselves have heard from his own mouth. And the whole company of them rose up, and brought him before Pilate. askest thou me? ask them that have heard me, what I spake unto them: behold, these know the things which I said.

    And when he had said this, one of the officers standing by struck Jesus with his hand, saying, Answerest thou the high priest so? Jesus answered him, If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil: but if well, why smitest thou me? Annas therefore sent him bound unto Caiaphas the high priest. . .

    They lead Jesus therefore from Caiaphas into the palace (Praetorium): and it was early. have heard the blasphemy: what think ye?

    They answered and said, He is worthy of death.

    Then did they spit in his face and buffet him; and some smote him with the palms of their hands, saying, Prophesy unto us, thou Christ: who is he that struck thee?. . .

    Now when morning was come, all the chief priests and the elders of the people took counsel against Jesus to put him to death: and they bound him, and led him away, and delivered him up to Pilate the governor. have heard the blasphemy: what think ye?

    And they all condemned him to be worthy of death. And some began to spit on him, and to cover his face, and to buffet him, and to say unto him, Prophesy: and the officers received him with blows of their hands. . .And straightway in the morning the chief priests with the elders and scribes, and the whole council, held a consultation, and bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him up to Pilate.

    HEBREW TRIAL ALL modern readers know that the Hebrew commonwealth, and the institutions which regulated it, were pervaded by a deep sentiment of justice and law. But all are not aware of the extent to which that sentiment, and its characteristic maxim, “Thou shalt do no unrighteousness ill judgment,” were developed in the later history of the people. In the more ancient part of the traditions of the Fathers, we read, “When a judge decides not according to truth, he makes the majesty of God to depart from Israel. But if he judges according to truth, were it only for one hour, it is as if he established the whole world, for it is in judgment that the Divine presence in Israel has its habitation.” It was a few years ago pointed out to English readers that that whole vast later literature of the Jews which we call the Talmud is “emphatically a Corpus Juris — a cyclopaedia of all law,” which may best be judged by analogy and comparison with other legal codes, more especially with that of Rome and its commentaries. It contains many other things, but this is its basis. And what is more important for us to notice, is that this legal basis is the older part. The whole Talmud consists of forty folios — a mass of discussion, illustration, and commentary. But the central part of it, which is comprised in twelve volumes, is called the Mishna, i .e . the Tradition. And the Mishna is nearly wholly law. The name was indeed of old translated as the second or oral law — the deute>rwsiv — a detailed traditional commentary on the written law of Moses, to which it professed complete subjection, while practically superseding it as a code. Mr. Deutsch, in striving to give English readers an idea of the multiplicity and confusion of the Talmud, likens it to Hansard: “The Parliamentary discussions or episodes answering to the Gemara or general commentary, while the Bills or Acts are called the Mishna.” The distinction of course is, that in Hansard the legislative Acts are the result and termination of the discussions, while in the Talmud the Mishna or law is the older portion and the starting-point.

    Accordingly, while portions of the general Talmud commentary did not come into existence for many centuries after the introduction of Christianity, the compilation of the whole Mishna, or central portion, was begun by Rabbi Judah, somewhere about 200 A.D. But the Rabbi founded his own views in it on those of the earlier and famous Rabbi Meir, and goes back for his traditions through the two Gamaliels to his own direct ancestor, Hillel, contemporary of Jesus, and himself a gatherer of the past.

    And while the oral law had thus been transmitted from mouth to mouth for centuries, two of its treatises are known to have been gathered together a hundred years before Rabbi Judah proceeded to compile the whole. So, when it was at last compiled, it was apparently as an oral law which had been growing in use and authority ever since the return of the nation from Babylon — as a “brief abstract of about eight hundred years legal production.” Hence modern Jewish writers have referred to it without hesitation as including the code of criminal law in existence at the date of the high-priestship of Annas and Caiaphas. Of course this cannot be matter of demonstration in the case of all portions of a book which was not finally reduced to writing until centuries had passed. But the evidence shows that the development of the Mishna in the direction of precaution against legal injustice or negligence was exceptionally early and strong. Its earliest period coincided with the time of “the Men of the Great Synagogue,” stretching from the Return from the Captivity to about B.C. Their work has been summed up in the leading aphorism of the Pirke Avoth , which runs, “Be cautious and slow in judgment, send forth many disciples, and make a fence round the law .” And this age, which inculcated caution in judicial action before all other things, was succeeded by the so-called age of “the Sanhedrin,” which for the next four hundred years worked out that caution in detail.

    In nothing is the Mishna more express than in the contrast recognized at an early time between civil and criminal proceedings — judgments “of money” and judgments “of the life.” Even with regard to the former, its rules strike the modern legal mind as leaning to the side of pedantic caution. But with regard to criminal, and especially to capital, cases, there can be no doubt that long before the time of Jesus the value set by the law upon the life of a Hebrew citizen had led to extraordinary precautions.

    What have been called the four great rules of their criminal jurisprudence — “strictness in the accusation, publicity in the discussion, full freedom granted to the accused, and assurance against all dangers or errors of testimony” — are carried out even in the Mishna in minute and scrupulous rules, leaning almost ostentatiously in every point to the side of the accused. And they ruled most of all in the case of a trial for life.

    Indeed, so far does this go, that modern Jews have been disposed to represent capital punishment as abhorrent to the whole genius of Hebrew jurisprudence. We read in the oral law the saying of Eleazar the son of Azarias, that “the Sanhedrin, which so often as once in seven years condemns a man to death, is a slaughter-house.” And more startling still, when we remember the Hebrew dread of all anthropomorphism in speaking of the Divine, is that terrible sentence of Rabbi Meir: “What doth God say (if one may speak of God after the manner of men) when a malefactor suffers the anguish due to his crime? He says, My head and my limbs are pained. And if He so speaks of the suffering even of the guilty, what must He utter when the righteous is condemned?” And so, to save the innocent blood, to hedge round and shelter the sacred house of life, rule after rule was laid down in successive lines of circumvallation, and presumptions in favor of the accused were accumulated, until a false conviction became almost impossible.

    Were the rules observed — was the law obeyed — in the trial of Jesus of Nazareth?

    The question whether the Hebrew trial was according to their own rules of law has perhaps not been exhaustively considered by any one writer, though it has been touched upon by many. The most celebrated discussion upon it was raised by a learned Spanish Jew, M. Salvador, who in 1822, in the first edition of a work since twice republished under the title of Histoire des Institutions de Moise , gave two careful chapters on the penal law of the later Jews and on their administration of justice, and followed them up by a dissertation to show that the Jugement de Jesus was according to law. He admitted the facts as stated in the Gospels, and founded on the law as stated in the Mishna; and from these sources professed to prove that while the result may have been unfortunate if Jesus was really the Messiah, the process followed and the result arrived at were alike necessary, if the tribunal adhered to its own law. Salvador was answered in a brilliant treatise by a distinguished member of the French bar, M. Dupin (aine). He, however (like an able American writer, Mr. Greenleaf), devoted himself rather to the substantial injustice of the trial than to its form according to the jurisprudence concerned; and in the third edition of his Institutions , published in 1862, Salvador maintains and reprints the whole positions originally laid down. His argument, however, falls short of its conclusion on the most essential points, so obviously, that to make it the basis of discussion would be one-sided and unfair. I propose, therefore, to treat the question independently, in so far as one who has no pretensions to Hebrew learning can deal with ascertainable fact on the basis of admitted law and underlying justice.

    On a Thursday night in that month of March, the Thursday towards the end of the Passover Week, unquestionably took place the arrest — the first step before most modern trials. The question has been raised whether the arrest was legal. There is no reason to doubt that it was by authority of the High Priest; and the addition of a Roman speira to the officers of the temple must have been procured by Jewish authority. But was arrest before trial at all a lawful proceeding by Jewish law, no matter under how high an authority? It seems not to have been so, unless resistance or escape was apprehended. In this case no escape was intended, but resistance, though not intended, was possible, and the lawfulness of the mere arrest need not therefore be questioned. What is more important is what immediately followed the capture, for this raises the question whether the intention of the captors, the arrest at nightfall was to be the preface to a regular trial. Had that been their intention, their legal course was plain. It was that followed a little later by the captors of Peter and John, who “put them in ward until the next day, because it was now eventide.” It was to be otherwise here.

    An examination by night followed the arrest. Jesus was first led by His armed escort to the presence of Annas, by far the most influential member of the Sanhedrin. For in that body there now sat no less than five of his sons, all of whom either had held, or were in a few years to hold, the supreme dignity of High Priest. The old man had exercised that great office twenty years before, and had, in the absence of the Roman governor, stretched his powers, as one of his sons afterwards did, perhaps to the extent of carrying out capital sentences. At all events, the indignant Procurator had insisted on his removal from office; but though Annas gave a formal consent, he merely transferred the chair of the great Council to the younger members of his family. It was now held by his energetic son-inlaw, Caiaphas, the aged head of the house remaining, in the estimation of orthodox Jews, the de jure High Priest. By Annas Jesus was Sent bound to Caiaphas, perhaps only to another department of the sacerdotal palace.

    But before one or other of these princes of the Church the accused was certainly subjected to a preliminary investigation before any witnesses were called.

    It is extremely difficult to decide whether this examination by “the High Priest,” recorded by John alone, was made by Annas or by Caiaphas — so difficult that it is fortunate that scarcely any legal question turns upon the point. The chief result of our decision of it will be its bearing on the proceedings which followed, the same night. For if the examination detailed by John took place before Annas, it was separated by an interval of place, and also of time, from the subsequent proceedings before Caiaphas. In that case it is more probable that the examination of witnesses, the confession, and condemnation which took place before the younger and titular High Priest were somewhat later in the night, or even towards morning, and followed the form and order of a regular public trial. If, on the other hand, Annas at once sent on the prisoner to Caiaphas, and if the examination recorded was by the latter, it may have been immediately followed by the production of witnesses, and by the adjuration and condemnation; and in this case it is likely that a considerable interval succeeded these proceedings before a formal or public meeting of Council in the morning confirmed the informal condemnation of the night.

    But the main point with regard to the High Priest’s examination is independent of the question who the examiner was. It appears in any case to have been wholly illegal. In some countries — in France, for example, and in Scotland — the accused is led before a magistrate, and subjected to private official interrogatories before he is remitted to his public trial. In others, and in the Hebrew law, it is not so. It was there the right of the accused to be free from all such private or personal investigation until he was brought for trial before his congregated brethren. This rule of publicity seems to have been derived from principles both as to judges and witnesses. “Be not a sole judge,” was one of the most famous aphorisms, “for there is no sole judge but One.” Still more clear was it, not from the Mishna only, but from the Pentateuch, that there was to be no such thing as a sole witness; and that the “two or three witnesses” at whose mouth every matter must be established must appear publicly to give their testimony. ( Deuteronomy 19:15-18.) Their deposition was the beginning of every proceeding; and until it was publicly given against a man, he was held to be in the judgment of law not merely innocent, but unaccused.

    It is this principle which gives the fullest explanation of the answers of Jesus of Nazareth to the midnight questions of the High Priest. The ecclesiastical magistrate, probably sitting alone, and certainly sitting privately and during the night, and before as yet any witnesses were called, asked Jesus of His disciples and of His doctrine. “Jesus answered him, I have spoken openly to the world; I ever taught in synagogues, and in the temple, whither the Jews always resort; and in secret have I said nothing. Why askest thou me ? ask them that have heard me , what I have said unto them: behold, they know what I said.”

    It was in every word the voice of pure Hebrew justice, founding upon the broad principle of their judicial procedure, and recalling an unjust judge to the first duty of his great office. But as one who studied that nation in older times observed, “When a vile man is exalted, the wicked walk on every side” around him; and when the accused had thus claimed his rights, one of the officers of court — a class usually specially alive to the observance of form, and of that alone — “struck Jesus with the palm of his hand, saying, Answerest thou the High Priest so?” The reply of Jesus is exceedingly striking. In it He again resolutely took His stand on the platform of the legal rights of a Hebrew — a ground from which He afterwards rose to a higher, but which He certainly never abandoned: “If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil: but if well, why smitest thou me?”

    The words are, no doubt, a protest for freedom of speech and liberty to the accused. But, they appeal again to the same principle of the Hebrew law — that by which witnesses took upon themselves the whole burden and responsibility, and especially the whole initiative, of every accusation, even as they were obliged to appear at the close, and with their own hands to hurl the stones. And the renewed protest was so far effectual. For now the witnesses came forward, or, at least, they were summoned to bear their testimony; and only when they carne forward can a formal trial, according to Hebrew law, be said to have commenced.

    But did not all this take place by night? And was a trial by night legal?

    On the question of fact whether the trial took place by night or in the morning, it will be found on turning back to their narratives that the four Evangelists give a confused account of what took place. Matthew and Mark, omitting the seemingly private interrogation of which we have already spoken, distinctly narrate a double and very striking trial by night — first by witnesses, and then by an attempt to obtain a confession; but all before the High Priest, the scribes, and the elders, to whom Mark adds, “all the chief priests.” Their narrative reads as if the first part of this trial might have taken place almost as soon as the prisoner was brought from the Mount of Olives. At all events, in their narrative it took place by night, while in the morning there was a second and separate “consultation” of a similar, but seemingly larger and more authoritative, meeting. John, on the other hand, narrates the interrogation by the High Priest, the transfer from Annas to Caiaphas, and the delivery to Pilate in the morning, but does not allude to any trial before the Council. These two representations, though not contradictory, are unsatisfactory and inconsistent; and the tradition of Luke, which differs from both, completes the confusion, but helps us to a result. He omits the earlier part of the alleged trial — the interrogation of witnesses; but narrates the confession and condemnation as at one meeting of the Council, which took place “as soon as it was day,” and after which the whole company led Him to Pilate.

    Putting all these representations together, there is no difficulty in arriving at the order of the historical transactions, though there will always be insuperable difficulty to those who insist on the exact accuracy of the narrators on the one hand, or on the legal regularity of the proceedings on the other. The visit to Annas and the transfer to Caiaphas came first, with the interrogation of the accused by one or other of the High Priests. About this earlier hour certainly took place the denial of Peter, related by all the Evangelists, while some time must have been consumed in sending for witnesses, and summoning either the whole Council or some members.

    That the whole Council did not meet at night is unquestionable: that a certain number of them were present by night with Caiaphas is equally clear. Assuming that there was a final and formal meeting of the whole Sanhedrin at its usual morning hour, it is barely possible that the vivid scene of the adjuration, confession, and sentence took place before it. But it is much more likely on the evidence that it took place earlier, when a considerable number, quite enough to be popularly called a Council, were already assembled. And, in any case, it is certain that there was a still earlier transaction — the examination of witnesses and the deliberation on their evidence-~ and that this must have taken place some time during the night. It will always remain doubtful whether this midnight testimony took place before a considerable meeting of the Council or its committee on the one hand, or before Caiaphas and a few of his friends on the other. Nor is it of much consequence. The confusion of representation is quite natural.

    For, according to all the rules of Hebrew law, such a transaction in the night was absolutely illegal, incapable of being validly transacted in either form, and incapable of being reported so as to produce an impression of justice upon the minds of the people.

    The detailed law is laid down in a passage of the Mishna, which contrasts capital trials with questions of money. It is so striking that the whole paragraph may be quoted, though it is with the concluding words that we have now to deal: — “Money trials and trials for life have the same rules of inquiry and investigation. But they differ in procedure, in the following points: — The former require only three, the latter three-and-twenty judges. In the former it matters not on which side the judges speak who give the first opinions: in the latter, those who are in favor of acquittal must speak first. In the former, a majority of one is always enough: in the latter, a majority of one is enough to acquit, but it requires a majority of two to condemn. In the former, a decision may be quashed on review (for error), no matter which way it has gone in the latter, a condemnation may be quashed, but not an acquittal. In the former, disciples of the law present in the court may speak (as assessors) on either side: in the latter, they may speak in favor of the accused, but not against him. In the former, a judge who has indicated his opinion, no matter on which side, may change his mind: in the latter, he who has given his voice for guilt may change his mind, but not he who has given his voice for acquittal. The former (money trials)are commenced only in the daytime, but may be concluded after nightfall: the latter (capital trials) are commenced only in the daytime, and must also be concluded during the day. The former way be concluded by acquittal or condemnation on the day on which they have begun: the latter may be concluded on that day if there is a sentence acquittal, but must be postponed to a second day if there is to be a condemnation. And for this reason capital trials are not held on the day before a Sabbath or a feastday.” The crucifixion of Jesus took place, as has scarcely ever been doubted, on the Friday, the day before a Sabbath which was also “an high day”; and this meeting of the Council took place on the same Friday morning. Such a meeting on such a day was forbidden. If indeed it only met to register an acquittal, it was lawful. But if the court was unable at once to acquit, it, was bound to adjourn for at least twelve hours before meeting for final judgment, and such a final meeting could not be on the Sabbath.

    The necessity of the adjournment of a capital trial to secure the rights of the accused is shown very clearly by the detailed regulations of the Mishna: — “If a man is found innocent, the court absolves him. But if not, his judgment is put off to the following day. Meantime the judges meet together, and, eating little meat, and drinking no wine during that whole day, they confer upon the cause. On the following morning they return into court” and vote over again, with the like precautions as before. . . “If judgment is at last pronounced, they bring out the man sentenced, to stone him. The place of punishment is to be apart front the place of judgment (for it is said in Leviticus 24:14, ‘Bring the blasphemer without the camp’). In the meantime an officer is to stand at the door of the court with a handkerchief in his hand; another, mounted on horseback, follows the procession so far, but halts at the farthest point where he can see the man with the handkerchief. [The judges remain sitting], and if anyone offers himself to prove that the condemned man is innocent, he at the door waves the handkerchief, and the horseman instantly gallops after the condemned and recalls him for his defense.” These regulations, taken not from the commentary on the oral law, but from the Mishna itself, may have existed in full detail during the highpriesthood of Caiaphas. There is no reason to doubt that at least the general rule, which prescribes adjourning the trial from daylight to daylight, bound the judges of Jesus of Nazareth. In no case was such a rule so absolutely necessary to justice, as where the accused, arrested after nightfall, had been put upon his trial by daybreak, without the least opportunity of summoning witnesses for his defense. But what the Gemara describes as the atrocity of thus anticipating the day of death of the accused, was exceeded in open injustice by the earlier outrage of commencing, and probably substantially concluding, the real trial under cloud of night. That would have been an intolerable scandal even in the case of an ordinary civil suit. Such a suit could only be called and commenced during the day, though upon occasion it might be prolonged after the shadows had fallen until a verdict were returned. But a grave criminal case — certainly a capital case of crime — was always to be begun., and resumed or continued, and finished, only in the light of day.

    And that, of all criminal cases, a trial in which a son of Israel, acknowledged to be mighty in deed and word before all the people, was to be judged for his life. . . that such a trial should be begun and finished and sentence formally pronounced, between midnight and morning, was a violence done to the forms and rules of Hebrew law as well as to the principles of justice. Yet there can be no doubt that at some untimely hour, between Thursday night and Friday morning, the form, and somewhat more than the form, of a trial by Hebrew law did take place. The judges, unjust as they were, were men trained in that law of minute scruples and mighty sanctions; and we may be sure that they would have felt it impossible to dispense with process and form altogether. The last words we caught from Jesus were His demand for open accusation and trial: “Why askest thou me? ask them which heard me.” And we shall hear no further utterance until the close.

    For when this demand for public justice was met by a nocturnal trial, the accused declined to take part in it. Meantime much was going on. The members of the Council present sought for witness against Jesus.

    Matthew says they sought for false witness. But even the former was a scandalous indecorum. Hebrew judges, as we have seen, were eminently counsel for the accused. And one of the strangest sights the world has ever seen must have been the adjuration or solemn address to the witnesses who came to speak against the life of Jesus, by the magistrate who had — no doubt with perfect sincerity — held it expedient that one man should die for the people. In our Courts an oath means a solemn undertaking by the witness, in the presence of God and the magistrate, to tell the truth. In the Hebrew Courts it was all adjuration by the magistrate of the witness as standing in God’s presence. That form of adjuration or solemn appeal still exists in the body of the law. It was the duty of the High Priest to pronounce it to each witness in a capital ease, and so to put them on oath.

    Who can measure the force of its utterance on this occasion by the sacred Judge of Israel upon the men who, while words such as these uttered, were forced to gaze into the face of those whose life it guarded? “Forget not, O witness, that it is one thing to give evidence in a trial as to money, and another in a trial for life. In a money suit, if thy witness-bearing shall do wrong, money may repair that wrong.

    But in this trial for life, if thou sinnest, the blood of the accused, and the blood of his seed to the end of time, shall be imputed unto thee. . . Therefore was Adam created one man and alone, to teach thee, that if any witness shall destroy one soul out of Israel, he is held by the Scripture to be as if he had destroyed the world; and he who saves one such soul to be as if he had saved the world. . . For a man, from one signet-ring, may strike off many impressions, and all of them shall be exactly alike. But He, the King of the kings of kings, He the Holy and the Blessed, has struck off from his type of the first man the forms of all men that shall live; yet so, that no one human being is wholly alike to any other. Wherefore let us think and believe that the whole world is created for a man [such as he whose life hangs on thy words].”

    The Son of Man, whose life was surrounded by the law with this tremendous sanction, stood silent before those witnesses; and, whatever was the reason, the narrative records that their testimony against him failed. Let us therefore refer now to the Hebrew law of evidence. The Talmud divides all oral evidence into — 1. A vain testimony. 2. A standing testimony. 3. An “equal” or adequate testimony; or (perhaps) the testimony of them that agree together (ijsh marturia ).

    The evidence of the earlier witnesses who on that night were examined seems to have been set aside as belonging to the first class; for a “vain testimony” was not even accepted provisionally — was not retained until afterwards confirmed. A “standing testimony,” on the other hand, was admitted in the meantime and provisionally, but not held valid until confirmed by others. To this intermediate rank attained the evidence of that witness who at length came forward to speak to the early utterance of Jesus about the destruction and rebuilding of the temple. And when following him another came, the question was at once raised whether the testimony of both did not amount to the third and complete order of evidence, known as “the testimony of them that agree together.” “But not even so,” says Mark, using the exact technical term — “not even so did their witness agree together.” This may undoubtedly have been a mere discrepancy in their narration of facts. That discrepancy cannot have been great, according to our modern ideas. For Mark gives the evidence of both in one indiscriminating sentence. And Matthew does the same in another sentence, slightly different. Neither of them makes any explicit distinction between what the two witnesses said. Let us suppose that the discrepancy between the two (alleged by Mark) amounted only to this, that the one said, in Matthew’s phrase, “I am able to destroy the temple of God,” and the other, “I will destroy this temple.” It is by no means clear that even such a difference as this might not have been sufficient to nullify their testimony. For in a Hebrew criminal trial “the least discordance between the evidence of the witnesses was held to destroy its value”; and this rule, like others, was pushed to that childish extreme which we now call Judaical. A mere verbal distinction may have sometimes been a fatal objection in the mind of even such a judge as Caiaphas. But the evidence of men who are not reported to have said anything extreme against the accused, but whom the Evangelists, departing, from their usual reserve, distinctly call “false witnesses,” was probably reckless and inaccurate, and so discordant upon the face of it. It is just possible, indeed, that the variation between the reports of the two Evangelists covers not a mere verbal distinction, but a substantial and serious difficulty, of great importance for the conduct of the case.

    For at this point, we are confronted by one of the most important questions in the whole inquiry, What was the crime for which Jesus was all this time being tried? What was the charge, what the indictment, upon which He stood before the Council? Up to this point we have had no intimation on that subject. In modern times that would be an extraordinary state of matters. To try a man, especially for his life, without specifying beforehand the crime on which he is to be tried, is justly held to be an outrage. Some of the greatest events in English constitutional history turn on the illegality of “general warrants” — the illegality, that is, not of trying a man without specifying his crime the most arbitrary of our kings did not venture to do that — but of even committing him for trial, without specifying his accusation in the warrant of committal. But we must not judge Jewish law, or indeed early law of any nation, by our modern rules.

    Hebrew law, as we have seen, gave a peculiarly important position to the witnesses. I believe we shall not fully realize that position unless we remember that, at least in the earlier days of that law, the evidence of the leading witnesses constituted the charge . There was no other charge: no more formal indictment. Until they spoke, and spoke in the public assembly, the prisoner was scarcely an accused man. When they spoke, and the evidence of the two agreed together, it formed the legal charge, libel, or indictment, as well as the evidence for its truth. This, to us paradoxical, but really simple and natural origin of a Hebrew criminal process, is nowhere better illustrated than in that ancient cause celebre of Naboth the Jezreelite. “They proclaimed a fast, and set Naboth on high among the people. And there came in two men, children of Belial, and sat before him; and the men of Belial witnessed against him, even against Naboth, in the presence of the people, saying, Naboth did blaspheme God and the king. Then they carried him forth out of the city, and stoned him with stones, that he died.”

    The essential points of a Hebrew trial for life are here given with admirable terseness. But in the case of Naboth the false witnesses suborned by the Sidonian queen are represented as using the technical word, or nomen juris , of blasphemy. In the trial of Jesus the only witnesses distinctly spoken to reported a particular utter trace of the accused. What crime was this utterance intended by the accusers, or the judges, to infer?

    There are two distinct meanings which may have been innuendoed .

    According to one of them, the words, “I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and within three days I will build another made without hands,” may have been represented as the voice of one come to attack the existing institutions — to “destroy the law and the prophets.” We have a most important commentary on this in the parallel accusation of Stephen a few months later’ “We have heard him say, that this Jesus of Nazareth shall destroy this place, and shall change the customs which Moses delivered us.” But, according to another view, the same reported utterance — especially in the modified form of Matthew, “I am able to destroy the temple of God” — may have been intended as a charge of arrogating superhuman power. So His original auditors felt it. “Forty-and-six years was this temple in building, and wilt thou rear it again in three days?” The two charges, it will be observed, though very distinct, are not inconsistent.

    May He not have been charged both with attempting to change the national institutions and with pretensions to miraculous power?

    The difficulty in this twofold supposition is that we have been seeking in these charges for the one crime upon which Jesus was finally condemned.

    But if we look more narrowly at the supposed difficulty, we may find what we have been seeking. Jesus was finally condemned for “blasphemy,” because He made Himself the Messiah and the Son of God, making thus higher personal claims than even the witnesses against Him had suggested. That was the crime, therefore, towards which one of the intended accusations — that as to superhuman power — may be held to have pointed. But what of the other, the attack upon Jewish institutions?

    The unexpected but satisfactory answer is, that such a charge may have fallen under precisely the same legal category, or nomen juris — that of blasphemy. This might be suggested to us even by the witnesses against Stephen, who describe as “blasphemous words” the deliberate utterances of the deacon as to the passing away of the holy place and the law. But I believe that it will be found there is no Hebrew category of crime under which the attempt to supersede the old institutions could so naturally come, as that which is here denoted by the term blasphemy. The witnesses, therefore, may have had this accusation somewhat in view from the beginning. The judges almost certainly had. And it is not too soon to devote a few sentences to the question what a legal word so important for our inquiry properly includes.

    Blasphemy is not mere profanity. It is profanity which, as the name imports, strikes directly against God. This is the original sense of the word, and it is that to which we have returned in modern days. But throughout the countries of Europe ruled by civil and canon law, blasphemy has long since taken on a secondary and constructive meaning.

    It stands in their law-books at the head of the enumeration of crimes as “Treason against the Deity,” taking precedence even of treason against the State. And this crimen laesae majestatis divinae , like the crime of treason against earthly rulers, has often, under the head of constructive treason, taken great and dangerous latitude. Now whether it is a necessary thing for ordinary nations and jurisprudences to have in their statute-book such a crime as treason against God at all, we need not inquire. One thing is certain. In the Hebrew commonwealth and under Hebrew law it was necessary. For that commonwealth was in theory a pure theocracy, and all its priests, prophets, judges, and kings’ were then held to have been the mere courtiers and ministers of the invisible King, whose word was Israel’s constitution and law. In such a constitution, blasphemy, or the verbal renunciation of God, was in the proper sense high treason; and any attempt to subvert the great institutions of His government was constructive treason. By what name was such constructive treason known and tried? I think it was probably blasphemy. Neither the crime of the “false prophet” of the true God, nor that of “the idolater” or seducer to the worship of strange gods, seems to have attained to the generality and eminence of the word Blasphemy in Jewish law. That some such word was used in the age of Caiaphas to designate constructive treasons — attempts against the Divine system of religion — is certain. That it had become the proper nomen juris for all such attempts I have not seen conclusively proved; but it seems highly probable.

    We cannot therefore hold, as has sometimes been done, that these witnesses brought forward special and isolated charge with regard to the temple, and that on the failure of it the Council passed unfairly to other and disconnected counts. The special charge was at least in the line of the whole procedure contemplated. For unless we are to become wholly unhistorical in our legal criticism, we must believe that the general course of this night’s proceedings was prearranged by the leading members of the Sanhedrin, and that they, and not the witnesses, really conducted the prosecution. The evidence is overwhelming ( John 7:25,30,45; 8:40; 9:22; 11:47, 57; Matthew 21:23,46; Luke 20:20; Matthew 26:3 et seq .) that at repeated meetings of what the Fourth Gospel even calls a Council, and what may have been formal meetings of the acting committee of that body, the suppression, and if need be the death, of Jesus had been previously resolved upon. And in these preliminary proceedings it was not merely His acts as a prophet or as an opposer of existing institutions that were deliberated upon. His claim to be the Christ, and even (as his nearer followers had already acknowledged Him to be) the Son of God — whatever that mysterious claim might mean — had during the second part of His career pressed heavily upon the Hebrew conscience, especially in Jerusalem. The decision alleged in the Fourth Gospel, “That if any man did confess that he was the Christ, he should be put out of the synagogue,” does not indeed formally negative that claim. It may only, as Neander holds, have reserved it for the judgment of the one competent tribunal, the great Council of the nation; while it forbade all private persons, whatever their individual views, from in the meantime publicly anticipating the solemn verdict. But it combines with innumerable other parts of the history to show the agitating questions which pressed on the minds of the judges as they listened to witness after witness in that early dawn.

    The evidence, all agree, was not found sufficient — perhaps not found “relevant” — so as to infer a conviction upon it alone. The rule of law in such a case was dear, that the accused must be at once liberated. It was not done. And even had the inculpatory evidence been found sufficient, the next step, according to the rules of the court, was to call witnesses for the defense. Such a proposal would of course have been a mockery in a trial at such an hour. But even that was not done. What was actually done was an attempt to cross-examine the accused. “Answerest thou nothing? What is it which these witness against thee?” are the exact words of the High Priest repeated in two of the narratives. But He “held his peace, and answered nothing.” The interrogation, too, was unlawful. But I am not, able to represent this silence as caused by indignation at the errors of the accusers, or the unfairness of the judges. That the ordinary rights of every accused Hebrew had been present to the mind of Jesus we have already seen. But that He had any expectation of escaping, or even any desire at this stage to do so, there is no evidence whatever. All the narratives combine to show that He had for some time been consciously moving on to a tragical and tremendous close of His brief career. His utterances in anticipation of it during the previous weeks, and especially on the preceding day, have held the world spellbound in each succeeding generation. A similar height of self-possession marks Him at this final hour. The inaccurate or malicious recollections of what He had said three years or three weeks before were nothing now to Him. He had not come to Jerusalem to perish by a mistake; and if we are to fill that silence with thoughts at all, we may suppose that they had reference to the scene that now surrounded Him. For there, at last, were gathered before Him the children of the House of Israel, represented in their supreme Council and great assembly. To this people He had always held Himself sent and commissioned. Now at last they have met; and all the ages of Israel’s past rise in the mind of Him who stands to be judged — or to judge.

    At what hour the great concluding scene, so vividly described by three of the Evangelists, took place, it is impossible to say. Plainly enough, the private and public examinations of the witnesses must have occupied a considerable time, and whether or not these had been attended by “all the Council,” or a portion of its members, it is quite certain that by this time at the point where these examinations were discontinued — a large number of the great Sanhedrin” was met. The members of that body numbered seventy-one; the “little Sanhedrin,” which was probably a committee or cabinet formed out of the larger, numbered only twenty-three. It is very possible that the smaller body may have been summoned at a somewhat earlier hour by Caiaphas, and it may be that no other ever assembled. Still the narratives rather suggest that the great Council, which alone could at this time try a man for his life, and which alone could at any time judge a prophet, was also called. Let us concede to the language of the Evangelists that so much of the law was properly observed. We must, in that case, imagine the Council as sitting in the hall Gazith, half within and half without the holy place. The seats were placed in a circle, and half of the seventy sat on the right and half on the left of the President or Nasi , who on this occasion was the High Priest Caiaphas. At his one hand sat the “Father of the Court,” at the other the “Sage.” Two scribes waited at the table to record the sentence; two officers guarded the prisoner, who stood in front of the President. Among the semicircular crowd of judges, Caiaphas and his friends, highest in rank and in Roman favor, represented also the great Sadducean element. The Sadducees, as rationalists, had no particular enmity to Jesus, over and above their general distaste for the introduction of the Divine as an element in human affairs. But, as the aristocratic and official party, they were most keenly alive to the disorganization which that element often produces, and were always disposed to suppress it before it had got to a dangerous length. The previous appeal of the High Priest to the salus populi as overriding all individual claims of right — “Ye know nothing at all, nor consider that it is expedient for us that one man die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not” — was one full of reason. His plan seems to have been founded on a just and sound view of the temper of his own nation and of the Roman authorities, — a clear-sighted and comprehensive view, omitting no element that ought to be taken into account, except the existence of God and His nearness to men. But in the working out of that plan a certain exasperation must by this time have mingled with the calm determination to get rid of a saintly fellow-citizen. The Pharisees, on the other hand, were an equally large part of the Council, and their patriotic and religious feelings had originally been far more appealed to by the preaching of Jesus. But the inward struggle which had preceded their rejection of His claims had caused that rejection to be followed, according to the ordinary laws of human nature, by a growing hostility, which by this time was almost hatred.

    It was they, the zealots of the Council, who no doubt took the initiative in the extraordinary and tumultuous scene which closed the sitting. During the later examination of witnesses Jesus had been silent; but the thought of His Messianic or Divine claim pressed upon His judges with overwhelming force, and broke out at last into passionate utterance. The discrepancy between the Evangelists here merely reveals to us all the actors in the scene. “Art thou the Christ? tell us,” they cried; and the irrepressible exclamations of the judicial crowd described in one Gospel were only put an end to by the solemn adjuration of their President, recorded in another. To the eager and hostile questions of the Council, Jesus answered at first in a twofold utterance: “If I tell you, ye will not believe.” Was He thinking sadly of their forgotten duty to weigh His word, and of a result to Himself, or to them? But He adds, “And if I also ask you,” as He had done perhaps only a few days before in the temple, when they had demanded His authority, “if I, instead, put my questions to you, ye will not answer me,” and ye will not release your prisoner. It was true; but the Council was long past being turned from its purpose by the reference which these words again have, as I think, to judicial fairness and the order of justice. They saw in his face the light of that more than earthly claim which His lips only for a few moments delayed to make; and with a mixture of terrible and hateful emotions, starting to their feet, then said they all, “Art thou then the Son of God?” But above that crowd of aged and angry faces was now seen rising the High Priest of Israel, and all voices sunk away as the chief magistrate and judge of the sacred nation demanded, in the name of God whose office he bore, an answer to his most solemn adjuration, “I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of the Blessed!” It was the question for which men had waited so long; and now the answer came. “I am,” the Christ, the Son of God; and, turning to the crowd who sat in their places of power around him, he added, “Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in. the clouds of heaven.” It was the critical moment for the elect people. When a king declared himself in Israel, the manner was that he stood in the temple by a pillar, and the people of the land receiving him rejoiced with hosanna and song., with palm-branch and with trumpet. And if this was the manner of a king, how should the King- Messiah be received when He claimed to be the Son of the Highest? But when a man blasphemed the name of God, the ordinance in Israel was that everyone who heard it should rend his garment from the top downwards — rend it into two parts which might again never be sewn into one. And scarcely had Jesus witnessed His confession before those many witnesses, when the High Priest, standing in his place, rent his clothes, saying, “He hath spoken blasphemy; what further need have we of witnesses? Behold, now ye have heard his blasphemy. What think ye?” And they answered and said, “He isISH MAVETH — a man of death.”. . . “Then they all condemned him to be worthy of death.”

    So passed that great condemnation.

    There are very few points with regard to it which remain to be noticed.

    One relates to the lawfulness of the High Priest’s adjuration, and to the judicial use of the confession of the accused. Nothing can be clearer than the Talmudists on this. “Our law,” says Maimonides, “condemns no one to death upon his own confession.” “It is a fundamental principle with us,” says Bartenora, “that no one can clamage himself by what he says in judgment.” Putting the question to the accused, and founding a condemnation on his answer, was therefore the last violation of formal justice.

    But what as to its substance? The question had been put, and the answer had been given. Assuming that the claim thus made by Jesus had come in some lawful form before the Sanhedrin, were they shut up to this condemnation? In answering this we have first to remember the distinctions already taken between blasphemy, in its simple meaning of profanity or insult to God, and blasphemy as equivalent to treason, overt or constructive, against the theocracy. In the former sense there was no case here. The words of the great accused were full of filial reverence for the Father. We have therefore to go on to the latter sense, and to face the grave question, Was it high treason in a Jew to claim to be the Messias, the Son of God? Most certainly it was — unless it was true . And if blasphemy was the proper word by which to designate so tremendously audacious a claim, then was such a false claim also blasphemous. But what if it were true? In such a case the falsehood was of the essence of the crime, and had to be proved or assumed before the judicial conclusion could be reached. The mere claim to be the Messiah was no crime. “Art thou the Christ?” was asked continually, of John, of Jesus, of every reformer, and of every prophet; though an answer in the affirmative was held to be the most daring claim that human lips could frame. What relation indeed the Messiah of the Jews was supposed to have to their unseen King, and how far the dignity, not unknown to that age, of “Son of God,” could freely be applied to the expected Christ, are questions on which vast learning has been expended. We shall equally err if we suppose that these words had in their ears all the meaning with which subsequent theology has invested them, or if we forget that the purpose and bearing of the accused gave them, on this last as on previous occasions, a unique and Divine significance. But the two-fold claim of the Messiahship and the Sonship — made seemingly in response to the grouping of the two ideas (Art thou “the Christ, the Son of God?”) by the High Priest himself — could never release a Hebrew tribunal from the duty of weighing a claim to Messiahship. The proper response of an unbelieving judge, like Caiaphas, when his adjuration was answered by confession, was, “What sign shewest thou then, that we may see and believe thee?” And when, instead, he rent his clothes, with the words, “What need ye further witnesses?” it was either the preconcerted plan by which to terminate the whole semblance of judicial procedure, or, perhaps, a sudden inspiration of evil, spoken a second time not wholly of himself, in a moment when the cold, hard, cruel thoughts, which had so long smoldered in the unjust judge, blazed up at the touch of confronting Righteousness into final and murderous paroxysm.

    We pass next to the Roman tribunal. But our conclusion on the question of Hebrew law must be this: that a process begun, continued, and apparently finished, in the course of one night; commencing with witnesses against the accused who were sought for by the judges, but whose evidence was not sustained even by them; continued by interrogatories which Hebrew law does not sanction, and ending with a demand for confession which its doctors expressly forbid; all followed, twenty-four hours too soon, by a sentence which described a claim to be the Fulfiller of the hopes of Israel as blasphemy, — that such a process had neither the form nor the fairness of a judicial trial. But though it wanted judicial fairness and form, it may nevertheless have been a real and important transaction. There is no reason to think that the Council missed the fact that Jesus claimed to be their King, though they deeply misunderstood the nature of His Kingdom. And there is every reason to believe that their condemnation truly expressed the rejection of His claim by the nation itself.

    THE ROMAN TRIAL Christus, Tiberio imperitante, per procuratorem Pontium Pilatum supplicio affectus est. — Tacitus.

    OuJtoi pa>ntev ajpe>nanti tw~n dogma>twn Kai>sarov pra>ttousi, Basile>a le>gontev e[teron ei+nai, jIhsou~n. Luke THE FOUR NARRATIVES MATTHEW MARK LUKE JOHN Now when morning was come, all the chief priests and the elders of the people took counsel against Jesus to put him to death: and they bound him, and led him away, and delivered him up to Pilate the governor. . .

    Now Jesus stood before the governor: and the governor asked him, saying, Art thou the King of the Jews? And Jesus said unto him, And straightway in the morning the chief priests with the elders and scribes, and the whole council, held a consultation, and bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him up to Pilate. And Pilate asked him, Art thou the King of the Jews? And he answering saith unto him, Thou sayest. And the chief priests accused him of many things.

    And Pilate again And the whole company of them rose up and brought him before Pilate.

    And they began to accuse him, saying, We found this man perverting our nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Caesar, and saying that he himself is Christ a King. And Pilate asked him, saying, Art thou the King of the Jews? And he answered him and said, Thou sayest. And They lead Jesus therefore from Caiaphas into the palace, and it was early; and they themselves entered not into the palace, that they might not be defiled, but might eat the passover. Pilate therefore went out unto them, and saith, What accusation bring ye against this man? They answered and said unto him, If this man were not an evil-doer, we should not have delivered Thou sayest.

    And when he was accused of the chief priests and elders, he answered nothing. Then said Pilate unto him, Hearest thou not how many things they witness against thee?

    And he gave him no answer, not even to one word; insomuch that the governor marveled greatly.

    Now at the feast the governor was wont to release unto the multitude one prisoner, whom they would. And they had then a notable prisoner, called Barabbas.

    When therefore they were gathered together, Pilate said unto them, Whom will ye that I release unto you? asked him, saying, Answerest thou nothing? behold how many things they accuse thee of.

    But Jesus no more answered anything; insomuch that Pilate marveled.

    Now at the feast he used to release unto them one prisoner, whom they asked of him. And there was one called Barabbas, lying bound with them that had made insurrection, men who in the insurrection had committed murder. And the multitude went up and began to ask him to do as he was wont to do unto them.

    And Pilate answered them, saying, Will ye that I release Pilate said unto the chief priests and the multitudes, I find no fault in this man. But they were the more urgent, saying, He stirreth up the people, teaching throughout all Judaea, and beginning from Galilee even unto this place.

    But when Pilate heard it, he asked whether the man were a Galilean. And when he knew that he was of Herod’s jurisdiction, he sent him unto Herod, who himself also was at Jerusalem in these days. Now when Herod saw Jesus, he was exceeding glad: for he was of a long time desirous to see him, because he him up unto thee. Pilate therefore said unto them, Take him yourselves, and judge him according to your law. The Jews said unto him, It is not lawful for us to put any man to death: that the word of Jesus might be fulfilled, which he spake, signifying what manner of death he should die.

    Pilate therefore entered again into the palace, and called Jesus, and said unto him, Art thou the King of the Jews? Jesus answered, Sayest thou this of thyself, or did others tell it thee concerning me?

    Pilate answered, Am I a Jew?

    Thine own nation and the Barabbas, or Jesus, which is called Christ?

    For he knew that for envy they had delivered him up. And while he was sitting on the judgment-seat, his wife sent unto him, saying, Have thou nothing to do with that righteous man: for I have suffered many things this day in a dream because of him.

    Now the chief priests and the elders persuaded the multitude that they should ask for Barabbas, and destroy Jesus.

    But the governor answered and said unto them, Whether of the twain will ye that I release unto you? And they said, unto you the King of the Jews? For he perceived that for envy the chief priests had delivered him up. But the chief priests stirred up the multitude, that he should rather release Barabbas unto them. And Pilate again answered and said unto them, What then shall I do unto him whom ye call the King of the Jews? And they cried out again, Crucify him.

    And Pilate said unto them, Why, what evil hath he done? But they cried out exceedingly, Crucify him.

    And Pilate, wishing to content the multitude, released unto them Barabbas, had heard concerning him; and he hoped to see some miracle done by him.

    And he questioned him in many words; but he answered him nothing.

    And the chief priests and the scribes stood, vehemently accusing him.

    And Herod with his soldiers set him at naught, and mocked him, and arraying him in gorgeous apparel, sent him back to Pilate. And Herod and Pilate became friends with each other that very day; for before they were at enmity between themselves. And Pilate called together the chief priests and the rulers and the people and chief priests delivered thee unto me: what hast thou done?

    Jesus answered, My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews: but now is my kingdom not from hence.

    Pilate therefore said unto him Art thou a king then? Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end have I been born, and to this end am I come into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth.

    Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, Barabbas. Pilate saith unto them, What then shall I do unto Jesus which is called Christ? They all say, Let him be crucified. And he said, Why, what evil hath he done? But they cried out exceedingly, saying, Let him be crucified. So when Pilate saw that he prevailed nothing, but rather that a tumult was arising, he took water, and washed his hands before the multitude, saying, I am innocent of the blood of this righteous man: see ye to it . And all the people answered and said, His blood be on us, and on our children.

    Then released he unto them and delivered Jesus, when he had scourged him, to be crucified. said unto them, Ye brought unto me this man, as one that perverteth the people: and behold, I, having examined him before you, found no fault in this man touching those things whereof ye accuse him: no, nor yet Herod: for he sent him back unto us; and behold, nothing worthy of death hath been done by him. I will therefore chastise him, and release him. But they cried out all together, saying, Away with this man, and release unto us Barabbas: one who for a certain insurrection made in the city, and for murder, was cast into prison. And What is truth?

    And when he had said this, he went out again unto the Jews, and saith unto them, I find no crime in him.

    But ye have a custom, that I should release unto you one at the passover: will ye therefore that I release unto you the King of the Jews? They cried out therefore again, saying, Not this man, but Barabbas. Now Barabbas was a robber. Then Pilate therefore took Jesus, and scourged him.

    And the soldiers plaited a crown of thorns, and put it on his head, and arrayed him in a purple garment; and they came unto him, and Barabbas: but Jesus he scourged and delivered to be crucified.

    Pilate spake unto them again, desiring to release Jesus.

    But they shouted, saying, Crucify, crucify him. And he said unto them the third time, Why, what evil hath this man done? I have found no cause of death in him: I will therefore chastise him and release him. But they were instant with loud voices, asking that he might be crucified. And their voices prevailed. And Pilate gave sentence that what they asked for should be done. said, Hail, King of the Jews! and they struck him with their hands.

    And Pilate went out again, and saith unto them, Behold, I bring him out to you, that ye may know that I find no crime in him.

    Jesus therefore came out, wearing the crown of thorns, and the purple garment. And Pilate saith unto them, Behold, the man! When therefore the chief priests and the officers saw him, they cried out, saying, Crucify him, crucify him.

    Pilate saith unto them, Take him yourselves, and crucify him: for I find no crime in him. The Jews answered him, We have a law, and by that law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God. When Pilate therefore heard this saying, he was the more afraid; and he entered into the palace again, and saith unto Jesus, Whence art thou? But Jesus gave him no answer. Pilate therefore saith unto him, Speakest thou not unto me? knowest thou not that I have power to release thee, and have power to crucify thee? Jesus answered him, Thou wouldest have no power against me, except it were given thee from above: therefore he that delivered me unto thee hath greater sin.

    Upon this Pilate sought to release him: but the Jews cried out, saying, If thou release this man, thou art not Caesar’s friend: every one that maketh himself a king speaketh against Caesar.

    When Pilate therefore heard these words, he brought Jesus out, and sat down on the judgment-seat at a place called The Pavement, but in Hebrew, Gabbatha. Now it was the preparation of the passover: it was about the sixth hour. And he saith unto the Jews, Behold, your King! They therefore cried out, Away with him , away with him , crucify him.

    Pilate saith unto them, Shall I crucify your King? The chief priests answered, We have no king but Caesar. Then therefore he delivered him unto them to be crucified.

    GOTO NEXT CHAPTER - TRIAL OF CHRIST INDEX & SEARCH

    God Rules.NET
    Search 80+ volumes of books at one time. Nave's Topical Bible Search Engine. Easton's Bible Dictionary Search Engine. Systematic Theology Search Engine.